The name the “Prague school of Brentano” refers to three generations of thinkers who temporarily or permanently lived in Prague, bound together by teacher/student relationships, and who accepted the main views of Franz Brentano’s philosophy.

In 1879 Carl Stumpf (see CHAP. 31) arrived in Prague to take up a professorship of philosophy at the Charles-Ferdinand University. In 1880 Stumpf’s close friend and also a student of Brentano, Anton Marty (see CHAP. 30), became a professor in the same department. This marks the beginning of the Prague School. The presence of Stumpf and Marty was in fact a dramatic shift in orientation first and foremost in the domain of psychology, for Prague had previously been an enclave of Herbartian psychology, which Brentano had criticized in various respects throughout his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (Brentano 1874). In a certain sense their presence even harked back to an earlier time in Prague when Bernard Bolzano was developing a theory of science very much in opposition to the Kantianism of his time. Though Brentano’s philosophy was very different from Bolzano’s in many respects, it was no less anti-Kantian. This was very important at that time, for neo-Kantianism was on the rise in the German-speaking world and even beyond, whereas Stumpf and Marty made efforts to combat this kind of philosophy.

Though Stumpf's sojourn in Prague was considerably shorter-lived than Marty’s, Stumpf published the first volume of his Tone Psychology (Stumpf 1883) during that time. This work drew not only on the general psychological framework that Brentano had developed, but also used experimentation as a source of knowledge. Stumpf thereby initiated a competition with other orientations in this domain, most notably with that of Wilhelm Wundt's psychological laboratory in Leipzig. When Stumpf decided to leave Prague in 1884 in order to accept a professorship in Halle, Brentano was very displeased (see the quotation from a letter from Brentano to Marty, July-August 1884, as quoted in Fisette 2015: 476 n.). As he was advancing his psychology and philosophy in Vienna, Brentano thought that the influence of his teachings would be considerably enhanced in the Habsburg Empire by Stumpf
and Marty in Prague.

Nonetheless, Marty continued to live in Prague until his death in 1914. He too was very much concerned with issues in psychology, but with a distinctive concentration on the philosophy of language. While Stumpf had helped to advance Brentanian psychology in opposition to other currents, Marty distinguished himself by describing and analyzing language in competition with other orientations that prevailed at the time in study of language. Moreover, the critique of language remained an enduring aspect of the intellectual climate in Prague, as later exhibited by the Prague Linguistic Circle.

By the early 20th century Marty had become a very impressive and effective mentor for students who formed a group around him. These students represent the second generation of the Prague school. Most notable among them were Emil Arleth, Emil Utitz, Oskar Kraus, Alfred Kastil, Franz Hillebrand, Hugo Bergman, Josef Eisenmayer, Otto Funke, and Oskar Engländer (see Chap. 37, 40). Marty put most of them in contact with Brentano, whom they visited for philosophical conversations and with whom they regularly exchanged philosophical letters.¹

When in 1916 Oskar Kraus became a professor of philosophy in Prague, his students, as well as students visiting Prague to study under his guidance, constituted the third generation of the Prague school. At least three of them should be mentioned – Georg Katkov, Walter Engel and Eberhard Rogge. Roughly around 1916, Brentano’s reism (see Chap. 12) became the official teaching of the more orthodox members of the Prague Brentano school. The development and application of reism in different areas of descriptive psychology became the main working project of this orthodox group (for a similar development in Innsbruck see Chap. 40).²

Besides Marty and his students, other students and Enkelschüler of Brentano’s came to Prague as well. After the Charles-Ferdinand University split into the German and the Czech parts in 1882, a former student of Brentano’s, Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, attained a professorship in philosophy and sociology at the Czech philosophical faculty. Two students of Meinong’s, Christian von Ehrenfels and Alois Höfler (see Chap. 31, 40), became professors in Prague as well (Ehrenfels in 1896 and Höfler in 1903). However, the relationship of Marty and his pupils to Ehrenfels and Höfler was often tense and unfriendly, for they diverged considerably from Brentanian orthodoxy in various respects.

Masaryk became a leading intellectual figure in Bohemia and his political activities came to fruition when the republic of Czechoslovakia was established in 1918 and he became
its first president. In 1930, when he was celebrating his eightieth birthday, Masaryk was awarded twenty million crowns by the state for his role in the creation of Czechoslovakia. Masaryk, who had been supporting work done by Kraus on the new editions of Brentano’s books since 1925, granted a part of the award to Kraus and other Brentano students to establish the Brentano Society in Prague and the Brentano Archives with an official goal of publishing Brentano’s work and of spreading knowledge of his philosophy (Bayerová 1990). From 1931 to 1939 the Prague members of the society, especially Kraus and Katkov, developed international contacts with England and Poland as well as other interested philosophers abroad. The society published four philosophical volumes of texts of its members and continued editing and transcribing Brentano’s work for publication.

Sixty years of the philosophical work done in Prague in the name of Franz Brentano came to an end in 1939 when Kraus followed his student Katkov into exile in England to save his life after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia. Most of the archives were moved to Bodleian Library in Oxford. The society remained in existence, but it was taken over by German authorities. In 1942 Kraus died of cancer in Oxford. Utitz survived the concentration camp in Terezín. Rogge was shot at the eastern front. Engel never wrote on philosophy again. Katkov could not find a proper position in philosophy and switched his research field to the modern history of Russia. At the end of the war the Prague property of the society was raided by Russian troops. After the communist revolution in 1948 the society remained inactive until 1955 when it was finally dissolved.

Since a many of the other chapters in the Handbook deal with the life and work of the members of the Prague School individually or describe it in some way, here the philosophical topics of the Prague school will be discussed mainly with respect to the so-called orthodox school of Brentano – i.e. to the work of Kraus and Kraus’s students.

1. The Reistic Turn within the Prague School

Initially, all Marty’s students – e.g. Eisenmeier, Bergman, Kraus, Kastil – supported and defended Marty’s view of intentionality. This meant accepting Marty’s version of states of affairs and states of values (Wertverhalte) required by his adequation theory of truth and value. Marty viewed these entities as special non-real contents of judgments and emotions (respectively) and as existing in the present time, but devoid of any causal power (see Chap.
According to Marty, these contents cannot be reduced to real things, for there are also truths (and values) concerning non-existing objects. Nor can they be reduced to immanent objects of our acts on Marty’s view, for this would make the whole relation of adequacy between correct acts and contents purely subjective (Marty 1908: 295). In the case of judgments the content is a being or non-being or possibility or necessity of presented objects (for further details see Smith 1995: 92-115). In the domain of emotions the contents are either positive or negative values or their betterness or worseness.

A closely related doctrine that Marty taught is that of non-real hypothetical predicates, or relative determinations. According to Marty, in affirming, for example, that Barack Obama is bigger than Napoleon I have affirmed a counterfactual determination of Obama – if Napoleon were here, Obama would be bigger. This property is not real, but it is nevertheless a property which Obama really has (see Marty 1908: 437).

Such determinations were used in Marty's theory of intentional relations. According to Marty, every mental phenomenon is either ideally conformal to its content or, in the case where the content of consciousness does not exist, the conformity of the mental phenomenon is its relative determination (Marty 1908: 423-426). Conformity of an incorrect mental phenomenon to a content is a relative determination as well.

Brentano rejected Marty’s non-real objects and determinations in his correspondence with Marty (see e.g. Brentano 1930: 87-96/1966: 52-9). Marty nevertheless kept his view and all his Prague students initially followed suit. Kastil defended Marty’s views in his instructive critique of Twardowski’s concept of immanent intentional objects (see Kastil 1909: 51-58; 183-190). Kraus held the theory in his 1914 critique of contemporary theories of value (Kraus 1914: 3-4) and in his introduction to the four volumes of Marty’s Gesammelte Schriften (Kraus 1916). Similar defense of Marty’s views can be found e.g. in Eisenmeier (Eisenmeier 1923: 9-12) and Bergman (Bergman 1908: 8-10). After Marty’s death Brentano managed to persuade most of Marty’s former students to abandon the views of their teacher in favor of his own reism (for Brentano’s arguments against non-real entities see Brentano 1930: 87-118/1966: 52-71).

From now on descriptive psychology was to be done hand in hand with the reistic critique of language, for whenever we believe that we relate ourselves to something non-real we are mislead by a linguistic fiction. This critique for Brentano was actually his attempt to solve the problem of the many different meanings of “what is” as it was found in the
Aristotelian metaphysics. Only a thing, on this view, is (or exists) in the strict and proper sense (*im eigentlichen Sinn*), whereas other alleged objects can be said to be only in an improper sense. The linguistic fictions which result from an improper speech are the result of using so-called synsemeantic expressions as if they were autosemantic one. (In Marty’s terminology, these expressions are suggested by the inner grammatical form. See CHAP. 30, Kraus 1942: 102-3.) Such “false friends” are, for example, names of properties (form-words) such as “redness” – for according to this view, there is no redness, there are only red objects – or the so-called reflexive words whose meanings have to be decoded by reflexive analysis of intentional mental phenomena. “Existence”, “non-existence”, “value”, “fiction”, “preference” are examples of such reflexive words. Therefore, a proper reistic reformulation of the statements containing hidden synsemeantic expressions has to be given such that the real meaning of these expressions becomes visible (Kraus 1942: 116). Since Brentano left the project of reism in its programmatic stage, Kraus, Kastil and their students tried to offer their own answers to concrete philosophical problems.

### 2. Selected Problems of the Reistic Theory of Intentional Consciousness

#### 2.1 Reistic Reinterpretation of Hypothetical Determinations

While Marty formulated his theory of non-real contents and relative determinations to describe intentional relations, Brentano replaced his theory of intentional relations with a view that they are in fact merely relation-like (see CHAP. 4). For they do not require (but do not exclude) the existence of both members of the relation. Instead, only the existence of the fundament of the relation is necessary if the relation exists (for other cases of what is relation-like, see Kraus 1942, Kastil 1951: 132-5). Now, Marty used his theory of relative determinations to explain certain cases comparative relations, e.g. “The population of the world is less than eighteen billion”. Hence, reistic interpretation of these comparative relations had to be given. Kraus (1924: XXXVIII/2009: 295) offered one in his introduction to the *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Kraus’ strategy is based on how we *think* or *present* relatives. Whenever a relative is presented, its fundament is presented directly (*in modo recto*) and the terminus, i.e. that to which the fundament stands in relation, is presented indirectly (*in modo obliquo*). In this way, for example, our inner perception as a moment of any mental acts presents intentionality. The inner perception, which is inherent to all mental
phenomena, has as its object the mental phenomenon in *modo recto* in relation to its intentional object, which is co-presented *modo obliquo*. If a relative is affirmed (as is always the case with inner perception), the only thing affirmed is the fundament, while, according to Kraus, the terminus is that through which the affirmed fundament is determined in its presentation. Therefore, in expressions such as “The population of the world is less than eighteen billion” we only have in mind what is associated with the term “eighteen billion” so that we can present a general idea of size to specify the population which really is affirmed. However, Katkov (1930: 83) pointed out that Marty had serious objections to this approach, which echo objections made by Brentano himself (see Taieb 2015: 194-5). For example:

> Relations have often been characterized as forms of thought, as something that would be established or produced by our conception of things. If this is understood in the strict sense, it obviously means that they do not lie in the things themselves, but are rather put into them by our act of presenting. However, someone who regards the relation as something objective, as belonging to the objects, must forego seeing them as a matter of forms of thought in the sense of subjective modes of presentation. If, however, someone wanted to call them a matter of objective modes of our act of presenting – wherein could this objectivity consist but in the fact that what is given therein is something belonging to the objects, hence a differentia of objects ... ? (Marty 1910: 67)

If the affirmation of the comparative relation is *true*, then the relation must be something *objective* and not *just* a part of our subjective presenting of the fundament. Katkov (1930: 486-7) therefore suggested a different reistic solution of the problem. His solution consists in the reduction of Marty's hypothetical predicates into apodictic rejections of complexes of which both fundament and terminus are parts. For example, the judge7 in the above example apodictically rejects someone evidently affirming a group of eighteen billion people which does not include the number of living people as its part. In the judgment “White is a lighter color than pure black” the judge apodictically rejects someone evidently affirming an instance of pure black that has the same or greater lightness than white and without having to worry that perception of pure black is factually impossible (see Katkov 1930: 485-6).

> These reistic interpretations presuppose reistic understanding of sentences referring to possibility and impossibility. These were usually treated by the late Prague school of Brentano as judgments pertaining to modes (evident/blind, apodictic/assertoric, affirmative/negative) of judgments made by a judge as such (*als solcher*) of objects presented *in obliquo*. The following elucidations roughly state the reistic strategy (Katkov 1930: 530-1, Rogge 1934: 28-32) in relation to modalities. If I say

1. “A is possible” then I apodictically reject a judge as such who is apodictically rejecting A
with self-evidence.

2. “A is impossible” then I apodictically reject a judge as such who is apodictically affirming A with self-evidence.

If one leaves out the apodicticity from the affirmation in point 1 or the negation in point 2, one gets an interpretation of “A is existing” (point 1) or A is not existing (point 2). A similar kind of answer would have to be given to the analysis of “A is necessary” (such an attempt was made by Rogge 1934: 32-40).

2.2 Katkov’s Reduction of Intentional Contents of Presentations, Judgments

When Twardowski distinguished between the intentional content and the intentional object of presentations (see Chap. 35), his distinction caught on among Brentano’s students, as both Meinong and Husserl began employing their own versions of it. However, according to the late Brentano, to call an object “intentional” is only to linguistically fix an intentional activity of which the object is an object and turn it into an external attribute of the object at the risk of creating a fictional class of special “intentional” objects. The horse I see is a “seen horse”, the object I want is a “wanted object” but there are not two horses or two objects of desire present. The intentional objects (in both senses distinguished by Twardowski) as special entities have to be rejected. However, Brentano’s reism once again had to face the problem of non-existing objects. Presenting “this” (e.g. a chair) and not “that” (e.g. a person) is a real attribute of intentionality. But if the object of intention does not exist and there are no intentional contents, how can intentionality be differentiated with respect to objects? Once again, the answer of the late Prague school is based on the theory of inner perception.

Whenever I present an object I affirm myself in the secondary inner awareness (see Chap. 5) as a “presenter” of this object which is presented *modo obliquo*. The so-called immanent content is nothing but a primary intentionality (an intentional relative) presented as object of its own inner perception. The differences between intentional contents are in reality differences between people who “take themselves to be”.

According to Katkov (1930: 493) and Kraus (1934a: 46-7), the whole theory gives us an *a priori* proof of the self-reflective nature of intentionality, for according to this theory the primary presentation of X must be *grounded* in being conscious of oneself as being conscious of X in an indirect way (Katkov 1930: 507).
Contents of judgments (states of affairs) must be reduced in a similar way to the character of universal validity of judgments (see Kraus’ remark in Brentano 1930: 185-6/2009: 109, Katkov 1930: 539-0). Brentano never really specified how the intention of a universal validity (correctness) of judgment (truth claim) is unified with judgment. Since there are judgments which continue even though we know about their falsity (namely, primitive sensory perceptions), Katkov decided to interpret the intention of correctness of a judgment (i.e. that we take the judgment to be true) as a second-order apodictic rejection of the self-evidence of the contradictory judgment (or rather of the contradicting evident “judger” as such). From this it follows that there could be beings, for example some animals, who could judge about something with self-evidence without being aware that the opposite is necessarily false. Traditionally speaking, such beings would not be conscious of the law of contradiction, and yet they would, for example, have evident inner affirmation of their mental acts. This (blind or evident) intention of objective validity is responsible for the fiction of states of affairs in which “the specific moments of judgments are mixed together into one whole with specific moments of things about which we judge” (Katkov 1930: 536).

This theory improves Marty’s theory of communication (Katkov 1930: 527-4, 1937: 13-4), for it is not enough, as Marty claimed, to manifest that I am making a judgment in order to move the listener to consider following the same judgment. I have to make the listener aware that I take my judgment for a correct one.

2.3 The Self-Evidence of Inner Perception

In 1908 Hugo Bergman devoted a whole book to the problem of explaining Brentano’s concept of the self-evidence of inner perception (see Chap. 37). The result was a meager one. A detailed defense of a strictly Brentanian view of the self-evidence of inner consciousness limited this self-evidence to simple existential affirmations of mental phenomena (Bergman 1908: 6). Following hints from the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint Bergman claimed that this affirmation is only implicit and simultaneous with the inwardly perceived phenomenon and – although conceptually differentiable from the perceived act – recognized as identical with it (1908: 12). However, it was very hard to see how this implicit consciousness could be of any use in descriptive psychology since psychology presupposes an explicit reflexive grasp which makes the acts primary objects of investigation in order to conceptualize them for further general psychological insights. Such a shift of attention
presupposes memory, but memory does not admit of self-evidence. Furthermore, the disagreement between different psychological descriptions was explained by the occasional lack of distinctiveness (Un deut lich keit) of our inner consciousness.

In looking for answers Kraus and his students wrongly ascribed to Brentano a theory of apperception which was published as Brentano’s official view in Brentano 1928 (which Kraus billed as Vol. III. of the Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint). This theory recognizes an evident act of reflexive perception (the so-called apperception) that is still evident even though it is not identical with the perceived act, because we have evidence that it could not have been caused by anything else. Such evidence of causality is called by Brentano the evidence of motivation (see Kastil 1951: 223-9). Brentano writes: “The act of apperception is therefore caused by the act of perception and has at the same time the character of being motivated by the act of perception. Precisely by this being-motivated the act of apperception is evident.” (Brentano 1928: 34-5/1981b: 26)

However, not everybody accepted this explanation. For example, Rogge clearly recognized that this could not have been Brentano’s position and refused it.10

2.4 Presentations as a Fundamental Class of Mental Phenomena

One of the most permanent features of Brentano’s thinking was his view that all intentional acts are either presentations or based on presentations. The question whether this principle should be upheld was raised among the Prague Brentanists, specifically by Kraus’ student Walter Engel. The outlines of Engel’s theory were presented by Kraus (Kraus 1937: 167). Unfortunately, the war prevented Engel from publishing his view, and the only thing which survived is Kraus’ short report of it:

According to Brentano’s theory, the relation of a presentation is the basis of judgement and emotion in a similar way as substance is to the accident. However, it is possible to advocate another version: Every consciousness, as is well known, is something that relates to something; it can vary in three respects: 1. The one who is relating can change in his individuality. 2. He can, as someone who relates, change qualitatively or modally (by being a presenter, a judger or someone conducting himself emotionally). 3. He can change by relating to something else, so-called “object-differentia”. If this view were correct, it should not be said that there is for every consciousness an underlying presenting, but rather that there could not be a consciousness without object-relation any more than one without a certain quality of relation. Dr. Walter Engel (Prague) advocates this view in a work that is not yet published.

Although this variational Husserl-like approach was presented only as a working hypothesis,
it reveals an open-minded approach of Kraus and his students to Brentano’s teachings.

2.5. The Character and the Existence of the Outside World

According to the late Brentano, our presentation is always general – sensation being the least general kind of it. We therefore do not perceive time, space and individual substances as they are in themselves. Hence, there is an unbreachable limit to our experience of the external reality. Among the Prague Brentanians this difference of for us/in itself led to a difference in perspectives. While Kraus and Kastil presented this view in a realistic fashion, stressing the fact that in the sciences we can judge about features of transcendent reality even though certain absolute determinations elude us (Kraus 1934b: 131-5, Kastil 1951: 239-40), Eisenmeier (1923) stressed the relational character of our scientific understanding of transcendent reality as something that excludes and confines us to the narrow limits of our experience. When Bergman refused Brentano’s use of the probability calculus in his proof of the external world,11 he was left with a relational structure of our knowledge that could be interpreted in a Neo-Kantian fashion as well as in a more Russelian style (see Bergman 1920). Furthermore, Rogge (1938: 168-9) not only criticized Brentano’s proof of the external world, but also pointed out the circularity in Brentano’s claim that the natural sciences experimentally prove the non-existence of sensory qualities in the real world, for in his Psychology Brentano’s already defines the natural sciences as dealing with a world radically different from what external perception shows us (see Brentano 1874: 138).

3. Preference and Critique of the Sum of the Greatest Good

Brentano’s ethics (as distinct from Brentano’s theory of moral valuation) is based on the principle of the best attainable good, i.e. we should strive for “the greatest possible spiritual good for all animate beings who fall within our sphere of influence” (Brentano 1952: 222/2009b: 139; see Chap. 24). Since the will is for Brentano an act of practical preference, the general concept of preference and the ethical principle of the greatest possible good were often discussed among the Prague Brentanists. The characteristic features of these discussions about “the greatest value” was an interest in the theories of economic value and marginal utility, especially in the form developed by the so-called Austrian school of
Economics. A critique of the general points of these theories from the Brentanian standpoint was offered by Kraus (1902, 1937: 357-86) and by Oskar Engländer (1914, 1931), who was a professor of economics at the Prague German University.

Another feature of these discussions was a critique of the utilitarian principle of the sum of the greatest good, which Brentano himself might not have differentiated clear enough from his own conception. The critique of the sum of the greatest good based on the development of Brentano’s remarks in Katkov’s interesting book is worth mentioning here (Katkov 1937: 43-70, see also Chisholm 1986). According to Katkov, an essential difference between correct emotion and correct judgment (besides the fact that correct judgments do not admit of the distinction of better and worse and correct emotions do not fall under the law of the excluded middle) is that, for example, from correctly loving pleasure as such it does not follow that it is correct to love all cases of pleasure. The love (or hate) of the object as such based in the content of its general content does not imply love (or hate) of all objects constituting its extension. Other considerations suggests that the positive value of a whole is not a simple sum of the positive values of its parts. Thus the principle of *bonum variationis* states that if two goods of different types A and B have the same positive value, then the whole consisting of goods of the type A+B will be more valuable then the whole consisting merely from goods of the type A+A or B+B. The principle of *bonum progressionis* states that given that the total value of unordered parts of a development of some entity is the same, a progress or rise of a value of that entity in time is more valuable than the process of its degeneration. The principle of the individual perfection says that the same goods will create a better whole if they belong to the same individuum than if they belong to different individua. “Dostoyevsky’s principle” states that an evil done to one individuum cannot be somehow undone by good done to another individuum. The same logic led Katkov to claim that the non-existence of a whole containing one part unworthy of existence is preferable to its existence. The whole treatise also defends the view that simple multiplication of an individual possessing a positive value would create only more objects with the value but not something more valuable (compare: the multiplication of a golden individual will create more golden things, but not a more golden whole). The classic utilitarian principle of the greatest good is for Katkov and for his teacher Kraus a secondary rule derived from the main principle that the existence of something good is itself good and therefore preferable to its non-existence. However, its grounding is rather different: “It is not for the sake of increasing goods and reducing evils, but rather for the sake of elevating as much as possible the incalculable intrinsic value of the relevant beings, that we seek to make the goods accessible to as many as possible and we
strive to reduce the evils as much as possible.” (Kraus 1937: 275)

Conclusion

The title “The Prague School of Brentano” covers a work of three generations of followers of Brentano. In this chapter, we mostly tried to cover some selected philosophical motives distinctive of its last, reistic phase, to show that the whole movement might not have been as orthodox in relation to its teacher as it looks from the apologetic introductions to Brentano’s work written by Kastil and Kraus. This overview hopefully gives the impression of an intellectual movement of great vitality and critical acumen forming contacts abroad in order to expand its horizons. Unfortunately, the promising signs of development of Brentano’s thought by Prague “reists” in the thirties were cut short and subsequently erased from the history of 20th-century philosophy due to the National Socialistic and later Communist regimes that brought darkness and devastation upon Masaryk’s democratic Czechoslovakia.  

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The Prague Brentano circle, of which many were German-speaking Jews (e.g. Kraus, Utitz, Bergman), used to meet after Marty’s lectures in the Café Louvre to continue philosophical discussions. There they were sometimes joined by other intellectual members of the Prague German Jewish community: Oskar Pollack, Max Brod and Franz Kafka.

Brentano gave Kraus and Kastil free hand to organize and put together the unpublished materials from his literary estate in a way that would correspond to his late reistic views. Reism and the philosophical theories contained in the resulting books (notably Brentano 1930, 1933) are often a result of heavy-handed editing and even rewriting and reformulating of Brentano’s texts. While it is sometimes hard to say whether a position expressed in these volumes corresponds to Brentano’s views, these books can be safely read as expressing positions of the Prague and Innsbruck reism at the time of their publications.

The list of known members of the Prague Brentano Society given by Binder (see Binder 2000: 564) states the following English members: G.E. Moore, H. Eaton, D. Hicks, R. Reeds.

The reism of Brentano and his followers and the reism of Tadeusz Kotarbinski were being developed independently until Twardowski and Katkov made Kotarbinski aware of the close proximity of his views and the views of the late Brentano (a short description of this development and a comparison of both reistic views is given in Kraus 1937: 268-271). Kotarbinski was in touch with Kraus and his pupils from 1930. The ties between Prague and Lvov where strengthened in 1937 when on account of Twardowski’s invitation Kraus gave a series of lectures in Poland. Another Polish philosopher, apart from Twardowski, who had ties to the Prague Brentano circle was Władysław Tatarkiewicz. Both Kotarbinski and Tatarkiewicz were on the list of the contributors for the second volume of the Abhandlungen zum Gedächtnis des 100. Geburtages von Franz Brentano that was to be published by the Prague Brentano Society in 1939. The volume never saw the light of day due to the outbreak of the war.

Utitz wrote a book about the psychology of life in the Terezín concentration camp which has recently been republished together with his shorter texts from the same camp (see Utitz 2015).

The following discussions are necessarily selective, for the output and the range of topics of the orthodox Brentanists was quite large.

It would be more proper to say “someone who judges” but this makes the structure of some further statements overly complicated.

Since conscious subjects differentiate themselves also as “judger” and “lovers and haters” the argument could be extended to involve all fundamental classes of intentionality. For a more formalized version of the Katkovian perspective see Chisholm 1990. An a priori argument for the grounding of intentionality in inner perception could be also deduced from Brentano’s late conception of time, which claims that to be conscious of time is to be conscious of the time modes of presenting acts (see Chap. 6), which presupposes self-consciousness.

Kraus confesses that the whole theory comes from what he wrote down after he read and discussed a psychognostic fragment of Brentano during his visit with Brentano in 1901 and that he wasn’t able to find this view in Brentano’s manuscripts (Kraus in Brentano 1928: 146/1981b: 105). What Brentano discussed with Kraus was most likely inspired by Brentano’s reading of Leibniz’ Nouveaux Essais. In his 1908 letter to Husserl Brentano writes: “However, I saw that he [Leibniz] in the second book assumes an apperception of one’s own acts by acts that occur later. And here you find yourself in agreement with him, but I don’t”. Kraus could not have known the letter since it was published only in 1994 (Husserl 1994: 50).

“[This theory of apperception] can only be a casual witticism, not a serious expression of belief, for otherwise wherever the origins of the concept of causality are noted [in the works of Brentano] the case of inner apperception would have to be mentioned as well... [F]or an immediate knowledge of causality very definite conditions must be fulfilled; these conditions are fulfilled only in the case of axiomatic grasping.” (Rogge 1938: 172).

“Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint works within the confines of critical realism without providing any serious “metaphysical” proof of the existence of the outside world. Later, Brentano offered a proof of an independent world or real objects standing under causal laws (see Brentano 1925: 118-30, Kastil 1951: 223-9; for critique see Rogge 1935: 57-67, 77-87).
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