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## WHAT PRODUCES CONSCIOUSNESS

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### **Abstract**

*Consciousness is the major, perhaps the only, issue that makes the perennial mind-body problem unsolvable. To solve the problem, it is necessary to identify what produces consciousness. Every attempt to explain what produces consciousness has failed, and this failure is venom in discoursing the mind-body problem. Without consciousness in the real sense: the materialists within their framework would have succeeded in explaining how the body responds to impulses from the brain, now, their explanation is redundant; the immaterialists would have had nothing to say, but now, their explanations on the nature of mind, and its relationship with the body, is confusing. This paper critically evaluates the concept, consciousness, it observes that materialism and immaterialism have created more problems than what they set out to solve. Their mutual exclusive positions on the source of humans' consciousness and explanations of the relationship between the mind and body have closed the door to remove the venom in the mind-body problem. Also, that has hampered human yearning to know the true nature of reality. Based on the foregoing, this paper argues that consciousness is the product of both the body and mind. The mind is seen as a quasi-material – an extension of the main-brain. The source is likening to the signal received by the digital television set. The decoder receives information from the satellite dish and presents it to human beings in understandable ways. Without the satellite dish, there would be no such information, and without the television set, such information would be meaningless.*

**Keywords:** *Consciousness; Main-brain; Materialism and Immaterialism; Mind-body; Neurons*

### **Introduction**

*Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable... Without consciousness, the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness, it seems hopeless.*

Thomas Nagel (1974:435)

The hopelessness identified by Nagel above is the preoccupation of this work. The work observes that if what produces consciousness is identified, the mind-body problem would be interesting without being a hopeless endeavour.

### **Defining Consciousness**

What is consciousness? This question seems simple, but it is not. Consciousness is one of the most difficult things we can scrutinize. It is difficult to define the same way almost all philosophical terms and concepts are. A major problem of defining consciousness is because we do not know its source(s). Another problem, which is the consequence of the above, is that in an attempt to define consciousness, it seems consciousness is being used to investigate or define itself.<sup>1</sup> For instance, the term is described as “nothing but perception or awareness of the state of our mind.”<sup>2</sup> This definition is the use of an element of consciousness to define it. The above points to the fact that consciousness is “notoriously mysterious.” To this extent, some philosophers thought it is “unanalyzable”. Some also claim that the term “consciousness” cannot be said to stand for one particular thing, entity, process or quality.<sup>3</sup>

The major problem with the acceptance of defining consciousness as “perception or awareness” and any related concepts, a very popular definition though, is the fact that there are times we perceive without been conscious of our perception, and at times we are conscious without being aware. At times that

we do things regularly and such become habitual. In habitual situations, we are conscious but not necessarily aware of our action. For an illustration, “Professor X may not be aware that he begins every analysis or argument by searching for historical analogies.”<sup>4</sup> If told, Professor X might be surprised he does that, but that does not mean he lacks consciousness of his state of mind. Conversely, someone might perceive without being conscious. In a dream state, perception takes place but no consciousness. Also, an anesthetic patient might be aware of events in his/her environment without been conscious.<sup>5</sup> Owing to the above illustrations, it would be convenient to say there are forms, levels or degrees of consciousness, such as minimal consciousness, retrospective consciousness, habitual consciousness and full-blown consciousness.<sup>6</sup> Each of these divisions would not be discussed, because that is not the focus of this work, nonetheless, the prefix to each division suggests its meaning.

From the foregoing, consciousness seems to be the “hard-nut” in the mind-body problem. Consciousness makes it difficult for us to give an adequate explanation of how mental activities spring from the physical body, which is classified as the mind-body problem. This made Julian Huxley wonder thus: “how it is that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes ... just as unaccountable as the appearance of the Djinn?”<sup>7</sup> The mind-body relationship became problematic due to Rene Descartes’ systematic explanation of how he arrived at knowledge through his conscious state. Descartes concluded that the only thing that cannot be doubted is his consciousness; because ‘he thinks’ (he is conscious), it follows that ‘he exists’. The problem that arises from this thesis is: what produces the consciousness? To answer this, Descartes posited that his state of consciousness cannot be the product of his body which is physical. He opined that there exists a non-physical mind, which is independent of the body but interact with the body. The mind, therefore, is what produces the non-physical mental activities – consciousness. Descartes’ assertion has polarized interested scholars into two major groups

to identify or explain what produces consciousness, and the relationship between the mind and the body.

### **Attempts to Explain the Sources of Consciousness**

There are two major schools of thought that attempt to identify the source of consciousness and understand the relationship between the mind (if such exist independent of the body) and the body. They are: (1) materialism – monists' materialism, central state materialism or psycho-neural identity theses (i.e. the reductionist), (2) immaterialism – monist and dualist immaterialism. Each of these theories has variations and challenges that emerge from their explanations of how consciousness occurred, and the relationship between minds and bodies. Their positions seem to be mutually exclusive. Additionally, scholars in each group portrayed themselves to have made colossal progress and to have been a panacea to the mind-body problem, but each of their explanations is a mere nostrum to the problem.

It should be noted, however, that some philosophers argued for non-existence the mind. For instance, Richard Rorty in *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, holds the non-existence view. He argued that the belief in the existence of mind-body problem is based on the wrong assumption that there are mental states, which are not located in space, and non-mental states, which are located in space, and “if the body were destroyed the mental entities or states might linger on.”<sup>8</sup> Rorty's objection here is, basically, against the position of the dualist immaterialism, and it seems novel. However, it is a wrong interpretation of the latter's position, in the sense that, the dualist immaterialism's claim is that ‘mental state’ is a product of ‘interaction’ of the mind and the body. If that is the case, once one ceases to exist, the activities that result from their interactions can stop without contradiction.

### **Immaterialism**

Central to immaterialism, particularly the dualist immaterialism, on what produces consciousness and how the mind relates with

the body is the somewhat absurd assumption that there exist a physical body and an incorporeal mind; the two are separate substance. The theory contends that there is a divine Being that is responsible for consciousness. According to Rene Descartes, the mind and the body are separate entities; one can exist without the body. The mind can be understood separately, and it is capable and responsible for consciousness: thinking, doubting, willing and so on. The body is not capable of consciousness, it only responds to the forces acting upon it,<sup>9</sup> perhaps by the mind. Descartes posited that the relationship of the mind-body is so mutual that they act upon each other. Descartes' view has triggered debates as to how the mind acts on the body, and vice versa.

There are other variances of dualist immaterialism, some claimed that God created the mind and the body to work in a parallel way. They compared the relationship with clocks that are set to strike at the same time. All dualists' positions can be summed up in the words of George Graham:

There seem to be two very different kinds of things occurring in the world: the physical going on that can be studied by science and exposed to public inspection and those other things – qualia – that belong in consciousness and which must be experienced from the inside.<sup>10</sup>

Dualist immaterialism couldn't substantiate the relationship between the mind and its products, and the body. It only ambiguously dumps the idea on us to pound. Descartes, the progenitor of the idea, opined that the point of interaction between the body and the mind is in the "pineal gland", which further complicated his assertions.

The monist immaterialism posits that all what exists is the immaterial mind, the existence of matters is an illusion. It follows that human's body, which works and we can see, does not exist in the real sense. This sound more confusing than convincing, and non-appealing. Based on the last statement let's turn to the materialists' theory for a contrastive view. The latter theory would be given more attention because of its near perfect prospect in analyzing what produces consciousness. This claim would be obvious at the end of the section dedicated to its analysis.

### **Materialism**

The materialist theory is a monist or reductionist theory because it sees the human being as a single entity that comprises of neurons, and that all human activities are products of the multi-million neurons in the brain. Many philosophers and scientists that hold above position presented fascinating, attractive, appealing and enthusiastic argument to back up their submission. D. M. Armstrong presented a pure materialistic conception of consciousness when he opined that what we called mental state is nothing but the function of the central nervous system. Armstrong argues that:

The consciousness of our mental state may be assimilated to the perception of our mental state, and that like other perception, it may then be conceived of as an inner state or event giving a capacity for selective behaviour, in this case, selective behaviour towards our mental state. ... There seems to be no bar to our identifying these inner states with purely physical states of the central nervous system. And so the consciousness of our mental states becomes simply the scanning of one part of

our central nervous system by another. Consciousness is a self-scanning mechanism in the central nervous system.<sup>11</sup>

Christof Koch buttressed the above position and opined that all concepts in the arena of consciousness should be fused onto the properties of neurons and the coalitions, and concentrate on the neuronal correlates of consciousness.<sup>12</sup> If the above is done, in Koch's view, what produces consciousness would be identified. Ray Cattell makes straight Koch's position and identifies what produces consciousness thus:

The main-brain a large area in the brainstem control the level of wakefulness in animals. If this area is given direct electrical stimulation, it arouses the forebrain. (Just what I need when I am falling asleep over my books). Damages to the main-brain can lead to a comma. It is in the brainstem that the different neurotransmitters are manufactured and stored: acetylcholine, serotonin, dopamine, noradrenaline, histamine and others... If a single neurotransmitter is critical for consciousness, it must be acetylcholine, but this is difficult to establish because the synaptic release of this transmitter is widespread.<sup>13</sup>

The question is: how does the acetylcholine produces consciousness? Why is the acetylcholine singled out, of all



neural, as what produces consciousness? The reason given for the acetylcholine been the producer of consciousness is that:

Activities in those neurons that release acetylcholine in the synapse are one of the enabling factors for consciousness. ...the existence of sufficient activity in certain areas of the thalamus which project to the superficial layer of many regions of the cortex. People retain consciousness even if they lose a large area of the cerebral cortex, but lose consciousness if they lose even a small part of the most crucial areas in the thalamus or part of the brainstem.<sup>14</sup>

Has the above analysis resolved the problem of consciousness in the ‘most interesting sense’ or the *qualia* Graham talked about? The answer, to my mind, is no. the analysis that the acetylcholine is the producer of consciousness has only succeeded, definitely, in exposing the debate to full nakedness. In the sense that it was unable to answer how the neuron is responsible for the production of consciousness satisfactorily. This inability, and similar positions, that the brain produces consciousness, might be different from Descartes “leap of faith” that God produces consciousness in him, but is not a better one. Though, the former could easily be verified or denied unlike the latter.

While Armstrong and Kock represent the extreme materialists with their not too convincing arguments, some thinkers take a moderate materialistic position. Though, the latter believes consciousness could not have proceeded beyond the neural in the central nervous, they accepted that such position is yet to be proven. John Searle, one of the moderate materialists, claimed

that consciousness is the product of the biological make-up of (organism) human being; but we are unable to recognize this fact because of the bigotry lens of the 'outmoded dualist/materialist assumption' that the mental character of consciousness makes it impossible for it to be physical property.<sup>15</sup> He argued optimistically that in future, there might be 'perfect science of neurobiology', which will reveal that mental concepts: belief, fear, pain and so on, have no existence in a scientific account of neurobiology. Searle did not suggest any solution to the mind-body problem. It seems he felt it is not a problem as such, it is just misunderstanding.

Attempt to know what produces consciousness, and the mind-body problem in Noam Chomsky's view is not a problem in the magnitude it was assumed. He seems to be in the same voice with Searle that human limited understanding of the body: physiochemical and neurobiological functions is what triggered the conflicting debate of mind-body problem. According to Chomsky human's biological nature or composition has limited human's understanding of what produce consciousness, and this might remain so forever.<sup>16</sup> Based on the foregoing, Chomsky illustrates how different species of animals have limitations in tackling some challenges than the others. He says:

Rat apparently cannot learn to run mazes that involve sequential concepts (for example, turn right twice the left twice). Surely no rat could learn to run maze that required turning right at every choice point corresponding to a prime number, left elsewhere thus turn right at the second, third, fifth, seventh, eleventh *and so on*, choice points. A human could presumably solve this problem though not without difficulty, and

not without conscious knowledge  
of arithmetic.<sup>17</sup>

Justifying the above illustration is Thomas Nagel's view that certain animal has cognitive power lacks in some other animal. Nagel illustrates using the example of a bat, in his article; "What is it like to be a bat". He writes:

Bats, although more closely related to us than those other species, nevertheless present a range of activity and a sensory apparatus so different from ours that the problem I want to pose is exceptionally vivid... Now we know that most bats perceive the external world primarily by sonar, or echolocation, detecting the reflections, from objects within range... Their brains are designed to correlate the outgoing impulses with the subsequent echoes, and the information thus acquired enables bats to make precise discriminations of distance, size, shape, motion, and texture comparable to those we make by vision. But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we possess... Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly, Colin McGinn stated that the problem we face with consciousness is because we do not have the cognitive capacity to know the particular element of the brain responsible for

consciousness. For us to understand the limitations of our cognitive capacity (cognitive competence), McGinn illustrated using “the idea of cognitive closure” in which a particular mind – brain – might be limited to get the understanding of a particular thing due to various factors – probably biases, ‘blind spots’ and so on – such things might be accessible to some other minds. Thus, McGinn writes:

Conceiving minds come in different kinds, equipped with varying powers and limitations, biases and blind-spots, so that properties (or theories) may be accessible to some minds but not to others. What is closed to the mind of a rat may be open to the mind of a monkey, and what is open to us may be closed to the monkey. Representational power is not all or nothing. Minds are biological products like bodies, and like bodies, they come in different shapes and sizes, more or less capacious, more or less suited to certain cognitive tasks.<sup>19</sup>

The question then, as acknowledged by McGinn is: is it the case that the human mind is limited or closed to certain reality? McGinn answer is simply, “... no species can perceive every property thing instantiate (without artificial instrumentation).”<sup>20</sup> Therefore total or absolute cognitive openness is not definite for human beings.

Furthermore, Ray Cattell exemplifies the revolutionary stages in the physical sciences’ study of matter, and the failure to get full understanding of it, as a failure to understand human brain. He avowed that human research has had little or no progress in an attempt to understand the nature, composition and *modulus opera*

*di* of the body (matter). Cattell cited Isaac Newton's rejection of the position he held about matters at a certain time; that objects could not act on each other from a distance, as one of the examples of unravelling exploration into the nature of matter. Cattell also mentioned the age-long belief that atom is the smallest unit of matter, and some decades ago, physicists' discoveries had revealed the existence of electrons, protons and neutrons which are smaller than atoms as another example. Even quarks are said to be smaller than the latter discoveries.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, as the physical world is evolving, with the knowledge of matter, the understanding that the body produces consciousness rather than a mind would be obvious.

### **Endless Futility of Materialism**

It is quite agreeable that animals do have awareness of some certain things ahead by introspection. For instance, elephants were said to know the location of the river from a, particularly, long distance. The question is: are animals' foreknowledge through introspection the same as human beings' introspective future knowledge? Is it appropriate to reject human introspective future knowledge because few animals do have a similar experience(s)? Can we reduce prophecies, voodooism and other related human's 'hermeneutic spiritism' to the kinds of introspective foreknowledge other animals do have? Is it not possible that the foreknowledge of animals mentioned earlier is just as a result of their biological makeup and perpetual practices? For instance, people that are used to the sea do understand that the closest shore to them inside the sea is where the sun is shining from. Hence, when they missed their route to the sea without compass to navigate, they quickly trace their way back to the shore through the knowledge they have acquired as a result of long-time practices. Is it not possible that that is how the "bat" and the "elephant" operate? It could be assumed that all human consciousness is in this form as well, but such will not be acceptable; because there are many instances whereby human being get accurate awareness and prediction of the future. Such as: through dreams, prophecies, trance, and so on.

The cognition of the future people get in introspection is beyond rational explanation in most cases. For instance, “Thales ... was believed by later Greeks to have been the first person to make an accurate prediction of an eclipse, in the year 585 BC.”<sup>22</sup> When this happened, there was no apparatus to examine the movement of the planets, moreover, the world was still operating on the assumption that the earth is the centre of the universe and all other celestial bodies revolved around the earth. The question is how can we be operating under such wrong assumption and still make that correct prediction? Synonymous to Thales’ prediction, are non-lettered in traditional societies, who engage in contemplative life; perhaps through sorcery, divination and so on, they make predictions about the future that come to pass. What can we say is responsible for the accurate predictions? These introspective knowledges of the future are the challenges that need to be conquered to get the accurate way consciousness arose. And such is a big challenge to materialism.

The failure of the materialists is well explained by U. T. Place in his article “Is Consciousness a Brain Process.” Place posited that the major problem of attributing consciousness to the brain is the difficulties in explaining how this happened. Place illustrates thus:

Just as the physiologist is not likely to be impressed by the philosopher’s contention that there is some self-contradiction involved in supposing consciousness to be a brain process, so the philosopher is unlikely to be impressed by the considerations that... there are two sets of events, one physicochemical, the other psychical. *The* argument *that* all emotional appeal depends on a fairly simple logical mistake,

which is unfortunately all too frequently made by psychologists and physiologists, and not infrequently in the past by the philosophers themselves. This logical mistake, I shall refer to as the 'phenomenological fallacy'.<sup>23</sup>

He explains further what he classified as a phenomenological fallacy:

The mistake of supposing that when the subject describes his experience..., how things look, sound, smell, taste, or feel to him, he is describing the literal properties of objects and events on a peculiar sort of internal cinema or television screen, usually referred to in the modern psychological literature as the 'phenomenal field'. If we assume, for example, that when a subject reports a green afterimage he is asserting the occurrence inside himself of an object that is literally green, it is clear that we have on our hands an entity for which there is no place in the world of physics. In the case of the green afterimage, there is no green object in the subject's environment corresponding to the description that he gives. Nor is there anything green in his brain; certainly there is nothing that could have emerged when he reported the appearance of the green afterimage. Brain

processes are not the sort of things to which colour concepts can be properly applied.<sup>24</sup>

From the foregoing, it seems the end is not near to know what produces consciousness. But, can we say that human beings are limited in knowing what produces consciousness? If the answer is affirmative, what limits us from knowing? Is it the human biological make-up? Is it because human research has had little or no progress in an attempt to understand the nature, composition and *modus operandi* of the body – the brain in particular? Conversely, if the answer is a denial, then, why don't know what produces consciousness? These questions would be responded to in the subsequent section.

### **What Produces Consciousness**

Before any attempt to answer the questions that end the last section, an attempt would be made to answer the question – what produces consciousness. This is important because answers to the former would serve as justification, clarification of misconceptions and misunderstandings that have been or would arise when the latter is addressed.

Now, consciousness is a product of multiple cells. Larger percent of it (consciousness) is the product of the human's main-brain.<sup>25</sup> Every organ of the human's body is connected to the main-brain. The main-brain, therefore, sends and receives correspondence from every part of the body. It also serves as links between all parts of the body. If the right hand is to communicate with the left leg, it is the main-brain that connect them through the numerous cells that it discharges in sending and receiving information. When a sensation takes place, for an instance, if there is a pain as a result of hitting a leg on a stone, the main-brain would receive the information, process it, and then, make the awareness know to the relevant parts of the body. This is how mental states that happen or develop within the body take place. There are external mental states, such as, when we



smell an odour, the main-brain would receive the data through one of the numerous channels, nose, and process to human's understanding – either such odour is offensive or pleasant.

There are other external mental states, which are not experienced through the known sense organs – eyes, mouth, skin, ear, and nose. Instances are: when something is happening or just happened in a far location to where a person is, without been told, the person might have a feeling that such a thing is happening or has happened; also, two people might be thinking the same way without verbal or any sign communication, they might not even be in the same location – this is similar to telepathy, which is apparent communication from one mind to another without sensory perceptions. The consciousness of these kinds arises as a result of the main-brain firing of millions of electrical tiny brain cells (neural) into the atmosphere. Each neuron remains active for sometimes (depending on its strength when it was fired into the atmosphere) and keeps communication (receiving and sending information) with the main-brain until the neuron becomes wan.

Hence, the consciousness of external events, which are not directly as a result of the sensory perceptions, occur because the main-brain receives the information directly from the neural it has fired into the atmosphere. Two people can get the awareness of the same thing, if some of the cells from both main-brains receive the same information and send to their corresponding receivers. Telepathy is possible as a result of the openness of information that the cells and a main-brain are sharing, other cells that belong to another main-brain could easily catch it and send to their main-brain. Owing to the foregoing, every human being can telepathize, but this potential is not actualized by many because people preoccupied their main-brain with a lot of things, and such does not allow for concentration or paying keen attention to every information their main-brain received.

If the above illustration concerning the consciousness of external events is taken, a big question remains unanswered, which is: how can we account for the consciousness of future events? Is the future accessible to the neural? Can the neural travel ahead of time to bring future events to the main-brain, perhaps the future is in front like many kilometres away and the neural get there ahead of time? It should be noted that some future predictions can easily be justified rationally. For instance, the political or economic system of a state could be studied to make accurate future predictions. A sports team could be analyzed and the result of her next matches predicted accurately. Meteorologists study the weather conditions and make a future prediction of the weather.

However, there are future predictions that cannot be justified rationally. For instance, in a situation whereby someone had a dream that another fellow died in a ghastly motor accident along a certain road, which later came to pass, and dreamer did not in any way orchestrate the accident. How can we rationalize a future awareness like this? Would it be right to say it is the thinking of the brain, just as the brain could be instrumental for some awareness through the dream?<sup>26</sup>

To affirm that the brain is solely responsible for the awareness (consciousness) of the future through the dream would be a grave mistake. However, the roles played by the brain is very important. The best way to explain consciousness in the situation under review is that, the main-brain fires its cells into the atmosphere. In the atmosphere, there are many super-natural atomic forces (powers or energies) that are potentially conscious of future events. Human beings get consciousness of the future when the neural fired by the main-brain get information from the super-natural atomic forces and send it to the main-brain. Then, consciousness in this sense comes as a dream, revelation, intuition, and so on. And when such is mentioned, it is being referred to as prophesying, predictions, foretold, forecast, and so on.

The consciousness of external events devoid of the sensory perceptions is in analogous to the signal received by the digital television set. The decoder receives information from the satellite dish or antenna, the latter get information from the bigger and powerful dishes in the atmosphere and the former presents the information to human beings in understandable ways through the television. Without the satellite dish, there would be no such information, and without the decoder and television set, such information would be meaningless. The main-brain could be likened to the decoder, while the neural is like the antenna.

Notably, the information that comes to the decoder are immaterial and beyond sensory perception, until they are presented by the decoder, hence, the decoder help to make the invisible visible. The same applies to the neurons' information that get to the main-brain. Based on the nature of the neural – immateriality – it is presumed overtime that what performs its work is a mind, which is independent of the human body. However, referring to the neural as mind and immaterial is not out of place, but to claim it is independent of the body is erroneous. Because the neural is immaterial when they are fired into the atmosphere, therefore, this paper agreed that consciousness is being produced by the combination of the material body – the main-brain, and the immaterial or quasi-material mind – the neural.

### **Conclusion**

Having done an in-depth critical analysis of what produces consciousness, it is beneficial, as a way of conclusion, to examine the reasons the findings of this paper remain hidden till now. These reasons are, also, responses to the earlier questions on the limitations of human beings to know what produces consciousness. The limitedness of human beings knowing what produces consciousness is obvious and based on many reasons. One of such reasons is the biological make-up of human beings; the sensory organs are not too sophisticated to perceive all realities. The development of technological apparatus has aid in

the audibility of radiating sounds, visibility of organism, and many other things human beings would not have gotten awareness of. Before the advancement in technology, the celestial bodies: Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune, and Pluto exist, but not because people believe in their existence. As a matter of facts, people were not aware of their existence thousands of years ago, but that would not have taken away the fact that they exist. Then, if the advancement in technology is sustained, how the main-brain and its immaterial or quasi-material extensions produce consciousness would be made obvious. Another reason is that enough research has not been done to understand the mode of operation of all human beings' composite parts. This could be as a result of international laws that forbid the abuse of humans: the use of humans in researches that could endanger life, and as a means to an end.<sup>27</sup> The above coupled with the fact that only a few people would surrender themselves to be used for researches they do not know its consequences, or which its consequences could lead to the end of their living.

In conclusion, any attempt to understand how consciousness is produce must take into consideration the relationship and workings of the main-brain and its extensions. Attributing what produces consciousness to main-brain alone or the existence of a separate mind elsewhere is inaccurate. Even if the cells fired into the atmosphere by the main-brain are regarded as the mind, they are not capable of producing consciousness of external mental states on their own. Hence, consciousness is the product of total, comprehensive and holistic workings of the main-brain and its extensions – the mind.

## Endnotes

1. Recent discourses on consciousness consists mostly of the attempt to describe it with its components, eliminating the conditions of its existence, but as D. Gasparyan argues, it is erroneous, because “we cannot see our body as a whole because our eyes belong to this very body”, similarly, we cannot describe consciousness with the components that belong to it. See Gasparyan, Diana. (2014). Who thinks inside of me? Some aspects of Merab Mamardašvili’s theory of consciousness. *Studies in East European Thought*, Vol. 66, No. ½ p. 158. Available on [www.jstor.org/stable/24673243](http://www.jstor.org/stable/24673243) Accessed: 17-07-2019
2. Armstrong, D. M. (1981). *The Nature of the Mind*. Great Britain: The Harvester Press. p,14
3. See Armstrong. p,55. Reiners, A.J. (1995). “A Definition of Consciousness.” *Gregorianum*, Vol. 76, No. 3, Gregorian Biblical Press p535. Available on <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23579536>. Accessed: 17-07-2019
4. Reiners. p, 545.
5. The use of consciousness and awareness interchangeably poses many problems, because, though they are synonymous, yet, there are circumstances in which we could make distinctions between them as illustrated here. Therefore, any form of awareness in this paper is taken to be a degree or form of consciousness.
6. I cannot claim to be the originator of these divisions many scholars that I might not be aware of must have said something related, just as some of the materials used with acknowledgement also have some divisions of consciousness related to this.
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11. Armstrong. pp,14-15
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14. *Ibid*. p,118
15. Searle, John. (1994). *The Rediscovery of the mind*. Cambridge: MIT Press. p,94
16. Chomsky, Noam. (1988). *Language and Problems of Knowledge*. Cambridge: MIT Press. p,149
17. Chomsky. pp,147-148
18. Thomas Nagel. 1974. What is it like to be a Bat? *The Philosophical Review LXXXIII*. p,436
19. McGinn. p,350
20. *Ibid*. p,351
21. Cattell. p,97
22. Kenny, Anthony. (2004). *A New History of Western Philosophy. Volume 1; Ancient Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press. p,3
23. Graham, George, Valentine, Elizabeth R. (eds). (2004) *Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp, 50-51
24. *Ibid*
25. The main-brain refers to the major structures of the brain, which include the following: the cerebral cortex; the thalamus; the hypothalamus; the pituitary gland; the brainstem; the cerebellum; the spinal cord. Each of these structures has its functions, though in this paper the functions are fused together. For their individual functions, see, Ackerman, Sandra, (1992). *Discovering*

*the Brain*. (National Academy of Sciences), Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, pp13-33.

26. The brain could be responsible for some awareness human beings get through dreams. An instance is if someone is thinking about something, even when he sleeps, the brain would continue the work of thinking, as such the person would be conscious of it as in a dream state. Based on the above, someone could get a solution to mathematical equations, logical puzzles, riddles and so on.
27. There are international laws Nations accented to for the safeguarding of individuals within their territories. See “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)”, General Assembly Resolution. 2200A (XXI) 1966 Article 7. Available on <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>. Accessed 18/11/2018.