

Review Essay: Moderating Racism: The Attempt to  
Restrain Anti-Japanese Racism in World War II  
Propaganda Films

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“In Europe we felt that our enemies, terrible and deadly as they were, were still people. But out here [in the Pacific theater] I soon gathered that the Japanese were looked upon as something subhuman or repulsive; the way some people feel about cockroaches or mice.”

—Ernie Pyle<sup>1</sup>

## 1. Introduction

In this essay, I will explore one of the most ironic episodes in the history of propaganda, namely, the attempt by various U.S. federal agencies to moderate racist elements in American World War II (WWII) anti-Japanese propaganda films. I examine four films: two produced by the military and two by Hollywood. They include *December 7<sup>th</sup>* (1943), *Air Force* (1943), *Know Your*

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<sup>1</sup> Clayton Koppes and Gregory Black, *Hollywood Goes to War: How Politics, Profit, and Propaganda Shaped World War II* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 253.

*Enemy: Japan* (1945), and *Betrayal from the East* (1945).<sup>2</sup> After setting up some historical context and summarizing each film, I will analyze how they served to intensify racial hatred of Japanese people in general and Japanese-Americans in particular as well as how the federal government tried to control that propaganda, but was limited by its own policies regarding Japanese-Americans.

Let's start with the context surrounding American WWII film propaganda. During the WWII period, film was *not* covered by the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1915 that films were merely business products, and thus they were not protected expression.<sup>3</sup> Essentially, films could be censored or regulated by agencies at all levels of government. It was only in 1952 that the Supreme Court first ruled that film is covered by the First Amendment. Therefore, even though by 1930 the motion picture industry was large and powerful, during WWII it was still monitored by various organizations.

Among these monitoring agencies was the Production Code Administration (PCA), set up to enforce the Hays Code, which was a voluntary form of self-censorship adopted by Hollywood in 1934. The Hays Code restricted what American movies could portray, mainly on social issues such as sex, crime, drug usage, nudity, and so on. However, during the war years, the PCA was also involved in some political censorship, as when it stopped the production of a film about Nazi concentration camps in the late 1930s—ironically, because the film portrayed negatively another country's institutions and leaders.

Also involved in vetting war films was the United States Office of War Information (OWI). President Franklin Roosevelt created the OWI by executive order in 1942, six months after the

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<sup>2</sup> *December 7<sup>th</sup>*, directed by Greg Toland and John Ford (Office of War Information, 1943); *Air Force*, directed by Howard Hawks (Warner Brothers, 1943); *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, directed by Frank Capra (Netflix, 1945); *Betrayal from the East*, directed by William Berke (RKO Radio Pictures, 1945).

<sup>3</sup> *Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio*, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).

Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. The OWI was created to provide news about and increase support for the war; in short, it was a kind of ministry of propaganda. It was in operation from June 1942 until September 1945.

The OWI had both dissemination and censorship functions. It disseminated information about the war domestically and abroad through a variety of media, including films, newspapers, radio broadcasts, and posters. It also produced a number of radio series and set up the Voice of America. More controversially, the OWI worked with the War Relocation Authority (WRA)—the agency tasked with incarcerating Japanese-Americans—to produce films that justified that internment.

The OWI's censorship function was directed at two main sources of war films: governmental war departments such as the Department of War (which during WWII contained the Department of the Army and the Department of the Army Air Force) and the Department of the Navy (which during the war was still a separate Cabinet-level department<sup>4</sup>) and the Hollywood studios. Eminent director John Ford was made a Naval officer and produced many of the U.S. Navy's war films and equally renowned director Frank Capra was made an Army officer and made many of the Army's war films, augmenting the already large number of war films produced by Hollywood studios during this period.

The OWI set up the Bureau of Motion Pictures (BMP) to try to ensure that studios produced films that presented what, in the eyes of the OWI, was the "right image" of the war and to increase the public's support for it. Despite the fact that President Roosevelt said there was to be no censorship of the movies, the

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<sup>4</sup> In 1947, the Army Air Force became the separate United States Air Force and the Navy Department was subsumed into the War Department, becoming the Department of Defense.

OWI exercised considerable power in forcing the revision of scripts or even blocking the release of films.

## **2. The Japanese Fifth-Column Narrative and the Internment of the Japanese in the U.S.**

The December 7<sup>th</sup>, 1941, Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor swiftly resulted in persecution of the Japanese in America. Within hours of the attack, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) started rounding up leaders of the Japanese-American community, which was mainly located in Hawaii and states along the west coast. In a matter of days, more than 2,000 of these community leaders were jailed and their assets frozen. The press also immediately sprang into action, running stories spreading what I term the Japanese Fifth-Column Narrative, which is the myth that Japanese-Americans actively assisted or even fought with the Japanese military in its attack on Pearl Harbor.

This narrative was given an early boost by the Roberts Report, which is a report on the Pearl Harbor attack issued on January 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1942, by a committee headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. This report held that the two highest officers in charge of Pearl Harbor's defense at the time of the attack—Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short—were “derelict” in their duties. The report also contained a vague statement that “[t]here were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the island of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected and, through various channels transmitted, information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the island.”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> “Attack on Pearl Harbor: Report of the Commission,” January 23, 1942, Digital History, accessed online at: [https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/active\\_learning/explorations/japanese\\_internment/pearl\\_harbor\\_commission.cfm](https://www.digitalhistory.uh.edu/active_learning/explorations/japanese_internment/pearl_harbor_commission.cfm).

Even though the Roberts Report made no mention of Japanese-Americans collaborating with the enemy, various politicians and newspapers quickly moved to promulgate the Japanese Fifth-Column Narrative. On February 14<sup>th</sup>, Lt. Gen. John DeWitt, commander of the Western Defense Command—the Army’s organization for coordinating the defense of America’s Pacific Coast region—wrote the U.S. Secretary of War to recommend that the Japanese “and other subversive elements” be moved out of the region and away from all military installations. Five days later, President Roosevelt issued an executive order giving the U.S. military the power to identify “military areas” and exclude from them any people the military command saw fit. Less than two weeks later, DeWitt ordered that Japanese-Americans were to be excluded from the western halves of California, Oregon, and Washington along with the southern third of Arizona. This exclusion zone was later expanded to include all of California and Alaska as well.<sup>6</sup>

By mid-November of 1942, 100,000 Japanese-Americans were moved first to temporary centers in places such as stables at race-tracks and then to large concentration camps in inland Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, and elsewhere. Japanese-Americans had to sell their property rapidly, often at artificially low prices. During 1942 to 1946, over 127,000 Japanese-American citizens spent time in the camps and they were released only after the war. In 1944 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the WRA had no right to subject loyal citizens to its concentration camp system.<sup>7</sup> The Court’s ruling only allied to Mitsuye Endo as an individual, but she refused to leave the camps unless all her people were let go. The Supreme Court took another year to decide that the whole

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<sup>6</sup> Besides the Western Defense Command, the Homeland Defense included the Eastern Defense Command, the Central Defense Command, the Southern Defense Command, the Alaska Defense Command, and the Caribbean Defense Command, each with its own commander with the power to relocate civilians. Only DeWitt exercised this power and he did so only against Japanese-Americans.

<sup>7</sup> *Ex parte Mitsuye Endo*, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).

prison camp system was illegal and allowed President Harry Truman to start closing the camp before it announced its final decision. By March of 1946 the last camp was closed.

Neither German-Americans nor Italian-Americans were interned during this time, despite the fact that both Germany and Italy also declared war on the U.S. Only Japanese-Americans were singled out for internment.<sup>8</sup>

### **3. *December 7<sup>th</sup> and Air Force***

The portrait of Japanese people in American WWII movies was invariably demonizing, but two films produced in 1943 were especially egregious. The first—*December 7<sup>th</sup>*—was initiated by eminent director John Ford. The Navy assigned him the project of making a short documentary about the attack on Pearl Harbor and the heroic efforts the Navy made to restore the base and repair the ships. Ford was busy making his documentary *Midway*, so he assigned the film to outstanding cinematographer Gregg Toland. However, instead of a short piece on the attack and the recovery from it, Toland produced a feature-length film about the failures of intelligence leading up to the attack. Toland's film has a prologue in the form of a staged argument between a naïve Uncle Sam and a realistic character "Mr. C" (Uncle Sam's conscience). It conveys the message that the Japanese—including Japanese-Americans—are different and dangerous. We are told that Japanese-Americans are only hyphenated Americans: they send their children to Japanese schools, worship a "so-called religion, Shintoism," and apply for dual-citizenship for their children. We see in the background Japanese children singing in Japanese,

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<sup>8</sup> No Italian-Americans were interned, despite the fact that the Fascist League of North America (FLNA) was founded in 1924, combining forty fascist Italian-American organizations, and the FLNA lasted until 1929. Again, no German-Americans were interned, despite the fact that in 1936, the German-American Federation was founded with the direct involvement of Deputy Fuhrer Rudolf Hess. It had a peak membership of 25,000 followers and engaged in spreading Nazi propaganda as well as openly seditious actions.

Japanese signs in shops, Japanese listening to long-range radio broadcasts from Tokyo, and so on. The film advances the Fifth-Column Narrative by showing Japanese-Americans engaging in espionage and the Japanese Consul receiving that information.

When the OWI saw an early cut of the film in October 1942, its members were angered by its portrayal of Japanese-Americans.<sup>9</sup> When the Joint Chiefs saw the film in early 1943, they were aghast. They seem to have had two basic objections to it. First, the film implicitly but strongly condemned the U.S. military for lack of preparedness. Second, it explicitly accused Japanese-Americans in Hawaii with actively aiding the Japanese military. That is, it pushed the Fifth Column Narrative with a vengeance.<sup>10</sup>

Ford took Toland's version of the film and gutted it, cutting it down from 120 to 32 minutes and removing the objectional material—especially the prologue—while keeping much of the footage of the attack. He thus restored the film's original purpose of showing how the attack occurred and how quickly the War Department and Navy acted to recover, so that it was approved for limited release.

Hollywood's first major film to deal with the Pearl Harbor attack was *Air Force* (1943). This was an A-level picture, with a top director, writer, producer, and actors. In the film, a B-17 Flying Fortress (part of a group of nine bombers) nick-named "Mary Ann" is sent on a routing flight from San Francisco to Pearl Harbor. The crew lands in the middle of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The crew's voyage is a voyage of discovery about the perfidious nature of the Japanese.

The message that Japanese (both native and American) are different and dangerous is conveyed through various scenes. For

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<sup>9</sup> Mark Harris, *Five Came Back: A Story of Hollywood and the Second World War* (Edinburgh: Canongate Books Ltd., 2014), 206.

<sup>10</sup> Alan Chalk, "Teaching Pearl Harbor Films, American and Japanese," *Education about Asia* 7, no. 1 (2002), 23.

example, a crewman calls the Japanese “monkeys” (a common anti-Japanese slur of the time). There are numerous scenes of Pearl Harbor, Hickam Field, Wake Island, and Clark Air Force Base (in the Philippines) in flames. An American airman is shot by a Japanese fighter plane as he parachutes to the ground and then is strafed as he lies wounded. Also, there are two scenes in which American servicemen discuss how sneaky it was for the Japanese to attack America while pretending to conduct good-faith peace negotiations in Washington.

The Japanese Fifth-Column Narrative is advanced in several scenes. Upon landing at Maui, “locals” (Hawaiian Japanese-Americans) shoot at them, forcing them to fly to another field. An officer then reports that a Japanese-American vegetable truck drove down Hickam Field, chopping the tails off the aircraft shortly before the attack. An airman reports that a “Jap” in a truck blocked the road leading to Hickam Field (and shot at him with a shotgun), so the pilot could not join in the defense. One soldier tells another that at Hickam Field there was a lot of “fifth-column” activity. At Clark Air Force base, an officer reports that the local Japanese set fires to guide in the bombers and cut the telegraph lines just before the attack, which was intended to show that Japanese Philipinos also constituted a fifth column.

The OWI reviewed the script for *Air Force* in October 1942 and heavily criticized it for its portrayal of Japanese-Americans as being a major cause of the defeats the U.S. suffered early on in the Pacific Theater. While the OWI objected to the film, the Army Air Force approved its domestic and foreign distribution. The PCA only objected to language such as “damn,” “hell,” and “lousy”—but not to phrases such as “fried Jap” and “stinkin’ Nips.”<sup>11</sup> The OWI was up against Hollywood’s economic interests: *Air Force* had cost a lot to make; hence, it played widely. While the Toland-made anti-Japanese jeremiad was quashed by the OWI and the military (and Ford’s version saw

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<sup>11</sup> Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 78.



only limited release), the Hollywood-produced screed was shown widely to the public.

#### **4. *Know Your Enemy: Japan and Betrayal from the East***

Of the eminent directors who volunteered to join the American Armed Forces and make propaganda films to support the war effort, doubtless the most prolific and effective was Frank Capra. Enlisting in the Army just days after Pearl Harbor, he started making propaganda films in 1942. After the Allied victory in Europe, Capra wanted to leave the service and return to Hollywood, but the Army wanted him to finish one last film, as the U.S. was still at war with Japan. That film was *Know Your Enemy: Japan*.

John Huston wrote script for the film in late 1944, making it frankly racist by adding lines about the Japanese having buck teeth and wearing glasses. The script was reviewed by the War Department and, even though it was blatantly racist, the Army approved its production. In fact, the Army was worried that it was “too sympathetic to the Jap people.”<sup>12</sup> Despite the approval of Huston’s script, Capra took him off the project, wrote the final version of the script, and finished making the movie in August 1945. The film is arguably the most venomous piece of anti-Japanese film propaganda produced during WWII.

The bulk of *Know Your Enemy: Japan* depicts Japan’s history and culture in a way that demonstrates how different and dangerous the Japanese are. In order to portray difference, numerous scenes show allegedly “strange” customs, such as worshipping a sun-god emperor and ancestral ghosts (Shintoism); regimentation of their children; and a stereotypical physical appearance of being short, skinny, and with their soldiers looking like “prints off the same negative.” Advancing the idea that the Japanese are dangerous include claims about them following a

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<sup>12</sup> Harris, *Five Came Back*, 336-37.

doctrine of world domination (“Hakko ichiu”) laid out in a written plan (the apocryphal “Tanaka Memorial”); learning from foreigners and then turning on them; using sneaky and treacherous tactics; finding meaningless the concepts of liberty and freedom; being prone to rape, brutality, and torture; and being especially bloodthirsty in their blind obedience to authority. All of this is accompanied by scenes of atrocities that Japanese troops committed, the death march of American prisoners in the Philippines, and the mass killing of innocent Philipinos. The film ends with the chilling warning that defeating Japan “is as necessary as shooting a mad dog in your neighborhood.”

Capra’s film was shipped off to be screened to U.S. troops in the Pacific, but it arrived three days after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima. When Gen. Douglas MacArthur—the most powerful military commander in the war at that time—viewed the film, he was utterly opposed to its screening. He told the War Department that he refused to show it to the soldiers and urged that it not be shown or publicized in the U.S. The film was locked away for over thirty years.

Turning now to *Betrayal from the East*, this film opens with journalist Drew Pearson saying that the film was based on a real story and cautioning the viewer that this must never happen again. The story opens in an American newspaper field office in Tokyo, where we learn that two journalists—the office editor and a reporter—have obtained a list of Japanese spies operating on the U.S. West Coast. The journalists are subsequently killed. We move to the Japanese consulate in San Francisco, where two Japanese agents (Kato and Yamato) discuss a Japanese plot to paralyze the Pacific region. Kato reports that West Coast operations are set to go, but the Japanese spy in Panama failed to get the defense plans for the Canal Zone. However, he knows an ex-GI (Eddie Carter) who likes “easy Money,” so he could be bribed to get the plans. The film revolves around the actions of Eddie Carter and Peggy Harrison, who is an American undercover agent who winds up working with Eddie to foil the Japanese spies and saboteurs. Eddie and Peggy wind up dying for their country at the hands of Japanese agents.

Various scenes advance the view that the Japanese are different and dangerous. For example, the opening title shows a caricatured Japanese face with glasses, fangs, and a scowling look and Eddie later calls the Japanese “monkeys.” The Japanese secretary and the clerk at the American newspaper office are portrayed as spies and Eddie calls the Japanese agents who intend to kill him “dirty double-crossing back-stabbers.” The editor at the newspaper office is defenestrated by the Japanese secret service and the American reporter who had memorized the list of Japanese spies and saboteurs on the West Coast is cruelly thrown overboard from a Japanese ship while returning to the U.S. We see Kato showing agents how to derail a train and he boasts that America will be saturated by “peace” propaganda while “our diplomats” delude American leaders until the day of the attack. A “traitor” (a Japanese-American U.S. intelligence agent) is tortured with a red-hot iron and Japanese and Nazi agents in Panama kill Peggy by steaming her in a sauna.

The whole film is an extended elaboration of the Japanese Fifth-Column Narrative. Many scenes convey this message. The American reporter tells the editor (when they are in the field office in Tokyo) that Japan has an espionage and sabotage organization from Seattle to San Diego for when war comes. The reporter tells the editor that this embedded fifth column are “all Japs living in America,” with the editor adding that many of them have lived in America for a long time. For example, a key Japanese operative poses as a student of English at Stanford and is on the football cheering squad, while Kato owns a club in Los Angeles. While in Los Angeles to meet Kato and “make easy money,” Eddie finds that he is being followed by Japanese agents and that his hotel room is bugged. Indeed, Peggy says that “the whole Pacific Coast is sitting on a powder keg.” At the Panama hotel Eddie is sent to, the bellboy and the travel concierge are both Japanese spies, while at a Japanese-owned beauty parlor in Panama, we see the wives of American servicemen blabbing military secrets as Japanese beauticians listen intently. Finally, while on a Japanese freighter that is supposed to take him back to California, Eddie discovers a box with the plans to numerous West Coast installations.

The OWI objected to *Betrayal from the East*. While it felt it couldn't stop the film's domestic distribution, it was able to block the film's foreign distribution. This marked a capitulation by the OWI. Since earlier Hollywood movies focused on the Japanese, the agency had urged Hollywood studios to present the Japanese fascist military regime—rather than the Japanese people as such—as the real enemy. Starting in 1942, though, a string of major Hollywood films pushed the racist narrative.<sup>13</sup> By 1944, the OWI gave up trying to constrain the studios from conveying that narrative and settled for keeping the movies from being distributed outside the U.S.<sup>14</sup>

## 5. The OWI Contradiction

In retrospect, the OWI's own actions made incoherent its efforts to rein in virulent anti-Japanese propaganda produced by Hollywood. One manifestation of this incoherence is that the OWI *itself* produced two short “documentaries” (really, just blatant propaganda films)—*Japanese Relocation* (1942) and *A Challenge to Democracy* (1944)—sugarcoating the decision to put Japanese-Americans in concentration camps. Both put forward the Japanese Fifth-Column Narrative.

Consider first *Japanese Relocation*. This short film is narrated by Milton Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower's younger brother. Milton Eisenhower directed the WRA, but after three months he resigned and became deputy director of the OWI. This film opens by telling us that the attack on Pearl Harbor made the West Coast “a potential combat zone.” With 100,000 people of Japanese descent in the region, two-thirds of them U.S. citizens and one-third “aliens,” Eisenhower tells us that “we knew that some were potentially dangerous” and we couldn't tell what that

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, *Little Tokyo, USA* (1942); *Wake Island* (1942); *Bataan* (1943); *Guadalcanal Diary* (1943); *Gung Ho* (1943); *Objective Burma* (1945); and *Blood on the Sun* (1945).

<sup>14</sup> Koppes and Black, *Hollywood Goes to War*, 276.

population would do if the Japanese invaded America. He warns that the country faced “sabotage and espionage.” For example, in Los Angeles (which had more Japanese residents than any other U.S. city) hotels used primarily by Japanese were close to an air base, shipyard, and oil facilities; Japanese fishermen could monitor the movements of our ships; and Japanese farmers lived near aircraft plants. Such people were relocated first, but the problem still remained of how the remainder would behave should the Japanese army invade.

U.S. military authorities thus decided that all Japanese-Americans had to move inland. We are told that the Japanese “cheerfully” handled the registration paperwork and the government helped them handle the disposal of their property. The Army provided vans to move belongings and buses to move people. “The evacuees cooperated wholeheartedly,” we’re told. “The many loyal among them accepted” the sacrifice for the “war effort.” In the centers and the camps, normal services such as churches and schools were quickly restored. Inmates are seen governing themselves, with the Army only guarding the perimeters. Eisenhower adds that special care was given to the children and adults were allowed to work outside the compounds during the day. The film winds to an end by looking forward to a time when the loyal can be free again and the disloyal “leave this land for good.” It closes with self-congratulation: the U.S. is protecting itself without violating norms of “Christian decency.”

Another manifestation of the OWI’s incoherence in controlling anti-Japanese propaganda was in the OWI’s justification for doing so. It did want to portray Japan’s fascists rather than Japanese-Americans as the real enemies of the U.S. However, its goal was not to exonerate Japanese-Americans from the charge of forming a fifth-column; instead, the OWI wanted to make it easier to *permanently* relocate them to small towns in the interior of the country. The OWI’s concern was that if Japanese-Americans were demonized, no interior small town would allow them to resettle there.

This agenda was made even more clear in the second of the OWI films about the camps. While *A Challenge to Democracy* still mentions the “military hazard” that Japanese-Americans posed, it emphasizes how well those interned have adjusted to life in the camps by running schools, successfully farming, engaging in recreation, doing productive work, and worshipping freely (except that Shintoism was not permitted). The inmates generally are shown smiling. There is also a tone of defensiveness—after all, this movie was made in 1944, with Allied forces clearly turning the tide of war, yet these American citizens are still held in concentration camps. Here, the film just lies: the Japanese-Americans “are not prisoners, they are not internees. They are merely dislocated people—the unwounded casualties of war.” “Casualties”—really? Held in camps guarded by soldiers?

In the end, we see Japanese internees being freed, but only after they “prove” their loyalty to U.S. security services. Most importantly, all the freed internees we see are ones who agree to join the Army or else to live in the U.S. Midwest. The message is clear: the camps will only be closed when the internees move to America’s hinterlands.

The OWI’s goal of permanently pushing Japanese-Americans into the hinterlands clearly assumed that they would have to be kept away from militarily important areas. This, in turn, assumed that Japanese-Americans would always present a danger of engaging in espionage and sabotage on behalf of America’s future enemies—in short, that Japanese-Americans were *by nature* always a danger of being a fifth column. The OWI was, therefore, not credible when it tried to dissuade Hollywood studios from making propaganda portraying the Japanese as a race as different and dangerous and pushing the Fifth-Column Narrative, *for it did precisely the same thing*.

## 6. Conclusion

By the end of WWII, antipathy toward the Japanese was at full tide. One poll conducted for the OWI showed that 73 percent

of respondents viewed the Japanese as treacherous, 62 percent as sly, and 55 percent as cruel. A 1944 poll reported that 13 percent of Americans wanted to see Japanese people exterminated.<sup>15</sup> A 1945 poll showed that 22.7 percent of Americans wanted *more* atomic bombs dropped on Japan.<sup>16</sup>

Japanese-Americans were considered to be apt by nature to be disloyal—so much so that they remained in concentration camps for the better part of a year *after* the Japanese government surrendered to the U.S. The camps weren't closed because the military or WRA viewed them as no longer needed or because the American public—even after having learned about Nazi concentration camps—demanded that they be closed. They were closed by U.S. Supreme Court rulings.

No doubt, many factors worked together to cause this fever pitch of hatred, such as pre-war racism toward the Japanese, the Pearl Harbor attack, reports of savage fighting in the Pacific (where the fighting took place in jungles rather than fields and cities), reports of Japanese brutality in China, and reports of Japanese mistreatment of American prisoners. However, adding to these factors were numerous, intensely hostile, and racist propaganda films.

Here, we can draw an analogy with anti-Semitic film propaganda produced by the Nazi propaganda ministry. In both cases, targeted groups were systematically portrayed as different and dangerous and they were demonized by a mythical historical narrative. In the case of Germany, it was the Nazi Historical Narrative, which held that Germany had been stabbed in the back by Jewish financiers in World War I. In the U.S., it was the Fifth-Column Narrative, which held that the Japanese Imperial Navy was actively aided by Japanese-Americans.

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<sup>15</sup> Office of Opinion Research, "The Quarter's Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (1944): 588.

<sup>16</sup> Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Atomic Weapons and Nuclear Energy," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 27, no. 2 (1963): 180.