Abstract: At Plato’s Phaedrus 270c, Socrates asks whether one can know souls without knowing ‘the whole.’ Phaedrus answers that ‘according to Hippocrates’ the same demand on knowing the whole applies to bodies. What parallel is intended between soul-knowledge and body-knowledge and which medical passages illustrate the analogy have been much debated. Three dominant interpretations read ‘the whole’ as respectively (1) environment, (2) kosmos, and (3) individual soul or body; and adduce supporting Hippocratic passages. But none of these interpretations accounts for the Phaedrus’ rhetorical method. A better reading sees the whole as the genos ‘soul,’ as the Phaedrus’ taxonomies divide that genus.

1. Introduction

When Phaedrus (in the dialogue named after him) refers to Hippocrates, it is one of only two such mentions in Plato and the earliest extant mention of Hippocrates by any author.1 It is excellent to know that Plato had been aware of the Hippocratic corpus in the first half of the fourth century. But the obliqueness of the reference at a crucial point leads us into the heart of a problem so old that it has become almost invisible, namely the problem of how philosophers have used the human body to describe and understand the human soul.

It is a commonplace for accounts of the soul to transfer language to mental and psychological events that had applied to bodily events. It has become a cliché even to point out the cliché. But speaking in such general terms does an injustice to the pioneering psychological explorations in Plato, which select specific talents of body to ascribe to soul, for different purposes. Following Isocrates, he compares intellectual and psychic activities to athleticism.2 He follows Gorgias, or might precede him, with metaphors about the ‘eye of
the soul’ or mind’s eye. In pursuit of this last comparison, the Phaedrus invokes a medical practice paralleling a practice of the philosophical rhetorician. Socrates is explaining what distinguishes a great orator, with the true technê of rhetoric, from a bad one. The art of medicine is Socrates’ model for describing philosophically guided oratory. Medical doctors and orators both possess knowledge of the nature of their beneficiaries: body in one case, soul in the other.

Socrates’ explanation seems straightforward enough, until he asks Phaedrus the notoriously cryptic question, ‘Do you think it’s possible to understand the nature [φύσιν] of the soul [ψυχῆς] in an adequate account without the nature of the whole [τοῦ λου]?’ (270c).

What ‘whole’ must one know in order to understand the soul’s nature? Does Socrates mean the whole environment, the whole cosmos, or the entire soul or body that an individual has? Instead of an explanation, Plato makes Phaedrus reply as if the matter had been fully explained: ‘If one ought to believe Hippocrates of the Asclepiads, [one can’t know] even about the body without this method’ (270c).

The exchange suggests that if one studies the Hippocratic corpus and figures out what ‘whole’ Hippocrates says the doctor must know in order to understand the nature of the body, one might grasp what kind of ‘whole’ Socrates thinks the orator must know to understand the nature of the soul. The soul is then like the body, and follows the body, in the way it belongs to a larger whole.

Much of the literature that tries to make sense of the exchange divides among three ways of taking the referent of this ‘whole’:

**Interpretation:**

S1, ‘whole environment’: The technikos ‘professional, expert’ needs to know the nature of the environment that the soul (or body) lives in.

S2, ‘whole cosmos’: The technikos needs to know the entirety of the universe before approaching any one part of it, such as a particular soul (in the rhetorician’s case) or a particular body (in the physician’s).

S3, ‘whole soul or body’: The technikos needs to know the entirety of an individual soul or body. If it is a unity, the technikos can address it as an integrated single subject. If it divides into parts, they need to be identified and addressed separately.

Each reading trusts that if we can put one interpretation forward as unambiguously describing Hippocratic practice, we will arrive at the sense of the Phaedrus passage by analogy.
But this path into *Phaedrus* 270c from the medical writings has been vexed. Scholars have found passages in the Hippocratic corpus consistent with S1, others that fit S2 or S3. Some Hippocratic passages apparently support several competing interpretations at once. Thus, *Regimen I* emphasizes the importance of knowing the whole of a patient’s environment, the whole of the cosmos, *and* the whole of the body, all in the space of a few lines. While identifying a Hippocratic passage that supports an interpretation of ‘the whole’ continues to be necessary to finding a determinate reading of the *Phaedrus* τοῦ λογοῦ, doing so has proved insufficient for settling the debate.

Needless to say, the task is made even more discouraging by scholarly disagreement over which treatises called Hippocratic really came from the school on Kos and which date to a time early enough that Plato could have known them. Those who find the treatises badly sorted and of unreliable origin will feel less confident about identifying any passage that explains how to read Plato.

We are trying to break the scholarly logjam by coming at the allusion in *Phaedrus* 270c from a different direction. Instead of looking for standalone Hippocratic passages to solve the puzzle, we focus on a theme that is common to both Plato’s dialogues and the Hippocratic corpus more generally: the theory of *techne* knowledge. The true *technikos* of rhetoric can offer the right speech to a given soul (271e–272a; 277b–c), and the true *technikos* of medicine knows how to administer the right treatment to a given body. Before proceeding, each *technikos* must begin by identifying what type of soul or body is before him. This in turn requires that he know the broader taxonomy of souls or bodies. So we argue that physician and rhetorician alike acquire the knowledge they need about a body or soul by looking at *where that body or soul falls within the larger class of all bodies or all souls*. We call this interpretation S4:

**Interpretation:** S4, ‘whole genos’: One must have knowledge of the genos ‘genus, kind’ soul or the genos body. This includes knowledge of all the species – types of human souls or types of bodies – subsumed under the broader genus, as well as knowledge of how to treat each species separately.

Thus according to S4, ‘whole’ is a taxonomical term.

S4 offers a defensible interpretation of the *Phaedrus* passage even in the absence of a Hippocratic passage exemplifying it. The *Phaedrus* emphasizes taxonomical analysis as a distinguishing feature of a *techne* quite apart from the passage comparing rhetoric to medicine. As a result, we can defend S4 on Platonic grounds and also use Hippocratic passages to confirm that reading, rather than depend on one or two Hippocratic passages to settle the debate.
2. Larger context of the Phaedrus

The *Phaedrus*’ erotic-rhetorical theory rests on one overarching question that Socrates presses: What distinguishes good rhetoricians from those merely adept at public speaking? No speechwriting guide has thought to address this question in its entirety, which is to say with reference to the intended audience of a speech. Socrates seeks to remedy that lacuna by making knowledge more consistently a feature of rhetorical practice than experts have acknowledged it to be. He says that true *technikoi* possess all three of

1. natural ability (φύσις) for rhetoric,
2. knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), and
3. practical experience (μελέτη) (269d).

The knowledge, part (2), for its part comprises the truth about one’s subject, knowledge of rhetorical tactics, and knowledge of the rhetoric’s audience that indicates which approach fits the audience one is writing for.

Of the types of requisite knowledge at stake, one sometimes needs to point out the importance of knowing about one’s subject matter, but normally, that can be taken for granted. From what Socrates says, we also know that the second knowledge had become part of accepted practice. Athenian speechwriters devoted themselves to developing expertise about rhetorical strategies; how-to manuals emphasize what comes first and which ordering of topics will sway a crowd. Therefore, the new knowledge at work is the knowledge of the rhetorician’s audience. Socrates brings that knowledge into the study of rhetoric, as he says it had always been present in playwriting, musicianship, and medical practice.

‘Know your audience!’ we say today to students in composition courses. Socrates finds it to have gone unsaid by rhetoricians.

Each of the *technai* Socrates cites in this passage begins with preliminary studies that achieve elemental knowledge. He moves from the closest analogue to rhetoric, the physician’s *technē*, to more approximate comparisons in music and tragedy. Musicians have to strike high and low notes. Tragedians should be able to write speeches that move a crowd to tears. But novice practitioners of music and tragedy need to be reminded that a *technē* calls for much more. The knowledge that is medicine above all includes ‘additionally knowing to whom to do each of those things [making people warm or cold, inducing vomiting or a bowel movement in them], and when, and to what extent’ (268b).

Socrates pictures Eryximachus and his father Acumenus shaking their heads over the neophyte’s failure to understand; his appeal to their practice reminds the reader that the medical *technē* is already at work at the beginning of the *Phaedrus*. Phaedrus spoke of Acumenus as ‘my companion and yours,’ and Socrates endorsed the doctor’s advice to walk along the roads outside the city walls (227a–b), as he also seemed to endorse advice on exercise from another physician Herodicus (227d).
As doctors, anyway, go beyond their way of tuning an instrument when they come to know their patients’ bodies, the good rhetoricians (which will turn out to mean its philosophical practitioners, that is, philosophers) advance beyond prestidigitation with enthymeme and epanalepsis when they come to know their audience. Somewhat as pretenders to medical expertise bring about effects in the body without knowing when and why to do so, the writers of speech manuals have information about of rhetorical techniques but omit the heart of rhetorical knowledge from their guidebooks. Although they know the soul well, ‘they hide it away’ (271c). Their readers are left practicing special effects without grasping the nature of the object they are trying to affect, like doctors inducing vomiting or putting patients to sleep – memorable tricks, no question – no matter what the patients’ condition calls for.

It is against this backdrop of proposals about rhetorical practice that the crucial passage about ‘the whole’ arises. How does the technikos acquire the knowledge (of the nature of a soul or body) that expertise calls for? This is when Socrates asks Phaedrus how one would understand the soul without knowing the nature τοῦ λού and when Phaedrus says understanding the body, if you believe Hippocrates, calls for the same holistic knowledge (270c).

3. S1: The whole environment

According to S1, Socrates means that the technikos acquires knowledge of his audience’s soul by observing the soul in the environment it inhabits. When Socrates asks whether it is possible ‘to understand the nature of the soul in an adequate account without understanding the nature of the whole,’ S1 says that the referent of ‘the whole’ is the whole environment. The soul mirrors the body by occupying a soul–land that mirrors the land that the body finds itself in, with psychic versions of climate, diet, and the rest.

Mary Louise Gill, for one, begins her defense of S1 by identifying passages in which Socrates diagnoses Phaedrus’ psychic malady by observing his interactions with his environment. Early in the dialogue Socrates is intent on observing Phaedrus’ actions and his reactions to what people say to him, in other words the ways in which he affects and is affected by those around him. From these observations, Socrates learns that Phaedrus enjoys exercise and follows the advice of doctors (227a–b). Similarly, when Phaedrus reads Lysias’ speech, Socrates focuses not on the content of the speech but on Phaedrus’ reaction to it, as if that is what ought to matter to a true rhetorician (234d); and S1 reads that reaction as the response to one’s environment.

Many passages in the Hippocratic corpus support the somatic side of S1. Airs Waters Places classifies diseases according to which geographical
region they most commonly occur in. If the city is exposed to hot winds and sheltered from north winds, it has waters lying near the surface. Consequently, its people have moist phlegm-filled heads, flabby physiques, and poor diets. The women are often barren and the children asthmatic; the men suffer from dysentery. We imagine that successful physicians would need to know the local climate in order to diagnose and treat prevailing maladies. Just as Socrates gains knowledge about Phaedrus’ psychic malady by observing Phaedrus in his environment, the Hippocratic doctor learns about a patient’s physical malady by paying attention to the patient’s environment.

What Socrates says about the true technikos also seems to call for attention to environments. The true technikos has, as noted, ability, knowledge, and experience; and Socrates spells out the last of these, the μελέτη, as requiring observations of people immersed in their lives. After learning about souls and speech-making methods, that is, the rhetorician should, ‘while watching them in real actions and being acted out, be able to attend to them with his senses [αἰσθήσει], or else he won’t have any more than when he was hearing the theories’ (271d–e).

S1 rightly draws attention to the rhetorician’s awareness of souls in action. To practice rhetoric, one must observe what souls do in the times and places they occupy. But S1 seems to have neglected the sequence of Socrates’ points. Socrates calls attention to μελέτη as a follow-up to what he says about knowing ‘the whole,’ not as an exegesis of that knowledge. The practical immersion comes in addition to (1) natural ability and (2) knowledge; S1 however presumes that perceiving people in action was part of (2). To read the description of rhetoricians people-watching in support of S1 requires transposing the requirement for (3) practical application to (2) the knowledge being applied.

You may have to be aware of people’s styles of driving before your automotive theory is worth anything. Inattentive drivers who ride the clutch ruin their throwout bearing. But that fact does not make recognition of driving styles part of automotive theory. It does not imply that automotive theory is a kind of anthropology.

Finally, Socrates’ comments about observing people in their environments distinguish such observations from knowledge of the ‘whole.’ The practitioner of rhetoric must εἰδέναι ψυχή ‘know the soul,’ and become capable of νοησάντα ‘apprehending’ the types of souls there are, then subsequently, as Socrates says, μετὰ ταῦτα go on to recognize the types when perceiving them (271d). The acts of recognition hark back to and draw on the theoretical preparation. The nascent rhetorician comes upon a textbook personality and figures out that ‘this is the kind of soul that those lessons/theories [λόγοι] were about, now present in fact [ pry]’ (272a1–2), a kind of soul to which he must now deliver a certain type of argument.
The practical application refers back to knowledge already acquired, which was the knowledge that needed understanding of ‘the whole.’ Sensitivity to contingent environmental factors, as important as it is to successful practice, appears not to have entered into the acquisition of knowledge.

4. S2: The whole cosmos

S2, something of a cousin to S1, likewise identifies ‘the whole’ with a larger world than the soul alone. But according to the more ambitious S2, the technikos has to learn and know not merely the environment in which the person is situated but the whole of the cosmos.

Despite their structural similarity, the two interpretations base themselves on different parts of the text. Where S1’s human environment comes into the Phaedrus shortly after Socrates and Phaedrus were talking about ‘the whole,’ S2 takes its lead from a passage immediately before that exchange, a passage in which Socrates explains what made Pericles so good at oratory. ‘All the great professions [μεγάλαι τό ντέχνων] require big talk [ἀδολεσχία] and speculation [μετεωρολογία] about nature.’ Pericles got that from knowing Anaxagoras, which ‘filled him with speculation and the nature of mind and of unintelligence … and from this he brought to the expertise at speeches what applied to it’ (269e–270a).

It is immediately after this reference to Pericles that Socrates asks Phaedrus whether one could understand ‘the nature of the soul’ without the nature of the whole, and hears the cryptic reply about Hippocrates (270c). Given how close together the two passages are, it seems straightforward to conclude that this ‘whole’ the rhetorician must know is the whole of the universe or cosmos.¹⁴ And soon afterwards, in an apostrophe to Tisias, Socrates says that the morally sound rhetorician must develop oratorical skills not to speak to humans, but so that ‘he can speak, on the one hand, and on the other hand do, everything [τό πᾶν] as much as possible pleasing to the gods’ (273e6).¹⁵ Again the universe seems to be at stake.

Jaap Mansfeld finds additional support for S2 in Plato’s Sophist, with its great genus of being (245e ff.). Here in the Phaedrus, Socrates does not approach that kind of ontological inquiry but confines himself to a ‘whole world’ as cosmologists like Anaxagoras would have conceived such a thing.¹⁶ Insofar as cosmologies before Plato bear on the question, it also seems relevant that Parmenides refers to being (which is all there is) as a whole. Aristotle will identify a use of ‘whole’ to refer to the universe, probably with Parmenides in mind, but imaginably as an elucidation of the Phaedrus passage too.¹⁷

Mansfeld’s principal argument draws on the dialectical reasoning exhibited in the Phaedrus, which begins with the category of excessive desire or madness within which erōs is to be found.¹⁸ Every analysis

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likewise begins by positing a larger class that contains the term under examination. To understand rodents, you begin with a larger group, the class Mammalia, so as to discover what sets the rodents apart from other specimens in that class. This is surely the point of executing a ‘collection’ at the start of a dialectical analysis (265d). But derangement does not subsume love as trivially as being subsumes souls and bodies—trivially in that it subsumes everything—so the methodological parallel in the *Phaedrus* fails to license an expansion of the first step along the ambitious lines Mansfeld envisions. Many good definitions go up a level of abstraction or generalization. It does not follow that they leap to the top of the great chain of being. Distinguishing rodents from other mammals brings you quickly to the essential features of the rodent. Distinguishing them from other things that exist—where to begin?

Mansfeld offers another consideration. ‘If active and passive capacities *per se* are common to all the subjects that one can study, the extension of the nature of such capacities is larger than that of each separate subject.’ Thus, ‘soul’ is to be studied under the aegis of a larger category.19

Mansfeld seems to be saying that because every analysis looks for the ways in which a thing is acted upon and the ways it acts upon other things, it must begin with the class of all things that can be acted upon or can act on something else. To divide into ‘active’ and ‘passive’ is necessarily to begin with the group of all things that can be active or passive. This is the principle, if Mansfeld means to argue this way, that applying any differentia implies using that differentia of all things divided by that differentia. By that principle, planning to study moths by distinguishing white moths from brown ones requires that one also be studying horses, given that horses too may be divided into white and brown. If we understand Mansfeld, he is taking the rule of collecting common phenomena too strongly. The methodological principle applies, at least in the technical sense of a species’ differentiae, to some arguments in Aristotle.20 Mansfeld is importing it back to a Platonic discussion where it does not belong.

In the present case, the class of things that can be called active or passive includes animals, plants, the air, and the sea. An oceanographer would have to be able to say how a sea acts and in what respects it is passive. To expect that knowledge of an orator takes us a long way from any plausible reading of what Socrates is saying about Pericles. The differentiae ‘active’ and ‘passive’ will not make the whole in question the world at large in the absence of other supporting evidence.

Furthermore, the soul will not resemble the body solely by belonging in the universe. If anything, that condition makes body and soul fellow beings, not one the image of the other. No parallel is implied by their joint membership in the cosmos, any more than there is a parallel between rats and orchids implied by their being beings. The collection will have to begin with a smaller inclusive category.

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Finally, we arrive at the most serious problem with S2, namely that the *Phaedrus’* talk of cosmology is confined to this passage that comments on Pericles. After mentioning Pericles, Socrates goes on to speak of dialectic that informs philosophical rhetoric. Nowhere in his discussion of philosophical rhetoric does he mention the whole cosmos. Other commentators raise the same objection. Knowledge of the whole cosmos simply does not play a role in a rhetorician’s development. Thus, even if we grant S2’s interpretation of the Pericles passage, interpreting ‘the whole’ as the whole cosmos is inconsistent with the rest of Socrates’ erotic-rhetorical theory in the *Phaedrus*.22

5. **S3: The whole body or the whole soul**

Karel Thein, who raises objections against Mansfeld’s version of S2, is one of the readers who would replace S2 with the reading we labeled S3. As Thein formulates S3, it takes ‘the whole’ to refer to either ‘the whole soul-body compound’ or ‘the whole soul,’ and either way to an individual soul composed of parts. Whether in one or both of these forms, proponents of S3 argue that what the *technikos* must know is a soul or a body. A soul as a whole comprises parts, as a body does, and the *technikos* needs to identify those parts in order to know which treatment affects each one.

Again, this application of ‘whole,’ speaking generally, has pre-Socratic precedent. When Xenophanes says that God sees, thinks, and hears *oulous* as a whole, he is conceiving God as an individual.24 As God, so a soul may be a whole.

S3 turns on precisely how we take Socrates’ language of soul simplicity and soul complexity. ‘In considering the nature of anything,’ he asks, ‘must we not consider first, whether … [it] is simple or of many forms [ἄπλοϊν πολυειδές]’ (270d). Shortly thereafter and with similar words, he expects a teacher of rhetoric to begin with a portrayal of the soul that ‘lets us see whether it is one [ν] and the same [μοιον] by nature, or rather many-formed [πολυειδές] as the body is’ (271a). These alternatives – one, simple, same, or multiple formed – mean on the one hand that the individual soul is *morphologically* simple or unitary, on the other hand that it is morphologically multiple. It follows that the ‘whole’ is the whole particular soul, which we hope to learn is either a unity that the rhetorician can address as a single subject or a concatenation of parts each of which needs to be separately addressed.

Part-language has something natural about it whatever the complex object is. Language is a complexity, and we identify the parts of speech. Socrates’ comparison of the soul to the figure of the body makes him seem pretty straightforwardly to be asking whether the soul’s constitution divides into elements comparable with the body’s limbs. Part-language can even be the
default reading of complexity, always applicable. Thus, Christopher Rowe, who states his preference for the reading that would have philosophers dividing ‘soul in general’ into types – something akin to our S4 – speaks as though that act of differentiation comes to much the same thing as distinguishing among a soul’s parts. Asking whether the question is about more than one part in the soul or ‘whether there is more than one type of soul,’ he answers that ‘the two questions will in the end go closely together.’

And yet the morphological simplicity that would make the individual soul unitary in form cannot be a live possibility when Socrates raises it; for by that point, the Phaedrus has repudiated that option. In Rowe’s own account of the difference between simple and variegated souls (277c2–3), he adverts to the exchange between Socrates and Phaedrus, early in the dialogue, during which Socrates contrasts the monstrous Typhon with the simple thing he would like his soul to be (230a3–6). This is the dialogue’s locus classicus for simplicity in an individual soul, and Rowe adduces the passage as a proof that the Phaedrus makes such simplicity an option.

The choice between being a Typhon and being simple should be taken with a grain of salt. Socrates imagines a punning classification of souls in that passage that contains only Τυφών and a soul with an τυφός ‘not puffed up’ fate, something simple and undesiring. On this picture, desire as such is a bad thing, as erôs is in the first speech Socrates makes. The assumption that desire as such is blameworthy guides the dialogue’s discussion until Socrates abandons his impious thought about erôs (242c–243b). He then offers a speech from Stesichorus of μερα ‘Desire’ (244a), the act of inspiration now setting him against the fantasy that good souls are sane souls. The second speech of Socrates introduces – as ‘what one must say’ (246a3) – a picture of the soul as tripartite, with horses and a charioteer (246a). If the simplicity meant in the contrast with Typhon is a deep-psychological description of the soul, as Rowe takes it to be, Socrates’ volte-face reaches back to eliminate that possibility. Thus, the distinction at 230a does not remain available to the understanding that encompasses ‘the whole’ at 270c, or to the dialectical rhetorical theory Socrates outlines at 277b–c.

On its own terms, anyway, the injunction to know ‘the nature of the whole’ as a prerequisite to knowing the soul threatens to collapse into pleonasm on S3, according to which the soul simply is the whole. What alternative could Socrates be ruling out? Rhetoricians of the kind he wants to replace with philosophers had not been seeking to know the nature of souls in some incomplete way so much as they had ignored souls’ natures altogether. ‘If you want to know a person’s soul then you will have to know all of it’ might correspond to insightful methodology by medical practitioners who otherwise set a leg without thinking about their patient’s diet. In the absence of rhetoricians who have been focusing on a mere part of the soul, the principle sounds vacuous.
If finding soul to be simple does not mean that an individual soul lacks internal articulation, the remaining option is that the predicate ‘ensouled’ is univocal, thus, that human souls are all alike and call for a single rhetorical manner from all rhetoricians on all occasions. As the proponents of S3 do, we too take the whole to mean the whole soul or soul in its entirety, rather than as in S1 and S2 to include something lacking soul (space, climate, etc.). But the entirety in question is the genos of all souls, and the practitioner of rhetoric has to begin with that collectivity.

6. Technê and taxonomy in Hippocrates

We begin to move to S4 with a different kind of appeal to the Hippocratic works. For as this chart reminds us, each of S1–S3 includes some idea of the technê of rhetoric, and each can be disputed on the grounds of how it conceives that technê. There are other bases for the disputes, as the pages above indicate; the point is that deciding what the whole is, whatever else it entails, also entails deciding what the technê of rhetoric should be.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interpretation</th>
<th>Attention to technê</th>
<th>Grounds for dispute</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1: environment</td>
<td>A technikos must make observations of the body or soul’s interactions with its environment.</td>
<td>Those observations provide only ancillary information about applying the technê, not the content of the technê itself.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S2: kosmos</td>
<td>The knowledge in a technê must meet the Phaedrus’ requirements for dialectical reasoning. So the grandest of all genera must be the starting point.</td>
<td>A complementary condition exists: that a technê also have limits to its scope, being about some subjects and not all.</td>
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<tr>
<td>S3: a soul</td>
<td>The scope of the rhetorical technê must be restricted to psychic matters. The whole comprises all and only souls (or bodies).</td>
<td>Starting with an individual soul or body leaves no role for the dialectical division of a general type into smaller subtypes.</td>
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Asking the Hippocratic corpus about technai rather than about wholes leads to one kind of evidence in favor of S4, given that (as we argue) technai in Hippocrates require expertise about causal relations and further given that causal knowledge operates through the taxonomic sorting of a genos.
In the corpus, causal knowledge enables a *technikos* to treat the body effectively. Works recognized as Hippocratic say (for instance) that ‘knowing the causes [ατ ι α] of each condition will permit the right treatment’; ‘it takes the same good sense to know the causes [τά α τα] of diseases as to be expert at treating them’; and ‘if one knew the cause [μθην] of a disease, one would be able to provide what is advantageous [τά σωμφέροντα] to the body [τσώ ματι].’

Causal knowledge entails taxonomy. The *technikos* needs to perform a taxonomical analysis before causal knowledge is even possible. That is, before physicians can learn about causal connections among the various types of treatments and types of bodies, they first have to classify all the different species of treatments and all the species of bodies.

The point is obvious for Galen, on whose understanding of Hippocrates causal knowledge in medicine is possible only after performing a taxonomical analysis. Along these lines, Galen contrasts Hippocratic medical practice, traditionally associated with Kos, with the school of thought said to have originated on Cnidus, which was responsible for rival treatises also labeled ‘Hippocratic’:

> Hippocrates censures the Cnidian physicians for their ignorance of the genera and species of diseases, and he points out the divisions by which what seems to be one becomes many by being divided.

The Hippocratic physicians from Kos grouped cases together to create broader genera of diseases, symptoms, and treatments, then divided each *genos* into species. The resulting taxonomy allowed the physician to identify the causal relationships between species from one *genos* and species from another.

Consistent with Galen’s account, the Hippocratic author of *Regimen in Acute Diseases* criticizes physicians who fail at classifying diseases. By contrast, the Hippocratic doctor succeeds by understanding diseases, symptoms, and bodies in terms of their positions in a larger taxonomy. *On Head Wounds* shows what classification might look like, distinguishing among T-, X-, and H-shaped sutures on the tops of skulls (referring to the Greek letters tau, chi, and eta, respectively). The Hippocratic author classifies head injuries into one ‘mode,’ divides the ‘modes’ into ‘forms’ of contusions and fractures, and then classifies weapons according to their shapes. Given this taxonomy, the treatise can identify causal connections between types of weapons and types of head injuries, and thus generalize about cranial injuries.

In similar spirit, *On Ancient Medicine* says that a physician should classify human beings according to how they react to a certain type of food. That text evokes preliminary and then complete knowledge in language reminiscent of the *Phaedrus*.
It is not sufficient to learn simply that cheese is a bad food… cheese does not harm all men alike; some can eat their fill of it without the slightest hurt, nay, those it agrees with are wonderfully strengthened thereby. Others come off badly. So the constitutions of these men differ… If cheese were bad for the human constitution without exception, it would have hurt all.34

The doctor acquires knowledge of the nature of any given patient’s body by considering where that body falls within the larger class of human bodies. Thus, the ‘whole’ that the doctor must know is the whole genos of bodies. If this is the similarity that Phaedrus seized on at 270c, the rhetorician needs to acquire rhetorical technê by knowing the genos of souls.

7. S4: The whole genos

In the Platonic dialogues too, the call for a technê leads to the demand for causal knowledge. Socrates says in the Meno that true opinions ‘are not worth much until one secures them with calculation or reckoning about cause [ἀρίθμος λόγοι]’ (98a3). A distinguishing feature of technê knowledge is that it specifically includes an understanding of the relevant causal relationships between bodies and medical treatments or between souls and speeches.35 That is what makes technê knowledge explanatory. The neophyte physician might know that a certain drug eases stomachaches, but if she does not know why the drug works, she will not know when it is appropriate to prescrive it and for whom. Those who possess a technê can offer an explanatory account of their subject matter that demonstrates their understanding of causal connections among patient, symptom, and treatment.

Causal knowledge is precisely what those activities lack that fall short of being technai. The Apology’s poets fail to qualify as true technikoi because they ‘say many fine things, but know none of the things they say’ (22c). At greater length, Socrates says in the Gorgias that pastry making fails to be a true technê because ‘it has no reason [λόγον] to offer about the nature of what it is about, so that it can’t tell the cause [ἀρίθμον] of any of its effects’ (465a); medicine however ‘has looked into the nature of the one it treats and the cause [ἀρίθμον] behind its actions, and can give a reason [λόγον] in each case’ (501a). In the Phaedrus, Socrates tells us that the technikos will be able to ‘identify the causes [ἀρίθμον] of the feelings produced’ by certain speeches on certain souls (271b). As that last passage suggests, the Socratic conception of technê knowledge resembles Hippocratic technê in calling for a taxonomical analysis.

The Phaedrus is full of taxonomies of souls. Socrates refers to the rhetorician’s διατάσσεσθαι τα λόγων τε και ψυχῆς γένη ‘classifying/arranging the genera of speeches and of souls’ (271b). This verb διατάσσω (Attic διάττω) carries a range of senses, often describing the appointment and arrangement of persons; but even in contexts far removed from scientific practice, it
implies differential assignment, as when Herodotus says that young Cyrus 
sets other boys to different tasks, ‘a task to each one.’ 36 The orator Socrates 
is speaking of will connect up a given speech with the soul in the right asso-
ciated genos.

The genera of soul recur through the Phaedrus. Socrates

1 tells a story of the souls before birth following different gods around 
heaven (247a) and possessing different characteristics as a result 
(252c–253c);
2 ranks the different degrees to which people fall into bodily states, from 
philosophers and lovers at the top down to tyrants (248d–e);
3 calls cicadas followers of the Muses who report back on human be-
ings, each of whom is said to follow a different Muse (259b–d).

The subdivision according to one’s prenatal god–leader provokes a partic-
ular mode of rhetorical address, thus by implication drawing on specialized 
causal knowledge. Lovers find themselves drawn to young love objects who 
had followed the same god around heaven’s rim. Partly to seduce that young 
right beloved and partly (what fortuitously has the same effect) to bring the 
young one into closer concord with the character of that god they had both 
followed, the man in love speaks to him of the qualities appropriate to being 
a Zeus or Hera type. If he fell in love with a Hera, he would address that soul 
so that it perceives its own affinity to Hera and acts accordingly, making it-
self yet more like Hera (253b–c). The classification of souls informs speeches 
in the erotic context, presumably as it will inform the rhetorician.

Thus, the true rhetorician who sees a soul begins by figuring out what spe-
cies it belongs to. Practicing collection and division, the rhetorician brings all 
souls under the genos of soul and then distinguishes among them. 37 Which 
of the 11 gods did they follow before embodiment? Which of the nine ranks 
did they fall into? Applying the right speech to a soul requires knowledge of 
the nature of that soul, and knowledge of the nature of that soul requires 
knowledge of ‘the whole,’ where ‘the whole’ is the whole genos of soul, much 
as ‘the whole of virtue’ in Plato’s Meno is the genus virtue as opposed to, for 
example, courage, one of its species (77a). The result is a treatment of the 
whole that resembles what Hippocratic doctors do and that draws on the 
analysis of soul–species laid out in the Phaedrus.

8. Objections and clarifications

Were this Plato’s Republic, the taxonomy of souls would collapse into the 
differentiation among a soul’s parts. S4 would restate S3, as Rowe’s remark 
about the questions ‘going together’ also implies. For Books 8 and 9 of the
Republic amount to the argument that three soul–elements can be interpreted so as to capture five soul types. As Book 10 begins, Socrates comments to Glaucon that they have enumerated the eidê of soul (10.595a), where eidê ‘kinds, forms’ can with equal plausibility describe both the types catalogued in Books 8–9 and the three elements or ‘parts’ defined in Book 4. If anything like the same ambiguity is possible for the Phaedrus, then Rowe is right, and our defense of S4 only provides additional support for S3.

But the Phaedrus cannot reduce types to elements as the Republic does. Consider the battle that takes place in a soul when it falls in love. Charioteer pulls back reins; good horse obeys; bad horse fights and only yields, if it does, after a bloody struggle (253d–254e). This struggle makes sense as an explanation of desire in humans only if it takes place in every tripartite soul, regardless of which god that chariot team had trailed around heaven. But if every species of soul, at least as membership in divine regiments defines the species, experiences the same conflict among its constituent parts, then the internal complexity will not account for differences among the kinds. S4 does not collapse into S3.

Another objection (this time in defense of S1) comes from Gill, who reads the Phaedrus’ explication of medical method along nontaxonomical lines. Her objection would render irrelevant the Hippocratic parallels we describe: ‘the passage describing the Hippocratic method of investigating natures quite clearly concerns parts (simples) and wholes (complexes), not species and higher kinds.’

For the terms to carry taxonomical meanings, according to Gill, simples would have to be species and complexes genera. ‘In that case, the kind would be a union of its species, not something more general, contrary to Plato’s treatment of kinds in his discussion of Collection and Division.’38

Leaving aside the modern conception of species as unanalyzable or indi-
visible, we have an important query at work here, whether a genus can be seen as a compilation or concatenation of species. Metaphysically speaking, the more general term would have to become a union of more specific terms; epistemologically speaking, one would ‘have to know all the species in order to know the whole kind, and that would reverse the direction of explanation demanded in the earlier passage that mentions “the whole”,’ which is to say at 270c.39

The metaphysical claim suggests a false dilemma. Rodentia both com-
prizes porcupine species and squirrel species and rats as their union and describes the animals under that heading more generally than any species name does, thus containing them as a general term contains special cases. The constantly growing pair of incisors manifests itself in a variety of body types, diets, and so on. If a genus were not a complex, it would not allow subdivisions.

Because the larger taxonomical term is indeed more general, Gill is right that knowledge of it precedes knowledge of the narrower term. But it does
not have to be known as the combination of species it contains. Zoologists familiar with rats and squirrels but not porcupines may identify Rodentia correctly and only later learn that this beast armed with quills belongs in the same group. The investigator has to start out recognizing some rodent species and spotting a similarity in their incisors; as long as we agree that adequate knowledge must wait for the proper definition of Rodentia and its subsequent division into smaller groups, taxonomy does not violate the Phaedrus’ description of medical and rhetorical practice.

Of Hippocratic taxonomies, we need to acknowledge one that captures modern readers’ attention, that is plausibly authentic, and that nevertheless supports a rival interpretation of Phaedrus 270c. Airs Waters Places, already mentioned, divides humanity into subgroups in a way that is close enough to some Platonic passages to make it believable that Plato knew that work.40 Because certain environments bring about certain types of bodies, this work’s analysis of environments would both fit with the prescription to know ‘the whole’ and support interpretation S1. For example, ‘the cause [ατι] of this [σκιά] Asian’s being gentler than Europeans] is the temperature of the seasons.’ Again, ‘the seasons are the main cause [ατι αιμάλαστα] of Asians’ lesser likelihood to fight in wars.41 If physicians know what species of environment the body inhabits and know what types of bodies that environment tends to cause, they will be able to identify what type of body is before them. Thus, in the case of the body, knowledge of the taxonomy of environments allows the doctor to understand the causal relationship between the environment and the body.

The problem with using this passage to support S1 arises when one tries to speak of souls as Airs Waters Places speaks of bodies. Unfortunately for S1, there is no causal relationship between types of sensible world environments and types of souls. The Phaedrus implies very much the contrary view that a soul’s disposition follows from the soul’s experiences before entering a body, not from its actions in the sensible world. First, each soul honors and imitates the god it had followed pre-embodiment (252d1–5) and this shapes how the soul affects things and is affected. Second, how much of the forms the soul perceived in its bodiless condition affects how it will respond to the sight of beauty (250a1–c5). Neither of these causal factors involves observable world environments. And because there is no causal relationship between the sensible world environment and a soul’s character, it follows that taxonomical knowledge of the sensible world environment is useless to the rhetorician.

In fact, pace S1, the technikos needs no knowledge of the soul’s environment to know what soul type is before him and how it will tend to behave. The technikos comes to know the nature of the soul by figuring out where that soul falls within the larger class of all souls. A rhetorician who knows the whole taxonomy of souls can predict each soul’s disposition from the classification alone (271d). If a soul had followed Ares, it will have a
tendency towards jealousy and will turn homicidal if it thinks it has been wronged (252d1). Taxonomy gives the technikos all the information necessary for knowing how the soul will behave in any given environment. Thus, it is knowledge of the ‘whole’ taxonomy of souls (S4) that gives us knowledge of the nature of a particular soul.

The rhetorician follows the medical researcher in sorting individuals and deciding what will move, reprove, and improve them. Souls resemble bodies in differing so as to require different treatment, and S4 recognizes that parallel. If anything about the Phaedrus’ myth translates into rhetorical practice, it is the assignment of souls’ differences to the realm beyond experience, whether that cause be the psychic cavalcade that first produced character types or the amount of truth a soul viewed prenatally. Even though psychic health mirrors bodily health, it begins under circumstances to which the psychic doctor has no access.

9. Conclusion

What we are doing with inner life in this discussion is imagining it as theoretically variegated, indeed imagining variation as an essential characteristic of soul. We have insisted on the methodological significance of the nature of tou holou in addition to its ontological meaning, that is seeing the whole as what has been collected and stands as a unity, but also as what admits of analysis into species. In doing so, we take ourselves to reflect the dialogue’s emphasis on that dimension of psychology. Other Platonic works present theories of the soul and account for its escapades before and after life; the Phaedrus stands out for the range and detail of psycho-taxonomies it offers, in particular for its separation of such taxonomies from the internal articulation of soul into parts.

On this reasoning, Hippocrates enters the conversation as a model for theories that subdivide a genos.42 Platonic arguments frequently make the soul an object of inquiry by comparing that entity addressed by a philosopher with the body a physician treats; at Phaedrus 270c–d, the act of situating one soul within its genos, as the Hippocratic sorts bodies’ lactose tolerance or the patterns of sutures in their skulls, ascribes taxonomical scrutiny to the student of the psyche. For with this act – not when situating the soul in the universe, not even when situating it in the lived environment – the philosopher comes to see one soul as a thing to be differentiated from others like it, as the Phaedrus makes it its mission to do.

Surely it encouraged Plato to discover a medical treatise that sorted the genus of human bodies into more specific types to be treated according to different protocols, whether he found that sorting in On Ancient Medicine or On Head Wounds or somewhere else. What physicians do with bodies now justify what the philosophical orator intends to do around souls. For all
we know, Plato even took his inspiration from Hippocrates, moving from bodily categorizations to the psychic kind, as he depicts Socrates at the beginning of the dialogue starting with a doctor’s advice about reducing bodily fatigue and transmuting it into the search for a place to rest the soul and feed it on speeches. In itself, the health that physicians make possible is not something to get obsessed with, as Socrates says in another context; but the way in which medical theorists organize knowledge of the body shows yet again how to advance our understanding of that whose well-being it is impossible to pay too much attention to.

Elizabeth Jelinek
Department of Philosophy & Religion
Christopher Newport University

Nickolas Pappas
Department of Philosophy
City University of New York, The Graduate Center

NOTES

1 Pl. Phdr. 270c; Prt. 311b–c.
2 Isocrates writing near the end of Plato’s life offers an education that is a gymnasian ‘work-out’ for the soul: Antidosis 181, 266. Plutarch says that Isocrates wrote this work at 82, which dates it to 354–353 B.C. (Life of Isocrates 838a). Platonic comparisons between psychic exertion and bodily athleticism include training in abstemious virtue, Phdr. 256b, Leg. 8.840a–c; dialectic as athletic competition, Cra. 421d, Philb. 41b. See J. P. Harris, ‘Revenge of the Nerds: Xenophanes, Euripides, and Socrates vs. Olympic Victors’, American Journal of Philology 130 (2009), 157–194.
4 A succinct example appears at Cri. 47d–e, so subtly that Socrates never mentions the soul. A. Kenny observed some years ago that ‘nothing in Greek thought before Plato suggests that the notion of a healthy mind was more than a metaphor.’ ‘Mental Health in Plato’s Republic’, in id., Anatomy of the Soul: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, 1973), p. 1.

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discussions of part and whole in Plato might be at stake in the obscure remarks on question.


both here in the until it is studied when embodied. Platonic passages imply if anything the contradictory claim, Cf. Lloyd (n. 5), p. 173.

cosmos, ‘allusion. In keeping with the multiplicity of wholes found in the reading, he advises that the precedents are implied by Aristotle

activity for the physician to perform regarding bodies that parallels any activity that Socrates as-

sents his composite reading as unique among interpretations of

Verdenius, ‘The Problematic Mention of Hippocrates in Plato

Port.

See (n. 16), p. 332. In general, de Vries says that Mansfeld

μετεωρ

a fortiori. Moreover, this section of Regimen I proposes no activity for the physician to perform regarding bodies that parallels any activity that Socrates as-

cribes, in the Phdr., to the knowledgeable practitioner of rhetoric.

gill (n. 5), pp. 301–302.

Ibid., p. 306.

Ibid., p. 303.

Hippoc. Aer. 3.2–23.

Gill (n. 5), pp. 303–304.

Brown (n. 6), p. 318.

Ibid.


For being as ouden (which is the Ionian for holon), see Parmenides fragment 8.38. Other precedents are implied by Aristotle’s comments on the whole of nature or simply ‘the whole’: Metaphysics 1.3984a31–33, 5.261024a3, 12.101075a11. An application of ‘whole’ to the universe might be at stake in the obscure remarks on ‘whole’ and ‘all’ at Theaet. 204a-b. But the extensive discussions of part and whole in Plato Prm., being applicable to all wholes, do not settle this question.

Mansfeld (n. 16), p. 349.

Ibid., pp. 350–351.


Rowe (n. 7), p. 205.

Thein (n. 20), pp. 139–152.


Rowe (n. 7), p. 206.

The whole as union of individual soul with individual body strikes us as the least supportable reading. It would commit Plato to the thesis that the soul’s true nature cannot be known until it is studied when embodied. Platonic passages imply if anything the contradictory claim, both here in the Phdr. with Socrates’ revelation about the psychological structure we do not
perceive (246a), and in Rep. 10’s image of the sea-god Glaucus (10.611b–c; and see Phd. 81b–c, 82e). Moreover Phaedrus’ reply would imply a Hippocratic tradition of treating a body by first coming to know the whole person, soul, and body together. In Charm., Socrates attributes that kind of medical practice to the legendary Thracian physician Zalmoxis (156d–e); but surely the point of that passage is that Zalmoxis differed from ‘the doctors of the Greeks.’

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Expertise within one subject implies nonexpertise outside it at Ion 537c. The technikoi of Ap. 22d get this wrong, seduced by success at their professions into thinking they are knowledgeable about ‘other more important issues.’ The fact that techné knowledge is restricted to its technè tells against S2. If the technikos does not necessarily know anything outside that technè, the Phaedrus’ technikos would not need to acquire knowledge of the cosmos before knowing either a soul or a body.

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29 Hippoc. Art. 11, 20–22.

30 Flat. 1, 24–26. The explicit reference to the body is surely relevant here. Cf. VC. 2, 2–51, whose Hippocratic author explains why certain types of weapons incur certain types of wounds depending on the part of the head that was struck. See below on taxonomic analysis in VC.


32 Acut. 43, 1–8.

33 VC. 1–10.

34 VM. 20, 23–47.

35 As C. D. C. Reeve points out, there are other features of technai that distinguish them from knacks; they are explanatory, teachable, and luck independent. Socrates in the Apology, (Hackett, 1989), p. 39. But these features follow from the fact that techné knowledge is causal knowledge. Because technai are explanatory, which is to say explaining events in terms of their causes, they are also both teachable (causal accounts being general) and luck independent (where luck implies a departure from causal regularities).

36 Hdt. 1.114.2.

37 This type of taxonomical analysis resembles the collection and division described earlier in the dialogue. This resemblance invites one confusion. In those earlier passages, collection and division came into the conversation as a method for the rhetorician to use in acquiring that first knowledge the rhetorical techné requires, namely knowledge of the subject matter of a speech. Lysias had gone wrong, and Socrates in his first speech, in failing to collect properly, thus takes the gauche kind of crazy love for the only crazy love there is. What invites confusion is that where the Phaedrus’ specimens of rhetoric are concerned, knowledge about souls satisfies both the first (knowledge of subject matter) and the third (knowledge of audience) of the three knowledge criteria. When you talk about souls in love, you study souls in order to learn what you are talking about; but when you do so, you are also learning about whom you are talking to. In other words, we are arguing that the rhetorician, uniquely, will have to employ collection and division to meet the third condition of techné knowledge (knowledge of one’s audience) in addition to the first (knowledge of the subject matter).

38 Gill (n. 5), p. 311.

39 Ibid.

40 See Pl. Rep. 4.435e–436a, which equates some Greek cities and some foreign nations with different elements of the soul. Some such association seems to lie behind the Menex.’s history of Athens, as that history organizes foes and allies; see N. Pappas and M. Zelcer ‘Plato’s

41 Hippoc. *Aer*. 5.73, 5.85/16.

42 Why should it enter so cryptically? Perhaps for the same reason that it is the first substantive mention of Hippocratic medicine: Plato has just come to acquaint himself with the writings and interpolates the remarks after having written the rest of the *Phaedrus*. This is mere speculation. But then we can say only speculatively why some Platonic passages are plain as day while others inspire volumes of interpretive debate.

43 Pl. *Phdr*.: Acumenus advises less tiring walk, 227a; they find καταγωγή ‘shelter,’ 230b1. Also see the reference to Herodicus at 227d and his general advocacy of long walks.

44 Pl. *Rep.* 3.405c–406e. Interestingly, Herodicus is the bad doctor here, not in the scientific status of the views he comes to but in his overvaluation of life extension. Evidently, the true value of body-theory emerges when we make it the model for soul theory.

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