Preface
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Special Issue: Concepts of the Psyche: Wittgenstein on Mental Phenomena
Edited by Stefan Majetschak and Yi Jiang
1. Origin of this issue

With words like “consciousness”, “spirit”, “mind”, or “soul” in our everyday language, our usual assumption is to refer to inner “objects” or mental “processes”. In his later philosophy, however, Wittgenstein holds that we are tempted to interpret all these words as referring to “inner objects” or “mental processes” only because we are construing them in the light of false analogies. As a consequence of his critique, Wittgenstein denies that we refer to an unseizable “yet uncomprehended” object or “process in the yet unexplored medium” of the human psyche when using these or other “psychological concepts”; for this appears to be the fundamental grammatical illusion. As he is well aware, however, his critique might be understood “as if” he “denied mental processes” as such. “And”, as he emphasizes in Philosophical Investigations § 308, “naturally we don’t want to deny them”.

A question arises if we take Wittgenstein by his word in PI § 308: if Wittgenstein is not denying the mental phenomena but only their misguided interpretation, then what does their adequate interpretation look like? How do we have to conceive the ontology of mental phenomena appropriately, if it is true that mental processes are undeniably real within the human psyche? In the so-called Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, which consists of Ts 229 and Ts 232, two late typescripts written after the main parts of the Investigations have been completed, Wittgenstein thoroughly discusses different types of mental phenomena. But whether a positive account of these phenomena—besides his critique of their grammatically misguided interpretation—can be found in these writings has seldom been examined.

2. Main contents

In what follows, we publish a selection of papers which have been presented during the conference Concepts of the Psyche: Wittgenstein on Mental Phenomena that took place at Beijing Normal University on 2017 April 8 and 9. Some of the papers address Wittgenstein’s trains of thought from a methodological point of view as mentioned above. In his article “Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology” Yi Jiang (Shanxi University) examines Wittgenstein’s negative attitude to some concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology, folk psychology, and the foundation of current study in psychology. Stefan Majetschak’s (University of Kassel) paper “‘A misleading parallel’: Wittgenstein on Conceptual Confusion in Psychology and the Semantics of Psychological Concepts” provides a brief sketch of what Wittgenstein considered to be the conceptual confusion prevalent in psychology. Majetschak suggests why Wittgenstein did not expect the methods of an experimental (natural) science to be successful in solving the problems that concern us in psychology. And Francis Y. Lin (Beijing International Studies University) in “Wittgenstein on Understanding and Emotion: Grammar and Methods” examines the grammar of some emotion words and the methods Wittgenstein employs in dissolving the philosophical problem(s) of emotion.

On the other hand, two articles by Anja Weiberg (University of Vienna) and Zhao Fan (University of Canterbury, New Zealand) focus on more detailed topics of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the philosophy of psychology after 1945. Anja Weiberg’s paper “Philosophical Concepts, the Ideal of Sublimation, and the ‘Unpredictability of Human Behaviour’” examines Wittgenstein’s critique of the widespread practice of constructing one’s own uses of words in philosophy and of taking these special uses to be more authoritative than the uses of everyday language. Finally, Zhao Fan’s article “A Critical Discussion of the ‘Memory-Challenge’ to Interpretations of the Private Language Argu-
ment” critically discusses interpretations of the famous “private language argument” recently launched by Francis Y. Lin.

3. Aim of the issue

Considering the lack of the attention paid to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology in present philosophical discussions, this issue focuses on the presentation and clarification of Wittgenstein’s thoughts in his later writings on the philosophy of psychology. All contributors to the issue at hand are experts who have been working on Wittgenstein’s philosophy for years and are engaged in projects on Wittgenstein in China as well as in the world. The aim of this issue is to pay more attention to Wittgenstein’s ideas about mental phenomena and his criticism of the philosophy of psychology as misguided by false analogies.

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