Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism

Abstract: Phenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several variants of phenomenalism, and then show that Berkeley’s idealism is characterized by his commitment to most of them. I then make the case that two forms of phenomenalism are consistent with Kant’s empirical realism. The comparison between Kant and Berkeley runs throughout the paper, with special emphasis on the significance of their theories of intentionality.

1. Introduction

Stated in the most general terms (there will be plenty of specification below), phenomenalism is the thesis that the objects of a subject’s experience are the subject’s own representations. One of the longest-standing traditions in the interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism describes his theory as a form of phenomenalism. There is just as long-standing a tradition of criticizing phenomenalist interpretations on the grounds that if Kant were a phenomenalist, then Kantian idealism would be Berkeleyan idealism, but since it is not, he is not.[[1]](#endnote-1) For instance, Paul Abela argues that phenomenalist readings of Kant amount to no more than ‘Berkeley with transcendental scaffolding’ (Abela 2002: 24). Lucy Allais groups ‘all mentalized readings of appearance’ as ‘phenomenalism’ (Allais 2015: 43) and argues that Kant’s rejection of Berkeley ‘gives us extremely strong grounds to reject any mentalized reading of appearances’ (ibid. 52). And Robert Hanna tries to defend Kant from the accusation that ‘Kant’s idealism is Berkeleyan or phenomenalistic in that it identifies all objects with complexes of sensory ideas inside individual minds, which is absurd’ (Hanna 2001: 96; see also Hall 2010: 47 and Collins 1999: 21-23).

In this paper I aim to undermine this line of criticism. For the generic phenomenalist thesis (that the objects of experience are the subject’s own representations) can be specified in several different ways. I intend to show that Kant could have been a phenomenalist of a certain sort without being a phenomenalist of the Berkeleyan sort. The obvious challenge faced by such a claim lies in showing how Kant could have been a phenomenalist of *any* sort without this undermining core elements of his empirical realism (the theory that we have direct epistemic and semantic access to real publically available objects). I take Kant’s realism to be a non-negotiable part of his theory: any phenomenalist interpretation that contradicts empirical realism must be rejected. My goal, therefore, is to show that although several phenomenalist theses certainly do contradict empirical realism, there are others that neither directly contradict empirical realism, nor do they entail (within Kant’s system) any of the phenomenalisms that do.

An ongoing comparison with Berkeley’s phenomenalism will prove useful here. For I will be arguing that Kant and Berkeley may be in agreement with respect to at least one phenomenalist thesis: that only sensory states (i.e., sensations[[2]](#endnote-2) or collections thereof) are directly present to consciousness in experience. I will show that Berkeley takes this thesis to entail several other stronger phenomenalist claims, which together constitute his full-blown empirical idealism. Kant, however, does not accept such an entailment relation and this (I will argue) leaves room for empirical realism. The crucial difference that makes this divergence possible has to do with the different theories of intentionality accepted by Kant and Berkeley. For Berkeley held that it is possible to make cognitive reference to an object only if that object is the sort of thing that could be directly present to consciousness as a sensory ‘idea’.[[3]](#endnote-3) In Berkeleyan terminology, it is possible for me to *conceive* of something only if it is possible for me directly to *perceive* it. Since the only things I can directly perceive are ideas or collections of ideas, it follows that the physical bodies that I do successfully make reference to must in fact be mere collections of ideas. For Berkeley, then, the range of what I can think about and refer to in experience is determined entirely by what Kant would call the faculty of sensibility. Kant, by contrast, holds that the possibility of cognitive reference is determined by the coordination of sensibility with understanding’s pure concepts, which represent the form of an object in general.[[4]](#endnote-4) According to this theory of intentionality, I will argue, it is possible to make direct reference to an object in cognition even if that object is not directly present to consciousness, and this is why Kant need not follow Berkeley down the rabbit-hole towards full idealism.

The discussion will go as follows. In the next section, I will present a taxonomy of several different species of phenomenalism: metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, and phenomenological variants will be distinguished. With this taxonomy in place, I turn to Berkeley in section 3. I will show that his commitment to his idealism can be characterized by the conjunction of several forms of phenomenalism, and that his commitment to the stronger versions of phenomenalism depends on his commitment to a less radical phenomenalist thesis, together with his imagistic theory of representation and intentionality. I then turn to Kant in the remainder of the paper. In section 4 I articulate the core metaphysical, epistemic, and semantic elements of empirical realism, and show that they are obviously incompatible with some phenomenalist theses. In the last two sections, I make the case that there remain two forms of phenomenalism which *are* compatible with empirical realism.

Before beginning, two quick remarks on the scope of this paper. First, I am adopting a defensive posture in the paper, arguing that the anti-phenomenalist criticism outlined above (that a Kantian phenomenalism would collapse into a Berkeleyan idealism) is wrong. Accordingly, while I will be trying to show that attributing certain phenomenalist commitments to Kant would not undermine his empirical realism, I will not attempt to give definitive evidence that Kant accepted those phenomenalisms. I will nevertheless give some indication as to why one might be inclined (as I am) to ascribe these commitments to him. Second, I will be focusing on Kant’s and Berkeley’s theories of intentionality as the crucial difference between them. This is not meant to imply that I take this to be the only important difference between their theories.[[5]](#endnote-5) I will also not be discussing Kant’s own attempts to distance himself from Berkeley. Many have already written about this issue and have concluded that Kant’s remarks fall somewhere between curiously off the mark and willfully disingenuous (see Allison 1973, Winkler 1989, Turbayne 1955, and Emundts 2008). The discussion in what follows is for the most part independent of this issue.

2. Varieties of Phenomenalism

The purpose of this section is to clarify and distinguish a cluster of philosophical theses that fall under the umbrella of ‘phenomenalism’.[[6]](#endnote-6) I begin with phenomenalism stated in the most general terms.

**Phenomenalism:** The objects of experience are the subject’s own representations.

Although this should sound like a familiar and uncontroversial characterization of phenomenalism, depending on how one takes the important terms – ‘objects’, ‘experience’, ‘representations’ – this thesis could be construed in several different ways.

Perhaps the most natural reading takes ‘objects of experience’ to refer to physical bodies (tables and mountains, etc.) and ‘the subject’s own representations’ to refer to collections of sensations (or perhaps some other kind of mental state, though I will focus on sensations) in the mind of the perceiver. This would yield a strong metaphysical thesis regarding the ontological status of bodies:

**Ontological Phenomenalism:** Physical bodies are ontologically identical to collections of sensations (or other mental states).

Ontological Phenomenalism may well be the first thing many philosophers think of as ‘phenomenalism’. However, when one surveys the history of modern philosophy through the twentieth century, one frequently finds phenomenalism articulated and defended with semantic or epistemic claims about the nature of experience. If we construe ‘experience’ in Phenomenalism as either a semantic notion (experience as intentional content) or an epistemic notion (experience as knowledge of objects), we get the following:

**Semantic Phenomenalism:** The only things to which the subject can make content-laden reference[[7]](#endnote-7) in experience are the subject’s own representations.

**Epistemic Phenomenalism:** The only things of which the subject can have knowledge in experience are the subject’s own representations.

Semantic Phenomenalism is a claim about the proper analysis of what we are (and take ourselves to be) thinking about when we think about the objects encountered in experience: a proper analysis of the content of our thoughts about objects reveals those thoughts to refer only internally to the mind’s own states. What I *really* mean when I refer to ‘this mug’ is something like ‘this grey, cylindrical-looking collection of sensations’. Epistemic Phenomenalism is a claim about the epistemic status of experience of objects: to have knowledge of an object is to have knowledge of mental states in the mind of the knower.

The relation of Semantic and Epistemic Phenomenalisms to Ontological Phenomenalism is natural in many contexts. If one thinks that the mind can make reference only to its own mental states (Semantic Phenomenalism), and one accepts the commonsensical assumption that we do make successful reference to physical bodies, the consequence is a commitment to Ontological Phenomenalism. (We will see in the next section that Berkeley makes this move.) Likewise with Epistemic Phenomenalism and the assumption that we do have knowledge of physical bodies.

Weaker versions of Semantic and Epistemic Phenomenalism were endemic throughout the modern period. Without insisting that reference to or knowledge of physical bodies *consists in* reference to or knowledge of mental states, many claimed that reference to or knowledge of bodies *depends on* reference to or knowledge of mental states. On these views, only mental states can be the *immediate* objects of reference or knowledge.

**Weak Semantic Phenomenalism:** The only things to which the subject can make immediate content-laden reference in experience are the subject’s own mental states.

**Weak Epistemic Phenomenalism:** The only things of which the subject can have immediateknowledge in experience are the subject’s own mental states.

According to Weak Semantic Phenomenalism, reference to physical bodies is never immediate, requiring instead mental states functioning as semantic intermediaries. Likewise, Weak Epistemic Phenomenalism posits that knowledge of physical bodies is mediate (inferred) knowledge, depending on an inference from immediately known mental states.

Where Ontological Phenomenalism is a thesis about the status of objects (what kinds of things they are), Semantic and Epistemic Phenomenalism (and their weaker cousins) are theses about the subject and what it has access to in experience. Another once popular thesis dealing with the subject’s access to its objects would construe phenomenalism as a thesis about what is directly present to consciousness, or ‘before the mind’s eye’ in experience. If one holds that only sensations and their phenomenal qualities are presented to conscious awareness in the experience of objects, one gets:

**Presence Phenomenalism:** The only things immediately present to consciousness in experience are sensations.

Presence Phenomenalism represents a long tradition in the history of philosophy. It has appeared in the guise of the ‘Cartesian theatre’ or the ‘veil of ideas’, and it is associated with various forms of representationalism. In claiming that only sensations are present to consciousness in experience, Presence Phenomenalism denies that bodies outside the mind can be present to consciousness. Hence, it has typically been taken to entail a denial of direct realism regarding our knowledge of the external world (but I will argue below that Kant can avoid this supposed entailment). Most of the early moderns accepted some version of Presence Phenomenalism. Some were led to infer versions of Epistemic or Semantic Phenomenalism (or their weaker variants) on the basis of it.[[8]](#endnote-8) (Berkeley, but not Kant, I will argue, numbers among them.)

Semantic Phenomenalism and Presence Phenomenalism both have to do with intentionality in representation, however they deal with different kinds of intentionality. The intentionality in Semantic Phenomenalism has to do with representational content, i.e., the purport of representations, what the subject takes itself to be representing. Hence the intentionality in Semantic Phenomenalism always involves representing an object *as* being an object of a certain kind. The intentionality in Presence Phenomenalism, by contrast, has to do with what is present to consciousness in a real relation to it, and is independent of whether the object is represented *as* anything. I emphasize that Presence Phenomenalism involves a ‘real relation’ to contrast it with Semantic Phenomenalism, which will not always be relational, e.g., in representations of non-existent objects, since there can be no real relation to non-existent things. The *real* relation at work in Presence Phenomenalism is the relation of phenomenal awareness obtaining between the conscious subject and the sensory states existing in the subject’s mind.

How one understands the relation between Presence and Semantic Phenomenalism turns out to be of crucial importance. We will see below that because Berkeley thinks that one can conceive of something only if that thing can be present to consciousness, he thinks that Presence Phenomenalism entails Semantic Phenomenalism (and subsequently Ontological Phenomenalism as well). Because Kant has an entirely different theory of intentionality, he is able to reject such an entailment relation.

There is an additional version of phenomenalism that is found primarily in discussions of Kant’s idealism. According to ‘intentionalist’ interpretations of Kant, empirical objects are identified with representations, but not in the sense that they are mental entities (things literally in the mind), but rather in the sense that they are represent*eds*, i.e., intentional objects. But importantly, according to these interpretations, they are *mere* intentional objects, having no ontological status of their own. I’ll call this:

**Intentional Object Phenomenalism:** Physical bodies are mere intentional objects.

According to Intentional Object Phenomenalism, physical bodies are what we *take ourselves* to be representing in normal perception, but these objects have no reality independent of our representation of them. As an interpretation of Kant, Intentional Object Phenomenalism is meant as an explanation of Kant’s thesis that physical objects have no *transcendental* reality. Nevertheless, so the interpretation goes, they are represented and cognized as being fully *empirically* real.

Like Ontological Phenomenalism, Intentional Object Phenomenalism is a thesis about the status of objects, not just a thesis about the subject’s access to objects. But where Ontological Phenomenalism grants a positive ontological status to objects by virtue of identifying them with things that really exist (collections of sensations), Intentional Object Phenomenalism denies them any such status. Thus, Van Cleve will describe Kantian appearances as ‘virtual objects’, which are ‘not to be conceived as having [their] own special kind of being’ (Van Cleve 1998: 8). Likewise, Aquila writes that, ‘perceptual appearances would […] not need to comprise a distinct set of mental or perceptual *entities*’; they should instead ‘be construed […] as ordinary objects of experience […] as they happen to “inexist” in instances of perception’ (Aquila 2003: 232). I will discuss Intentional Object Phenomenalism as an interpretation of Kant in greater detail in section 6.

I do not claim that the above taxonomy is exhaustive,[[9]](#endnote-9) but it will be more than enough for present purposes. With this menu of phenomenalist options in full view, I turn now to an examination of Berkeley and Kant to show how their idealisms can be characterized and distinguished in terms of the different phenomenalist theses they accept or reject.

3. Berkeley’s Phenomenalism

In this section I consider Berkeley’s idealism in terms of his commitment to some of the above phenomenalist theses. Although I will not attempt to reconstruct every aspect of his idealism (and I will not touch on the immaterialist side of the Berkeleyan coin at all), we will see that one of the central lines in Berkeley’s reasoning can be cashed out in terms of his commitment to most of the phenomenalist theses laid out above.

First off, it is clear that Berkeley would not have accepted Intentional Object Phenomenalism. Berkeleyan ideas may well be intentional objects in the sense that they are what the mind is directed towards in experience. But they are not *mere* intentional objects. They really exist; their existence just happens to be a mental existence. Berkeley’s slogan is that *esse est percipi*, not *esse est intendi* nor *esse est inesse* (see Winkler 1989: 7 on this point)*.* Secondly, I think it is uncontroversial to say that Berkeley’s idealism involves commitments to Presence, Epistemic, Semantic, and Ontological Phenomenalism. My concern, however, is not to argue that Berkeley did accept each of these (again, I take it to be uncontroversial that he did), but rather to examine the relations between (some of) them in his system. I want to suggest that Berkeley thinks that Semantic Phenomenalism entails Ontological Phenomenalism, and that Presence Phenomenalism entails Semantic Phenomenalism. Hence, Berkeley thinks that once one has accepted the claim that only mental states are present to consciousness (Presence Phenomenalism), one has already begun an irreversible slide into full empirical idealism (i.e., Ontological Phenomenalism).

I am more concerned with the ‘Presence Phenomenalism entails Semantic Phenomenalism’ claim, and so my discussion of the ‘Semantic Phenomenalism entails Ontological Phenomenalism’ claim will be brief. The basic idea with the latter, as many have noticed, is that some of Berkeley’s core arguments for idealism turn on semantic considerations about what can or cannot be conceived in thought (e.g., Rickless 2013: 93-97). Simplified, his reasoning runs something like this:

1. The only things to which the subject can make content-laden reference in experience are the subject’s own mental states. [Semantic Phenomenalism]
2. We successfully refer to physical bodies.
3. Therefore, physical bodies must be mental states. [Ontological Phenomenalism]

Premise 2 is supposed to be a common-sense assumption not open to serious doubt, and hence the move from Semantic Phenomenalism to Ontological Phenomenalism is fairly direct.

This line of reasoning is most apparent in PHK §3, where Berkeley gives an account of the semantics for ‘exists’.

The table I write on, I say, exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I might perceive it. […] This is all that I can understand by these and the like expressions. […] Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them. (PHK §3)

The claim here is that the representational content of my thought about a body involves the thought that such objects are essentially perceptibles *and nothing else besides this*. His inference is hasty, but it is clear that he thinks that since it is possible to *conceive* bodies only as perceptibles, i.e., as collections of ideas (Semantic Phenomenalism), they must therefore *be* only perceptibles (Ontological Phenomenalism). The move from Semantic Phenomenalism to Ontological Phenomenalism is also at work in the so-called ‘Master Argument’ at PHK§§22-23. There, Berkeley argues that since we cannot even form a coherent conception of something existing independent of the mind, the bodies we do successfully conceive must therefore exist only in the mind.

Clearly Semantic Phenomenalism is doing important work in getting Berkeley to his full empirical idealism. Accordingly, one wants to know how he arrives at Semantic Phenomenalism. I argue that Berkeley derives Semantic Phenomenalism from Presence Phenomenalism, and that this derivation depends on his additional commitment to an empiricist theory of intentionality.

The core of Berkeley’s theory of intentionality has to do with what Gallois has called the ‘imagistic criterion’ as a condition on concept-possession, i.e., on the ability to conceive of or have a thought about something: ‘In order for someone to have the concept of things of a certain kind, he must be able to [conjure an] image [of] things of that kind’ (Gallois 1974: 59; see also Winkler 1989: 3 and PHK §§5, 14, 33 and DHP 203). A corollary of the imagistic criterion is a thesis we might call the ‘resemblance criterion’. This is the claim that an idea cannot represent an object unless the idea resembles (‘is like’) its object (see PHK §§8-9, 27 and DHP 204).[[10]](#endnote-10) Winkler describes the position as follows:

The belief [that representational ideas must resemble their objects] provides [Berkeley’s] account of the intentionality or ‘aboutness’ of thought about the natural world. We are able to think about that world because our acts of thought are directed towards images of the objects in it. All thinking about things is representational, and the mechanism of representation is resemblance or similitude. (Winkler 1989: 13-14; see also Muehlman 1992: 57)

Accordingly, Berkeley’s theory of intentionality places considerable restrictions on what can be conceived in thought. If it is not possible to form an image of a certain kind, then I cannot have a representation of an object of that kind.

So what delineates the range of possible image-formation? According to Berkeley, it is possible to form an image of something only if it is possible to have an immediate sensory perception of that thing:

[M]y conceiving or imagining power does not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or perception of it. (PHK §5; see also §33)

Every time I successfully conjure an image of an object of a certain kind, I’m relying on memory of an earlier immediate perception of an object of that kind. And for Berkeley the only objects that can be perceived immediately are ‘ideas or sensations’ (DHP 215; see also PHK §§1,3, 46 and DHP 174).

Putting it all together, we get the following argument:

1. It is possible to conceive of an object of a certain kind only if it is possible to form an image of an object of that kind.
2. It is possible to form an image of an object of a certain kind only if objects of that kind can be immediately perceived.
3. The only things that can be immediately perceived are ideas.
4. Therefore, it is possible to conceive only of ideas.

The first line embodies Berkeley’s belief that an idea can represent an object only insofar as that idea functions as a resembling image of its object. The second line specifies Berkeley’s claim about the limitations on image formation: I can form images only of things that could be present to consciousness (i.e., be ‘immediately perceived’). Lines 3 and 4 should be familiar: they are Presence Phenomenalism and Semantic Phenomenalism stated in Berkeleyan terminology. Regarding 3, Berkeley makes it clear that his notion of immediate perception involves a real relation between the perceiver and an idea which is directly present to consciousness; to immediately perceive an idea is for the whole idea to be given directly to conscious awareness (on this point, see Pappas 1982: 7, Park 1982: 35, and Rickless 2013: 42). This amounts to a commitment to Presence Phenomenalism. And regarding line 4, Berkeley’s notion of conception, or rather the range of possible conception, has to do with the possibility of what I have been calling content-laden reference. Accordingly, the claim that only ideas can be conceived amounts to the claim that they are the only possible objects of content-laden reference.[[11]](#endnote-11)

We can see clearly now that by accepting a Berkeleyan theory of intentionality together with the claim that only ideas are present to consciousness, we arrive first at the semantic claim that only ideas can be referred to in experience, and subsequently that the physical objects we refer to must themselves be no more than collections of ideas. Thus for Berkeley, Presence Phenomenalism entails Semantic Phenomenalism, which itself entails Ontological Phenomenalism. I will argue in the next section that because Kant adopts a radically different theory of intentionality, he could accept Presence Phenomenalism without being forced down the slide through Semantic Phenomenalism to Ontological Phenomenalism.

1. Kant’s Empirical Realism

The primary complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics has to do with a perceived incompatibility between phenomenalism and Kant’s empirical realism. I will be arguing in the following two sections that it is possible to attribute Presence Phenomenalism and Intentional Object Phenomenalism to Kant while maintaining a significant distance between his theory and Berkeley’s, and while staying true to the central tenets of empirical realism. In this section I will briefly explain what those tenets are, how they place interpretive constraints on our understanding of transcendental idealism.

The core of empirical realism, as I understand it, comprises the following metaphysical, semantic, and epistemological theses.

**Scientific Realism:** Physical bodies consist of material substance (the stuff described by physics) which exists and goes about its business in a spatial realm (empirically external to the mind).[[12]](#endnote-12)

**Semantic Immediacy:** Content-laden reference to physical bodies is direct, not relying on an intermediate reference to mental states.

**Epistemic Immediacy:** Knowledge of physical bodies is direct, not relying on an inference from a prior knowledge of mental states.[[13]](#endnote-13)

In other words, the empirical world exists more or less as physical science and common sense describe it (outside the mind!) and our knowledge of and reference to objects in the external, empirical world is immediate.

I take these components of empirical realism to be non-negotiable aspects of Kant’s theory. Any interpretation that is inconsistent with any of these cannot be viable. When anti-phenomenalist critics reject phenomenalist interpretations as too Berkeleyan, their complaints typically involve the claim that phenomenalism would contradict one or more of these features of empirical realism. For instance, Collins and Abela focus on Semantic and Epistemic Immediacy:

[Kant] does not reduce our conception of [material objects] to concatenations of mental things, or suppose that our evidence for the existence of material objects is the occurrence of mental representations. Therefore, Kant is not a phenomenalist, as ordinarily understood. (Collins 1999: 23)

When one prioritizes constructivist and phenomenological readings of Kant’s account of experience, it becomes hard to see how full-blooded notions of empirical reference and truth can be smuggled back into the picture. If these latter features are not necessary for determinate mental content, we are likely to end up with no more than a form-buttressed version of empirical idealism: Berkeley with transcendental scaffolding. (Abela 2002: 24)

Langton worries primarily about Scientific Realism:

If phenomenalism is true, then there is no room for existential commitment to the unobservables of science. […] We have good reason for thinking Kant cared for the scientific, not the manifest, image [of nature]. We therefore have good reasons for thinking that the phenomenalist interpretation of Kant is a failure. (Langton 1998: 145-7)[[14]](#endnote-14)

Allais is concerned with Epistemic Immediacy and Scientific Realism:

Kant wants to argue […] that the very external objects whose existence Berkeley denies and Descartes renders doubtful are immediately known in perception. (Allais 2004: 662)

[Kant] clearly thinks that empirically real objects genuinely persist, and are made up of absolutely enduring stuff, and not just that there are certain relations between appearances which represent persistence. No phenomenalist reading of appearances is compatible with this. (Allais 2004: 663)

While I whole-heartedly agree that any version of phenomenalism that contradicted the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic aspects of empirical realism should be rejected, I just as whole-heartedly believe that not all phenomenalisms present such a threat.

It is clear that the ontological, semantic, and epistemic variants of phenomenalism are incompatible with empirical realism. Ontological Phenomenalism is incompatible with Kant’s realism about the metaphysical status of physical bodies, and Semantic and Epistemic Phenomenalism are incompatible with the belief that we refer to and know those bodies. Further, because of empirical realism’s semantic and epistemic *immediacy*, even the weaker versions of Semantic and Epistemic Phenomenalism are ruled out.

What should we make of Presence Phenomenalism and Intentional Object Phenomenalism? In the remaining two sections, I will make the case that each of these can be construed in a way that is consistent with empirical realism. Consequently, the anti-phenomenalist claim that *all* forms of phenomenalism collapse into Berkeleyan empirical idealism and undermine empirical realism is unfounded.

5. Kant as Presence Phenomenalist

According to Presence Phenomenalism, only internal, mental states are directly present to consciousness in experience. Kant makes several remarks that could easily be taken as expressions of Presence Phenomenalism.[[15]](#endnote-15) For instance, throughout the first *Critique,* Kant repeatedly describes the idealistic aspect of his transcendental idealism with the claim that ‘we have only to do with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere’ (A190/B235, see also A105, A129, A390). This expression is admittedly vague, but one natural way to take it is as the claim that only the sensory effects resulting from the transcendental affection of things in themselves are immediately present to consciousness in experience (we have only ‘to do’ with them). Although sensations could be present to consciousness only in the context of their organization into intuitive form, as the matter of what is presented into intuition, it would be only them with which we have ‘to do’. Further indication of Presence Phenomenalism as a part of his theory of experience appears early in the Aesthetic in his account of the relationship between intuition, sensation, and space. He claims that empirical intuitions involve sensations being ‘ordered and placed’ in space (A20/B34), and that we ‘represent them as outside and next to one another’ (A23/B38). The model Kant seems to have in mind is one in which intuitions enable the representation of objects by way of presenting spatially arrayed collections[[16]](#endnote-16) of sensations to the subject’s conscious awareness.[[17]](#endnote-17)

Several commentators have adopted this line of interpretation over the years. For instance, Vaihinger (1892: 32) argued in the nineteenth century that Kantian appearances are originally constituted by an ‘*Empfindugsmaterial*’ arrayed spatiotemporally. More recently, George (1981: 240) defends a ‘sensationist’ interpretation of Kant according to which reference to external objects depends on ‘an interpretation placed upon certain sequences of sensations’, and that ‘initially only the succession of sensation is present’. Sellars argued that Kantian intuition involves the construction of mental ‘image models’ that stand in as ‘proxies’ for the external objects we come to represent (2007: 460; for similar interpretations, see Haag 2007 and Jankowiak 2016).

One’s first reaction to this sort of reading might be to exclaim that it is just unabashed Cartesianism and hence marks a lapse back into a pre-Kantian theory of mind. For if only sensations are present to consciousness, then only they can be the immediate objects of reference or knowledge (in violation of empirical realism’s semantic and epistemic immediacy). And this leads directly either to the Berkeleyan empirical idealism or at least the Cartesian skepticism that Kant took himself to have refuted in the Refutation of Idealism.

This reaction would be premature. It only follows that the objects of immediate reference and knowledge are the same sensations that are present to consciousness if one follows Berkeley in the inference from Presence Phenomenalism to Semantic Phenomenalism. The claim that we can only immediately refer to objects that are present to consciousness is by no means tautological and accordingly the inference depends on a substantive theory of the conditions on the possibility of reference to objects. In this regard, we saw above that Berkeley held an imagistic theory of representation according to which the range of what can be conceived is coextensive with the range of what can be present to consciousness.

Now at a certain level of description, Kant is in agreement with Berkeley regarding the possibility of intentional reference in experience. Both hold that something can be referred to in cognition only if such a thing could be represented sensibly. That being said, no one would attribute the Berkeleyan theory of intentionality to Kant. The Berkeleyan theory entails that I can form and employ a concept only if the concept in question can be presented in an image of an object to which the concept applies. Thus I can use the concept ‘dog’ only if I can form an image of a dog. A consequence of this is that unless I can literally see (or otherwise sense) a property in an image, I cannot form a concept of it. This leads Berkeley to banish several core philosophical and scientific concepts from his picture of reality. Thus the concept of physical bodies as causally efficacious is ruled out on the Berkeleyan model because the images of physical bodies we encounter are passive, with no efficacy discernable in them (see PHK §25). He gets rid of any metaphysical concept of substantiality as well: since a persisting substratum, distinct from the perceived sensible qualities in an object, cannot be perceived in a ‘perpetually fleeting and variable image’ (DHP 205), it follows that the only concept of substance available to Berkeley denotes no more than the continued conjunction of several sensible ideas (see also PHK §§1, 37 and DHP 197-199). And since scientific posits such as gravitational or magnetic fields can never be perceived directly, their concepts can serve only to refer to certain sensible regularities (iron filings lining up near iron bars, objects falling towards the earth, etc.), but never to an actual invisible field (see PHK §§103-107).

For Kant, by contrast, we do succeed in conceptualizing the objects of experience in terms of active causal interactions between objects, we do think of bodies in terms of persistent substrata, and we do incorporate unperceived entities (like magnetic fields) into our scientific representations of the world. And we form these conceptions despite the fact that causal interactions can never be seen directly, that our perceptions of objects are fleeting (never eternally persistent), and that many scientific entities are not even in principle perceivable. Clearly then, the Kantian sense in which we can conceive only of objects that can be represented sensibly is very different from the Berkeleyan sense. In contrast to Berkeley’s imagistic model of intentionality, Kant argued that an object can be conceived so long as its concept can be represented within the spatiotemporal form of intuition. Thus although I cannot perceive causality itself, I can successfully represent the temporal determination of irreversible sequences of events in intuition (see A188/B232ff.). Although I never perceive the substratum underlying sensible accidents, I can still represent intuited bodies as containing a persistent substratum (see A182/B224ff. and Bxli, n.). And although I can never directly perceive magnetic fields, I can still refer to them as actual entities because positing them as the cause of perceived effects is necessary for making sense of those effects (see A226/B273).

Let us take stock. Berkeley held a theory of intentionality according to which we can conceive of something only if such a thing could be present to consciousness. This claim, together with the belief that only ideas are present to consciousness (Presence Phenomenalism), leads Berkeley to infer that we can conceive only of ideas (Semantic Phenomenalism). The Kantian theory of intentionality, by contrast, allows for the possibility of conceiving of objects even though those objects cannot be present to consciousness. Consequently, if we attribute to Kant the claim that only collections of sensations are present to consciousness (Presence Phenomenalism), we need not thereby also attribute to him the claim that only collections of sensations can be conceived in experience (Semantic Phenomenalism), since he is already on the record thinking that it is possible to refer to something even if it cannot be present to consciousness. Thus a Kant who adopts Presence Phenomenalism need not follow Berkeley down the slide through Semantic Phenomenalism and Epistemic Phenomenalism all the way to Ontological Phenomenalism.

I take this to establish the claim that Presence Phenomenalism would not collapse Kant’s idealism into Berkeley’s. Anti-phenomenalist critics may not yet be satisfied however. For it could be objected that even though Presence Phenomenalism does not entail Semantic Phenomenalism on Kant’s theory of intentionality, it would still entail Weak Semantic Phenomenalism (the claim that the only *immediate* objects of reference in experience are mental states). According to Weak Semantic Phenomenalism, it is possible to conceptualize and refer to objects existing outside of my mind, but my intentional relation to these objects is mediated by a prior conceptual awareness of internal mental states. While not quite as objectionable as the stronger version, Weak Semantic Phenomenalism is nevertheless incompatible with empirical realism’s semantic and epistemic immediacy.

However, even this entailment relation (from Presence Phenomenalism to Weak Semantic Phenomenalism) would not hold for Kant. One would only think that Presence Phenomenalism entailed Weak Semantic Phenomenalism if one thought that all conceptual reference to objects *not* present to consciousness must be constructed out of a conceptualized awareness of whatever *is* present to consciousness. But this is simply not Kant’s theory of intentionality. As he explains in the Transcendental Deduction and Second Analogy, all objective representation is generated by the rule-governed synthetic activity of the categorially structured understanding.

If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our representations by the *relation to an object*, and what is the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule. (A197/B242; see also A104-5, B138)

I take Kant to be saying here that the ability to refer to an object as an object, and as an object of a certain kind (especially including as a spatial object outside the mind), depends on the understanding’s ability to construct the concept of the object by combining representations in accordance with rules.[[18]](#endnote-18) This account of the generation of conceptual reference nowhere requires that conceptual reference to an object not present to consciousness requires and depends on a conceptual reference to what is present.

What all this shows is that it is possible to attribute Presence Phenomenalism to Kant so long as one also insists (as one should), that having an object present to consciousness is not the same thing as (and neither entails nor is entailed by) making content-laden reference to that object. Thus Presence Phenomenalism entails neither Semantic Phenomenalism nor its weaker cousin and so does not threaten empirical realism.

6. Kant as Intentional Object Phenomenalist

Intentional Object Phenomenalism[[19]](#endnote-19) (also referred to as ‘intentionalism’ in the literature: see Aquila 2003) is a thesis about the ontological status of objects. Physical bodies are identified with merely the intentional content of certain complex representational states. They are what our representations purport to be about, but beyond the representational purport of ‘intentional inexistence’ (as it is sometimes called), such objects have no positive ontological status. To function as an interpretation of transcendental idealism, Intentional Object Phenomenalism must be qualified in a few important respects. Most importantly, it must be noted that physical bodies (qua intentional objects) are ontologically distinct from things in themselves (which makes Intentional Object Phenomenalism incompatible with traditional ‘two-aspect’ readings). Things in themselves exist in the full sense and thus have a radically different ontological status than the physical bodies (‘appearances’) to which they correspond. So it is not as though *all* reality is reduced to mere intentional inexistence on such an interpretation. Secondly, Intentional Object Phenomenalism would have to be understood as a transcendental claim about the status of objects, not an empirical one. As I will spell out in more detail below, physical bodies are necessarily represented as the sorts of things that exist in space, outside the mind; this precludes the possibility (on pain of incoherence) of representing them simultaneously as mind-dependent mere intentional objects. Thus while it is transcendentally true that physical bodies are mere intentional objects, it is not empirically true. Or to put it differently, a textbook on transcendental philosophy would correctly describe physical bodies as mere intentional objects, but a textbook on physics would not.

Although usually in a minority, there have been at least a few prominent commentators who have recognized the appeal of Intentional Object Phenomenalism as a potentially fruitful interpretive approach to Kant (see Sellars 1967, Aquila 1983 and 2003, Van Cleve 1999, Haag 2003, George 1981, Pereboom 1988). However, anti-phenomenalist commentators have been quick to group Intentional Object Phenomenalism with other forms of phenomenalism and dismiss it with the rest. For instance, Allais argues that ‘to compare Kantian appearances with merely intentional objects is to keep appearances in the mind: we simply have a more sophisticated version of a phenomenalist interpretation’ (Allais 2015: 42). Sophisticated or not, she rejects this approach with all other interpretations which ‘mentalize’ Kantian appearances (ibid. 37-56). Similarly, Hall argues that Intentional Object Phenomenalism ‘simply returns us to a Berkeleyan phenomenalism in a different guise, in so far as the phenomenal object would still depend entirely upon the mental activity of the subject to generate the object through acts of construction […] or mental directedness’ (Hall 2010: 47). And Ameriks describes Van Cleve’s intentionalist reading as a form of ‘neo-Berkeleyanism’ (Ameriks 2006: 77). These commentators are being fair in characterizing Intentional Object Phenomenalism in terms of the dependence of physical bodies on certain kinds of mental activity. The question, though, is whether it is also fair to dismiss Intentional Object Phenomenalism out of hand along with all other phenomenalisms as not significantly different from Berkeleyan idealism. I will argue that it is not. I will first spell out more explicitly how radically different Intentional Object Phenomenalism is from Berkeley’s empirical idealism. The resulting contrast will point the way towards demonstrating the compatibility of Intentional Object Phenomenalism with the scientific realism at the heart of empirical realism.

The central contrast between a Kantian Intentional Object Phenomenalism and Berkeley’s empirical idealism has to do with the metaphysical status of the objects of experience, i.e., ordinary physical bodies. For Berkeley, physical bodies are identified with collections of ideas which exist in the mind. Specifying the metaphysical status of an object for Kant is complicated by his empirical/transcendental distinction. How we describe the metaphysical status of an object *qua object of experience* will differ from how we describe it *qua explicandum of transcendental philosophy*. In either case though, Kant’s account will differ significantly from Berkeley’s.

If we ask about the status of an object qua explicandum of transcendental philosophy, then we’re asking how a transcendental idealist would characterize the ultimate ontological status of empirical objects. According to Intentional Object Phenomenalism, physical bodies are mere intentional objects which have no positive ontological status of their own (this would be put as an explication of Kant’s claim that physical bodies are not transcendentally real). This differs markedly from Berkeley, who was by Kant’s lights a transcendental realist regarding physical bodies. The collections of ideas that constitute Berkeleyan physical objects really exist in the mind as more than mere intentional object.

If we instead ask about the status of an object qua object of experience, then (according to Intentional Object Phenomenalism) we’re asking for a specification of the representational content describing the object in question. After all, with mere intentional objects, what the object *is* will be determined by the intentional content by which it is *represented*. In normal cases of everyday cognition, this representational content will involve (at least implicitly) predicates such as ‘spatial,’ ‘substantial,’ ‘not-in-my-own-mind’ (among of course others). More specifically, the first *Critique* explains that all bodies must be represented as causal substances describable by extensive and intensive magnitudes; and *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* explains that all bodies move and interact in space and are composed of spatially diffuse attractive and repulsive forces. According to Kant’s theory of experience, it is possible to form objectively valid judgements about physical objects only when such objects are being represented and intended in accordance with these principles. Thus a physical body, qua object of experience, is exactly the sort of thing common sense and physical science take it to be: a spatially extended, causally active substance which interacts with other such substances. It is not, as with Berkeley, a collection of ideas in the mind.

The difference between Kant and Berkeley on this issue is by no means trivial, since it indicates how Kant and Berkeley can go in opposite directions with respect to the metaphysics of the physical world. To spell this out, I want to focus on the different ways that Kant (via Intentional Object Phenomenalism) and Berkeley will understand the truth-conditions on judgements about objects: Under what conditions is a sentence of the form ‘*o* is *F*’ true?

Berkeley identifies physical bodies with transcendentally real collections of sensations. On his theory, a judgement of the form ‘*o* is *F*’ will be true if and only if the collection of sensations constituting *o* is in fact *F*, hence, if and only if it presents *F*-ness to consciousness.

Truth conditions on claims about Kantian intentional objects will be quite different. For facts about mere intentional objects can be determined only by the representational content through which they are represented. Specifically, for Kant, a judgement of the form ‘*o* is *F*’ will be true if and only if the judgement is formed in accordance with the rules laid down by the synthetic a priori laws of the understanding. Rules such as those laid down in the Analogies of Experience determine the necessary features that objects must have (e.g., causality and substantiality) (A176/B218ff.). Rules laid down in the Postulates of Empirical Thinking determine what is actual (even if only contingently actual) in objects (A218/B266, A225-6/B272-4).

So the features of a Berkeleyan object are determined by the features displayed by collections of sensations, and the features of a Kantian object are determined by the intentional content of judgements formed in accordance with the a priori laws of the understanding. The resulting metaphysics of Berkeleyan objects differs markedly from the metaphysics of Kantian objects. I emphasize the following four differences as especially significant.

1. Primary/secondary quality distinction: Kant can, while Berkeley cannot, maintain a primary/secondary quality distinction (within the empirical realm). Since for Berkeley, all of the sensible qualities presented in appearance are equally real, there is no room for designating some of them as merely the byproducts of the way the mind is affected (PHK §§9, 14-5; DHP 189-195). Kant needs such a distinction for his scientific realism,[[20]](#endnote-20) and Intentional Object Phenomenalism leaves room for it. For Kant, the difference between a primary quality (e.g., volume) and a secondary quality (e.g., sweetness) is that the former can be predicated of an object in objectively valid judgements (‘the bottle contains 750mL of wine’), while the latter results only in subjective judgements of perception (‘the wine is sweet’). The content of the former is necessitated by the a priori laws of the understanding (in this case, the laws pertaining to extensive magnitudes), and so the object must be represented in that way if it is to be represented correctly at all. Qua mere intentional object, if it is necessary that the object be represented in a certain way, then it is true of the object that it is that way. The latter sort of judgement, by contrast, is not necessitated by any such law, so it can only reflect the contingent way the subject is affected by objects.[[21]](#endnote-21)

2. Externality: As we saw in section 3, Berkeley argues that it is not even possible to conceive of a physical body existing outside of and independent of the mind, and hence he thought there could be no such thing. This was his ‘Master Argument’ for Ontological Phenomenalism (PHK §22-23). A consequence of this is Berkeley’s deflationary theory of spatiality. Objects do not truly exist in a three-dimensional realm outside the mind, and what we understand as distance relations (for instance the distance between me and my cat over there) is to be cashed out in terms of counterfactuals regarding how various sensations could change over time (e.g., how long it would take to walk over to my cat while he gradually takes up a larger part of my visual field; see PHK §§42-3, DHP 201-2). Kant by contrast is a realist about space and the spatiality of physical bodies. Bodies exist outside the mind and it is necessary that they be represented as such. This was the central thrust of the A-edition Fourth Paralogism and the B-edition Refutation of Idealism. Accordingly, the proponent of Intentional Object Phenomenalism can argue that since it is necessary that we represent physical bodies in an empirically real, external, three-dimensional space, then, qua mere intentional objects, it is true of them that they external, etc.

3. Causal power: As we saw in section 5, Berkeley argues that physical bodies can have no causal power because ideas are essentially passive, with no active power being sensibly apparent in them. Accordingly, any metaphysics that explains the operations of nature by appeal to causal powers (forces) is ruled out for him. For Kant, by contrast, the Second Analogy in the first *Critique* and the dynamic theory of matter articulated in *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* are intended to show that it is not only possible but necessary that we represent objects and events in terms of the activity of causal powers. Once again, the proponent of Intentional Object Phenomenalism will argue that if it is necessary that we represent physical bodies and events in this way, then it is true of them that they are this way.

4. Substantiality: As we also saw in section 5, Berkeley understands bodies to be substantial only in the sense that they are constituted by collections of sensible qualities that tend to remain together. There is no room for a substrate/accident distinction in his metaphysics of bodies, because there is no substratum presented in sensation over and above (or perhaps under and below?) the sensible qualities of the sensations. By contrast, Kant argues in the First Analogy that physical bodies must be represented as containing a persistent substrate (this is a condition on the possibility of time-determination, which is itself a condition on the possibility of experience). And so once again, since it is necessary that objects be represented this way, then, qua mere intentional objects, it is true of them that they are that way.

These points of contrast highlight the very different metaphysical pictures of the material world that result from Berkeley and Intentional Object Phenomenalism as a reading of Kant, and they show how this reading can respect the realistic aspect of Kant’s theory. The world of physical objects is the world we always took it to be: physical bodies are in space, outside the mind, interacting as causal substances, and they possess objective features that are distinct from the secondary qualities presented in sensation. Anti-phenomenalist critics are correct to describe Intentional Object Phenomenalism in terms of the dependence of physical bodies on certain kinds of mental activity. But since their real concern has to do with preserving Kant’s empirical realism, the consistency of Intentional Object Phenomenalism with this realism indicates that those critics are wrong to dismiss Intentional Object Phenomenalism along with the other, more pernicious forms of phenomenalism.

8. Conclusion

I have made the case that not all phenomenalisms are created equal. While there is a tendency in the literature to reject each while rejecting all, I hope to have shown that two forms of phenomenalism are consistent with Kant’s realism. The claim that only sensations are present to consciousness may appear to threaten Kant’s insistence on the semantic immediacy of our cognition of external objects; but this threat disappears once one takes seriously Kant’s account of intentionality, which bears little resemblance to Berkeley’s theory that an object can be intended only if it can be directly present to consciousness. And the claim that empirical objects are ultimately to be construed as mere intentional objects may appear to threaten Kant’s realism regarding the metaphysical status of physical bodies; but this threat disappears once one takes seriously what Kant thinks is required for making true claims about objects, and once one sees that these Kantian truth-conditions bear no resemblance to Berkeley’s claim that what is true of an object is determined only by what that object presents to consciousness. I do not claim to have demonstrated that Kant did indeed subscribe to these phenomenalist theses, although I do think the case can be made that he did. The purpose of this paper has simply been to show that these interpretive options remain open, viable, and promising, and that it is possible to read Kant as a phenomenalist without collapsing his idealism into Berkeley’s.[[22]](#endnote-22)

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1. All translations of Kant’s writings are from the Cambridge Editions of the Writings of Immanuel Kant. Page references to *Critique of Pure Reason* are given with the standard A/B pagination. References to Kant’s other writings are given with volume and page number of the *Akademic Ausgabe* edition.

   References to Berkeley’s *Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge* (abbreviated ‘PHK’) given with section numbers. References to his *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous* (abbreviated ‘DHP’) given with page numbers from the Collected Works of George Berkeley. However, all quotations are taken from the Oxford Philosophical Texts editions edited by Johnathan Dancy.  [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. By ‘sensation’ (Kant’s ‘*Empfindung*’) I mean to refer to the mental effects that result from the affection of objects on sensibility. Although some might occasionally use the term ‘sensation’ to refer to the intentional object of a sensory state, rather than the state itself, I will not be using the term in this way. Hence, I take Kant’s official understanding of sensation to be, ‘the effect of an object on the capacity of representation, insofar as we are affected by it’ (A20/B34). I will not take a stand here on the question whether Kant thinks that the affecting objects are empirical objects or things in themselves. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. I will discuss Berkeley’s theory of what is or can be directly present to consciousness in more detail below. For now I will just mention that I take Berkeley’s sensory ‘idea’ to be what I will otherwise be referring to as sensations or collections of sensations. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. There are in fact two significant differences between Kant and Berkeley here. First, there is Kant’s insistence that object-directedness requires both sensibility and understanding working together (where Berkeley thinks that object-directedness is determined by the senses alone). Second, there is Kant’s claim about the specific way in which sensibility contributes to object-directedness (space and time are a priori forms of intuition), which is not a part of Berkeley’s theory. My concern is with the first issue, but that is not meant to discount the importance of the second. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. For instance, Allais (2007) and Wilson (1999) have pointed out the differences between Kant’s and Berkeley’s theories of sensible qualities and the implications this has for their respective idealisms. And Emundts (2008) has discussed their different notions of objectivity in judgement. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. In conversations about earlier versions of this paper, I have found that different philosophers have different opinions about which of these theses should or should not be classified as ‘phenomenalism’. So first off, I want to emphasize that I’m not really concerned to argue about labels; all I’m concerned with is the content of the theses in question, and whether these theses do or do not fit in Kant’s and Berkeley’s philosophies. Secondly, many anti-phenomenalist Kantian critics do consider the following to be aspects or forms of phenomenalism, thus there is precedent in the literature for treating them as such. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. By ‘content-laden reference’ I mean a conceptually determined intentional directedness. To make content-laden reference to an object requires thinking of it *as* something. Hence it is not possible to make content-laden reference to something unless one possesses the concepts necessary for describing the thing. (This restriction will be significant in our discussion of Berkeley) [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. For instance, it is natural to read Hume along these lines. His familiar mantra that there can be no idea without a corresponding impression could be interpreted as the claim that the representational content of an idea can never extend beyond reference to the impressions given directly to consciousness. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Most notably, I will not be discussing what is sometimes referred to as ‘analytic’ or ‘linguistic phenomenalism’, which is the thesis that all thoughts or claims about physical bodies can be translated directly into thoughts or claims about collections or logical constructions of sensations. On analytic phenomenalism in Berkeley, see Winkler (1989: 193-4); in Kant, see Van Cleve (1999) and Ameriks (2006: 79-86) [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. One might ask whether it makes sense to distinguish Berkeleyan ideas from their objects at all, since Berkeley sometimes seems to indicate that ideas *are* the objects of experience. It is true that ideas are themselves the objects of *immediate* perception. But Berkeley also indicates that ideas can enable *mediate* perception of other objects (see DHP 204). There is disagreement in the literature regarding whether Berkeley’s official position is that bodies are *only* ever mediately perceived (Pitcher 1986), or that some parts of bodies are immediately perceived and other parts only mediately perceived (Winkler 1989: 157), or that some objects are immediately perceived while other (distinct) objects are only mediately perceived (Rickless 2013: 59-79), or that all sensible objects are immediately perceived (Pappas 2000: 174). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. In my reconstruction of this argument, I attributed content-laden reference only to conception. There is disagreement in the literature regarding whether Berkeley understood perception to have a semantic or epistemic component above and beyond the brute relation of presence to consciousness. My claims about the relationship between perception and conception in Berkeley will hold irrespective of which way one goes on this issue; for the argument does not require that immediate perception involve *no* epistemic or semantic component, only that it *at least* involve presence to consciousness. On this debate, see Dicker (1982), Pappas (1982: 7), and Winkler (1989: 153). , and two anonymous referees.sm (see Jankowiak 2016), and Winkler (1989: 153). /B266, A225-6/B272-4).ctive validty of judgements [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Kant’s scientific realism is articulated primarily in the first *Critique*’s Principles of Pure Understanding and the Refutation of Idealism, and in *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*’s theory of matter. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Kant’s semantic and epistemic immediacy are defended primarily in the first *Critique*’s A-edition Fourth Paralogism and the B-editions’ Refutation of Idealism. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Kant certainly did care for (what we now call) the ‘scientific image’ of nature, but it’s not clear that he did not care at all for the ‘manifest image’, as Langton suggests. One could argue that Kant sometimes is focused on the manifest image of nature (e.g., when individual bodies are described as discrete substances), and other times on the scientific image (e.g., when he gives his theory of substance in terms of the interactions of attractive and repulsive forces diffused in space). I will not take a stand on this issue here, and either way, my point with respect to the passage from Langton is simply to highlight her concern that phenomenalism is incompatible with scientific realism. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. I should emphasize here that Presence Phenomenalism is meant only as a claim about what is directly present to consciousness *in experience*, i.e., in the cognition of empirical objects. There may be other things that are, in some sense at least, ‘present to consciousness’ as well in Kant’s system. For instance, in his ethical theory Kant sometimes describes the ‘fact of reason’ as immediately available to conscious awareness, and so there is some sense in which it is ‘directly present’. Additionally, some might argue that the subject is present to itself through the transcendental unity of apperception underlying all synthetic activity. Kantian Presence Phenomenalism should be construed to be compatible with these other kinds of ‘presence’. Either way, the significance of Presence Phenomenalism has just as much to do with the denial of what is present to consciousness (things outside the mind) as with the assertion of what is present (sensations). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. To say that *collections* of sensations are present to consciousness implies that these sensations have been combined by some sort of synthetic activity. Accordingly, it will only make sense to speak of collections of sensations being present to consciousness when those sensations are functioning as the ‘matter’ of empirical intuition. Brute sensations, as mere sensory effects not combined in intuitions, could not be present to consciousness as collections (and arguably could not be present to consciousness at all). In Jankowiak (2014), I elaborate this position at length. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. This reading is also supported by the occasional claim that sensation is the matter of appearance (B207, A166/B208, A223/B270), or is ‘the real’ in space (A375). On their face, such passages might be taken as (troublingly unkantian) expressions of Ontological Phenomenalism. I would suggest instead that they be read in terms of Presence Phenomenalism, which, as I will be arguing, is compatible with empirical realism. I discuss these passages at greater length in Jankowiak (2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Note that in my reading of A197/B242, I am claiming only that the *concept* of the object (and hence the conceptual representation of it) is constructed by the understanding. As my discussion of Intentional Object Phenomenalism will make clear, I also think that the object itself is constructed by this process. However, I will not insist on that point here, since I want to keep my defenses of Presence Phenomenalism and Intentional Object Phenomenalism separate. For an opposing view, see Vinci (2015: 141-144), who argues (against Van Cleve, with whom I agree) that the A197/B242 passage is meant only to explain the representational relation to an object, not the object itself. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Presence Phenomenalism and Intentional Object Phenomenalism are independent interpretive theses, and it is possible to attribute just one of them to Kant without the other. I have argued elsewhere, however, that the most textually and philosophically satisfying Intentional Object Phenomenalism-based interpretation of Kant is one that comes paired with Presence Phenomenalism (see Jankowiak 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. On the importance of the primary/secondary quality distinction for Kant’s scientific realism, see Wilson (1999). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Allais (2015: 44-45) also discusses the difference between Kant and Berkeley on secondary qualities. She appeals to this difference to argue against phenomenalist interpretations, but she grants that the objection does not work against ‘sophisticated’ phenomenalisms like Intentional Object Phenomenalism. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. I am very thankful to the following individuals for offering helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper: Mavis Biss, Georges Dicker, Mike Nance, Michael Oberst, Oliver Thorndike, Laura Papish, Joseph Trullinger, and two anonymous referees. The paper is better because of their input. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)