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The Matrix, or When the Natural World Is Scary

Introduction

An uneasy conscience is one of the symptoms of human mind in today's world. Undoubtedly, as Martin Heidegger says, anxiety means tending to life, or rather opposing death, due to "thrownness," that is, in the case of a sui generis "subjectivity." We often find ourselves in situations that overwhelm and overpower us. We are subject to constraints. However, the conviction that the natural world does not correspond to the sense of world has been already addressed by Edmund Husserl in a number of places because it is at the heart of the reduction itself. But perhaps Husserl stays mostly to the point once again making the revision of reduction in his last major work, *The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Nevertheless, what exactly does the natural world mean? Jan Patočka goes deep in his analysis, after Husserl and Heidegger. According to Patočka, the worlds that eventually emerges either from Husserl's or Heidegger's investigations are derivative. The response must be sought elsewhere.

The problem is puzzlingly presented in *The Matrix* movie: the demand for understanding is continually frustrated through updates. The worldview changes abnormally. Thus, by reasoning all the time, even without noticing it, the brain runs the risk of overheating and therefore

requires to be reset every now and then. But this prospect precisely is scary and perhaps raises doubts about the world of life (*Lebenswelt*) as such.

The Controversy over Reality

Edmund Husserl's approach that leads to the insight into the real, that is, marks a "return to the things themselves" is that of reduction, as we know. Husserl does not stop with the change of attitude from the naive to the phenomenological one. In fact, he tells us about the two reductions or better of the two "moments of reduction," that is, the phenomenological or eidetic, and the transcendental one. There are, in fact, not two separate steps, but only one, as John Cogan notes:

> Let me also draw attention to the term "moments" here because, in order to get an accurate conception and understanding of the phenomenological reduction, we must see that it is not done in two "steps." The moments are internal logical moments and do not refer to two "steps" that one might take to conclude the procedure as one might do, for example, in waxing a floor: where the first step is to strip off the old wax and the second step is to apply the new wax; steps imply a temporal individuation that is not true of the moments of the phenomenological reduction. Husserl's term, epoché, the negative move whereby we bracket the world, is not a "step" that we do "first" in an effort to prepare ourselves for the later "step," reduction proper; rather, the bracketing and the move whereby we drive the self back upon itself, the reduction proper, occur together.[1]

The guide-reason for each moment is the same, that is to "make new beginning, each for himself and in himself, with the decision of philosophers who begin radically."[2] Husserl's slogan, namely the "return to the things themselves," does not mean but the transcendental idealism. However, according to Angela Ales Bello, "Husserl's transcendental

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[1] J. Cogan, "The Phenomenological Reduction," The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed November 29, 2021, https://iep.utm.edu.

[2] E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology*, transl. D. Cairns, Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media 1960, p. 7.

idealism is a realism."[3] Leaving aside her argument for the thesis of realism, the issue at stake is far from settled, at least for us today. Indeed, on the one hand, the new attitude of reduction, as Bello notes "help us investigate how it is possible to reach and seize 'the sense of things,'"[4] which are the real findings, if you like. Husserl therefore guides us toward "that which is" and therefore what can be found present, in a certain given way (*leibliche Selbstgegebenheit*).

On the other hand, you cannot prescind from the idea itself, that is of the Cartesian idea or of "res" (*res cogitans*, *res extensa*), as Martin Heidegger makes it clear. That which is found "as is" enters into designing one's self. The idea is no longer the image, or the sense of what is presented (*Vorstellung*), but the possibility of use, the being available (*Zuhandenheit*). The type of ontology that derives from such an approach is the hermeneutics of facticity. To understand is apparently to grasp a fact. However, in Heidegger's account it is being in a mood (*Befindlichkeit*) of being subject to objectifying.

Jan Patočka notes in this context, "It must be said here, with regard to a currently very widespread life-feeling, that man who has experienced modern science no longer lives simply in the naive natural world; the habitus of his overall relationship to reality is not the natural worldview."[5] Put differently, the term "reality" no longer refers to the naive natural world, on the contrary what is called "reality, at least in its ultimate root, is something else – above all it obeys mathematical laws, it is to be understood *sub specie* of a formal mathematical model. All concepts and principles contrary to this model must be – and progressively are – barred from the reflection on true reality."[6] Thus, the naive natural world is interpreted *sub specie* of the mathematical model, that is "going back from the results of natural science to 'subjective givens,'

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[3] *Ibidem*, p. viii.

[4] *Ibidem*, p. xv.

[5] J. Patočka, *The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem*, transl. E. Abrams, eds. I. Chvatík and L. Učník, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 2016, p. 8.

[6] *Ibidem*.

which are lawfully correlated with them."[7] The gap between the meaning as the lived-experiences' expectation and that of the meaning in the model framework is increasingly noticeable. What is the real thing after all? Patočka notes in this context:

> It is important then that, in this peculiar conflict without contact, the scientific view can induce a profound change in the very foundations of the life-feeling; man lives in the fundamental apperception of his unfreedom, he feels himself the agent of objective forces, perceives himself not as a person but rather as a thing. Without our explicit awareness, there has been a substitution of our lived-experiences, a confusion that can then easily blind us to their deeper nature. Without going outside himself, man has become reified, alienated from his natural life-feeling. . . [8]

Thus, the real gradually becomes reified, rendered eventually "natural" as Robert Brandom intends it,[9] in a sense provided by the "language of post-Galilean natural science," namely that "its basic explanations can't be in terms of the meanings things have for us humans."[10] We live by artificial intelligence and no longer by metaphors, to paraphrase George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's breakthrough.[11] Therefore, what kind of life can you expect from the artificial? All in all, what is at stake is a challenge of the human factor[12] and for humans.

Descartes does not pose the problem of the idea, that is, of the duality of "res," to himself. In other words, noting one's own existence in the same way as that of the triangle or of wax creates a perplexity.[13] So, the transition from geometry to the reality of self-consciousness

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[7] *Ibidem*, p. 9.

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 10.

[9] C. Taylor, *The Language Animal: The Full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity*, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2016, p. 131.

[10] *Ibidem*, p. 131.

[11] See G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press 1980.

[12] See C.B. Sullenberger, *Sully: My Search for What Really Matters*, New York, NY: William Morrow Paperbacks 2016.

[13] See J. Patočka, *The Natural…*, p. 23.

is not given or guaranteed at all. Even more, "[a]s long as we remain in the purely mathematical order, we attain neither being nor absolute certainty—not even by the thought *quicquid cogitat, est*."[14] So, one can delude oneself or better yet be deluded as Descartes' "idea of a *deus malignus*" suggests.[15] And there's no way out.

Therefore, Patočka notes subsequently, Descartes "differentiates two *cogitos . . .* The first certainty is not *quicquid cogitat, est* but rather *cogito, ergo sum*. The *cogito* as an idea must be distinguished from the *cogito* as a living certainty."[16] The two orders should not be mistaken one for the other, because "though there are more originary *simplicia* in the logical-mathematical order, the *cogito* is first in the order of certainty. Descartes himself distinguishes the *cogito cogitans*, source of all certainty, from the *cogito cogitatum*, which is an objectified result of the former."[17] However, "what does the *cogito cogitans* mean in its unreflectedness? This question did not interest Descartes, it finds no answer in his work; in Descartes, the *cogito* remains unanalyzed."[18]

It is Immanuel Kant to address the problem of self-consciousness with philosophical dignity, according to Patočka.[19] He notes: "The problem of reality is, in Kant's eyes, the problem of the possibility of knowledge of reality. The formal condition of all knowledge is consciousness. Kant's understanding of consciousness is, to use a modern term, intentional."[20] The possibility of knowledge means for Kant the synthesis, which "consists in bringing together a manifold of representations in the unity of a cognition."[21] The faculty that mediates between sensibility and understanding is the transcendental imagination.[22] However,

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[14] *Ibidem*.

[15] *Ibidem*, p. 24.

[16] *Ibidem*, p. 23.

[17] *Ibidem*, p. 24. Note that this duality is well captured by Baruch Spinosa in the expressions *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*.

[18] *Ibidem*.

[19] *Ibidem*.

[20] *Ibidem*.

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 25.

[22] *Ibidem*.

in Kant, the *cogito* is finite, "it can never look *beyond* its own giveness."[23] This is not sufficient, of course, for the philosophical foundation, that is, the understanding of reality, as Fichte rightly points out.[24]

Yet, the understanding of reality may be seen as the question of being. Therefore, as Patočka notes, "Something can be existent only insofar as it fulfills the conditions of *being*; being however, as we well know, is no predicate attached to things as their determination, so that things could be thought without it, or it without things. Now, the reduction to pure consciousness has shown that givenness in itself is no being, nothing existent, but rather a pure *phenomenon of being*; and this phenomenon, because it is a phenomenon, i.e., something uncovered, manifest, is no less than the existent itself, but rather *contains it* as something that has a claim to recognition. If it can demonstrate its claim to being posited, we say: it *is*; being is demonstrability."[25] It is precisely at this point that the artificial life of the idea is possible, namely the demonstrability that it is an outcome of science itself.

Husserl and Heidegger – Two Sides of Almost the Same Coin

Insistence of Husserl on the necessity of the reduction of the so-called natural attitude[26] and his conviction on repeating the same operation every time he arrived at the system[27] was well captured by Jean-Luc Marion in the saying "autant de réduction, autant de donation."[28] While

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[23] *Ibidem*, p. 28.

[24] *Ibidem*, p. 29.

[25] *Ibidem*, p. 39.

[26] See J. Patočka, *Body, Community, Language, World*, transl. E.V. Kohák, Chicago, IL: Open Court 2006, pp. 111-112. The famous exchange of letters with Roman Ingarden that echoes even more Husserl's emphasis on the necessity of reduction.

[27] E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, transl. D. Carr, Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1970, § 17.

[28] See J.-L. Marion, *Réduction et donation. Recherches sur Husserl, Heidegger et la phénoménologie*, Paris: PUF.

on the one hand, the natural attitude means first of all a pre-scientific position, as it is the case of early Husserl, on the other hand, the natural attitude means the opposite either, as Patočka attests in his research on the natural world and the thesis of the nowadays mentality.

Comprehending the current mentality, Patočka proceeds all the way up to the resolution on reduction itself, which captures the true heart of this operation, namely the transition from problem, or the naive attitude, to the problematization,[29] which is not simply a shift or turn. Indeed, the transition is not possible *ad libitum*. On the contrary, Aristotle notes this by stating, "Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who need argument, not punishment or perception."[30] Aristotle's statement, pronounced at the introduction of the *Organon* and more specifically of categories, is about grasping the idea. It echos Plato's dilemma regarding the reason attributed to Socrates and not to the Sophists.[31] The point is precisely a finding oneself in wonder or perplexity, puzzlement.

It is no coincidence that both Heidegger in *Being and Time* justifies himself by quoting the perplexed Plato of the Sophist, and Ingarden (in his letter to his mentor Husserl) apologizes for not having a motive for the reduction. Not to mention Scheler's disdain for Husserl's transcendental reduction. Nonetheless, all three go their own ways, as did Aristotle with respect to Plato, moving away from the dilemma itself.

Heidegger, by thematizing anxiety, seeks to posit the problem in the sense of how to deal with it, or rather of how to stand in front of it (*Dasein*). His choice of the approach in the sense of anxiety can be

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[29] See J. Patočka, *Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*, transl. J. Dodd, Chicago, IL: Open Court 1996, pp. 12-13.

[30] Aristotle, "Topics," transl. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1995, p. 105a.

[31] Plato, "Sophist," in *Complete Works*, transl. N.P. White, ed. J.M. Cooper, Indianapolis, IN.; Cambridge: Hackett 1997, p. 244a.

justified, as Stein does,[32] or it results in the twist,[33] of which Heidegger is aware,[34] according to Canullo's line of reasoning. In other words, it is a typical pronouncement of Heidegger's mental experiment "more Galileano." Although in the end, for Stein there is a problem of the subject of *Dasein* as impersonal,[35] for Canullo it means an opening of the hermeneutic circle, later advanced by Gadamer,[36] even if with the abandonment of the subject itself,[37] as it were. However, more precisely, both Stein and Canullo can agree on the question of the annulment of the subject in Heidegger, which for Stein means the lack of the personal psyche,[38] and for Canullo the vanishing of the "anima"[39] or the climax of transition in the case of the translation.[40]

Ingarden, in almost the same way as Scheler, accords with the findings of the natural sciences as if they were "objective" in a sense of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy*, that is of one's own view. Thus, Ingarden limits himself to asking the question about the neces-

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[32] E. Stein, "Martin Heidegger's Existential Philosophy," *Maynooth Philosophical Papers* 2007, 4, p. 61. Stein refers to the word "Angst," which perhaps should be translated as "anxiety," and not "anguish," contrary to the translator's choice (p. 56). However, the translator's choice could be explained by the assumed origin of the word, i.e., the Old French root, or the Proto-Indo-European one.

[33] C. Canullo, *Il chiasmo della traduzione: metafora e verit*à, Milano: Mimesis 2017, p. 48. Canullo uses an Italian expression "violenza traduttiva," which refers to "forzatura," translated into English as "twist," from which the metaphore of "spiral" may derive.

[34] *Ibidem*.

[35] E. Stein, "Martin Heidegger's Existential…," p. 69.

[36] C. Canullo, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[37] *Ibidem*, p. 135.

[38] "It is nowhere expressly said — even though it probably is presupposed as self evident — that the analysis as a whole does not claim to be complete. The fundamental determinations of the human being — e.g., state of mind, thrownness, and understanding — must be very undetermined abstractions, as they do not take account of the specificity of the psychosomatic being into consideration." E. Stein, "Martin Heidegger's Existential...," p. 70.

[39] C. Canullo, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[40] *Ibidem*.

sary conditions of the personal freedom as such.[41] Scheler's position is incongruous in this understanding, as Stein points out in *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*.[42] Interestingly, both Heidegger and Ingarden think in the way of self-interest and consequently of values, however Heidegger prohibits subjection to actual values, and Ingarden tends to see subjection to values postulated as reasonable. So, both Heidegger and Ingarden require an underlying sense that justifies the stance, the sense to be discovered just in the case. If we speak of Ingarden's *intentional objects* or of Heidegger's *nothingness* as underlying the quest for sense, we are already committed to the derivative world. These are the long-run consequences of the approach to intentionality that go back to Leibniz and Descartes himself, that is, of "res" as "idea" *clear* and *distinct*. Any reduction goes up to there.

If intentionality according to Husserl and disciples, including Heidegger, cannot be other than the idea itself, then it is just a something for something, but not all, at all. It's like giving voice to one thing and not another, or better yet feeding one at the cost of the other. Patočka makes this clear in describing the situation,[43] which for the phenomenologist is a world in which situate oneself, to inhabit. The idea is at the same time a dreamed, imagined vision and what is desired to be a reality, alluding to self-giving or projection in the mode of reception.

Discrete Reality, Response, and Language

The outcomes of science – as well as the findings of phenomenology – are properly called a "something that is not nothing." These appa-

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[41] R. Ingarden, "O odpowiedzialności i jej podstawach ontycznych," transl. A. Węgrzecki, in idem, *Książeczka o człowieku*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2009, p. 127. Ingarden distinguishes further between "an intentional objectivity, such as is the work of art, and real objectivity that is not constituted in this kind of manner." J. Patočka, *Plato and Europe*, transl. P. Lom, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2002, p. 178.

[42] E. Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, transl. M. Sawicki, Washington, DC: ICS Publications 2000, p. 200.

[43] J. Patočka, *Plato...*, pp. 1-4.

rently echoes Leibniz's concept of sufficient reason, i.e., "Why is there something rather than nothing." But it is not the concept originated by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, although successfully used by him in the formulation of the notation for infinitesimal calculus. It is in fact Francisco Suárez who precisely distinguishes sufficient reason and effective reason, and it is he who stands at the transition between the Middle Ages and modern thought. In this light, it is still necessary to distinguish the "sufficent reason" of the intellectual results of science and the "sufficent reason" of the pragmatist efficacy of understanding. The former comes from insight as content knowledge, the latter from intelligence as know-how. Said differently, in the case of content learning, the ambiguity lies in the a-temporality and abstraction, i.e., that it is to be applied; whereas in the case of intelligence, the ambiguity lies in the game, i.e., of committing. However, both reflect the experience as *discrete*, that is, valid only through the intermediate results and in the intermediate results that form the artificial, non-living tissue, that is, according to the measure of the AI (Artificial Intelligence) device.

The "discrete experience" is digital, i.e., a schematized so-called *more algebraico*. It is not simply a re-presentation of reality, but in a sense a "reduced reality," i.e., reality itself, providing according to particular interest the essential of a goal and the idea. The *discrete experience*, so to speak, is an approximation that is used with a certain purpose, consequently, it leads to a simulation.

Without any ado, the *discrete experience* can be considered – in Patočka's sense – "asubjective."[44] Indeed, Patočka points out: "Tout en fondant sur le sum l'analyse de la sphère phénoménale, l'analyse de l'apparition dans son apparaître, on peut néanmoins la qualifier à juste titre d' « asubjective ». Elle évite la ponctualité de l'ego qui, dans le transcendantalisme kantien, sert de pierre angulaire aux sythèses de la conscience et met en outre le sceau à sa clôture subjective dans la phéno-

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[44] J. Patočka, *Qu'est-ce que la phénomenologie ?* traduit de l'allemand et du tchéque par E. Abrams, Grenoble : Éditions Jérôme Millon 2002.

ménalité « pure et simple »".[45] Idealism, which results from this, is not a thread between the transcendental ego and phenomena in the immediate appearance, but a reality as being understood. No doubt, the *discrete experience* enjoys ideal existence, thus "[f]or ideal existence, such as, for example, a logical formulation, time does not have any sense."[46] Reasoning is going under guidance of the described procedure, or according to the ascertained method to get the expected results, as long as it works. In the case of the "living doubt," what collapses is not reality, but this derivative, that is, *discrete experience*. It is nicely approached in Charles S. Peirce's conception of *semiosis* as the simulation of the flow of ideas. Working on the categories of Kant and Aristotle, Peirce formulates the uniqueness of the sign, articulated decimally, in the extent from impression to something to be reasonable ascertained.[47] His concept contributed to the digital age and therefore the world we live in. Peirce's work made "mechanical" reasoning, that is, reasoning performed by a digital machine, viable. His contribution lies in the creation of the logical and semiotic foundations; the rest was taken care of by engineers over time.

From the idea – in the track of Aristotle's thought – one can start in two ways, namely quantitative-qualitative or qualitative-quantitative, of which Aristotle himself left a trace in the two formulations of the list of the categories. The former formulation can capture idea as *nominal*, the latter as *existential*, which Patočka grasps entirely as the "situation"[48] or better yet "a relation to this or that present matter which requires our whole commitment."[49] Patočka adds, "[i]t is a matter of nothing less than transforming the present given in the sense called for by the service of life."[50] Commitment to life requires going back to the concept of time linked closely with corporeality, that is, the present as *pre-*

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[45] J. P a t o č k a, *Qu'est-ce...*, p. 186.

[46] J̶. E a d e m, *Plato...*, p. 166.

[47] See P. J a n i k, "Transcendent Action in the light of C.S. Peirce's Architectonic System," *Forum Philosophicum* 2007, issue 12/1.

[48] J. P a t o č k a, *Plato...*, p. 2.

[49] J̶. E a d e m, *The Natural …*, p. 171.

[50] *Ibidem*.

esse. Thus, according to Patočka, "[v]ery insightful progress was made in this respect by Maine de Biran," who uncovers "one of the major features of our original experience in the natural world: the localization of lived-experiencing in the body, which is something immediately given, prior to all perceptive experience."[51] The passage in time that, thanks to the commitment, leads to the lasting affirms and recreates the body as a uniqueness. Put it differently, "[w]here the quantitative conception sees diversity and an infinite plurality, movement viewed thus from within is one, a single act. The unity of the act is the unity of duration. Duration is an indivisible unity, every stage of which contains all previous stages; for this reason, it is necessarily individual and original."[52] How immediate could this individual and original act be we marvel at the extreme situations in comparison to simulation and procedures. It is precisely the time as the present to commit oneself that makes the difference. Put differently, it is a decision taken in the absence of support in an apparent precedence, at least in a sense of the being at hand formulation of the way to proceed.[53] Shortly, it is a *respect* "for himself and in himself" according to the situation; the "respect"[54] to the extent of the latin "respectus," which regards the response as the reflex toward the *species / abstract*. At this point you can go no further, you have arrived at the indiscernible, that is the meaning of the term both countable and uncountable, or better yet the idea of the programming language of the *mathesis universalis*.

Matrix, or What's Going On

The term "matrix" makes you think of the science fiction movie series, the first of which was released in theaters in 1999, precisely as *The Matrix*. The scenario is based on the philosophical metaphor, that of Plato's cave, in the fashion of the digital age. The protagonist, named Neo, is

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[51] *Ibidem*, p. 131.
[52] *Ibidem*, p. 161.
[53] See C.B. S u l l e n b e r g e r, *op. cit.*
[54] See https://etymologeek.com/eng/respect, accessed December 28, 2021.

a young adult employed as a programmer in the state-owned company of good reputation, who however is a hacker in his private life, not only for fun, but also for money. Thanks to an intervention from beyond, he gets in touch with Morpheus and his team of a few people who want – as Plato's philosophers – to live in the real world. He receives instructions – first on the computer screen, and then through a phone call – how to escape from the agents who control the system-world, mistaken for the living-world. During the first meeting, Morpheus makes Neo aware of his own desire saying, "You're here because you know something. You know you can't explain it but you feel it. You've felt it your entire life. Something's wrong with the world. You don't know what it is, but it's there, like a splinter in your mind, driving you mad. It is this feeling that has brought you to me. Do you know what I'm talking about?"

The scene reminds you of Descartes' collapse of certainty, which received the input for the breakthrough from the nascent science with Galileo. However, the case of Neo is that of long-living in the lack of support of reality, precisely because of distrust: something is wrong, and this can only be sensed.

According to Patočka, "being is demonstrability." If it is, it could mean either mathematical proof, scientific evidence, or even the testimony of life, which in Ingarden's approach results in the question of responsibility.[55] However, the particular case for both Patočka and Ingarden is the question of freedom, addressed by the former in terms of experience, and for the latter from the point of view of moral values, proper to humans.[56] For both of them, the situation is one of denial of recognition of the philosopher's freedom by the oppressive system, the situation that resembles that of Socrates. But this is not the situation of our Matrix hero. For Neo, the idea of the real means the struggle to "compromise the system," which is the key-concept of the hacker mentality, i.e., cracking the code. In the final scene, Neo finds a way out

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[55] R. I n g a r d e n, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
[56] *Ibidem*, pp. 108-109.

in withdrawing his assent and in this way leaving the system, that is, going "outside the projection of the system-world," in short, in a line of Heideggerian idea. One thing is undoubtable and very disappointing, that is, Neo remains "condemned to commitment"[57] to a system, which however updated or upgraded, is still a system. In other words, it is not possible to leave aside the very ideas in which you think and express yourself. The universality achieved by the hero lies not in expressing himself, but in fighting. Thus, he alters the true meaning of the term "subject," pointing toward "being subject to something." Ingarden poses a delicate issue in this context, namely "The whole process is tragic if it turns out at the end . . . that your understanding of the value for which you fought has led you astray and that you are wrong. Then a very complicated situation arises and it is difficult to decide rightly which positive or negative value you are ultimately responsible for."[58] Eventually, Ingarden prefers a "fair-play" solution, namely the recognition of consistency and integrity in the struggle.

But perhaps the problem lies in the struggle itself, as Patočka makes clear in another analysis, and it requires a new kind of consensus, as Paul Ricoeur comments: "What, then, in this advance of the Night, corresponds to a collective plan, to the lucidity of the solitary philosopher? Patocka has only a single formula that counts as a response: 'the solidarity of the shaken for all their contradiction and conflict.' In this view, the privileged experience is that of the front, as it was worked out and commented on by Ernst Jünger and Teilhard de Chardin: '[T]here might also be a certain prospect of reaching the ground of true peace from the war engendered by peace. The first presupposition is Teilhard's front-line experience, formulated no less sharply though less mystically by Jünger: the positive aspect of the front line, the front line not as an enslavement to life but as an immense *liberation* from precisely such servitude.'"[59]

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[57] Contrary to what J.-P. S a r t r e said.
[58] R. I n g a r d e n, *op. cit.*, p. 97.
[59] J. P a t o č k a, *Heretical Essays…,* p. xv.

However, the term "matrix" has a proto-Indo-European origin and first of all refers to the uterus. All other uses of the term are derivative. Therefore, one can rightly argue that such a *derivative* use of the term bridges or better yet mediates the origin and the *most reasonable* that justifies the *derivative* sense as a means.

In the battle, the other is but an enemy. Maybe they speak a language you don't understand. Hence, cracking the code can also have some positive meaning other than crashing the system. In fact, the positive meaning lies in understanding. Most famous in this context may be the story of the Rosetta Stone, which helped French linguist Jean-Francois Champollion decipher it and crack the hieroglyphic code. In an instant, the world that had been lost and inaccessible for centuries became alive and human.

Conclusion

It is first and foremost language as a phenomenon that makes the world familiar or unfamiliar. That is, language as expressing oneself in communicating one's desires, perhaps beyond what one even says with words in the consciousness of learning about oneself. It is the language that speaks, but not in the metaphorical sense – as in the case of the world or of everything in the world – on the contrary, in the intermediate of the transparent "interface," as a means of receiving and giving oneself in understanding.

Undoubtedly, the experience of immersion in foreign culture – known as adaptation and even inculturation – begins with incomprehension and the inability to find a reason beyond what is given as such. However, in contemporary society the changing in this regard is felt properly within society. If it is so as Maurice Merleau-Ponty described more than half a century ago in his famous analysis on speech in *Phenomenology of Perception* that language has become the means used, but not understood, because it is not one's own, even more so today one can feel the lack of being at the word. Due to the advancement of technology, programming language has entered the domain of lan-

guage itself and artificial and natural language have merged and collided. Acquiring the language becomes a human challenge that once again opens up the unknown world of life to us.

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Abstract

The Matrix, or When the Natural World Is Scary

Husserl's commitment to reality is marked by the urgency to return, or rather to a repeated return each time the objective is achieved. He explains this explicitly in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, taking his cue from Descartes' Meditations. Reduction, which is the exact name for return, means change of attitude, abandonment of the natural position as naive. Jan Patočka notes in this regard, that today people who have experienced modern science no longer simply live in the naive natural world. The naive natural world is interpreted under species of the mathematical model. So, the gap between meaning as an expectation of experience and meaning within the framework of the model is increasingly evident. If intentionality, according to Husserl and disciples, including Heidegger, cannot be other than the idea itself, then it is just a something for something. It's like giving voice to one thing and not another. Commitment to life (Husserl's *Lebenswelt*) requires a return to corporeality, as Patočka adds, following Maine de Biran's accurate insight, that is, of something immediately given, prior to any perceptual experience. The term "matrix" in the title brings to mind the eponymous 1999 film based on the philosophical metaphor of Plato's cave in the fashion of the digital age. The protagonist, Neo, finds himself living for a long time in the lack of support of reality, precisely because of distrust: something is wrong, and this can only be felt. However, how can the hacker mentality help you understand that perhaps it is but a game?

Keywords: phenomenology, natural world, science, reduction, *cogito cogitans, cogito cogitatum*, corporeality, matrix, game, hacker, language, crack the code, understanding

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