Abstract

In Crowder’s reformulation of Berlin’s argument, not only does value pluralism provide support for liberalism, it actually suggests a version of liberalism that promotes the public use of personal autonomy. For Crowder, personal autonomy is a necessary element given value pluralism as it allows the individual to choose between a plurality of incommensurable options. In order to advance personal autonomy, Crowder advocates a robust account of freedom of exit coupled with a form of autonomy-facilitating education. To this effect Crowder posits that it is acceptable to intervene in the lives of non-liberals in order to promote individual autonomy as a public ideal. However, I argue that despite the positive implications that a pro-autonomy account of liberalism may have for both the individual and the state, it will limit range of acceptable values within the liberal state and thus undermine certain aspects of value pluralism.

Key words: autonomy, education, exit, liberalism, value pluralism

Value Pluralism: Outline and Implications

Value pluralism is most often associated with the work of Isaiah Berlin. While Berlin did not develop his thesis of value pluralism in a systematic or coherent fashion, his important contributions to this topic can be located throughout his substantial body of work. As noted by George Crowder and Henry Hardy, “Berlin had not written a systematic account of this topic [value pluralism], central though it was to his thought, and his scattered remarks were tantalizingly incomplete and, at times, frustratingly unclear or even (it seemed) contradictory.”\(^1\) Despite the fragmented nature of Berlin’s writing, it is possible
to determine distinct elements of his value pluralism. In the analysis of both Crowder and Steven Lukes, Berlin’s value pluralism is characterized by the following four key elements: (1) the existence of universal values; (2) the plurality of values; (3) conflict among values; and (4) the incommensurability of many, but not all, values.²

Berlin developed his thesis of value pluralism partly as a rebuttal to the development of monism in both moral and political thought. In its broadest sense, moral monism is the belief that all ethical questions possess a single correct answer, and it is therefore possible for all answers to be derived from a single and coherent moral system.³ All other forms of morality and, by extension, political association are considered defective to the extent that they fall short of the standard set out by the monist super-value. Alternatively, they have value only insofar as they are a necessary step on the trajectory towards this monist super-value. With an acknowledgement to the ancient Greek originators of this reductionist method, Berlin calls this search for the elusive monist value the “Ionian fallacy”. This is the flawed belief that:

all genuine questions must have one true answer and one only, all the rest being necessarily errors; in the second place, that there must be a dependable path towards the discovery of these truths; [and] in the third place, that the true answers, when found, must necessarily be compatible with one another and form a single whole, for one truth cannot be incompatible with another – this we know a priori.⁴
Examples of such forms of moral and political monism include Plato’s theory of the forms, utilitarianism and its various accounts of utility, and anarchism.

Berlin suggests that we should be wary of moral and political monism for two important reasons. First, it runs counter to the evidence of both human history and human experience. Monism does not accurately represent the depth and continued persistence of conflict in the human experience. Instead, as Berlin notes, “the world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others.” Second, and perhaps more importantly for Berlin given the Cold War context in which he was writing, monism has provided the foundation for authoritarianism and totalitarianism, which were the cause of so much human suffering and death in the first half of the twentieth century. While Berlin is careful to note that monism does not automatically result in authoritarianism or totalitarianism, the intellectual roots of these extreme regimes can always be traced back to a belief in monism; monism always possesses the potential to lead in the direction of such regimes, as both authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies require the belief in utopianism.

Much has been written about the differing interpretations and political implications of Berlin’s thesis of value pluralism. To this effect, three divergent political positions have emerged from these debates. The first takes as its starting point a specific interpretation of Berlin’s plurality of values. Plurality, in this context, is understood as referring to a plurality of different cultures and
ways of life, as opposed to a plurality among or within goods. The implication of this plurality is that there will exist a diverse collection of different cultures and ways of life. If ways of life and the political and moral goods they entail are both plural and incommensurable, then we have no rational or *a priori* reason to prioritize liberalism over any other form of political association. Accordingly, value pluralism generates a number of valid forms of political association, of which liberalism is but one. This interpretation therefore denies any positive link between value pluralism and liberalism. This leads to a form of politics that is based on modus vivendi, where different forms of political association seek peaceful coexistence through negotiation and compromise. This interpretation of value pluralism is most often associated with John Gray and his thesis of “agonistic liberalism”.

The second interpretation of the political implications of value pluralism, as advocated primarily by William Galston, does provide a positive link to liberalism. Here we see a shift from pluralism referring to different cultures and ways of life, to a form of pluralism among goods and values themselves. According to Galston, value pluralism suggests that liberal and non-liberal values are equally valid. In this context, a value pluralist account of plurality argues that goods and values such as tradition, equality, community and solidarity are not inherently superior or inferior to liberty, as they all possess value. Accordingly, value pluralism leads to a defence of liberalism as it is the form of political association best suited to maximally accommodating this mixture of both liberal and non-liberal values within the state. For Galston, value pluralism supports a form of liberalism that shares many characteristics with Reformation liberalism,
particularly its focus on toleration and state neutrality. This Reformation account of the state is preferable as it allows for the “expressive liberty” of its citizens, allowing them to lead their lives as they see fit “within a broad range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value.” ¹⁰ In contrast to Gray’s interpretation, here we see the debate focusing on what happens within the state as opposed to between states.

The third interpretation also provides a positive link between value pluralism and liberalism. However, unlike Galston’s account, this is not a form of toleration-based Reformation liberalism. Instead, it is a form of autonomy-facilitating liberalism that shares many characteristics with Enlightenment liberalism. As value pluralism generates a range of valid goods, both moral and political, it requires that the individual be able to make reasoned choices among such options. Accordingly, it implies a strong defense of the kind of liberalism in which the facilitation of autonomy is viewed as a legitimate political ideal. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this third position is Crowder, and it is a detailed examination of particular aspects of this argument that will be the focus of this paper.

This paper will be divided into two main sections. The first will examine Crowder’s argument, which provides a positive link from value pluralism to a specific form of autonomy-facilitating liberalism. The second section, which will constitute the crux of this paper, will be a critical evaluation of the autonomy-facilitating aspect of Crowder’s argument. In particular, this section will examine Crowder’s twin arguments of freedom of association and exit, and autonomy-
facilitating education, as legitimate aspects of public policy. I conclude that while a pro-autonomy liberalism may produce both individual and societal benefits, the restrictions that it places on acceptable forms of pluralism run counter to the central thrust of value pluralism.

**From Value Pluralism to Liberalism: Crowder’s Argument**

While Crowder is not alone in his examination of Berlin’s contribution to political thought and the history of ideas, it is perhaps he who has been more responsible than anyone else for the development and exposition of value pluralism as an important and coherent contribution to both moral and political philosophy. Central to Crowder’s contribution is the argument that value pluralism leads logically to a form of liberalism that is distinctly pro-autonomy. This is not a position that Crowder has always held. Indeed, in his earlier work on value pluralism, published in 1998, Crowder argued that there was no positive relationship between value pluralism and liberalism:

I cannot claim to have exhausted the possibilities for arguing from meta-ethical pluralism to liberalism but I think it fair to say that the failure of all the arguments I have considered is strong evidence for the following general conclusion: value pluralism has, of itself, no tendency to support the case of liberalism.11

In Crowder’s initial analysis, not only does value pluralism fail to provide a justification for liberalism, but it may instead result in illiberal outcomes: “Not
only does [value] pluralism provide no support for liberalism, it positively undermines the liberal case, since it is always open to the pluralist to ask, why not the illiberal option?"\textsuperscript{12} Crowder's position in this earlier manifestation is congruent with that of Gray and the first of the three positions outlined above.

However, despite his earlier misgivings, Crowder now holds that value pluralism does in fact provide a coherent and logical defence for liberalism. More specifically, value pluralism provides a defence for a form of liberalism that encourages and prioritizes the capacity for autonomous decision making within the individual. In this context, Crowder holds that “value pluralism generates arguments that decisively favour pro-autonomy liberalism over the liberalism of group toleration.”\textsuperscript{13} This is not a defence of autonomy that is premised on Kantian metaphysics, but rather one that focuses on the instrumental benefits that autonomous decision making can provide the individual within an environment characterized by a plurality of incommensurable values.

In order to understand Crowder's specific line of argument, which provides a positive link between value pluralism and (a pro-autonomy account of) liberalism, we must first examine briefly Berlin's attempt to do likewise. Crowder identifies in Berlin's work two arguments that attempt to provide a positive link from value pluralism to liberalism. The first focuses on choice: if value pluralism is true, then it gives rise to the value of freedom, as freedom is required to be able to choose between competing options.\textsuperscript{14} Crowder rejects this argument as it contains “an obvious logical flaw” in that it violates “Hume's law” by attempting to derive values from facts.\textsuperscript{15} More specifically, Berlin attempts to
move directly from arguing that choice is unavoidable to valuing freedom of choice itself. However, just because something is unavoidable does not mean it is inherently valuable.

The second argument that Crowder identifies focuses on the impossibility of moral and political perfection. Value pluralism rejects monism and therefore rejects the possibility of political perfection. Accordingly, it should promote a form of political association which both accommodates and facilitates this inescapable imperfection, rather than a form which attempts to overcome it. This suggests the form of Reformation liberalism that is associated with Locke and its emphasis on toleration and human imperfection. However, for Crowder, this line of argumentation is weak as it does not provide an argument from value pluralism to liberalism and only liberalism. While Reformation liberalism is anti-utopian, it is not the only form of political association to be so. Conservatism also shares this sceptical approach towards human perfection.

In order to avoid the violation of Hume’s law that Berlin falls foul of, Crowder will need to demonstrate that his argument does not pass from fact to value, but rather from value to value. It is not enough to show that liberalism is one possible outcome; rather, if Berlin’s pluralism is true, then Crowder will need to show that liberalism is a necessary outcome, and is best suited both to accommodate and to facilitate pluralism. Crowder believes that this is indeed possible, and to make it so he turns away from the defence of Reformation liberalism and instead moves towards a formulation of liberalism that has much in common with Enlightenment liberalism.
As with the first argument from value pluralism to liberalism that Berlin proposes, Crowder’s argument also revolves around the issue of choice. However, whereas Berlin focuses on the transition from the necessity of choice to valuing the ability to make such choices, Crowder focuses on the character traits required by those who must make such choices, in particular those hard choices that are produced by value incommensurability.

Pluralism forces the individual to make choices. As there exists a plurality of values and goods, which are at times in conflict, and which it is impossible to order against some other ultimate-value, Berlin’s pluralism, if correct, forces the individual to make choices. It is at the point at which the individual makes such a choice that Crowder’s argument from pluralism to liberalism is situated. At this point, there are essentially two options: to select one option over the other on a purely arbitrary, if not random, basis; or to follow a particular course of action for “a good reason”. Crowder’s argument from pluralism to liberalism is contingent upon providing individuals with the intellectual tools that enable them to formulate such “good reasons”. In Crowder’s reformulation of Berlin’s argument from choice, these intellectual tools are only associated with the specific liberal virtue of personal autonomy, as it is only through the use of autonomy that such choices can be made for “a good reason”, as opposed to arbitrarily or randomly.

There is at play here, however, an important assumption on the part of Crowder, and this is something that he openly admits. Crowder’s defence will be
successful only if the individual actually wants to make choices for “a good reason”. If the individual in question wishes to submit their life to the winds of fate and choose arbitrarily or at random, then Crowder’s argument fails. Crowder believes, however, that there is sufficient justification for the individual to be committed to reason and reasoned decision making in this context.

To this extent, Crowder draws upon the work of Martha Nussbaum, who argues that reason – interpreted widely as meaning to incorporate practical reasoning and critical reflection – is a vital human function as it allows the individual to “organize and arrange all of the ... other [human functions], giving them in the process a characteristically human shape.” More recently, Nussbaum has incorporated practical reason into her “capabilities approach”, noting that it is essential as it enables the individual to “form a conception of the good life and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life.” Without this capacity for reason and reasoned decision making, it would be impossible to select between incommensurable values. Any choices made in this condition would be random, “arbitrary, incoherent and perhaps self-defeating.” Crowder is not so bold as to argue that a life without the capacity for reasoned decision making is devoid of value. Rather that if pluralism is true, those individuals who do possess this capacity for reasoned decision making are better placed to make such important decisions given the options presented to them, compared to those who do not possess such a capacity. As Crowder argues,

Pluralism does not imply indifference; on the contrary, it stresses the intrinsic value of many goods. Practical reasoning is essential to the
honouring of these goods. Since practical reasoning under pluralism requires personal autonomy, respect for plurality requires autonomous thinking.\textsuperscript{22}

To aid our capacity for reasoned decision making in the harsh light of incommensurability, Crowder argues that we need to develop four particular virtues and dispositions of character. The first of these is the “open-mindedness” we require in order to take the plurality of values seriously.\textsuperscript{23} Berlin’s pluralism shows us that there is a wide variety of valid human values and goods, and these possess some form of moral parity as there is no form of external metric against which to quantify them. Furthermore, there is also a wide variety of valid forms of human flourishing connected to these values and goods.

While Crowder makes no specific mention of them, incorporated under this first “virtue” are the characteristics of Reformation liberalism, in particular the promotion of tolerance as a \textit{political} virtue. Tolerance, at its simplest, is demonstrated when an individual or institution refrains from interfering with, or extends a form of permission for, the practices or beliefs with which they disagree.\textsuperscript{24} While we as individuals or members of a particular group may not see the merit in \textit{all} of the values and forms of human flourishing validated through Berlin’s pluralism, we do need to acknowledge that for other people they are of merit and are therefore valued.

Secondly, because of the implications of value incommensurability, we need to be aware of the inescapable reality of the consequences of our decisions.\textsuperscript{25} The
choices that we make have real consequences, both moral and political. When we choose to follow a particular course of action, we must do so from a position that allows us to evaluate our options and acknowledge that our decision may have both positive and negative outcomes. Following Berlin, Crowder refers to this as “realism”.26 Similarly, Glen Newey refers to it as “agent-regret”, in that we are often faced with the “tragic choice” scenario whereby we acknowledge that in order to pursue certain values others will need to be sacrificed.27

Thirdly, as pluralism necessarily entails the rejection of abstract rules and forms of thinking and ordering that exist a priori, it should make pluralists both aware of and attentive to the particular details of choice-making situations, “including the claims and circumstances of those people affected by the choice.”28 Here, it appears that Crowder is influenced by Kant’s doctrine of respect for the individual.

Finally, we come to the value of mental flexibility. As pluralism rejects monism and the recourse to a monist super-value, the individual who is attempting to determine a course of action through practical reasoning will need to make decisions that relate to their specific situation. As these situations change, pluralists must possess sufficient flexibility within their mental architecture to be able to accommodate such changes. As Berlin notes, “the concrete situation is almost everything.”29

In order for individuals to be able to make reasoned choices between incommensurable moral or political values in any given situation, they must be
able to judge for themselves what to do. They no longer have recourse to the monist super-value, as this is ruled out by pluralism, and thus the individual is forced to make these difficult decisions independently, taking into account the specifics of each particular case. Furthermore, as the nature of the good life is subject to constant disagreement and will inevitably change over time, it cannot be used as a base from which to permanently premise our decision making. These bases must themselves remain open to constant analysis and revision, and this is possible only through the exercise of personal autonomy.30

The argument that Crowder proposes is that these four pluralist virtues and character traits – open-mindedness, realism, the rejection of abstract rules, and mental flexibility – are also distinctively and uniquely liberal virtues. The crux of his argument is that in order for individuals not only to choose but to be able to choose for good reason among any given set of incommensurables, they require a particular mental architecture that allows them to do so. This mental architecture is best expressed as the ability to exercise personal autonomy. As Crowder concludes, “Pluralism, in short, imposes on us choices that are demanding to a degree such that they can be made well only by autonomous agents. If pluralism is true, then the best lives will be characterized by personal autonomy.”31

The Tensions Within Crowder’s Liberal Pluralism

The emphasis that a value pluralist understanding of liberalism places upon the diversity and pluralism inherent in human nature may prove beneficial to those
who are concerned with the demands of pluralism. Value pluralism recognizes
that diversity and conflict are an inevitable part not only of liberal tradition but
also of being human. A liberalism grounded in value pluralism is, potentially,
more likely to be open to the desires and needs of groups that have been
historically marginalized, such as women and various cultural or ethno-religious
communities. It will allow these groups to challenge the strict application of
values such as liberty and equality, as well as the traditional classification of life
into the public political and private non-political spheres. Furthermore, it will
allow the state space in which to re-evaluate the construction and
implementation of these various structures and values, given the detrimental
effects they have on these marginalized groups.32

A liberal polity informed by value pluralism may be congruent with certain
forms of multiculturalism and cultural minorities. As this reformulation of the
liberal polity places an emphasis on the public use of autonomy, it may be
acceptable to those who demand special or differentiated rights for such ethno-
religious communities while simultaneously positing that such communities still
hold that individual autonomy is a value of fundamental importance. (This can be
seen in Crowder's defence of a robust right of exit and an account of autonomy-
facilitating education, both of which will be examined in the following sections.)
Indeed, Crowder notes that on this point there are similarities between his work
and that of Will Kymlicka, who argues that cultural membership is important as
it allows individuals to make sense of their life choices.33 While Crowder and
Kymlicka take very different justificatory paths, their conclusions are quite
similar.
However, it is my contention that Crowder is blind to the potentially restrictive and exclusionary effects of his account of liberal value pluralism. This problem is not located in any theoretical deficiency or misreading of Berlin, but rather in the actual social and political *implications* of his thesis. As I have already stated, value pluralism forces the individual to make choices – often tragic choices – between incommensurable options. For Berlin, this means that being free to choose is of importance, and this capacity is best achieved through liberalism as liberalism can be characterized as the political expression of negative liberty. However, as Crowder notes, this is a violation of Hume’s law. What is important, Crowder argues, is not only being free to make decisions but also being able to make decisions for good reasons within any given context. As the contexts for our decisions change, so too must our reasons for making such decisions. It is only liberalism that allows us to develop the mental architecture necessary for making such decisions in fluid contexts. Thus, a liberalism that is grounded in value pluralism not only frees the individual to make decisions but also furnishes them with the skill set necessary for making such decisions for good reason.

In order to secure the social and political conditions necessary for an agent to be able to make decisions for “a good reason”, Crowder believes that the promotion of personal autonomy is therefore a legitimate aim of public policy. As Crowder writes, “I conclude, then, that pluralist multiculturalism will be framed by Enlightenment liberal principles that include a public commitment to the facilitation of personal autonomy among all citizens.”34 Indeed, for Crowder, this gives rise to both negative and positive duties on behalf of the state: not only
should the state remove boundaries that restrict an individual’s ability to exercise personal autonomy (negative duties), but it should also help individuals acquire the skills that allow them to make such decisions (positive duties). To this effect, negative duties are achieved through a robust account of an individual’s “right of exit”, and positive duties are achieved through a distinct form of liberal education that facilitates or enables the individual to develop and employ autonomy when it is deemed necessary.\textsuperscript{35}

I argue, however, that it is in the implementation of these two duties through public policy that we can see the emergence of tensions within Crowder’s account of liberal value pluralism, which may, ultimately, undermine the extent to which it can facilitate and accommodate a true plurality of values. The exact nature of these tensions will become clear through a detailed examination of the right of exit and of an autonomy-facilitating liberal education.

**Autonomy and the Right of Exit**

Freedom of association is an important characteristic of the modern liberal democratic polity. Within such polities, citizens are often members of associations, such as academic associations, sporting clubs, political parties, or churches. Membership in such diverse forms of association reflects the heterogeneous nature of the modern liberal democratic polity. A corollary of freedom of association is freedom of disassociation, or the right of exit. Within the modern liberal democratic polity, membership of any of these forms of association must be voluntary. It would be a distinctly illiberal polity that forced
an individual to join a particular association, such as a (state-sanctioned) political party or religion.

Voluntary membership is perhaps most clearly expressed when an individual chooses to join an association of which they are currently not a member. For example, I may currently not be a member of a cricket club, and in order to demonstrate my appreciation for the game, decide to join local cricket club “A”. Similarly, due to a change in my geographic circumstances, I may choose not to renew my membership with “A” and instead become a member of my new local cricket club “B”. These two examples demonstrate an uncontroversial account (at least within the liberal discourse) of voluntary membership – I have chosen, without coercion, to join association “A”, and then to switch my allegiance from association “A” to association “B”. Within liberal democracies this form of voluntary association is most evident in sporting clubs and political parties.

This is very different, however, from membership of an association into which one is born, rather than chooses to enter, such as an ethno-religious community. How do individuals demonstrate that they have chosen freely to remain a member of an association or community they were born into? Person A’s decision to join religion X is a less problematical demonstration of voluntary membership than person B’s membership of religion X if the latter’s membership was due to the circumstances of their birth. While they are both members of religion X, it is more difficult for B to demonstrate that their initial and continued membership is voluntary.\(^{36}\) In this context, an individual demonstrates genuine – that is to say voluntary – freedom of association through their continued
membership even though they are given the option to leave. When an individual refuses to exercise their right of exit from an association, their continued membership could be considered as constituting voluntary membership.

However, this specific interpretation of voluntary association and freedom of exit assumes that the only reason why an individual has not exercised their right of exit is because they desire to continue their membership. It does not take into account situations where an individual may wish to exercise this right, but where the costs involved are too prohibitive to do so. As Neil Burtonwood notes, “Membership of communities based on religion or culture is, for the most part, the outcome of birth and [therefore] exit from such a community is of a different order from resigning membership of the local golf or tennis club.”37 This may be an issue for minorities, but it is a more pressing issue for those members who feel oppressed within such minorities.

Within the modern liberal democratic polity, members of minorities tend to be at a greater disadvantage than members of the dominant demographic, often facing challenges that the latter would not encounter. However, it would be incorrect to assume that these minority groups are homogenous; even within such groups, internal minorities can and do develop. These sub-groups are often particularly vulnerable. As Leslie Green brings to our attention, “Minorities are badly off, but internal ones are often worse off. They suffer from being members of minority groups who need to defend themselves not only from the majority but also from other members of their own minority.”38 Within the academic literature of feminism, sociology, and cultural studies, this is referred to as intersectionality.39
Within the specific context of minorities, Avigail Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev refer to “minorities within minorities”.40

Examples of such vulnerable groups within minorities often include women and children,41 as well as members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community. Women within such communities are often presented with limited educational opportunities, limits to control over their own sexuality (sometimes enforced through violence), and forced marriages. Children, as James G. Dwyer notes, are often “involuntary and unwitting participants” in such communities.42 In such situations, particular members of these communities within the liberal state may feel that their cultures are excessively patriarchal, and are therefore detrimental to women and children. Similarly, those who identify as LGBT and who are members of such restrictive communities may feel unable to express their true sexuality for fear of isolation, expulsion, or violent acts.

The traditional liberal defence against such restrictive behaviour is the individual’s right of exit. That is to say that all individuals are protected against such intra-group oppression if they are free to leave such an oppressive group. If they are denied this right, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, for the individual to escape such oppressive practices.43 But what does it mean to be free to leave a group in this context? What is it that actually constitutes the ability to leave?
Does a strict negative interpretation of liberty help us here? In a negative liberty understanding of the right of exit, all that is required to be free is that the individual is not prevented from doing so by the use of force, or the threat of such use. But this does not take into account the various “costs” that the individual may suffer as a direct, or even indirect, result of their decision to exercise their right of exit. An individual may be so embedded within a community that they know of no other way of life. It may be that not only are their friends and families connected to this way of life, but so also may be their way of thinking. Even if we exclude issues of violence (both physical and emotional), to exit this way of life would not only mean (potentially) losing one’s friends and family, but also being removed from an environment that gives one’s life meaning through a shared context. To what extent do these “costs” restrict the freedom of exit?

In *The Liberal Archipelago*, Chandran Kukathas identifies two opposing positions regarding this important question. The first concludes that these additional costs in fact negate this “freedom of exit”. In reality, an individual “would be unfree...if exit were extremely costly – as it often is.” Kukathas provides us with the example of Amish teenagers: while they are free, in that there are no overt barriers limiting their ability to remove themselves from their community, this freedom comes at the unreasonable cost of their family, friends, and property. While no one is physically forcing them to stay, their freedom to exit is not as simple as merely not being actively prevented from doing so. As Kukathas concludes, “they are not [free].” The Amish teenager is embedded too deeply in
their community to simply walk away without incurring substantial costs to themselves, both mental and financial.

Opposed to this position one could argue that these additional costs, extreme as they may be, do not negate an individual’s right of exit. At the core of this position is the belief that ultimately, within a liberal democratic polity, an individual still has the choice to leave their community. These additional costs may make this process more difficult, but they do not remove this course of action as a legitimate and viable option. As Kukathas notes, these costs “may have a large bearing on the decision taken; but [they have] no bearing on the individual’s freedom to take it.” While there are undoubtedly substantial obstacles that make the Amish teenager’s decision to leave their community a difficult one, they still do possess the option to do so. A difficult option is still, nonetheless, an option.

Kukathas rejects this second approach, and instead advocates a strict negative liberty interpretation of the right of exit, as demonstrated in the following extract from The Liberal Archipelago:

Consider the case of Fatima, the wife of a Malay fisherman living in the state of Kelantan on Peninsular Malaysia. She is a Muslim, a mother, and a wife; and her life is very much shaped by these aspects of her identity, and also by her membership of the village community, which reinforces the view – her view – that her life should be governed by her religion and her duties as wife and mother. She has no desire to live elsewhere or
otherwise. If she did wish to live in some other way she probably would
have to live elsewhere, since it is unlikely that the village would tolerate –
let alone welcome – any deviation. Is Fatima free?48

It is Kukathas’ contention that Fatima is, in fact, free. While there are still costs
involved, she is free to leave the community in which she is embedded; no one,
other than herself, is stopping her from leaving. By implication, therefore, she is
also free “if she does not have any wish to leave – even if she is ignorant of the
possibility of leaving or living differently – and simply continues to live her life. A
society of villages such as Fatima’s is, on the view offered here, a free society –
whatever else may be said about it.”49 Kukathas is aware that his specific
interpretation of the right of exit is open to question. He concedes that it would
be wrong to think that Fatima is free because she is autonomous and has chosen
freely her particular course of action, as this is simply not the case. As Kukathas
notes, “she has not ‘chosen’ it; she has simply not rejected it. She has acquiesced
in a life she has been raised to lead, but she has not embraced it.”50

How, then, does Kukathas consider Fatima to be free? It is his opinion that
Fatima is free “because she may live a life she has not rejected and is not forced
to live a life she cannot accept.”51 This is not a form of freedom that, contrary to
Kant’s reasoning, is dependent upon autonomy or any form of self-direction.
Rather, for Kukathas, Fatima is free because she possesses “liberty of
conscience”. While this may be a deviation from the negative liberty informed
account of freedom, and therefore of a free society, it is consistent with Kukathas’
understanding of what a liberal, and therefore free, society should be. As Kukathas argues,

A society is free to the extent that its members do not have to live lives they cannot, in good conscience, accept. If this is so, then a society will not be free simply because there are many options open to individuals. It can only be free if individuals can dissociate themselves from options they cannot abide.  

Thus, while Kukathas does not deny that there may be costs involved – indeed, quite high costs – when an individual wishes to exercise their right of exit, this does not constitute a barrier to that individual’s freedom to exercise such a right.

However, this is not a position that Crowder shares. For Crowder, a viable right of exit is more than simply the lack of restrictive practices. It is in this context that Kukathas’ argument is problematic, as it refuses to acknowledge the reality that these additional costs have for the individual in question. This can be illustrated by returning to the example of women within a liberal democratic polity who may wish to leave their community due to excessive patriarchal practices that are inimical to their personal autonomy. Here we can see how difficult their right of exit is in reality. Drawing on the work of Susan Moller Okin, Crowder correctly points out that women’s “choices in these contexts are severely limited by lack of education, since girls are frequently thought less worthwhile educating than boys, and by damaging education designed to train girls to accept confining gender roles.” The unfortunate result of these
restrictive practices is that they tend to leave the individual in such a limited state that the idea of exiting such communities is rarely an option. Okin provides us with the following example:

The words of a seventeen-and-a-half-year old Indian student from Fiji capture the dilemmas such young women face. Suddenly faced with a coerced marriage that would not allow her to graduate from high school, she said: "I don't know what to do now. My dreams and plans are all messed up. ...I am tormented." But when a teacher suggested that she need not, perhaps, go through with the marriage, she responded indignantly: "In our religion, we have to think of our parents first. It would kill them if I ran away and disobeyed them. ...For me, I couldn't marry someone who wasn't a Muslim. I will do it the Muslim way. And I would never go against my parents!"55

For Crowder, what is required, therefore, is a right of exit that is more than simply not being obstructed, or not being threatened with violence. We need an understanding of the right of exit that takes into account the various obstacles and costs that one may encounter. As Crowder argues, "Crucially, it seems, real freedom of exit seems to involve the capacity to stand back from the group’s norms and to assess them critically – that is, the capacity for autonomous judgement."56 How does an individual develop this capacity for autonomous judgement? As in the case of a hypothetical liberal society that would be characterized by Rawls’ political liberalism, in order for the individual to have the capacity to make autonomous judgements they must be educated to do so.57
Autonomy-Facilitating Liberal Education

In order to prevent the type of social conditioning that works against the capacity for autonomous judgement, and that therefore restricts an individual’s ability to exercise their right of exit, Crowder argues that we need to encourage “the development in children of a form of character in which serious thought along these [autonomous] lines is possible and valued.”\textsuperscript{58} It is not enough that autonomy is required; rather, the argument actively promotes the "facilitation of individual autonomy."\textsuperscript{59} Crowder is aware that by linking autonomy to education, he could be guilty of advocating a form of comprehensive liberalism, and thus suggesting a move towards a moral monist account of liberal perfectionism. In order to avoid such a charge, Crowder, drawing upon the work of Harry Brighouse,\textsuperscript{60} draws a distinction between “autonomy-promoting” and “autonomy-facilitating” forms of liberal education.\textsuperscript{61}

An autonomy-promoting form of liberal education would be inexorably linked to a comprehensive doctrine (such as Enlightenment liberalism), as it would shift autonomy to the centre of a student’s life in an attempt to ensure that they employ it whenever possible. In contrast, an autonomy-facilitating form of liberal education aims to “enable them to live autonomously should they wish to.”\textsuperscript{62} It would operate in the same abstract way as the teaching of languages or mathematics, in the sense that a student would have the capacity to use these skills, but need not use them continuously. While a student may have the capacity to speak a foreign language, they will only do so when the need or desire arises. As Brighouse notes, “The [autonomy-facilitating] argument
suggests that, other things being equal, people’s lives go better when they deploy the skills associated with autonomy, but does not yield any obligation to persuade them to deploy them: autonomy must be facilitated, not necessarily promoted.”

Crowder concurs explicitly with Brighouse on this point, suggesting that:

the Enlightenment-liberal state need only facilitate autonomy, not promote it. Such a state need only ensure, principally through the education system, that its citizens have the capacity to live autonomously; it need not demand that its citizens’ lives be comprehensively autonomous in content, like the energetically innovative lives celebrated by J. S. Mill.

It is Crowder’s contention, therefore, that a form of liberal education that is autonomy-facilitating, as opposed to autonomy-promoting, will enable individuals to make decisions autonomously without undermining any of their other cultural values. While Crowder does acknowledge that this may “bring changes to a traditional society,” the central thrust of his argument is that it is erroneous to think that traditional (ethno-religious) practices are necessarily mutually exclusive of the liberal facilitation of an individual’s capacity to make decisions autonomously.

While I am sympathetic to what Crowder is trying to achieve in his bifurcation of autonomy into its moral (autonomy-promoting) and instrumental (autonomy-facilitating) aspects, it is my contention that he is too optimistic regarding the
extent to which this division can be successfully maintained. The distinction that Crowder envisages may work at the abstracted level of ideal theoretical scenarios, but when it is actually implemented at the level of real-world application (that is to say in the classroom environment), I suggest that the boundaries that separate these two forms of autonomy would be less robust, and more porous, than Crowder imagines. Accordingly, at the level of practice, it would be very difficult to disentangle autonomy-facilitating education from autonomy-promoting education. This is an important point that Crowder fails to acknowledge. Indeed, this oversight of Crowder's is exacerbated by the fact that Brighouse, whose work Crowder draws on, acknowledges openly that the collapse between these two forms of autonomy is a distinct possibility: “Although the methods recommended will be more somber than evangelizing, it may be hard to distinguish autonomy-facilitating from autonomy-promoting education in practice.”

It is on this important point that parallels can be drawn between Crowder's emphasis on a form of autonomy-facilitating liberal education and the educational demands of Rawls' promotion of autonomy within the public political sphere. In Rawls' later work, particularly *Political Liberalism*, autonomy is promoted as a political rather than a moral good. The justification for this politicization of autonomy is to avoid the restrictive effects of a comprehensive form of perfectionist liberalism, such as that developed in *A Theory of Justice*. For Rawls, autonomy is to be promoted only insofar as it allows individuals to make decisions in relation to the constitutional essentials of society, as opposed to being a necessary metaphysical element that provides the foundation of the good
life. Yet, as Andrea Baumeister correctly brings to our attention in relation to Rawls, and contrary to what Crowder argues, it is wrong to assume that autonomy can be compartmentalized and brought out only when required. In this sense, the learning of autonomy, even in its facilitating context, cannot be equated with the learning of mathematics or languages.68

For many students in secular schools, the teaching and prioritization of autonomy pose no problem. However, for some (but by no means all) religious students, the teaching and prioritization of autonomy, even in its facilitating context, may challenge and undermine certain aspects of their faith, for example by challenging the epistemological foundations of, say, the Qur’an as the revealed word of God. Furthermore, how would this autonomy-facilitating education sit with the school curriculum in what are referred to in the United Kingdom as “faith schools”? While many of these schools may reject an autonomy-promoting based curriculum, would they also place restrictions on autonomy-facilitation if the results of such a programme included the questioning of fundamental beliefs? If so, would this mean they are to be deemed unreasonable and therefore excluded from Crowder’s value pluralist liberal polity? I am not suggesting that religion should be assigned a privileged position within society, or excluded from critique. Indeed, within the modern liberal democratic polity, I believe that religion should be scrutinized, particularly with regards to both the public sphere and education. However, my point is that the restriction of autonomy to the public sphere, and its valuation solely as a political and instrumental good, is not as simple as either Rawls or Crowder argue.
Exclusion through Restriction

This move towards the active promotion of autonomy has important implications regarding the role of the state. If, given Berlin's value pluralism, personal autonomy is a necessary attribute, then this presents, prima facie, an argument that the state ought not only to prevent restrictive actions that discourage the development of autonomy but also to actively promote its development. What is required is more than negative liberty regarding the development of autonomy; non-interference in its own right does not go far enough. Crowder argues that the existence of a dominant liberal society outside the walls of a non-liberal community will not prevent the restriction of autonomy within such non-liberal communities. Such autonomous attributes are often actively discouraged, and various non-liberal communities have developed effective means of isolating themselves from these external influences.69 The Amish and Mennonite communities in America are obvious examples of groups who have been very successful in minimizing external influences that oppose their traditional beliefs.

It is perhaps only now, after a detailed analysis of Crowder’s particular interpretation of a pro-autonomy liberalism premised upon value pluralism, that the tensions within it become evident. Value pluralism tends to oppose forms of perfectionist liberalism, such as Enlightenment liberalism, because they use autonomy as the ultimate value against which everything is measured. Value pluralism may, at least on an initial reading, suggest a form of liberalism that does not prioritize autonomy. But when Crowder’s liberal value pluralism is
examined in more detail, we see that autonomy re-emerges as a value of particular importance.

This is not to suggest that Crowder’s reformulation of autonomy takes on the same degree of importance as does a super-value within a monist form of political association. Crowder prioritizes autonomy for instrumental rather than metaphysical reasons; it is a value that enables individuals both to make choices for “a good reason” and to actively exercise their right of exit from groups as they see fit. As Crowder concludes, “the exigency of choosing well among incommensurables points to an emphasis on personal autonomy.”70 In this context, Crowder shares with Rawls and Nussbaum an interpretation of autonomy that is not linked to a specific formulation of Kantian metaphysics but is, rather, implemented and valued as a political tool; not for what it is, but for what it does.

Accordingly, my argument is not meant to challenge the benefits of a pro-autonomy account of liberalism. Indeed, I agree with Crowder’s belief that an individual’s capacity to make decisions for themselves, particularly among incommensurable options, is enhanced by their ability to reason autonomously. Furthermore, this ability to reason autonomously is bolstered by a robust account of freedom of exit combined with some form of autonomy-facilitating education. However, while the autonomous individual that resides within the Crowderian liberal polity may be better equipped to make decisions when faced by incommensurable values, the number of values that may be open to them to choose from has been greatly reduced.
By assigning to autonomy (even when restricted to its instrumental aspect) a privileged position, Crowder’s liberal value pluralism is effectively pre-determining the parameters of his liberal polity. It is only those who are willing to accept a liberal polity that upholds individual autonomy as a necessary public good who will be accepted. Those who, for whatever reason, do not share this specific liberal formulation will be forced either to modify their internal practices (and perhaps, ultimately, their beliefs), or alternatively to reject the liberal polity.

The effect of pre-determining the parameters of a value pluralist liberal polity in such a way, either by design or by unintended consequence, is to restrict the forms of pluralism that can be successfully incorporated. Thus, the issue becomes a question of the extent to which forms of pluralism can be translated successfully into a liberal discourse and polity that intentionally promotes autonomy as both a public and a private good. If it is possible for forms of pluralism to be translated in such a way then they can be incorporated under Crowder’s value pluralist liberal paradigm. However, if they are either unwilling or unable, then according to Crowder’s analysis they cannot be incorporated.

As we have already seen, Berlin’s thesis of value pluralism provides the foundation for both an ethical and a political defence of a broad array of values. However, Crowder’s specific interpretation of value pluralism excludes many of these values through his continued emphasis on autonomy. It is therefore my contention that a value pluralist liberal polity may have the potential to
accommodate a wide variety of values, but not in the specific form in which Crowder presents it.

1 George Crowder and Henry Hardy, “Berlin’s Universal Values – Core or Horizon?” in The One and the Many: Reading Isaiah Berlin, eds. George Crowder and Henry Hardy (Amherst, NY.: Prometheus Books, 2007), 293.

2 George Crowder, Isaiah Berlin: Liberty and Pluralism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 132; George Crowder, Liberalism & Value Pluralism (London and New York: Continuum, 2002), 2, 45; and Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications for Diversity (London: Verso, 2003), 90. Crowder and Lukes are not entirely aligned in their analysis. For example, Lukes does not include the existence of conflict between values in his analysis. Furthermore, Lukes separates value incomparability from value incommensurability, whereas I interpret Crowder’s definition to collapse these two points under the single banner of value incommensurability.


Crowder, “Pluralism and Liberalism,” 304.


Berlin, *Liberty*, 214


17 Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.


20 Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.

21 “…I do not claim that lives in which personal autonomy plays little or no part are wholly without value. Such lives may exhibit many other goods that are valuable from a pluralist point of view, and must therefore be judged to be good in some degree. Indeed, such lives may well be better than autonomous lives in certain respects.” Ibid., 152. Elsewhere, Crowder notes that “People who are not equipped to think critically will be to that extent ill-equipped to cope well with the hard choices that, on the pluralist view, will inevitably confront them. This does not mean that heteronomous lives are valueless. Such lives may exhibit many genuine goods. But heteronomous lives cannot be among the best possible
overall, judged from a pluralist perspective, since they lack a capacity for good
decision-making in the fact of inevitable and profound value conflict.” Crowder,


23 Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.


25 Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.


27 Glen Newey, “Metaphysics Postponed: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Neutrality,”

28 Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 150.


30 Crowder, “Pluralism and Universalism,” 151.

31 George Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value-Pluralist Approach,” in Political


33 Crowder, “Multiculturalism: A Value-Pluralist Approach,” 54. For more on
Kymlicka’s argument, see Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A


Some religious traditions, such as Catholicism, have specific rituals that demonstrate full acceptance of that religion. Such rituals, broadly referred to as “confirmation”, are said to demonstrate voluntary membership of the religious community. In Eastern Churches, confirmation is often conferred on infants straight after their baptism. In Western Churches, such rituals are usually performed at a later age, when the participants are deemed to have reached the “age of reason”, that is, they are old enough to understand fully the consequences and obligations of their promises to the church. However, even here, confirmation is taken under the age of eighteen, and often as young as twelve. In these cases, the crux of the issue is whether such decisions are indeed voluntary and fully informed, and free from family or societal pressures. Accordingly, I do not consider this form of voluntary membership to be as voluntary or un-coerced as an individual who decides to join a new cricket club due to geographic changes.


43 This traditional liberal approach of framing the problem in such an “either/or” way (either the individual accepts this patriarchal behaviour as being part of their community, or they choose to exercise their right of exit, and leave their community) tends to ignore a viable third option of an individual choosing to
remain as a member of their community and attempting to implement reforms from within. An example of this third option would be the feminist theology movement, with their desire to reform certain aspects of religious practice from within the various religious traditions themselves.


46 Ibid., 107.

47 Ibid., 107.

48 Ibid., 113.

49 Ibid., 113.

50 Ibid., 113.

51 Ibid., 113.

52 Ibid., 113-114.

53 Okin, “‘Mistresses of Their Own Destiny’: Group Rights, Gender, and Realistic Rights of Exit.”


Ibid., 734.


Ibid., 55.

Ibid., 55.
Brighouse, “Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy,” 734. I find this oversight by Crowder to be all the more problematical as Brighouse’s warning is clearly stated on the same page (734) that Crowder cites with approval.


Crowder, “Two Concepts of Liberal Pluralism,” 139.