New Perspectives on Anarchism

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Introduction

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Anarchism is back on the scene. Theoretically, as well as practically, anti-authoritarian thought is in a resurgence that has probably surprised many of those who have been involved in it in one way or another over the years. Whether as a mode of organizing resistance, as a model for interpersonal relationships, or a way of thinking about politics specifically and our world more generally, anarchist thought has once again become a touchstone. One might want to call this the third wave, after the wave of the late 1800s to early 1900s and the anarchist inflections of the 1960s.

There is more than one reason for this resurgence of anarchist practice and thought. For starters, one might point to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of Marxism as a framework for the left. Of course, much of what marched under the banner of Marxism has been discredited for many years. However, in a bipolar world it was difficult not to choose sides. Anarchists and anti-authoritarians, because they did not pick sides, were often marginalized. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the (temporary) hegemony of the United States, the left was forced to cast about for new frameworks for conceiving and practicing struggle. Anarchism, which had never entirely gone away, offered a framework grounded in both history and theory.

Not only did it have the pedigree of a legacy. Anarchism offers an approach to progressive politics that runs counter to the most egregious element of the way the twentieth century appropriated Marx: its avant-gardism, its authoritarianism. For anarchists, Stalin and Mao were not accidents of the way Marxism was articulated in revolutionary movements. They were instead proper expressions of that articulation. Indeed, Mikhail Bakunin foresaw this very unfolding back in 1873. (And given the way Marx treated Bakunin in the First International, they may also be seen as proper expressions of Marx himself.) Here are his words.

> Now it is clear why the *doctrinaire revolutionaries*, whose objective is to over-
> throw existing governments and regimes so as to create their dictatorship on
> their ruins, have never been and will never be enemies of the state. On the con-
> trary, they have always been and will always be its most ardent defenders . . .
> they are the most impassioned friends of state power, for were it not retained,
> the revolution, having liberated the masses in earnest, would eliminate this
> pseudo-revolutionary minority's hope of putting a new harness on them and
> conferring on them the blessings of their own governmental measures.[1]

They might stand as a coda to the Marxist-inspired revolutionary projects of the
last century.

The anti-authoritarian character of anarchist thought and practice not only
responded to the discredited avant-gardism of Marxism. It also responded to the
identity politics of the 1980s and 1990s, recognizing the irreducibility of differ-
ent struggles without falling into the ghettoization of those struggles that is the
legacy of identity politics. Whereas Marxism reduced all struggles to class
struggle, identity politics could never see solidarity across struggles. Anarchism
navigates this divide by pressing an egalitarian agenda wherever deleterious
power relationships are in play. With identity politics, it recognizes that there is
no privileged center of power or of struggle. With Marxism, it recognizes the
need for solidarity and connection if resistance is to succeed. Because anarchists
focus on the equality of all who struggle and the necessity to fight domination
wherever it appears, they offer a way to exit from the reductionism and conse-
quent avant-gardism of Marxist practice while retaining the ability to
communicate among disparate struggles.

Anarchism responds not only to the ghettoization of identity politics but
also to a more general phenomenon of academic leftism over the past thirty
years: its increasing insularity of both thought and vocabulary. Much of what
has been produced theoretically in the name of progressive thought is obscure in
its writing and isolated from political struggle. We need not name names here.
Those who have participated in the academic world over the past several dec-
ades know how many arenas of progressive thought have produced texts on
democracy and resistance that can be understood only by an initiated few and
practiced by nobody. Anarchism cuts against the grain of such thought. In taking
equality seriously, it also takes seriously the recognition that everyone is capable
of participating in thought, reflection, and conversation, unless they are being
prevented from doing so by those who would speak in their name.

Moreover, there is something in the egalitarian and horizontal structure of
anarchism that responds to the technology of the internet. Although attempts
have been made to narrow the democratic bandwidth of the internet, it has been
able to retain its character as a forum for democratic opinion and an organizing
tool that allows for more nearly equal participation. The French thinkers Gilles
Deleuze and Félix Guattari offered the image of a rhizome to counter what they

called arboreal thought. Arboreal thought is like a tree. It has one root system and its growth stems from a single trunk. It is centered, immobile, reductionist. Rhizomes, like our kudzu here in South Carolina, shoot out in all directions, taking whatever path is open to them. They have no center, they are not reducible to a single root system, they are mobile, and they spring up wherever there is room. The internet, at least so far, is rhizomatic rather than arboreal. It lends itself to an anarchist appropriation rather than a Marxist one.

If recent history has prepared the ground for the resurgence of anarchist practice and thought, so have its own recent experiments. The demonstrations in Seattle (and later in Washington, Philadelphia, and Genoa) were a testimony to the organizing power of anarchism. I refer here not to what the media called anarchism: the Black Bloc destruction of property. (The Black Bloc is indeed anarchist, but hardly exemplary of the non-violent anti-authoritarian orientation of most of the Seattle participants.) What is of much more interest is what the mainstream press, of course, ignored. These were the affinity groups, the complementary and horizontal organizing strategies, the participatory feel of much of what was misleadingly called the anti-globalization movement. Young people, seeking a solidarity with those around the world whose names they did not know and faces they had not seen, recognized and acted as though the most important thing they shared with those anonymous others and with one another was equality. Those of us who toil in the fields of academia can only be thankful for the example they have set.

And so we arrive at anarchist theory. The anarchist theoretical tradition is, in many ways, a thin one. Most of the major thinkers from its founding period before the twentieth century can be counted on two hands. Except for periodic upsurges of anti-authoritarian thought in the twentieth century, for example the Situationists and the green anarchists influenced by Murray Bookchin in the late 1960s and 1970s, there is little in the way of an anarchist theoretical tradition to be found after the Russian Revolution. The thread running from the nineteenth century up to recent developments is frayed along much of its length. But this is not necessarily a weakness in the theoretical tradition of anarchism. It is also an opportunity. If theoretical anarchism is not nearly as rich as theoretical Marxism, neither is it as sclerotic. Precisely because of its leanness—and because of its openness to all struggles—theoretical anarchism is rife for development. Those who would return to its founding thinkers for new insights, those who would graft its thought onto other traditions or political developments, those who would seek to understand current politics and offer insights for resistance by reference to it, have found its resources to be at once relevant and supple. Anarchist thought speaks to the world in which we live, but it remains open enough to allow us to speak through it.

The chapters in this volume exemplify the possibilities the anarchist theoretical tradition has to offer contemporary thought and practice. Several of the essays engage historical figures in the anarchist tradition, both well-known and

less so, seeking to show their contemporary relevance. Some offer anarchist-oriented reflections on power. Others investigate the vexed relationship between anarchism and religion. There are essays on art and literature, pedagogy and the environment, the last of which was integrated into anarchist thought well before it appeared on the agendas of most other progressive traditions. In addition, there are engagements with contemporary events, such as the Seattle movement. One should not read these chapters as attempts to place the various aspects of social life under a particular framework. Anarchist thought is not a lens through which we can see cultural and political phenomena and render them transparent. Anarchism is not a theory of everything, first and foremost because it is not a theory. It is better conceived as a theoretical tradition.

What is the difference between a theory and a theoretical tradition? A theory purports to explain a broad range of phenomena. The broader the theory, the broader the range of phenomena purportedly explained. A theoretical tradition, by contrast, comprises a number of theories that overlap or intersect in various ways. They may share a common theme or have a common object. They may have significant overlaps in approach. Or they may have what the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein called "family resemblances": there is no single element or aspect all the theories share, but a number of them, some of which appear here and others there, like genetically determined physical features. That there is an anarchist theoretical tradition is doubted by few. What its common or family elements are is more contentious. This is particularly so given the division between individualist anarchism, which has close affinities with free-market capitalism, and the more dominant tradition of left or collectivist anarchism.

If I were to categorize the latter by means of a common theme, I would say it concerns radical equality, what recent French thinker Jacques Rancière sometimes calls "the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being."[2] Anarchist theories investigate the meaning and implications of human (and sometimes not-so-human) equality. Primarily, these investigations take place in the political and social realm, but as the essays in this volume show, they need not. They can take place in religion, art, pedagogy, and elsewhere. Moreover, there is no overarching position that is sketched in the anarchist theoretical tradition. Agreement on human equality leaves open many questions, concerning not only the consequences but even the character of that equality. The reader of this volume, then, should not expect a seamless set of reflections, but rather a constellation of questions and issues that revolve around the core issue of our equality with one another.

Moreover, the anarchist tradition has evolved over the past hundred and fifty years. Much nineteenth-century anarchism was characterized by views of power and human nature that are no longer with us. The failed history of what marched under the banner of communism has provoked changes in the way progressives approach politics. The emergence of post-structuralism, postmodernism, and deconstruction, as well as the events of the 1960s that spawned them, has influenced the theoretical context in which anarchist reflec-

tion takes place. If a theoretical tradition is not synchronically seamless—seamless across a certain time and place—neither is it historically inert. Changes in historical contexts provoke changes in the way issues are approached, earlier thinkers interpreted, and action conceived.

Judging from my admittedly biased perspective, the effects of a renewed anarchist theoretical and practical tradition have been salutary. The protests in Seattle, for instance, were by many accounts empowering to those who engaged in them. People felt they participated in the creation of a political event rather than simply following a design created somewhere else by someone else. Theoretically, at least two related consequences have appeared. First, progressive political theory influenced by anarchism is usually more clear and comprehensible than much other recent progressive thought. Taking human equality seriously means refraining from gestures that seek to place a theoretical reflection out of reach of its readers. Second, anarchist-influenced theory is more cognizant of current events and trends. It does not operate at a remove from people's concerns, but rather seeks instead to shed light on them. These consequences are as yet marginal, since the theoretical renewal of the anarchist tradition is in its early stages. But they offer promise for the future.

Whether anarchist thought will continue to grow is an open question. History is contingent; it leads necessarily neither to anarchism nor to anything else. One hopes, however, that volumes like this will help cement a relationship between anarchist thought and the larger tradition of social, political, and cultural theory and reflection, keeping alive the possibilities for thought and for practice that stem from considering each of us in our equality with one another.

Notes

1. Michael Bakunin, *Statism and Anarchy*, trans. Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 137.

2. Jacques Rancière, *Disagreement*, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 30.

Part 1: Anarchism and Philosophy

1

Anarchy in Political Philosophy

Francis Dupuis-Déri

What is the best political regime? This is the fundamental question to which occidental political philosophy has traditionally seen itself as having to respond. According to tradition, the contest is between four types of regimes, three of which are "pure" (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy), and one which is a "mixture" (republic) of elements of the three former pure regimes.[1] Under certain conditions, those who exercise authority in all of these regimes might seek and secure the realization of the "common good" for the entire community as well as "good life" for every member. Conversely, those who exercise authority in pathological regimes (tyranny, oligarchy, etc.) only seek to egotistically enjoy the good life (in a material rather than a moral sense) at the expense of the "common good" and their subjects" "good life." With regard to "anarchy," the most influential traditional philosophers have identified it as the pathological and corrupt form of democracy, here understood in terms of its direct form whereby all citizens can participate in the assembly where collective political decisions are taken.

To equate anarchy to a corrupt direct democracy is a serious error which impoverishes political philosophy. Instead, I argue that a complete typology of political regimes must include anarchy not as a deviant form of democracy, but rather as one of the ideal types of legitimate political regime. I will identify anarchy as a fourth type of pure political regime in which all citizens govern themselves together directly through consensual deliberation and without resorting to an authority which relies upon coercive apparatus. To sustain my argument, it is necessary first to synthesize the quantitative discourse of political philosophers on the types of pure political regimes, to analyze the qualitative approach used by philosophers to distinguish between "good" and "bad" political regimes, and finally, to discuss the nature of anarchy.

The challenge to post-structuralism is to offer an account of itself as a theoretical political practice. It is a challenge that cannot be answered within the terms of the two traditions that have defined the space of political theory in the

twentieth century: liberalism and Marxism. Both these traditions have been re-
jected by the post-structuralists. However, there is a tradition, though not cited
by the post-structuralists, within which their thought can be situated and thus
better understood and evaluated. That tradition is the neglected "third way" of
political theory: anarchism.

The Typology of Political Regimes: A Quantitative Perspective

For more than two thousand years, the majority of the most influential occi-
dental philosophers have restricted themselves to identifying three ideal types of
pure political regimes: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.[2] These regimes
are given different names at times depending upon the individual philosopher
("oligarchy," for example, can be exchanged for "aristocracy") and certain phi-
losophers will not always be consistent or coherent in the ways they use this
typology.[3] Nevertheless, three fundamental regimes remain, mainly because this
typology rests upon a mathematical calculation insofar as official political au-
thority may rest in the hands of a single person (monarchy), a few or a minority
(aristocracy) or a majority of the people (democracy).

   This calculation is often presented as being self-evident, as with Aristotle,
for whom "The sovereign must necessarily be either the One, or the Few, or the
Many."[4] The Greek etymology of these regimes' names also underlines the ma-
thematical foundation of this typology. "Monarchy" comes from the Greek
words *mona*, which signifies one (person), and *kratia*, which signifies "to gov-
ern." "Aristocracy" also comes from the Greek, and *aristos* signifies "the best."
An aristocracy is therefore the regime where the best govern. But to say "the
best" implies that a division exists between said group and others, and that aris-
tocrats are a minority of individuals who are superior to the average person. An
aristocracy thus signifies a regime in which a minority of individuals within a
community exercise authority. Finally, within the word "democracy," *demos*
signifies "people." By democracy, traditional political philosophy understands a
regime based upon the Ancient Athenian model whereby those who are consid-
ered citizens—the people—have the right to present themselves at the agora to
participate in the Assembly and take a direct role in the process of political deci-
sion making.

   If this typology is primarily associated with classical philosophy, it will be
taken up also by Ancient historians, and by political philosophers and actors at
the beginning of modernity.[5] In the course of the debates around the American
war of independence, for example, a number of texts—speeches, pamphlets,
etc.—make explicit reference to this typology. Zabdiel Adams, the cousin of

the second president of the United States, John Adams, would declare in a speech of 1782 that "three different modes of civil rule have been prevalent among the nations of the earth, a *monarchy, aristocracy,* and *democracy.*"[6] Conscious that this first typology does not permit one to grasp all of the complexity of political reality, some philosophers will come to believe it important to introduce a second typology, which mirrors the former in a distorted fashion, by proposing an eventual degenerate or pathological form for each pure regime.

The Typology of Political Regimes: A Qualitative Perspective

Aristotle is the first to emphasize the importance of adding the distinction of linking the morality of a regime to its mathematical classification. A just regime distinguishes itself from an unjust regime insofar as the object of the first is the common good while the object of the second is uniquely the good of the person or the people who govern.[7] Several philosophers will also propose a typology of regimes which takes account of the moral aspect of the exercise of political authority. The risk of corruption is great in pure regimes because nothing in their institutional structure—such as the Constitution—prevents those who govern from turning their backs on seeking, defending and promoting the common good to luxuriate unduly in the power at their disposal. Government by one thus becomes a tyranny; government by a few, is an oligarchy; and government by many, is anarchy.

Table 1.1 The Traditional Division of Political Regimes According to a Mathematical Calculation

authority	*one*	*a minority*	*a majority*
authority's goal			
common good (just)	monarchy	aristocracy	democracy
own interests (unjust)	despotism	oligarchy	anarchy

This is where a newly named regime occurs, that of the "republic." The term "Republic," from the Latin *res publica* or "public thing," may be attributed to any just regime[8] as well as to a mixed constitution composed of the three elements the pure regimes incarnate. One must distinguish, here, classical

republicanism from modern republicanism. The former rests upon an organic vision of the republic, at the heart of which the three aforementioned elements of society find themselves in concert in the public sphere in search of the common good. Modern republicanism rests, on the other hand, upon a mechanical vision whereby the diverse elements of a society pursue their divergent interests (the modern idea of a pluralist society) but interact with the goal of protecting their private lives from public despotism, thereby creating a complex structural regime in which the diverse powers are separate and balance out one another. A republic is constituted by an equilibrium of diverse social orders, be it a monarchy (or a president), an aristocracy which sits in the Senate or in the House of Lords, and the "people" who are represented in the democratic branch of the Republic (known as the National Assembly, House of Commons, House of Representatives, etc.). According to most political philosophers, of whom Aristotle and Cicero are foremost, a mixed constitution is necessarily a just regime because none of the three forces can impose its will over the others. The three forces neutralize one another and the common good comes out the winner.[9] In its classic version, as in its modern version, the republic is incompatible with a pure, absolute, authority.

Since the nineteenth century, politicians, like the philosophers, have developed the habit of using the term "democracy" (qualified as "modern," "liberal" or "representative") to designate the republic, such that today the terms for the two regimes are more or less synonymous. However, modern "democracy" is a distant cousin of Ancient democracy. In the latter, those enjoying the title of "citizen" had the right to assemble at the agora and participate directly in the deliberative decision-making process. Then, the majority would win the day (majority rule). In a modern "democracy," several forms of authority coexist and compete within the official political system. The real majority of the people does not express its voice, even in the so-called "democratic branch," where only an extremely small minority of "representatives" deliberate in the name of the majority, or of the entire "nation."[10] As Jean-Jacques Rousseau noted, the majority has only the authority to select the happy few who shall rule the community. To draw a comparison, one might wonder, then, ought a regime in which one individual—known as the "king" or the "queen"—whose only political function would be to elect a few "representatives" every four or five years to rule on his/her behalf, be known as a monarchy? Such a regime should be most probably seen as a phony monarchy and as a true aristocracy. It might still be labeled "monarchy" for traditional or ideological reasons, despite its obvious aristocratic nature. In the same vein, a regime in which the aristocrats' only political function would be to elect one "representative" every four or five years to rule on their behalf should most probably be seen as a true monarchy. Similarly, modern "democracy," which is ruled by elected aristocrats, is very much closer to a real aristocracy than to a democracy. Such a fact finds echo in the tradition of political philosophy, in which Aristotle,[11] Spinoza,[12] and Montesquieu,[13] amongst

others,[14] as well as some of the most influential founders of modern republics (Thomas Jefferson[15] and Maximilien Robespierre,[16] for instance), openly stated that election——i.e., the selection of an "elite"——is truly aristocratic and clearly alien to democracy in its very nature. Modern "democracy" is a "representative," "popular," "elected" or "liberal" aristocracy, hidden under the deceitful label of "democracy" in the wake of rhetorical games motivated by political struggles.[17] Throughout the remainder of this chapter, the use of the word "democracy" will identify a regime where the people govern (themselves) directly, respecting the sense the word had during almost two thousand years of the philosophical tradition.

Democracy and Anarchy: A Mathematical Confusion

The mathematical relationship between (real and direct) democracy and anarchy evidences an error in terms of the way political philosophy understands anarchy. If despotism (by a single despot) is not mathematically distinguishable from monarchy (government by one person), nor oligarchy (by a clique) from aristocracy (government by a few), there nevertheless exists a clear mathematical difference between a democracy and anarchy. From an etymological point of view, "anarchy" comes from the greek word *anarkhia* at the heart of which the root *an* signifies "without" and *arkhia* "military chief," which eventually comes to denote simply a "chief" or "leader." From an etymological point of view, therefore, "anarchy" refers to the absence of a leader. From a mathematical perspective, it signifies no, or zero, leader. If one looks at historical examples of anarchy (free-communes, squats, militant groups and collectives, etc.), she will find indeed no formal and official leader(s). However, she will also find that anarchy is a form of political organization in which (1) all members may participate directly in the collective and the deliberative decision-making process, through which (2) they seek consensus. Thus, stating that there is no (zero) leader (or despot) does not imply that there is no politics, nor collective decision-making procedures. In anarchy, there is no leader(s) or authority exercising coercion over some people, because all rule together in a consensual way (i.e., all agree to agree with the collective decision).

Hence, to introduce anarchy as a legitimate political regime implies confronting the tradition of political philosophy, especially its mathematical based definition of democracy. Indeed, some political philosophers refer to democracy as being the rule of the many (a majority), while others as the rule of all.[18] The mathematical confusion results from a lack of distinction between the collective deliberative process and the decision itself. In conceptual and organizational terms, democracy and anarchy can be, at first glance, difficult to distinguish: the

two regimes function thanks to a general assembly to which all of the citizens can participate in and the two regimes don't have a leader/s. But to say that there is direct democracy is not to say that there is an absence of political authority and coercion. In democracy, the Assembly possesses authority—as the incarnation of the general will—to oblige everybody to obey. Hence, it seems correct to suggest that democracy is the rule of all only if one thinks of who has the right to be part of the deliberative decision-making process (whom may enter in the agora to participate in the popular deliberation). Yet, a democratic popular assembly does not seek consensus. At the end of the deliberation, the majority (i.e., the many, not all) imposes its will upon the minority (majority rule). Thus, with regard to authority and coercion, democracy is a regime where the majority (the many) rules over the minority, rather than the rule of all.[19]

If we are to remain true to the mathematical logic of the tradition of political philosophy, anarchy (the rule of all) must be distinguished from democracy (the rule of the majority). Mathematically speaking, "all" and "many" are not synonyms and therefore there is no mathematical correspondence between a democracy (majority rule) and anarchy (consensus rule and genuine self-government). Hence, to affirm, as the philosophers do, that the latter is a pathological form of the former is a mathematical error. Anarchy cannot be the pathological form—a "perversion," as Aristotle puts it—of democracy for the simple reason that anarchy and democracy are not equivalent from a mathematical point of view.

Anarchy as a Political Regime: Political Considerations

In respecting the mathematical rule of traditional typology, it is logical to include anarchy not as a corrupted form of the democratic regime, but rather as a particular form of political organization in which all rule. This raises three questions: (1) Is it legitimate to say that an anarchist community where there is no longer any government constitutes a political "regime"? (2) If it is in effect a regime, is it viable and is it worth our discussing it seriously? A final consideration returns one to the question of the qualitative element of regimes: (3) What would be the degenerate form of anarchy? These concerns merit responses.

Is anarchy a political regime? It is necessary to make distinctions between "governance," "authority," "coercion," "power" and "violence" in order to better understand the specificity of anarchy. To loosely appropriate a distinction which the philosopher Hannah Arendt makes, a political authority (of one, a minority or a majority) exercises coercive means, that is to say that it can physically force an individual over whom it has authority to act or not to act depending upon the will of the authority. The political authority has the physical means to coerce—

impose its will upon——individuals who immediately lose their autonomy and their liberty. According to Arendt, coercion is not "power," but rather, it is "violence" or the threat of violence. All authority is potentially coercive and therefore violent. "Power"——as distinct from "violence"——constitutes itself collectively, as the result of a collective will based upon deliberation amongst free and equal individuals who seek to understand one another and give themselves the power to realize things together, to create a common world.[20] From a theoretical point of view, anarchy does not so much signify the absence of "government" as it does the absence of a leader/s, that is to say an official/s who wield officially recognized authority. Thus, if we understand "political regime" to refer to a way of governing a community in order to organize its collective life, anarchy must be understood as the best regime for individuals who wish to live together in a context of real liberty and equality, without having to submit to a political authority exercised by some privileged citizens. In their collective participation in the assembly, where they attempt to achieve a consensus, the citizens give themselves the power to act collectively (in this chapter, I deal exclusively with "politics," although anarchism is also about radical liberty and equality and self-rule with regard to economic, ecology, identities [cultural, gender, etc.], etc.).

If we reconsider the myth of the "social contract," anarchy would be the result of a contract in which the contractors decide to live together peacefully but without delegating their "sovereignty" and their power to legislate to a political authority separated from the multitude of citizens. There would thus be a popular assembly where collective goals would be discussed, but the assembly would seek to attain a consensus rather than a simple majority and it would not have recourse to a coercive branch to impose its authority (everyone agreeing, no coercion shall be necessary).

Is anarchy viable? The preceding comments demonstrate that it is possible to think of anarchy as a political regime via which a community decides to govern itself without authority, that is to say, without coercion or violence. This conceptual definition of anarchy must be understood within the frame of theoretical thought. Political practice clearly responds to other pressures when it is incarnate in a world obviously not as neat or ordered as that of philosophical typologies. To know whether such an anarchist regime is possible from a military, economic or cultural perspective, for example, is subject to debate. This debate deserves to be pursued, but too often the philosophers have simply avoided reflecting upon and discussing anarchy by affirming that it is not a viable regime.

In the real political world, anarchy——like other regimes——faces several challenges that jeopardize its stability and its coherence. Yet a large number of so-called traditional societies functioned for thousands of years without political authority (neither a State, nor police): the Inuit, the Pygmies, the Santals of In-

dia, and the Tivs of Nigeria. More recently, some anarchist organizations have taken place on a large scale (during the Spanish revolution of 1936-1939, for instance) and on a small scale (in communes or libertarian political groups).[21] In short, the experience of a political organization without a leader is not simply utopian but is an integral part of human history.

Philosophers such as Marx, Nietzsche, and Foucault, as well as sociologists and anthropologists, have forcefully argued that the question of power, of its conservation and its effects of domination and resistance, are not only limited to the official structure of a political regime. Nor do traditional societies without a State or police necessarily lack situations of domination based on sexual, religious, economic cleavages, for instance. Thus, one must not presume that the process of anarchist decision-making is exempt from social and psychological tensions and paradoxes. The search for consensus is a complex process in the course of which appear certain sociological and psychological dynamics of normalization and self-censorship, informal exclusion, etc.[22] In an anarchist society, influence and domination inevitably articulate themselves around symbolic struggles. But what is true for anarchy is also true for the other types of political regime: there are several forms and networks of informal authority and domination in a monarchy, aristocracy, democracy and a republic, even if these regimes claim to secure the common good and, in the latter regime, despite a republic's pretence of neutralizing power. Hence, a realist-anarchist doesn't dream of a world without conflict or domination. Real anarchists—often inspired by radical feminists—have thought of and experienced several methods to respond to problems of informal inequalities within their communities or groups. Some methods include the implementation of a speaker's list which alternates between men and women (because men in the Western world are generally more willing than women to speak in public, thereby giving them more influence in a deliberative process),[23] and/or prioritizes the individual who wants to speak for the first time over those who have already spoken. In addition, there are role-play simulations which aim to identify existing informal inequalities and influences, and also non-mixed groups formed among the less influential members of a same sub-community (defined by their gender, age, class, etc.) in order to empower themselves, etc. In other words, and as in the other forms of political regimes, all anarchist communities or groups do not have exactly the same decision-making procedures: they may adopt and adapt specific procedures and practices in order to deal with specific challenges to their core principles (liberty, equality, solidarity, consensus, common good), and they may modified them through their experiences and history.

What is the degenerate form of anarchy? If the tyranny of the majority is the degenerate form of democracy, what is the degenerate form of anarchy?[24] It is *chaos*, that is to say the absence of a collective, communal, political organization. Here, the inclusion of anarchy within the traditional typology of political

regimes highlights and undermines, simultaneously, the simplistic mathematical schema. Indeed, by definition, one, a few, or the many holding authority may seek personal interests that are incompatible with the common good. All, however, cannot. This is not to suggest that an anarchist assembly always reaches clever decisions and implements them wisely. Anarchists may make mistakes, and reach a consensus or implement a decision in such a manner that it will lead to unexpected problems for the community, and therefore undermine the common good. A consensus, however, implies that the decision is made by all for the good of all, and not for the good of some. Even if a consensual decision deals more specifically with only a part of the community (the women or the youth, for instance), it is thought—in principle—to be for the good of all. Consensus is then by definition about the common good. Yet, seeking consensus is not always easy. Still within the conceptual paradigm of anarchy, a single individual has the capacity to block the process by opposing the majority. If the peer pressure is too strong, the individuals who disagree with the expected decision may decide to withdraw from the community, freeing themselves from the consensual process and its results. It is worth noting that actual anarchist groups do include the right to "abstain," or stand aside, from a decision-making process when an individual disagrees with the majority but does not want to paralyze the group, or the right to "block" when s/he has fundamental reasons to oppose the decision. Such members might abstain or block in order to promote the common good, if they believe that the majority is mistaken. These methods might lead the majority to reconsider a situation and to change its mind, if the dissenter(s) view about the common good is determined through deliberation to be the best. In real political life, consensus does not mean pure unanimity, and anarchist communities may function even though some individuals abstain or block a decision from time to time.

On the other hand, anarchy, like other regimes, faces the threat of degeneration if such attitudes—withdrawing and blocking—are driven by egoistic interests rather than concern for the common good, or if the majority decide that it is in its own interest to overrun the dissenting stance. In such situations, one individual, a minority or even a majority, feeling uncomfortable about the process or its expected results, may claim that some form of authority (by one, a few or a majority rule) must take over consensus.[25] Such a crisis may result in a coup against anarchy, in favor of monarchy, aristocracy, or democracy. While anarchism implies a radical criticism of other regimes, the latter may be seen by some people as tools to solve some problems in anarchy, or to secure their own interests. There is, thus, a tension and a rivalry between regimes. Yet, if the crisis does not go beyond the conceptual and political limits of anarchy, the regime switches from its pure to its degenerate form, which is chaos, i.e., the dissolution of the community and the collective decision-making process, where everyone is

against everyone. There is then no more political community and politics, because nobody rules anymore. Thus, from a mathematical perspective, the relation is from the all to zero, and there is therefore no mathematical correspondence between anarchy and its degenerate form. Anarchy is the self-government of all, its degenerate form is the dissolution of politics, it is a situation where nobody rules.[26] As a result of this discussion, a new typology can be schematized:

Table 1.2 A New Typology in Which Anarchy is a Model Type

Authority	nobody	one	a minority	a majority	all
Authority's goal					
common good	chaos	monarchy	aristocracy	democracy	anarchy
own interests		despotism (by one)	oligarchy	tyranny (by the majority)	

Anarchy: Between the Macropolitical and the Micropolitical

If we agree to think of anarchy in its non-degenerate form, we can adopt either a pessimistic or an optimistic vision. The optimistic anarchist will claim that it is only possible to hope to attain the common good within regimes without formal authority. In effect, according to the political philosophy of anarchism, individuals in positions of authority do not help achieve social peace nor the common good. As a matter of fact, the process of exercising formal authority changes the psychological and socio-political mind set and attitude of those who exercise it, such that they eventually come to defend and to promote their own authority rather than the common good. In short, since the exercise of authority inevitably corrupts those who exercise it, any regime accepting formal authority is corrupted and incapable of defending and promoting the common good. Consequently, anarchy is the only conceptual and practical response to the issue of the common good defined as the good of all community members.

In regarding political authority with such disdain, the anarchist is tempted to practice a mathematical simplification which results in one of two binaries: on one side there is anarchy, on the other tyranny. But the defenders of republics or mixed regimes (according to Aristotle, Machiavelli, Montesquieu, or Madison), call upon the anarchist to be more moderate. For though they are imperfect, the balance of political forces (between the presidency and the upper and lower chambers) and their separation (between the executive, the legislature and the judiciary), as well as the Charter of rights, of any number of liberal republics, help to avoid, in principle, political authority that is nothing more than pure and

arbitrary violence. Yet modern "democracy," despite the republican inner organization, lacks a genuine democratic element: there is no popular assembly where the people might express their will. Such a flaw fuels the authoritarian tendencies within modern republics. Moreover, even if such a democratic touch was added to modern republics, it would only introduce a new form of authority, i.e. the majority rule. Such a republic would still be an imperfect mixed regime, because of the lack of any anarchist elements or branches.

A pessimist anarchist will say that even the idea of a "common good" is an invention of those who govern in order to deceive the governed. For instance, monarchs, aristocrats, and the members of the majority, have claimed to govern on behalf of the common good. According to the pessimist, each society is constituted by divergent, opposing, interests and there will always be one or more individuals who will not accept the anarchist way of life and against whom the anarchist regime must exercise a certain amount of coercion (by excluding or eliminating them). Even more problematically, there would be a plurality of ways of being an anarchist and self-proclaimed "anarchists" would without a doubt be incapable of coming to an agreement in the course of a consensual deliberative process about a definition of the common good and even less so regarding how to defend and promote it. In this sense, an anarchic regime is nothing more than an ideal type which can never be achieved.

Such a tension between optimism and pessimism does not prevent anarchy from finding its place within political philosophy, that is to say, as a type of regime which must inspire thinking rather than mockery or hatred. The silence which political philosophy exhibits regarding anarchy as an eventual legitimate regime deprives the political imagination of a stimulating subject for thought. Anarchism invites us to think of politics in other than global or strategic terms. The philosophical tradition tends to conceive of political communities as being globally defined by the nature of the political authority which heads them. Classical anarchist thinkers, such as Proudhon and Kropotkin, contemporary anarchists such as John Clark and Todd May, as well as political philosophers like Foucault and the "postmodernists," suggest, in very distinct ways, that politics be looked at as a world composed of multiple margins and cores, layers and cells, as well as intertwining and tactical relations of power.[27]

The Occident is currently dominated by impure regimes which incarnate the traditional principles of republicanism: balance and the separation of authority. Within their territories there can be sites or politics which function according to other principles. Anarchism is a political philosophy concerning any form of non-authoritarian political organization dealing with local and daily life. Consequently, it can incarnate itself just as well within a regime as it can within political groups, housing cooperatives and squats, newspapers and publishing houses, co-operatively managed enterprises, etc. Anarchy can live here and now, and different anarchisms inspired by specific and distinct sensibilities

and experiences may be organized differently from each other.[28] Therefore, the
blanket rejection of anarchists by political philosophers who argue that its politi-
cal realization is impossible necessarily impoverishes our philosophical thinking
and our understanding of the complexity of real political life.

Notes

1.   The occidental tradition is deeply influenced by Ancient Greek and Roman phi-
losophers and historians. Anthropology offers a broader perspective (see David Graeber,
Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004).
2.   Socrates (as cited by Plato in *The Politics*, 291d-292a), Aristotle (*The Politics*,
bk. III, ch. 7, 1279-a), Machiavelli (*Discourses*, bk. I, ch. 2), Calvin (*Institution Chres-
tienne*, 1560, IV), James Harrington (*The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System of
Politics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], p. 10), Jean Bodin (*Republic*,
II, I), Samuel Pufendorf (*On the Duty of Man and Citizen* [Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1991], p.142), Thomas Hobbes (*Leviathan*, ch. XIX), Baruch de Spinoza
(*Political Treatise*), John Locke (*Second Treatise of Civil Government*, ch. 10, § 132),
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (*The Social Contract*, bk. III, ch. 3), Friedrich Hegel (*Philosophy
of Right*, § 273).
3.   See also, *inter alia*, Socrates (in Plato's *Republic*, bk. VIII, 557 A), Aristotle
(*The Politics*, bk. III, ch. 7, 1279-2 [3]) or Montesquieu (*L'Esprit des Lois*, bk. II, ch. I).
4.   *The Politics*, bk. III, ch. 7, 1279-a [2] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958),
p. 114 (emphasis added).
5.   See J. de Romilly, "Le classement des Constitutions jusqu'à Aristotle," *Revue
des études grecques* LXXII (1959), pp. 81-99. The republican philosopher, James Har-
rington, stated that "[g]overnment, *according to the ancients* and their learned disciple
Machiavelli, the only politician of the later ages, is of three kinds: the government of one
man, or of the better sort, or of the whole people; which by their more learned names are
called monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy" (*The Commonwealth of Oceana and a
System of Politics* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992], p.10) (emphasis add-
ed).
6.   Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz, eds, *American Political Writing During
the Founding Era 1760-1805*, I (Indianapolis: Liberty Press Edition, 1983), p. 541 (em-

phasis in the original). This typology is taken up by others on other occasions. See pp. 330, 420, 614-616, of James Otis, *The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved*, Boston 1764, in Bernard Bailyn, ed., *Pamphlets of the American Revolution 1750-1776*, I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 427.

7. Aristotle asserts this as follows: "We may say that when the One, or the Few, or the Many, rule with a view to the common interest, the constitutions under which they do so must necessarily be right constitutions. On the other hand the constitutions directed to the personal interest of the One, or the Few, or the Masses, must necessarily be perversion" (*The Politics*, bk. III, ch. 7, 1279-a [2] [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958], p. 114).

8. As when Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes: "I . . . give the name "Republic" to every State that is governed by laws, no matter what the form of its administration may be: for only in such a case does the public interest govern . . . . Every legitimate government is republican" and, more precisely, that monarchies, aristocracies and democracies can be "republics" (*The Social Contract*, bk. II, ch. 6 [in *The Social Contract and Discourses* (London: Everyman, 1993), p. 212])).

9. In a republic, according to the contemporary theorist of republicanism Philip Pettit, "the authorities are effectively checked and balanced: [the power is] effectively channeled into the paths of virtue" (in P. Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 234). See also James Harrington, *The Commonwealth of Oceana and a System of Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 10 and Charles Blattberg, *From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 5.

10. The majority really rules only when the elected aristocrats dare to hold a referendum about a specific issue.

11. Aristotle, *Politics*, IV, 15, 1300-b-21.

12. Spinoza, *Traité de l'autorité politique*, chapter 8, ß 2.

13. Montesquieu, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, I, bk II, ch. 2.

14. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Du Contrat social*, bk IV, ch. III; James Harrington, "Oceana" (1656), in John Pocock (ed.), *The Political Works of James Harrington* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 184. Philodemus [Thomas Tudor Tucker], "Conciliatory Hints, Attempting, by a Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party Prejudice" (Charleston, 1784), in Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz (eds.), *American Political Writing During the Founding Era 1760-1805*, 1 (Indianapolis: Liberty Press Edition, 1983), p. 615. Bernard Manin, *Principes du gouvernement representative* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1995), pp. 19-61.

15. In Giovanni Lobrano, "République et démocratie anciennes avant et pendant la révolution," Michel Vovelle (ed.), *Révolution et république: l'exception française* (Paris: Kimé, 1994), p. 56.

16. In his "Lettre à ses commetants" (Sept. 1792), in Gordon H. McNeil, "Robespierre, Rousseau and Representation," Richard Herr & Harold T. Parker (eds.), *Ideas in History* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1965), p. 148. Murray Bookchin, *Remaking Society* (Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books, 1989), p. 174.

17. Francis Dupuis-Déri, "The Political Power of Words: The Birth of Pro-Democratic Discourse in the 19th Century in the United States and France," *Political Studies* 52 (March 2004), pp. 118-134.

18. According to Hobbes, for instance, "the Representative *must needs* be One man, or More: and if more, then it is the Assembly of All, or but of a Part. When the Rep-

resentative is One man, then is the Common-wealth a MONARCHY: when an Assembly of All that will come together, then it is a DEMOCRACY, or Popular Common-wealth: when an Assembly of a Part onely, then it is called an ARISTOCRACY. Other kind of Common-wealth *there can be none*: for either One, or More, or All, must have the Sovereign Power" (*Leviathan*, ch. XIX [emphasis added]).

19.   As Robert Paul Wolff recalls: *In Defense of Anarchism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998 [new edition]).

20.   Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), pp. 44-47 and Jürgen Habermas, "Hannah Arendt: On the Concept of Power," in J. Habermas, *Philosophical-Political Profiles* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 173-189.

21.   See Harold Barclay, *People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchy* (London: Kahn & Averill, 1996); Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State: Essays in Political Anthropology* (New York: Zone Books, 1988 [1974]).

22.   Donald Black, *The Behavior of Law* (Orlando: Academic Press, 1976), ch. 7 ("Anarchy"); Graeber, *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology*, pp. 24-37; Joseph Pestieau, "La tyrannie de l'État et son contraire," Guy Lafrance (ed.), *Pouvoir et tyrannie* (Ottawa: Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1986), pp. 95-98 (the section entitled "De la tyrannie des coutumes").

23.   Nina Eliasoph, "Politeness, power, and women's language"; Margaret Kohn, "Language, Power, and Persuasion: Toward a Critique of Deliberative Democracy," *Constellations* 7:3 (2000), pp. 408-429; Iris Marion Young, "Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy," Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 120-135.

24.   This concept is proposed by John Stuart Mill (*On Liberty*, ch. 1) and Alexis de Tocqueville (*De la Démocratie en Amérique*, vol. I, part 2, ch. 7), both of whom speak less of political tyranny than of a social pressure upon the individual to conform.

25.   Even amongst anarchist philosophers, the distinction between direct democracy and anarchism which is articulated around the practice of unanimous consensus has failed to achieve consensus principally for reasons of a practical order. For an anarchist who encourages the search for consensus, see the anarcho-syndicalist, Erich Mühsam, "La Société libérée de l'État : Qu'est-ce que l'anarchisme communiste?"[1932], E. Mühsam, *La République des Conseils de Bavière-La Société libérée de l'État* (Paris: La Digitale-Spartacus, 1999), p. 165. For a more critical approach to consensus which valorizes recourse to a decision by the majority, see Murray Bookchin, "Communalism: The Democratic Dimension of Social Anarchism," in M. Bookchin, *Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left: Interviews and Essays, 1993-1998* (San Francisco-Edinburgh: AK Press, 1999), pp. 146-150.

26.   The so-called anarcho-capitalism must then be classified, according to our new typology, under the category of chaos. According to anarcho-capitalism, the members of a community do not take collective political decisions since such a society has the capacity to control and regulate itself thanks to the mechanics of individual *economic* actions and relations within a free market. But such a regime is not political: rather than making political choices individuals limit themselves to making economic decisions which permit a Stateless capitalist economic regime to regulate itself naturally. In other words, individuals are no longer citizens but producers and consumers: instead of deliberating they buy and sell (goods or their labor). Such individuals ultimately have no need to discuss things, since communication happens via the exchange of money or goods (barter). According to anarcho-capitalism, the conquerors of the market——the owners of the means

of production——can legitimately luxuriate in their authority over their employees and can even resort to coercive means in the form of protection agencies Such a regime, without citizens or political acts, certainly can not be identified as a *political* regime. At its best it is an *economic* regime which deploys relations of authority, coercion, violence and submission (in principle, by mutual consent), at its worst it's chaos. From the point of view of political philosophy, capitalism *without politics* may be one of the dark sides of anarchy, one of its degenerate forms. See David Friedman, *The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1989); Pierre Lemieux, *Du libéralisme à l'anarcho-capitalisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983).

27.   Clark, "The microecology of communities"; Todd May, *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 7-15. See also F. Dupuis-Déri, "L'altermondialisation à l'ombre du drapeau noir."

28.   The line "here and now" may be found in Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia* (New York: Collier Books-Macmillan Publishing Company, 1949 [1946]), p. 81. See also: Hakim Bey, *T.A.Z.-The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (Autonomedia, 1991 [1985]); Peter Kropotkin, *The Conquest of the Bread* (1892); Elisée Reclus, "Anarchie," lecture delivered in Brussels, 1894 (<www.bibliolib.net>). Murray Bookchin is very critical of TAZ and of what he calls "lifestyle anarchism." He rejects the vision of micropolitical tactics, preferring a more strategic approach (*Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left: Interviews and Essays, 1993-1998* [San Francisco-Edinburgh: AK Press, 1999]). Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 3 *et passim.*

2

Is Post-Structuralist Political Theory Anarchist?

Todd May

I would like to say something about the function of any diagnosis concerning the nature of the present. . . . Any description must always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fractures which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e. of possible transformation.

—Michel Foucault[1]

[O]bviously a whole series of partial and incomplete victories, of concessions won from the holders of power, will not lead to an anarchist society. But it will widen the scope of free action and the potentiality for freedom in the society we have.

—Colin Ward[2]

The difficulty in evaluating the political philosophy of the French post-structuralists—Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard in particular—is inseparable from the difficulty in understanding what their general political philosophy is. That they have rejected Marxism as an adequate account of our social and political situation is clear. But what they have substituted for it is still a subject of contention. This is because, rather than offering a general political theory, the post-structuralists have instead given us specific analyses of concrete situations of oppression. From Foucault's *Histoire de la Folie* to Lyotard's *The Differend*, the focus has been upon madness, sexuality, psychoanalysis, language, the unconscious, art, etc., but not upon a unified account of what politics is or how it should be conducted in the contemporary world.

This absence or refusal of a general political theory has led some critics to accuse the post-structuralists of a self—defeating normative relativism or outright nihilism.[3] The question these critics raise is this: if the post-structuralists cannot offer a general political theory which includes both a principle for political evaluation and a set of values which provide the foundation for critique, don't their theories lapse into an arbitrary decision, or worse, mere chaos? The

assumption behind this question is that in order to engage in political philosophy adequately, one must first possess a set of values which are either generally accepted or can be defended by recourse to generally accepted values. Then, one must construct one's political philosophy using those values as foundations. Last, one should compare the present political situation with the constructed one in order to help understand the deficiencies of the present and possible routes to remedy those deficiencies.[4]

The challenge to post-structuralism is to offer an account of itself as a theoretical political practice. It is a challenge that cannot be answered within the terms of the two traditions that have defined the space of political theory in the twentieth century: liberalism and Marxism. Both these traditions have been rejected by the post-structuralists. However, there is a tradition, though not cited by the post-structuralists, within which their thought can be situated and thus better understood and evaluated. That tradition is the neglected "third way" of political theory: anarchism.

Anarchism is often dismissed in the same terms as post-structuralism for being an ethical relativism or a voluntarist chaos. However, the theoretical tradition of anarchism, though not as voluminous as Marxism or liberalism, provides a general framework within which post-structuralist thought can be situated, and thus more adequately evaluated. The remainder of this paper will take up the task of understanding post-structuralism as a contemporary form of anarchism. First, the traditional anarchist position will be discussed. Second, the post-structuralist critique of certain nineteenth century concepts underlying the anarchist narrative will be brought to bear. Third, an anarchism free from these concepts and more consonant with contemporary French political thought— post-structuralist anarchism—will be sketched. In this sketch, it will be shown how such an anarchism avoids the problems that vitiate what might be called "foundationalist" political theorizing of the type described above.

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

In the conflict between Marx and Bakunin that defined the First International, at issue were both the method and goals of organizing the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.[5] In Marx's view, it was necessary that there be a centralized leadership coordinating the struggle. Further, the goal of the struggle would be proletarian state ownership of the means of production. All this was incompatible, in Bakunin's eyes, with the aims of the workers and would lead unavoidably to a new repressive political structure.

> Since there is to be political power there will inevitably be subjects, got up as citizens, true, in proper republican style, but subjects all the same, and as such compelled to obey, for without obedience no power is possible.[6]

What Bakunin found onerous in Marx's politics, both in its strategy and its goal, was the Idea of representation as a political concept. Where there is representation, there is oppression. Anarchism can be defined as the struggle against representation in public life.

Representation, as a political concept, is the handing over of power by a group of people to another person or group of people ostensibly in order to have the interests of the former realized. Political representation differs from administrative representation, which involves no fundamental transfer of power but instead merely a delegation of administrative capability. In administrative representation, a group empowers an individual or another group to enact specific programs or specific means to a general goal; the representing group can be withdrawn or recalled at any time, and all final decisions lie with the represented group. By contrast, political representation involves a transfer of decision-making power from the represented to the representer.[7] The representing individual or group acts in the name of, and thus with the legitimation of, the represented group; its decisions cannot be overturned by the represented group.

Anarchist thought distrusts political representation because it sees the cession of power as the invitation to abuse. In this sense, it is not only state or economic power which is the object of its mistrust, but all forms of power exercised by one group over another. Within the anarchist tradition, the concept of politics and the political field is wider than it is within either Marxism or liberalism. For Bakunin, the two fundamental power arrangements to be struggled against (along with the capitalists) were, as his major work indicates, the state and the church.[8] To these, later anarchists have added plant managers, patriarchy and the institution of marriage, prisons, psychotherapy, and a myriad of other oppressions.[9] Thus, in all areas of an individual's social life, anarchism promotes direct consensual decision-making rather than a delegation of authority.

Direct decision-making along the various registers of one's social life leads to a more decentralized approach to political intervention than Marxism would allow. For the latter, although a variety of social ills may not, strictly speaking, be reducible to capitalist economic structure, it is capitalism that founds their possibility. In the end there is only one intervention that matters: the intervention to reappropriate surplus value through the seizure of the means of production and the capture of the state. Marxism, no matter how supportive of struggles against racism, sexism, etc. it has been, has always seen them as strategically subordinated to the struggle for economic socialism. That is why it lends itself to centralized forms of struggle and political representation, in short Leninism, as its strategic expression. As anarchists have pointed out, however, and as history has made evident, such means are not to be divorced from their ends. The dictatorship of the proletariat has turned out to be, above all, a dictatorship.

It has thus become obvious that a further advance in social life does not lie in the direction of a further concentration of power and regulative functions in the

hands of a governing body, but in the direction of decentralization, both territo-
rial and functional.[10]

Both territorial and functional. Both in strategy and as the goal. Real political
change comes from below and from many points, not from above and from a
center. "The anarchist alternative is that of fragmentation, fission rather than
fusion, diversity rather than unity, a mass of societies rather than a mass soci-
ety."[11]

Anarchism, then, focuses upon the oppressed themselves rather than upon
those who claim to speak for them. And it sees oppression not merely in one
type of situation, but rather in a variety of irreducible situations. In order to un-
derstand oppression, one must describe the situation in which it is found; there is
no such thing as a class that is *a priori* oppressed across all situations. Here an-
archism exhibits a resistance not only to reducibility but to abstraction more
generally. "By proclaiming our morality of equality, or anarchism, we refuse to
assume a right which moralists have always taken upon themselves to claim,
that of mutilating the individual in the name of some ideal."[12] What anarchism
resists are the many ways in which the individual becomes subordinated to
something outside him or herself. Representation by a group or another individ-
ual is one form of that subordination. Representation of one's humanity by
means of an ideal is another. Whether it be "the good," the march of history, or
"the needs of society," anarchism is suspicious of ideals that function to coerce
individuals into subordinating themselves to a larger cause.

This does not mean, however, that anarchism is either individualist in the
liberal sense or morally hedonistic. Liberal individualism has always claimed to
value freedom over enforced equality, holding the latter to require unnecessary
constraints upon the former. In the anarchist tradition, however, it makes no
sense to talk about freedom without some notion of equality. "Freedom without
equality means that the poor and weak are less free than the rich and strong, and
equality without freedom means that we are all slaves together."[13] Freedom is
not juridical, it is material; it is defined not by how one is treated under the law
but by the concrete choices one is capable of making in the situations in which
one finds oneself. Although there is a tradition of individualist anarchism,[14] its
thought runs counter to the anarchist analyses of concrete oppression occurring
within a variety of concrete contexts. Anarchism is not, fundamentally, liberal-
ism gone wild.

It is also not a form of amoralism. By refusing to submit to an ideal of "the
good," anarchism does not reject morality. Instead, it argues that by holding an
ideal to which individuals must subordinate themselves, one in fact acts counter
to the moral intuition of respect for others. The rejection of a moral ideal is
made precisely on moral grounds. "The good" is merely another way to repre-
sent people to themselves by means of something external to them. Rather than
relying upon their own moral intuitions and their capacity to reflect upon them
in irreducible concrete situations, individuals are asked to submit to an ideal

which claims to realize their highest nature but in fact disjoins them from their capacities for critical reflection and thoughtful action. If individuals are to be able to act morally, they must be allowed to consider the situations in which they lend themselves in their specificity and materiality, rather than submitting to an abstract formula which is imposed upon situations from above.

Here lies the a priori of traditional anarchism: trust in the individual. From its inception, anarchism has founded itself on a faith in the individual to realize his or her decision-making power morally and effectually.[15] The clearest contemporary statement of this trust comes from anarchist Murray Bookchin: "The revolutionary project must take its point of departure from a fundamental libertarian precept: every normal human being is competent to manage the affairs of society and, more specifically, the community in which he or she is a member."[16] Left to their own devices, individuals have a natural ability—indeed a propensity—to devise social arrangements that are both just and efficient. It is only in situations of inequality, situations in which some individuals are permitted to have power over others, that individual capabilities are deformed and become directed toward oppression rather than mutual respect and creativity. "It is the characteristic of privilege and every privileged position to kill the mind and heart of men."[17]

In this sense, the distinctive feature shared by all institutions that oppress—political, economic, religious, patriarchal, or other—is the repression of individual potential. Although oppression occurs on a variety of fronts and in a multitude of ways, all of its variegations share the trait of restricting action, of limiting individual choice. It is, of course, a parody of anarchism to claim that it promotes a chaos of hedonism to subvert the monolith of state power; but it is here, in the complementary notions of individual competence and oppression as repression, that such a claim takes root.

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There are, on the surface, several similarities between traditional anarchist thought and post-structuralist theory. The critique of representation is a central theme of the post-structuralists; Deleuze once told Foucault "you were the first . . . to teach us something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others."[18] Decentralization, local action, discovering power in its various networks rather than in the state alone, are hallmark traits of post-structuralist analyses. However, if post-structuralist political thought were to be characterized by a single feature, it would be the critique of autonomy involved in the theory of the subject. Foucault's histories of the constitution of the subject, Deleuze and Guattari's encrustation of the social into the interstices of the personal, and Lyotard's analyses of the pragmatic aspects of language that are determinative for thought were produced, in part, to denigrate the concept of the subject as

an autonomous, self-transparent, self-sustaining entity. The *a priori* of traditional anarchism is anathema to post-structuralism.

It would seem, then, that the similarities between anarchism and post-structuralism end at the surface. For what would anarchism be without individual autonomy? It is autonomy that founds the possibility of action from below, that resists the reduction to representation, and that constitutes the moral dignity that abstraction and representation offend. Without a trust in the individual it makes no sense to accuse institutional powers of repressing the individual; without a subject recognizably distinct from the social sphere, it makes no sense to talk of autonomy at all. Traditional anarchism is founded on the conception of the individual as possessing a reserve that is irreducible to social arrangements of power; to remove it, or to dilute it in a network of social practices, effectively precludes the possibility of resistance.

Yet it is precisely the denial of a reserve within subjectivity forming the locus of resistance that the post-structuralists assert. Foucault and Lyotard are clear on this. Foucault: "All my analyses are against the idea of universal necessities in human existence."[19] Lyotard (in a review of Deleuze and Guattari's *Anti-Oedipus*):

> Looking for the creditor [the one from whom surplus value is stolen and who will revolt for its repayment] is wasted effort. The subject of the credit would always have to be made to exist, the proletariat to be incarnated on the surface of the *socius*.[20]

Deleuze is the closest to traditional anarchism; his claim that "[t]here is only desire and the social, and nothing else"[21] appears to lend itself to an interpretation of individual autonomy opposing social repression. But, for Deleuze, desire is not autonomy: it is anonymous energy that has revolutionary potential only because it is an excess over the constraints which, in connivance with the social, it also creates and sustains.

> To the question "How can desire desire its own repression, how can it desire its slavery?" we reply that the powers which crush desire, or which subjugate it, themselves already form part of the assemblages of desire.[22]

Why does post-structuralist political theory reject the concept of individual autonomy, which forms the cornerstone of traditional anarchist theory? Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard seek social change no less than the anarchists. But if they do not rely upon a reserve within the subject to constitute the wellspring of change, where will they find it? Certainly not in an external representative they are unanimous in rejecting. The abandonment of the autonomous individual or subject as the locus of resistance, and for it the substitutional "something else," constitutes the decisive passage from a concept of resistance rooted in nineteenth century thought to more current conceptions. It parallels changes that

have occurred in other areas in philosophy, as theorizing rooted in the subject has given way to the "linguistic turn" and, more recently, a "social turn."[23]

The reasons for jettisoning the subject as the locus of resistance are both historical and conceptual. Historically, the revolution predicted by Marx has not, in the West at least, come to pass. This failure is in part due to the fact that the working classes of the industrially developed nations have not, as Marx thought they would, become increasingly immiserated. However, part of the reason for the failure of the revolutionary prediction has also been ascribed to the ability of capitalism to manipulate subjectivity.[24] The Frankfurt School, for instance, had sought to explain the absence of revolution by recourse to the cultural system's ability to absorb all resistance and with it all subjectivity. In the events of May 1968 in France, students claimed that contemporary capitalism created a spectacle in which everyone was maneuvered into participating. In short, the reserve of individual autonomy had been absorbed into the systems of oppression, and thus was unsuited to form the basis for radical change.

The questioning of individual autonomy, however, is more than a historical matter. Twentieth century philosophy has come to understand the subject to be suffused by forces once considered external to it. The structure of knowledge has been found to be tied to the structure of language and to social and cultural practices of justification: it is not a given of the species. Behavior is thought to be more deeply rooted in surrounding milieux (whether they are societal reinforcements or the unconscious family theater) than was previously considered. To these changes post-structuralism has added a critique of humanism that precludes a return to the subject as the hope of resistance.

The post-structuralist critique of humanism is founded on two intertwined tenets: first, that the subject as such is constituted in exteriority, and second, that power does not repress but rather creates. In Foucault, the critique cuts across both historical and conceptual dimensions. Particularly in his later work, he concerns himself with the question of how the subject is constituted within networks of knowledge that are also networks of power (a schism that Foucault calls "power/knowledge"). *Discipline and Punish*, "a correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge,"[25] demonstrates how the discourse of knowledge about the modern psyche is also a practice of power such that what has been read as a journey of scientific discovery can as easily be read as an increasingly subtle display of disciplinary technique. In this nexus of science and discipline, the subject as such is being constituted. An autonomy is ascribed to the subject, a realm of individual character that offers itself to prison wardens, psychologists, social workers, educators, and others as material to be shaped into socially acceptable patterns. Subjectivity and "normalization" become corresponding terms with a relationship of direct implication: the wholeness of each depends upon adequacy of the other. The first volumes of Foucault's *History of Sexuality* broaden these themes, using as their point of reference "'that interplay between truth and sex' which was bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century."[26]

His studies offer historical reasons that are simultaneously political and conceptual for rejecting the view of subjectivity as a proper cite for situating resistance to the current order.

Deleuze focuses more on the energic than on the historical.[27] Like the anarchists, and more than Foucault, he is concerned with finding a space of resistance. But like Foucault, he rejects the concept of subjectivity, seeing it as constituted rather than constituting. His analysis of this constitution takes the form, in the two-volume *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, of showing how desire, a productive energic stratum that is "part of the infrastructure,"[28] can become self-oppressive in its appropriation by the social field within which it exists. Under capitalism, the central mechanism of the oppression of desire is the constitution of the subject through the Oedipus complex. The operational Oedipus is, for Deleuze and Guattari, historical rather than anthropological; its result, the modern subject, is a contributor to the social order rather than a form of resistance to it. To discover the possibility of revolution is to abandon the subject and to seek alternative routes, which Deleuze calls "lines of escape,"[29] in which to channel desire. Thus Deleuze's critique of humanism parallels Foucault's, and denies the subject the dignity of its autonomy through an analysis of the mechanisms by which it becomes constituted to be a subject.

During most of the 1970s, Lyotard shared Deleuze's concern with energies, objecting only that Oedipus was an irrelevant part of the analysis and that capitalism had its own energic mechanism of self-destruction.[30] For him, the subject was not so much dangerous as negligible; humanism was more irrelevant than insidious. In more recent works, Lyotard moves away from energics to a concern with language; the subject, however, remains unaddressed. What *The Differend* analyzes are the pragmatics of discourse that enable some discourses to achieve hegemony while others are reduced to silence. The concern here is with justice, which in his earlier book, *Just Gaming*, had emerged as a preoccupation for Lyotard because he was seeking, in the wake of the demise of metanarratives, the concept (following Aristotle) of "justice without models."[31] *The Differend* studies the political pragmatics of language, and argues that linguistic discourse always appears in the form of a genre, with its own rules of style, evidence, and succession. In his most urgent example, he takes up the denial by Robert Faurisson that the Holocaust ever occurred. Faurisson argues that since no one can describe the operation of the gas chambers from first-hand experience, there is no evidence for their having actually operated or killed anyone. This type of argument Lyotard calls a "differend," "the case where the plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a victim."[32]

For Lyotard, the dominance of certain genres of language creates victims by denying the expression proper to other genres. The dominance of the scientific genre is one of those victimizing genres, whose rules of evidence Faurisson uses (or better, warps) to deny the claims of Jews upon history. The underlying argument of Lyotard's concern with the pragmatics of discourse is that there must

be space created for a proliferation of different (and even new types of) genres, if the incommensurability that attaches to different genres is not to result in the victimization of speakers. In this concern, Lyotard focuses not upon the autonomy of a subject—a focus which would merely substitute another dominant genre—but upon discourse itself, the possibilities and dangers presented by the necessity of events of spoken discourse. Genres of discourse create worlds; at the same time, the dominance of some genres threatens to cast the worlds of some into obscurity, and ultimately into non-existence.

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The post-structuralist analyses of the knowledge of desire and of language subvert the humanist discourse which is the foundation of traditional anarchism. Moreover, they consider humanism's emphasis on the autonomy and dignity of the subject to be dangerous (except for Lyotard, for whom it is mostly irrelevant), continuing in a subtler guise the very mechanisms of oppression it sought to resist. Humanism is the nineteenth-century motif, and individual autonomy and subjectivity its concepts, that must be rejected if a politics adequate to our age is to be articulated. This motif and its concepts are not peculiar to anarchism; they provide the foundation both for liberalism, with its emphasis on freedom and autonomy, and for traditional Marxism, with its focus on labor as a species-being, as well. (It is no accident that recent Marxists such as Althusser have tried to reformulate Marxism by divesting it of all humanist categories.) Humanism is the foundation of all political theory bequeathed to us by the nineteenth century. In rejecting it, post-structuralism has questioned not only the fundamental assumptions of such theory, but also the very idea that political theory actually requires foundations. That is why post-structuralism is so often misunderstood as an extreme relativism or nihilism.

However, it is not in favor of chaos that post-structuralism has abjured the notion of foundations, humanist or otherwise, for its political theorizing. What it has offered instead are precise analyses of oppression in its operation on a variety of registers. None of the post-structuralists claims to offer unsurpassable perspectives on oppression; indeed their analyses raise doubts about the coherence of the concept of an unsurpassable perspective in political theory. Instead, they engage in what has often been called "micopolitics:" political theorizing that is specific to regions, types, or levels of political activity, but makes no pretensions of offering a general political theory. To offer a general political theory would in fact run counter to their common contention that oppression must be analyzed and resisted on the many registers and in the many nexes in which it is discovered. It would be to invite a return to the problem created by humanism, which became a tool of oppression to the very degree that it became a conceptual foundation for political or social thought. For the post-structuralists, there is

a Stalin waiting behind every general political theory: either you conform to the concepts on which it relies, or else you must be changed or eliminated in favor of those concepts. Foundationalism in political theory is, in short, inseparable from representation.

This is the trap of an anarchist humanism. By relying on humanism as its conceptual basis, anarchists precluded the possibility of resistance by those who do not conform to its dictates of normal subjectivity. Thus it is no surprise when in Kropotkin's critique of the prisons he lauds Pinel as a liberator of the insane, failing to see the new psychological bonds Pinel introduced and which Foucault analyzed in *Histoire de la Folie*.[33] For traditional anarchism, abnormality is to be cured rather than expressed; and though far more tolerant of deviance from the norm in matters of sexuality and other behaviors, there remains in such an anarchism the concept of the norm as the prototype of the properly human. This prototype, the post-structuralists have argued, does not constitute the source of resistance against oppression in the contemporary age; rather, through its unity and its concrete operation it is one form of such oppression.

Traditional anarchism, in its foundational concepts—and moreover, in the fact of possessing foundational concepts—betrays the insights which constitute its core. Humanism is a form of representation; thus, anarchism, as a critique of representation, cannot be constructed on its basis. Post-structuralist theorizing has, in effect, offered a way out of the humanist trap by engaging in non-foundationalist political critique. Such critique reveals how decentralized, non-representative radical theorizing can be articulated without relying upon a fundamental concept or motif in the name of which it offers its critique. However, one question remains which, unanswered, threatens the very notion of post-structuralism as a political critique. If it is not in the name of humanism or some other foundation that the critique occurs, in what or whose name is it a critique? How can the post-structuralists criticize existing social structures as oppressive without either a concept of what is being oppressed or at least a set of values that would be better realized in another social arrangement? In eliminating autonomy as inadequate to play the role of the oppressed in political critique, has post-structuralism eliminated the role itself, and with it the very possibility of critique? In short, can there be critique without representation?

To the last question, the answer can only be: in some sense yes, in some sense no. There can be no political critique without a value in the name of which one criticizes. One practice or institution must be said in some way to be wrong relative to another. Simply put, evaluation cannot occur without values; and where there are values, there is representation. For instance, in his history of the prisons, Foucault criticizes the practices of psychology and penology for normalizing individuals. His criticism rests on a value that goes something like this: one should not constrain others' action or thought unnecessarily. Lyotard can be read as promoting the value, among others, of allowing the fullest expression for different linguistic genres. Inasmuch as these values are held to be valid for all, there is representation underlying post-structuralist theorizing.

However, these values are not pernicious to the anarchist project of allow-ing oppressed populations to decide their goals and their means of resistance within the registers of their own oppression. They do not reduce struggles in one area to struggles in another. They are consonant with decentralized resistance and with local self-determination. The values that infuse the works of Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard are directed not toward formulating the means and ends of the oppressed considered as a single class; they try to facilitate the struggles of different groups by offering analyses, conceptual strategies, and political and theoretical critique. Foucault observes that

> [t]he intellectual no longer has to play the role of an advisor. The project, tac-tics and goals to be adopted are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellectual can do is to provide instruments of analysis.[34]

Post-structuralism leaves the decision of how the oppressed are to determine themselves to the oppressed; it merely provides them with intellectual tools that they may find helpful along the way.

And to those who say that even the minimal values of the post-structuralists are too much, who refuse to be represented as people who think others should not be constrained unnecessarily, or would like to allow others their expression, the post-structuralists have nothing to offer in the way of refutation. To seek a general theory (outside any logical conflict or inconsistency between specific values) within which to place such values is to engage once again in the project of building foundations, and thus of representation. Beyond the point of local values that allow for resistance along a variety of registers, there is no longer theory—only combat.[35]

Thus post-structuralist theory is indeed anarchist. It is in fact more consis-tently anarchist than traditional anarchist theory has proven to be. The theoretical wellspring of anarchism—the refusal of representation by political or conceptual means in order to achieve self-determination along a variety of regis-ters and at different local levels—finds its underpinnings articulated most accurately by the post-structuralist political theorists. Conversely, post-structuralism, rather than comprising a jumble of unrelated analyses, can be seen within the broad movement of anarchism. Reiner Schurmann was correct to call the locus of resistance in Foucault an "anarchist subject" who struggles against "the law of social totalization."[36] The same could be said for Deleuze and Lyo-tard. The type of intellectual activity promoted by the traditional anarchists and exemplified by the post-structuralists is one of specific analysis rather than of overarching critique. The traditional anarchists pointed to the dangers of the dominance of abstraction; the post-structuralists have taken account of those dangers in all of their works. They have produced a theoretical corpus that ad-dresses itself to an age that has seen too much of political representation and too little of self-determination. What both traditional anarchism and contemporary post-structuralism seek is a society—or better, a set of intersecting societies—in

which people are not told who they are, what they want, and how they shall live, but who will be able to determine these things for themselves. These societies constitute an ideal and, as the post-structuralists recognize, probably an impossible ideal. But in the kinds of analyses and struggles such an ideal promotes—analyses and struggles dedicated to opening up concrete spaces of freedom in the social field—lays the value of anarchist theory, both traditional and contemporary.

Notes

1.   Michel Foucault, "Structuralism and Post-structuralism: An Interview with Michel Foucault" (conducted by Gerard Raulet), *Telos* 55 (Spring 1983), p. 206.

2.   Colin Ward, *Anarchy In Action* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973), p. 138.

3.   Cf. ex., Peter Dews, *Logics of Disintegration* (London: Verso, 1987) and Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987) on normative relativism and J. G. Merquior, *Foucault* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985) on nihilism. For accounts of the Habermas-Lyotard debate for which this is a core issue, see David Ingram, "Legitimacy and the Post-Modern Condition: The Political Thought of Jean-Francois Lyotard," *Praxis International* 7:34 (Winter 1987-1988), pp. 286-305 and Stephen Watson, "Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard: Post-Modernism and the Crisis of Rationality," *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 10:2 (1984), pp. 1-24.

4.   Of course, one need not proceed in this order. However, contemporary political philosophy—both Anglo-American and Continental—has been guided by the predominance of these three intertwined elements, with Rawls and Habermas providing perhaps the most enlightened examples.

5.   For an overview of the history of this conflict, see James Joll's *The Anarchists* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 79-96.

6.   Mikhail Bakunin, *Selected Writings*, ed. Arthur Lehning, trans. Steven Cox and Oliver Stevens (London: Cape: 1973), p. 253.

7.   It can be argued that, since all administration involves decision-making, even administrative representation requires a transfer of power; thus the change from administrative to political representation is a matter of degree rather than one of kind. This is true; but it is only another way of saying that politics is not science. To delegate a minimal amount of decision-making power to an administrative body is not to surrender the fundamental decisions of one's public life. To put the matter otherwise, anarchist decision-making may be a relative rather than an absolute goal, but as a goal it is distinct from either liberal democracy or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

8.   Cf. *God and the State* (New York: Dover, 1970),

9.   For a contemporary account of some of the fronts of anarchist struggle, see *Reinventing Anarchy: What are Anarchists Thinking These Days?* ed. Howard Ehrlich, Carol Ehrlich, David DeLeon, and Glenda Morris (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).

10.   Peter Kropotkin, "Anarchist Communism" in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, ed. Roger Baldwin (New York: Dover, 1970), p. 51.

11. Ward, p. 52.

12. Kropotkin, "Anarchist Morality" in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, p. 105.

13. Nicholas Walter, "About Anarchism" in *Reinventing Anarchy*, p. 43.

14. Represented by such figures as Max Stirner and Benjamin Tucker.

15. Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (London: Heinemann: 1902) is a reply to Darwin's thesis of natural selection, arguing that there is among all animals a cooperative spirit dedicated to furthering the race that exists alongside the competitive spirit. "Sociability and need of mutual aid and support are such inherent parts of human nature that at no time of history can we discover men living in small isolated families, fighting each other for the means of subsistence" (p. 118).

16. Murray Bookchin, *Remaking Society* (Montreal and New York: Black Rose Books, 1989), p.174.

17. Bakunin, *God and the State*, p. 31.

18. Michel Foucault, "Intellectuals and Power," in *Language, Counter-memory, Practice*, trans. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 209.

19. Michel Foucault, "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview," in *Technologies of the Self*, ed. Luther Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick Hutton (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p. 11. See Foucault's "Afterword" in Dreyfus and Rabinow's *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982): "My objective has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (p. 208).

20. "Energumen Capitalism," trans. James Leigh, in *Semiotext(e)* 2:13 (1977), p. 17.

21. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus* (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 29.

22. Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, *Dialogues*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 133.

23. Cf. ex., Richard Rorty's *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), the most seminal of the works emphasizing the importance of the social in epistemology.

24. Cf. ex., Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1972).

25. *Discipline and Punish*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 23.

26. *History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House: 1980), p. 57.

27. Though we only address *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* here, Deleuze's concern with energies goes back as far as his second book, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), where he follows Nietzsche's analysis of subjectivity in its constitution by active and reactive forces.

28. *Anti-oedipus*, pp. 104-181

29. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) p. 3 *et passim*.

30. Cf. *Economie Libid.inale* (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1974), esp. pp. 9-26. For a full account of Lyotard's energies and "Energumen Capilalism" pp. 21-26 for his critique of Deleuze and Guattari's handling of Oedipus.

31.   Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thebaud, *Just Gaming*, trans. Wlad God-zich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 26.

32.   *The Differend*, trans. George Van Dan Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 9.

33.   Cf. "Prisons and Their Moral Influence on Prisoners" in *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, esp. p. 234; and Foucault's *Histoire de la Folie a L'age Classique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1972), pp. 511-530.

34.   *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, trans. C. Gordon, L. Marshall, J. Mepham, and K. Soper (New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 62.

35.   It should be noted that it is not only politically unappealing but theoretically impossible as well to seek to found a set of values in order to refute a value held by another. Hitler's central value—roughly that Jews were the cause of all European trouble and must be eliminated—could not be refuted if he could make all of his other values logically consistent with it, which is certainly possible in principle.

36.   "On Constituting Oneself as an Anarchist Subject," *Praxis International* 6:13 (1986), p. 307.

3

Power and Anarchy: In/equality + In/visibility in Autonomous Politics

Uri Gordon

> You are approached to answer questions for our group, make decisions and an-
> nouncements. You even think it is okay to define our group to visitors,
> strangers. Somehow you aren't ever questioned by the group for this behavior.
> . . . It's like you think that calling yourself an anarchist makes you clean and
> pure and no longer subject to self examination or criticism. You've made the
> term repulsive to me.
>
> —Anonymous, "What it is to be a girl in an anarchist boys' club"[1]

Let us put things on the table: with all the decentralization, autonomy and the
sitting in a circle during meetings, there are clearly power issues in the anarchist
movement. There are individuals who consistently wield more power in a group,
or are frequently found in positions of responsibility, initiating and leading ac-
tions and projects. Some people have more personal confidence, tend to speak
and get listened to more often than others, or are just particularly well-read and
well-spoken. There are entire groups whose coherence and activity profile have
given them a very strong influence in the wider movement. Some collectives
and networks have become cliquey; others are constantly disempowered by end-
less stagnation over "process." Concerns about power relations in the movement
surface at meetings, during actions, and in everyday conversations—still echo-
ing the same issues that feminists, peace activists and many others have faced
since the 1960s. And all the while, the most dedicated activists, overworked and
burned out, get to deal with a guilt-trip over being leaders.

It is not surprising that these issues are so difficult. Anarchists and their al-
lies are, after all, experimenting with the uncharted territory of non-hierarchical
organizing and social relations that challenge domination, going against the
grain of our own socialization as children, pupils and workers. Prole Cat writes:

Everywhere we turn in capitalist society is hierarchical organization. . . . The
habits and perspectives that accompany such a social arrangement do not auto-
matically disappear as one enters the gates of the revolutionary movement. . . .
The leaders and the followers, the by-products of an authoritarian society: this
is the raw material from which we must build the free society. . . . We must be-
gin our egalitarian relations today, among our damaged selves, if we are to live
in a free world tomorrow.[2]

The discussion of power inside the movement is really the obvious place to start
for anarchist political theory. It cuts to the core: hierarchy, domination, direct
action, the liberation of desire—power is the stuff of these. So a central place
should be given to probing the concept of power, to mapping its unequal distri-
bution, and to making sense of the everyday dimension in which power relations
are reproduced. In this chapter I want to show what a theory grounded in prac-
tice can do for us in disentangling the dilemmas and controversies around
leadership and unequal power in anarchist organizing. What are the basic *ques-
tions* that sit at the bottom of these dilemmas? How could anarchists best
understand the functioning and distribution of different kinds of power within
their own networks? And how can power dynamics on the ground come to re-
flect anarchist values and priorities?

   This chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of power itself. As a
starting point I draw on the threefold understanding of power suggested by eco-
feminist writer Starhawk, distinguishing between power-to (the basic sense of
power as the capacity to affect reality); power-over (power-to wielded as domi-
nation in hierarchical and coercive settings); and power-with (power-to wielded
as non-coercive influence and initiative among people who view themselves as
equals). My central argument is that problematic issues with power in the
movement should be traced to two distinct sources: standing inequalities in
power-to among activists (the "where" of power), and the lack of transparency
in the dynamic exercise of power-with among them (the "how" of power). To
clarify these problems, I trace the sources of power-to in the movement to what I
call "political resources"—material ones as well as skills and access to net-
works—which make for the ability to participate in movement activities. This
allows us to address the first issue by suggesting concrete tools for redistributing
at least some of these resources and making access to influence more equal. I
then analyze the more difficult part of the debate—the tension between the overt
or covert, formal or informal exercise of non-coercive influence, as suggested by
the idea of a "Tyranny of Structurelessness." In analyzing the conditions under
which such power tends to be wielded in the movement, I argue that the diffuse
and autonomous use of power in anarchist organizing is sometimes *inherently
unaccountable*, and that this situation *cannot* be remedied by formal structures
and procedures. In response to this difficulty, I suggest elements of a culture of
solidarity around power, one that can make its use more reflective and respon-
sive.

Three Kinds of Power

Anarchists are hardly "against power." This common misconception is easily shown untrue by anarchist political language, in which "empowerment" is mentioned as a positive goal. Empowerment is seen as a process whereby people literally acquire power, whether concretely (as in having access to the resources and capacities that are necessary for creating change) or psychologically (as in having the self-confidence needed for initiative and the grounds to believe that it will be effectual). On the other hand, of course, anarchists want to "fight the power," or at least "the powers that be," and to resist all systems of domination under which people are systematically subject to power (in the state, capitalism, patriarchy and so on). This indicates not a "rejection of power," but a more nuanced and differentiated use of the concept. What different kinds of power are we actually talking about here?

One very useful explanation of power is suggested by Starhawk, whose threefold analysis of the term has since been taken up elsewhere in feminist writing.[3] First, Starhawk suggests the term "power-over" to refer to power through domination. This is the kind of power "wielded in the workplace, in the schools, in the courts, in the doctor's office. It may rule with weapons that are physical or by controlling the resources we need to live: money, food, medical care; or by controlling more subtle resources: information, approval, love." The second category she suggests is "power-from-within," which I will call here "power-to." This is

> akin to the sense of mastery we develop as young children with each new unfolding ability: the exhilaration of standing erect, of walking, of speaking the magic words that convey our needs and thoughts. . . . We can feel that power in acts of creation and connection, in planting, building, writing, cleaning, healing, soothing, playing, singing, making love.[4]

Finally, Starhawk adds a third form of power, "power-with" or "power among." This is the power of a strong individual in a group amongst, not to command, but to make suggestions and be listened to, to initiate something and see it happen. This kind of threefold division is very helpful for our purposes, because it takes us beyond monolithic conceptions of power and highlights different kinds of power with different political significances. To get a firmer grasp on the substance of these distinctions, let me take a minute to elaborate on each form of power and relate it to wider debates.

Power-over as Domination

Theories of power in academic literature overwhelmingly address the concept solely in terms of power-over. Following sociologist Max Weber's definition of power as domination (*Herrschaft*), the concept is identified with the imposition of one will over another—"the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance."[5] American political scientist Robert Dahl similarly defines power as a relationship in which "*A* has power over *B* to the extent that he can get *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do"[6] There are, however, different ways in which one person can be made to comply with another person's will, against her or his own will or interests. Political theorists distinguish between four different ways for power-over to be wielded—force, coercion, manipulation and authority.[7] The difference between them is in *why* B complies.

- *Force* is being used when *A* achieves his objectives in the face of *B*'s noncompliance by stripping him of the choice between compliance and non-compliance (e.g., *A* wants *B* to exit the building so he physically pushes *B* through the door).

- *Coercion* is at work where *B* complies in response to *A*'s credible threat of deprivation (or of "sanction"). In the face a disadvantageous cost/benefit calculus created by the threat, *B* complies of his own unfree will (e.g., *A* points a gun at *B* and demands that *B* exit the building).

- *Manipulation* occurs when *A* deliberately lies or omits information in communicating his wants to *B*. The latter complies without recognizing either the source or the exact nature of the demand upon him (e.g., *A* asks *B* to check if the doorbell is working, but once *B* exits *A* locks him out).

- *Authority* is in place when *B* complies with *A*'s command out of *B*'s belief that *A* has the right to issue the command and that *B* has a corresponding duty to obey (e.g., *A* is a police officer who tells *B* to exit the building, and *B* obeys).

These distinctions are useful as a rule of thumb and I will return to them later. Meanwhile, we can see how the idea of power-over helps us clarify the anarchist concept of domination. It can now be said that a person is dominated, in the relevant anarchist sense, when s/he is systematically subject to power-over. The placement is involuntary because people do not normally choose the structure of their society, their prospects in life, the social class they are born into, or the race and gender with which they are identified. It should thus be emphasized that power-over functions in the dense social context of intersecting regimes of exclusion, and is not limited to one-on-one interactions. Power-over is also manifest in "predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures . . . that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others"[8] Those who benefit—usually a minority or elite

group—are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interest. Thus power-over is also present when these groups create or reinforce values and institutions that limit the scope of public consideration. As Stephen Lukes points out, power-over may also be exercised by influencing, shaping or determining people's very wants, being able to secure their compliance by controlling their thoughts and desires.[9]

Indeed, deep social manipulation of people's own values and wants is a recurrent theme in popular culture as well as critical theory—from films like *The Matrix* and *Fight Club* which many anarchists seem to find appealing, to the writings of Western Marxists like Marcuse and post-structuralists like Michel Foucault. Foucault famously wrote about how power functions in the "capillaries" of social relations—in cultural grammar, routine practices, social mechanisms and institutions—in a much more subtle and potent form than in its overt expressions in rigid hierarchy and military violence.[10] It is thus easy to see that the word domination is more comprehensive than another concept often used by anarchists—hierarchy. While hierarchy is an apt description for the structure of many of the social relations making up domination, it does not express all of them. In hierarchical relations inequalities of status are visible, either because they are formalized (say, in the relations between a CEO and a secretary), or because one can identify their presence in a particular behavior or utterance. But the domination of human beings is often an insidious dynamic, reproduced through performative disciplinary acts in which the protagonists may not even be conscious of their roles. Many times, the dominated person can only symbolically point to an embodied source of her or his unfreedom. These insights feed into an anarchist critique of power which goes beyond the structural focus on hierarchy, and points to new avenues for resistance.

In fact, most recent pieces that confront issues of power in the movement focus on the way in which patterns of domination in society are imprinted on interactions within it—uncovering dynamics of racist, sexist, ageist or homophobic behavior, and asking why it is that positions of leadership in activist circles tend to be populated by men more often than women, whites more often than non-whites, and able persons more often than disabled ones.[11] I return to these discussions later.

Power-to as Capacity

Although power-over is the most readily observed *application* of power in society, it does not emerge from nowhere. The analysis of power suggested here sees power-over as a particular application, in human relations, of a more basic sense of power. This is the primitive notion lying behind all talk of power—the notion that A has power to the extent that s/he can produce intended effects in B.[12] Now A and B can be persons, but if B is a physical object, for example a

block of wood, and *A* moves it from here to there, then it still makes sense to speak of the action as a manifestation of power—*A*'s power to alter physical reality, to cause an effect or to achieve a desired result. This basic notion of power is what I call power-to, and it is clearly present in the Spanish word *poder*, which as a noun means "power" and as a verb means "to be able to."

Power-over always has its source in the dominant party's power-to. Force cannot be applied without some measure of bodily strength—an aspect of power-to—even if it is just enough to pull a trigger. *A* cannot coerce *B* without *being able* to exact whatever deprivation the threat inherent in coercion specifies (or without being able to give *B* the illusion that he can do so). If a person has no power to speak, s/he cannot manipulate others. And a judge who cannot talk, read or write would not be able to actualize any authority in the courtroom— though by law he "has" that authority. Thus we can also see that the possession of power-to is logically and temporally antecedent to its use: it is "there" to the extent that success can be *predicted* for the possessor's attempts to influence physical objects or other persons' behavior.

The relationship between power-to and power-over has been given a recent twist by John Holloway. Recasting the Marxist theory of alienation in terms of power relations, Holloway sees power-to and power-over as standing in a 'dialectical and oppositional' relationship. In the dynamic he portrays, the starting point is "power-to"—understood primarily as persons' capability to change the material environment through labor. However, the reproduction of capitalist social relations consists in a constant conversion of "power-to" into "power-over"—the transfer of control over human capacities, which is most clearly present in the selling of labor power. This alienates humans from their capability to do and puts that capability under the rule of capital. Hence Holloway suggests a conception of social struggle centered on the notion of liberating "power-to" from its conversion into "power-over":

> Power-to exists as power-over, but the power-to is subjected to and in rebellion against power-over, and power-over is nothing but, and therefore absolutely dependent upon, the metamorphosis of power-to. . . . The attempt to exercise power-to in a way that does not entail the exercise of power over others, inevitably comes into conflict with power-over. . . . Power-to, if it does not submerge itself in power-over, can exist, overtly or latently, only as power-against, as anti-power.[13]

Such an account is attractive on its own, but it has two flaws. First, it takes place on the level of society as a whole, in which capitalist relations of production are assumed from the outset. But in our case the question is not how objectionable senses of power operate in capitalist society, but what causes problematic accumulations and dynamics of power within grassroots groups and networks. It is difficult to imagine that the same type of process Holloway describes is at work in anarchist collectives. This is not to say that there is no power-over among

anarchists (see below)—but it is difficult to argue that objectionable power in anarchist groupings is generated and operates in the same way as it does in capitalist society as a whole. The second problem is that this framework presents power-to and power-over as the two sole elements in a binary antagonism, and therefore does nothing to explain forms of wielding power-to in human relations (as opposed to material labor) which are clearly *not* power-over. Imagine, for example, that I ask you for a glass of water and you give it to me. I have clearly made you do something that you would not otherwise do—but it is hardly a case of force, coercion, manipulation or authority. Hence, a third form of power is needed in order to account for the entire range of human interactions that involve other forms of influence than power-over.

Power-with as Non-coercive Influence

Influence without force, coercion, manipulation or authority is a very broad area of power that is normally left unexamined. But there are manifold cases in which people get each other to do things without there being a conflict of wills or interests between them—and these are still cases in which some form of power is being wielded. However, these forms of power are so distant from the central meanings of power-over that they require a separate category. This establishes the need to talk about a third, cooperative form of power, where individuals influence each other's behavior in the *absence* of a conflict of wills or interests.

This is the idea of power-with, or power as non-coercive influence. Power-with is clearly generated by power-to, just as power-over is. The less one is able to do things (to communicate and to mobilize capabilities, skills and resources) the less one can influence others. Power-with includes many interactions in which the participants unreflectively comply with one another's requests—again if *A* asks *B* for a small favor (a glass of water, or to keep an eye on *A*'s bike), *B* will very rarely ask *why A* wants that favor. This is because *A* and *B* share cultural codes that stand at the background of their unspoken, mutual expectations. Still, *A* gets *B* to do something that *B* would not otherwise do. Or take the case of persuasion—*A* asks *B* to do something together, and although *B* initially disagrees, *A* manages to persuade *B* to go along through honest and rational argument. Again *A* clearly gets *B* to do something s/he would not have otherwise done, but surely it matters whether *B* complies despite her or his continued opposition to *A*'s will, or because that opposition has been removed by honest persuasion. In the latter case it could be argued that *B* autonomously accepted *A*'s *reasons* for doing what s/he wanted *B* to do—making the reasons themselves the cause for *B*'s action.[14]

Now while power-with is clearly not the same as power-over, it can still be wielded unequally and/or abusively—and this is where the present discussion

comes in. The vast bulk of anarchist discussions of power deal with power-over. Anarchists analyze the accumulation and ab/use of power by governments and corporations, and inequalities of power along class, race and gender lines. The entire premise of anarchist ideas for social change is that society can and should be altered "without taking power"—without building a new apparatus of power-over that would impose different social relations from above. However, the issues anarchists face when thinking about power in their *own* groups and networks have much more to do with power-to and power-with than they do with power-over. The brief account of the different kinds of power above is helpful in mapping these issues and making the discussion more manageable.

I would now like to argue that there are actually two separate issues around power in horizontal groups. While the two often overlap and compound each other, they still derive from different sources and should be separated for the purpose of discussion before bringing them back together again. The first issue regards the unequal distribution of power-to among activists, which in turn generates unequal access to power-with. This may be called the "static" aspect of power, and it is relatively easier to disentangle by tracing the sources of this inequality and suggesting tools for removing it. The second category, the "dynamic" one, regards the machinations of power-with once it is being wielded. This issue is much more tangled, and to address it I shall have to go in some depth into the basic characteristics of power in action among activists, analyzing the anarchist movement itself as an arena of power.

What is important to emphasize for the moment, however, is that the two issues are indeed separate. Inequality in terms of the basic ability to participate is a problem, no matter how that participation takes place or what process is used to make collective decisions. Conversely, even equally distributed influence can be abused and abusive. First, then, let me look at the issue of standing inequality, and see what insights can be had about its sources and possible solutions.

Equality and "Political Resources"

The following statement from Murray Bookchin is a good example of how uncomfortable the debate around power can get:

> Many individuals in earlier groups like the CNT were not just "influential militants" but outright leaders, whose views were given more consideration—and deservedly so!—than those of others because they were based on more experience, knowledge, and wisdom, as well as the psychological traits that were needed to provide effective guidance. A serious libertarian approach to leadership would indeed acknowledge the reality and crucial importance of leaders— all the more to establish the greatly needed formal structures and *regulations*

that can effectively *control* and *modify* the activities of leaders and recall them.[15]

What is acutely missing here is the issue of equality. It is one thing to acknowledge that leadership is a useful quality, but quite another to ask *who* leads *when*. Bookchin's statement limits problems with leadership to the possible abuse of such positions and their consolidation into unaccountable power. But this glosses over whether or not these positions are continuously inhabited by the same individuals. One may doubt, however, whether a "serious libertarian approach" can sit satisfied with what is, essentially, a call to meritocracy. This would not only ignore equality, but also the whole range of intrinsic rather than instrumental values that anarchists find in their groups: making them nurturing spaces that facilitate the self-realization of individuals and provide them with a self-created environment for overcoming alienation and entrenched oppressive behaviors.

A move towards more equality obviously requires some form of redistribution. But it is impossible to simply redistribute "power." Power comes from somewhere, and it is the *sources* of power that should be redistributed. So we need a clearer idea about the sources of power in social movements, and their currency in material and social terms. What generates the ability to influence others in movements for social change? And to what degree can (some of) these things be equalized?

In his participant's ethnography of the Manchester *Earth First!* group, Jonathan Purkis interpreted unequal influence as the result of inequalities in "cultural capital," borrowing Bordieu's term: "the collective amount of acquired knowledge, skills and aesthetic outlook which allows groups or individuals to produce themselves as a viable social force." For example,

> although Phil described himself as the "convenor" of MEF! there was little doubt that he was perceived by other political groups in Manchester as the leader. This seemed to be reinforced by the cultural capital which he had at his disposal: home access to a fax machine and electronic services, personal friendships with several of the original half dozen members of UKEF! and employment with a "sympathetic" organization. His stable position in Manchester ensured that, regardless of what other activists were doing, he always seemed slightly ahead.[16]

Sociologist Mario Diani explains leadership roles in social movements as often a result of "certain actors'" location at the centre of exchanges of practical and symbolic resources . . . [such as] actors' ability to promote coalition work among movement organizations."[17] In short, certain *political resources* are required for effective influence in anarchist activity, and mapping them can help us understand how influence is generated and distributed within nominally non-hierarchical groups. In activist seminars I organized on this topic, brainstorms

around the idea of "political resources" regularly brought up a familiar list of items—things like money, space, publicity, time, commitment, expertise, access to networks, status in the movement and so on. To organize our thinking around such resources, let me suggest a distinction that is important for our concerns: that between zero-sum and non-zero-sum resources. A zero-sum resource is one whose possession, use or consumption by one person prevents, excludes or diminishes another person's ability to do the same. A van is a zero-sum resource that can only be driven to one destination at a time. Money is a zero-sum resource because if I use it to buy item X, nobody can use the same money to buy item Y.

On the other hand, a skill or a piece of information is a non-zero-sum resource. I can teach you a skill that I have without depleting my own possession of that skill, and I can give you information without forgetting it myself. Such resources are non-zero-sum since in their transfer we are effectively making a copy of them. So publicity can also be a non-zero-sum resource, to the extent that it is in accessible electronic format (though in this case other, zero-sum resources become the issue—computers, printers). Intangible resources like time and commitment are also part of this logic. Time is a zero-sum resource—I cannot give my time to any number of activities at once, and I cannot give you more time than you have. Because of this, the fact that people have different *constraints* on their time will mean that this resource is almost always unequally distributed. Finally, there are resources like commitment, energy, confidence, articulation and charisma. All of these are personal traits, shaped by individual circumstances: one's age, biography, experiences and so on. With these resources, although no depletion is involved in their use they are also *difficult or impossible to duplicate*, compared to skills and access to networks. A summary of these resources and their different kinds is given in the accompanying table.

Table 3.1 Summary of Different Kinds of Resources

	Zero-sum	*Non Zero-sum*
Easier to redistribute	Money (personal, fund raising options . . .) Spaces (houses, offices, allotments . . .) Equipment (vehicles, banners, puppets, tripods . . .)	Skills (writing, climbing, cooking, facilitation . . .) Information Access (networks, trust . . .) Publicity (electronic)

Difficult to redistribute	Time	Commitment Energy Confidence Charisma

This is obviously only one possible mapping—other resources that give a person influence in activist groups can be identified, and different sub-divisions suggested. But it is now easier to understand how to equalize access to power in non-hierarchical groups: doing so would mean that anyone can easily get the resources they need in order to take initiative, be effective and feel valued—as well as recognition and support in doing so. In his Food Not Bombs group, writes Criss Crass:

> We began to identify positions of leadership in the group and had open discussions of power and strategized ways to share it . . . seeing different levels of responsibility as stepping stones to help people get concrete things done, to build their involvement, to increase their sense of what they are capable of and to develop the skills necessary for the job . . . [it] is also about encouragement, recognizing that people frequently carry enormous insecurities about being good enough, having enough experience, having anything worthwhile to say and doubting that anyone thinks they're capable enough.[18]

So what concrete tools for redistribution are available for each type of resource? Beginning with zero-sum resources, we can consider two distinct forms of redistribution: sharing and collectivizing. Sharing redistributes from one person to one or more other people. The person who shares subjects the portion that s/he shares to the discretion of whomever s/he is sharing it with. If I have a van, I can share it with you for a day and subject it to your discretion, with or without an explicit agreement on the purpose to which you will use it. I can also permanently share a zero-sum resource with a person or group. In this case we agree that the use of the van, which used to be subject to my sole discretion, is now subject to decision-making by other people as well. Where money is concerned, I am familiar with more than one instance in which an anarchist came into a million or two through inheritance, and used the money to set up funds that finance projects, actions and social centers.

A second version of redistribution, collectivizing (or pooling), redistributes from several people as individuals to the same people as a group, subjecting the use of the resource whole to their collective decision-making, where before different parts of it were under the discretion of each individual. Again money is the most obvious example. Several groups can raise donations or funding for their joint activity separately, and then pool it. If five of us are making salaries we can move in together and set up a co-op, sharing most of our money. The

same goes for spaces: personal spaces can be shared, and collective spaces can be established. If, in a given locale, the only space available for meetings or banner-making is a large-ish house owned by an activist co-op, then the members of this co-op will have disproportionate access to space, and thus disproportionate influence in the movement. One solution is for them to rent a smaller house to live in, and funnel the rest of their housing benefit to operate a social centre.

With non-zero-sum resources, redistribution looks a bit different since it means that the resource (a skill, a contact, a file or a design) is effectively duplicated from one person to others. Access to networks is a key activist resource that can be redistributed in this way. Since local activist milieus tend to be quite integrated, this type of resource is in particular need of redistribution when it comes to larger-scale activities, such as coordinating simultaneous direct actions or longer-term campaigns. It is often, however, an important condition for day-to-day work as well. Because of the highly decentralized nature of activist movements, the ability to initiate and carry out actions is strongly conditioned on the ability to communicate with individuals outside one's face-to-face setting. Access to networks can thus be thought of in terms of the quantity and quality of communication links that a person has with other activists, in particular those outside her immediate group or local area.

Communication links do not exist between groups as such. It is individuals within the groups who communicate with each other, some more than others. In his ethnography of activist networks in Barcelona, Jeff Juris identifies, as the most important network nodes, "social relayers," who process and distribute information in a particular network, and "social switchers," who occupy key positions within multiple networks and can channel communication flows among different movement sectors.[19] These are key positions of power, allowing them to significantly influence the flow, direction and intensity of network activity. The wider diffusion of networking capabilities can contribute significantly to equalizing access to influence in this area. On the most basic level, a person's connectivity is greatly increased by the awareness of, and access to, venues of communication with individuals from diverse groups and places. These could be regional or international gatherings, email lists and web forums. Beyond this, a familiarity with the architecture of the relevant networks (who's in touch with who, who is working on what) is also a resource that can be transferred. More substantially, however, the qualitative aspect of networking ties is determined in great measure by personal affinity, close mutual knowledge and trust. These can also be extended, for example by mutually trusting activists introducing one another to each other's equally trusted friends.

All of this might seem pretty straightforward, even trivial—until we come to the last class of resources, which opens up a whole can of worms. These are resources that are not zero-sum, but also difficult or impossible to transfer. Some, such as commitment and energy, are not even stable resources for a given individual, and are influenced by a complex combination of factors. Levels of

commitment change with one's priorities, experiences and circumstances, and one's energy is often conditioned by health, disposition and mood. But the resources most difficult to come to terms with are those related to personality traits such as articulate speech, self-confidence, strong convictions, and even external appearance—all of which certainly play a role in a person's ability to influence others, especially in the intimate setting of friendship networks and fluid affinity groups. Although such resources can sometimes be acquired or consciously developed, transferring them from one person to another is a different matter. It is very strange to imagine anarchists giving each other 'charisma coaching' and organizing skill-sharing workshops in public speaking, personability and pep. What is distressing about this imagery is that it evokes the approach to such qualities in the worlds of business and state politics, where power-with operates informally alongside power-over.

Thus we seem to have come to an impasse—while a great deal of work can be done towards redistributing many material and immaterial resources, there are at least some in which equality can hardly, if ever, be achieved. But if they cannot be transferred, can the degree to which these qualities are allowed to generate power be *diminished*? Why do such qualities enjoy the status of political resources in the first place? Surely different environments for organized human action – hierarchical and non-hierarchical, formal and informal—would give these qualities different weight as far as influence is concerned.

This brings us directly to the second issue, the "how" of power. Articulation, confidence and charisma are special not only in being personal qualities, but also because they relate most closely to power dynamics—to its actual wielding in human interaction. These qualities come to the fore when taking initiative, building trust, or convincing other people—when playing the game in the anarchist arena of power. The thing is, in anarchist networks like everywhere else, a lot depends on who you know. Much anarchist activity is organized in a diffuse and informal way, by self-selected groups in closed meetings. The presence of invisible power behind the scenes of anarchist networks has been a cause of anxiety for years. It raises serious questions about inclusion and accountability in a decentralized movement—a test-case for prefigurative politics.

The Tyranny of What?

Argentinean activist and scholar Ezequiel Adamovsky has been a closely observing participant in the movement of autonomous neighborhood assemblies that emerged following the 2001 economic crisis in his country.[20] As of 2005, Adamovsky reports, participation in assemblies has massively diminished, and they network only on a very small and localized level (interviewed in Kaufman).[21] Part of the reason, he says, is that the horizontalism that characterized the emergence of the assemblies was so focused on rejection—of power pyra-

mids and of a hierarchical division of labor—that no positive groundwork for coordination could be established. This failure led to the disintegration of some of the autonomous initiatives, as activists resorted to "old certainties" such as building a workers' party. Others became comfortably isolated in very small circles of familiarity without the capacity to articulate the struggle with the larger society. Mara Kaufman associates the breakdown of the *assambleas* with the lack of "a transparent distribution of tasks and clear democratic decision-making method":

> The fear of delegating responsibility becomes a kind of privileged voluntarism: whoever has the connections and time, both elements of privilege, to get something done does it. The intended avoidance of hierarchical leadership leads to an open denial of power but [allows] a nameless and invisible informal structure of power where charisma or well-connectedness becomes the defining factor for emerging leadership. In movement politics, unstructured 'open space' becomes a shady stand-in for democratic process.[22]

Like another expression, "lifestyle anarchism," the idea of "the tyranny of structurelessness" (*TToS*) haunts the anarchist movement though its source is not animated by anarchist values at all. While what we must ultimately confront is the looser sense in which people use the expression, it is worth glancing at the original. *The Tyranny of Structurelessness* is an essay written in 1970 by sociologist Jo Freeman under the pen-name Joreen.[23] The essay argues that the women's liberation movement has reached an impasse because feminist consciousness-raising groups have elevated the lack of formal structures and responsibilities to the level of an unquestioned dogma. This commitment to "structurelessness," however, enables *in*formal hierarchical structures to emerge and perpetuate themselves within groups. The vacuum created by the lack of formal communication structures is filled by the existing friendship-networks among part of the group's participants. This creates a friendship-elite—a class of leaders who form an in-group, while those who are not part of it remain disempowered. To perpetuate their status, in-groups create criteria by which people in the larger group are judged, and limit their participation to prescribed roles or channels. The lack of formal structure

> becomes a smokescreen for the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others. . . . The rules of how decisions are made are known only to a few and awareness of power is curtailed by those who know the rules, as long as the structure of the group is informal. Those who do not know the rules and are not chosen for initiation must remain in confusion, or suffer from paranoid delusions that something is happening of which they are not quite aware.[24]

Freeman thinks that unless a movement for change can overcome this problem, it will not develop but become inward looking, trapped in sterile rituals and

dominated by elites. But the solution that Freeman proposes is in no way anarchist in spirit. She suggests to accept inequalities as inevitable, but to formalize group structures so that the hierarchies they generate are constituted democratically. Since she thinks an elite is unlikely to renounce its power, even if challenged, "the only other alternative is formally to structure the group in such a way that the original power is institutionalized. . . . If the informal elites have been well structured and have exercised a fair amount of power in the past, such a task is feasible." From then on, democratic institutions are introduced; positions which incur authority and decision-making power are delegated by election, consciously distributed among many participants, rotated often, and include a requirement to be responsible to the group. Information is diffused widely and frequently, and everyone has equal access to the group's money or equipment. At the end, "the group of people in positions of authority [sic] will be diffuse, flexible, open and temporary."

Some anarchists cite *TToS* in support of their preference for formal organizations, on the model of bottom-up federations rather than diffuse networks.[25] Many others are at best ambivalent about Freeman's analysis and proposals. In a targeted rebuttal, anarcha-feminist Cathy Levine insists that formalizing elites is an unacceptable concession to the ossified patterns of the traditional left, which she associates with a patriarchal worldview. Rejecting "easy answers, pre-fab alternatives and no room in which to create our own way of life," Levine emphasizes the need for a radical milieu where participants are respected, nurtured and sustained, avoiding the bleak mechanization of formal structures.[26] Jason McQuinn goes on to argue that these problems are the same, or worse, in formally structured organizations:

> It's much more common (because it's probably a hell of a lot easier) for "the strong or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others" by starting or taking over formal organizations. After all why bother with blowing "smokescreens" to hide a shaky hegemony over a small, informal group when it's easier to insinuate yourself into powerful roles in formal organizations?[27]

Beyond the fact that Freeman's proposals run against the grain of anarchist priorities, the most obvious problem with implementing them today is that they would be utterly impractical. Calling for formal structures amounts to requiring the movement to entirely change its political culture, placing itself in an entirely unfamiliar mould that needs to be learned and followed against one's habits. It also means the effective stoppage of the movement's inherent fluidity in order to adapt it to rationalized structures, losing the advantages of high connectivity and rapid action afforded by decentralized, networked forms of organization. Since any widespread change in anarchist organizing would have to be widely accepted in order to happen, the stakes look very bad for the advocates of formal structures. Freeman and Bookchin, on their own principles, would have to fall in with the majority's considered choice.

More substantially, however, Freeman's analysis does not really explain the problem. People who enjoy internal positions of influence within a group or network are not necessarily friends. Identifiable leadership groups may exist, but while some of them are intimate friends, others have more of a working relationship based on trust rather than fondness. Some are happy to organize together but cannot stand each other socially. Alternately, there can be a group where all members are friends but there are *still* internal patterns of exclusion or domination. More basically, the stable, long-term elites portrayed in *TToS* would seem to require stability in the identity of the members and in the relationships between them. Otherwise, it would be hard for it to function as a forum for political coordination, especially within a larger group that it needs constantly to manipulate. But groups of friends very rarely work like that: people have different kinds of friendships with each other (best friends, good friends, mates, lovers . . .) creating a complex network of ties that is very rarely monolithic. Moreover, groups tend to have a very fluid nature: people burn-out, fall out with each other, make new friends, migrate a lot and so on. This does not mean that the analysis of *TToS* is *never* a reality—Freeman's analysis is clearly relevant to her own experiences in the women's movement.[28] What is denied here, however, is the portrayal of the friendship-elite as some kind of First Cause lying at "the" root of the problem, which tags the circumstantial as essential.

A more formal problem with *TToS* is that its analysis is clouded by the functionalist conventions of 1970s "value-free social science." Functionalism, an approach associated with sociologists like Emile Durkheim and Talcot Parsons, handles its object of study as a system, and asks only how this system functions and how it responds to change. The only available type of value-judgment within this framework is how successfully systems fulfill their goals, whatever they are. As a result, the only problem that *TToS* can find with elites is that they hinder the effectiveness of the movement. First, the prerequisites for being part of an informal elite "do not include one's competence, dedication to feminism, talents or potential contribution to the movement." Second, there is not space for all good ideas: "People listen to each other because they like them, not because they say significant things." Finally elites "have no obligations to be responsible to the group at large." All the while, nothing is ever said in critique of elites as such; as with Bookchin's statement above, equality is simply absent from the agenda.

Nevertheless, the concerns that motivate Freeman, Kaufman and Bookchin are legitimate. There is a felt need to have some way of monitoring, checking and making visible the operations of influence within anti-authoritarian groups. People find it disempowering to participate in actions and projects that are steered behind their back. Being put in a situation you did not create and over which you have only marginal control—this may be the norm in environments like the army, workplace or school, but they should not be the norm in anarchist organizing which wants to empower the individual.

In order to make sense of these issues in a way that goes beyond *TToS* in terms of both analysis and proposals, we need to take a closer look at how power moves and flows in the anarchist movement. Before we make any normative judgment on invisible power, we need to understand *how* it is created and encouraged. This requires us to examine the unique "rules of the game" in anarchist organizing—rules very different from those obtaining in the public sphere at large. How is power-with actually wielded in the movement? And what can this tell us about its use and abuse?

Decentralization versus Accountability

The term "decentralization" is often mentioned as a central principle of anarchist organization—but what does it mean in practice? To clarify, let us look at how decisions are made in large networks. Consciously or by default, it seems that the space for network-wide decisions in anarchist networks is in fact very small. Most of the activity that happens within their fold is undertaken by autonomous affinity groups, working groups and individual networkers. For example, in bi-monthly UK gatherings of the *Dissent!* anti-G8 network, decentralization was often cited to argue for *not* making a decision on various matters at the plenary. Often a participant would say something to the effect that the plenary meeting should not micromanage the smaller groups, and that it should trust people to get on with their plans and projects as long as they are working within the principles of unity. Some of this was surely because of fatigue: large meetings are very boring affairs, and the consensus decision-making process can often make strong demands on one's patience. However, it is also clear that the activists saw decentralization and autonomy as positive values, not just as an expedient method. Thus, when a network plenary was discussing things such as transport or legal support, people would often invoke decentralization and relegate these decisions to a working group. Now what should be clear is that a working group on transport or legal support is not in any way a "local" node, since it operates on a network-wide level. What it is, is *a new center of power-with*. To describe what is happening in such a situation, one could say that the plenary, a temporary "center" of collective power-with in the network, is "seeding" several new "centers." So clearly decentralization means not fewer centers but more. It means that there should be a process to increase the number of "places" (face-to-face or virtual) where power gets exercised, while avoiding disproportionate aggregations of power, and/or transferring existing ones into the new locales (a principle of equality enacted on an increasing number of recipients).

However—and this is the crucial point—the transfer of such power to new centers goes unmanaged and unlegitimated. In practice, what typically happens is that by the time the plenary meets, a number of people willing to volunteer their time and effort to moving a particular issue forward will have already

formed a working group, open for others to join. The plenary's "decision" to "decentralize" boils down to advertising an accomplished fact. One might think that, since the plenary has agreed that the creation of working groups is a good thing, this constitutes some kind of ratification. But what if the working groups simply announced their existence, without seeking to generate discussion in the plenary? Unless the purpose of the group sounded strange, or controversial individuals were involved, the announcement would likely pass without discussion (at most with a few questions for clarification). In other words, people would see the same legitimacy in the working groups whether or not they explicitly gave their consent to their existence in a plenary. Membership in the working group is also largely without oversight, since it may change at any time as people join and leave. What is distressing about these observations is that they show that decentralized processes tend to be highly *unaccountable*—which is the root of the concerns associated with ideas like *TToS*.

 Accountability is the end-goal of the formal structures approach, which calls for responsibility to be clearly delegated and mandated, overseen and re-callable; and for influence in the movement to be exercised as visibly as possible. Indeed, the concept of accountability has a great deal of currency from the position of movements for social change. Many activists talk about holding corporations accountable for their abuses (e.g., making Dow Chemicals pay for the Bhopal disaster), or about holding politicians accountable to the public. Anarchists, who believe that corporations and politicians should be abolished, might have less use for such a concept—but even with them it retains some rhetorical strength in the immediate term. In the case of both corporations and politicians, this is because the demand for accountability is directed towards an entity that is *more* powerful than the source of the demand. However, accountability as such does not imply a given direction for power relations. In fact, accountability most often operates hierarchically from the top down—workers are accountable to their bosses, soldiers are accountable to their officers, and so on. What does accountability, as a relationship between two agents, most basically consist in? Looking at top-down accountability and *in particular* to the kind of bottom-up accountability that anarchists support when they say they want to "hold corporations accountable," we should understand that all our notions of accountability are based on the idea of exerting certain behaviors from agents through *demands backed by sanctions*. So A is accountable to B if and only if B has the ability to impose sanctions on A in case of B's dissatisfaction with A's activities. And this is where the problems begin. For sanctions are impossible to use in a consistent way in decentralized networks. The discussion of decentralization above reveals that, while often addressed as a value, decentralization is also a *default functional principle* of anarchist organizing. I would now like to argue that this is because of the "elephant in the room" so often ignored during discussions of anarchist organizational processes: the absence of enforcement.

The concept of "enforcement" introduced here is meant as a particular variant of coercion. The latter, as we mentioned above, is the extraction of compliance through a threat of deprivation. Enforcement, on the other hand, is coercion which has two additional features. First, it is rationalized and institutionalized. Enforcement is coercion that follows formal procedures and guidelines, such that both the victim and the perpetrator know what behaviors are expected from them. It is usually a form of coercion against which society considers it illegitimate and/or illegal to defend oneself, that is, it is attached to a legal/rational form of authority.[29] Second, it is coercion where the threat is permanent. The means and protocols for enforcement are constantly available to the enforcer. The coercer, on the other hand, may have to "invent" their own means and strategy for coercion. Both of these aspects differentiate enforcement from sporadic or diffuse coercion.

It should be clarified in passing that while anarchists would clearly object to enforcement, they do not have to take the same position on coercion as such. If someone attacks me, today or in an "anarchist society," I will certainly coerce them to stop. Social transformation will also likely involve some forms of nondefensive coercion, against owners for example. Even in the hunter-gatherer and horticultural communities that many anarchists look to for cues on nonhierarchical living, there exists the use of "diffuse social sanctions"—shunning, marginalization, exclusion—whose application or threat coerce sociable behavior to some extent.[30] In fact, anarchists use the same form of diffuse social sanctions—gossip, refusal to work with certain people, or public displays of distrust. Social sanctions are threatening to the degree that it is costly for a person to pollute their relations with other members of a group or, ultimately, to leave it. Marginalization as a result of falling out with a bunch of anarchists may not seem very costly—compared to the threats issued by the state, or even to diffuse sanctions in a tribal community, where one's survival may depend on cooperation. However, the cost is neither zero nor insignificant—it could only be so if there were no purpose in participating in the movement. For example, there is often a large degree of overlap between activists' political milieu and their social one, with one's comrades being the bulk of one's friends. An individual thus also faces the cost of drifting to the periphery of their social milieu, losing friendship ties and opportunities for social interaction with like-minded people outside the activist circle. This cost is larger, the more of one's friends are activists, and smaller to the degree that individual friendship ties that were created through activism can continue.

The point, however, is that whereas diffuse social sanctions are indeed coercive, they are hardly something on which an edifice of *enforcement* could be built. Social sanctions, taken on their own, do not yield to the permanence and rationalization entailed by enforcement. They are by nature only possible to employ in a sporadic and diffuse way. And aside from social sanctions, the available sanctions that can be exercised in a networked social movement are

next to nil. Anarchists have no army or police, nor any economic sanctions to mobilize against one another. When it comes to the rub, activists hardly have a way to make someone do something s/he strongly refuses to do, or to prevent someone from doing something s/he strongly wants to do. The lack of appropriate sanctions, then, makes enforcement not only undesirable for anarchists in their politics, but structurally impossible. This is important; because where there is no enforcement to begin with, there can only be anarchy. Human relations in activist networks will follow anarchist patterns almost by default, since enforcement is inevitably absent from its structures.

Perhaps this is only possible in the thin air of dislocated network politics, and such a model is untested in the more messy ground of community living, food production, etc. I am not asking whether this absolute non-enforcement can or cannot work in an anarchist *society* and apply to all areas of life (I think it can, to the degree that there is ease of mobility between communities, making the cost of secession low). But what cannot be denied is that as far as the contemporary movement is concerned, decentralization and autonomy are not just values but also facts on the ground. They are there because the impossibility of rationalized, permanent enforcement stands the entirety of anarchist activities on the basis of voluntary association.

Once we shift our understanding of anarchist process in this way, we are able to shift the mistake that most clouds our thinking over process—the continued couching of the debate in the language of democracy. It is true that there are major parallels between some of the values animating activists' collective process practices and those which feature in the more radical end of democratic theory—especially concepts of participation, deliberation and inclusion.[31] However, there is still a fundamental difference between the coordinates of the debate. Democratic discourse assumes without exception that the political process results, at some point, in collectively binding decisions. That these decisions can be the result of free and open debate by all those affected does not change the fact that the outcome is seen to have a mandatory nature. Saying that something is collectively binding makes no sense if each person is to make up their own mind over whether they are bound by it. Binding means enforceable and enforceability is a background assumption of democracy. But the outcomes of anarchist process are inherently impossible to enforce. That is why the process is not "democratic" at all, since in democracy the point of equal participation in determining decisions is that this is what legitimates these decisions' subsequent enforcement—or simply sweetens the pill. Anarchism, then, represents not the most radical form of democracy, but an altogether different paradigm of collective action.

The confrontation with non-enforceability reveals that the status of a "decision" in anarchist organizing is fuzzy, and can easily be seen as a matter of consultation and arrangement. The consensus decision-making process that anarchists widely employ is not only a cultural relic handed down from feminists and Quakers. It is also, for all decentralized movements, the default option that

makes most sense. Much has been written about the mechanics of consensus decision-making, about its difference from unanimity, and about its intrinsic qualities, such as non-adversarial and patient discussion, valuing everyone's voice and concerns. The provision for "blocking," or qualified veto, is said to express respect for the individual, and the facilitated discussion process is widely promoted as encouraging creative overcoming of differences or coexistence despite them.[32] But there is another point to be made about the important *functional* role that consensus plays in producing collective action under circumstances of unenforceability. In groups and networks thoroughly predicated on voluntary association, compliance with collective decisions is also voluntary. Consensus is the only thing that makes sense when minorities are under no obligation or sanction to comply, because consensus increases the *likelihood* that a decision will be voluntarily carried out by those who made it.

Such a perspective also enables us to look differently at the function of spokespeople, delegates or representatives in the anarchist movement. If we assume that what representatives decide among themselves will then *have* to be followed by those they represent, then we will obviously want to ask who gave these representatives their mandate, and what is its nature and scope. We would perhaps consider it good practice for "spokes" to arrive at the meeting with a "starting position" based on earlier consensus in their own group, and to have some guidelines from their group as to how flexible they can be. We may also be strict and expect that for such a decision to be legitimate, it would have to be ratified by the local groups. All of these would indeed make the decision more democratic, but only because they would be mitigating the basic problem of enforced decisions.

Anarchists, however, are not doing very good at all at being "democratic," because delegates to spokescouncils are rarely given a specific mandate, nor do they get elected. Usually those who have the time and money to travel to a meeting do so, and at the meeting itself nobody even checks which local groups are represented. However, the spokespeople can have no way of having their decision enforced—and thus they require no legitimacy. At most, a spokescouncil is a useful mechanism for banging heads together—generating "decisions" for which the spokespeople can *anticipate* that the individuals not present will voluntarily follow. A spokescouncil's consensus will be practicable to the degree that the spokes are being literally "representative" of the rest of the moment. This means not that they are appointed to make decisions on someone else's behalf, but that they think like others think, and are likely to raise and resolve the issues that others would raise. Again, the resulting consensus is of practicable utility simply because it generates not a decision but what essentially remains a proposal, while ensuring through discussion a high *likelihood* of voluntary acceptance from other people not present in the meeting, because their concerns will have already been anticipated in the shaping of the proposal for decision.

These observations cast a grave doubt on the possibility of truly "account-able" relationships becoming the norm in the anarchist movement. But the difficulty is even deeper than that. Sanctions or no sanctions, *B* certainly cannot hold *A* accountable in any meaningful sense *if B does not know about A's actions*. What the entire issue really boils down to is the *invisibility* of influence in anarchist networks. The dilemmas we are confronting here stem from the power-with that anarchists use invisibly, behind the scenes—where those affected may never know who made things this way, and how they conspired to do it. The demands for formal structures are, at the end of the day, demands for visibility. But what happens when invisibility is inevitable? More importantly, what happens when it is politically *valuable*?

The Plenary and the Campfire

In this final section I want to talk about two major problems with visibility, which finally exclude all talk of formal structures and force us to look for another way to address issues around the wielding of power-with in the anarchist movement. The first problem is that in some cases visibility is *impossible*—namely in actions that require secret planning although they will inevitably affect people who did not participate in their preparation. The second problem is that there is an important sense in which anarchists would be drawn to *positively value* the existence of invisible power within the movement, based on a feminist critique of the demands of public forums for influence.

Many times a small group of activists may wield, at least for a given time, a great deal of influence that is inherently unaccountable because it has to be wielded in secret. When illegal actions are being planned, anarchists may or may not agree with the outcome—but they cannot honestly expect the organizers to be transparent about the process. The activities of Reclaim the Streets (RTS) in its heyday are a poignant example. RTS originally formed in London in 1991, close to the dawn of the anti-roads movement, but entered its most prolific phase in the mid 1990s through the organization of mass, illegal street parties. Harnessing the energies of the recently criminalized rave subculture to an environmental anti-roads and anti-car agenda, RTS organized parties that rendered vast areas car-free for the day, creating self-organized spaces of party and protest—a combination that would carry on in anarchist mass actions. The parties drew thousands of people, and fused together several agendas: the reclamation of urban space from the hands of developers; a critique of the automobile culture and climate change; and the drive to create spontaneous, unregulated "Situations" or, in more recent terminology, "Temporary Autonomous Zones," which display a qualitative break with normality.[33] The RTS project reached its climax on 18 June 1999, the first "global day of action" against capitalism coinciding with the G8 summit in Köln, Germany, when

thousands of dancing people caused massive disruption in the City of London and simultaneous actions were held in over 40 cities from Vancouver to Tel-Aviv. As John Jordan recounts,

> the road became a stage for participatory ritual theatre . . . participatory because the street party has no division between performer and audience, it is created by and for everyone, it avoids all mediation, it is experienced in the immediate moment by all, in a spirit of face to face subversive comradeship.[34]

We might accept that an RTS party is "participatory" once it has started. But it is highly questionable whether this also applies to the organization of the event. The parties were, after all, staged entirely by a small core group of RTS activists, working full-time from an office in a London suburb and devising the plans to minute detail. The thousands who participated in the parties would turn up at a designated meeting place without having any idea of what was about to happen. As Jordan recounts, in one scenario

> thousands of people emerge from Shepherd's Bush tube station, no-one knows where they are going—the mystery and excitement of it all is electrifying. Shepherd's Bush Green comes to a standstill as people pour on to it . . . up ahead a line of police has already sealed off the roundabout. . . . The crowd knows that this is not the place: where is the sound system, the tripods? Then, as if by some miracle of collective telepathy, everyone turns back and disappears around the corner; a winding journey through back streets, under railway bridges and then up over a barrier and suddenly they are on an enormous motorway and right *behind* the police lines. . . . The ecstatic crowd gravitates towards the truck carrying the sound system which is parked on the hard shoulder. . . . The crowd roars—we've liberated a motorway through sheer numbers, through people power![35]

No "miracle of collective telepathy" took place here. There were always activists from the RTS core group who took on leading the crowd to the tarmac, in a carefully planned tactical maneuver which none of the thousands of attendants knew about in advance. The idea that a handful of activists could wield so much influence over a crowd, however willing, has given many anarchists cause for alarm, and was raised in numerous other events.[36] It is important to emphasize that nobody was coerced—you did not *have* to turn up at the event or stay there. However, once you were there you were basically putting yourself in a situation where you did not have the space to control what was going on around you. Police attacks, injuries and arrests were not an uncommon feature of these events, and organizers who created the situation have been accused of behaving like irresponsible cadres. However, could they have acted otherwise? Putting together a successful street party (or a summit blockade for that matter) seems to be inherently incompatible with visibility. To begin with, technically, a discussion of the operation among a large number of people, each of which would of

course have to have their say, would be time-consuming and endless. Second, and most obviously, the realities of police surveillance and potential repression that surround the planning of these actions rule out any public process. It is important to remark that the RTS model is also power-sharing, because it is easy to imitate. RTS groups were started throughout the early 2000s in many cities around the world, adding nothing to the power of the original RTS group. However, the tactic *itself* is inherently incompatible with visibility. Someone else can adopt it, but in doing so they are only creating another invisible process.

The point, however, is that despite these dynamics it is clear that the RTS experiment was immensely valuable. By developing such an innovative, inspiring and meaningful form of direct action, this small group of people politicized a large amount of people, and helped make the anti-capitalist movement a global phenomenon. So the fall-back position for supporters of visibility would be to say that, while there are unfortunate limitations to visibility, the ideal itself should not be given up. However, this cannot overcome the second issue—namely, that sometimes invisibility is not merely a matter of expedience, but politically meaningful in itself.

Imagine Emma, an activist who lives in a town which has a strong and vibrant anarchist milieu. She has a great deal of experience and commitment, many friends, and is a very empathic and caring person. She also has a lot of energy and many useful ideas for actions and projects. However, Emma is also very uncomfortable speaking at large public meetings. She believes that this is the result of deep-seated emotional patterns that derive from her socialization as a woman, and finds confirmation for that view in the experiences of many other woman activists. Speaking in a large group of people makes her feel uneasy and anxious—something she has noticed that men do not suffer from nearly as much. When she has something to say she takes a lot of time to think it through, often speaking only if she sees no one else is saying it, despite the fact that she knows her ideas are worthwhile and that the others respect and value her. As a result, Emma says she much prefers to offer her ideas to people informally, in personal or small group conversations. When she has a good idea for an action, or some strong opinion about how some resources should be allocated, she prefers to speak about it with people she trusts, informally, by the campfire as it were. She prefers to float an idea and see how it rolls along in the local milieu, rather than arguing for it in a large meeting. Since her ideas are often very well thought-out, and since people trust her, Emma has in fact a great deal of power. She is clearly an invisible leader.

Emma's behavior is clearly not an accountable way to exercise power. None of her influence is transparent or visible to those she does not want to see it. On the other hand, anarchists who have a strong critique of patriarchy will find it very hard to censure the path Emma has chosen to empower herself. Like many women (and other members of disempowered groups), Emma is going to use power invisibly or not at all. To expect that she strive to "get over" her emotional patterns and feel empowered at meetings would be not only patronizing,

but sexist, because it brackets the conditions of patriarchy that engender these patterns. What I am getting at is that the ideal of visibility privileges "the Plenary"—the public theater of power-with—while excluding "the Campfire"—the venue for its informal wielding behind-the-scenes. But making the Plenary the only accepted way to put things into motion is very problematic. Returning to the discussion of resources in the previous part, it can be seen that exercising power-with in the Plenary requires precisely those resources which are most difficult to share—public confidence, articulation and charisma. Not only that, often these resources *only become* ones that generate inequality in such formal and assemblary venues of decision-making. Because it is so difficult to share this resource, and because its current distribution strongly reflects patterns of domination in society, the only way to equalize the access to the influence it generates is *to minimize its relevance as a resource*, to reduce the volume of instances in which it matters to have it.

While anarchist networks may well be a supportive environment for self-deprogramming and empowerment, as matters stand it is unfair to say to a woman "you have to get self-confidence" as a condition for participation. Why does she have to make a special effort to change in order to participate on equal footing just because she is a woman in a patriarchal society? At the same time, privileging the Plenary erases and delegitimizes the manifold forms of using power that women have developed in response to patriarchy, and the ways in which many people find it most comfortable to empower themselves. As a result of these considerations, I think anarchists are bound to acknowledge that this invisible, subterranean, indeed *unaccountable* use of power is not only inevitable in some measure (because of habit and secrecy), but also needs to be embraced, since it coheres with their worldview in important respects. The quest for accountability, then, arrives at a dead end. Such an agenda inevitably ends up challenging the legitimacy of any invisible power, which is not only a practical necessity but also has intrinsic political value from an anarchist perspective. Where, then, does this leave anarchist concerns about invisible power?

Any resolution of these issues would have to meet two basic requirements. First, it could never take the form of a model that seeks to artificially redesign movement practices, running against the cultural logic of decentralized and autonomous organizing. Rather, any change in the anarchist use of power-with would have to be itself a *cultural* change, which can proliferate organically in a diffuse process. Unlike structures and protocols, only cultural change can reach beyond the public theatre of power and influence habits and attitudes in anarchists' everyday activities. Second, and more ambitiously, any modification to how people reflect upon and wield power in anarchist organizing would have to be viewed not as a restriction on freedom but as its expression. Rather than discouraging empowerment in informal venues, it would make people *more* encouraged and excited to create, initiate and do—only perhaps in a different way. Precisely because the entire edifice of anarchist organizing is built on pure

voluntarism, any change would have to be actively desired rather than seen as a concession.

For these reasons, I would suggest that the only way to resolve this particular set of anarchist anxieties would be through a *culture of solidarity* around the invisible wielding of power in the movement. Solidarity expresses a relationship between persons and within and between groups that is based on a feeling of mutual identification. Cohen and Arato define solidarity as

> the ability of individuals to respond to and identify with one another on the basis of mutuality and reciprocity, without calculating individual advantages, and above all without compulsion. Solidarity involves a willingness to share the fate of the other, not as the exemplar of a category to which the self belongs but as a unique and different person.[37]

Therefore, inasmuch as solidarity modifies behavior it does so as a positive motivation, not as a limiting duty. Solidarity can be amplified and actualized in activists' choices about their use of influence, and it can also be actively promoted. A culture of solidarity would encourage activists to wield power reflectively rather than tripping on empowerment; to make actions participatory and/or easily copy-able whenever possible; and to encourage consideration for the anticipated needs and desires of those whom one's actions will inevitably impact unaccountably. Solidarity in the dynamic wielding of power-with would also have to meaningfully intersect with the redistribution of political resources discussed earlier. By itself, the practice of redistributing resources requires a cultural orientation that makes it a matter of habit rather than bookkeeping, and solidarity in the use of power could naturally be added to this. The way to promote such cultural change—an act of power in itself—is not so much through verbal propaganda but through propaganda by deed. People can initiate change in their own organizational practices, taking initiative to create habits of resource-sharing and of reflective and considerate use of informal power, displaying that agenda and hopefully inspiring others to follow suit. If these practices catch on, then resource-sharing and solidarity will have become something that people keep in mind by default. Such a resolution is clearly partial and imperfect, but at least it is something that can actually happen, unlike a 180-degree turn away from informal organizing that extinguishes the Campfire of initiative.

Notes

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4

The Anarchism of the Other Person

Mitchell Verter

αναρχιαν

Levinas employs the word "anarchy" in all of his post-war writings as a counterpoint to both temporal and thematic orders, but in his 1968 essays "Humanism and An-archy" and "Substitution," he focuses more closely on how one may state this anarchy in a final term. In "Substitution," he defines ontological self-consciousness as a movement that loses and finds itself through "an ideal principle or *arche*."[1] His usage of Greek terminology seems to be a deliberate attempt to engage philosophy at its Greek origin in the same manner as Martin Heidegger. Reiner Schürmann,[2] following Heidegger, argues that the term *archē* enters the philosophical lexicon with Aristotle. Aristotle begins *Physics*—which Heidegger considers the foundation of Western metaphysics— by explaining that all scientific knowledge, *epistemē*, derives from a proper acquaintance with *archē*. Aristotle describes the history of Greek thought as a series of attempts to define the true nature of physical *archē*. However, many commentators have suggested that Aristotle himself retrospectively imposed this origin upon previous thinkers in order to position his own philosophy as the culmination of a distinguished legacy.

Heidegger and Schürmann criticize the Aristotelian notion of *archē* for correlating the inception of a phenomenon with its domination by a principle. In the same manner that "to lead" can both signify "to initiate" and "to rule," the term *archē* has always been used—even in the most ancient Greek writings—to signify both a commencement and a political authority. Aristotle refers to these everyday significations in Book Δ of the *Metaphysics*, defining *archē* as the commencement of motion, the preliminary manifestation from nature, the first knowable part, and the creation by something external. Among these meanings of *archē* as origination, Aristotle defines *archē* in another sense as rulership:

"that in accordance with whose deliberate choice that which is moved is moved, such as magistracies, authorities, and despotisms."[3]

The collusion of the inceptive and dominative meanings of *archē* is further illuminated in *Politics*. Throughout the book, Aristotle employs the fundamental distinction between whole and part to rationalize domination. He explains that the parts of a *polis* consist of households, and that part of the art of household management, *oikonomos* (economy), is acquiring property. The first kind of property Aristotle discusses is the slave, explaining that it is also the part of a whole:

> Again, a possession is spoken of as a part is spoken of; for the part is not only a part of something else, but wholly belongs to it; and this is also true of a possession. The master is only the master of the slave; he does not belong to him, whereas the slave is not only the slave of his master, but wholly belongs to him.[4]

Because the slave is always compelled to maintain his exclusive relationship of servitude to his master, one can consider his very existence to be subsumed by his master's existence. Aristotle further justifies slavery by founding the *archē* of rulership upon the *archē* of genesis. "Authority and subordination are conditions not only inevitable but also expedient: in some cases things are marked out from the moment of birth to rule or to be ruled." (*kai euthus ek genetês enia diestêke ta men epi to archē sthai ta d' epi to archē in.*)[5] He similarly naturalizes the domination of husbands over wives and of fathers over children using the same logic and the same doubling of *archē*.[6]

Whereas Aristotle insists that the dominative *archē* of men over women and parents over children emerges from an original paternal *archē*, the first active political (or antipolitical) usage of the term "anarchy" seems to have emerged from the speech of a sister. Although the nominative *anarchos* does occur in the earliest Greek composition, Homer's *Iliad*, it typically describes a faction's lack of leader. The word was also used to describe years in which no Archon (magistrate) was elected to direct Athens. The poem of Parmenides, written approximately 300 years after Homer's *Iliad* and approximately 150 years before Aristotle's *Physics*, uses the term *anarchos* to signify "without beginning." Roughly contemporary with Parmenides, the word also occurs in Aeschylus' drama *Seven Against Thebes*. In contrast to the privative usages of the term, the tragic character Antigone employs the term in the accusative, declaring that not only is she willing to risk punishment for burying her brother, she "is not ashamed to act in anarchist opposition to the rulers of the city." (*oud' aischunomai echous' apiston tênd' anarchian polei.*)[7] Fifty years later, Sophocles confirms this image of Antigone as the first anarchist when Creon condemns Antigone, asserting "there is no evil worse than anarchy" (*anarchias de meizon ouk estin kakon*).[8]

In the myth of Antigone, Creon—whose very name signifies "ruler" in Greek—represents the power of the State. Creon's foundation of the *polis* can be understood through Carl Schmitt's description of the political as the distinction between friend and enemy, "the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or disassociation."[9] His inauguration speech is a long meditation on the significance of friendship and enmity. "Anyone thinking another man more a friend than his own fatherland, I rate him nowhere . . . I would not count any enemy of my fatherland as a friend."[10] Creon concludes his inauguration speech with a law that establishes the boundaries of the political. "I here proclaim to the city that this man shall no one honor with a grave. . . . But he that is loyal to the state in death shall have my honor."[11] Through this edict, Creon effectively incorporates the memory and the body of one of Oedipus' sons within the physical borders of the State as its historical friend; he incorporates the memory and the body of the other son by excluding him beyond the physical borders of the State as its historical enemy.

Rather than opposing civic morality to family morality as Hegel asserts, Creon explicitly correlates political leadership with patriarchal domination. Every fraternal citizen must be loyal to his fatherland, and must demonstrate this loyalty among his brother citizens in the battle line. Conversely, the family also has the essential political function of maintaining animosities and friendships. "It is for this that fathers pray to have obedient sons begotten in their halls, that they may requite with ill their father's enemy and honor his friend no less than he would himself."[12] A man who successfully controls his family will be a respected citizen in the political realm, but one who allows disobedience from within his kinship group will invite the same hostility from an external enemy.

In addition to defining the enemy as "existentially something different and alien,"[13] Carl Schmitt notes the every political entity must necessarily develop a "formula for the declaration of an internal enemy."[14] Because a man may be a citizen in a fraternal patriarchy, he can also be a member of external enemy state or betray the state to a foreign power. As demonstrated by the conflict between Oedipus' sons, fraternity can degenerate into fratricide, and the allegiance to a patriarchal state can devolve into a bloody fight over patrimony. However, a more insidious threat comes from a person who can never be a citizen. In Creon's second major discourse on the nature of the political, he explains that woman can be the most subversive threat within both the state and the family; whose anarchy "destroys cities (*polis*)" and "demolishes homes (*oikos*)." Creon warns Antigone's fiancé, his son Haemon, that a woman who provides pleasure before marriage may become evil and frigid once she enters the home. Therefore, he urges Haemon to abandon his marriage plans, "What greater wound can there be than a false friend? No. Spit on her, throw her out like an enemy."[15] Antigone's very name already identifies her as an anarchist in another sense. Etymologically, it decomposes into *anti*, "against," and *gonē*, "birth." For the Greeks, she is named as one who opposes the *archē* of genesis. She recognizes

her solidarity with her brother as their shared experiences of accursed origin: "of a common womb were we born, of a wretched mother and unfortunate father. Therefore, my soul, willingly shares his evils, even though they are unwilling, and live in kindred spirit with the dead."[16] Heiress to a doomed bloodline, Antigone represents the determination to terminate the Oedipal curse. Not only does she embrace death, she refuses to give birth. Practically confirming Creon's warning that she is unfit for normative heterosexual matrimony, she deprecates marriage and maternity in favor of an almost incestuous bond of sisterhood. "A husband lost, another might have been found, and if bereft of a child, there could have been a second from some other man. But when a father and mother are hidden in Hades, no brother could ever bloom for me again."[17]

Antigone challenges the political order constructed by fathers and brothers by upholding the ethic of sisterhood. For her, each brother is unique and irreplaceable, and she finds herself responsible to each one even after his death. As a sister, she refuses to recognize the distinction between friend and enemy, anarchically subverting the foundation of the *polis*. Her rebellion does not originate from a political sphere as something against which Creon could struggle on a field of battle. Rather, it is produced from her radical vulnerability, her commitment to ethics. It is Antigone's obsession by her brother—not an abstract Divine Law or Filial Piety—that allows her to take responsibility for her brother's treachery, transforming it into her own guilt and persecution. Perhaps this would make her what Levinas refers to as a "sister soul" of "substitution and sacrifice."[18] Antigone expresses her solidarity with her brother by burying his corpse in order to prevent it from being consumed by vultures and wolves. Contrary to the political logic of exclusion and animosity, burial signifies an inclusion in society: among the animal kingdom, humans are the only ones who bury their dead. This image of consuming the dead can also be taken as a metaphor for the writing of history. Antigone anarchically protests Creon's erection of a State upon human graves by preventing her brother's corpse from being consumed as carrion for the history of the *polis*.

Anarchy before History

Levinas employs the term *anarchy* throughout his work to critique the question of history posed by his former teacher, German thinker Martin Heidegger. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger associates the historical character of the world with *Dasein*'s (human being's) historical nature as something that *has-been-there.*

> Nature is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as the site of a cult. . . . [World-historical] signifies, for one thing, the historizing of the world in its essential existent unity with *Dasein*.[19]

Not only does history emerge through humanity's interaction with its environment, *Dasein* realizes itself most authentically when it connects its own historical activity to its social Being-with-Others, and together they take over their heritage and determine their destiny. "This is how we designate the historizing of a community, of a people (*Volk*)."[20]

Right after the Nazis took power, Levinas warned that this Germanic assertion of an ineluctable chain to the past, history, and destiny correlates to a political ideal of war and conquest. In contrast, Jewish, Christian, and Enlightenment thought have promoted various ways that man[21] is freed from the bonds of the past and is granted a new beginning in a new present moment: "speaking absolutely, [man] has no history."[22] After his anticipation of Nazi violence was confirmed by the horrors of the Second World War, Levinas, like Antigone, critiqued the institution of history for the way it consumes the murdered. He writes,

> Historiography recounts the way the survivors appropriate the works of dead wills to themselves; it rests on the usurpation carried out by the conquerors, that is, by the survivors; it recounts enslavement, forgetting the life that struggles against slavery.[23]

By definition, history can only be written by survivors, by those who live (*vivir*) on top (*sur*) of the corpses of those whose past has already passed away. Levinas employs the term "anarchy" in *Totality and Infinity* to elaborate this distinction between living historical speech and the silenced dead:

> Both the historical and the past are defined as themes of which one can speak. They are thematized precisely because they no longer speak. The historical is forever absent from its very presence. This means that it disappears behind its manifestations; its apparition is always superficial and equivocal; its origin, its principle, always elsewhere. . . . This world that has lost its principle, anarchical, a world of phenomena, does not answer to the true.[24]

A historical fact is a raw datum: a dead, silent piece of evidence. By itself, it is enigmatic. Precisely for this reason, a historian can impose a theme upon it, assembling it into a meaningful system with other connected facts. Ultimately, however, this collection is arbitrary; the facts themselves remain ambiguous and open to interpretation. For example, even if I know that Heidegger joined the Nazi party during May 1933, I can never know the true meaning of that information. From my interiority, I can never penetrate the exteriority of his psychic life, even through the testimonials he himself left behind; no explicit remark or concrete action would ever provide the crucial piece of evidence for discerning his precise intention. Not only does this enigmatic anarchy cast doubt on any possible interpretation of the past, it also underlines the urgency of continuing to interpret it.

Levinas deepens his analysis of anarchy and history in his later work. Although *Totality and Infinity* does consider the past, it ultimately points towards the future. It foretells how the Other confronts me as someone who can not be fully comprehended, whose unforeseeable responses will resurrect me for an infinite future of responsible fecundity. A book dedicated to the memory of his family members murdered by the Nazis and of all victims of the same hatred of the other man, *Otherwise than Being*[25] and Levinas's more intensely focuses on reconciliation with the past. As in *Totality and Infinity*, it was something incomprehensible—the enigma of the silenced and forgotten past—that manifested itself as an ethical obligation. Prior to one's origination as a historical being, one was already created as someone responsible for a world created by others. Anarchical responsibility is

> a responsibility of the creature, a responsibility of one who comes too late into being to avoid supporting it in its entirety. This way of being, without human commitment, responsible for the other, amounts to the fact of human fellowship prior to freedom.[26]

This notion that one is anarchically responsible for a world created by others echoes a foundational assertion of the ethical anarchist Peter Kropotkin. Kropotkin explains that one's present well-being upon the earth depends upon a legacy inherited from an infinity of others. Our very material grounding rests upon the corpses of dead laborers. "The value of each dwelling, factory, and warehouse has been created by the accumulated labor of millions of workers, now dead and buried."[27] Given this radical indebtedness, Kropotkin concludes that the very notion of private property is absurd because everything a self creates is radically dependant on the work of others:

> There is not even a thought, or an invention, which is not common property, born of the past and the present. Thousands of inventors, known and unknown, who have died in poverty, have co-operated in the invention of each of these machines which embody the genius of man.[28]

What is Property?

For Levinas, the critique of history has always been echoed by a critique of property ownership. In the opening section *Principle and Anarchy* of "Substitution," Levinas explains that in Western ontology, essence fluctuates by losing itself and finding itself out of an *archē*, allowing it to "possess itself" and to instantiate a "moment of *having* in *being*."[29] This doubling of having and being occurs throughout Levinas's writing. In his 1935 article against "Hitlerism," he condemns fascist thought for figuring the body as an inevitable bondage to history. In contrast, Western thought has spiritually detached man from time and

physicality. He characterizes this as a "power given to the soul to free itself from *what has been*,"[30] italicizing the pluperfect combination of *to have* and *to be* that grammatically converts the past into a possession.

Immediately after World War II, Levinas introduces the notion of an "*il y a*" (there is), the undifferentiated whole of existence that compels part-icipation, possessing and nullifying any private separation. Not only does this term parody Heidegger's idea of a generous "*es gibt*" (idiomatically "there is"; literally "it gives"), it redefines Being as an anonymous it (*il*) in a there (*y*) that has (*a*) existence. Emerging from this flux as someone who can *be* requires becoming someone who can *have:* the me (*moi*) that I am doubles as the self (*soi*) that I own. Through this hypostasis, the self posits itself in a particular space at a particular moment. This self-mastery allows the self to convert exteriority into personal property by exerting its labor.

John Locke is generally credited as being the first thinker to propose a labor theory of property. He bases the right to private property in an individual's self-identity and self-ownership. "Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a 'property' in his own 'person.'" For Locke, all property ownership ultimately originates in the fact that a man is his own, proper person — not merely an abstract personhood, but also the concrete materiality of one's body. By combining the efforts of his own physical body with the objects in the external world, a man can turn these objects into his own personal property.[31]

Whereas Locke defines property as that which can be integrated back into a person's dominion through his bodily labor, Marx argues that, under capitalism, private property emerges as the thing that is alienated from the labor of the proletariat. "Private property is therefore the product, result, and necessary consequence of alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself."[32] Through his labor, the worker establishes himself as a subject creating a world of external objects, a totality of cultural products. Under capitalism, the worker experiences this self-objectification as self-estrangement because the fruits of his labor do not belong to him: they are delivered over to an Other, the capitalist. "If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, this is only possible because it belongs to another man than the worker."[33] A process of self-mortification, alienated labor converts the living essence of the worker into dead matter, sacrificing him to a stranger. Work is "vitality as a sacrifice of life, production of the object as loss of the object to an alien power, an *alien* person . . . who is *alien* to labor and the worker."[34]

Levinas' economic analyses in *Totality and Infinity* draw from these classic sources. Like Locke, he defines the act of possession as an appropriation of external being. One is born into a sensuous element whose *arche* escapes ownership, something that is "*coming* always, without my being able to *possess* the source."[35] Labor stills this anonymous flux and postpones the unforeseeable future of Infinity by allowing one to maintain oneself in a present. It breaks me

free of my dependence on the element by suspending its independence. "Posses-
sion neutralizes this being: as property the thing is an existent that has lost his
being."[36] By generating a total ensemble of things that answer to the needs of a
separated ego, ownership thereby establishes the self's mastery over external
reality.

Levinas inveighs against the ontological tradition for reducing the world to
Being and beings that ultimately refer back to ownership. Despite his insistence
that *Dasein* is not a human person, even Heidegger poses the question of Being
as *eigenlichtkeit*, "own-like-ness" or "authenticity," and as *ereigen*, "en-own-
ing" or "the event of appropriation." Levinas argues:

> The relation with Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the
> existent in order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the
> other as such, but the reduction of the other to the same . . . a suppression or
> possession of the other.[37]

Although this possession establishes one's sovereign ownership over otherness,
it also indicates "a certain form of economic life"[38] with an Other, a stranger.
Levinas's analysis of labor combines and generalizes Locke's understanding of
property as integration with Marx's understanding of it as alienation, "an es-
trangement of man from man."[39] Labor relates the world to the self by positing
entities as graspable objects. Because these works are positioned within a social
ensemble of work, they also relate to the possessive grasp of an Other who pre-
sents himself as a Master and property owner. "The inexpressive character of the
product is reflected in its market value, in its suitability for others, in its capabil-
ity to assume the meaning others will give it, to enter into an entirely different
context from that which engendered it."[40] Not just commercial products, but
one's will and one's body are alienated in the instant that they are manifested.
The projects a will initiates are always co-opted by another person. As an owned
body, a *"corps proper,"*[41] one positions oneself as a corporeal being, exposing
one's material self to being bought for gold or being murdered by steel. There-
fore, one's birth into a present moment is experienced as a kind of suicide. One
becomes registered in history through the mortified material products of one's
labor, "the works of dead wills."[42]

As an act of appropriation, property ownership necessarily proceeds from
violence and ultimately from murder. Levinas' discussion of the first ethical
commandment, *You Shall Not Commit Murder*, is sometimes misunderstood to
be simply an ultimate moral prohibition. However, Levinas explains, "this inter-
diction is to be sure not equivalent to pure and simple impossibility, and even
presupposes the possibility which precisely it forbids."[43] Although murder is an
ethical impossibility, it is preeminently an event that occurs within every single
instant of time. The Other is *always* approached and appropriated through a
doubling of his origination and his death: through his production in a work, his
incarnation in a body, and his representation under a concept. At every instant, I

seize the Other through his manifestation, suspending his existence, and grasping him historically through the records of his past. This everyday occurrence can be grasped most clearly on the digital commons where, online, one encounters the preservation of moments from different past identities; the real lives of real people reduced to and articulated as a multiplicity of media.[44]

This murder is enacted at every moment as cannibalism, as consumption of another person's corpse. All of Levinas's analyses of materiality, of need and eating, of the content of elemental *jouissance*, of the goods encountered in a home, and even of hunger and destitution, must be understood in relation to this vampirism, this flesh-eating. Levinas explains, "in satiety the real I sank my teeth into is assimilated, the forces that were in the other become *my* forces, become me."[45] The past of the other, his death, has become retrospectively incorporated into my own present moment of consumption. Therefore, I—as a consumer, through the things I purchase and use—become entangled in a net of works, in networks of responsibility. These responsibilities manifest in consciousness once I understand that the products which result in my enjoyment are ultimately the results of human and environmental degradation and death.

Taking into account the relationship between death and consumable products, one can deduce that the first ethical commandment, *You Shall Not Kill*, results in a corollary: *You Shall Not Steal*. Levinas explicitly recognizes this relationship between ownership and robbery.

> To approach someone from works is to enter into his interiority by burglary; the other is surprised in his intimacy, where, like the personages of history, he is, to be sure, exposed, but does not express himself.[46]

As mentioned above, these ethical impossibilities point to everyday realities: not only does one murder in every moment of consumption, one's ownership of Property is Theft, as the anarchists teach.

Autarchy or Anarchy

Like many anarchist-communists, Levinas understands that the very existence of other persons necessarily casts doubt on my alleged right to individual personal property. "Possession itself refers to more profound metaphysical relations; a thing does not resist acquisition; the other possessors—those whom one can not possess—contest and therefore can sanction possession itself."[47] Whereas Aristotle grounds slave ownership on the subsuming logic of part and whole, post-Enlightenment thought considers each person to be a separate individual, and understands that ownership arises out of the social relation between them. The absolute assertion of one self's individual freedom over the existence of others Levinas terms "autarchy." "Such is the definition of [ontological] freedom: to

maintain oneself against the other, despite every relation with the other and to
ensure the autarchy of an I." Autarchy retrospectively refers entities back to a
self (*auto*) by re-presenting otherness through a theme (*archē*). "Thematization
and conceptualization, which moreover are inseparable, are not peace with the
other but suppression or possession of the other." Subsuming otherness under a
general theme is ultimately war and violence exercised as "the imperialism of
the same" and instituted as "the tyranny of the State."[48]

Just like *anarchy* disrupts the genetic *archē* of history, it also disorders the
dominating *archē of* thematization imposed by an existential state or a political
state or a propositional statement. Levinas remarks, "The I's form no totality;
there exists no privileged plane where these I's could be grasped in their princi-
ple. There is an anarchy essential to multiplicity."[49] Even though I and the Other
posit a common world using social categories, we maintain our independence
through our anarchical enjoyments of the world. Even in our relationships, I
always preserve my separated interiority, and the Other always maintains his
separated exteriority. No matter how revealing we are to each other, we can
never render our experiences entirely transparent to each other. In the words of
collectivist anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, no totality could be "mighty enough and
massive enough to encompass the infinite multiplicity and diversity of substan-
tive interests, aspirations, wishes, and needs."[50] Anarchically, we resist any
common category, any plane of signification that would pretend to encompass
us.

Levinas further explains this anarchy, stating "multiplicity can be produced
only if the individuals retain their secrecy."[51] The importance of this privacy is
illuminated by anarchist Max Stirner's careful distinction between freedom and
individuality. Stirner recognizes that, in any relationship, one will necessarily
have one's freedom limited by the powers of others.

> Even so, were I the autocrat of all the Russians, I could not enjoy absolute free-
> dom. But as far as my individuality, I do not want anyone tampering with it.
> Now it is precisely individuality that society targets and means to subject to its
> powers.[52]

The State attempts to repress the uniqueness of an individual by subsuming his
identity within its dominion. It ultimately does so by restricting the most essen-
tial freedom of the individual: his freedom to make and break associations with
other individuals. An individual not only maintains the indivisible integrity of
his own ego, he also retains the freedom to divide himself from any whole that
would encompass him as a part. Conversely, the State compels one to maintain a
constant relationship with it, denying the sovereign power for separation and
reattachment. "Once an association has crystallized in society, it has ceased to
be an association, since association is an ongoing act of re-association."[53] Like
Stirner, Levinas understands freedom as the capacity to break from bondage. No
matter what commitments one has made in the past, one can betray history in a

new present moment. "Man can regain control and go back on his choice."[54] The ego's individual consciousness allows it to eschew absorption into any totalizing categories and to evade enslavement to any tyrannical state. Just as Levinas refers to this capability to break with participation as "atheism," Stirner explains that "our individuality acknowledges no injunction to 'fidelity' and 'commitment': it permits everything, including apostasy and desertion."[55]

The Italian anarchist Enrique Malatesta explains that the distinction between autarchy and anarchy undergirds the difference between cooperative association and the State. Authoritarian political theory justifies itself with Thomas Hobbes' claim that the State is necessary for preventing wars between selfish and brutal human natures:

> The philosophers of authoritarianism say: if the interests, inclinations, and desires of one individual are at odds with those of another, or even with society as a whole, who will have the right and power to oblige the one to respect the other's interests? Who could prevent the odd individual from violating the general will? As they say, the liberty of each individual is circumscribed by the liberty of the rest. But who establishes these limits, and who sees that they are respected? Natural conflicts of interest and temperament create a need for government, and provide a justification for the sort authority that exerts a moderating influence in the social struggle and defines individual's rights and duties.[56]

Authoritarian political thought imposes two correlated types of domination, first by converting the enlightenment notion of free individuality into pure selfishness; and second by justifying the state as a neutral party that can neutralize all conflict. However, Malatesta points out that the state actually works to enforce the power of propertied classes and to sanction the exploitation of the rest of the populace. Against this domination, Malatesta asserts that "there exists in Man another feeling which draws him closer to his neighbor."[57] Without any coercion from the state, people draw to work in "voluntarily formed associations."[58] That is, man's will, his voluntarism, necessarily refers to an allegiance to other people.

Like Malatesta, Levinas criticizes the Hobbesian model of egotistic subjectivity that justifies the war of all against all. "Being's interest takes dramatic form in egoisms struggling with one another, each against all, in the multiplicity of allergic egoisms which are at war with one another and are thus together."[59] An authoritarian order grows out of this self-interest that "outlines the dimension of baseness itself and the birth of hierarchy"—both genesis and rule—ultimately producing political domination: "[It] is the very egoism of the ego that posits itself as its own origin, as uncreated, sovereign principle, a prince."[60] In contrast, Levinas asserts that the self is created as someone who is radically responsible for the world of creation, anarchically committed to the Other. One's own origin is "preceded by a pure passivity that is responsibility . . . it is my responsibility for the freedom of others."[61] Anarchist Mikhail Bakunin simi-

larly asserts this priority of the Other over my Self "Far from being a limitation or negation of my freedom, the freedom of my neighbor is instead its precondition and confirmation."[62]

University of Nanterre: 1968

In a footnote that has not yet been adequately analyzed, Levinas claims that his own usage of the term anarchy "precedes the political (or antipolitical) meaning popularly ascribed to it."[63] However, this very statement indicates that he was seriously contemplating political (or antipolitical) anarchism while developing his later work. The two texts in which Levinas begins to seriously consider the problem of saying "anarchy" as a term, "Humanism and An-archy" and "Substitution," were written in 1968 when he was teaching at the University of Paris Nanterre. A few months prior to the publication of these two essays, Nanterre was the epicenter of the revolutionary events of May 1968. During this period, group after group was pulled into an anarchy of political responsibility for the suffering of Others. On May 3, eight students were to be expelled from Nanterre for protesting the senseless war that was murdering innocent Vietnamese. Students at University of Paris Sorbonne protested the injustice exercised against these other students at Nanterre. In response to the violence employed against students during a succession of brutal police riots, factory workers declared a general strike that shut down the State of France.

Several of Levinas's essays specifically meditate on the meaning of these events. He understood the 1968 political tumult as a crisis of modernity and bourgeois humanism. For him, the overwhelming problem was the same as the one that confronted Antigone: what should one do about the corpses that still haunt the living; how can one make sense of history after so much mass murder? "The unburied dead in wars and extermination camps . . . render tragic-comic the concern for oneself and illusory the pretension of the rational animal to have a privileged place in the cosmos."[64] Throughout their writings, various radicals similarly denounce the ways that modernity manifests as murder, through the actual slaughter committed against foreign peoples, through the transformation of human existence into commodity, and through the politics practiced by authoritarian leftists. Not only was culture permeated by death, even the possibility of vital revolution seemed doubtful. Many graffiti quoted situationist Raoul Vaneigem's condemnation of the institutional left:

> People who talk about revolution and class struggle without referring explicitly to everyday life, without understanding what is subversive about love and what is positive in the refusal of constraints, such people have corpses in their mouths.[65]

The brutality of institutional revolutionary regimes in Russia and China shocked

many young radicals, and many felt alienated by the authoritarian regimentation of various Marxist parties. Levinas explained

> Today's anxiety is more profound. It comes from the experience of revolutions that sink into bureaucracy and repression, and totalitarian violences that pass as revolutions. *For in them the disalienation is in itself alienated.*[66]

Ultimately, both the bourgeois and the ostensibly revolutionary bureaucracies obstructed the ethical relationship with the other person because they thematized everything according to a universal principle. Levinas observed that the May 1968 protests arose against the ontological conception of humanity in modern society as a substance with qualities, a bearer of roles, and a thing with properties.

> Over and beyond capitalism and exploitation what was contested were their condition: the person understood as an accumulation of being, by merits, titles, professional competence, an ontological tumefaction weighing on others and crushing them, instituting a hierarchized society maintained beyond the necessities of consumption, which no religious breath any longer succeeds in rendering egalitarian.[67]

Even in the very cadence of its voice, this articulation echoes the many graffiti protesting the inhumanity of institutions. "We refuse to be highrised, diplomaed, licensed, inventoried, registered, indoctrinated, suburbanized, sermonized, beaten, telemanipulated, gassed, booked."[68] According to situationists like Guy Debord, this reduction of a human existence was produced by the regime of representation in the society of the spectacle, the product of the capitalism that transforms *being* into *having* and further commodifies *having* into *appearing*. Against this social drama, Levinas asserts in "Humanism and An-archy," "There where I might have remained a spectator, I am responsible."[69] Neither absorbed by egoism nor captivated by the world, the human subject finds itself ethically responsible for the freedom of the Other.

In his reflections on May 1968, Levinas deliberately employs his ethical terminology to describe the revolutionary anarchism of the student revolutionaries. He identifies Youth as the one whose vulnerability makes him responsible for the suffering of the Other. "Youth, which the philosopher loves, is the 'before being,' the 'otherwise than being.'"[70] He explains:

> The youth is the break in a context, the trenchant, Nietzschean prophetic word, without status in being. Yet it is not arbitrary, for it has come from sincerity, that is, from responsibility for the other. This unlimited responsibility is not felt as a state of the soul, but signifies in the oneself of the self, consuming itself, the subjectivity of the subject, as embers covered with ashes—and blazing up into a living torches. The responsibility, a wound smarting with cruelties and evils suffered by others, characterizes our epoch as much as these very cruelties

and evils. Youth consisted in contesting a world long since denounced. . . .
Able to find responsibilities under the thick stratum of literature that undo
them, youth ceased to be the age of transition and passage and is shown to be
man's humanity.[71]

According to Levinas, political radicalism ultimately finds its origin in this anar-
chical responsibility for other people. Revolution does not come from mere
activism, from violent overthrow, or even from self-sacrifice. These are also
qualities admired by fascists—today, by terrorists. Instead, "Revolution must be
defined by its content, by values: revolution takes place when one frees man;
that is, revolution takes place when one tears man away from economic deter-
minism."[72] Accepting responsibility for economic and social injustice is at the
root of radicalism. Levinas identifies the degradation of the worker with the al-
terity of the other, saying "the economic deprivation of the proletarian—to be
sure, his condition as one who is exploited—constitutes this absolute stripping
of the other as other."[73] Alluding to the solidarity between students and workers
during May 1968, Levinas asserts, "To affirm that the working man is not nego-
tiable, that he cannot be bargained about, is to affirm that which begins a
revolution."[74]

The radicals of 1968, and indeed all revolutionaries "who best merit the
name revolutionary,"[75] are characterized by their capacity to substitute ethically
their selves for the suffering of other people. Whenever people stand up to pow-
er, they do so not merely to fight for their own rights or for the politics of their
own identities. Instead, they willingly stand in for the other, declaiming the in-
justice shown unto him. One hears this sentiment all over the world in every
revolutionary statement. For Levinas, the most poignant example of this revolu-
tionary sincerity occurred when the revolutionary masses proclaimed "We are
all German Jews" to protest the government's refusal to allow anarchist Daniel
Cohn-Bendit, the son of two Jews who had narrowly escaped Nazi Germany,
from reentering France because he was not a legal citizen of any country. As an
ethical substitution for the suffering of the foreigner, the stranger, the Other,
revolution is the most profound ethical responsibility of anarchy. As one May
1968 graffito explained, "We must destroy and replace the system when it falls
into a position of weakness, not just for our own sakes but for the future of hu-
manity."[76]

Notes

1.   Emmanuel Levinas, *Basic Philosophical Writings*, ed. Adrian Peperzak, Simon
Critchley and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 80.
2.   Reiner Schürmann, *Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles to
Anarchy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

3.   Aristotle, *Metaphysics,* trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 1013a, pp. 10-15.

4.   Aristotle, *Politics,* trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1944), 1254a, pp. 12-17.

5.   *Ibid.,* 1255b, pp. 7-10.

6.   *Ibid.,* 1259a 36 – b16.

7.   Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes,* trans. H. W. Smyth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), pp. 1035-6 (translation modified).

8.   Sophocles, *Antigone,* trans. David Greene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 673.

9.   Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political,* trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 26.

10.   Sophocles, pp. 182-187.

11.   *Ibid.,* pp. 202-212.

12.   *Ibid.,* pp. 640-644.

13.   Schmitt, p. 27.

14.   *Ibid.,* p. 46.

15.   Sophocles, pp. 640-681.

16.   Aeschylus, pp. 1036-1041

17.   *Ibid.,* pp. 909-913.

18.   Whereas Hegel explicitly refers to Antigone as a figure of filial morality, she may also appear as a hidden character in Levinas' work. Levinas mentions in *Totality and Infinity* that erotic love can be "seek but a connatural being, a sister soul, present itself as incest" (p. 254). Even more suggestively, he states in *Otherwise than Being* "the ego involved in responsibility is me and no one else, me with whom one would have liked to pair up a sister soul, from whom one would require substitution and sacrifice" (p. 126).

19.   Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time,* trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 440:389.

20.   *Ibid.,* p. 436:384.

21.   Because gender is such an important problem in Levinas and throughout philosophy, I will use masculine pronouns to discuss human persons and neuter pronouns for abstractions, but will try not to masquerade this issue by alternating with feminine pronouns.

22.   Emmanuel Levinas, "Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism," trans. Sean Hand, *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1990b), p. 64.

23.   Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity,* trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 228.

24.   *Ibid.,* p. 65.

25.   Emmanuel Levinas, *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,* trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981).

26.   Levinas, 1996, p. 91.

27.   Peter Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread,* ed. Marshall Shatz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 14.

28.   *Ibid.,* p. 15.

29.   Levinas, 1981, p. 99

30.   Levinas, 1990b, p. 65.

31.   John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* (New York: New American Library, 1963), §25-7, p. 327-9.

32. Karl Marx with Frederich Engels, *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1978), p. 79.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 81.

35. Levinas, 1969, p. 141.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

39. Marx, p. 77.

40. Levinas, 1969, p. 227.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 232-233.

44. Perhaps Levinas' phenomenology of conversation can be most clearly observed in an internet chat room, in which one party makes a statement, forever etched in memory, but retains the possibility to respond in ways that cannot be anticipated. A Levinasian critique of technology would require a meditation on The Turing Test, in which artificial intelligence is assessed by whether a computer's responses seem human to its interlocutor. In what way does an Other person's freedom to respond forever transcends the programming of any automated network?

45. Levinas, 1969, p. 129. Alphonso Lingis's strategy of capitalizing "Other" in his translations unfortunately obscures the relationships between the human Other and the elemental Other.

46. Levinas, 1969, pp. 66-67. In *Otherwise Than Being*, Levinas similarly describes responsibility for the Other as something that affects the self anarchically, prior to its own identity "slipping into me like a thief" (pp. 13, 148, 150).

47. *Ibid.*, p. 162.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

50. Daniel Guerin, *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2005), p. 207.

51. Levinas, 1969, p. 120.

52. Guerin, p. 23.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 22.

54. Levinas, 1990b, p. 59.

55. Guerin, p. 28.

56. Errico Malatesta, *Life and Ideas*, ed. Verne Richards (London: Freedom Press, 1965), p. 18.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

59. Levinas, 1981, p. 4.

60. Emmanuel Levinas, *Collected Philosophical Papers*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987a), pp. 137-8.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

62. Guerin, p. 151.

63. Levinas, 1996, p. 180.

64. Levinas similarly notes that the Talmud unconditionally requires the burial of unattended corpse, calling it the "mercy of truth" (1989, 248).

65. Raoul Vaneigem, *Revolution of Everyday Life*, trans. Daniel Nicholson-Smith (London: Rebel Press, 1994), p. 26.

66. Levinas, 1987a, p. 143.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

68. Kenneth Knabb, ed., *Situationist International Anthology* (Chicago: Bureau of Public Secrets, 2006); http://www.bopsecrets.org/CF/graffiti.htm (accessed April 7, 2006).

69. Levinas, 1987a, p. 136.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 151.

72. Emmanuel Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, trans. Annette Aronowicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990a), p. 102.

73. Emmanuel Levinas, *The Levinas Reader*, ed. Sean Hand (London: Blackwell, 1989), p. 243.

74. Levinas, 1990a, p. 102.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

76. Knabb, 2006.

5

The Double Paradigm of Power

Salvo Vaccaro

Translated by Samantha E. Bankston

Power, as everyone knows, is a filthy animal that escapes the immediate grasp, and tends to be represented in a univocal manner. The metaphysical question *par excellence,* at the heart of western civilization, questions its structure while linking it to its own essence—What is power?—which at once demarcates the perimeter of truth, enchaining it to its existence: in fact the question is only possible for that which is, not for that which is not (nihilism), and things as they are given exist according to their particular essence, thus temporally immutable and not deniable for their effects of truth. If things are in essence, they are true: in this way, and this way only, there is nothing to be done![1]

Tracing the linguistic sign to the interior of this structure of western civilization reinforces the primacy of essence as the real sense of things in their existentiality with the subsequent question—who has (the) power?—which in this case demarcates the proprietary subjectivation just as well as the substantial objectivity of power itself. By this last question, in fact, power is given to a linguistic level as the property of a thing, as property of an owner, as a substance to be appropriated externally, which is to say from a sphere that is exterior to power itself, as if it is a stake to be claimed and used according to certain interests, tastes, passions, desires, wills, etc. We thus seek the double axis of signification from a classical theory of power to be articulated; on one hand, through the dimension of sovereignty as the (legitimate) subject of power, of which we will have the opportunity in the future to specifically analyze the structures and forces, the fields and tensions; and on the other hand, through the very verticality of the hierarchical command in and by which we mimic the subjective gesture of the object's grasp.

The Head of the Sovereign

The theories of sovereignty position the task of enthroning a legitimate subject in the exercise of public power. This instance of legitimacy reveals a secular dislocation that is at the origin of the reason itself for seeking a justification of power. Inside a theological and divine framework, in fact, we neither search for a reason, nor the emergence of a world subject, if not also if not also carrying out the Other's will ("By the grace of God . . . ," to which only after the ninteenth century—with the constitutional monarchy—we added, " . . . and by the will of the nation"). This dislocation plays itself out in the passage of the *potestas a deo* in the concept of *authoritas*, where one lives in just as silent a powerful form, either in the former roots of "first creation" that interlaces author and authority (Benveniste), or the authoritarian genesis of representation that characterizes bourgeois rationality in classical political philosophy. Power was previously derived directly from the *divine potestas*, by which God's representative on earth claimed to crown the sovereigns, and thus ultimately to control their legitimacy and their fidelity in the exercise of power. Then with the secular sliding, which is inaugurated in the co-existence of two opposing directions, the one who exercises power is authorized in this exercising *de facto* to rise *de jure* as the sovereign originator of becoming-social in its proto(institutional) dimension. That which is identified by a logical aporia—the transitive nexus between being and duty-being—is brilliantly resolved by combining the force of arms with the realistic force of right, which in a powerfully auto-referential way guarantees legitimacy at the exact moment that one seems to stop the dialectic between war and politics. In the exchange between freedom and security the foundation of the state legitimates the Leviathan, as well as the political sovereignty that is born from the fictitious end of *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Thus from the establishment of politics as the publicization of the social game, it is the public authority that gives the rules of the social game, invading every sphere with the paradigm of power.

The process of secularizing the political authority led to the face of sovereignty being carried over as its point of origin: every problem of legitimacy is a reflection of this. But two elements denounce how this process constitutes a metamorphosis of the sacred in reality, by remapping power and its sovereign as inviolable forms at the cost of death ("the double body of the king," according to Kantorowicz), just as doubting God's existence and his/her representation on earth led to heresy and even being put to death. Where is this fact of theological renewal in politics more visible? In the abyssal verticality in the hierarchical commandment of the world, which precisely mimics the opening of space from top to bottom which was inaugurated by the expulsion of Adam and Eve from earthly paradise after having defied *Jahvé's* unwarranted order—the pleasure of

the fruits of knowledge signify an attack against the unreason of the authority of power—which is auto-exempted from criticism by force of vengeance: symbolically, it is the *fall* from the top of Eden to the bottom of the world.

From this interpretation, the hierarchical command marks a *descending* vertical linearity of power, in accordance with a forbidding view that is recovered from paternalism as the mythic origin of power itself which guides and orients within the wanderings of chaos and perdition. The metaphor of the upright path thus reinforces the vision of power as an external substance, which is looked out for and around which one comports oneself with deference and obedience. Here we arrived at a pastoral conception of the hierarchical command that, from Plato to Hobbes, renews the tie that binds antiquity to modernity without a resolution of continuity, at least from this perspective. In this conception power shows itself in its double quality as an assured guide for life that, on the one hand, stylizes rules for the herd in terms of its survival from external perils; on the other hand, and at the same time, devastation is attentively given to each member of the herd so s/he can develop her/himself well, either for her/himself, or in relation to the organic totality of the herd. The good pastor nevertheless serves as the sovereign and disciplinary figure, authoritarian and paternal, by demanding obedience and providing care.[2] From here the double analytic constellation of power, macro-physical and micro-physical, echoes a double paradigm of which it seems more useful to grasp the assonant elements, rather than the more dissonant elements.[3]

Within the joint of deterritorialization and reterritorialization where the secular *dérive*[4] is realized with a mimetic effect of theology which is apparently just deposed, we cast a net for clear critique, which brings to light the exact point where the metamorphosis veils the sign of power's inexorable necessity, no matter what historical form of sovereignty it had. All of the weight of the critique is deployed in the individuation of the support for legitimacy, by installing the subjectivity of power in its sovereign dimension of the public institution. The enlightenment always keeps a substantial and external conception in mind, which produces three paths as a result where each synthesis of power is contained (liberalism), distributed (socialism), or else abolished (anarchism). The transcendent moments, of which only anarchism shows radicality and ultimate coherence, all frame power as an external substance originating from another world that is necessary to control, reduce, vanquish or completely overcome. Rather than an etiology that is in all senses abundant and redundant, the enlightenment provides some diversified treatments which are tactically neighborly, strategically exclusive (despite the interlaced connections), but that evade certain test cases that are resistant to the therapeutic analysis of freedom, which is interpreted as a healing release from an external infectiousness.

What the enlightenment fails to see are the enigmas of power: the necessary obedience or voluntary servitude, the sense of eternal debt, the lacing of power dynamics in the interior of the very fabric of social relations (and not only in the

instituted dimension of public politics, namely the State and *politics*), the profound dive into human interiority, the obscurity Freud opens up while denouncing its decipherability at the level of the light of reason. This is not the case if, among the three paths of the enlightenment, they succeeded in finding an appropriate path for only those that keep power in some way, contained or distributed (abstraction made by historical regimes that gave them form, often by translating them in a misrepresented manner, as it comes with the best intentions, besides not always existing, but on the contrary dissimulated under very chic formulations). It's at this point where anarchism is also the same offspring of the enlightenment and suffers eternal defeat because, finally, until today failed at the heart of its proposition, namely the abolition of political power. This would be interesting to discover if the reasons are uniquely historical, or, as I suppose, also partially theoretical.

Micrology of Power

The immense strategic detour that Foucault takes from the analysis of power departs precisely from this failure (even if we do not find any declaration that belongs theoretically to anarchist thought), with the addition of postmodern reflection, which takes into account the skeptical suspicion, systematically practiced by Nietzsche and Freud, of the possibility to hold a strict split between exteriority and interiority in the human sphere which rests on the substantial conception of power.[5] Contrary to the modernity of Decartes, in Foucault the strong connection between body and soul respectively surfaces from the inscription of power and the source of auto-discipline and obedience. It begins to pursue the complex framework of indiscernibility between exterior dimensionality and interior dimensionality, the one unfolds from the other, says Deleuze, by exposing the relational connection of force as will to power which becomes instituted power, on the one hand, but on the other hand, as the singular capacity of becoming-historic while tying and untying the social bonds within the contingency of events, without having them assume the form of relations of domination.

In fact, the relational conception of power in Foucault is in part the performance of a fractal reading of the birth of power in an institutional framework, which can only be held onto if it is hatched at its interior by relations of force; in which the displacement between contingency and institutionalization signifies the play of power itself. This is, to paraphrase Marcel Mauss, an infrasocial global relation, meaning a bundle of relations that are extricated in the spheres of society where words and things, signs and bodies, ideologies and strategies, rhetoric and violence, argumentation and brutality, conviction and propagandist persuasion converge in a conflicting way in both material practice and discur-

sive practice. In order to bend the other to its will, the whole acts in accordance with the dictates of the Other.

Displacing attitudes of power in the dimension of interiority signifies the directing of a capable gaze to follow the analytical cadences of becoming-power, from its birth which is bound to human spirituality—otherwise legible according to a perspective of anthropological aggression that accounts for half of human behavior—until its causal link with a collection of social practices that are not all reducible to the interest of survival, to which power is also bound (Canetti). Step by step, in his analytical narrations, Foucault follows the intertwining interests, discourses, strategies, and events that are given in the positive and the negative (namely, that which does not reach history); with all the responsibility of human experience, with all the contingent importance, and with all the necessary moments of what happens, as well as what could happen otherwise. Precisely because nothing outlaws an alternative way of thinking which opens up space for stylizations of different forms of life; a more or less anomalous space that is graduated in regard to the standard of normality (and in Foucault normality is not dissociated from the normativity of public power, nor from the institutional thought that normalizes and marginalizes through exclusive inclusion).

Power does not exist because it comes from outside by an act of *imperium*, but rather, it rises from inside in the transformation of a force of human capacity—which is equalized in human reciprocity and is thus arranged in a fluid horizontality of individual relations in their pure determination—in a symbolic-material mechanism that converts contingency into historical "necessity," by crystallizing relations among forces linked through domination. In the

> paradox (of relations) of capacity and power, . . . the acquisition of capacities and the struggle for freedom constituted permanent elements. Now the relationships between beliefs of capacities and belief of autonomy are not as simple as the eighteenth century would have believed . . . thus the stake is: how to disconnect belief of capacities from the intensification of power relations?[6]

Foucault only seems to refer to the notion of capacity associated with *techne*, the hyperpower of which outclassed the search for autonomy and the liberation of nature; even if the originary vice resided precisely in the Baconian locution that identified power with knowledge. But what seems more interesting is the aim to disconnect capacity from power relations, the intensification of which folds capacity by subordinating its potential to the demands of power.

It's this vertical irreversibility that not only explains the descending hierarchization, but also the one ascending which unnerves power all the way to the interior of the individual. It subjugates her in order to make the type of each and all coincide with the affairs of conflict among the demands of power that tend toward the acquisition of public supremacy:

It's here where it is necessary to introduce the notion of domination. The analy-ses that I try to do essentially bear on power relations. By that I mean something different from the states of domination. Power relations have an ex-tremely large extension in human relationships. But that does not mean that political power is everywhere, but that, in human relationships there is a ray of power relations shining everywhere, which can exert itself between individuals, within a family, in a pedagogical relationship, in the political body. This analy-sis of power relations constitutes an extremely complex field; it sometimes encounters what one can call the facts, or states of domination, in which power relations, instead of being mobile and permitting different agents to modify them, find themselves blocked and paralyzed.[7]

The distance between power and domination—which is necessary to maximally enlarge according to Foucault—falls under the emblem of the space-time of the mobility of actors' positions in a fixed field because they, and only them, suc-ceed in drawing a perimeter thanks to their acting (intentioned at least). In regard to a state of domination, freedom, as the movement of subtraction from the cadaverous rigidity of domination, allows a line of flight, which offers no guarantees for the non-return of the same. Ethics in Foucault thus becomes a stylization of existence, of conduct, of an attitude illuminated by the light of freedom as the counterweight to the crystallizing force of power relations in states of domination. Freedom thus takes function from an ethical tension, and for that is pragmatic and non-prescriptive, which not only preserves the risk of irreversibility in the relations between individuals by institutionalizing social roles and by specifically giving them a surplus of protected authority, but also preserves the risk that the dynamic space drawn between individuals in games of power fall back under the sphere of influence and hegemony of the state of do-mination. Meanwhile, the practices of freedom take charge of enlarging this space and keep it flexible and impermeable to any penetration that ex-terminates its dynamicity. "Freedom opens a field for new relations of power, which is a matter of controlling by practices of freedom."[8]

Power Games

Among other objections, Foucault was reproached because his relational concept of power, conceived so deeply in respect to the very constitution of human be-ings, no longer acknowledges the inexorability of staying within the closed perimeter of power as the existential drive. Its omnipresent and omni-inclusive ubiquity might not leave any space, be it an alternative that breaks the circularity between discursive practices and material practices, or a reason from outside that pushes to avoid submitting itself to power by escaping its seduction. We do not understand how it is possible to think *against* or *without* power, if Foucault

rejects the idea of a normative pressure within thought that motivates auto-support in favor of a different vision of becoming-social, in the manner of ethical obligation or a moral imperative.[9]

It's hence impossible for us moderns to exit. It's the circle of capacities that each one of us possesses in order to encounter the real, namely to be able to make history, to be able to direct our own becoming, without it overflowing into an omnipotent delirium, because it is always—as Foucault attentively noted—contextualized in a contributory framework by the field of forces which are drawn by the singular capacities of power. The fact that each human relation is a relation of power situated within a mechanism where material practices and discursive practices (languages, ideologies, myths, symbolisms, and imageries) converge does not show an anthropological ubiquity of power from which an escape would result in nonsense. This does not occur because the birth of human power is linked to order and pragmatic contingency, and not to fateful necessity or the political iron cage. Additionally, as G. Deleuze highlights, "It's that the relation of power does not have a form itself, and puts unformed matter (receptivity) and non-formalized functions (spontaneity) into contact."[10]

The making and unmaking of mechanisms of power designates a horizontal and multifarious fluidity that does not represent a particular danger. And due to a specific mechanism which blocks power relations by organizing stability with a name (and not by chance, *state*), this fluidity begins to impose itself at the level of practices resulting in a conflict between field and forces. Reversibility breaks in a hierarchical verticalization, in its ascending and descending aspects, according to the double interpretation of the paradigms of power (sovereignty and discipline, respectively); it just adopts the normative function, which in the critiques of Foucault, would legitimate an alternative choice. But this normative function would lay it out on the same plane of coercion, by perpetuating a stifling logic of the same in order to remove by coercion: the normative criterion would introduce a necessary condition (even for differentiated orders: sometimes formal-logical, sometimes linguistic, sometimes theocratic-religious, sometimes moral, sometimes biopolitical) which Foucault wants to eliminate by laying down a plane for conflict dispersion that does not move in the direction of a definitive closure (time after time), but rather toward a pluralist opening that does not erect hierarchizations.

> I believe that there cannot be a society without relations of power, if we understand them as strategies by which individuals try to behave, and to determine the behavior of others. Thus the problem is not to try to dissolve them into a utopia of perfectly transparent communication, but to provide rules of right, management techniques and also moral techniques, *ethos*, practices of the self, that will allow, in these power games, play with the minimum possible amount of domination.[11]

While the attack is leveled at J. Habermas' theory of communicative action, in this passage Foucault reaches toward the furthest extremity from the anarchist wavelength, by welcoming practices that would confine domination to a minimal space so as to not block the fluidity of power games, along with those which also introduce elements of institutionalization in mobile power relations, such as right and management. It's difficult to understand how we could play with the minimal possible domination along this trajectory.

The ethical-aesthetic care approached by Foucault in the last moments of his life, evokes a more plausible idea of *sublimity* of the *many de jure* (as well as *de facto*) where the model for sensibility of taste works well in representing preference options that are not universally coercive for anyone, but in any case, opens up a space of affirmation with and against other options. The rest is a question of taste. The idea of Foucault seems to come close to a conception of collective freedom, therefore public, that is not framed by a given sovereignty, but within the limits of a strict asceticism, namely, detached from monastic rules. In any case, however, this conception of freedom is habituated to practicing a care of the self as an exercise of one's own existential stylization in the domain that is opened by conflicts in play of encounter-combat that arise between different practices of self. But these do not find a political authority in a closed space that is characterized by oppositional stress, like a kind of exceptional decision-maker who suspends the infinite and interminable play of conflict, to paraphrase Freud, just as in the interior of the aesthetic domain there is not any authority that can determine, for example, the superiority of Manet over Magritte—while contrasting the free play of tastes—but even the differences of style or artistic-cultural context, which are equally accessible to all and any who may play. That of course supposes a rupture of *unity* (at the interior of the political and social theory, and even before, at the interior of the identifying thought of the *one* which even submits pluralism, which is tied to the level of hegemonic signification that begins it); however, Foucault does not approach it.[12] But here, to conclude, I am looking for support by digging up a few references to anarchist thought from outside sources, of course, as well as from Adorno and Deleuze.

Beyond Foucault

From this last point, what is pertinent is whether he seems to be a philosopher of becoming who disjoints names and things from their essential gravity: The destruction enacted by thought is reverberated in the naming of processes and not the gritty substances that should represent the originary core of western metaphysics. In Deleuze's opinion, on the contrary, immanence of the real is played out at the intersections of planes, which no longer reflect some anterior ground of conflict itself, from where it becomes possible to be removed from the subju-

gating grasp while jumping from the edges of planes and, by a break, being placed into the flux of becoming. That breaks identity and unity of being, either as body-brain, of which the synapses are constantly sped up in the same way that our cells are renewed at each moment; or as the real, of which stability is a special effect of a becoming that is always in a process of transformation that takes on nomadic mobility—namely a-directional and an-archic—as a surface element under which neither ground nor substance exists.

Adorno tried to take the idea of a shapeless form of thought that does not rejoice to its ultimate conclusion; at the interior of its own reproductive core is the matrix of domination at hand in society. The interruption of dialectical reflection supposes the primacy of the negative as the drive within a thought which to some degree blocks its own power an instant before it penetrates—rather than caresses—the real which it touches. Brushing up tangentially—instead of capturing it by seizure (we note the narrow affinity between *Be-greifen* and *Begriff* in German)—against the things and individuals with which thought engages the world, signifies a drawing from aesthetic thought, which is always at hand, even at the end of the Adornian task. These sensibilities are available so that each can construct his/her own life practice, by attempting it without exaggerations in respect to care of the self and the other. With this intention in Adorno, the refinement of the senses—a view that is not blinded by the undistorted touch, by the attentive and patient listening—gives an antidote to the dialectic of rationality which softens the elements of violent force within, which generally become carried away in politics. An un-political aesthetic, thus, constitutes a point of contact between the theoretical critique of Adorno and the post-structuralism of Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard (by using an omni-inclusive *etiquette* ...).

From the anarchist point of view, at last, it would be indicated in refining an intuition that is connected to the a-centered instant of becoming-social, where the levels of singular and plural autonomy are combined in a federalist model that constantly renews, if the opportunity arises, the intertwined and untied connections in complete freedom. This is accomplished on one hand, by qualifying conflict without a final solution, but even by constantly opening it up to infinite distribution of the organizational module of society; and on the other hand by dispersing the political power until neutralizing its authoritarian weight within the universally normative function, without however losing the debt of connection which is so freely chosen and renewed. Now, it's a matter of not only thinking about the rupture of political unity, namely the state, but also the possibility of life in a fluid and dispersed social space, where the pluralist assemblages (relative to the sphere of affections, passions, life, work, leisure, knowledge, etc.) are formed and un-formed at will, by projecting a specific mobile figure into the social field each time, which can be shaped from given limits by voluntary assemblages, of which stability is given each moment that they are lived, even without any institutional apparatus. Anarchism known as postmodern, thus, will have to think in terms of a porous (spongelike?) society as the

complement of the dispersion of power in the interstices of social relations, in order to prevent the creation of a fixed condensation by which becoming-social is represented as an instituted form, namely the state or that which would be the political unity of the space-time of a communal existence.

In conclusion, to think the absence of power does not mean alluding to an absolute and paranoiac emptiness wherein nostalgic thoughts of being a full self fall, often because the absence is filled, although the liberating emptying of a mind and body is caught again in a complex of prejudices, mental and compart-mental expenses, inducted in turn by a specific organization of thought and society, which we can resume with the word of the state (on this side of the re-gime form that takes world-thought in a stranglehold in history, at every age). To this end, the philosophical diagram that Foucault left us, even at the level that is closer to political theory, is revealed to be ethical-aesthetic, in terms of free-dom for each and all to stylize her own existence at will by combining it with the interior of the given form-of-life, from a coercive grammar of which it must remove in order to put back the indefinite, infinite narration which defines each and every one of us at the same time as protagonists and extras, authors and readers. The multiplicity of roles would change the grammatical rules all the way to their disappearance as hegemonic forces, in order to find, on the con-trary, the antidote of reciprocity so as to not dominate one another, while holding ourselves as the ruling measure, by never closing the infinite narration and by pre-trusting a framework, which the rest is only available to a univocal and unilateral writing such as only the metamorphosis of theology in politics of immoderate force claimed to do.

Notes

1.   See M. Foucault, "Structuralism and Poststructuralism," in *Dits et écrits*, ed. D. Defert & François Ewald (Paris: Gallimard, 1994) IV, p. 449.

2.   P. Sloterkjik, *In the Same Boat* (Paris: Rivages Paris, 1997); original edition *Im Selben Boot*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993); M. Foucault, "Omnes et singulatim: Towards a Critique of Political Reason," in *Dits et écrits*. IV, pp. 134-161.

3.   S. Vaccaro, *Biopolitics and Discipline* (Milano: Mimesis, 2005), chapter 1.

4.   "Dérive" is a philosophical concept in French that means an aimless walk with-out preconceptions.

5.   M. Foucault, "Insanity, the absence of work," in *Dits et écrits*, I, p. 412-420; "Thinking Outside," pp. 518-539; "Response to Derrida," II, p. 281-295; "The Extension of the Social Norm," III, pp. 74-79; "Governmentality," pp. 635-657.

6.   M. Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?" in *ibid.*, IV, pp. 575-6.

7.   M. Foucault, "The Ethics of Care of the Self as a Practice of Freedom," in *ibid.*, pp. 710-11.

8.   *Ibid.*, p. 711.

9.   J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988); N. Fraser, *Unruly Practices* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). A few responses to these objections can be found in my *Postface* (Bari: Dedaldo, 2002).

10.   G. Deleuze, *Foucault* (Paris: Minuit, 1986), p. 84.

11.   M. Foucault, "The Ethics of Care," p. 727.

12.   M. Foucault, "Theatrum Philosophicum," in *Dits et écrits*, II, pp. 75-99. "The categories . . . repress the anarchic difference. . . . It's necessary to invent an a-categorical thought . . .where being thinks, in the same way, of all differences, but does not think differences . . . being is not the unity that guides and distributes them, but their repetitions as differences" (p. 91). There is no room here to discuss the magnificent essay about Deleuze.

Part 2: Anarchism and Political Science

6

Vanguards and Paternalism

Benjamin Franks

Paternalism has long been a contentious subject in moral and political philosophy.[1] Analyses, however, have tended to be restricted to questions concerning the legitimacy of governmental, or quasi-governmental, paternalistic action. The debate, thus, is largely limited to a contest between two positions: that of modern liberalism, with its justifications of certain types of political paternalism, as against classical liberalism's strident objections. The contribution of political philosophies from outside of the liberal tradition has largely been disregarded in the academic literature. Outside of academia, however, radical activists have raised the issue of paternalism, and it is often invoked in their critical assessments of "vanguard" actions.

The vanguard is a particular group with claims to either superior knowledge or more fortunate location in the political terrain, and which can take strategic priority and win battles for others (and often speaks *on behalf of* the client group). Such a view is associated with orthodox Marxism (henceforth referred to as Leninism),[2] and has been widely condemned by past and current anarchists, indeed repudiation of strategies based on vanguards is considered as central to the "anti-representationalism" of anarchist and related new radical movements.[3] This is exemplified in the oft-cited remark of the Zapatistas' pseudonymous spokesperson, subcomandante Marcos, that he "shit[s] on all the revolutionary vanguards of this planet."[4]

The repudiation of vanguards often goes hand-in-hand with a rejection of paternalism. The vanguard claims to act in the interests of the oppressed, and

often does so without the consent of the oppressed.[5] Debates on paternalism, even within militant circles have, however, tended to base their criticisms of paternalism on the same classical liberalism principles, thereby reproducing, as David Graeber notes, the social hierarchies associated with economic liberalism.[6] As such many anarchist theorists have failed to transcend the *impasse* of liberalism, identified by Alasdair MacIntyre, namely the conflict between non-interference and the necessity to intervene in order to promote, extend or defend sovereignty.[7] An alternative to the paternalism of Leninism and the liberal deontological approaches of the classical liberals (and endorsed by some anarchists in some of their rejections of vanguards) is posited, based on an anarchist variant of MacIntyre's virtue ethics.

This chapter will attempt four tasks: First, to clarify the concepts of anarchism and paternalism; second, to demonstrate how anarchists have used the concept of paternalism in critiques of vanguard practices; third, to illustrate weaknesses in the some of the shortcomings of some anarchist responses which overly rely on deontological arguments; and finally, to illustrate the advantages of an alternative practice-based anarchism (practical anarchism).[8]

Anarchism

It is a standard complaint that "anarchism" is ill-defined. Indeed, many texts on the subject start by providing distinctive interpretations,[9] a complication further enhanced by different methodological approaches to the subject, each producing their own distinctive nuances. Whilst sociologists like James Bowen, John Carter, Graham Chesters, Karen Goaman, Jonathan Purkis and Ian Welsh look at the institutions, organizations and social practices of contemporary groupings to develop an interpretation of anarchism,[10] Anglo-American philosophers, as Michael Freeden points out, tend to adopt techniques of defining movements in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, and concentrating on argument analysis[11] of largely canonical texts. Political philosophy, according to Freeden, because of its thrall to the analytical tradition, and its belief in a universal form of reason, has tended to be biased in favor of liberalism.[12] This predisposition has lead to largely liberal interpretations of anarchism dominating philosophy, as against sociology's more radical constructions.

The account of anarchism in this paper (referred to as "practical anarchism"), therefore, is unlike that found in most philosophical accounts. Contemporary philosophers, with a few exceptions,[13] tend to regard anarchism in three ways, each of which is rejected here. The first interpretation of "anarchism" employs the populist stereotype of random, irrational violence,[14] what might be referred to as "anarchy," but which is actually its opposite, rule by the strongest with social rules that reflect this power-relationship. The second version would be to view it as a form of consequentialism, taking its lead from

proto-utilitarian William Godwin[15] or Sergei Nechayev.[16] The third, however, is the most frequent in academic literature: that is, to view anarchism as a deonto-logical theory.[17] Anarchism in the setting of Anglo-American philosophy tends to be regarded as a subset of Kantian, rights-centered theory, with the key texts being Robert Paul Wolff's *In Defense of Anarchism*[18] and Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia*.[19] The myriad of articles that followed Nozick and Wolff, whether critical or supportive of philosophical anarchism, acted to confirm this individualist interpretation of "anarchism." These texts framed the central question of "anarchism" to be whether autonomous agents were obligated to obey the state.[20] They presumed just a simple cast of characters in all moral and social issues—the state and the liberal, rational subject, thereby omitting the range of alternative subjectivities and broader nexuses of social practices.

Historically, the more popular version of anarchism[21] shares more in common with the sociological than mainstream philosophical accounts. Whilst both the social (sociological) and individualist (philosophical) versions of anarchism share one core feature, a rejection of the state, this is insufficient to assume an identity between them. Whilst individualists view individual enforceable market contracts as the paradigm for all interaction, social anarchism regards contractual relationships as hierarchical and coercive. Liberal contracts are viewed as hierarchical because they give greater power to those with larger wealth and tend to exacerbate economic inequalities. They are considered coercive for two reasons. The first is that capitalism relies on coercion. Capitalism needs labor in order to create surplus value, it therefore forces workers to sell their labor to survive. Proletarians have no choice but to sell their labor, as commonly held sources of goods have been enclosed or privatised.[22] Second, because liberal-ism's contractual relationships require enforcement, they therefore depend upon apparatuses of compulsion to ensure obligations are met.[23]

Practical anarchism, as opposed to the individualist, philosophical variants, opposes hierarchies of economic and political power, whether in the form of class domination or state control. Amongst the few characteristics it shares with Wolff's philosophical anarchism is a rejection of the state, even the democratic state. However practical anarchism differs from individualism in numerous ways, not least the account of moral agency. The agents of change in practical anarchism are not the universal, abstract individuals of negative rights-based individualist anarchism. In deontology the moral agent is the "sovereign rational being," one removed from their social context and asserting their universal, neg-ative rights. In social or class struggle anarchism, it is a historically and socially contextual subject, one formed by—but capable of resisting—oppressive social structures.

Another distinguishing characteristic, one which also has a long history within practical anarchism and which demarcates it from deontological anar-chism (and also Leninist consequentialism) is a commitment to prefiguration. In attempting to bring about anti-hierarchical social relations, the methods used

must reflect, as far as possible, the desired goals. An illustration comes from James Guillaume, a colleague of Bakunin, who criticized his orthodox Marxist colleagues within the wider socialist movement for the divergence between their intended egalitarian goals and hierarchical methods: "How could one want an equalitarian and free society to issue from authoritarian organisation? It is impossible."[24] Similarly, the historian Paul Avrich makes use of the distinction between prefigurative tactics and consequentialism when distinguishing between the methods of Kropotkin and the terrorist tactics of the revolutionary Nechayev[25] (another of Bakunin's colleagues). For Avrich, the methods of the first were consistent and preferable as Kropotkin's anarchist-communism maintained that the ends and means were inseparable while the latter prioritised objectives exclusively.[26] The commitment to consequentialism led Nechayev's biographer to conclude that his subject was a precursor to Leninism rather than anarchism.[27]

As unequal relationships of power can never be wholly eradicated, as Alan Carter identifies,[28] thus anarchism is an ongoing process. Thus, anarchists tend to advocate methods that are consistent with their goals, a process referred to as "prefiguration," as the tactics used are supposed to encapsulate the values desired in their preferred goals.[29] As discussed below, this prefigurative characteristic of creating and maintaining fulfilling, social practices that are cooperative, non-hierarchical and generate or perpetuate similar activity, is one of the characteristics which distinguish anarchism as having a distinctive political ethic. These characteristics of seeking the minimization (or elimination where possible) of hierarchical structures and using prefigurative tactics, with context-specific oppressed subjects as the moral agency, have been recognized in the wider historical anarchist movements from the turn of the previous century by Quail,[30] in groups from the period of the New Left[31] as well as more contemporary organizations.[32]

The commitment to prefiguration is the framing strategy for tactics that avoid reproducing economic or political hierarchies, or generating new, detrimental power relations. This corresponds with the position advanced by contemporary anarchists, some of whom use the label "postanarchist." Theorists such as Jason Adams, Lewis Call, Richard Day, Todd May and Saul Newman, adopt the term "postanarchist" or "postmodern anarchist" or "poststructuralist anarchist" in reference to both their commitment to core anarchist anti-hierarchical principles and their advocacy of theoretical techniques from post-structuralist writers such as Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Felix Guattari, Jacques Lacan and Jean Lyotard.[33] It is not my intention here to debate whether postanarchisms represent a break with anarchism; this is a dispute covered in much detail elsewhere.[34] For the purposes of this paper, the many core features of postanarchism are held to be congruent with practical anarchism, although like some social anarchists, certain postanarchists slip into a classical liberal defense of their practices.

Postanarchists share the poststructuralist critiques of essentialisms and skepticism of claims to a universal rationality; thus, they reject deontological

versions of anarchism. It is more consistent to regard anarchism as a virtue theory embodied in social practices as described by MacIntyre in *After Virtue* than a deontological (or consequentialist) political ethic. The prefigurative characteristic of creating and maintaining non-/anti-hierarchical social practices is one of the features which distinguishes anarchism from deontology and strict consequentialism, and makes it more consistent with virtue ethics.

Virtues, as MacIntyre explains, are the internal goods[35] of intersecting social practices,[36] which have their own specific contexts.[37] Like prefigurative action, they immanently generate the desired for goods, rather than relying on external, consequential benefits for their value.[38] Like the context-specific (local or micropolitical) character of anarchist tactics, MacIntyre's virtues are tied to particular arenas of action. These practices have specific types of agents involved in them, rather than the universal agent of deontology (the rational, sovereign subject) or utilitarianism (the calculating, rational social being).[39] Thus virtues share practical anarchism's account of the fluidity of the moral agent. In addition, virtuous practices also require institutions (human initiative, norms and material resources) in order to develop. The combination and development of these practices creates traditions.[40] Traditions are not fixed but adaptable. As agents are socialized into a tradition, they appreciate the norms that identify and develop immanent goods. Once socialized into a practice, agents develop competencies that challenge these underlying norms.[41]

Practical anarchism is committed to practices that embody, as far as possible, anti-hierarchical social relations in both the goals and methods. However, this affinity to prefigurative practices raises particular problems for traditional revolutionary politics. The Leninist tradition, is based on a single strategic battle, namely that of capital versus labor. For Leninism specific sites of conflict take priority, in particular the point of production. This key arena of conflict has a specific type of agent (the proletariat) and they require a specific form of political organization, the revolutionary party, structured to hasten success in this economic battle. This particular group, at the point of production are engaged in the critical "millennial" battle, when victorious their success paves the way for resolution of the problems for all the oppressed. This is the politics of the vanguard, and as such is regarded as paternalistic and incompatible with the prefigurative ethic of anarchism.

Paternalism

The ethicist Gerald Dworkin explains that for an act to be considered "paternalist" a good outcome has to be achieved for the benefit of the paternalized at the expense of their autonomy.[42] It thus differs from other types of (occasionally) justifiable coercive action. Usually, the defenses of compulsion are addressed in terms of defending the rights of third parties or ensuring the distribution of harm

is not persistently concentrated onto minorities,[43] whilst justifications of paternalism refer specifically to the benefits to the paternalized themselves. In popular discourse, "paternalism" often undergoes a gender transformation and becomes "the nanny state" or just "nannying."

The rejection of paternalism developed at the same time as liberalism. John Locke's liberal theory was a reaction to Robert Filmer's justification for a conservative absolutist state acting as a father (*pater*) to his subjects.[44] Liberal's have rejected paternalism on two interrelated grounds. First, that as part of the general Enlightenment skepticism that there is a single general account of the "good" or ultimate end (*telos*) which can defend a paternalistic act.[45] Second, that there is no higher duty than to respect the sovereign rights of the autonomous individual. As a result all goal-driven approaches are viewed as diminishing sovereignty and being precursors to tyranny.[46] This theoretical approach has, as David Harvey explains, been the ethical justification for the neoliberal political thinking that now dominates decision-making.[47]

Paternalism is usually defended on three main grounds: First, that there are ultimate goals more important than individual liberty, such as protecting moral character, a position associated with, but is not exclusive to, (neo-) conservatism.[48] The second is that paternalism is justified when it enhances general utility.[49] The third, a liberal defense, is that the intervention is necessary to protect or enhance individual sovereignty.[50] Whilst the first two rely on a *telos*, and are thus incompatible with liberalism, the third defense raises an irresolvable problem.[51] If interventions to protect future sovereignty are acceptable then there seems little difference between liberal paternalism and standard consequentialism, as a case can always be made that an infringement will ultimately extend sovereignty at some (distant) point in the future. However, if protection of sovereignty is not the ultimate goal, then the fundamental basis of liberalism is undermined.[52] However, these interminable debates ignore an important feature of paternalism, namely such action is only possible, where the paternalised are, in some significant way, less powerful than the paternalist.

Paternalism does not require explicit coercion. Moral agents' consent can be managed without force or threat by the manipulation of information or social frames that structure a subject's reality. As a result a "choice," which is believed to be autonomous, is actually the product of active manipulation or less consciously restricted by the previous decisions of others. Dominant social institutions can influence public discourse such that general populations accept the existing order as beneficial or natural and thus do not need to be coerced into obedience.[53]

The paternalistic defenses outlined here raise additional problems, for practical anarchists in that it produces or reinforces hierarchies of power. There are both epistemological problems for an external agency claiming to have greater knowledge than the oppressed themselves about their situation and range of options, and the subsequent power-relation which develops if the oppressed depend upon others to determine their "real" interests.[54] Ashar Latif and Sandra

Jeppesen report on the number of Asian- and African-American radicals who are frustrated at privileged sectors "proposing to have all the answers to ending racism."[55] For anarchism the oppressed have to be in charge of the emancipatory project, whilst paternalism places control in the hands of others. This is not a restriction, which is shared by Leninists, who often appeal to strong consequentialist criteria.[56]

Vanguard

The word "vanguard" or "vaward" appears to originate in medieval warfare, but "lead units" were features of Greek and Hellenistic Roman armies.[57] The Roman military tactician Flavius Vegetius Renatus made a distinction between auxiliaries and legionnaires. The auxiliaries come from many different occupations and backgrounds and have little agreement in "training or in knowledge or in sentiment," and they are secondary to the disciplined legionnaires. The legion has a "unified spirit," "forms the battle lines," and "makes the attack."[58] The legionnaire's lead cohort is superior and according to Flavius "requires men most qualified in race and learning."[59] The lead units can win battles on behalf of the Empire on their own, but the auxiliary units can play useful supporting roles in helping victory so long as they play their proper role.

The notion of a vanguard party, which is central not only to the revolutionary traditions of Leninism, but which also appears in social democracy (and can be detected in the practices of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism),[60] is based on a military model. Lenin—who like many other theorists and activists, often saw political problems in terms of military analogies[61]—utilizes the notion of the revolutionary vanguard to construct his revolutionary program. The party is the legion, whose function is to lead the masses (the undisciplined auxiliary units) in the millennial social conflict to come:

> The immediate task that confronts the class-conscious vanguard of the international labor movement, i.e. the Communist parties, groups and trends is to be able to *lead* the broad masses (now, for the most part, slumbering, apathetic, bound by routine, inert and dormant) to their new position.[62]

In both the pre-revolutionary text *What is to be Done?* and the post-revolution *"Left Wing Communism,"* Lenin outlines the characteristics and function of the vanguard in terms Flavius would recognize. They are the most disciplined and most knowledgeable people who will provide leadership to the oppressed masses.[63]The vanguard will organize and discipline the masses to achieve ends of which the subjugated, because of their impoverished social position, cannot conceive.[64]

Lenin was aware that the vanguard was open to charges of paternalism and offers three of the standard defenses that are consistent with liberalism. The first is that the masses are too ignorant to choose responsibly and thus not fully autonomous.[65] The second is based on consequentialist reasoning, that the vanguard party is the most efficient in diminishing the damage of capitalism and promotes the benefits of communism, which includes not only welfare benefits but extended autonomy.[66] The third defense of revolutionary paternalism is that once the authoritarian process is complete, and the vanguard's role is over, the paternalized would give their consent.[67]

It is important to note that the vanguard elite are, for Lenin, not just a theoretical category to explain the development of political strategies, but a specific grouping of special individuals who must be identified and trained distinctly from the broad mass of the population.[68] This educated vanguard, who can analyze the objective conditions of the economy and thus understand which tactics have a duty to lead the oppressed to victory. The underlying assumption is that such paternalism will later be vindicated by the revolutionary class once the masses have been given the adequate information and training.[69]

For Lenin, the ability to gain consent, at the time of the earlier text, was impossible ("utopian") under Tsarist authoritarianism,[70] but once the revolution is successful then the agreement of the workers is required. However, as Day points out, there were always pressing reasons for Lenin to defer more democratic means of acquiring legitimacy, principally civil war or foreign capitalist conspiracies.[71] Even under post-revolutionary conditions the degree of meaningful consent was limited as civil society came under political control.[72] Nonetheless the desire for *post hoc* consent indicates that Lenin regards paternalistic action can be justified on liberal grounds.

Leninism has declined in popularity, and not just in the Western World, since the fall of the Berlin Wall.[73] However, Lenin's underlying assumptions, about the requirements of the educated, or theoretically-rich, elite to gain precedence and thus lead the ignorant masses to an appreciably better end state are identifiable in many other political movements. So it is not surprising that there are anarchists, who despite opposing Leninist methods, have, on occasions, promoted tactics that either share Leninism's hierarchical assumptions and/or emulation of liberalism.

Anarchism and the Problems of the Vanguard

The Leninist concept of the vanguard is based on the strategy in which those with the appropriate training and knowledge can guide the masses to develop the correct techniques for their millennial battle against capitalist oppression. Todd May in *The Political Philosophy of Poststructuralist Anarchism* identifies the main features of this account: "there can be only one struggle, there can be only

one theory, and there can be only one leadership."[74] May, therefore, detects three main problems: first is the *strategic*, that there is a single determining struggle; the second weakness is *epistemological*, that Leninism is based on the suspect assumption that an external group of people can "objectively" and "scientifically" identify the right moments for intervention; and third is the problem of *universal primacy*, that there is a group whose position is primary in these strategic struggle.

The strategic weakness of vanguardist analysis means that one particular domain of conflict is prioritised as the universal battle for liberation. For Lenin, it is the economic conflict between the bourgeoisie and working classes, but other political movements identify other Manichean conflicts. For instance, in radical feminism it has been between women and patriarchy, while for national liberation movements the central strategic tension is between colonial oppressors and native populations. By concentrating on one terrain of oppression, others are trivialized, marginalized or ignored.

Theorists interested in postanarchism, like Graeber and Day are critical of Leninist epistemological assumptions (also identified in certain classical anarchist texts),[75] in which general laws about societal development can be derived.[76] For Lenin, the appropriately trained vanguard can legitimately make paternalistic intervention as they have access to the grander, scientific truths, which will rescue the ignorant masses. Practical anarchists have a different epistemology, one that rejects a singular origin of domination, and instead is predicated on a multi-sited "multidimensional, interlocking analysis of oppression."[77] For anarchists knowledge of tactics is produced by the oppressed themselves. As May explains, using—like Day—references to Foucault, there is no objective, universal knowledge to which the privileged vanguard elite has access. Knowledge is the product of social interactions which are localized, and communicable.[78] Not only does the vanguard consequently bring inappropriate modes of analysis into the conflict, but their interventions and claims to intellectual primacy further belittle the oppressed and make liberatory action less, rather than more, likely. There is consequently no single, fixed revolutionary subject. As oppressions are multiform and changing, then the identity of the primary agent of liberation alters.

Leninism's scientific epistemology assumes that there is a fixed set of universal principles which are passed down from the vanguard to the masses. The degree to which the masses endorse these ideas is indicative of the extent to which they are moving to become the revolutionary class ("for-itself") and it becomes the measure of the success of the revolutionary leadership. The ethicist and libertarian-socialist David Lamb critically identifies in Leninism a clear-cut distinction between the knowledgeable paternalistic educator, and the ignorant mass: "The party functioned as a revolutionary school teacher assessing the consciousness of the masses, awarding conditional support for this or that struggle insofar as it came up to standard."[79]

Practical anarchism places under the question the whole relationship be-
tween teacher-taught and leader-led, whilst also rejecting egoism's radical
subjectivism. Practical anarchism acknowledges that within particular settings
there are different levels of expertise, which those who are novices to that prac-
tice are unlikely to be skilled in. Leadership is based on know-how; this is
localized and provisional, not universal.

This localized knowledge is not to be confused with what the philosopher
Dudley Knowles calls "practical authority," where those with advanced wisdom
can legitimately dictate to others, where the officeholder has more advanced
knowledge about the battle, is acting within his domain of legitimacy and is not
making immoral or absurd commands.[80] For practical anarchists there is still no
compulsion to follow the advice of the more knowledgeable, as knowledge is
generated through social interactions, including democratic fora.[81] This is not to
deny that within a particular grouping some might have access to more useful
skills. In these contexts their advice is more likely to be heeded as they have
knowledge-power, which others lack. To flatten hierarchies those with such
skill-resources are encouraged to share them. Indeed, anarchist organizational
methods often stress the importance of structures to ensure the transmission of
expertise, such as circulation of tasks (chairing meetings, minute taking, and
editorship of publications) and skill-sharing workshops to ensure that such hier-
archies of knowledge are leveled out.[82] This demarcates practical anarchist
practices from Leninist and liberal organizations, which primarily sought effi-
ciency through the division of labor.[83]

An example from the environmental anti-roads campaigners illustrates the
point. In the early 1990s, certain localities were particularly threatened by exten-
sive road building schemes that would prioritize the speedy transportation of
commodities over the less capital-determined social interactions of local resi-
dents. The new road would also often involve the enclosing of common land,
which groups, usually with little social power, such as children, used for recrea-
tion. Thus, particular sections of a locale were particularly affected by the road
building scheme. In addition, there were social groups, often identified as "envi-
ronmental activists," who attempted to subvert capitalism, by avoiding wage-
labor, and by gaining positive pleasures through non-commodified living. They
made common cause with the local residents.

· On the protest camps, there were groups and individuals who had particular
specialist skills, either through previous environmental campaigns, or through
knowledge of local geography. So in particular contexts, particular individuals
(or groups) came to the fore, but they did not form a vanguard for two reasons.
First, their expertise was not universal: in other contexts their skills were inade-
quate or irrelevant and other individuals or groups came to the fore. Second, to
demonstrate expertise in a particular area (or claim to specialist knowledge) it is
necessary to share it with others. Genuine expertise also requires being able to
illustrate the limits and constraints on one's knowledge. In sharing it, the elite
status of teacher-taught is broken down, and the aura of authority dispersed. The

operation of consistent anarchist groups conforms to the skill-sharing model and constantly seeks forms in which "natural" hierarchies of knowledge can be democratized and flattened. However, when activists maintained divisions of expertise, as was the allegation against the more closed "tribal" anti-road groupings (such as the Dongas)[84] their practices were no longer anarchistic.[85]

By taking a practice-centered virtue approach, then anarchist methods avoid recreating vanguards as no campaign is regarded as the fundamental or millennial battle that creates the revolution. Without a single vanguard class, or a party, to provide universal guidance oppressed groups themselves (in all their myriad and fluid forms) are the agents of change, without any particular grouping taking universal priority. Multiple tactical forms are possible which are unmediated by either the state, capital or vanguard party.

Success in an environmental campaign against enclosure of natural commons was but one terrain and was not viewed as being the sole pivotal struggle to human liberation. In partaking in a radical action, participants seek out new routes of solidarity and through these practices seek to alter power relations and thus alter their social identity. One may enter a setting with one identity, such as the oppressed worker, frightened pedestrian or discriminated-against woman, but through developing anti-hierarchical skills that confront or evade oppression, groups construct other identities.

This stands in contrast to Leninism where there is one central strategic battle, which could be identified objectively, and one clear, universal class of people whose battle is foremost in the universal struggle for liberation. For Lenin, it was the industrial proletariat whose unified conflict against the capitalist class would lead to human emancipation. This is not to suggest that Lenin was unaware of other forms of oppression, such as women's subjugation, but he considered these to be either secondary to the economic battle, or a subset of it.[86] Thus, women's struggles against patriarchy or ethnic groups' resistance to racism are subsumed into economic battles guided by the vanguard.

It should be noted that the leadership that the vanguard party offers is genuinely paternalistic as it is designed to be beneficial to the client class. The harm that attends such paternalism is not the intended consequence of such interventions. The imposition of the vanguard, which is meant to guide and assist, nonetheless creates a set of social dynamics caused by the distinction between the egalitarian-libertarian aims of the Leninists and its hierarchical-coercive methods. Once the vanguard becomes the necessary means for working class liberation, then, as Lamb points out, the interests of the leading party quickly take priority over the client class.[87]Anarchist commitment to prefiguration avoids this distinction, promoting means that prefigure (or are a synecdoche of) the ends and thus is committed to a rejection of vanguard methods.

Problems of Some Anarchist Approaches

Anarchists have highlighted the paternalistic problems of vanguardism. However, as postanarchists like May and Day indicate, there are nonetheless significant weaknesses with contemporary and past anarchist methods as they replicate the hierarchical relationships of the vanguard organization. This in part stems from some anarchist theorists sharing the same epistemological weaknesses of Leninism, which in turn creates hierarchical strategies with paternalistic relationships. Alternatively, attempts to evade paternalism sometimes replicate classical liberalism and thus reproduce the hierarchies of right-libertarianism.

It has been a longstanding feature of the features of postanarchism to draw attention to the epistemological weaknesses within traditional (sometimes referred to as "classical") anarchism and orthodox Marxism, in particular their overt commitment to positivism. Day draws out from Utopian socialists like Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, through to the early anarchism of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon to Bakunin, a strain of "scientism" in which an educated elite had access to universal laws concerning the appropriate forms of societal development and it was necessary to impart this to the masses.[88] As such, a division is set up between the elite who have the specialist expertise and the masses who are guided by them.[89] For Bakunin, this was to take the forms of a covert revolutionary organization to help ensure that the oppressed's desires are expressed in a manner consistent with anarchism:

> But you will ask, if we are anarchists, by what right do we wish to and by what method can we influence the people? Rejecting any power, by what power or rather by what force shall we direct the people's revolution? An invisible force—recognized by no one, imposed by no one—through which the collective dictatorship of our organization will be all the mightier, the more it remains invisible and unacknowledged, the more it remains without any official legality and significance.[90]

As Day notes, not only is Bakunin's vanguard inconsistent with anarchism's critique of orthodox Marxist methods, as it appears to reproduce the paternalist division between revolutionary leaders and the masses, but there also is a considerable tension in Bakunin's writings concerning anarchist epistemology. Bakunin seems on one hand to reject socialist positivism, recognizing that it is in practical struggles of everyday life that guide our understandings, whilst on the other hand maintaining that there are anarchist ideals which the masses have yet to realize, which must be introduced to them. It is the latter that leads Bakunin to his hugely problematic approval for the "invisible dictatorship," which paternalistically guides the masses without them realizing it.

The question of leadership is one which anarchists have often been confronted with. If anarchist groups offer leadership, then, it is alleged that it must

be recreating a hierarchy (between leaders-and-lead). One set of responses has been to claim that it merely a "leadership of ideas" rather than management of others:

> Anarchist-communists are involved in the social and class war and we seek to influence it with the ideas and tactics we develop through our direct involvement in the struggle. We are not attempting to be a vanguard, we are attempting a leadership of ideas.[91]

This quotation highlights the tension between identifying oneself as epistemologically advanced, and the general anarchist rejection of hierarchies. Claiming to be providing simply a "leadership of ideas" is not a rejection of hierarchy, but an acknowledgement of a power structure. It only avoids reinforcing hierarchies if it aims, through knowledge-sharing, to reduce the imbalance, and recognizes that there are areas where the "anarchist" is deficient in comparison to the non-anarchist, and thus leadership positions constantly change.

The case studies in relation to paternalism, such as those of medical interference into patient autonomy, demonstrate that claims to superior knowledge justify the motivations of the paternalist, and encourage the paternalized to comply. The justification of "leadership of ideas" still means the leadership of those who have access to the "ideas," and the social position to deem them the "right ones" necessary to lead. Thus the claim to offer only "leadership of ideas" without further clarification merely encapsulates the problems for consistent libertarians of avoiding reproducing unequal power-structures, rather than provides a defense. This contradiction of anarchist vanguardism is resolvable if the leadership of ideas (or skills) is contestable, contextual, temporary and geared towards eradicating that hierarchy. However, for many vanguard groups, including supposedly anarchist ones, such leadership extends beyond particular practices, as it shares the scientific epistemology of Leninism, and thus reproduces the fixed hierarchies and paternalism of this form of operation. This replication of Leninism has been critiqued by individualist anarchists, in particular many contemporary individualist anarchists.

Individualist Anarchism and the Paternalism of the Vanguard

Common amongst past individualist theorists like Max Stirner, Benjamin Tucker and the US individualist anarchists, Wolff's philosophical anarchism, Nozickian anarcho-capitalists, as well as contemporary theorists like Hakim Bey, Bob Black and Susan L. Brown, there has been a consistent rejection of paternalism. Stirner proposes instead of the coercive intrusion of the state (even a democratic, communist one), a voluntary union of egoists, in which the ignorant masses are

left to fend for themselves.[92] Wolff's fundamental defense of autonomy against statist social structures embraces much of the earlier American individualist anarchist ambition to liberate the self from constraints without interfering with others.[93] Yet, as Frank H. Brooks indicates in his account of American individualist anarchism, their interpretation of the moral agent is consistent with liberal commitments to non-interference, and leaves the unenlightened in an oppressed state, creating a hierarchical social relationship.[94]

The modern individualism of Bey, Black and Brown, is more complex as they recognize some of the deficiencies of earlier anarchist individualism, and share certain features with practical, social anarchism. Brown shares with Stirner and the American individualists a similar version of moral agency: a universal existential individual subject.[95] However, Black views Brown as a collectivist,[96] a view with some credence given her support for some of Marx's criticisms of capitalism,[97] and views liberal political arrangements as "ultimately oppressive."[98] However, Brown has a fundamental separation of the individual from social practice. As a result she rejects entering into any social practice in which hierarchy operates, based on the absolute commitment to the existential self. "*No* hierarchy is acceptable, *no* ruler is allowable, *no* domination is justifiable in a free society."[99] This division of the individual from the social practice is not only epistemologically suspect, but leads to a quietism that permits oppression to continue. In addition, any form of radical response to oppression inevitably involves some externality to groups that have not, or cannot, consent. As Paul Chatterton recounts in his supportive analysis of an anti-war/anti-climate change blockade, harm is caused to others (drivers whose desires are frustrated, families who will face of loss of earnings).[100] The aim is to reduce these hierarchical externalities, seeking the best possible alternatives, not to fail to engage and allow existing oppressive social structures to persist.

Black and Bey's responses to the problem of paternalistic vanguards are similarly complex, or as their detractors, like Bookchin would argue, more contradictory.[101] Black proposes that activists should concentrate on constructing, in the here-and-now, the types of institutions that reflect anarchism's anti-hierarchical practices, creating lifestyles that evade statist features, and ignore attempts to reach out to others as this would be potentially paternalistic.[102] Bey suggests similar tactics. His influential concept of the Temporary Autonomous Zone (or TAZ) involves individuals creating new realities through acts of autonomous creative interplay, which prefigure, albeit temporarily, anti-hierarchical social relations.[103] However the TAZ, like the liberated lifestyles Black recommends, does not aim to defeat or subvert dominating powers like the State, instead it disbands, when confronted, and re-forms elsewhere in order to avoid entering into hierarchical relationships.[104] Examples of these methods include the Peace Convoys of the 1980s, the New Age travelers or the temporary raves, which melted away and reformed on another site.

There are a number of lines of criticism to this form of anti-paternalism. The first is based on MacIntyre's account of virtues. Practices require institu-

tions, that is to say material resources and established skills. As a result of enclosure (the taking of commonly held goods into private ownership) and the division of labor, most people lack the resources and portfolio of competences necessary to create separate lifestyles outside of the main hierarchical apparatuses of capitalist enterprises and the state, unless they challenge these enterprises for resources. Thus Black and Bey risk creating a specialist vanguard class of the already economically advantaged, whilst ignoring those who cannot flee the grip of dominating powers or need to contest, rather than flee from, existing hierarchies (such as Palestinians who are caught within the institutions of state power where even going to the beach involves engaging, and subverting myriad oppressive powers). Practical anarchism involves a radical engagement in existing institutions, attempting to alter or subvert them in an anti-hierarchical direction, as well as encouraging the development of social practices that are outside and beyond oppressive capitalist institutions. As Ben Holtzman, Craig Hughes and Kevin Van Meter describe in their account of anarchistic Do It Yourself culture, consistent radical actions are double-edged. They generate use values outside of the realm of exchange value, and these practices are in conflict with economic institutions, military power and patriarchal structures.[105]

A second criticism is made by Black's rival, the environmentalist Bookchin, in his text *Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm.*[106] Bookchin argues that lifestyle anarchists place their own transitory self-interest above that of oppressed others, in a fashion similar to Stirnerite egos, and thus replicate a hierarchy between those indulging in a radical lifestyle and those not.[107] Black replies, quoting the critic Dwight Macdonald, that whilst there is an elitism at work in creating non-hierarchical communities (or TAZ's), these gatherings are open for others to join as "coequal elitists." Just as a group of workers resisting managerial authority do not have to wait for all workers to join in the struggle against capitalism, but have to be open to solidarity with those who do, so too those who wish to construct lifestyle communities that evade hierarchical relations do not have to wait until everyone agrees, so long as they are accessible to others in a mutually-supportive fashion. However, this raises a third problem, by what means are the enlightened invited to join?

Bey and Black's individualist (or post-Left) anarchist rejects a *telos*. Grand meta-narratives of singular determining oppressions are rejected as limiting and epistemologically suspect. As Day identifies in Bey there is no adequate account of how different nomadic individuals find affinity.[108] The few clues Bey gives are that there are "secret caravan routes and raiding trails,"[109] which provide networks of cooperation, but these sound as if they are open to only an elect few (like Bakunin's invisible dictatorship). Whilst Day identifies these shortcomings in Bey,[110] he shares with Bey the rejection of a shared *telos* which can link the TAZs or anti-hierarchical social practices and which can seek out routes of solidarity. But rejecting single determining narratives (such as class-centric accounts)[111] does not mean rejecting all-linking theories, which can discern

shared interests, even if these shaping goals are provisional and adaptable. Nor should it mean ignoring that class-oppression extends beyond discrete sites. Anarchism has long maintained a central narrative of liberation, in which the goal of evading, transforming or eradicating oppression provides a historical link to previous practices and guides future action. The narrative subtly alters, depending on the narrator and the context, but is necessary to framing the understanding of social forces—and assists in expanding solidarity out of a particular context into others, identifies methods of subversion and of discerning fruitful routes of solidarity, without them oppressed subjects remain the isolated abstract subjects posited (and constructed) by liberalism.

Conclusion

Paternalism is a problem that arose simultaneously and in tandem with the birth of liberalism. Liberal theory views legitimate social arrangements are being constructed out of acceptable consensual relationships, with a small subset of justifiable coercive relationships to protect or enhance sovereignty. So whilst liberalism identifies paternalism as a denial of autonomy, it obscures the specific character of the power-relationships that makes paternalism conceptually and concretely possible. Revolutionary theory from Leninism (and other forms of traditional Marxism) shares the model of liberalism. Lenin advanced a range of substantive justifications for paternalistic intervention, through reference to the barriers to full sovereignty that are created by capitalism and *post hoc* democratic consent.

Some social anarchists replicate Leninism's commitment to vanguard organizations (albeit in a different form), whilst individualist anarchists attempt to evade paternalism by returning to liberalism's model of consent. This latter strategy consequently recreates the hierarchies of liberalism, excluding or marginalizing those without the material resources to build consensual counter-communities. Alternatively, individualist responses fail to recognize that resisting or evading oppressive powers might involve actions which oppressors, and those who identify with the status quo, would classify as coercive. Practical anarchism, by contrast, recognizes that direct action involves producing, as far as possible, the anti-hierarchical relationships sought as the immediate goal, but that these take place within a realm of existing complex institution forms and multifaceted, intersecting power-relationships. Thus relationships are rarely purely anti-hierarchical, but continually attempt to challenge and minimize inequalities of power.

Notes

1. My thanks to Lesley Stevenson for her kind assistance and the participants at the "Civil Rights, Liberties and Disobedience" conference, Loughborough University, July 2007, for their considered advice and thoughtful suggestions.

2. See for instance Bob Jessop, "The Regulation Approach," *The Journal of Political Philosophy* 5:3 (1997), pp. 287-326: 318.

3. See for instance D. Graeber, "The New Anarchists," *New Left Review* 13 (Jan-Feb 2002), pp. 61-73:71; and D. Graeber, "The Twilight of Vanguardism," in *Realizing the Impossible: Art against authority*, ed. J. McPhee & E. Reuland (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007), pp. 250-54: 250.

4. Zapatista National Liberation Army, "To the Basque political-military organization Euskadi Ta Askatasuna Basque Country, From the Zapatista National Liberation Army Mexico," trans. L. Fecha (January 9-12, 2003) available at <http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/2003/marcos/etaJAN.html>, last accessed 14 May, 2007. It is endorsed by Simon Critchley who approvingly cites it at the close of *Infinitely Demanding* (London: Verso, 2007), p. 146 and Richard Day uses it as an epigram in *Gramsci is Dead* (London: Pluto, 2005), p. 19.

5. See the individualist anarchist Bob Black's contribution to the long running polemical debate with the anarchist collectivist Murray Bookchin in which the latter is accused of vanguardism, whilst Black maintains his individualist tactics avoid such "paternalism" in *Withered Anarchism*, Spunk Press, <http://www.spunk.org/library/writers/black/sp001843/wither.html>, last accessed June 13, 2007.

6. D. Graeber, "Interview by Mark Thwaite," *Ready, Steady Book*, <http://www.readysteadybook.com/Article.aspx?page=davidgraeber>, 16 January 2007, last accessed January 25, 2008.

7. A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 2nd Ed. (London: Duckworth, 2006 [1981]), pp. 6-8.

8. Referring to "practical" anarchism is not to suggest that alternative accounts, such as individualist anarchism, are "impractical." "Practical" merely indicates that it is consistent with an account of the virtues based in social practices.

9. See for instance S. Clark, *Living Without Domination* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 1-2; R. Kinna, *Anarchism* (Oxford: Banbury, 2005), pp. 4-5, J. Jennings, "Anarchism," in R. Eatwell and A. Wright, *Contemporary Political Ideologies*, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 1999), pp. 130-31; Day, pp. 1-2.

10. See for instance, J. Bowen, "Moving Targets: Rethinking anarchist strategies," in *Changing Anarchism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp.117-128; J. Carter and D. Morland, "Anti-Capitalism: Are we all anarchists now?" in *Anti-Capitalist Britain*, ed. J. Carter and D. Morland, (Cheltenham: New Clarion Press, 2004), pp. 8-28; Karen Goaman "The Anarchist Travelling Circus: Reflections on contemporary anarchism, anti-capitalism and the international scene," in *Changing Anarchism*, ed. J. Purkis and J. Bowen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 163-80; J. Purkis, "Towards an Anarchist Sociology" in *Changing Anarchism*, ed. J. Purkis and J. Bowen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 39-54.

11. M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 6 and 28.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

13. Such as S. Clark, 2007.

14.   A version identified, but rejected by R. Martin, "Wolff's Defence of Philosophical Anarchism," *The Philosophical Quarterly* 24:95 (1974), pp. 140-149: 140; and Edward Tverdek in his review of Alan Carter's *A Radical Green Political Theory* in *Ethics* 111:2 (2001), pp. 403-05: 405.

15.   J. Cohn, "Anarchism, Representation, and Culture," *Neme* 13, (September 2006), <http://neme.org/main/310/anarchism-representation-and-culture>, last accessed July 22, 2007.

16.   S. Nechayev, *Catechism of the Revolutionist* (London: Active Distribution, 1989).

17.   See for instance D. Copp, "The Idea of a Legitimate State," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 28: 1 (1999), pp. 3-45: 11; D. Keyt, "Aristotle and Anarchism," in *Aristotle's Politics*, ed. R. Kraut and S. Skultety (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 203-22: 204; J. P. Scanlan, "Review of *Classical Anarchism: The Political Thought of Godwin, Proudhon, Bakunin, and Kropotkin* by George Crowder," *Ethics* 106:3 (1996), pp. 646-647: 647.

18.   R. Wolff, *In Defence of Anarchism* (London: Harper Torchbooks, 1976).

19.   R. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

20.   For instance R. Dagger, "Philosophical Anarchism and Its Fallacies: A Review Essay," *Law and Philosophy* 19:3 (2000), pp. 391-406; C. Gans, *Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); D. Knowles, "The Domain of Authority," *Philosophy* 82:319 (2007), pp. 23-43: 43.

21.   For membership figures of labor-based anarchist collectives at the start of the twentieth century, see the papers in *Revolutionary Syndicalism*, ed. M. van der Linden and W. Thorpe, (Aldershot: Scolar, 1990).

22.   In this regard anarchists agree with the analytical Marxist G. Cohen, "The structure of proletarian unfreedom," in *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology*, ed. R. Goodin & P. Pettit (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); autonomist Marxist H. Cleaver, *Reading 'Capital' Politically* (Brighton: Harvester, 1979) and K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol 1. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992).

23.   A. Berkman, *The ABC of Anarchism* (London: Freedom Press, 1987), pp. 64 and 69, a view also shared by S. Freeman, "Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is not a liberal view," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 30:2 (2001), pp. 105-151: 124-25.

24.   Q. Guillaume in Bakunin, *Marxism, Freedom and the State*, trans. K. Kenafick (London: Freedom Press, 1984), p. 7.

25.   S. Nechayev, *Catechism of the Revolutionist* (London: Violette Nozieres Press and Active Distribution, 1989).

26.   P. Avrich, *Bakunin and Nechaev* (London: Freedom, 1987), pp. 7-8 and 29.

27.   M. Prawdin, *The Unmentionable Nechayev* (London: George Allen and Urwin, 1961).

28.   Carter, 2000, p. 231.

29.   Carter, 1999, pp. 266-67; Jonathan Purkis and James Bowen, "Conclusion: How anarchism still matters" in Purkis and Bowen, p. 220; See too Graeber, 2002, pp. 62 and 73 and Uri Gordon, *Anarchism and Political Theory*, Ph.D. Thesis, Mansfield College, Oxford University, 2006: 172 and 203, available at <http://ephemer.al.cl.cam.ac.uk/~gd216/uri/0.1_-_Front_Matter.pdf>, last accessed March 12, 2007.

30.   J. Quail, *The Slow Burning Fuse* (London: Paladin, 1978), p. x.

31.   For instance, "The interpretation of anarchism" from 1967, reprinted in *The Anarchist Yearbook 1992* (London: Phoenix, 1991) and W. Breines, *Community and Organization in the New Left, 1962-1968* (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp. 52-55

32. See for instance *Organise!* No. 33, 19 and *Class War*, No. 39, 13; "The Aims of the Solidarity Federation," Solidarity Federation, <http://www.direct-action.org.uk/solfed-iwa/vol.2/html/38.htm#02>, last accessed June 5, 2007.

33. J. Adams, "Postanarchism in a Bombshell," *Aporia Journal* 2, <http://aporiajournal.tripod.com/postanarchism.htm>, last accessed 17 February 2008; Day, 2005, p. 9; May, 1994, p. 25; S. Newman, 2001.

34. For instance J. Cohn "What Is Postanarchism 'Post'?" <http://www3.iath.virginia.edu/pmc/text-only/issue.902/13.1cohn.txt>, last accessed 18 February 2008; Zabalaza Anarchist Communist Federation of Southern Africa, "Sucking the Golden Egg: A Reply to Newman," Inter Activist Information Exchange (2003), <http://info.interactivist.net/node/2400>, last accessed 18 February 2008.

35. MacIntyre, 2006 [1981].

36. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

39. A. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (London: Duckworth, 2001 [1988]), pp. 3-4.

40. MacIntyre, 2006, pp. 222-23.

41. MacIntyre, 2001, pp. 12-13; Horton and Mendus, 1994: J. Horton and S. Mendus, "Alasdair MacIntyre: *After Virtue* and after," in *After MacIntyre*, ed. P. Johnston (London: Polity, 1993), pp. 1-15: 12-13.

42. "'[P]aternalism' [. . . is] roughly the interference with a person's liberty of action justified by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests or values of the person being coerced" (G. Dworkin, "Paternalism," *The Monist* 56 (1972), pp. 64-84: 65).

43. These are the "offence principle" and "harm principle" discussed in Joel Feinberg's *Harm to Others* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

44. J. Locke, *Two Treatises on Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988 [1698]).

45. MacIntyre, 2006, p. 62.

46. MacIntyre, 2006, pp. 142-43.

47. D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 20.

48. See for instance, I. Kristol, "Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship," in *Neoconservatism*, ed. I. Seltzer (London: Atlantic, 2004), pp.169-80.

49. B. Gert and C. Culver, "The Justifications of Paternalism," *Ethics* 89:2 (1979), pp. 199-210: 200; Dworkin, 1972, p. 83.

50. Dworkin, 1976, pp. 74 and 82.

51. For a discussion on this tension within right-libertarianism see Freeman, 2001.

52. MacIntyre, 2006, pp. 6-7.

53. See Antonio Gramsci and in particular his account of the role of "intellectuals" in constructing "hegemony," for instance *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998), pp. 59-60; 333-34.

54. U. Gordon, "Israeli anarchism: Statist dilemmas and the dynamics of joint struggle," in *Anarchist Studies* 15: 1 (2007), pp. 7-30, 12.

55. A. Latif and S. Jeppensen, "Towards an Anti-Authoritarian, Anti-Racist Pedagogy" in *Constituent Imagination*, ed. D. Graeber, et al. (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007), pp. 288-300: 289-90.

56.   Lenin makes clear that his recommendation for organizational structures which are based on their efficiency in meeting their predetermined revolutionary goals. See V. Lenin, *What is to be Done?* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963 [1902]), pp. 144-46.

57.   My thanks to Patrick Parsons, a historian of early modern combat, for his advice on the start of this section.

58.   Renatus, *Epitoma Rei Militaris*, trans. L. Stelten (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), p. 67.

59.   Flavius, 1990, p. 73.

60.   See for instance Harvey's description of the *modus operandi* of neo-liberal and neo-conservative "think tanks" to organize an intelligentsia to create a new hegemony (Harvey, 2007, p. 40).

61.   See for instance V. Lenin, *'Left-Wing' Communism: An infantile disorder* (Peking [Beijing], China: 1975 [1920]), pp.75-76; 85.

62.   *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

63.   "Not a single important political or organizational question is decided by any state institution in our republic without the guiding instruction of the Central Committee of the Party" (*Ibid.*, pp. 37-38).

64.   "The history of all countries shows that the working class, solely by its own forces, is able to work out merely trade-union consciousness" (Lenin, 1963 [1902], pp. 62-63).

65.   Explaining communism to the masses is "like trying to teach higher mathematics to a four year old child" (Lenin, 1975, p. 40).

66.   Lenin, 1963, p. 149.

67.   Lenin, 1975, p. 29.

68.   Lenin, 1963, p. 153.

69.   Lenin, 1975, p. 51.

70.   Lenin, 1963, p. 140.

71.   Day, 2005, p. 60; See too Maurice Brinton, "The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, 1917-1921: The state and counter-revolution," in *For Workers' Power* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2004), pp. 293-378.

72.   Lenin, 1975, p. 37.

73.   M. Elbaum, *Revolution in the Air* (London: Verso, 2006).

74.   May, 1994, p. 20.

75.   Day, 2005, pp. 114-15.

76.   Graeber, 2007, p. 252; Day, 2005, pp. 107-08.

77.   Day, 2005, p. 178.

78.   May, 1994, pp. 98-100; Day, 2005, pp. 10-11; see too Gordon, 2007 and Latif and Jeppesen, 2007.

79.   D. Lamb, "Libertarian Socialism," <http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/2379/lamb.htm>, first published in *Animal* No. 1 (1997), last accessed July 12, 2007.

80.   Knowles, 2007.

81.   The Trapeze Collective, "Why We Still Have a Lot to Learn" and "How to Inspire Change Through Learning" in *Do it Yourself: A handbook for changing our world*, ed. Trapeze Collective (London: Pluto, 2007), pp. 108-19; "How to Inspire Change Through Learning" in *ibid.*, pp. 120-38.

82.   See many of the practical proposals for collaborative, consensual decision-making, productive and distribution in *ibid.*

83. C. Atton, "Green Anarchist: A Case Study of Collective Action in the Radical Media," *Anarchist Studies* 3:7 (1999); A. Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, [1776]), pp. 109-122; Lenin, 1963, p. 153.

84. D. Wall, *Earth First! and the Anti-Roads Movement* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 69-71 and "Comments on Camps: Out of site, out of mind?" *Do or Die* No. 8, p. 155.

85. There is a substantial literature on whether activists' identities create or reinforce between those who identify as conscious militants and the non-activist "others." See for instance "Give Up Activism" in *Do or Die* No. 9, available online at <http://www.eco-action/dod/no9/activism.htm>, last accessed 14 July, 2007; P. Chatteron, "'Give up Activism' and Change the World in Unknown Ways: Or, learning to walk with others on uncommon ground," *Antipode* 38:2 (2006), pp. 259-81

86. See Lenin's criticisms of Clara Zetkin and the women members of the Communist Party for debating "sex problems and the forms of marriage" rather than concentrating on matters that would unite "proletarian revolutionary forces" quoted in R. Tong, *Feminist Thought* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1989), p. 173.

87. Lamb, 2007.

88. Day, 2005, pp. 102-03 and 107. Cohn questions the representation of Proudhon as a positivist, and interprets him as being closer to Gustav Laudauer, in being critical of a science of society. See Cohn, "Signs, Ideas, Windows: Interpretation and the Proudhonian Series," paper at the *Aesthetics and Radical Politics* conference, Manchester University, February 2007 [not yet published].

89. Day, 2005, pp. 115-117.

90. M. Bakunin, "Bakunin to Nechayev on the role of secret revolutionary societies" (June 2, 1870) <http://struggle.ws/anarchists/bakunin/writings/nechayev_secret_disagree.html> last accessed 16 July, 2007.

91. North Eastern Federation of Anarchist Communists, "The Perspectives of the Northwest Anarchist Federation" <http://www.nefac.net/node/1409>, last accessed 21 June, 2007. See also, for instance, Workers Solidarity Movement, "The Role of the Anarchist Organization: A Workers Solidarity Movement Position Paper" <http://struggle.ws/ppapers/role.html>, last accessed 21 June, 2007.

92. M. Stirner, *The Ego and Its Own* (London: Rebel Press, 1993 [1845]), pp. 178-82.

93. Wolff, 1976, pp. 69-70.

94. F. Brooks, "American Individualist Anarchism: What it is and why it failed," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1 (1996), p. 85.

95. S. Brown, *The Politics of Individualism* (Montreal, Canada: Black Rose, 2003), pp. 107-118.

96. B. Black, "Wooden Shoes or Platform Shoes?" first published 2002, <http://www.inspiracy.com/black/wooden.html>, last accessed 18 February, 2008.

97. Brown, 2003, pp. 109-110 and 127-28.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

100. Chatteron, 2006, pp. 263-67.

101. Black, 2007.

102. *Ibid.*

103. H. Bey, *T.A.Z.: The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism* (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 2003), pp. 105-06.

104. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

105. B. Holtzman, C. Hughes and K. Van Meter, "Do It Yourself . . . and the Movement Beyond Capitalism," in Shukaitis and Graeber, 2007, pp.44-61.

106. M. Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism*, (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1995).

107. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-25.

108. Day, 2005, p. 162.

109. Bey, pp. 107-08

110. Day, 2005, p. 164.

111. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

What Did the Anarchists Ever Do for Us? Anarchy, Decentralization, and Autonomy at the Seattle Anti-WTO Protests

Clive Gabay

In 2005, the World Trade Organization commissioned a ten-year history of it-self. In all of its 255 pages, it had just this to say about the demonstrations at the WTO convention in Seattle, 1999:

> Ministers and delegates convened at Seattle on 30th November 1999 against the backdrop of sometimes violent demonstrations against the WTO by NGO's and other civil society groups representing labor, the environment and other in-terests.[1]

In addition to airbrushing over demonstrations that had the immediate effect of shutting down the Seattle meeting, and in the long term marked a sea change in the securitization of transnational and inter-governmental meetings, the state-ment suggests that the violence that occurred in Seattle was endemic (if not constant) across the spectrum of all those who demonstrated. Media reported at the time and afterward reinforced the notion that the demonstrators were violent, ignorant carnival-folk, and certainly had no coherent organizational model that they were operating under. I will be drawing on existing studies and activist accounts to suggest that far from adhering to the pejorative notions these terms were meant to represent, the vast majority of those demonstrators at Seattle who were committed to shutting down the meeting were in fact highly organized. Indeed, in a subversion of media reports who labeled the violence as "anarchist," I will show that whilst the majority of demonstrators themselves were not anar-chists, anarchist values and methods in fact played an integral part in the highly drilled non-violent demonstrations that shut down the WTO Seattle meeting. This has some important lessons for how we think about organizing mass pro-test, especially in light of the ongoing anti-war/pro-peace movements.

In their assessment of Australia's daily national newspaper, *The Australian*, and its coverage of the Seattle demonstrations, Thomas McFarlane and Iain Hay illustrate the manner in which popular media can reinforce hegemonic ideology. *The Australian* is owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation Limited, and thus could be argued to explicitly represent the hegemonic elite. *The Australian's* coverage of the Seattle demonstrations illustrates how the media can engage in efforts to de-legitimize any attempt to challenge that elite:

> Transgressive events such as social protest may force a reply to questions asked of the hegemonic "common sense." It is in these responses that established orders are defended and reproduced . . . the media act inadvertently as a form of guard-dog or gatekeeper, regularly covering protests from the perspectives of those in power and thereby entrenching hegemonic "common sense."[2]

McFarlane and Hay illustrate the systematic attempts of *The Australian* to downplay the political message of the Seattle protesters. On the one hand, reporting of the events painted a carnival scene, where people danced, sang, dressed up and generally had a good day out.

> The city's streets were a . . . "stage" . . . packed with "performers" (29 November 1999, p. 13), described as "creative . . . to the bizarre" (4 December 1999, p. 43). Even if they were beaten, gassed and shot at by police, "at least the rioters had a good time" (*Ibid.*) . . . "Protestors were represented by *The Australian* as performers within a spectacle."[3]

By painting the demonstrators as figures of fun, or figures having fun, the radical nature of their message was drained away. In the end, this was just a bunch of people having a pleasurable day.

However, more malicious descriptions of the protestors were also employed to drain them of their radical political message and make them appear "fringe" and "other." Descriptions focused on the looks and diet of protesters, rather than their opinions or beliefs—

> Approximately 33 percent of the space given to protestors in *The Australian* was dedicated to descriptions of their appearance, identity, personal attributes and even their diets. However, not a single word was devoted to those same characteristics of any of the pro-WTO/anti-protest commentators. Attention was focused clearly on their opinions and statements.[4]

Indeed, similar reporting could be found in *The Washington Post*, which called protesters, "the people who don't like free trade . . . the freaks, the randomly angry people."[5] The labels attached to the protesters, provided mainstream commentators with a method by which to simultaneously over-emphasize and under-emphasize the importance of a particular set of ideas within the organiza-

tional and tactical approach of the downtown Seattle protesters. The following will demonstrate how these mainstream commentators had in fact created a "straw anarchist," all the while missing the actually existing nature of the phenomenon unfolding before them—the implementation of de-centralized and autonomous anarchist ideas and organizational methods.

Overemphasis

After the first day of the WTO meeting, *The Washington Post* reported that "A guerrilla army of anti-trade protesters took control of downtown Seattle today..."[6] On the same day, CBS News anchor Dan Rather reported that ". . . the meeting of the WTO was thrown into turmoil by violent demonstrations that went on into last night. That brought down today's crackdown."[7] The crackdown involved the use of tear gas, concussion grenades and night sticks to break up the crowds of demonstrators. The "post violence" historiography of the crackdown became an accepted part of the Seattle narrative amongst the media, police reports, and political elites. According to Jeffrey St. Clair's diary of the protests, however, the tear-gassing began at least two hours before the first shop window was smashed. Indeed, and perhaps more persuasively, he goes on to claim that "At most, the dreaded Black Bloc, which was to become demonized by the press . . . amounted to fifty people. Much of the so-called looting that took place was not done by anarchists, but by Seattle street gangs."[8] Others claimed of the street gangs and looters that

> It was this second group, estimated to number at least one hundred or more, who engaged in looting some of the broken store windows, as well as occupying the awning over the Nike store. An eyewitness on Sixth Avenue described how the two groups could be distinguished by their dress and the different slogans which they spray-painted on buildings and windows. . . . the Black Bloc graffiti consisted of legible political slogans, while the "wilding teenagers" were "tagging" with illegible individualized symbols.[9]

However, blaming the violence on the "Black Bloc" Anarchists became a convenient hook to hang the blame on for the Police and media alike.

At a meeting called by the *Seattle Weekly* and KPLU Seattle Radio a few weeks after the demonstrations,

> the consensus emerged that both local and national media had . . . failed to report the overall story in either a balanced or accurate way . . . news reports echoed police claims that the tear gas and subsequent disorder followed, rather than preceded, the Black Bloc attack. [The anarchists] became a convenient, if totally misleading, media hook on which to hang the distinction between the "peaceful parade" and the "violent protests."[10]

It is interesting to note that coverage of the protests by the Seattle papers was overwhelmingly more nuanced than that given by national or international media outlets. Both the *Seattle Weekly* and the *Seattle Times* carried numerous stories distinguishing between the violent and peaceful demonstrators, and indeed recognized that the demonstrations were the result of careful and intelligent planning (more of which will be discussed further on).[11] One possible explanation for this is provided by St. Clair's observation that many passersby were also attacked by the police, and that in some instances groups of demonstrators were chased into residential neighborhoods, leading to stand-offs between police and local residents, who quickly realized how heavy-handed the police's tactics were.[12] It is possible that in experiencing what the demonstrators experienced, Seattle reflected this in its media coverage.

What does emerge, however, is that for those media organizations not based in Seattle, the tying together of violence and anarchy provided a useful scapegoat for what prominent activist and movement theorist Starhawk called police ignorance:

> The police claimed "they were not prepared for the violence." In reality they were not prepared for the non-violence. . . . My suspicion is that our model of organization and decision making was so foreign to their picture of what constitutes leadership that they literally could not see what was going on in front of them.[13]

According to MacFarlane and Hay, "Anti-WTO protests [in *The Australian*] were presented within an 'anarchy and violence' narrative structure in which repeated reference was made to property destruction by protestors," to their acts of violence, and to the presence of "masked anarchists dressed in black" (*The Australian*, 4 December 1999, p. 21). The streets of Seattle became a "playground for anarchists." One journalist simply labeled the protests "Anarchy in the US" (3 December, 1999, p. 8).[14] This created a dual perception according to which the demonstrators were linked not so much to anarchy, but to a popular and shallow perspective of anarchy:

> [P]rotests were connected at a superficial level with anarchy and violence, reasserting longstanding associations of anarchists with chaos, lawlessness, disorder, violence, bombs and political ignorance . . . simplified sets of assumptions common among readers were drawn on to demonize protestors (and to reproduce particular understandings of anarchy).[15]

Indeed, the sheer diversity of those who participated in the downtown demonstrations around the convention centre illustrates how misplaced it was to label the protesters as Anarchists, violent or both. In addition to the seasoned protesters and performers, union members and ordinary Seattleites took part in great

numbers, including what was claimed to be the entire Seattle taxi fleet, which went on strike to show solidarity with the protesters.[16]

It is clear then that that the conflation of the demonstrators with anarchy and violence was over-emphasized by the media and other official channels. This served to de-legitimize any political message that the demonstrators were trying to convey and portrayed them as a dangerous rabble, thus justifying the persecution meted out to them by sections of the police. Furthermore, this portrayal served to obscure the highly tactical and strategic approach of the protestors to the demonstration—I hesitate to add on here "at a leadership level" because, as will become clear, much of this approach was necessarily horizontal in nature, highlighting its roots in decentralized, autonomous anarchist thought. However, it is in the other side of the popular portrayal of the protesters as violent anarchists that we can see the contradiction inherent in it—that according to media reports, whilst the protesters shared ideological unified and violent tendencies, they were at the same time uncoordinated, ignorant, and directionless.

Under-emphasis

It seems as though every group with every complaint from every corner of the world is represented in Seattle this week . . . the thousands of demonstrators will go home, or on to some other venue where they'll try to generate attention for whatever cause that motivates them (12/3/99).[17]

So said ABC's Peter Jennings in his description of the protesters. This portrayal of them as narcissistic and directionless is a theme picked up on in Hay and MacFarlane's study of *The Australian*:

Journalists stated repeatedly, and explicitly, that protestors had little or no understanding of that against which they were protesting. They were: "only demonstrating an impressively wide portfolio of anarchic ignorance and precious little understanding" (*The Australian*, 4 December 1999, p. 34). "Most of them didn't know what it was exactly the WTO did" (3 December 1999, p. 8).[18]

This seemingly contradicts the coverage given to protesters as highly drilled violent anarchists. However, if seen in the context of protester de-legitimization and de-politicization then this portrayal begins to make sense also—

More than any of the previous frames associated with *The Australian*'s coverage of the Seattle protests, that of "idiots at large" most blatantly denunciates and denigrates protestors, their political viewpoints, and their actions on the streets of Seattle.[19]

A question remains, therefore, about what form the protest at Seattle actually took. On the one hand it was certainly not the case that there were columns of black flag-waving anarchists marching through Seattle for those few days in November and December 1999. However, it was equally not the case that some kind of imbecile carnival was taking place either.

Who Said No to the WTO?

The American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the largest federation of unions in the US, was responsible for bringing an estimated 25,000-50,000 demonstrators to Seattle, "unquestionably the largest number of people mobilized on 30 November [the first day of the meeting]."[20] The AFL-CIO was aligned with an organization established by Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Initiative for the protests (People for Fair Trade–PFT). In addition to these two groupings there was the Direct Action Network (DAN), which had spent the preceding months touring US cities and towns to recruit activists for a barricade and shut-down of the WTO. Initially all the groups were going to converge on the convention centre to prevent delegates from entering. However, as the planning stages progressed it became clear that there were major tactical divisions between the main actors, with the AFL-CIO and PFT becoming increasingly opposed to working with DAN in any capacity. This was largely due to opposition to DAN's avowed aim of shutting down the WTO. This also had the effect of marginalizing minority groups that had originally signed up to the AFL-CIO/PFT position, many of whom eventually backed out and either went along with DAN or organized their own demonstrations.[21]

Eventually two distinct organizational processes producing two distinct protests took place. However, mutual animosity was not the only driver in this process. According to Paul de Armond, research manager at the Public Good Project:

> AFL-CIO policy goals are directed more at American politics and less at international issues. Simply stated, the AFL-CIO's strategic target was supporting and legitimizing President Clinton's actions at the conference through purely symbolic displays by a loyal opposition. . . . Clinton indicated in an interview on the Tuesday afternoon that there was strategic coordination between his administration and the AFL-CIO in regards to the parade and protests. . . . [this] underscores the very reason for the protests in the first place: the exclusion of dissenting opinion from trade policy decisions.[22]

Indeed, labor leaders were promised a private meeting with Clinton on the Wednesday and an official presence at all future trade meetings. In return the AFL-CIO/PFT demonstration met at noon rather than at the beginning of the day

as DAN was planning, and marched some 15-20 blocks from the convention centre where delegates were meeting and the rest of the protest was taking place.[23] This highly centralized organizational approach led to

> serious dissension. . . . Some activists supported the official AFL-CIO position on WTO reform. Others were entirely opposed to the WTO. . . . They were convinced that the AFL-CIO establishment was manipulating the rank and file in support of a reformist stance.[24]

This was supposed to draw attention away from the convention centre protests and present an alternative "peaceful demonstration" against which to judge the direct action protesters. It was also designed to coincide with Clinton's pro-labor and protectionist announcements, thus allowing the AFL-CIO to take the credit:

> All the AFL-CIO had to do was prevent any effective protests by groups not under their control and allow the media to spin the tale of how labor caused a "sudden change" in national policy. The AFL-CIO proved to be unequal to the task of rounding up all the protesters and keeping them muzzled.[25]

This was because an increasing number of groups broke off from the official march route and made their way downtown into the DAN "protest zone." Furthermore, the success of the DAN protesters drew attention away from the AFL-CIO/PFL march:

> If the direct action protesters had not put their bodies on the line throughout that entire week, if the only protest had been that under official AFL-CIO banners, then there would have been a 15 second image of a parade on the national news headlines that Tuesday evening and that would have been it. The WTO would have gone forward with barely a ripple of discord.[26]

It is now clear which actors performed which roles, and how these presented the media with the backdrop between "sensible" (AFL-CIO/PFT) and "violent" (DAN, Convention Center) protesters. However, rather than conforming to the stereotypes of anarchy already discussed, I will now outline the a more accurate picture of the role anarchist principles played during the Seattle WTO protests—neither as anarchic violence nor anarchic ignorance, but as a highly de-centralized, multi-headed, autonomous yet solidarity-based mode of organizing.

Anarchy in Action

Far from being a disorganized rabble, the downtown Seattle street protests were highly planned, coordinated, and meticulously executed. In the weeks leading up

to the summit, thousands of people were given a three-hour course in non-violence, involving the history of the idea, role plays, etc. They were taught how to stay calm in the face of police brutality, the use of non-violent tactics, and making decisions together. Thousands also went through second level training, involving first aid, jail preparation, solidarity strategies, and legal rights/tactics. These several thousand people formed a nucleus of groups prepared to stand their ground in the face of any police brutality.[27]

During this process, the idea of coordinated but autonomous actions by affinity groups replaced the original idea of a single focal mass direct action. All decisions were reached via a participatory process where clusters of affinity groups sent representatives to "spokescouncil" meetings:[28]

> The area around the Convention Centre was broken down into thirteen sections, and affinity groups . . . committed to hold particular sections. In addition, some of the units were "flying groups"—free to move to wherever they were most needed. . . . All of this was coordinated at the spokescouncil meetings.[29]

Indeed, whilst the other movements at Seattle found great difficulty in resolving tensions between member groups (resulting in walk-outs in some cases) DAN proved the most capable of reaching the consensus required to implement their plans: "DAN created governance arrangements that enabled broad participation. Daily meetings and the use of consensus decision-making processes permitted the 'spokescouncil' to work out problems as a group without isolating dissenters."[30]

The affinity groups assumed different roles, with some dedicating themselves to non-violent confrontation with the police, with others forming a second tier to come in behind these vanguard groups to ensure they couldn't be surrounded and cut off in a pincer movement. This second tier ranged from street theatre groups to those dedicated to locking themselves to buildings or simply to each other in an attempt to prevent the police from breaking through their lines. By the first morning of the WTO meeting, all of this planning and coordination resulted in a militaristic-style shut-down maneuver of downtown Seattle:

> At 5 a.m. Tuesday morning, Washington State Patrol Chief Annette Sandberg saw demonstrators moving into strategic positions before any police had arrived. The converging columns of the Direct Action Network began to shut down Seattle. . . . The first Direct Action Network "arrest" affinity groups moved in on the strategic intersections in the vicinity of the Convention Center. . . . By 8 a.m. most of the key intersections had been seized by the protesters, now reinforced by their second way. . . . Though the police didn't realize it, the Direct Action Network had already swarmed them and were now shifting to a defensive strategy of holding on to the streets that they now controlled.[31]

The process which led to these actions can be said to be informed by distinctly anarchist values. Direct action has its roots in Anarchist practice and thought, and was first used as a term by anarcho-syndicalists in France at the turn of the twentieth century.[32] The ways in which DAN promoted autonomous but confederated affinity groups has direct precedent in the original meaning of the Greek word *anarchos*, which, whilst it can employed in a general context "to signify a condition of total disorder and unruliness," can also be used in "the more positive one of being unruled because rule is unnecessary for the preservation of order within a just and freely associated society."[33] Indeed, this second definition has direct resonance with the following observer's claim: "No authoritarian figure could have compelled people to hold a blockade line while being tear gassed—but empowered people free to make their own decisions did choose to do that."[34]

Many defining anarchist thinkers realized that freedom must be an organized concept. The 18th and 19th century philosopher William Godwin argued that because the state demands an infinite commitment from the individual, it is therefore invalid. From this he concluded that only pre-arranged and temporary agreements between autonomous individuals could have legitimacy,[35] a theme apparent in the way that DAN promoted affinity groups and spokescouncils. However, such a conclusion did not lead subsequent defining anarchist thinkers to reject all forms of organization. Rather, anarchists like Bakunin and Kropotkin realized that freedom must be organized, hence their focus on the realization of a society based on confederated autonomous communities. Thus, it is that one can claim that not despite, but because of DAN's highly organized approach to the Seattle demonstrations, they can be rightly said to embody anarchist traditions and values.

It is clear that more contemporary anarchist thinkers have attempted to develop theories that will allow for autonomous freedom in the present, rather than building to an unspecified future free society. Hakim Bey's "Temporary Autonomous Zones" (TAZ) promote the idea of temporarily claiming a space which for a short period of time will be free from the state and therefore be allowed to develop along the desires of participants. The TAZ is "like an uprising which does not engage directly with the State, a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere . . . before the State can crush it."[36] Once again, such forms of organizing, dissipating and re-organizing can be observed in the manner by which the affinity groups were able to fill a space with a particular activity (e.g., active resistance, street-theatre) and then dissolve to re-form somewhere else in a newly recognized strategic area of downtown Seattle.

Finally, I leave it to activists who were part of DAN and the demonstrations to provide their perspectives on the influence of anarchist values and methods on the protests:

It was a strategy of "anarchism without the 'A' word" in which we promoted anarchist organizational and decision-making structures and ideas, but we didn't use the words or symbols. It worked much better that way. "Soft anarchism" this was sometimes called, as opposed to the black bloc-types with black flags and circle "A"s.[37]

My sense was that a clear majority of folk did have a sense of "anarchism in practice" but like many good organizers who are also committed anarchists, didn't push an anarchist sectarianism, but rather opened space for anyone interested in giving a non-violent direct action "fuck you" to the WTO and pals. Anarchist culture and practices were prevalent, but not always explicit. The mass trainings before the WTO were often led by anarchists . . . but participants didn't necessarily even identify with anarchism and if you read through the handbook and websites you'll find little mention of anarchism.[38]

Discussion and Conclusion

None of the popular depictions of events at Seattle portrayed an accurate picture of what was actually happening. Whilst some commentators over-played the role of violent anarch-"ists," others down-played the role of intellectual and practical anarch-"ism," all in an explicit and implicit attempt to maintain hegemonic, ideological dominance in the face of threats to the structure of global capitalism. As has been argued, the reality was that whilst violent Anarchists were insignificant in number (even compared to other violent looters who took advantage of the confusion over those few days), Anarchism in both theory and practice had a very large role to play in the organized and coordinated protest action that took place against the WTO. Activists were in the main informed, organized and knowledgeable, as opposed to the contradictory depictions of "idiots at large"/"violent ideologues" propagated by many mainstream media institutions.

For the Direct Action Network, the Seattle WTO protests had a very clear aim in mind—the shut-down of the WTO meeting—which was met with great success. Utilizing anarchist principles of mutual aid as well as autonomy and organized freedom, protesters showed that a demonstration can be flexible to ongoing events and rise to the new challenges these may pose with speed and numbers.

In addition to shutting down the Seattle meeting, other concrete impacts on the WTO and other large international meetings have included the increased securitization of such meetings. However, it would be naïve to suggest that these tactics have achieved wholesale policy-change in the guise of more equitable trade rules for example. But what Seattle does teach contemporary protest movements is the empowering nature of decentralization. The institutionalization of the anti-war movement could be said to have wasted the sheer size of

numbers willing to march against the war back in 2003. Seattle showed us that protest does not have to be conducted under the direction and guise of establishment platform speakers, but that a large mass of people can agree on outcomes and mobilize for change under their own steam. Such empowerment creates a momentum for future mobilizations and activism that the anti-war movement has not been able to sustain.

Notes

1.   P. Gallagher, *The First 10 Years of the WTO: 1995-2005* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 69.

2.   I. Hay and T. McFarlane, "The battle for Seattle: protest and popular geopolitics in *The Australian* newspaper," *Political Geography* 22 (2003), p. 216.

3.   Hay and McFarlane, p. 218.

4.   *Ibid.*, p. 219.

5.   J. Achenbach, "Hell No! We Won't WTO!" *The Washington Post* (December 2, 1999).

6.   J. Burgess and S. Pearlstein, "Protests Delay WTO Opening: Seattle Police Use Tear Gas/Mayor Declares a Curfew," *The Washington Post* (December 1, 1999).

7.   Cited by S. Ackerman, "Prattle in Seattle: Media Coverage Misrepresented Protests," in R. Burback and K. Danaher, eds. *Globalize This! The Battle Against the World Trade Organization and Corporate Rule* (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 2000), p. 63.

8.   A. Cockburn, J. St. Clair and A. Sekula, eds., *5 days that shook the world: Seattle and Beyond* (London: Verso, 2000), p. 29.

9.   P. de Armond, "Netwar in the Emerald City, 1999-2000," http://nwcitizen.us/publicgood/reports/wto/ (accessed on 2 February 2007).

10.   *Ibid.*

11.   Several articles from the Seattle Weekly (www.seattleweekly.com) and Seattle Times (www.seattletimes.nwsource.com) were accessed between 31 January and 3 February 2007.

12.   Cockburn, et al., p. 42.

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25. de Armond, "Netwar in the Emerald City."
26. Cockburn, et al., p. 67.
27. Starhawk, p. 53.
28. Levi and Murphy, p. 660.
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8

Anarchist Theory and Human Rights

Scott Turner

Human rights theory is typically divided into two rival paradigms, one focused on political and civil rights and derived from the liberal philosophical tradition, and the other focused on economic, social and cultural rights and derived from the socialist philosophical tradition. These rival rights, traditions, and theories are manifestly present in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and are reflected in the subsequent decision to develop separate conventions for political and social rights respectively. While the influence of both liberalism and socialism on contemporary human rights thought is undeniable, it is also possible to identify common themes between modern human rights thought and anarchist theory. This paper explores points of convergence between anarchism and human rights. Obvious tensions between anarchism and contemporary human rights theory are acknowledged, and no attempt is made to unite them in all respects. However, it is suggested that anarchism can offer a valuable corrective to both liberal and socialist thought where they fall short of providing a satisfactory philosophical framework for the contemporary human rights movement.

Contemporary Applications of Classical Anarchism

The term *anarchism* has two chief usages in political lexicon. The first is traceable to Hobbes' state of nature, whose circumstances are assumed to be so desperate as to compel men to construct authoritarian government to replace anarchy with order. Consequently, Hobbes' dreary conception of anarchy becomes the essential justification for an authoritarian state. Ironically, the same anarchist conception is employed in the realist theory of international relations to describe the international condition in which each sovereign state is

responsible for its own preservation, therefore justifying the pursuit of power after power and a perpetual war of all against all.[1] However, few disciples of Hobbesian realism follow the theory to its logical conclusion and advocate the establishment of world government to bring an end to the madness of international anarchy.

The second usage of the term is a positive formulation deriving from the nineteenth century offshoot of socialism. Its tenets were espoused by a handful of brilliant crackpots like Mikhail Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, and Leo Tolstoy. In contrast to Hobbes, who saw human nature as so avaricious as to necessitate authoritarianism, anarchists joined socialists in identifying the state itself, along with capitalism, as a destroyer of human rights and freedom. Kropotkin insisted that, "repression has so badly succeeded that it has but led us into a blind alley from which we can only issue by carrying torch and hatchet into the institutions of our authoritarian past."[2] It is anarchism that ultimately retained the left's anti-statist libertarianism when other socialists embraced the strong state as the means of securing a publicly managed economy. This tenacious libertarianism became all the more compelling when many practical experiments in revolutionary socialism resulted in totalitarian states that rendered personal rights and liberty non-existent.

I have previously argued that anarchist theory can inform our understanding of today's emerging global civil society. The array of human rights, ecology and other groups that have become a new voice of global opinion have impacted the direction of multilateral negotiations on issues ranging from global warming to debt relief. Gear asserts that "human rights NGOs are the engine for virtually every advance made by the United Nations in the field of human rights since its founding."[3] There are hundreds of human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) scattered throughout the United States, Europe and the developing world. This new civil society transcends the boundaries of sovereign states and is participating in the processes of global governance absent the existence of a global state. Ishay argues that historically, "The era in which human rights made more decisive progress was one in which the state was relatively weakened by the burgeoning of popular participation in civil society, and in which the private realm escaped its control."[4] Whether applied to the national or global levels, this is suggestive of the mode of decentralized authority long advanced by anarchist theory. Consider Kropotkin's vision of an anarchist order:

> In a society developed on these lines, the voluntary associations which already now begin to cover all the fields of human activity would take a still greater extension so as to substitute themselves for the state in all its functions. They would represent an interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all sizes and degrees, local, regional, national and international—temporary or more or less permanent—for all possible purposes: production, consumption and exchange, communications, sanitary arrangements, education, mutual protection, defence of the territory, and so on; and, on

the other side, for the satisfaction of an ever-increasing number of scientific, artistic, literary and sociable needs.[5]

In *Act for Yourselves*, he argues:

Human progress . . . aims at the limitation of the power of the State over the individual . . . it will result in a society giving free play to the individual and the free grouping of individuals, instead of reinforcing submission to the State.[6]

While there are many different types of NGOs, and while they demonstrate both adversarial and cooperative relations with states and international organizations, clearly the phenomenon of global civil society has become an important realm of political action that challenges the complete centralization of authority within the rigid boundaries of state hierarchies.[7] To be sure, few contemporary NGOs are fired by the anti-statist rage of nineteenth century anarchists. To the contrary, leading human rights groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch seek more effective state enforcement of human rights norms. Yet when we consider just why earlier revolutionaries focused their critique on the state and what they hoped to achieve through its abolition, the anarchist credentials of contemporary activists, particularly in the field of human rights, become more visible.

While classical anarchists devoted much of their energies to critiquing the existing order, it is possible to isolate the essential principles that inspired their alternative vision. For Bakunin, the driving force was individual liberty. In this respect he differed from classical liberals only in believing that the state necessarily tends to undermine rather than secure the blessings of liberty. He saw natural liberty, outside of the governing authority of the state, as "the unique condition under which intelligence, dignity, and human happiness can develop and grow," the "liberty that consists in the full development of all the material, intellectual, and moral powers that are latent in each person."[8] According to Rocker, anarchists view freedom as "the vital concrete possibility for every human being to bring to full development all the powers, capacities, and talents with which nature has endowed him."[9] This concern with human freedom and dignity is consistent with the defining principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), according to which "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights," and "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person." But anarchists saw the bourgeois state as the primary obstacle to such liberty for the vast majority of the population, and bourgeois democracy was "a cunning swindle benefiting only the united barons of industry, trade, and property."[10]

Nevertheless, some anarchists recognized electoral democracy as a progressive advance over monarchy, and many of the goals they advocated were subsequently realized by such democracies, or continue to be goals of leading human rights organizations today. These goals included rights for the working

class, a reduction of working hours, free public education, housing rights, and the right of women to equal pay for equal work.[11] Notably, the UDHR likewise declares a "right to social security," "just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment," "equal pay for equal work," "remuneration ensuring for himself [the worker] and his family an existence worthy of human dignity," "rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay," and most fundamentally, "Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions." Classical anarchists shared with socialists a desire for positive rights that most liberals ignored at the time, yet they shared with liberals a distrust of strong states as a reliable means of securing them:

> The liberation of man from economic exploitation and from intellectual and political oppression, which finds its finest expression in the world-philosophy of Anarchism, is the first prerequisite for the evolution of a higher social culture and a new humanity.[12]

Anarchists agreed with socialists that the bourgeois state was an instrument of social tyranny, but they ultimately refused to follow them in erecting revolutionary states in pursuit of social rights at the expense of personal liberty.

The Question of Violence

An additional feature of classical anarchism is its nuanced attitude toward violence. Often condemned as bloodthirsty revolutionaries and terrorists, some anarchists like Tolstoy actually advocated passivism. After all, principled passivism is perhaps an even greater challenge to state authority than revolutionary violence. No state could survive for long without violence, and Saint-Simon treated the words "governmental" and "military" as synonymous.[13] Contemporary peace activists put forth a broad and bold vision of human rights in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King that is genuinely revolutionary in its challenge of the legitimacy of warfare, which is integral to the realist, state-centric conception of international politics. In other words, to challenge the legitimacy of war is to challenge the very idea of state sovereignty, and to elevate a global vision of people's security and freedom from violence above the conventional theory of national security and *raison d'état*. Not surprisingly, peace advocates are maligned and resented by patriots everywhere. Their attack on war threatens the essential right of state sovereignty that has been so aggressively defended by contemporary political realists like George Bush, Tony Blair, and Saddam Hussein. Thus we arrive at the conclusion that contemporary critics of state violence are themselves continuing in the footsteps

of nineteenth century anarchist thinkers like Tolstoy and Kropotkin. As such, they may be viewed as a left wing of the human rights movement.

Kropotkin, on the other hand, accepted "the right of people living under violently repressive regimes to respond in kind, for specific liberating purposes." In this respect he echoed Locke and Jefferson. However, "He was far more critical of violence, and manifestly more peaceful, than most of those who have opposed anarchism."[14] After all, it is obviously not violence that statists condemn, but challenges to the state's monopoly of it. Indeed, states have been the central perpetrators of violence in the modern world. Only the state is institutionally capable of carrying out the mass slaughters that are so characteristic of modern times. Far from imposing order on chaos, it is precisely the state system that made possible two world wars, the Holocaust, and the global Cold War in the 20th century. Between 1945 and 2000, almost 65 percent of war casualties were civilians.[15] "[T]here are few wars that do not seem to involve widespread and systematic violations of international humanitarian law."[16] Furthermore, in the twentieth century more civilians were killed by their own governments than from any other form of armed violence. Governments killed an estimated 170 million of their own citizens or civilians in territories they occupied.[17] Atrocities of such scale illustrate a science of violence which the modern bureaucratic state is uniquely qualified to administer.

While there is robust debate about when if ever military force is justified to defend human rights, it is obvious that war is horribly destructive of the rights of its victims—most notably the most fundamental right of them all. A suggestive guideline for the just use of force is offered by Kropotkin in what can be termed the anarchist Golden Rule: "Treat others as you would like them to treat you under similar circumstances." He goes on to clarify the moral right of self-defense and in the process offers a damning critique of imperialism:

> Perhaps it may be said—it has been said sometimes—"But if you think that you must always treat others as you would be treated yourself, what right have you to use force under any circumstances whatever? What right have you to level a canon at any barbarous or civilized invaders of your country? What right have you to dispossess the exploiter?" [. . .] Because we ourselves should ask to be killed like venomous beasts if we went to invade Burmese or Zulus who have done us no harm. We should say to our son or our friend: "Kill me, if I ever take part in the invasion!"[18]

Kropotkin here anticipates not only the right of self-determination for colonized peoples, but also the right to resist such colonization by force. The UDHR likewise acknowledges the necessity of human rights to avoid "rebellion against tyranny and oppression," and it proclaims that "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized." But Kropotkin's declaration came at a time when liberal theorists lined up almost universally behind imperialism as a just and

humanitarian venture. Though it is not his primary intention, he in essence offers a just war theory that is morally consistent, in contrast to the highly selective theory that had guided liberal thought since Locke. One could extrapolate from this an argument in support of humanitarian intervention, though Kropotkin would no doubt join many contemporary anarchists in their skepticism of the actual motives behind such policies, and the strategic interests they serve. This is particularly true given that no consistent policy of humanitarian intervention has yet emerged among any of the world's major powers, or even the United Nations. Furthermore, there are innumerable examples of states or centralized powers using this type of argument to justify aggression or internal suppression.

Problems with Liberalism and Socialism

The liberal contribution to anarchist theory is widely recognized. Central to liberalism are the philosophical doctrine of natural rights and the consequent necessity of limited government.[19] Furthermore, as liberalism has evolved it has come to include those positive rights that facilitate democratic government, including near-universal suffrage, freedom of association, freedom of the press, and free speech. Yet liberalism's fixation on personal property rights has also linked it indelibly to capitalism, which consequently leaves it vulnerable to the radical critique to which both socialists and anarchists subscribe, and which despite their pretensions to the contrary, capitalism's apologists have yet to defend adequately. As Donnelly points out, "Rather than ensure that people are treated with equal concern and respect, markets systematically disadvantage some individuals to achieve the collective benefits of efficiency." Consequently, "Free markets are an economic analog to a political system of majority rule without minority rights."[20] Classical liberalism's unrestrained personal property rights undoubtedly advantage some over others and at a minimum impose short-term deprivations that include lost jobs, higher food prices, and inferior health care. Whole generations may be denied the collective benefits of efficient markets. Despite all that socialist prophets and economists got wrong, and despite the egregious abuses of socialist states, the unlimited right of personal property remains in tension with the goal of positive social rights for all. Thus the anarchist critique of capitalism, while perhaps overstretching, retains its moral force in light of the global inequality that is truly a matter of life and death for millions of people, especially in the less developed and more exploited regions of the globe.[21] As Kropotkin argues, "In a society based on exploitation and servitude human nature is degraded. But as servitude disappears we shall regain our rights."[22]

There is a further, more basic flaw in liberal philosophy, which is that Locke's natural rights theory does not hold up well against post-modern scru-

tiny. Magnarella points out that "humans naturally want and value the freedom to think, to express their thoughts, to bond with others, to be free from torture, to have an adequate diet, shelter and clothing. We value and want to be free to learn and develop our mental abilities." But these are natural wants, not natural rights, and "[i]t is only recently that they have become, for some people, human rights."[23] While this argument divorces human rights from liberal natural rights theory, it is perfectly consistent with the anarchist advocacy of the free development of the individual. Anarchism derives more from an affirmation of natural human needs and desires than from Locke's philosophy of natural rights. Likewise, the contemporary human rights movement relies more on public discourse, or "communicative action," than on abstract natural rights claims.[24] Furthermore, the UDHR and subsequent rights conventions are clearly the products of political consensus and compromise, not statements of universal truth discerned by insightful philosophers.

State socialism is perhaps an even more beleaguered human rights philosophy. Needless to say, many of the twentieth century's experiments with socialism were miserable failures, both from the standpoint of economic productivity and human rights. The failures were particularly acute in countries where liberal rights were suppressed in favor of the social rights whose achievement was deemed to necessitate authoritarian government. Writing in the early twentieth century, Rocker cites Bakunin's opposition to authoritarian communism, and goes on to declare:

> The "dictatorship of the proletariat," in which naïve souls wish to see merely a passing, but inevitable, transition stage to real Socialism, has to-day grown into frightful despotism, which lags behind the tyranny of the Fascist states in nothing.

He insists:

> Economic equality alone is not social liberation. . . . It was not without reason that Proudhon saw in a "Socialism" without freedom the worst form of slavery. The urge for social justice can only develop properly and be effective, when it grows out of a man's sense of personal freedom and is based on that.[25]

Kropotkin likewise warned of the inherent dangers of state socialism decades before its dreary consequences became a reality:

> A section of socialists believe that it is impossible to attain such a result [economic equality] without sacrificing personal liberty on the alter of the State. Another section, to which we belong, believe, on the contrary, that it is only by abolition of the State, by the conquest of personal liberty by the individual, by free agreement, association, and absolute free federation that we can reach communism—the possession in common of our social inheritance, and the production in common of all riches.[26]

While he retains the socialist commitment to economic equality and the anarchist animus toward the state, Kropotkin simultaneously stresses the centrality of personal liberty, as well as his vision of free agreement and association, which again appears to anticipate to some degree contemporary global civil society.

On the other hand, where economic justice was pursued in conjunction with civil and political rights, we find the most compelling defense of the state as a necessary instrument for promoting and protecting the broad spectrum of human rights. While perhaps continuing to function largely as a committee of the bourgeois class, welfare states and social democracies have proven to be the most effective instruments for curtailing the abuses of free-reign capitalism. As Ishay argues:

> [A] human rights realist perspective would call for more state intervention, not less—to develop economic infrastructure, public health and education, and civil institutions. In the same vein, one should call for the implementation of supportive regulatory mechanisms within international financial institutions. . . . Needless to say, keeping people alive, controlling the spread of epidemics, and providing clean water cannot be left solely to the work of the "invisible hand."[27]

To abandon the state, he asserts, would be to accept "a weakening of welfare, workers' rights, and democratic governance."[28] By ensuring that the shifting and indeterminate victims of market forces are provided with effective social protection, the welfare state in effect promotes both the individual and collective rights of all.[29] These are precisely the rights that anarchists advocated in conjunction with their socialist compatriots, their distrust of the state as their procurer not withstanding. Social welfare policies can in fact be viewed as a partial decentralization of economic power to the population as a whole, including society's most vulnerable. By extending the state's representative sphere beyond corporate interests to include labor unions and the poor, power is ironically less centralized and people are empowered, even though the state's power itself is extended, or rather redirected. That is, the socialized state is more consistent with the aims of both anarchists and the advocates of economic and social rights. To be sure, it falls far short of the anarchist ideal of a stateless society, but again the aim here is not to prove a perfect union between anarchism and human rights theory, but to reveal significant points of convergence. To the extent that social welfare and regulatory policies can be viewed as decentralizing and democratizing functions of the state vis-à-vis corporate capitalism, they in fact correspond more readily with the anarchist vision than one might initially assume. While anarchists saw both capitalism and the state as the problem, the principles underlying Kropotkin's critique of the state are in actuality consistent with the objectives of twentieth century reformers who advocated state policies

that would promote egalitarian social rights while preserving individual liberties within the context of a democratic polity:

> By proclaiming our morality of equality, or anarchism, we refuse to assume a right which moralists have always taken upon themselves to claim, that of mutilating the individual in the name of some ideal.[30]

Kropotkin stresses the necessity of unifying the right of equality with personal liberty, which is precisely what the modern human rights movement has sought to do by advocating both the political and civil rights and the social, economic and cultural rights imbedded in the International Bill of Human Rights.[31] Rocker asserts:

> In modern Anarchism we have the confluence of the two great currents which during and since the French Revolution have found such characteristic expression in the intellectual life of Europe: Socialism and Liberalism.[32]

Likewise, social democracy has promoted the full range of human rights, political and social, more effectively than either authoritarian socialism or laissez-faire capitalism.[33]

Anarchism and International Law

Many contemporary activists seek coercive mechanisms for enforcing human rights norms, whether through states or international organizations. Yet in practice human rights protection depends as much on publicity and shaming by groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as on actual international law, which is largely unenforceable.[34] The work of such groups in promoting human rights education is consistent with the anarchist reliance on custom over statutory law. "Anarchists maintain that the laws need not be imposed by a central authority—that is, laid down as authoritative law—but can and do arise through customary arrangements and understandings that evolve over time."[35] Likewise, the Universal Declaration encourages "teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms," or a culture of human rights to supplement legal provisions. Relying solely on state coercion to enforce human rights subjects them to the routine manipulations of power politics and potentially undermines their credibility as legitimizing standards.[36]

Yet recognizing the relationship between anarchist theory and human rights does not require the abandonment of the state system altogether. It is assumed that the state is not withering away any time soon. But it behooves us to reconsider just why anarchists condemned the state to begin with. At first glance, one might assume that anarchists should be equally critical of international law and

organizations. After all, both are constructs of states themselves. Yet both have the potential to constrain the absolute sovereignty that traditionally has provided cover for states engaged in the full array of human rights violations. To the extent that international law and organizations impose constraints on the abusive and exploitive behavior of states, they ironically function to decentralize power away from states, just as social democracy decentralizes economic power. Far from forging a world government that multiplies the tyranny of miscreant states, international human rights laws and institutions distribute power more evenly and constrain the concentrated tyranny of state hierarchies. We will now review the ways in which international human rights law challenges the absolute authority of states, and is therefore consistent with the objectives of anarchist theory.

National sovereignty was historically the cornerstone of international legal theory. By freeing the state from the outside authority of church and empire, sovereignty underpinned the right of self-government, and with it the full array of rights that potentially accrue from it. Yet we have already discussed the socialist critique of the state, which portrayed it as the institutional mechanism by which the bourgeoisie ensured its exploitation of the proletariat. Furthermore, the twentieth century saw the rise of authoritarian states on both sides of the political spectrum that systematically abused the rights of their citizens on an unprecedented scale. Sovereignty ceased to be the legal mechanism for ensuring the autonomy and self-government of citizens, and became merely an excuse for deflecting international criticism of egregious human rights abuses. Consequently, a new legal theory emerged that elevated the fundamental rights of individuals above the absolute sovereignty of states.

· The idea of limited sovereignty was a central motivating principle behind the establishment of the United Nations and the subsequent adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 1944, the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace published a report entitled *International Safeguard of Human Rights*, which stated that "no nation may be insulated and wholly a law unto itself in the treatment of its people."[37] In light of Nazi Germany's genocide of the Jews and other minority groups, the Westphalian system was revealed to be morally bankrupt, and the new challenge to its legal premises has been called the most "radical development in the whole history of international law."[38] The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other legal instruments made war crimes and crimes against humanity subject to universal jurisdiction.[39] This was a shift not only in legal theory, but also in public opinion, which has continued to develop through public reactions and expectations to the present day. UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar observed in 1991 that, "We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents."[40] In the words of Micheline Ishay:

The [human rights] community now confronts the need to rescue and strengthen the progressive aspirations once embodied by the state, to enhance democratic control in civil society both domestically and internationally . . . and to strengthen existing human rights supranational institutions.[41]

Human rights and other NGOs have long been at the forefront of the effort to forge and strengthen international institutions for human rights protection. The First International, in which anarchists like Bakunin participated, can be viewed as a precursor to twentieth century international institutionalism as well as contemporary human rights NGOs. It advocated workers' political and economic rights, some of which were later incorporated into the legal systems of modern industrial states. To be sure, Bakunin favored a federal order without states, and later came to view the International as centralist and authoritarian.[42] Nevertheless, his argument with socialists was about institutions and not principles. Human rights and freedom were unquestionably powerful motivating factors behind anarchist theory. The anarchist critique was focused on states, not international organizations, few of which existed prior to the twentieth century. While we can assume that heady revolutionaries like Bakunin and Kropotkin would be suspicious of a centralized bureaucracy like the United Nations whose membership consists exclusively of bureaucratic states, we can also postulate that they would have welcomed the curtailing of state sovereignty by human rights law and the institutions charged with promoting it. The International Criminal Court aptly illustrates the challenge that international human rights institutionalism poses to traditional state sovereignty—a point well understood by the United States and the other national governments that oppose it.

Thus I return to the anarchist model of global civil society discussed earlier. It is a model that describes a robust community of NGOs interacting with both states and international organizations to promote progressive norms and laws through popular governance. The model is anarchist to the extent that it describes a relative leveling of state power, and the vertical authority of states is constrained by the horizontal authority of international standards. It is by no means a complete or sufficient model of world politics, but it does help to describe the erosion of the Westphalian system by the advancement of human rights norms. Furthermore, as demonstrated earlier, it provides a theoretical corrective to both liberal and socialist models, both of which suffer substantial deficiencies.

We arrive at a model of international politics from which human rights activists may draw on anarchist concepts and principles, retaining a healthy skepticism of hierarchical institutions without becoming irrelevant through anachronistic devotion to rigid anti-statism. Activists with an anarchist bent can promote and welcome international laws and institutions that constrain the capacity of states to murder and torture their own citizens without wholeheartedly acknowledging the legitimacy of states. It must be remembered that international human rights law aims at constraining the power of states and other

powerful actors over individuals, not at constraining the freedom of individuals themselves. Without erecting a world government that might merit the same criticisms as bureaucratic states, human rights law protects personal rights and promotes a political culture that elevates the rights of individuals above the whims of authoritarian governments. While not exactly the vision of nineteenth century anarchists, anarchism itself should not be thought of as dogma. Its own internal logic should welcome the widest range of revisionism.[43]

Thus human rights necessitate a cautious rapprochement between anarchist theory and governing institutions. Whether through domestic law and policy or international coercion, a properly ordered state remains critical for the promotion of human rights.[44] Many internationally recognized human rights are specific to national citizens, including the rights of political participation, public education, social insurance, and nationality.[45]The UDHR makes repeated references to rights of legal protection and equality under the law. It also guarantees the right of everyone "to take part in the government of his country" through "periodic and genuine elections." While acknowledging the important role of the state in securing human rights may initially appear hopelessly incompatible with anarchism, the preceding argument demonstrates that anarchist concepts are indeed relevant to contemporary human rights theory and can usefully inform the thought and objectives of activists.

Conclusion

In a sense human rights activists seek to overcome the anarchy described by realist theory by imposing legal constraints on sovereign states and even intervening in those states to stop egregious abuses. On the other hand, human rights law is ultimately unenforceable absent the willingness of one or more powerful sates to act, so groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch rely largely on persuasion and public shaming to affect the behavior of states as actors within the anarchical international arena. On a global scale, this is clearly not liberalism, which applies to the protection of citizens' rights through domestic constitutional constraints on state power. While human rights advocates may welcome liberal political systems for their good rights reputation, at least in regard to political and civil rights, liberal theory alone does not address the urgent need for international human rights norms in a world with many illiberal regimes. Furthermore, simply advocating liberalism is not enough, since liberalism does not always do a particularly good job with second and third generation rights.[46] Even democracy may be insufficient to guarantee rights, especially in majoritarian form, and especially during times of war when voting publics may be persuaded to tolerate the retrenchment of civil rights and liberties. The UDHR and subsequent conventions explicitly prohibit torture and

cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention. But if truth is the first casualty of war, human rights law is surely the second. Finally, we must be suspect of states claiming to spread democracy and protect human rights through the use of force, not only because of dubious motives, but also because of the vast human rights catastrophe that inevitably accrues from warfare. Anarchism and human rights theory should be united in their critique of state violence, both foreign and domestic, as well as state sanctioned exploitation and injustice. The history of liberal imperialism is long, vast and tragic, but among anarchist thinkers like Bakunin we find some of its earliest and most forceful critics.[47] Such courageous moral clarity should continue to inspire human rights activists in their cautious interactions with states.

Notes

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10.   Guérin, p. 17.
11.   Ishay, p. 125.
12.   Rocker, p. 33.
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17.   Hewitt, *op. cit.*
18.   Peter Kropotkin, "Anarchist Morality," in *Anarchism: A Collection of Revolutionary Writings*, pp. 97-100.
19.   Rocker, p. 23.

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20. Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 201-202.

21. See Rocker, pp. 106-107.

22. Kropotkin, "Anarchist Morality," p. 104.

23. Paul G. Magnarella, "International Human Rights: Roots of a Progression," *Journal of Third World Studies* 19:2 (2002), pp. 13-21.

24. The terminology "communicative action" is borrowed from the work of Jürgen Habermas.

25. Rocker, pp. 26-28.

26. Kropotkin, "Anarchism: Its Philosophy and Ideal," p. 130.

27. Ishay, p. 293.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 344.

29. Donnelly, p. 202.

30. Kropotkin, "Anarchist Morality," p. 105.

31. The International Bill of Human Rights includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

32. Rocker, p. 21.

33. Of course, this is an old controversy in leftist circles. For one of the many criticisms of reform socialism, see Rocker, p. 83.

34. Paul G. Magnarella, "Universal Jurisdiction and Universal Human Rights: A Global Progression," *Journal of Third World Studies* 12:21 (1995), pp. 159-171.

35. Christopher J. Coyne, "Order in the jungle: Social interaction without the state," *Independent Review* 7:4 (2003), pp. 557-566.

36. See Scott Turner, "The Dilemma of Double Standards in U.S. Human Rights Policy," *Peace & Change* 28:4 (2003), pp. 524-554.

37. Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1988), p. 159.

38. Andrew Moravcsik, "The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe," *International Organization* 54:2 (2000), pp. 217-252.

39. Magnarella, *op. cit.*

40. Rieff, *op. cit.*

41. Ishay, p. 355.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

43. Rocker, p. 30.

44. Ishay, p. 349.

45. Donnelly, p. 34; Keri Iyall Smith, "Response to Rodriguez: A 'Long Walk to Freedom and Democracy?'" *Social Forces* 83:1, pp. 413-421.

46. Civil and political rights are sometimes labeled "first generation," social and economic rights "second generation," and cultural rights "third generation."

47. Guérin, p. 68.

Part 3: Anarchism and Religion

9

Christian Anarchism: A Revolutionary Reading of the Bible

Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos

Christianity in its true sense puts an end to the State. It was so understood from its very beginning, and for that Christ was crucified.

—Leo Tolstoy

Where this is no love, put love and you will find love.

—St. John of the Cross

Christianity and anarchism are rarely thought to belong together. Surely, the argument goes, Christianity is about as hierarchical a structure as you can get, and anarchism is not only the negation of any hierarchy but it is also often stubbornly secular and anti-clerical. Yet as Ciaron O'Reilly warns, Christian anarchism "is not an attempt to synthesize two systems of thought" that are hopelessly incompatible; rather, it is "a realization that the premise of anarchism is inherent in Christianity and the message of the Gospels."[1] For Christian anarchists, an honest and consistent application of Christianity would result in a political arrangement that would amount to anarchism, and it is actually the notion of a "Christian state" that, just like "hot ice," is a contradiction in terms, an oxymoron.[2] Thus Christian anarchism is not about forcing together two very different systems of thought——it is about pursuing the political implications of Christianity to the fullest extent.

This chapter will explore this unusual and revolutionary political vision by conveying some of the observations made by some of its main proponents. The most famous of these is undoubtedly Leo Tolstoy—he is often the *only* example of Christian anarchism cited in the academic literature on anarchism.[3] Among the aficionados, however, Jacques Ellul is also very famous, and people are

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usually familiar with Vernard Eller and Dave Andrews as well. Also well known are some of the figures associated with the Catholic Worker movement (especially popular in the United States), in particular Dorothy Day, Peter Maurin, and Ammon Hennacy. The Christian anarchist literature is also enriched by contributions from thinkers at its margins, who are perhaps not the most vociferous fanatics of pure Christian anarchism, or perhaps not Christian anarchists consistently (maybe writing anarchist texts for only a brief period of their life), or perhaps better categorized as pacifists or Christian subversives than anarchists, but whose writings complement Christian anarchist ones. These include Peter Chelčický, Nicholas Berdyaev, William Lloyd Garrison, Hugh Pentecost, Adin Ballou, Ched Myers, Michael Elliott, and Jonathan Bartley, among others.[4] Finally, Christian anarchism also has its anarcho-capitalists, like James Redford and Kevin Craig.[5] This chapter will not discuss them all, but will draw from most of them in an attempt to extract some of the main arguments made in the Christian anarchist literature.

The first section discusses the central role that Christian anarchists assign to love as the basis of Christian anarchism. The second looks more closely at the Christian anarchist reading of some key Biblical passages, including the "render unto Caesar" incident and Romans 13. This is followed by a brief explanation of why their specific understanding of Christianity is hardly heard of today. The fourth section outlines some of Tolstoy's direct criticisms of the state. The fifth lists a few examples of Christian anarchism, past and present. The chapter then closes with some concluding remarks on the overlap of religion and politics presented by Christian anarchism.

Love: The Heart of the Revolution

Where modern—certainly Hobbesian—political theory deals with injustice and insecurity by force, by bestowing the monopoly over the legitimate use of force to the state, Christian anarchism argues that the best response to violence and injustice is actually Christian love. That is, Christian anarchists believe that a just social order can only be secured through the persistent enactment of brotherly love, not through any system of rewards and punishments policed by a scolding father. The ordering principle of society would thus be love, not the threat of violence.

According to Tolstoy, the essence of this Christian alternative is best expressed in Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, and in particular in the following verses:

> You have heard that it was said, "Eye for eye, and tooth for tooth." But I tell you, Do not resist an evil person. If someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also. And if someone wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. If someone forces you to go one mile, go

with him two miles. Give to the one who asks you, and do not turn away from
the one who wants to borrow from you.[6]

Tolstoy thus understands Jesus as spelling out a revolutionary and indeed wiser
method for human beings to deal with evil, with fear, violence or insecurity:
when treated unjustly, do not use force or retaliate, but respond with love, for-
giveness and generosity. Dave Andrews agrees:

> Christ is the archetype of compassion—the original model of radical, non-
> violent, sacrificial love—which humanity desperately needs, now more than
> ever, if it is to find a way to save itself from the cycles of violence that will
> otherwise destroy it.[7]

For Christian anarchists, the radical political innovation of Jesus' message
was therefore to put forward a completely different way of responding to what-
ever may be seen as evil. That is, even in the face of unjust demands, behave
like a generous and loving servant; do not rebel, do not get aggressive, and cer-
tainly do not even contemplate using power to enforce your view of justice. In
the eyes of Christian anarchists, the political implications are self-evident: the
only response to disorder and insecurity in human relations is not to delegate
power to a state, but to act as Jesus taught and acted—even if the ultimate price
is one's own death, as explained in more detail further below in the discussion
of Jesus' crucifixion.

Of course, this means that the Christian anarchist has to abandon the appar-
ent effectiveness of social engineering. Inasmuch as s/he wishes to change the
world, in Dorothy Day's words, s/he can only do this "one heart at a time."[8]
Christian anarchists thus believe in persuasion by example, not force. The hope
is that love and forgiveness eventually win over the evildoer through the heart.
Impressed by such radical love and forgiveness, one day the evildoer may well
repent. But in the meantime, cheeks keep being smitten and coats keep being
taken away. The Christian anarchist, however, does not seek punishment and
redress but patiently and generously forgives the wrongdoer.

Hence to use Vernard Eller's words, the Christian anarchist chooses the
path of "voluntary self-subordination" as the "model of social justice."[9] An-
drews therefore speaks of treating Christ as a *model* rather than an *idol*:

> The example of Christ . . . is so powerful that many of us find it overpowering
> and, therefore, unfortunately, disempowering, rather than empowering as it
> ought to be. So we tend to treat Christ as our *idol*, someone we'd like to be like,
> but know we never will be like; rather than our *model*, someone we'd like to be
> like, and do our best to be sure we are like. But Christ never wanted to be an
> *idol*. He never asked anyone to worship him. Christ only wanted to *model* how
> to live life to the full. And all he asked of people who wanted to live this way
> was to follow him.[10]

Christian anarchists thus bemoan the fact that Christianity has evolved into the worship of an idol rather than the personal and collective effort to imitate Jesus and thereby represent him (or make him present) in the world.

Yet if, instead of delegating government of society to a system that legitimizes some violence and punishment, Christians were to choose to govern their lives by love and compassion, then there would be no need for a state. The only thing that would "govern" or steer this stateless society would be love. Humanity would resemble the original meaning of *ekklesia* as a "gathering" of individuals into community and communion.[11] And gradually, more and more people would indeed gather because "the beauty of love and justice embodied in [these] communities will encourage all men and all women of goodwill to continue to do good works as well."[12] Christian anarchists therefore also reject any separation of ends and means: violence breeds violence, and only love can breed love and gather humanity into a peaceful community.[13]

Of course, this goal does appear distant and utopian, and it is easy to accuse Christian anarchists of lack of realism. Love, forgiveness and non-resistance to evil are difficult enough to enact on a personal level, let alone as a whole community. But in reply to this contention, Tolstoy has this to say:

> It may be affirmed that the constant fulfillment of this rule [of love and non-resistance] is difficult, and that not every man will find his happiness in obeying it. It may be said that it is foolish; that, as unbelievers pretend, Jesus was a visionary, an idealist, whose impracticable rules were only followed because of the stupidity of his disciples. But it is impossible not to admit that Jesus did say very clearly and definitely that which he intended to say: namely, that men should not resist evil; and that therefore he who accepts his teaching cannot resist.[14]

In other words, although the practicality of Christian anarchists' vision can be argued upon, the grounding of it in scripture is harder to dispute. They certainly believe that their interpretation is validated by countless passages of the New Testament, and that any other interpretation that compromises with the state exposes both hypocrisy and a lack of faith in the very essence of Jesus' teaching. According to Christian anarchists, the political implications of Christianity might be utopian, but they are made clear throughout the Bible: Jesus articulated the foundations of a community based on love, a community in which love and forgiveness can be the only response to injustice and insecurity, a community therefore that cannot but reject the state as we know it.

Other Passages in the Bible

Aside from numerous verses on love and forgiveness, Christian anarchists point to several passages in both the Old and New Testament to further validate their

interpretation of Christianity. Only the most significant of these can be reviewed here, but many more can be found in the Christian anarchist literature.[15] One example concerns one of Jesus' temptations in the wilderness, which reads as follows:

> Again, the devil took him to a very high mountain and showed him all the kingdoms of the world and their splendor. "All this I will give you," he said, "if you will bow down and worship me." Jesus said to him, "Away from me, Satan! For it is written: 'Worship the Lord your God, and serve him only.'"[16]

Jacques Ellul argues that according to this text, "all powers, all the power and glory of the kingdoms, all that has to do with politics and political authority, belongs to the devil."[17] It is moreover important to note that Jesus does not deny that political power does indeed belong to the devil. Rather, "he refuses the offer of power because the devil demands that he should fall down before him and worship him."[18] Jesus refuses political power because it would entail worship of the devil. So Jesus declines the possibility of changing the world through political channels.[19] He rejects the state because he can only serve one Lord, and it is not possible to serve both God and the state.

Ellul notices that a similar point is made in the Old Testament.[20] Until Samuel, Israel had no king. Decisions were taken mostly by popular assembly: "people did what was right in their own eyes."[21] But in 1 Samuel 8, they told Samuel that they wanted a king so that they could be like other nations and have more efficient military leadership. As Ellul explains,

> Samuel protested and went to God in prayer. The God of Israel replied: Do not be upset. The people have not rejected you, Samuel, but me, God. . . . Accept their demand but warn them of what will happen.[22]

Samuel then warned them of all the abuses of power that would ensue, but they wanted their king. Thus, they chose an earthly ruler, a state, instead of God. That is, they opted for idolatry, for the service and worship of the state rather than God.[23] (Note that even though he disapproved, God allowed them to freely reject him).[24]

Another important passage in terms of how to respond to fear and insecurity can be found in Matthew 26:56–52. Jesus has just been betrayed by Judas, and is about to be taken away. One of his disciples then draws out his sword and strikes one of the guards. But Jesus famously tells him to put away his sword, because "all who draw the sword will die by the sword."[25] So once again, even in the face of perceived injustice or insecurity, do not resort to any violence, because "it can only give rise to further violence."[26] And as Ellul notes, the warning applies quite broadly. On the one hand, "since the state uses the sword, it will be destroyed by the sword, as centuries of history have shown us."[27] But on the other, this can also be seen as a caution to Christians: "do not fight the

state with the sword, for if you do, you will be killed by the sword."[28] Violence should never be used, neither to hold political authority nor to overthrow it. And if violence *is* used, then no validation for it can be claimed from Christianity, because Jesus explicitly denounces it.

So, Christian anarchists understand Christianity to be strictly incompatible with the state and political power; for them, Christianity provides the blueprint for a non-violent, anarchist revolution. However, there are two important phrases from the New Testament that are frequently raised against Christian anarchists as if these self-evidently contradict their political interpretation: "render to Caesar," and Paul's instructions in Romans 13. These must now be analyzed in turn to show why Christian anarchists consider them not as contradicting but as actually confirming their own interpretation.

It is important to recall the details of the "render to Caesar" episode before commenting on it.[29] The story reads as follows:

> Later they sent some of the Pharisees and Herodians to Jesus to catch him in his words. They came to him and said, "Teacher, we know you are a man of integrity. You aren't swayed by men, because you pay no attention to who they are; but you teach the way of God in accordance with the truth. Is it right to pay taxes to Caesar or not? Should we pay or shouldn't we?" But Jesus knew their hypocrisy. "Why are you trying to trap me?" he asked. "Bring me a denarius and let me look at it." They brought the coin, and he asked them, "Whose portrait is this? And whose inscription?" "Caesar's," they replied. Then Jesus said to them, "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's." And they were amazed at him.[30]

Ellul notes that in the first place, if they put this question to Jesus, it must have been because it was already debated, and Jesus must have had "the reputation of being hostile to Caesar."[31] But aside from this, it must be borne in mind that "in the Roman world an individual mark on an object denoted ownership."[32] Hence the coin did actually belong to Caesar.[33] No surprise, then, that Jesus says "Give it back to him when he demands it."[34] Nevertheless, as Ellul notices, "Jesus does not say that taxes are lawful."[35]

So the key question is "what really belongs to Caesar?" Ellul replies:

> Whatever bears his mark! Here is the basis and limit of his power. But where is his mark? On coins, on public monuments, and on certain altars. That is all . . . on the other hand, whatever does not bear Caesar's mark does not belong to him. It belongs to God.[36]

For instance, Caesar has no right over life and death. That belongs to God. Hence while the state can expect Christians to abide by its wishes regarding its belongings, it has no right to kill dissidents or plunge a country into war.[37] Therefore the "render to Caesar" episode seems to reinforce, not weaken, the case made by Christian anarchists. Some things do belong to Caesar, but many

more essential things belong to God, and the state is overstepping its mark when it encroaches upon God's domain.

But then what about Romans 13? There, Paul does clearly assert:

> Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God.[38]

Does this verse and those following it not finally defeat the Christian anarchist fallacy? After all, this passage has often been used to justify the divine institution of civil government—including Nazi Germany.[39]

Here again, however, Christian anarchists offer a compelling response.[40] For a start, one must realize that Romans 12 and 13 "in their entirety form a literary unit."[41] In both chapters, Paul is writing about love and sacrifice, about overcoming evil with good, about willingly offering oneself up for persecution. In doing so, he is mainly repeating the message that Jesus articulated not only in the Sermon on the Mount and other parables, but also in the very way he lived and died – indeed, Jesus' ultimate act of love and sacrifice was to subject himself to Roman crucifixion.[42] But the point is that as John H. Yoder asserts, "any interpretation of 13:1–7 which is not also an expression of suffering and serving love must be a misunderstanding of the text in its context."[43] And in Ellul's words, once one interprets Romans 12 and 13 as a coherent whole, one notes that

> there is a progression of love from friends to strangers and then to enemies, and this is where the passage then comes. In other words, we must love enemies and therefore we must even respect the authorities.[44]

Hence Paul's message in Romans 13 is to call for Christians to subject themselves to political powers *out of love*, forgiveness and sacrifice.

It is also worth repeating Eller's point that to "be subject to" does not mean to worship, to "recognize the legitimacy of" or to "own allegiance to."[45] Ellul thus comments that "we have no right to claim God in validation of this order as if he were at our service. . . . This takes away all the pathos, justification, illusion, enthusiasm, etc." that can be associated with any specific political authority.[46] So no specific government has any particularly special relationship with God, even though God will use it in his mysterious ordering of the cosmos.[47] Therefore, according to Ellul, "the only one whom we must fear is God," and "the only one to whom honor is due is God"—not political authorities.[48]

But "the immediate concrete meaning of this text for the Christian Jews in Rome," Yoder indicates, "is to call them away from any notion of revolution or insubordination. The call is to a non–resistant attitude toward a tyrannical government."[49] Paul is calling for Roman Christians to act as Jesus did. Besides, if you choose resistance, Eller remarks, "you could find yourself resisting the par-

ticular use God has in mind for that empire"—whatever that might prove to be.[50] Thus Paul, just as Jesus did before him, is advising against a violent political uprising and instead encouraging Christians to cultivate love, sacrifice and forgiveness. Paul is endorsing neither the Roman establishment nor any uprising to overthrow it, but reminding followers of Jesus that what matters is to focus on God and Jesus' radical and no less revolutionary commandments.[51] Thus, Romans 13, when understood in its context, ends up supporting rather than discrediting Christian anarchists.

As already hinted, this touches on the core of the seemingly paradoxical understanding of Jesus' teaching by Christian anarchists. That is, Jesus' political subversion is carried out through submission rather than revolt. Jesus' crucifixion is the Biblical episode which best illustrates this.[52] For Christian anarchists, the cross is the symbol both of state violence and persecution, *and* of Jesus' alternative to overcome it. To paraphrase from Paul, by submitting to his crucifixion—even uttering as his last words a call for God to "forgive them, for they do not know what they are doing"[53]—Jesus "makes a public example" of the state, "unmasks" it as violent and demonic and "dethrones" it from its power and perceived legitimacy.[54] By submitting to his crucifixion, Jesus demonstrates that love and forgiveness, even—indeed, *especially*—in the face of violence and vindictiveness, must go to the very end. Hence Jesus' submission is subversive because it unmasks the true nature of the state and at the same time embodies his alternative to overcome it. At the cross, Jesus and his teaching, although seemingly crushed, are paradoxically exalted. However surprising this may at first seem, the cross thus symbolizes Christianity's anarchist subversion. And of course, Jesus repeatedly demands of his followers that they take up their cross and follow him, in other words that they reject violence, accept persecution, and nonetheless keep on striving to love and forgive both their neighbors and their enemies, just like he did.[55]

This does not mean, however, that Jesus asks from his followers that they remain completely silent when faced with injustice.[56] Jesus himself set the tone when he stormed and cleansed the Jerusalem temple—an event that fixed the resolve of the authorities to have him arrested and executed.[57] In commenting on this event, Christian anarchists emphasize that this temple was Israel's most potent religious, political, and economic symbol. Jesus' "direct action" against it is therefore a clear statement of opposition against such concentration of power and authority. For Christian anarchists, too much attention has been distracted from these broader political implications by endlessly debating whether Jesus' action was violent. Besides, they argue that very little violence was used anyway: only one Gospel mentions a whip, and it does so only in relation to the cattle in the temple. Thus if any physical violence was used, it was clearly only to drive out the cattle, not to strike any human being. And if Jesus' verbal condemnation is nonetheless a form of violence, then that is the limit of the violence that Jesus allows. Indeed, Jesus does repeatedly denounce, in strong terms, the religious and political authorities of his day. Christian anarchists only regret that

today's self-proclaimed followers of Jesus hardly ever repeat such courageous denunciations of political, religious and economic power.

Christian History

If Christian anarchists are correct, however, how come their version of Christianity is mostly unheard of today? The short answer is that the church colluded with the state and thereby compromised the essence of Jesus' teaching. For Christian anarchists, the symbolic moment which epitomized the degeneration of Christianity was Emperor Constantine's "conversion," when "Christ, who had turned the Roman Empire upside down, was turned into a lap-dog for the Roman emperor."[58] The early church had strived to enact Jesus' teaching. But with Constantine's reforms, what had begun as a voluntary, nonviolent movement, a conscious choice of love, forgiveness and sacrifice eventually became a compulsory and hence meaningless tag synonymous with the status quo.[59] And predictably, scriptural exegesis was thereafter reassessed in order to justify unquestioning obedience to the state.

Tolstoy uses particularly strong language to condemn this corruption of Christianity.[60] Although the following are not his words but Henry George's, he quotes them at length because they eloquently echo his view:

> The Christian revelation was the doctrine stating the equality of men, that God is the Father and that all men are brothers. It struck to the core of the monstrous tyranny which inspired the civilized world; it smashed the slaves' chains and annihilated the enormous injustice whereby a small group of people could live in luxury at the expense of the masses, and ill-treat the so-called working classes. This is why the first Christians were persecuted and why, once it became clear that they could not be suppressed, the privileged classes adopted it and perverted it. It ceased to be the celebration of the true Christianity of the first centuries and to a significant extend became the tool of the privileged classes.[61]

When Constantine converted to Christianity, instead of adapting politics to Jesus' teaching, "they arranged a Christianity for him . . . they carefully devised a kind of Christianity for him that would let him continue to live his old heathen life unembarrassed."[62]

The resulting paradox, for Tolstoy, was most visible in the army. Before Constantine, Origen had justified Christians' refusal of military service by arguing "that Christians fight more than others for the sake of the Emperor, but they do it through good deeds, prayers, and by setting a good example to others," not through armed combat.[63] But this changed:

Under Constantine the cross had already appeared on the standard of the Ro-
man Legions. In 416 a decree was issued forbidding pagans to join the army.
All the soldiers became Christians: that is, all the Christians, with only a few
exceptions, renounced Christ.[64]

And so for Christian anarchists, Christianity never recovered from this compro-
mise with political power. Emperors, Crusades, the Inquisition, the Wars of
Religion—according to Christian anarchists, none of these really have anything
to do with the essence of Christianity. Those dark chapters of history were po-
litical power–games in which Christianity was hypocritically used as hypnotic
cloak to mobilize the masses; and as a result, the real meaning of Jesus' teaching
remained hidden under thick layers of lies and stupefying rituals.[65]

Hence the net of true faith, to use Chelčický's phrase, was torn by two great
predators: the pope and the emperor.[66] Christian anarchists are therefore very
critical of the church's alliance with the state.[67] They accuse the church of disin-
genuously reinterpreting Jesus' radical commandments to enfeeble them and
curb their politically revolutionary importance. They accuse it of further dis-
tracting its flock from these commandments by the promotion of obscure
dogmas and the enactment of stupefying ritual. And they accuse it of remorse-
lessly supporting any political authority, however violent and repressive, that
offers it benefits and protection. Thus for Christian anarchists, the church is real-
ly the antichrist, portraying itself as the savior but in fact confining Jesus'
emancipatory teaching to its very opposite.

Enslavement to the State

As to the state, Christian anarchists claim that it fails to live up to the very pur-
pose that it claims to fulfill. That is, far from preserving justice and security, the
state merely distorts injustice and perpetuates organized violence; and in doing
so, far from safeguarding individual freedoms, it systematically imprisons its
citizens by a clever mix of hypnotism, economic slavery and legitimized brutal-
ity, often with the blessing of the church. That, at least, is what Leo Tolstoy says
in the various political essays that he published during the last thirty years of his
life, after he converted to (his very idiosyncratic understanding of) Christianity.
For him, the semblance of order achieved through the state is just as unjust as
the disorder that it is supposed to save humanity from. The limited scope of this
paper makes it impossible to summarize all the criticisms that Christian anar-
chists level against the state, but Tolstoy's views provide a good sample.[68]
Therefore, although much more can be found in some of the sources listed in the
bibliography (including in Tolstoy), only part of Tolstoy's specific critique of
the state as modern slavery will be outlined here.

The line of argument is fairly simple: Tolstoy first notes that there are al-
ways disagreements within society about proposed laws, and this then implies

that some form of—unchristian—coercion or threat of it will always be required in order to enforce any particular law.[69] But for Tolstoy, "being compelled to do what other people wish, against your own will, is slavery."[70] Hence if violence must always be potentially called upon to enforce laws among defiant minorities, then all laws by definition amount to slavery. Moreover, for Tolstoy, the cloak of democracy does not in the least redress this fundamental injustice:

> When among one hundred men, one rules over ninety-nine, it is unjust, it is a despotism; when ten rule over ninety, it is equally unjust, it is an oligarchy; but when fifty-one rule over forty-nine (and this is only theoretical, for in reality it is always ten or eleven of these fifty-one), it is entirely just, it is freedom! Could there be anything funnier, in its manifest absurdity, than such reasoning? And yet it is this very reasoning that serves as the basis for all reformers of the political structure.[71]

Tolstoy thus clearly does not consider democracy to escape from his criticism of law as amounting to slavery. Besides, as the parenthesis in this excerpt reveals, Tolstoy anyway does not believe that democracy is truly democratic: for him, it is driven by a small proportion of the population who impose their will upon the majority under a hypnotic pretence of democratic legitimacy.[72]

Furthermore, on top of this legislative dimension of slavery, Tolstoy criticizes the modern state for perpetuating a cunning form of economic slavery too. Tolstoy's denunciation of his contemporary economic system in fact continues to ring true today:

> If the slave-owner of our time has not slave John, whom he can send to the cesspool to clear out his excrements, he has five shillings of which hundreds of Johns are in such need that the slave-owner of our times may choose anyone out of hundreds of Johns and be a benefactor to him by giving him the preference, and allowing him, rather than another, to climb down into the cesspool.[73]

Whereas physical violence was once needed to force slaves into carrying out degrading work, today's more advanced economic system has so successfully transposed the coercive element into the "system" that employers can portray themselves as benefactors when they offer no less degrading work to the "lucky" employees who were picked out of many candidates who were forced to apply for such a job out of sheer hunger and economic necessity.

Such (legislative or economic) slavery, of course, does not appear to be so much of an improvement from the initial "state of nature" that humanity is assumed to have been saved from through the social contract that theoretically established the state. Indeed, the state behaves exactly like the villain it was supposed to eradicate—only on a much broader, institutionalized scale.[74] It secures obedience to its laws only through the threat and use of violence against its

citizens, and thus maintains the people it was designed to save under a systemic kind of slavery. The order that it therefore protects is fundamentally unfair and unstable. Violence breeds more violence, and so sooner or later, the state's acts of violence and injustice result in retaliatory acts of further violence and injustice.[75]

More to the point, the outcome is the opposite of both the letter and the spirit of Jesus' teaching. The only real alternative, for Christian anarchists, must come through an unequivocal rejection of violence. This alternative society, this anarchist vision, can only grow bottom-up, and it must be a society of peace, love, care for another, forgiveness of wrongs, and willingness to suffer in the process if need be. This alternative society, for Christian anarchists, is the true church, the gathering of radical Christians which Jesus intended his disciples to be. And for that gathering to come about, "true" Christians—that is, Christian anarchists—must lead the way, teaching it not by fear or coercion but by example. That is, Christian anarchists must "be the change they want to see," so that this revolutionary society can be built "in the shell of the old."[76]

Examples, Past and Present

In a way, therefore, Christian anarchists would argue that Christianity has never really been tried yet on a politically significant enough scale. As already noted, the early churches did their best; but they were betrayed by the Roman authorities' manipulation of their cause. In the late Middle Ages, several millenarian movements and protestant sects (such as the Anabaptists, the Mennonites, the Hussites and the Quakers) endeavored to apply some of the political aspects of Jesus' teachings; but although some of these survive today, they often compromised their goals in the face of persecution.[77] There are also both ancient and more recent examples of conscientious objectors inspired by Jesus' example of love and non-resistance; but these examples of bravery remained local and individual, not social.[78]

Today, the Catholic Worker movement, founded by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, continues to strive to embody the Christian anarchist society that Jesus described through its network of houses of hospitality, through its regular publications and through its involvement in public demonstrations.[79] Thus Ammon Hennacy, another famous Catholic Workers, picketed, protested, and worked the land in what he called his "one-man revolution."[80] More recently, there are groups like the "Jesus radicals," formed on the internet, who organize conferences and discussion groups on a Christian anarchist vision for society.[81] In Australia, Dave Andrews has for years worked on several projects that aim to strengthen a sense of Christian community in his neighborhood, and his writings abound with moving examples of the impact that such beacons of love, care and forgiveness have had and can have.[82] In Britain, in the late 1980s, a journal

called *A Pinch of Salt* was published for several years to try to publicize the theory and practice of these Christian anarchist ideas, and it has recently been revived. Aside from these, there are plenty of examples of radical Christians who are trying their best to create communities that foster the sort of love and forgiveness preached by Jesus, and who also speak up, sometimes through nonviolent demonstrations, against the violence and injustice perpetrated by the state.

But these are all small-scale examples. The political implications of Jesus' teaching have never really been tried yet at any society-wide level—if anything, they have been forgotten, even by self-proclaimed Christians. Almost all Christians today accept the premise that the state is necessary to preserve our freedom and security. Almost all Christians today explain away the more radical element of Jesus' message as admirable but unrealistic. And almost all Christians today accept that a good Christian ought to work within modern political institutions rather than undermine them from a religious perspective. For Christian anarchists, however, Christianity actually proposes a radical alternative to the state, and only Christians who stubbornly enact even the most radical of Jesus' commandments are faithful to their professed religion.

Religion and Politics

Some may be uneasy at the sort of mix of religion and politics prescribed by Christian anarchists, yet there is no reason to fear their political activity. In the first place, the idea that violence and bloodshed automatically follows when religion ventures into politics is both short-minded and historically questionable. Indeed, Cavanaugh argues fairly convincingly that contrary to popular opinion, the modern secular state was not the white knight that saved humanity from otherwise endless religious wars.[83] In a nutshell, he contends that the "Wars of Religion" of the sixteenth and seventeenth century were in fact "the birthpangs of the State," that they "were fought largely for the aggrandizement of the emerging State over the decaying remnants of the medieval ecclesial order," and that

> to call these conflicts "Wars of Religion" is an anachronism, for what was at issue in these wars was the very creation of religion as a set of privately held beliefs without direct political relevance.[84]

It would therefore seem hasty to categorically declare that history clearly proved that religion is the main cause of conflict and war. Besides, for Christian anarchists, it is in fact the state that epitomizes the cycle of violence that humanity should evolve away from.

Many secular anarchists, for their part, may protest that anarchism rejects all rulers and tyrants, and that this list must de facto include "God." Yet as Nekeisha Alexis-Baker explains,

> The simplistic representations of God as "All-powerful, the King, the Autocrat, the radical Judge, [and] the Terrible One" that are held by some anarchists and Christians is the heart of the problem. . . . Throughout the Bible . . . God is also identified as Creator, Liberator, Teacher, Healer, Guide, Provider, Protector and Love. By making monarchical language the primary descriptor of God, Christians misrepresent the full character of God.[85]

God is not some whimsical tyrant ruling his subjects from up in the clouds. What he really is, even to the tradition, remains a subtle mystery that only reveals itself through patient contemplation. But the point here is that it is too simplistic to accuse God of behaving like a dictator that any true anarchist must reject (not least since according to the New Testament he sent his Son, who is love, to save humanity from its predicament).

But what should finally appease the secularists and even give them reasons to be fond of Christian anarchists is the fact that their approach is obstinately peaceful and loving: Christian anarchism is founded on absolute non–violence, and in a world in which Abrahamic Scriptures can often be interpreted in antagonistic fashion, Christian anarchists offer a religious alternative that is refreshing precisely because of the primacy it accords to love, non-violence and charity. Hence the Christian anarchist message is really aimed first and foremost at those who define themselves as Christians, to call them to bear witness to the radical political element of their religion. To non-Christians, it would seem that all Christian anarchism has to offer is a more educated understanding of the apparent political implications of one of the world's major religions. But the hope harbored by Christian anarchists is that others can be won over and converted through the courageous bearing witness of Christians to even (if not above all) the more challenging elements of Christianity. Again, though, this first relies on Christians fanatically committing themselves to Christian love. But then that is what a literal, indeed (in that sense) "fundamentalist" exegesis of the Bible seems call to. "What a fine place this world would be," Peter Maurin thus remarked decades ago, "if Fundamentalist Protestants tried to exemplify the Sermon on the Mount."[86]

Notes

1.   Leo Tolstoy, "Church and State," in *On Life and Essays on Religion*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 338.

2.   Ciaron O'Reilly, "The Anarchist Implications of Christian Discipleship," *Social Alternatives* 2/3 (1982), p. 9 (*sic*).

3. Leo Tolstoy, "Church and State," in *On Life and Essays on Religion*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 338.

4. Tolstoy wrote too many Christian anarchist texts to give an exhaustive list of these here, but the most frequently cited one is Leo Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God Is within You," in *The Kingdom of God and Peace Essays*, trans. Aylmer Maude (New Delhi: Rupa, 2001).

5. John H. Yoder is also cited in this chapter because, despite being a pacifist Mennonite who was keen to dissociate himself from the anarchist conclusions that his argument has been said to lead to, his writings do further reinforce certain flanks of the Christian anarchist critique.

6. Craig is the person behind the otherwise anonymous Vine and Fig Tree websites; see for instance [Anonymous], *Ninety-Five Theses in Defense of Patriarchy* (Vine and Fig Tree), available from members.aol.com/VF95Theses/thesis.htm (accessed 20 April 2007).

7. Matthew 5:38–42. (Note that all Bible quotes in this chapter are from the New international Version.)

8. Dave Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy: Discovering a Radical Spirituality of Compassion* (Oxford: Lion, 1999), p. 100.

9. This expression, which she attributes to "Peace News," is quoted by Dorothy Day in the *London Catholic Worker* 13 (April 2005), p. 6.

10. Vernard Eller, *Christian Anarchy: Jesus' Primacy over the Powers* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1987), chap. 10 for an elaboration of this argument (pages 239–240 for the quoted words).

11. Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy*, p. 114 (Andrews' emphasis).

12. Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, p. 49.

13. Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy*, p. 126.

14. This is explored further in the context of a discussion of international terrorism in Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos, "Turning the Other Cheek to Terrorism: Reflections on the Contemporary Significance of Leo Tolstoy's Exegesis of the Sermon on the Mount," *Politics and Religion* 1/1 (2008).

15. Leo Tolstoy, *What I Believe <My Religion>*, trans. Fyvie Mayo (London: C. W. Daniel, [1902]), pp. 18–19.

16. Among the passages on which Christian anarchists collectively offer extensive comments (and which are not already mentioned in this chapter), one finds Jesus' many proclamations about forgiveness and about service to others, his answer to the crowd who wanted to stone the adulteress, his arrest and trial, and other sayings from the Sermon on the Mount, such as the commandments to love enemies, not to judge, not to swear and not to be angry, the Golden Rule, and the claim that he came not to "destroy" but "fulfill" the old law.

17. Matthew 4:8–10.

18. Jacques Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, trans. George W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1991), p. 58. See also Archie Penner, *The New Testament, the Christian, and the State* (Hagerstown: James Lowry/Deutsche Buchhandlung, 2000), 36–38; James Redford, *Jesus Is an Anarchist: A Free-Market, Libertarian Anarchist, That Is Otherwise What Is Called an Anarcho-Capitalist*, available from praxeology.net/anarchist–jesus.pdf (accessed 14 August 2006), pp. 22–24.

19. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, p. 58.

20.   Linda H. Damico, *The Anarchist Dimension of Liberation Theology* (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), pp. 78–79, 89–90; Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, p. 10; Michael C. Elliott, *Freedom, Justice and Christian Counter-Culture* (London: SCM, 1990), pp. 157-158.

21.   Note that on the whole, Christian anarchists comment much less on the Old Testament than on the New. While some treat it with patience and interest, others (Tolstoy in particular) disregard it as almost completely irrelevant to the radical teaching of Jesus.

22.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, p. 47.

23.   *Ibid.*, p. 48.

24.   Stephen   W.   Carson,   *Biblical   Anarchism*,   available   from www.lewrockwell.com/orig/carson2.html (accessed 8 November 2007); Tom Lock, ed., *A Study of Peter Chelčický's Life and a Translation from Czech of Part One of His Net of Faith*, by Enrico C. S. Molnár (Oberlin: www.nonresistance.org, 2006), available from www.nonresistance.org/literature.html (accessed 28 March 2007), p. 93; Michael Tennant, *Christianarchy?* (Strike the Root), available from www.strike-the-root.com/51/tennant/tennant5.html (accessed 21 November 2007); Michael Tennant, *Government as Idolatry* (Strike the Root), available from www.strike-the-root.com/3/tennant/tennant1.html (accessed 21 November 2007).

25.   Nekeisha Alexis-Baker, "Embracing God, Rejecting Masters," *Christianarchy* 1/1 (2005): 2; Dave Andrews, *Subversive Spirituality, Ecclesial and Civil Disobedience: A Survey of Biblical Politics as Incarnated in Jesus and Interpreted by Paul*, available from anz.jesusradicals.com/subspirit.pdf (accessed 17 July 2006), p. 4.

26.   Matthew 26:52. Note that Christian anarchists often just cite this saying, without commenting much on it, assuming that it fairly self-evidently confirms their understanding of Jesus' teaching.

27.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, 65.

28.   *Ibid.*

29.   *Ibid.*

30.   The exposition of the Christian anarchist argument here follows Ellul. But one can also find interesting and similar remarks in Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, chap. 4 and 8; Elliott, *Freedom, Justice and Christian Counter-Culture*, 51-53; Ched Myers, *Binding the Strong Man: A Political Reading of Mark's Story of Jesus* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988), pp. 310–314; Penner, *The New Testament, the Christian, and the State*, pp. 49–52; Redford, *Jesus Is an Anarchist*, pp. 10–11; John Howard Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1994), chap. 2.

31.   Mark 12:13–17.

32.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, 59.

33.   *Ibid.*

34.   The same logic still applies today, as a close look at the small print of most bank notes exposes.

35.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, 60.

36.   *Ibid.*

37.   *Ibid.*

38.   *Ibid.*, p. 61.

39.   Romans 13:1.

40.   Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p. 193.

41.   The argument summarized here is a combination of the following: Nekeisha Alexis-Manners,   *Deconstructing   Romans   13:   Verse   1–2*,   available   from

www.jesusradicals.com/essays/theology/Romans13.htm (accessed 28 October 2005); Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, chap. 8; Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, chap. 2 and appendix; Lock, ed., *A Study of Peter Chelčický's Life*, sect. 8 and 9; Penner, *The New Testament, the Christian, and the State*, chap. 4; Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, chap. 9 and 10.

42.   Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p. 196.

43.   Alexis-Manners, *Deconstructing Romans 13*; Dave Andrews, *The Crux of the Struggle*, available from www.daveandrews.com.au/publications.html (accessed 3 December 2006).

44.   Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p. 196.

45.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, p. 81.

46.   Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, p. 199.

47.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, p. 88.

48.   Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p. 202.

49.   Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, p. 81.

50.   Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, p. 202.

51.   Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, p. 203.

52.   *Ibid.*, p. 41; Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, chap. 9 and 10.

53.   The argument summarized in this paragraph is mostly based on the following: Andrews, *The Crux of the Struggle*; Jonathan Bartley, *Faith and Politics after Christendom: The Church as a Movement for Anarchy* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2006), chap. 11; Hendrik Berkhof, *Christ and the Powers*, trans. John Howard Yoder (Scottdale: Herald, 1977); Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, pp. 83–85; Myers, *Binding the Strong Man*; Walter Wink, *Engaging the Powers: Discernment and Resistance in a World of Domination* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992); Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, chap. 2 and 8.

54.   Luke 23:34.

55.   See Colossians 2:15 and its interpretation by the authors cited above.

56.   For instance: Matthew 10:38, 16:24; Mark 8:34, 10:21; Luke 9:23, 14:27.

57.   Note also that there seems to be a tension in Jesus' teaching between pure nonresistance and non-violent resistance, but there is not enough space to discuss it here. A short discussion of it is available in Alexandre J. M. E. Christoyannopoulos, "Leo Tolstoy on the State: A Detailed Picture of Tolstoy's Denunciation of State Violence and Deception," *Anarchist Studies* 16/1 (2008).

58.   Matthew 21:12–16; Mark 11:15–18; Luke 19:45–48; John 2:13–17. The Christian anarchist commentary summarized here is based on the following: Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy*, p. 149; Dave Andrews, *Not Religion, but Love: Practicing a Radical Spirituality of Compassion* (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2001), pp. 65–66; Andy Baker, *Nonviolent Action in the Temple*, available from www.jesusradicals.com/essays/theology/temple.html (accessed 16 May 2006); Adin Ballou, *Non–Resistance in Relation to Human Governments* (www.nonresistance.org), available from www.nonresistance.org/ literature.html (accessed 28 March 2007), pp. 29–31; Elliott, *Freedom, Justice and Christian Counter-Culture*, pp. 80, 166–167, 180–181; Robert Ellsberg, ed., *Dorothy Day: Selected Writings: By Little and by Little* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2005), p. 344; Peter Maurin, *Easy Essays* (Washington: Rose Hill, 2003), p. 3; Jim Missey and Joan Thomas, eds., *The Book of Ammon*, by Ammon Hennacy, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Fortkamp, 1994), pp. xix, 381, 433; Myers, *Binding the Strong Man*, pp. 297–306; Penner, *The New Testament, the Christian, and the State*, pp. 68–69; Leo Tolstoy, "The Gospel in Brief," in *A Confession and the Gospel in Brief*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1933), pp. 146–238; Leo Tolstoy, "The Teaching of Jesus," in *On Life and Essays on Religion*, trans.

Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934), p. 379; Yoder, *The Politics of Jesus*, pp. 40–43.

59.   Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy*, p. 70.

60.   See for instance Bartley, *Faith and Politics after Christendom*, chap. 2 and 3; O'Reilly, "The Anarchist Implications of Christian Discipleship," p. 10; Penner, *The New Testament, the Christian, and the State*, chap. 2.

61.   In particular, see: Leo Tolstoy, "An Appeal to the Clergy," in *On Life and Essays on Religion*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Tolstoy, "Church and State."; Leo Tolstoy, "The Restoration of Hell," in *On Life and Essays on Religion*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934); Tolstoy, *What I Believe*; Leo Tolstoy, "What Is Religion, and Wherein Lies Its Essence?," in *On Life and Essays on Religion*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1934).

62.   Henry George, quoted in Leo Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence," in *A Confession and Other Religious Writings*, trans. Jane Kentish (London: Penguin, 1987), p. 187.

63.   Tolstoy, "Church and State," pp. 339–340. See also Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God Is within You," p. 164.

64.   Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence," p. 188.

65.   Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence," p. 190.

66.   On these dark chapters of history and the church's role in them, see most of Tolstoy's political writings already mentioned above, but also (for instance) Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy*.

67.   Lock, ed., *A Study of Peter Chelčický's Life*.

68.   The argument summarized in this paragraph, as well as even stronger diatribes against the church, can be found in many of Tolstoy's writings, but also Lock, ed., *A Study of Peter Chelčický's Life*; Missey and Thomas, eds., *The Book of Ammon*.

69.   A more detailed account of his criticisms can be found in Christoyannopoulos, "Leo Tolstoy on the State."

70.   Leo Tolstoy, *What to Do?* (London: Walter Scott), p. 148.

71.   Leo Tolstoy, "The Slavery of Our Times," in *Essays from Tula*, trans. Free Age Press (London: Sheppard, 1948), p. 120.

72.   Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence," p. 165.

73.   See, for instance: Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God Is within You." Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence."; Tolstoy, "The Slavery of Our Times."

74.   Tolstoy, "The Slavery of Our Times," p. 95.

75.   Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God Is within You."

76.   George Kennan, "A Visit to Count Tolstoi," *The Century Magazine* 34/2 (1887); Leo Tolstoy, "I Cannot Be Silent," in *Recollections and Essays*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1937); Leo Tolstoy, "Thou Shalt Not Kill," in *Recollections and Essays*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1937); Leo Tolstoy, "What's to Be Done?," in *Recollections and Essays*, trans. Aylmer Maude (London: Oxford University Press, 1937).

77.   The former quote is usually attributed to Gandhi, whose revolutionary thinking, as he himself acknowledged, was influenced by Tolstoy. The latter quote, borrowed from the International Workers of the World, is frequently repeated by Catholic Workers—for instance: Maurin, *Easy Essays*, xii, 37; Missey and Thomas, eds., *The Book of Ammon*, p. 232.

78.   Andrews, *Christi-Anarchy*, section 3; Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, chap. 2; Tolstoy, "The Kingdom of God Is within You," preface and chap. 1 and 3.

79.   Eller, *Christian Anarchy*, chap. 8; Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, introduction and appendix; Tolstoy, "The Law of Love and the Law of Violence," chap. 9 and 11.

80.   *London Catholic Worker* pamphlets; Andrews, *Christ-Anarchy*, section 4; Dorothy Day, *The Long Loneliness: The Autobiography of the Legendary Catholic Social Activist* (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1952).

81.   See his detailed autobiography: Missey and Thomas, eds., *The Book of Ammon*.

82.   See www.jesusradicals.com.

83.   See his website (www.daveandrews.com.au), for instance, as well as his books, where he often reflects on personal experiences or experiences reported to him by friends and neighbors.

84.   William T. Cavanaugh, "A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House: The Wars of Religion and the Rise of the State," *Modern Theology* 11/4 (1995).

85.   Cavanaugh, "A Fire Strong Enough to Consume the House," p. 398.

86.   Alexis-Baker, "Embracing God, Rejecting Masters," p. 2.

87.   Maurin, *Easy Essays*, p. 193.

10

Anarchist Confrontations with Religion

Harold Barclay

From its beginning as a social movement, anarchism has been seen by others as wholeheartedly rejecting religion and a belief in god and the supernatural. Certainly most anarchists have been atheists. Most would probably agree with Bakunin who said his two *betes noires* were the State and the Church. However, in this essay I propose to demonstrate that there is considerable variety in the attitude toward religion taken by anarchist writers. I propose first to briefly describe the approach to religion made by some of the major classical anarchist theoreticians: Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), Max Stirner (1806-1856), Michael Bakunin (1814-1876), Elisée Reclus (1830-1905), Peter Kropotkin (1848-1924), and Errico Malatesta (1853-1932). Leo Tolstoi (1828-1910) should also be included in this group, but I have instead placed him in a category of Christian anarchists where, were he alive today, he might be more comfortable.

Proudhon and Stirner

Proudhon, who was the first to call himself an anarchist, was one of those anarchists who could not be called an atheist. His early work, "System of Economical Contradictions," discusses the innumerable contradictions which appear to dominate this world. His general orientation is Kantian in his emphasis upon antinomies or contradictions. Thus, he says non-producers should obey but in fact they rule; credit should provide work but it oppresses; property should provide us with the earth but it denies it; and god who is evil is opposed to mankind.

When they were first married, Proudhon prevailed upon his wife that they would never go to church, and his children were never baptized. In the "System of Economical Contradictions" he writes:

And for my part I say: The first duty of man, on becoming intelligent and free, is to continually hunt the idea of God out of his mind and conscience. For God, if he exists, is essentially hostile to our nature, and we do not depend at all upon his authority. We arrive at knowledge in spite of him, at comfort in spite of him, at society in spite of him; every step we take in advance is a victory in which we crush Divinity.[1]

I deny, therefore, the supremacy of God over humanity; I reject his providential government, the non-existence of which is sufficiently established by the metaphysical and economical hallucinations of humanity—in a word, by the martyrdom of our race; I decline the jurisdiction of the Supreme Being over man; I take away his titles of father, king, judge, good, merciful, pitiful, helpful, rewarding, and avenging. All these attributes, of which the idea of providence is made up, are but a caricature of humanity, irreconcilable with the autonomy of civilization, and contradicted, moreover, moreover, by the history of its aberrations and catastrophes.[2]

In light of all this, one might readily assume that he was an atheist, and most religiously-oriented people of his day denounced him as such. But Proudhon does not deny the existence of god. He only claims that god is an enemy of mankind and so also is religion, particularly Christianity. Proudhon in fact denounces those who are humanist-atheists because they seek to replace god with humanity while others may replace god with the state. What Proudhon clearly has in common with other anarchists is a hatred of god as dominator and authority along with the church and religion in general. At the same time he, like other anarchists, emphasizes the doctrine of loving one's neighbor and doing unto others as one would have done unto oneself. Proudhon also seems to have had a great respect for Jesus Christ.

Following Proudhon it is customary to discuss Max Stirner (1806-1856), sometimes referred to as an extreme individualist anarchist, although I along with many others would consider him to be on the fringe of the anarchist movement. Like Nietzsche he might be more appropriately described as an "aristocratic radical." In his magnum opus *The Ego and His Own*, for example, he declares:

What you have the *power* to be you have the *right* to. I derive all right and all warrant from me; I am *entitled* to everything that I have in my power. I am entitled to overthrow Zeus, Jehovah, God, etc., if I can; if I cannot, then these gods will always remain in the right and in power as against me. . . . I decide whether it is the *right thing* in *me*; there is no right *outside* me. If it is right for *me* it is right. . . . He who has might has right; if you have not the former you have not the latter. Is this wisdom so hard to attain? Just look at the mighty and their doings.[3]

Nevertheless, there is still much in Stirner's writing that identifies him with more mainstream anarchism. He was a staunch critic of the status quo and denied both the Church and the State. Furthermore, he condemned the humanist elevation of man to take the place of god. Indeed, Stirner believed that religion had created Man and described god and saints as all so many "spooks." These concepts, coupled with the organization of the Church, were all authorities over humankind and so, like the State, were all forms of oppression. He proposed a union of egoists, recognizing that it was necessary to cooperate in various circumstances. Such cooperation among egoists would be possible because we would all be humans of equal status.

Bakunin, Reclus, and Kropotkin

Michael Bakunin (1814-1876) is properly called a father of anarchism, an avowed atheist and a vigorous opponent of all religion. Bakunin's argument against god and religion is based primarily upon his belief that all religions are dominative and authoritarian and, moreover, could never pass any scientific test of validity. In reading him one is led to wonder if he is not replacing religion with science, which, as we saw above, is what Proudhon criticized the humanists for doing. *God and the State* is an extract from "The Knouto-Germanic Empire," a long manuscript written by Bakunin in early 1871. The following quotations from it provide some of its flavor:

> All religions, with their gods, their demigods and their prophets, their messiahs and their saints, were created by the credulous fancy of men who had not attained the full development and full possession of their faculties. Consequently the religious heaven is nothing but a mirage in which man, exalted by ignorance and faith, discovers his own image, but enlarged and reversed—that is *divinized.*[4]

> Christianity is precisely the religion *par excellence*, because it exhibits and manifests, to the fullest extent, the very nature and essence of every religious system, which *is the impoverishment, enslavement, and annihilation of humanity for the benefit of divinity.*[5]

The idea of God implies the abdication of human reason and justice; it is the most decisive negation of human liberty, and necessarily ends in the enslavement of mankind, both in theory and practice.[6]

> If God really existed, it would be necessary to abolish him.[7]

> Church and State are my two *betes noires.*[8]

Yet Bakunin recognized that even the Bible had here and there some very profound observations and, like Proudhon, he saw that there are valuable moral teachings in religions such as the emphasis upon love and mutualism.

Elisée Reclus (1830-1905) was the son of a Protestant minister. Initially Reclus prepared for the same calling himself but by age twenty gave up theological training to study geography, eventually becoming one of the more prominent geographers of the 19th century. Though he renounced religion and belief in god, Reclus nonetheless emphasized the Christian teachings of love and brotherhood. It has been said that he believed in and taught Christianity without god and that Jesus would have seen him as a brother.[9] At the same time Reclus was somewhat contradictory in his espousal of violent propaganda by deed[10] and his belief in the doctrine of an eye for an eye.[11]

Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921) generally dismisses religion as superstition and regards it as unnecessary, at least as an explanation for doing good. In his early years he studied the main branches of Christianity but had little interest in them and seems unaware or unconcerned about the deleterious effects of religion. He had a greater interest in physical and biological sciences. Later on as he absorbed revolutionary and anarchist doctrine he recognized that Christianity was always in close alliance with the state and political power.[12] For him the idea of good and evil has nothing to do with religion or a mystic conscience but is rather a natural need of all animals.[13] Rather than merely denouncing faith and religious practice in general, Kropotkin instead attempts to discover an alternative explanation for moral concepts such as good and evil. He finds it in what he believes is a universal and innate inclination amongst animals toward mutual aid. Though the struggle for existence and survival of the fittest are indeed significant mechanisms of evolution, they are surely overemphasized (even in banal contexts such as television nature programs). Today we know that mutual aid is at least as important to evolutionary development as competition and that reciprocity as an expression of mutual aid is a universal human behavior.

Malatesta, Rocker, Goldman, and Others

Errico Malatesta (1853-1932) wrote little about religion, but what he did say conformed with the general position of other Italian anarchists:

> [W]e want to make amends, replacing hatred by love, competition by solidarity, the individual search for personal well-being by the fraternal co-operation for the well-being of all, oppression and imposition by liberty, the religious and pseudo-scientific lie by truth.[14]

As part of an anarchist program he declares "war on religions and all lies, even if they shelter under the cloak of science" and advocates "[s]cientific instruction

for all to advanced level."[15] In contrast to Bakunin's unwavering dedication to capital "S" science as well as Kropotkin's desire to produce a scientifically-based anarchism, Malatesta states:

> I do not believe in the infallibility of Science, neither in its ability to explain everything nor in its mission of regulating the conduct of Man, just as I do not believe in the infallibility of the Pope, in revealed Morality and the divine origins of the Holy Scriptures.[16]

He adds: "'Scientific socialism' as well as 'scientific anarchism' . . . has always seemed to me grotesque concepts, a mixing up of things and concepts which are by their very nature quite distinct."[17]

In "Nationalism and Culture," Rudolf Rocker (1873-1958) provides us with a kind of world history which includes, among other things, a view of the origin and history of religion that enjoyed some popularity in the early twentieth century. There he situates the origin of religion in animism and proceeds through fetishism to more contemporary varieties. Rocker regards religion—that is, priesthood—as a basis for the state. As he writes, "All politics has its roots in religious concepts of men."[18] Religion, in turn, is "intergrown with the idea of might, of supernatural superiority, of power over the faithful, in one word, of rulership."[19] He continues:

> All systems of rulership and dynasties of antiquity derived their origin from some godhead and their possessors soon learned to recognize that the belief of their subjects in the divine origins of the ruler was the one unshakable foundation of every kind of power. . . . All power at the outset is priestly power. . . . Every system of government without distinction of form, has a certain basic theocratic character.[20]

Emma Goldman (1869-1940) preached against religion but primarily repeated the words and ideas of Michael Bakunin in her article, "The Philosophy of Atheism," which appeared in the journal *Mother Earth*. She does, however, seek to point out the advantages of atheism. Whereas theism is static and fixed, she says, atheism is dynamic and open. So, too, theism is an unreal world of spirits which has kept human kind in a state of "helpless degradation" while atheism is related to the real world, to *this* life. Atheism emancipates humans and frees them from the "nightmare of gods." Only through atheism can we be freed of the "horrors of the past."[21]

Other important twentieth-century anarchist writers in English have produced little if anything regarding religion. This undoubtedly reflects an assumed decline of religion as an issue of significance in the modern world, particularly the English-speaking world, and especially religion as a formal and organized church with support from the state. In a similar vein there are several American individualist anarchists who, with the exception of Benjamin Tucker (1854-

1939), had little to remark about religion. For Americans religion was not the issue it was in Europe. Compared to any society which had existed before it, the United States had provided for considerable freedom of thought and, at least since the late nineteenth century, had suffered no oppression by an authoritarian church (though atheism was scarcely tolerated). Like other anarchists, Tucker has no use for the church or religion, but he believes the church is a declining institution and an object of "derision." It is the state, rather than the church, that one should engage in battle.[22]

Apart from individual secular theoreticians, anarchist orientations toward religion are notable in relation to the activities of two important anarchist movements: The Spanish anarchists in the War of 1936-1939 and the Makhnovist movement in the Ukraine from 1917 to 1920. In both cases the movement was vigorously anti-religious. The Spanish movement acquired a very negative reputation in many American and European circles for their burning of churches and execution of Catholic priests, particularly in the early days of the war. Nestor Makhno also was scorned by Christian groups and individuals for his antipathy toward religion. Notable here was the expropriation of farm ands and his depredations among kulaks , many of whom were Mennonite settlers.[23]

Anarcho-Pacifism and Religious Anarchism

Anarcho-Pacifism is a term which may encompass those who profess a Christian anarchism and those secular anarchists who totally reject the use of violence under any circumstances. The latter, however, profess no religious justification for their belief but rather rely on the principles of reciprocity, mutual aid, and mutualism for their position. They hold that humans are innately driven to mutual aid, that reciprocity is a universal feature of human behavior which ultimately means a brotherly love as practiced through non-violence. Being secular, they are, like the classic anarchist thinkers, critical of religion and include the church and clergy with the state and the capitalist corporation as oppressive and domineering institutions which should be abolished. Perhaps Paul Goodman (1911-1972) might fit in this category.

One may be surprised at the number of individuals who are Christian anarchists, but one should be aware of the close similarity of the teachings of the Sermon on the Mount with those of anarchism. Both teach a rejection of domination and power and emphasize non-violence (although the latter has not always been recognized by non-Christian anarchists). I have already noted the extent to which secular anarchists embrace Christ's emphasis on love and the golden rule.

Adin Ballou (1803-1890), noted primarily as a founder of the Hopewell Community in Massachusetts, is probably known to few anarchists today and

had no influence on the movement. Although he was the first that one would call a Christian anarchist, he completely rejected the term and called himself a socialist instead. Even the Wikipedia's somewhat extensive biographical entry of Ballou never mentions his anarchist orientation. Ballou affirms a primary adherence to a divine government:

> the infallible will of god prescribing the duty of moral agents, and claiming their primary undivided allegiance, as indispensible to the enjoyment of pure and endless happiness . . . denominated "the kingdom and reign of Christ."[24]

He then proclaims the anarchist position that human government is totally unnecessary. Like Tolstoi, who devoted some space to reporting Ballou's beliefs in his "Kingdom of God," Ballou advocated non-resistance. The non-resistant seeks to supersede human government with the kingdom of Christ.[25]

Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tolstoi, likely the greatest anarchist theoreticians, were all born into the Russian aristocracy and reared in the Russian Orthodox Church. In his thirties, Tolstoi (1828-1910) underwent a conversion experience which eventually led him to adopt his own version of Christianity and anarchism. He was uncomfortable with the term anarchist because of its association with violence, even though he clearly adhered to anarchist principles. Tolstoi's primary objection to the state was that it was a purveyor of violence—indeed, the chief agent of violence in the world. He was utterly opposed to all violence anywhere and for any reason, and his anarchism was clearly derived from this non-violent stance as well as from the belief that Christian doctrine provided a sufficient guide for behavior. (Hence his belief that government is unnecessary.) For Tolstoi, the central message of Christianity is the Sermon on the Mount. He denied that Christ is the son of god and instead regarded him as a great moral teacher. He advocated a life of voluntary poverty, simplicity, and non-violence. For this he was excommunicated from the Orthodox Church in 1901. In response he wrote:

> I believe in God whom I understand as Spirit, as love, as the Source of all. I believe that He is in me and I in Him. I believe that the will of God is most clearly and intelligently expressed in the teaching of the man Jesus, whom to consider as God and pray to, I consider the greatest blasphemy. I believe that man's true welfare lies in fulfilling God's will, and His will is that men should love one another and should consequently do to others as they wish others to do to them. . . . I believe therefore that the meaning of the life of every man is to be found only in increasing the love that is in him . . . that this increase of love leads man . . . towards the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth: that is, to the establishment of an order of life in which the discord, deception and violence that rule will be replaced by free accord, by truth and by the brotherly love of one for another.[26]

Tolstoi inspired a number of Tolstoyan societies and communities including many in Russia and England, though few if any have survived.[27]He was a great hero of Mohandas Gandhi, who was arguably his greatest disciple. Indeed, it is doubtful that any other anarchist has ever been as influential as Tolstoi.

Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948) is rarely mentioned in anarchist circles or publications. Nevertheless he is obviously a Christian anarchist. In "Slavery and Freedom" he writes

> There is absolute truth in anarchism and it is to be seen in its attitude to the sovereignty of the state and to every form of state absolutism. . . . The religious truth of anarchism consists in this, that power over man is bound up with sin and evil, that a state of perfection is a state where there is no power of man over man, that is to say, anarchy. The Kingdom of God is freedom and the absence of such power . . . the Kingdom of God is anarchy.[28]

In his youth Berdyaev was a Marxist but soon came to reject Marxism and was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1922. Furthermore, although he was a member of the Russian Orthodox Church throughout his life, he was nonetheless charged with blasphemy in 1913, a charge which was never pursued because of the onset of the First World War.

In a short book entitled *Anarchy and Christianity* Jacques Ellul offers his position on the relation between the two and affirms a Christian anarchy. Like Tolstoi, Ellul rejects all violence (including any which might be inspired by or carried out in the name of anarchism) and advocates "pacifist, antinationalist, anticapitalist, moral and antidemocratic anarchism."[29] At the same time, however, Ellul does not believe that an ideal anarchist society is possible, but only a new social model which would be similar to that proposed by anarchosyndicalists of the latter part of the nineteenth century.[30] In his attitude towards religion he is similar to Tolstoi, associating the church with the state and therefore regarding it as un-Christian. For Ellul, God is not a king nor is Jesus a Lord. The Bible, he thinks, teaches a different view of god according to which god is love and so cannot be forced or imposed on anyone. God, like love, is free; god liberates. Ellul further believes that the Hebrew Bible is opposed to political power and, of course, that Jesus, as well as Paul, are teachers of love and non-violence and opponents of government.

In the contemporary United States the most influential Christian anarchist group is (odd though it may appear) the Catholic Worker Movement, founded by Peter Maurin (1877-1949) and Dorothy Day (1897-1980). The philosophical basis for the movement derives from Peter Maurin, who draws first on his devout Catholicism and then upon a Catholic system called personalism combined with the influence of Nikolai Berdyaev, Leo Tolstoi, and Peter Kropotkin (particularly his *Mutual Aid* and *Factories, Fields and Workshops*). Personalism

emphasizes the primacy of Christian love, of "putting on Christ" in human affairs, a position much akin to Berdyaev's view.

The Catholic Worker movement claims to be committed to non-violence, voluntary poverty, prayer and hospitality to the needy. Catholic Worker centers are organized in 185 cities throughout much of the world, but especially in the United States, and still thrive today by providing meals for the poor and places to sleep. The anarchism of the Catholic Worker Movement is a "romanticized and nostalgic notion of a medieval free commune. Their model amounts to a variation on an authoritarian corporate one: the church becomes the state."[31] From the New York City center the movement has published for many decades a monthly four-page paper; other papers are published in Los Angeles and Houston. Members have been active participants in numerous anti-war demonstrations. It is difficult to determine how many of the Catholic Worker supporters are actually anarchists. While its monthly publication may have 100,000 or so readers, it is freely distributed or sold for only a few pennies and distributed largely to Catholic parishes. It seems likely that the actual number of members who consider themselves anarchist may be only a tiny percentage of the total.

Mention may be made of various religious denominations which tend to hold anarchic ideas. These are primarily Christian groups, though there may have been Muslim sects in the past which held these ideas. None of these groups is consciously anarchistic—particularly not politically so. The anarchic Christian sects include those in the Anabaptist tradition, especially Old Order Amish and Hutterites along with the Doukhobors and the Sons of Freedom.This being said, it must be emphasized that clearly few if any of them would appreciate being classed with anarchists. Basic to the teaching of the Anabaptist groups is the "Two Kingdoms" theology, which holds that there is an earthly city or kingdom represented by the state and government. The earthly kingdom is worldly and un-Christian because it is based upon a legitimation of the use of violence which cannot be used by true Christians. Thus true Christians cannot participate in government and have no need for such an entity. There can be no such thing as a Christian state, as States are only necessary for worldly non-Christians. At the same time, Christians must render unto Caesar and be obedient to the state so long as doing so is consistent with their conscience. Thus, they are conscientious objectors to war; they do not vote, participate in juries, join armies or police forces, or hold positions in government. The true Christian associates only with the kingdom of god through the church, the community of believers who practice the teachings of Christ. The church is a voluntary organization of full and equal members guided by a clergy that is elected by lot. A member may be expelled or "disfellowshipped" from the association if he is found guilty of un-Christian behavior. For the Old Order Amish and Hutterites this means the individual will be shunned by members of the community and it is in this manner that Hutterite colonies and Amish communities operate. They have no police

or courts and they do not apply to them (although because they exist within na-
tion states they are ultimately subject to the law and force of the worldly
government).

As I have said, the Hutterites and Amish would never consider themselves
to be anarchists, and other Anabaptists such as most all of the Mennonite groups
have abandoned the two kingdoms theology and its implications. Nevertheless it
seems clear that the Old Order Amish and Hutterites at least do adhere to a fun-
damental anarchist principle that government and the state are evil and
unnecessary institutions and this principle is based on an interpretation of Chris-
tian doctrine. The Doukhobors are a sect originating in eighteenth-century
Russia who hold to principles similar to the Society of Friends or Quakers. As
with the Anabaptists, few if any Doukhobors would much appreciate being
called anarchists and the term would still be best limited to that branch known as
the Sons of Freedom. Doukhobors differ from Anabaptists in fundamental ways.
For example, they accept the Bible only as one inspiration and source for belief,
holding that there is a continual revelation as individuals receive the spirit of
god which is found in all people. This is similar to the Friends' belief in the in-
ner light and, like the Friends, Doukhobors also observe neither baptism nor
communion and have no clergy. Some individuals within the Doukhobor com-
munity are believed to be filled with the spirit more than others and so take on
greater powers of authority. The anarchistic aspects of Doukhoborism are in this
belief in the inspiration by the Holy Spirit which takes precedence and is there-
fore above all human governments and laws. Any such inspirations are believed
to follow the Gospel teachings of Jesus so that on this basis Doukhobors are
objectors to war and all violence. They further stress voluntary poverty and sim-
ple lives of prayer and toil. In the latter part of nineteenth century they came
under the influence of Leo Tolstoi and, consequently, these ideas were rein-
forced. The Sons of Freedom also stressed more than other Doukhobors as well
as the Anabaptists the supremacy of the guidance by the spirit of god and a re-
jection of state authority.[32] They gained a reputation for violent protest against
the state especially concerning the education of their children and subjection to
other state regulations although they still professed pacifism.

Among Muslims there have been in the past sects as well as individuals
which have adhered to anarchic ideas. Patricia Cone has discussed one such me-
dieval Kharijite sect, the Najdiyya. In traditional Muslim thought the laws of
god have been instituted and written in the Holy Qu'ran and the only necessity
for a leader of the Muslim community—i.e., an imam—is to enforce those laws.
There is ideally no provision for a ruler as legislator. However, these imams in
practice became true rulers and legislators. The Kharijites in general were criti-
cal of the whole notion of the imam or leader of the community and the
Najdiyya sect, a branch of the Kharijites, particularly rejected the notion entirely
as did some of the followers of the Mu'tazilites. They argued that if people fol-

lowed the Qu'ran they did not need an imam. The idea of the imam was just another fallible human institution.[33]These sects have long since become extinct.

In addition to these religious sects there are numerous societies which have an anarchistic social organization although its practitioners would not recognize it as such and they would in no sense be considered advocates of anarchism. All of these groups hold as well various religious beliefs. I have discussed these peoples in *People without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchy*. Anthropologists generally refer to these societies as acephalous, or without a head, rather than as anarchistic, believing that to call them anarchist is to suggest that they are chaotic. A considerable number of such acephalous societies are characterized by a tribal organization, particularly in Africa, in which there is a division of the "tribe" into several segments which are in turn segmented into smaller groups although the smallest groups may be considered the most significant to the individual. There is no central leadership, the chief individuals in a tribe being elder male kinsmen whose relationship to group members is a family one and not that of governmental appointee. That is, they do not have the power to force obedience but rather act as men of influence.[34]There are other anarchic peoples who maintain a "band" type organization usually characteristic of hunting and gathering or foraging peoples such as Inuit and Bushman, but also the Sami reindeer herders. Bands are composed of small groups of a dozen to a few dozen people who are invariably related to one another and again the political system is a kinship one usually one in which the senior kinsman is the most influential. However, he may also be the most successful hunter in the band. In any case, as with the tribal leaders above, these do not have power to command and force obedience but are rather men of influence.[35]

Within the tribal societies there is a widespread belief in ancestor worship and also rain making cults are common. Among the band type shamanism is widespread. In both it is possible for a single individual to obtain a considerable amount of power such that he frightens individuals into obedience to him. Rituals of ancestor cults are invariably under the supervision of a senior kinsman. Rain cults center on those who have acquired some supernatural powers as do the shamans in the band organization. It is through these religious roles that it is possible to overthrown an anarchic order and invest domineering power, if only temporarily, in the hands of the religious leaders and in this way Hocart and Rocker's claim for the origin of government and the state in religious power might be substantiated.

Discussion

It is perfectly logical for one who rejects all forms of domination, as anarchists do, to then reject concepts of an all powerful divinity or religious institution. The Catholic Worker Movement, however, expresses an illogical position in its

affirmation of such an extreme authoritarian system as the Roman Catholic Church while at the same time professing to embrace anarchist ideas. After all, the head of that church claims to be infallible in terms of faith and morals. He appoints the hierarchs immediately beneath him and they in turn appoint lesser lights and so on in a completely top-down, authoritarian, and hierarchical form of organization. The priestly rulers are empowered to censor all members in what they may read, observe, or hear. The Catholic Worker leadership would close the entire operation down if required by their priestly superiors. Those superiors may excommunicate—meaning that a believing individual can be denied access to his eternal salvation—for criticizing the church or its priests, for engaging in behavior that is opposed to church teaching (such as birth control, abortion, or divorce), for reading or writing heretical material and so on. In their adherence to this system the Catholic Worker Movement is part of a church which for 700 years practiced an Inquisition in which as late as the nineteenth century individuals were executed for their beliefs and until only a few decades ago maintained an Index of Books which censored the use of hundreds of books for the members. Further, it carried on four crusades against Muslims in which thousands died and throughout it existence its agents engaged in innumerable forced conversions.

Aside from their alleged espousal of anarchism, a further quite incongruous feature of the Catholic Workers is their reliance upon the writings of Leo Tolstoi and Nikolai Berdyaev. Tolstoi embraced many views heretical to the Roman Church and he was very critical of the Roman Catholic Church. Berdyaev was, like Tolstoi, affiliated with the Orthodox Church although in maturity he took an independent, quite mystical and anarchical interpretation of Christianity. That a Roman Catholic could claim to be an anarchist demonstrates the most profound misunderstanding and lack of knowledge of what anarchism is all about.

Concerning the Christian sects which I have designated as having anarchistic tendencies, they are in general to be faulted for their distinctly patriarchal orientation. While they cannot exercise violence in their use of authority, the Hutterite and Old Order Amish ministers readily become authoritarian powers within the community. Even more so have been leaders among the Dukhobors including the Sons of Freedom. Further, the Anabaptists groups , like the Muslims, have various puritanical rules and regulations regarding life style which one would hardly consider amenable to an anarchist. The Anabaptists even consider that government and the state are necessary for non-Christian "sinners." The Doukhobors seem much more "liberal" in all of these issues.

Tolstoi's pacifism is most compatible with anarchism. It does not seem at all reasonably un-anarchist to proclaim his hatred and opposition to power and domination and then, to use that power and domination to impose his free society as was attempted by Nestor Makhno in the Ukraine or by Spanish anarchists in 1937 or by the advocates of propaganda by the deed. How can an anarchist confiscate factories, farms or other businesses for the revolutionary society

without compromising his principle? How can he employ the ultimate sources of violence to institute his beloved society?

Adin Ballou's notion and, one should add, the notions of Anabaptists and other Christians as well that we must accept a divine government as our absolute law and that it makes human government superfluous would certainly be rejected by most anarchists since it would be readily argued that a divine government is only another form of domination which can only be imposed by human agents. Ellul may be cited for a rather unusual interpretation of the Hebrew Bible and of the apostle Paul. The Bible has many different messages. Certainly the so-called books of Moses contain so much violence that one must conclude contra Ellul that god is a very violent and cruel entity and that the main message is one of political power and murder. There is one appropriate point, frequently overlooked, which Ellul does make, and that is that the tribes of ancient Israel like tribal systems mentioned above possessed no central authority. While Ellul writes positively about Paul as one who cherished liberty, we must recall that Paul asks us to obey our masters and keep our proper place. It is only with Jesus that we find a message of love, non-resistance, a questioning of political power and a possible argument which might be made for an anarchist Christianity.

An unusual feature in the recent history of contemporary American thought is the apparent revival of conservative fundamentalist Christianity. Among such groups is the Christians United for Israel which holds that we are now moving historically towards the fulfillment of Biblical prophecy. This is the end of the world as we know it, and presumably the establishment of the kingdom of god centered in Israel for god's chosen people, the Jews. One wonders how many Jews actually realize that this organization is actually not sympathetic to them but would have all the Jews converted to the brand of Christianity preached by Pastor Hagee.

In addition to this there is at least one evangelical organization which advocates the enforcement of the Levitical law with all of its stoning and execution of adulterers, homosexuals, and other supposed undesirables. There are millions of others in the fundamentalist movement all of whom profess a belief in the literal truth of the entire Bible and among other things deny any truth to the theory of evolution and hence to the biological sciences. And, of course, we never cease to hear from the Vatican. Only recently the pope has declared that atheism is the main cause of evil in the world, having overlooked the role of his own organization in this. Perhaps Tucker and other anarchists have been in error in believing they do not need to be so much concerned about religion and the church.

As to other believers in god it seems to me that various definitions of god are less acceptable to the anarchist than others. Who could possibly believe in a god who is at one and the same time all powerful and all loving? Our world operates according to rules which clearly produce cruelty. If god loves his creation

we may legitimately ask why life is so widely based upon a principle of preda-
tion of the innocent and if an all powerful god is supposed to love mankind why
does he permit the widespread painful death of so many infants and young chil-
dren. Why does he permit death at all? And for those Christians who believe that
god gave his only begotten son as a sacrifice for humanity, one may inquire how
a loving god could permit his only son to be nailed to a cross and allowed to die
in such a terrible fashion. It is argued that god in his infinite wisdom cannot pos-
sibly be comprehended by mortal man. Therefore, the pain and suffering in the
world are beyond our understanding. But if god loves man as is claimed, it is
only proper that he should explain why there is all this apparently unnecessary
suffering. Otherwise by keeping us in the dark god is playing the role of a cruel
trickster.

In No anarchist could believe in an almighty god or in a Christian god who
murders his own son. While it seems to me that the evidence is overwhelmingly
against it, nevertheless, perhaps an anarchist could have a loving divinity that
has little power or, say, one who merely acts as a human advisor. The chief en-
emy of an anarchist is domination and authority used for purposes of
manipulation and control. Most anarchists seem to recognize that authority has a
legitimate place in human relations in that we accept the authority of various
kinds of specialties where one has little or no expertise himself. A layman ac-
cepts the diagnosis and recommendation of the physician, dentist, or plumber;
the policeman on the other hand is an arbitrary authority, an appointed domina-
tor.

In *People Without Government* I noted that religion and anarchism need
not be totally incompatible depending in the main on how authoritarian the relig-
ion was.[36] Religious systems which demand human interveners between humans
and the divine give power of domination over people to those invested with such
roles. A religion which insisted upon priesthood as essential intermediaries is
incompatible with anarchism since it gives a select elite power over others much
in the same way that governors and police exercise similar powers in the state.
Although the religious functionary does not employ force to impose his will he
does use fear and threatens the believer with great pain if "the will of god" is not
obeyed. Anarchists must address the problem of order. If they object to the state
as the chief agent of violence in forcing social compliance the question arises, is
the use of sanctions which instill fear and terror in any way more legitimate? All
sanctions on an individual's behavior are coercive and aimed at disturbing his
psyche. Does this mean they are all to be rejected by the anarchist? How then is
social order to be maintained? If the anarchist is to have any society at all he
must satisfy himself with the minimum of coercion. He may forego the authority
of the state, the church and the capitalist corporation, but must tolerate some
minimal kind of rule enforcement for without rules there is no society. Anar-
chists themselves engage in rule enforcement all the time. And in contrast to the
general society they recognize as well that each person is equal in his capacity to

enforce the rules. Enforcement is not to be limited to an elite group. The sanctions they practice include criticism of their fellows, gossip, and shunning.

Priestly religions and any which aim to frighten the individual into obedience are very likely to hold beliefs in powerful, autocratic divinities and are best associated with the conception of the state. So not only priest ridden religion but also any religion which holds to supreme and autocratic gods is quite intolerable. It is to be noted that authoritarian forms of Christianity and Islam both prevail in powerful nation states and this is because these religions teach authoritarian doctrines of dominance.

While a majority of anarchists readily profess atheism, perhaps that belief appears a bit arrogant for it embraces a point of view which has not much more scientific proof than an affirmation of god. I would prefer to say that god is an unproven or unprovable hypothesis, a view which is quite amenable to a complete rejection of priestly and church organization and all powerful gods. The most positive contribution to an anarchist theory of religion is derived from Peter Kropotkin who rather than devoting his energies to a negative denunciation of religion proposed an alternative explanation for the basis of morality as the innate capacity for mutual aid. Perhaps Kropotkin's examples of mutual aid among animals are sometimes naive and even mistaken. Nevertheless, mutual aid stands as a fully legitimate factor of evolution. Further, Kropotkin believed too much in the goodness of humankind and like Bakunin and Proudhon was immersed in that nineteenth century intoxication with science and inevitable progress. Modern anarchism has long since rejected the notion of progress and like Malatesta has developed a skeptical view about the sanctity of science. It is no longer so optimistic.

Rudolf Rocker's hypothesis of the origin of the state in the institution of the priesthood and in religious ritual is another important contribution even though it may be an over statement. At the same time it should be noted that the anthropologist A.M. Hocart in *Kings and Councilors*, presents evidence in support of this point of view. Anarchism must never be identified with Christianity or any other religions, but rather with the doctrine of love thy neighbor as thyself. It was advocated by classical anarchists such as Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Reclus who were mostly atheists. There is no social or political philosophy other than anarchism which so embraces this principle, even though those who profess anarchism have too often strayed from it. Kropotkin's theory of the innate nature of mutual aid is basically a restatement of neighborly love. In the past 3000 years there has occurred within the areas of the so-called civilized world religious systems which advocate the golden rule in an attempt to alleviate the differences between various peoples who are brought together through trade, settlement and conquest. However, these systems also become immersed in ideas of dominance and power and are hijacked by the state to buttress its power.

Although anarchists have rightly criticized religion as an agent of the state, the cause of the murder of millions, the suppressor and censor knowledge, let us always recall that religion has been a primary motivation for the creation of the greatest music, art, and architecture. Let us bear in mind that even though submerged in blood it is through religions that we have been continually reminded of the importance of that anarchist principle of brotherly love. Perhaps it is that very principle which can act as an alternative to religion.

Notes

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2.   *Ibid.*, pp. 450-1.
3.   Max Stirner, *The Ego and His Own* (New York: Boni and Liveright, n.d.), pp. 197-8, 200.
4.   Mikhail Bakunin, *Selected Writings*, ed. A. Lehning (New York: Grove, 1973), p. 124. Italics here and below in original.
5.   *Ibid.*
6.   *Ibid.*, p. 125.
7.   *Ibid.*, p. 128.
8.   *Ibid.*, p. 131.
9.   Marie Fleming, *The Geography of Freedom* (Montreal: Black Rose, 1988), p. 38.
10.   *Ibid.*, p. 162.
11.   *Ibid.*, p. 153.
12.   Brian Morris, *Kropotkin: The Politics of Community* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2003), p. 70.
13.   Roger Baldwin, ed., *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets* (New York: Dover, 1970), p. 91.
14.   Vernon Richards, ed., *Malatesta: His Life and Ideas* (London: Freedom Press, 1965), pp. 23-4.
15.   *Ibid.*, p. 24.
16.   *Ibid.*, p. 39.
17.   *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
18.   Rudolf Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture* (Los Angeles: Rocker Publication Committee, 1937), p. 42.
19.   *Ibid.*, p. 45.
20.   *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 55.
21.   Peter Glassgold, ed., *Anarchy: An Anthology of Emma Goldman's Mother Earth* (Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 2001), pp. 92-93.
22.   Benjamin Tucker, *Instead of a Book* (New York: Arno, 1972), pp. 30-31.
23.   Frank Epp, *Mennonites in Canada, 1920-1940* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1982), p. 145.
24.   Leonard Krimerman and Lewis Perry, eds., *Patterns of Anarchy* (Garden City, NY: Anarchor Books, 1966), p. 141.

25.   *Ibid.*, p. 144.
26.   Peter Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism* (London: Fontana, 1993), pp. 371-2.
27.   George Woodcock, *Anarchism* (New York: Meridian, 1962), pp. 233-234.
28.   Nikolai Berdyaev, *The Beginning and the End* (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 147-8.
29.   Jacques Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1991), p. 13.
30.   *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.
31.   Harold Barclay, *People Without Government: An Anthropology of Anarchy* (London: Kahn and Averill, 1996), p. 104.
32.   Hugh Herbison, "Religion" in Harry Hawthorne, ed., *The Doukhobors of British Columbia* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1955), passim; Svetlana Inikova, "Spiritual Origins and the Beginnings of Doukhobor History," in Andrew Donskoy, John Woodsworth and Chad Gafford, eds., *The Doukhobor Centenary in Canada* (Ottawa: Slavic Research Group, University of Ottawa, 2000), pp.1-21.
33.   Harold Barclay, "Islam, Muslim Societies, and Anarchy," *Anarchist Studies* 10:2 (2002), pp. 105-118.
34.   Barclay, *People Without Government*, pp. 54-89, 90-92.
35.   *Ibid.*, pp. 39-54, 90-92.
36.   *Ibid.*, p. 30.

Part 4: Classical Anarchism

11

Reinventing Resistance: Constructive Activism in Gustav Landauer's Social Philosophy

James Horrox

As a writer, journalist, playwright, translator, activist, literary critic and political theorist, Gustav Landauer (1870-1919) attracted a following that included some of the most esteemed literary and philosophical figures of his generation. Studying the problems of language and religion, of atheism and skepticism, reformism and revolt, his theoretical books *Skepticism and Mysticism* (1903), *The Revolution* (1907) and *A Call to Socialism* (1911) laid the foundation of a voluntaristic, anti-dogmatic form of anarchism that fused the likes of Proudhon, Bakunin, Stirner, Kropotkin, Tolstoy, Nietzsche, de la Boétie, the Medieval Christian mystics and the German Romantics into a complex mix of conservative and revolutionary mentalities aspiring to a reconciliation of Stirnerite individualism and socialist communalism. Although only a minuscule fraction of Landauer's work is presently available in English and the full extent of his contribution to the development of European anarchism thus largely unacknowledged, a seeming renewal of interest in Landauer during the last few years is no coincidence given the complexion of contemporary anarchist thought. As one of the first to endorse the notion that "you can't blow up a social relationship," Landauer's analysis of political power is one held as virtually axiomatic by today's radicals, his strategizing for a "living revolution" clearly anticipating recent shifts away from direct confrontation towards strategic non-violence and the construction of prefigurative social institutions as functioning alternatives to extant systems of domination.

Through two lines of inquiry——theoretical and empirical——this article assesses the continued relevance of Landauer's social thought within this milieu. I begin with an overview of his particular form of anarchism, with a specific focus on his critique of power and his take on the role of popular agency in the transition to a post-capitalist future, before moving on to consider some of the ways in which his ideas resonate with contemporary anarchist dialogue and action. By way of concepts derived from Day, Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari I close

with a look at how Landauer's strategizing is also being seen in practice in grassroots anti-authoritarian movements external to the mainstream activist milieu, and suggest that his social theory presents a theoretical framework uniquely suited to the landscape of 21ˢᵗ century anarchist resistance.

Landauer as Anarchist

Landauer's politics were formulated during the 1880s and 1890s, a time when Germany was feeling the full effects of the Industrial Revolution and Marxism had established its foothold in the European workers' movement. When Landauer abandoned university in Strasbourg for Berlin in 1891, the libertarian worldview that had been cultivated in his youth by a love of music, theatre and literature, by the social insights of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Rousseau, Tolstoy and Strindberg and by the bombastic existentialism of Friedrich Nietzsche, led to his rapid immersion in the revolutionary mood of the city's left-wing literati. Under the aegis of the radical student group the *Berliner Jungen* (the Berlin Youth) he received his introduction to the ideas of Proudhon and Kropotkin, and as editor of *Der Sozialist* (The Socialist), a weekly newspaper established in 1891 by an offshoot of the *Jungen* known as the Union of Independent Socialists, he became a distinguished figure within the countercultural milieu of *fin de siècle* Europe. Under Landauer's editorship *Der Sozialist* came to be widely viewed as one of the best anarchist newspapers on the continent, and earned Landauer Europe-wide interest.

Shortly after his arrival in Berlin, Landauer penned a number of articles for the Socialist Democratic Party's newspaper *Die neue Zeit* which intimate a degree of sympathy for the early, less authoritarian Marx, but his experiences of political activism during the 1890s (notably his expulsion from the Second International Congresses in Zurich in 1893 and London in 1896) cultivated an ardent opposition to Marxism as accepted in the European Social Democracy of the time. Remote from the "free association and union, the absence of authority, mind freed from all fetters, independence and well-being for all"[1] that Landauer held to be socialism's true objective, the ideology of Plekhanov, Kautsky, Bebel et al, directed exclusively at the "use [of] political rights and the legislative machinery . . . to enhance the interests of the proletariat and win political power,"[2] seemed to him an authoritarian, state-bureaucratic dogma whose demands of blind allegiance led to the stifling of free expression and steamrollering of dissenting voices by then typical of the SPD. Influenced by Nietzsche's sociological method and critique of modernity and by the epistemological skepticism of Fritz Mauthner, who during the 1880s and 1890s formulated an opposition to positivist science derived from a linguistic critique of human knowledge, Landauer saw in the Marxism of European Social Democracy little more than an ideological construct of particular fetishized scientific ideas ele-

vated into a quasi-religious creed negating the holistic, subjectively-derived understanding of self and society that the complexity of the human being demands.

Rejecting the reigning Marxian conception of the human being and society as an expression of alienated thought rather than a response to it, Landauer held Marx and Engels directly responsible for "the mechanization of thought and dogmatic fossilism in the areas of science and the view of history" arising from their "attempts to construct a political dogma out of a scientific dogma."[3] The progenitors of scientific socialism, he declared in 1895, are the "fathers of the dark contention that the study of history and the recognition of the laws of economic development must, with complete certainty, determine how our circumstances will evolve in the future."[4] The science to which Marxism appealed for its integrity was, he maintained, in fact little more than "the presumption of being able to calculate the future with mathematical certainty from a few crumbs of knowledge of the past and present."[5] As he quotes from Nietzsche's *On the Use and Abuse of History for Life*,

> [H]e who first learns to stoop and bow before the "power of history" ends up nodding his approval like a Chinese puppet to every power, be it a government or public opinion or a numerical majority, and moves his limbs exactly in time to some "power" that pulls the strings. . . . What? Religions are dying out? Just look at the religions of historical power, beware the priests of the mythology of evolution and their scuffed knees! And which school of decency is such a contempt for history! Take everything objectively, understand all, how that makes it gentle and cozy![6]

A second though no less important corollary of "such an unbearable pride of knowledge as the Marxist godfathers of science display" is that their "scientific" approaches to sociology ignore the role of the spiritual and independent intervention in political and economic conditions, relying instead on an "automatically functioning evolution" based on a

> knowledge of the past and currently effective trends [which] is so completely deficient that we have every reason not to rely on their efficacy . . . and to put more value on our will than our knowledge.[7]

Hostile to the notion of consciousness as a super-structural reflection of economic conditions endorsed by Marx, Engels and their "desolate and spiritless successors"[8] Landauer thus believed will and consciousness to be of critical importance and saw room for a much greater degree of pluralism within European socialism than permitted by historical materialism's reduction of human history to the artificial rigidity of two battling economic classes.

> Just as the brain in the human body raises itself to lord over the rest of the body and forces the other organs into automatic activity, so too do the spiritual movements in society often become completely independent and develop from

each other without every individual link requiring material intervention in every case.[9]

Viewing the proletariat's non-reflexive conformity to protest mentalities and their tendency to frame their movements' ideological self-understanding in predominantly negative terms as expressions of their own alienation, Landauer savagely excoriated those more concerned with the politics of protest and demand than with creativity. Equally fallacious, he believed, was the anarchist notion that political power could be forcibly overthrown, and he reproached advocates of left-wing violence as having "accustomed themselves to living with concepts, no longer with men."[10] "From force one can expect nothing" he proclaimed,

> neither the force of the ruling class today nor that of the so-called revolutionaries who would . . . attempt to command a socialist society, out of nothing, into existence.[11]

> One can throw away a chair and destroy a pane of glass, but those are idle talkers and credulous idolaters of words who regard the state as such a thing or as a fetish that one can smash in order to destroy. . . . The State is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of behavior; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by behaving differently toward one another. . . . We are the State and we shall continue to be the State until we have created the institutions that form a real community.[12]

Taken from his 1910 article *Schwache Stattsmänner, Schwacheres Volk* (Weak Statesmen, Weaker People) this remarkably prophetic passage—Landauer's most radical step beyond the leftist critiques of political economy of his time and today probably the most famous of all his writings——presents a dispersal of power relations that moves beyond the strictly class-based analysis prevalent among his contemporaries. The capitalist state ceases to be an extra-societal entity explicable by rigid scientific theorems and governed by teleological historical forces, and becomes instead a delicate and infinitely complex living organism woven from a vast multiplicity of living relationships between individuals. Power is implicit in and expressed by every single one of these interactions, and it is the sum total of the asymmetries of domination inherent in this capillary network of relationships that makes up the larger power structures. Fetishization of terms like "the establishment," "the system" and "the state" obscures the fact that the systems of domination to which they refer are therefore not external to us, but are implicit in the configuration of our relationships. Though necessarily centralist, bureaucratic and coercive, state power is therefore not something that can be "smashed" by a radical overthrow of capitalist institutions; rather, as the product of the will of the masses at a given time, it is something carried within each and every human being and will therefore subsist

(only) to the extent that human interaction takes the form of this particular relationship that supports it.

From Isolation to Community

Social transformation thus becomes a creative endeavor for all humanity involving the gradual erosion of the importance and the source of existence of the particular kind of relationships from which the state is composed. Seeing no reason why one or other section of society should be endowed with the mantle of sole agent of human transformation (not least since class is itself an artificial organization of human beings, an edifice of industrial capitalism) Landauer therefore rejected class struggle for externally-induced changes in economic organization, as he did all other strategies seeking to effect change by working within the structures of the capitalist state (labor unions, socialist political parties etc.). Since such approaches merely legitimize and perpetuate existing structures and ultimately result only in greater enmeshment within their constituent webs of power,[13] socialism for Landauer is

> in no way a matter of state politics, of demagogy or of the struggle for power and position by the working class, laboring for the capitalist economy, and it is equally less limited to the change of material circumstances than it is . . . a spiritual movement.[14]

Anarchism, as Landauer understood it, is

> a basic mood which may be found in every man who thinks seriously about the world and the spirit. . . . [T]he impulse in man to be reborn, to be renewed and to refashion his essence, and then to shape his surroundings and the world, to the extent that it can be controlled.[15]

Such a "sublime moment," he writes, "should fall to the lot of everyone." Social revolution must therefore be a process of wholesale spiritual renewal, beginning with the individual and extending to the entire life of society. Following in the leftist, humanitarian volkisch tradition within German romanticism, Landauer saw in the organic unity of the nation (an organic association of individuals based on shared spirit, culture, ideals, memories, values and language) a beautiful and deep-rooted spiritual bond, a natural link between people which currently lies dormant, trampled underfoot by the capitalist state. Whereas the latter is a hollow, artificial institution, clothing itself fraudulently in the mantle of nationality to disguise its nothingness and "deceitfully connect[ing] this nationality . . . with a community occupying one geographical territory which has nothing to do with it,"[16] in the organic interplay between the local folk cultures of pre-capitalist Europe Landauer saw a genuine society formed from a rich

multiplicity of freely federated communities bound into a cohesive whole by the warmth of this unifying spirit. This bond, Landauer believed, needs to be "summoned from the depths where it lies buried under the incrustations of the State," possible if and when "the hard crust that has formed on mankind, if their own 'inner statehood' is broken open and the slumbering immemorial reality aroused beneath."[17]

"The path we must tread" therefore "does not lead outwards but inwards."[18] Invoking Eckhart's notion that man carries the whole world within himself, Landauer sees a retreat into the deepest and most intimate recesses of ourselves as a means of achieving a "communion with the world" and thereby enabling our inner convictions finally to come to the surface and find outward expression in a living reality:

> We . . . can only find the community which we yearn for and which we need if we separate ourselves from the old communities. If we isolate ourselves completely, and if we as individuals withdraw deep into ourselves then we will finally discover the most primeval and common community in the innermost core of our most secret being: the human race and the universe. Whoever has discovered this joyful community in himself is enriched and blessed forever and a day and once and for all divorced from the everyday random communities of the present age.[19]

This emphasis on individual self-realization and the belief that the individual could achieve this self-realization at any time mean that a free society is not conditional on a future stage of human development, but rather is always both possible and impossible in the present: "possible when there are people who want it and are willing to act; and . . . impossible when people are unwilling or are only willing but not able to act."[20] The form of detour by way of the archaic in Landauer's elegiac and largely eisegesic anthropology (as in that of Marx or Kropotkin or Morris) thus acts as a powerful and subversive device for critiquing and revitalizing modern capitalist civilization: should individuals transcend the artificial mindset of capitalist modernity, it argues, step out of their received social construct of reality and renew deep-rooted bonds of community at the most basic, everyday levels of human interaction, then "the creation and renewal of a real organic structure" can begin. With the restoration of community, "an organic cohesion that . . . wants to expand and, out of many groups, form a great arch,"[21] this embryonic formation in time "'destroys' the State by displacing it."[22] In this way, socialism will grow up from below, gradually becoming a reality "not within the state, but outside the state; at first alongside the state as long as this outdated stupidity, this organized infringement, this great foolery still exists."[23]

Lebenskristallen

In an article published in 1910 entitled "Destroying the State by Creating Social-ism," Landauer proclaims that radicals should "under no circumstances have anything to do with politics,"[24] which he defines as "the rule of the privileged with the help of fictions." In place of such "politics," he calls for a "direct affin-ity of real interests," an anti-political movement away from any dependence on the state, parties, trade unions or any other centralist or coercive institutions. Those seeking a restructuring of society must remove themselves physically and psychologically from the capitalist world and, through common effort, carve out functioning enclaves of libertarianism within the shell of the existing order as a prefigurative framework for emancipation. Through the expropriation of vacant land and the establishment of cooperative financial institutions to pool resources for larger land purchases, self-sufficient co-operative communities should be brought into being as the seeds or "life crystals" (*Lebenskristallen*) of a future order. Adamant that there is nothing preventing people from getting together and building factories, workshops and houses for themselves if they so desired, Lan-dauer borrowed from Proudhon and Gesell (cf. also Samuel Edward Konkin III, John T. Kennedy, Wendell Berry) in promoting such forms of transitional econ-omy as an exchange bank or "People's Bank," a system of egalitarian exchange and popular, interest-free credit system conducive to general trade without the interference of banks and other profiteering intermediaries.

Synthesizing elements of modern *Zivilisation* and pre-capitalist *Kultur*, this emergent formation would gradually grow into a complex and far-reaching net-work of interlaced alliances and inter-alliances of agro-industrial *Gemeinschaft* settlements modeled loosely on the federalist, decentralized communal life Lan-dauer saw in the village communities (*Gemeinden*) of Medieval Europe. Within each settlement, the artisanal forms of production and rural communal traditions of pre-modern societies would be restored in tandem with small-scale industry, re-establishing the organic unity between agriculture, industry and the crafts, and between manual and cerebral work. The development of this autonomous community system within and alongside the existing order would in time see an entire alternative infrastructure rising up within the bosom of the state, eventu-ally to outgrow it, displacing corporate structures as the economy's primary engine of wealth creation and the centralized coercive state as the focus for all other forms of community.

A mutually-fertilizing combination of disengagement and reconstruction, the creation of such alternative forms of organization is therefore not seen as preparatory to some future revolution (as in most other modern revolutionary theories), but rather is of intrinsic value in and of itself. Rather than providing positive energy to existing structures and processes in the hope of their eventual reform, rooted in the critique of authority propounded in Étienne de La Boétie's *Discourse on Voluntary Servitude* (1548) it works to erode the relevance and

efficacy of capitalist structures by gradually diverting creative energy away from them, depriving them of their life blood and thereby rendering them obsolete. "The further the spirit of socialism gains ground" Landauer writes,

> the deeper it is brought forth from the true nature of man, . . . the more em-
> phatically authoritarian violence is replaced by tolerance [and] the state
> replaced by the league of free communities and associations, i.e., society.[25]

Topos and Utopia

The vigorously pluralistic and non-dogmatic nature of this vision reflects Lan-dauer's pervasive emphasis on "unity through diversity," his loathing of the abstract, undifferentiated world promised by the social blueprints of Marxism translating into a utopianism based on the interpenetration of a diversity of so-cial forms into a voluntaristic, freely constituted "society of societies." Close parallels can be found in the political tradition of Panarchism, the advocacy of co-existence between disparate political systems based on a maximal disaggre-gation of authority and the absolute freedom of the individual to choose the political system in which to live. Landauer's friend and collaborator Max Net-tlau wrote on the concept in *Der Sozialist* in 1909, stressing the value of Landauer's notion of secession in noting how "'Down with the State!' and 'Only upon the ruins of the State . . . ' express emotions and wishes of many, but it seems that only the cool 'Opt out of the State' . . . can help them towards their realisation."[26] Analogous ideas have characterised extra-territorial or exterri-torial governance systems such as the Functional Overlapping Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) of Swiss economists Bruno Frey and Reiner Eichenberger and "multi-government" as advocated by Le Grand E. Day, as well as propo-nents of ideas such as seasteading.

Landauer's overriding concern, however, is not so much with the physical complexion of the emergent structures——community can manifest itself in myr-iad different forms——as with their metaphysical formation. Community for him is something slow, something that accretes; it is intangible (though also mate-rial), and is, above all else, something woven out of relationships. When Landauer speaks of a "wedge, pushing forward,"[27] he is not referring to some or other kind of producer- or consumer-cooperative, or one or other specific occu-pation or specific location, but a *gemeinschaft-type society and process* woven from strong primary relationships, a process in which individuals interact in an "all-embracing mutual conditioning."[28] The "commune" is primarily a *particu-lar relationship between individuals*, rooted in a fundamental redefinition of self, community and reality——more a "holism" than a cooperative, an "organic social reciprocity"[29] or "intensity of belonging" born of a deep-rooted reconnec-tion with a "full consciousness, an inner individual awareness of social ties that demand cooperative activity."[30]

From here a radical new form of anarchism becomes possible, an anarchism that has no finite goal, nor aims to be a final state of development or a static form of society, but rather becomes permanent, an infinite and perpetual process in which ends and means are one and the same. Remote from the eschatology of millenarist traditions with which he shares many of his mystical, pantheistic traits (cf. Vieira, de Fiore, da Silva), Landauer envisaged no one final stage of development, but a boundless evolution stretching off into the far distance. "It does not occur to me to desire to see a finished result" he declared in 1918. "I will always see something beyond the end; I am concerned with the process."[31] Every utopia for him leads to a new topia——different from the old one, but a topia nevertheless. "The utopia is the sum of all aspirations in a pure and refined state" he proclaims, "none of which can achieve its end, and all of which can only bring about a new topia." Revolution, rather than being one singular spark of creation/destruction, is the period between the end of the old topia and the beginning of the new topia,

> the path from one topia to the next, from one relative stability to another, through chaos and revolt, individualism, heroism and bestiality, the loneliness of the great, and the total disappearance of the atom in the mass.[32]

Landauer in a Post-Foucauldian Age

Landauer's middle-class origins and hostility to the class-war led to a certain degree of isolation from the mainstream European workers' movement of his day, the vehemence and eloquence of his excoriation of Marx proving insufficient for him to be fully accepted even by many anarchists. Although many of the 19th century's anarchist theorists (notably Kropotkin, Proudhon, Bakunin and Reclus) shared the Romantic outlook to some extent, Landauer's attraction to secular spiritualism, his fascination with Christian mysticism and nostalgia for the popular religiousness of Medieval Europe align him much more solidly with classical German Romanticism than any of his contemporaries. His 1903 book *Skepsis und Mystik* (Skepticism and Mysticism) and his translation of *Die mystischen Schriften des Meister Eckhart* (the Doctrines of Meister Eckhart) locate his worldview powerfully within the Romantic tradition of Eckhart, Spinoza and Goethe, and the religiosity that surrounded him has elicited enduring comparisons with the Old Testament prophets. Buber in particular portrayed Landauer as an anarchist in the image of Jesus, continuing on the path blazed by the Essenes in exhorting the reinvigoration of the spiritual community as a means of destroying the state from within. Like Jesus, Buber believed, Landauer founded "a new sect destined to grow in the belly of the monster and burst it."[33]

Yet Landauer should not be regarded purely as the anarchist mystic Buber and others have made him out to be. Throughout his life he participated in nu-

merous and diverse political struggles, from his early agitation activities with the *Jungen* (during which he fought against the expulsion of the anarchist factions from the Second International and earned himself a series of prison sentences for *Der Sozialist*'s advocacy of civil disobedience), to the more "utopian" practical experiments in which he engaged during the early years of the twentieth century. In 1903 he attended meetings of the union of *Deutsche Gartenstadt Gesellschaft* (German Garden City Association), an organization based on the romantic anti-urbanism of the Garden City movement of Geddes and Howard and the Arts and Crafts movement of Ruskin and Morris in England. In 1908 he was among the founders of the *Sozialistische Bund* (Socialist Bund), a federation of autonomous communities spread across Germany, Switzerland and France intended to be a framework for the construction of a libertarian order. The local-level initiatives in which he took an interest were many and varied. In 1914 for example, he exhorted communities to set up soup kitchens for the homeless and hungry, to take common action to provide food, clothing and shelter for those affected by the developing hostilities in Europe, for instance though growing food on lawns and street borders. As well as helping provide relief for those displaced by the war, he believed, such projects would provide a training ground where people could be introduced to the benefits of common effort.[34]

Landauer's most consistently enthusiastic audience, however, was always among Europe's middle-class idealists rather than within the organized workers' movement. The neo-romantic worldview of many of the artists, writers and other bohemian types of *fin de siècle* Berlin contained much of the ethical-idealism of his own, and from the turn of the century, as his politics became increasingly orientated towards Christian mysticism and the pacifist agrarianism of Tolstoy, Landauer gradually drifted further away from agitation activities and towards the literary and artistic milieu. He remained heavily involved in avant-garde theatre, writing plays and serving on the literary and artistic committee of the Neue Freie Volksbühne (New Free People's Theatre), which he co-founded alongside Wilhelm Bölsche and Ernest von Wolzogen in Berlin in 1892, and retained close links with German literary naturalism and writers of the expressionist movement, notably Georg Kaiser and Ernst Toller. His lectures in the salons of Berlin and his prolificacy as a journalist, translator and literary critic earned him the admiration of Silvio Gesell, Eberhard Arnold, Ernst Bloch, Gershom Scholem, Walter Benjamin, Hermann Hesse and Arnold Zweig among others. Through his close friendship with Martin Buber, whom he met at a meeting of the Friedrichshagen bohemian group Neue Gemeinschaft (New Community) in 1900, he was to become a major intellectual influence on Europe's nascent socialist Zionist circles; at Buber's behest, during the first two decades of the twentieth century he lectured to many of the socialist Zionist youth groups who later travelled to Palestine as part of the Third wave of Jewish immigration during the 1920s, and it is no coincidence that much of his social theory would later find expression in the practical reality of the kibbutz movement.[35]

Leaving the Left Behind

Following his death in the Bavarian Revolution of 1919, an uprising in which he was at best a reluctant (though important) participant, Landauer drifted out into the peripheral vision of English-language academia and radical social movements, returning briefly during the 1960s and 1970s when interest in communal living and non-violent, communitarian forms of anarchism afforded him an energetic, if transient, revival among left-wing social movements. Though his name is well known to today's radicals, a continued paucity of translations means that the substance of his ideas still remains largely obscured to an international audience. Nevertheless, much of the very same vocabulary that led to his isolation from the struggles of the workers' movement of *fin de siècle* Europe will be more than familiar to the present generation of anarchists: as one of the first and most articulate remonstrations against the fetishization of values and reification of state and society, his frustration with the vacuity and lack of imagination evident in the proletarian strategizing of his own time is today echoed in the thinking of post-leftist and post-anarchist theorists, his appreciation of the inefficacy of protest and class-oriented struggle and impatience with the left's inability to think beyond the confines of abstract ideological frameworks finding clear expression in contemporary criticisms of traditional radical thought.

Moreover, Landauer's analysis of state power anticipated the central premise of Foucault's governmentality thesis so fundamentally that it has today come to form the basis of post-anarchist theory, whose grounding in post-structuralism (notably Foucault's "infra-power") develops his notion of capitalism and the state as sets of relations between subjects (discourses) rather than rather than as 'things' that can be smashed (structures). Hence Todd May argues that

> anarchist political intervention issues from a recognition of the network character of relationships of power and of the variety of intertwined but irreducible oppression that devolve upon those relations.[36]

Anarchism's objective thus shifts from the elimination of power to the reconfiguration of power, from the attempt to confront the institutions of capitalism and the state head-on towards the reorganization and rearrangement of social relations in such a way as to achieve greater symmetry in power relationships. In other words, although the macrostructures cannot be "beheaded," the networked micro-relations of power from which they are constructed can be used to produce systemic effects.[37] From here, the adoption of Landauer's analysis of power translates into a corresponding practical expression of the particular modality of resistance he tried (with limited success) to introduce to the radicals of his own era.

Reinventing Resistance

In mapping the present generation of social movements, Canadian sociologist Richard Day identifies a pervasive abandonment of the universalizing conception of social change characteristic of the logic of hegemony as it developed within (post)Marxism and (neo)liberalism, observing how defining elements of the "newest" social movements (post-1980s) embody a shift away from the "hegemony of hegemony" ("the assumption that effective social change can only be achieved simultaneously and *en masse*, across an entire national or supranational space")[38] which he argues characterized the twentieth-century left. Instead of restoring representative forms of centralism and a hierarchical structure, the "Newest Social Movements" are defined by their use of "non-universalizing, non-hierarchical, non-coercive relationships based on mutual aid and shared ethical commitments"[39] to achieve social change. Formed from lateral affiliations and complex systems of networks and popular bases, thus "organized along rhizomatic lines and actively warding off the development of arborescent structures," this system provides bases for

> social forces that neither ask for gifts from the state (as in the liberal democratic new social movements) nor seek state power themselves (as in classical Marxism). Unlike the molar forms of social transformation, these molecular movements . . . resist the will to domination in Foucault's sense, in favor of affinity; that is, they . . . take up ethico-political positions, but refuse to try coercively to generalize these positions by making moral, ontological, or other foundational claims.[40]

Today's social movements, Day argues, are thus "not oriented to allowing a particular group of people [i.e. "class"] to remake a nation state or a world in its own image," but are attempts to "determine the conditions of [our] own existence, while allowing and encouraging others to do the same."[41] Finding extant social movement theory undermined by its failure to address these shifts, Day suggests that in order to fully comprehend current developments it is necessary to break away from the tradition of hegemonic thought and formulate an alternative genealogy based on the anarchist tradition of "structural renewal" which, he believes, finds its apogee in Landauer's work.[42] By way of Deleuze and Guattari and Foucault, he thus revives Landauer's concepts of "affinity" and "structural renewal" which he sees as finding practical expression in contemporary activist currents, integral to which is an emphasis on direct action tactics based on "the construction of radical alternatives within and against postmodern globalizing capitalism."[43]

Within the organized anarchist left, itself a rhizomatic model of molecular social movement organization characterized as a "decentralized global network

of communication, coordination and mutual support among countless autonomous nodes of social struggle'[44] the ethos of prefigurative politics, a creative approach to direct action based on "[realizing] anarchist social relations within the activities and collective structures of the revolutionary movement itself"[45] is central. Having adhered for most of the twentieth century to the traditional inventory of protest, demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, destructive action, uprisings and riots,[46] anarchists' strategic repertoire now encompasses "a commitment to 'being the change one wants to see in society, on any level from personal relationships that address sexism and racism to sustainable living and communal economies.'"[47] With anarchists of all stripes united in the belief in going beyond simply preparing for revolution and actually building the future in the present,

> [t]he collectives, communes and networks in which activists are involved today are themselves the groundwork for a different society "within the shell" of the old one.[48]

Rebuild, Redefine, Respirit

With Landauer's concept of "decentralized networks of alternatives" now defining a generation of antiauthoritarian action, anarchism is no longer seen by its proponents as a "speculative vision of a future society" but "a description of a mode of human organization, rooted in the experience of everyday life, which operates side by side with, and in spite of, the dominant authoritarian trends of our society."[49] But since the target of anarchist struggle has shifted from "state and capital" to the more general "domination," and since the baseline understanding of political power is now founded in an acknowledgement of the state as "a whole set of little powers, of little institutions situated at the lowest level,"[50] the consensus underlying this endorsement of prefigurative action, namely that attacking state power necessitates "challenging and attacking infrapower," facilitates a radical expansion of anarchist dialogue and action beyond even its present boundaries. As Jacob Mundy argues:

> If oppression operates along a spectrum, running from sexist slurs to genocide, then we should be open to the idea of anarchies of different scales, durations, qualities and conditions. In other words, we should move away from absolutist or binary thinking (e.g., hierarchy/anarchy) to a more pluralist and gradated analysis of hierarchies and anarchies.[51]

This position evokes Buber's reading of Landauer, namely that the "abstract alternative 'State or No-state'" (the "Either-Or principle") becomes an obstruction inasmuch as its negativity towards anything less than the absolute "devalues the measures that are *now* possible. If the State is a relationship that can only be

destroyed by entering into another relationship, then we shall always be helping to destroy it to the extent that we do in fact enter into another."[52] In other words, should we embrace the pluralism of what David Graeber terms "a kind of sociology of micro-utopias, the counterpart of a parallel typology of forms of alienation, alienated and non-alienated forms of action," then

> the moment we stop insisting on viewing all forms of action only by their function in reproducing larger, total forms of inequality of power, we will also be able to see that anarchist social relations and non-alienated forms of action are all around us.[53]

With the historical distinction between "reformist action" and "revolutionary action" therefore effectively nullified, a plethora of fresh sites of resistance and avenues of empirical exploration are opened up; a whole range of initiatives designed to translate anti-authoritarian values into grass-roots social restructuring by altering the asymmetries of power in our everyday relationships become potential new centers of struggle——not tools for facilitating increased confrontation with the state and capitalism (which is essentially the role Gordon sees for prefigurative social institutions within the anarchist arsenal), but a transformative force of value *in and of itself* within a modality of resistance that transcends the notion of "being-against-something" altogether, in favor of constructing alternative institutions in an attempt to combat the existing system by replacing it with a new society.[54]

Day's examples of such include the "*asambelistas* in Argentina, LPM activists in South Africa, Zapatista villagers in Chiapas, Mohawk warriors within/against North America, squatters in London,"[55] all them groups and movements he sees as "exploring the possibilities of non-statist, not-capitalist, egalitarian modes of social organisation,"[56] Various other ways by which people might begin "to 'behave differently,' to go beyond Anarchist theory and begin to build the elements of a new society"[57] ubiquitous in contemporary anarchist literature include autonomous social centers, popular assemblies, small-scale decentralized agriculture, LETS (Local Exchange Trading Systems), alternative currencies, mutual banking, credit unions, tenants committees, food cooperatives, allotments, directly democratic extended neighborhood communities, household and home assemblies, employees' associations, cooperative housing associations, alternative education institutions and progressive forms of home schooling, temporary and permanent autonomous zones, community gardens, guilds, co-housing, alternative and sustainable technology and numerous different kinds of low-impact living initiatives.

Most of these find direct precedents in Landauer's writings, and many have now been tried and tested in varying degrees by social movements around the world. But it is equally important——if not more so——to take into account the momentum such ideas have been gaining external to the political activist milieu. During the late twentieth century, a whole range of experiments aiming in vary-

ing degrees at self-sufficiency, cooperative labor and ecologically sustainable community life came into being as a means of enabling people to live outside extant axes of domination in cooperative alternatives—alternatives designed not as bases from which to coordinate direct confrontation, but to "rebuild, redefine and respirit . . . from the ground up."[58] With acceptance of the notion that the first steps towards building an anarchist society lie in examining our own personal relations for asymmetries in domination must come a broadening of anarchist intervention to encompass numerous such initiatives designed to readjust the asymmetry of power in our everyday relationships in such a way as to create "the institutions that form a real community," and thus to forge our own, non-alienated futures within and alongside the existing order.[59]

The anarchist notion of "Guerrilla" or "Community" Gardening for example, aiming at rebuilding community and reclaiming the capacity to grow one's own food, is today being adopted and developed on a much wider scale than ever before, having been transforming the landscape of towns and cities across the world over the last three or four decades. During the mid 1990s, for example, community gardeners in Detroit radically expanded the reach and efficacy of the guerrilla gardening model in forming the Detroit Agricultural Network (DAN), which has since helped organize a coalition of health providers, emergency food providers, church representatives and university researchers who have developed a Food Security Plan combining urban agriCulture, food cooperatives and youth training programs. Students at the University of Detroit Mercy created a vision of how a two and a half square mile area of the city could be developed with gardens to produce food, windmills for energy, a tree farm and sawmill to produce lumber for sale and schools that include community-building in their curriculum,[60] the message being that "we can't free ourselves until we feed ourselves," that "once we can meet our basic needs, we are also empowered to make our own choices on how we want to live."[61]

This message is being repeated across a much larger movement for change that seeks to promote food self-reliance, creating better community health and local community involvement.[62] A quarter of a century after the advent of permaculture, one of the movement's founders, ecologist David Holmgren, sees declining energy reserves and concomitant economic contraction giving rise to "new opportunities for bottom-up social processes more invisible and more subversive than the mainstreaming of environmental innovation," pointing in particular to the Worldwide Opportunities on Organic Farms" (WWOOF) as a way to

> harness the catalytic energy of nomadic youth' towards constructive alternatives, but also as a means for practical skills, as well as tactical and strategic thinking to circulate among an itinerant subculture.[63]

Formed in 1971 as a means of providing city-dwellers with experience of rural life, WWOOF now has an expansive network of host farms stretching right

across the world providing room and board in exchange for work, with volunteers often able to cultivate their own organic garden and in most cases sharing in the farm's produce. Some of the more well-established communities offer forms of home schooling for their younger members and volunteers and many are developing permaculture-based socio-economic models aiming towards complete secession and total sustenance from local and regional sources.

Such (quasi-)exterritorialy autonomous volunteer communities represent both an alternative or "counter-power" facilitative of secession from mainstream forms of organization, and a locus for environmental and social awareness to encourage changes within society (consuming behavior, resources use, abundance perceptions etc.) with the aim of fostering changes in people's lifestyles towards sustainability. Comparable examples are infinite, ranging from urban homesteads, ecovillages and related forms of intentional community to freeganism, rewilding and online networks of information-sharing about DIY lifestyles, self-sufficiency and alternative living strategies based on limited participation in the capitalist economy and minimal resource consumption. As initiatives with the aim and/or effect of siphoning energy away from capitalist forms of production and reversing the ontologies that feed them by providing schooling in alternative ways of living, these globally-networked enclaves of collaboration—though seemingly humble, perhaps, in comparison to the Zapatistas or the MST—belong within a modality of resistance eminently consistent with Landauer's notion of "structural renewal," acting at once as a negative force working against the monopolization of everyday life by the institutions of capitalism and the state, and as a positive one working to reverse this process through the cultivation of community, social concern, cooperation and sharing at the grass-roots level.

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12

Alchemy in Clarens:
Kropotkin and Reclus,
1877-1881

Dana Ward

The connection between geography and anarchism may seem obscure, but it was no accident that two of the major anarchists of the late Nineteenth Century were also geographers, for capitalism despoils both land and labor. Nor was it a mere accident that the two found themselves exiled together in Switzerland, long a magnet for outcasts, but also home of the most vibrant anarchist movement in the aftermath of the Paris Commune. Between 1877 and 1881 Kropotkin and Reclus worked and, for a time, lived close together, remaining lifelong friends despite steel bars and open waters separating them. Kropotkin's stay in Switzerland proved formative and the purpose of this essay is to explore the role the friendship between Reclus and Kropotkin played in the development of their thought. The conclusion to be drawn from that exploration is that in "balance of trade" terms, Kropotkin was very much in Reclus' debt. Consequently, Reclus deserves as much recognition as Kropotkin for development the anarcho-communist flavor on the menu of anarchist options.

Although Elisée Reclus was the more important geographer, and Peter Kropotkin the more important anarchist, the merger of their views produced a new understanding of the anarchist ideal, one grounded more firmly than ever in both science and nature. Sorting out the terms of the merger is difficult for several reasons. Both Kropotkin and Reclus were influenced by ideas already in circulation, particularly Darwin's among the non-anarchist writers, and both were already committed anarchists when they met, so there were bound to be considerable overlapping areas in their ideas, but at least in broad outline their distinct contribution to each other's ideas can be charted. To simplify, each gave the other an adjective to modify their principle subjects. Reclus gave Kropotkin a more social, or what today we would call ecological, focus for his geography, and Kropotkin gave Reclus a more communal understanding of anarchism. Even

that characterization distorts the nature of the exchange, since before their encounter Reclus certainly appreciated the function of communes and Kropotkin could not help but have noticed the environment's impact on the lives of Siberian peasants. So perhaps it would be best to say that each polished the other's understanding, but that Reclus' "polishing" of Kropotkin's ideas was more thorough and complete. The new perspective presented here is that Kropotkin's life's work was very much a working out of the practical applications of Reclus' ideas. Below an attempt is made to get inside their friendship, to see how each experienced the other. The goal is to re-experience the alchemy at work in Clarens during the years when Kropotkin and Reclus worked together most closely.

Reclus' Turn to Anarchism

Reclus, only twelve years Kropotkin's senior, adopted anarchism long before Kropotkin. In 1851, at the age of twenty-one, Reclus wrote:

> Our destiny is to live in an ideal state where nations no longer need to be under the tutelage of a government or another nation. It is the absence of government; it is anarchy, the highest expression of order.[1]

Although it is clear Reclus had read Proudhon by this point, this declaration by no means indicates that Reclus had a fully developed anarchist philosophy. The point simply is that he had already embraced an anarchist ethic as a young adult. That ethic included principles of justice, equality and brotherly love that in many respects was a form of secularized Christianity. Not until after the Paris Commune of 1871 did Reclus drop his belief that the anarchist ideal might be achieved via republican institutions. Once he adopted that position, he stepped firmly into the anarchist stream of thought. Still, he did not publicly call himself an anarchist until 1876. Despite this lack of a public declaration, Reclus had aligned himself with anarchists, and was perceived as an anarchist, long before 1876. Indeed for the preceding twenty-five years Reclus cleaved firmly to anarchist principles surprisingly rooted in his father's, or perhaps even his great-grandfather's, dissident religious faith.[2]

The Reclus family's spirit of revolt was officially noted as early as the 18th Century. A local official registering great-grandfather Jacques Reclus' marriage described him in the register as a "cooper, heretic, and scholar."[3] Elisée's father (also named Jacques) "embodied a rigorous, Christian-inspired individuality and made much of announcing that he lived by the dictates of his conscience."[4] The emphasis on individual conscience did not preclude a social conscience. Indeed,

> Jacques became a living legend in the Orthez region for his numerous acts of generosity and altruism. . . . For example, when he learned that poor folk were

stealing his potatoes he blamed himself for not being mindful of their needs and then set some potatoes out at the edge of the field for them to share.[5]

In the late 1890s thieves broke into Elisée's house in Sévres and made off with some books, but rather than directing his anger at the thieves, Reclus castigated himself for not anticipating the thieves' needs.[6] In his memorial tribute to Reclus, Kropotkin told a related story about Elisée's father:

> One day, at the age of seventy, he saw in the fields a young peasant burying a horse, dead from anthrax. "You are young," the old man said to him, "and you are risking your life. I am old. Return home! I will bury the animal." The peasant refused—he [Jacques Reclus] insisted; and he worked with the spade alone the whole day. At nightfall the heavy beast was buried.[7]

This kind of solidarity became fundamental to Elisée's anarchist principles. Despite antagonism between father and son, centering primarily on the son's atheism, there is a remarkable continuity in their characters, each struggling to maintain their individuality without losing sight of their social responsibility, although the son seems to have developed a far warmer, gentler demeanor.

Kropotkin's Turn to Anarchism

Kropotkin came to his anarchism after his sojourn in Siberia (1862-1867),[8] but the fact that he chose to go to Siberia upon graduation from the Corps of Pages is an indication of an already well developed social conscience. Kropotkin tells us in his memoirs that he made his unusual decision because "there is in Siberia an immense field for the application of the great reforms which have been made or are coming."[9] In 1866, while still in Siberia, Kropotkin began studying Proudhon, along with the works of Mill, Yunnan, Heine, and Herzen. By this date Kropotkin's experiences had dimmed his hopes of reform in Russia. This disappointment, combined with his reading, began his turn toward anarchism, but that turn was not complete until 1872, in the Jura, amidst workers still inspired by the heroics of the Paris Commune, that Kropotkin "read his way"[10] into anarchism and finally declared himself an anarchist.

The Paris Commune and Its Aftermath

Both Kropotkin and Reclus were profoundly affected by the uprising in the spring of 1971, but just as profoundly, by the Commune's suppression (French historian Alfred Cobban puts the number executed at 30,000).[11] Reclus, of course, was a Communard himself, carrying a rifle (often upside down and nev-

er used in battle) in defense of Paris. Arrested for his effort as the Commune was suppressed, Reclus was jailed for his troubles, spending just short of a year in prison, followed by a ten-year sentence to exile (commuted from exportation), a process which cemented his radicalism and "made it quite impossible for him ever 'to work within the system' again."[12] Reclus chose Switzerland for his exile, joining his brother Elie in March 1872.

For Kropotkin's part, it was news of the Paris uprising that lured him to Europe. In February, 1972, he made his way to Switzerland where many of the Communards had fled, arriving just before Reclus' arrival in Zurich. It appears that Kropotkin and Reclus did not meet each other even though they may have been in the same city at the same time. But neither man lingered long in Zurich. Reclus quickly moved on to Lugano, near the Italian border, while Kropotkin left Switzerland in May, persuaded by James Guillaume that his talents would be put to better use fomenting revolution in his homeland. Arrested for these efforts, Kropotkin was jailed in 1874 and returned to Switzerland only after a dramatic escape from the St. Petersburg military hospital in 1876.

On the Cusp of Their Encounter

In January 1877 Reclus and Kropotkin were at quite different stages in the life-cycle and this difference may have shaped their encounter in significant ways. When they met, Reclus was about to turn 47 and Kropotkin was 35 years old. Neither man would have seen age as a justification for deference and neither man ever seems to have exhibited any will to dominate others, but combined with a number of other factors the age difference was part of a foundation upon which Reclus became the "senior" partner in their relationship.

There was much more than age to create an imbalance, however slight, in their relationship. Perhaps the most important difference was the fact that Reclus was much more embedded in the anarchist movement than Kropotkin, a movement to which Kropotkin ardently wished to contribute. To begin with, Reclus had many direct connections with the foremost leaders of the anarchist movement. When Reclus returned from the Americas, he actually met Proudhon in Paris, as opposed to Kropotkin who merely read Proudhon in Siberia. Proudhon, of course, had turned both Reclus and Kropotkin to anarchism, and their shared appreciation of Proudhon's ideas created a natural affinity between them. Aside from this direct contact with the libertarian cynosure, Reclus had an even closer relationship with the premier anarchist of the second generation of anarchists, Mikhail Bakunin.[13] Reclus had bet Bakunin in Paris when the latter visited in November, 1864. Bakunin was recruiting for his secret International Brotherhood which he had founded earlier in the year, but it was not until January 1865, when Reclus reciprocated Bakunin's visit in Florence, that Reclus joined the already legendary figure in his International Brotherhood. Bakunin also had

asked Elisée to accompany Fanelli on his fateful trip to foment anarchism in Spain.[14] Bakunin's influence on Reclus is subject to debate, for Reclus already had quite well-developed anarchist principles, but it would seem fair to say that Bakunin further radicalized Reclus and moved him farther into militant confrontation than he had previously moved on his own. Despite some friction between the two, Reclus had deep respect for Bakunin, and maintained an amicable relationship with him. Upon Bakunin's death, Reclus gave one of five graveside eulogies.[15] Thus, when Reclus and Kropotkin met, they both were highly evolved anarchists, but Reclus was clearly the more seasoned. Given these direct connections to two major contributors to the anarchist tradition, while Kropotkin had met neither and indeed regretted not having made an effort to meet Bakunin in 1872,[16] it would be surprising if Kropotkin did not show Reclus a natural respect, perhaps envy, or even deference (once his initial misgivings—see below—were overcome).

The problem with this interpretation is twofold. First, Kropotkin was somewhat notorious for being ambivalent toward authority figures and may not have given a hoot as to whether or not Reclus had connections to the leaders of the anarchist movement. Secondly, it could be the case, as Miller noted, that Kropotkin did not want to see Bakunin and "intentionally avoided seeing Bakunin."[17] But it is also the case that Kropotkin told Max Nettlau that the reason he did not visit Bakunin was that Guillaume had told him Bakunin was too frail and ill to receive visitors. Thus, it is likely that Kropotkin's avoidance of a meeting with Bakunin was a function of respect, not ambivalence toward authority. He simply did not wish to cause Bakunin any additional discomfort given his frail condition. Given Kropotkin's regrets about not meeting Bakunin, it is likely that Reclus' relationship to Bakunin only added to Kropotkin's esteem for Reclus. Furthermore, given that there was much more to Reclus' status in the anarchist movement than his personal connections to leaders, there seems to me more than enough evidence to suggest that Reclus was the senior partner in the relationship with Kropotkin.

Aside from age and "pedigree" another factor creating an imbalance, however slight, in their relationship was that Reclus had in fact been a Communard. The Paris Commune was the signal event for anarchist (and Marxists) in the late nineteenth century and to be on close terms with one of its participants must have given Kropotkin some slight sense of awe. We know from Kropotkin's memoirs that the two talked about Reclus' experience in the Commune. Furthermore, Kropotkin wrote his piece on the Paris Commune while living in close proximity to Reclus. The piece was published in the journal *Révolté* which Kropotkin founded and which Reclus contributed to frequently and, almost from the beginning, helped finance. It is clear that the Paris Commune was a pivotal event for Kropotkin and it is also clear that much of his understanding of the politics of the Paris Commune came from Reclus' reminiscences in conversations with Kropotkin.[18] Consequently, it would be surprising if Kropotkin, at a

minimum, did not feel indebted to Reclus for his assistance in bringing the Commune into focus, and more surprising still if he did not feel some sense of respect for the old Communard.

Another factor that may have contributed to Kropotkin's predisposition to regard Reclus as the senior partner in their relationship was professional. Both men were geographers, but Reclus' reputation as a geographer was much more well-established, even by 1877. Although Reclus was not an "academic" geographer he was already regarded as a major contributor to geography and thus in some ways Kropotkin might have come into Reclus' orbit more like a graduate student than a peer. Reclus eventually asked Kropotkin to contribute to the sixth volume of *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle,* and to be asked by such a well established figure into he world of geography to contribute to his opus must have added another grain of sand tipping the scales in the relationship slightly toward deference.

Finally, Kropotkin was a relatively recent convert to anarchism. He had not yet made much of a contribution to the movement and he was eager to find contacts, perhaps even mentors, who could help him find his niche. He eagerly sought out people like Brousse, Guilaume, and Schwitzguébel and often followed their advice, e.g., to return to Russia, to form contacts with workers, to join the Jura Federation, and so forth. Thus his relationship with Reclus would have served him well in realizing his goal of becoming fully integrated into the anarchist movement.

In sum, in early 1877 as Reclus and Kropotkin are about to meet, we find Kropotkin actively seeking entry into the anarchist movement despite only recently having been converted to the "Ideal"; Kropotkin is also relatively young, at the beginning of his career as a revolutionary and geographer, whereas Reclus is more than a decade older and at the midpoint of his already well-established career as both anarchist and geographer; Reclus is already among the leaders of the anarchist movement while Kropotkin is still a foot soldier; and Reclus already had international stature as a geographer while Kropotkin's fame as the first to map the physical structure of northern Asia was only just beginning to develop. Below I will note some temperamental similarities and differences between the two men, but suffice it to say here that Reclus' humility, openness, tolerance, and self-effacing nature made him the perfect mentor for a man "constitutionally" rebellious toward authority figures.

Kropotkin and Reclus Meet

Early in 1877 Kropotkin was once again among his beloved watchmakers where he devoted his time to working with the Jura Federation and pouring out articles for the Federation's *Bulletin* and for *L'Avant-Garde.* Within a month of his return Kropotkin met Reclus for the first time. There is some confusion over the

nature of that meeting. According to Nettlau, Kropotkin had the following assessment of his first encounter with Reclus: "I liked him a lot. We discussed much, and I was pleasantly surprised to find a true Socialist (I was a bit mistrustful about that because of his scholarliness)."[19] According to Miller, however, "His first encounter with Elisée Reclus turned into an argument, and though he later changed his mind Kropotkin doubted whether Reclus was a 'real socialist.'"[20] There are several possible interpretations of this discrepancy: 1) Kropotkin's misgivings were based on second hand descriptions of Reclus before they met; 2) Kropotkin liked Reclus as a person, but disagreed over specific issues or disapproved of Reclus' seeming lack of commitment to action; 3) years after their first encounter Kropotkin's memory of the event may have been colored by his subsequent close relationship with Reclus; and 4) Miller may have mischaracterized Kropotkin's feelings.

As for the first possibility, Miller may be confusing an impression formed before the two geographers met in person with the impression made a the actual meeting. Miller uses the term "encounter" rather than "meeting" when discussing Kropotkin's initial doubts about Reclus, so the misgivings may have arisen prior to the meeting. Miller went on to say, "After meeting with Auguste Spichiger, one of the best-known radical workers among the Jura watchmakers, Kropotkin was left with an unpleasant impression [of Reclus]"[21] It is possible, therefore, that the negative impression Kropotkin had of Reclus came from Spichiger's second hand reports of Reclus' activities. Likewise, Brousse, who was closest to Kropotkin in 1877 and among the Jura Federation's most outstanding members, may have made disparaging comments about Reclus, a member of the more eclectic Geneva group of radicals, and those comments may have aroused Kropotkin's suspicions about Reclus.

With regard to the second possible interpretation, since the negative sentiments toward Reclus quoted by Miller come from a letter written to Paul Robin on April 29, 1877, more than a month after Kropotkin and Reclus had met in February, it could also be the case that Kropotkin was favorably impressed by the man, but was less impressed with Reclus' lack of action. This may indeed be part of the explanation, but it does not preclude other possibilities. It is likely that Kropotkin's memory of his first encounter with Reclus was reshaped by their subsequent close friendship, or at least he had no reason to raise the negative impressions when they were far outweighed by the positive. Kropotkin's description of the initial encounter was related to Nettlau long after the event and long after Kropotkin and Reclus had cemented their relationship. The description of the meeting in the April letter to Robin was much closer to the actual encounter, but there is another letter to Robin, written on February 16, 1877, within days of their meeting, in which Kropotkin states clearly that "I liked him very much. . . . I was pleasantly surprised to see a true socialist."[22] In sum, Kropotkin most likely held reservations about Reclus prior to their meeting

based on others' accounts of Reclus' activities, but upon meeting Reclus, he took a liking to the older man, but still had substantive differences with him.

It is not completely clear what those differences may have been. It is likely, however, that it had to do with the debate over whether and how to commemorate the Paris Commune. Paul Brousse was organizing a commemoration and there was some concern that the event might provoke a police attack. Kropotkin thought such an attack could be useful from a propaganda point of view and he backed Brousse's plans. Reclus, however, was skeptical. Part of his skepticism was based on his critical attitude toward the commune, which, after all, had established a form of government. The proposal for a commemoration of the Paris Commune was made the previous year, in 1876, as part of an effort to revitalize workers' sagging interest in the anarchist movement. Brousse argued that a commemoration would create opportunities to propagandize among workers and to spread anarchist education. For his part, Kropotkin threw himself behind Brousse's effort hoping to use the event to spread anarchist education.

Reclus was more worried about the content of that education. As Fleming noted,

> Reclus said that the very fact of being a government and exercising authority condemned the Commune to impotence, but also that the authorities should have taken the initiative and proceeded to systematically destroy all state institutions and suppress the obstacles preventing the spontaneous grouping of citizens.[23]

Fleming also pointed out that Reclus,

> was aware of the political potential of exploiting the memory of the Paris Commune; in fact, he promoted it as a central feature of revolutionary ideology. He was no less clear in his own mind that he was participating in creation of a "myth."[24]

Reclus' counter-argument about celebrating the Commune was that as a government, the Commune inevitably would become more conservative and undermine the revolutionary momentum of the workers. Consequently, celebrating the establishment of a government, from Reclus' perspective, was problematic. The commemoration did take place in March, the police responded as expected, and while Brousse and Kropotkin regarded the event a success, Guillaume and Reclus were more doubtful. Given the timing of the event between Reclus and Kropotkin meeting each other, and the second letter to Robin in which Kropotkin expressed frustration with Reclus and the Geneva radicals, it is likely that the politics around the Paris Commune commemoration was the source of friction in the early months of their relationship.

Cementing Their Relationship

In the post-Commune atmosphere, Swiss radicals were split between two tendencies and in the first years of their relationship Reclus and Kropotkin found themselves on opposite sides. Kropotkin tended to see the post-Commune period as a continuation of the struggle for freedom going back as far as the French Revolution, if not deep into the Middle Ages. Reclus, in contrast, saw the Paris Commune as marking a distinct break with the past. Reclus wanted nothing to do with the old politics, or parties of any kind. As Fleming noted,

> He chose to associate with the motley Geneva group of French and Russian exiles, communards, and others, instead of moving in the sectarian circles of the Jurassians in Neuchâtel. Reclus was a curiosity; the most anarchist of the anarchists, as often as not he could be found with non-anarchists, and would thus raise the ire of those whose outlook was closest to his. And true to form, much of the hostility directed at Reclus in the 1870s came from people who would later become his closest associates. This was especially true with regard to Kropotkin.[25]

Kropotkin arrived in Switzerland bursting with the revolutionary fervor that his years in prison only stoked. Now a committed anarchist he seemed, as Fleming put it, "captivated by the romantic notion of working for a 'pure' anarchist party."[26] Consequently, Kropotkin linked himself with those striving to keep the First International alive and joined the Jura Federation.

Kropotkin gravitated toward Paul Brousse who seemed to Kropotkin to be uncompromising in his commitment to revolution, possessing as well the energy to bring it about:

> Paul Brousse was then a young doctor, full of mental activity, uproarious, sharp, lively, ready to develop any idea with a geometrical logic to its utmost consequences; powerful in his criticisms of the state and state organization; finding enough time to edit two papers, in French and in German, to write scores of voluminous letters, to be the soul of a workmen's evening party; constantly active in organizing men, with the subtle mind of a true "southerner."[27]

It was through Brousse that Kropotkin was "briefed" about developments since his first visit to Switzerland, and it was no doubt Brousse's influence which led Kropotkin to comment on the Jura Federation's disarray, saying, "Elisée Reclus does absolutely nothing and only lends his name."[28]

Whatever the source, Kropotkin's initial caution toward Reclus points to a fundamental difference between the two men. Once Kropotkin converted to anarchism his career as a geographer was essentially over. He continued to write occasionally about geography (e.g., 1885), including working with Reclus on his magnum opus, but for all practical purposes his career as a geographer was over

when his career as a revolutionary began.[29] For Reclus, it was through his work
as a geographer that he actively, if indirectly, expressed his anarchism. Although
by no means averse to direct action, as in his defense of Paris, Reclus was an
academic and a propagandist, not an activist, a fact he readily acknowledged. In
1879, writing to his friend, the Hungarian geographer Attila de Gerando, Reclus
commented,

> Much more than you, I would merit the reproach of our friend Kropotkin, for
> although I am a revolutionary by principles, tradition and solidarity, I concern
> myself only in a very indirect way with matters of revolution. Apart from some
> articles, calls, a little oral propaganda, and from time to time, some marks of
> solidarity among friends, I do nothing.[30]

That lack of activism may be the root of Kropotkin's initial skepticism
about the nature of Reclus' anarchism. Neither did the fact that Reclus associ-
ated with the non-anarchists ease Kropotkin's initial misgivings. Be that as it
may, Reclus and Kropotkin quickly became friends, collaborators, and if not
comrades in arms, certainly comrades armed with pens.

Between their meeting in 1877 and Kropotkin's expulsion from Switzerland
in 1881, Kropotkin worked closely with Reclus. During this period the two men
formed a lasting friendship based on their enormous similarities in experience,
ideology and interests, which far outweighed their temperamental differences, of
which there were more than the issue of activism:

> Nettlau . . . pointed out some differences between Reclus and Kropotkin, and
> he preferred the former's style. "Reclus always ranged a step higher, standing
> on a wider, higher platform than Kropotkin. . . . Kropotkin's Anarchism seems
> harder, less tolerant, more disposed to be practical; that of Reclus seems to be
> wider, wonderfully tolerant, uncompromising as well, based on a more humani-
> tarian basis.[31]

Reclus, by several accounts, seems to have been the more tolerant of the
two men (his willingness to associate with non-anarchists and his attitude to-
wards thieves being two examples). Although as he aged Kropotkin appears to
have become gentler, more willing to compromise on at least minor principles,
at this stage in his career Kropotkin exhibited the kind of zeal often associated
with recent converts to religious doctrines. This led him to be attracted to the
Jura Federation, the party of "pure" anarchism, rather than Reclus' motley group
of Geneva radicals.

Despite these differences, the similarities between the two men were enor-
mous. Again, here is Nettlau comparing the two anarchists:

> Both tore themselves from milieux which had clung to them through birth and
> education, Reclus from the religious, Kropotkin from the aristocratic-military.
> . . . Both were led by the drive for knowledge and love of humanity towards

the most comprehensive study of nature and man, not in order to specialize in a narrow area but to recognize on the basis of exact observations, the way of social evolution and going from theory to practice to remove the obstacles to this evolution. . . . Both were early introduced to communism, Reclus to the idealizing communism of the early Christians and later persecuted religious sects, Kropotkin to the primitive communism of Russian peasants; both got to know primitive people in their natural habitat (in South American and in Siberia, respectively). . . . Neither belonged to any school or party.[32]

Both men were renown for their good will and both had deep identifications with the down trodden. In many ways, they seem to have been psychologically "in sync" which would only add to the flow of ideas. In his preface to *Words of a Rebel*, a collection of Kropotkin's articles put together by Reclus, Reclus comments,

> Among those who have observed his life from near or far, there is nobody who does not respect him, who does not bear witness to his great intelligence and his heart overflowing with good will. . . . His crime has been to love the poor and the powerless; his offense has been to plead their cause.[33]

For his part, Kropotkin reciprocated the sentiment. In his tribute upon Reclus' death, Kropotkin wrote,

> It was at Clarens that we became acquainted, and soon all of us had learned to love him by meeting him at meetings, at conventions, and at the informal parties of the Jura Federation. . . . [W]hen the *Révolté* was formed at Geneva, he joined us and soon identified himself completely with our paper. To help us, he disdained no work, however small it might be.[34]

Like his father helping bury a horse, Reclus offered up his labor with no thought of compensation, no anticipation of laudatory recognition, merely attention to the work to be done. This lack of self-importance and his many self-effacing comments are perhaps an indication of why this name is not as well known, even among anarchists, as it should be. Later in the same essay quoted above Kropotkin continued:

> Anarchism has already produced a group of characters of marvelous beauty. Elisée was one of the most striking, one of the most expressive. . . . He was an Anarchist to the uttermost depths of his mind—to the smallest fiber of his being. Dry bread would have sufficed him to go through a revolutionary crisis, and to work at building up a future full of wealth for all. He managed to remain poor in spite of the success of his beautiful books. The idea of dominating anyone at all seems never to have crossed his mind; he hated down to the smallest signs a dominating spirit. . . . Since Nature, the study of Nature, of history, of man under all latitudes and at all times, had brought him to see in Man—both in the community and in the individual—a product of the surroundings; since he had conceived Anarchism in its sense

of progressive force acting through the ages, it was for him no more a vain word, or a far off desideratum. He saw, even today, a better way for men to live without seeking to govern one another. He practiced even from now this mode of life, and had he found himself once again in a revolted Commune, his motto would have been: "Anarchism—straightforward, consequent, audacious, and therefore triumphant!"[35]

Clearly the two men had developed the deepest mutual respect, each seeing in the other the embodiment of anarchist principles. In those informal parties, meetings and conventions and in the exchange of manuscripts for their various publications their mutual respect deepened and the role Reclus played may have been something along the lines Paul Reclus described: "It is my impression that Elisée was not the initiator, but that he gave a logical conclusion to discussions and formulated in clear terms the aspirations of his group of friends, Gross, Herzig, Kropotkin, Dumartheray, Grave, etc."[36] The basis of those "conclusions" no doubt came from Reclus' own already well developed anarchist ideas.

The point of all this is that there were several reasons for Kropotkin to be open to influence from Reclus at this point in his career. As Kropotkin, himself, noted, this point in his career was when he "worked out the foundation of nearly all that I wrote later on."[37] In short, the period in Switzerland, in close proximity to Reclus, is the period when Kropotkin consolidated his principle ideas. Exploring those ideas, it is somewhat easy to point to at least some which came directly from Reclus, indeed, some of the most important.

Before turning to an analysis of that flow, it might be best to clarify which projects the two men worked on together, as well as the work they did apart, and to show just how closely they bonded. Between 1877 and early 1879 Kropotkin's activities were centered upon the Jura Federation and the two men met only occasionally. During these initial years Kropotkin began to make a name for himself as a result of his participation in the various socialist congresses between 1877 and 1881. In 1877 there were three such congresses in close succession. In the last, held at Ghent, Kropotkin was elected as one of the two secretaries at the first session, but upon learning he was wanted by the police, Kropotkin quickly left.[38] In 1878, Kropotkin presented his first major political program at the annual Jura Congress in Fribourg. The program was purely Bakuninist, calling for collectivism, abolition of the state, social revolution, and propaganda of the deed.[39] The following year, in 1879, during the Jura Congress, Kropotkin put forward a major ideological statement in connection with his effort to reorganize the Federation. In that statement we see the first move toward anarcho-communism, and as will be shown below, it was Reclus who was responsible for pushing Kropotkin toward this new school of anarchist thought. In short, this is the crucial year in the relationship between Reclus and Kropotkin. By 1880 at the Jura Congress in La Chaux-de-Fonds, Kropotkin is joined by Reclus and during his Congress Kropotkin played a leading role in establishing a redefinition of anarchism along anarcho-communist lines.[40] The last conference Kropotkin participated in before his incarceration in French pris-

ons was the London International Anarchist Conference which met from July 14-19, 1881. At that conference Kropotkin gave an important speech outlining an anarcho-communist perspective on the coming social revolution.[41] The critical event in between the various congresses was the beginning of collaboration between Reclus and Kropotkin both in the journal *Révolté* and on Reclus' *Nouvelle Géographie Universelle.*

It is in their journalistic endeavors that Reclus and Kropotkin had their closest collaborations, not in the politics of the Federation. As Miller noted, "Kropotkin's early radical journalism represents some of his best writing. It is clear from his numerous articles during this period that he was gradually constructing his anarchist ideology."[42] It was with Reclus often at his side, over his shoulder or in his face that Kropotkin began to articulate a new version of anarchism. Kropotkin began by writing for the *Bulletin* of the Jura Federation, but by 1878 the Federation's publications were out of business. In February 1879 Kropotkin, along with François Dumartheray and Georg Herzig, launched his own paper, *Révolté.* Shortly thereafter Reclus came on board both as contributor and financier, and it is from this date that the two began their most fruitful collaboration. It is from here that the flow of ideas between the two men must be addressed, but that flow became a raging river by the spring of 1880 when Kropotkin moved to Clarens to be near Reclus as they worked on *La Nouvelle Géographie Universelle*, and while Kropotkin's wife recovered her health.

The Flow of Ideas

Perhaps the easiest to identify among Reclus' ideas adopted by Kropotkin are those associated with geography. Before Kropotkin met Reclus, it is fairly clear that he saw himself as a physical geographer. Indeed, he was the first to work out the earth's physical structure in Northern Asia. But after his encounter with Reclus, manifest most clearly in the sections on Siberia in *La Nouvelle Géographie Universelle*, Kropotkin had become a social geographer, as Martin Buber noted in *Paths in Utopia*: "Kropotkin is no historian; even where he thought historically he is a social geographer, a chronicler of the states and conditions on earth."[43] Reclus' social geography was more mystical and Kropotkin's more practical, but after their years together in Clarens both were bio-regionalists, emphasizing the natural systems that bind humans to a particular place. Reclus had not yet used the term "social geography" when he and Kropotkin were in Switzerland together. His first published use of the term was in 1905 in *Man and Earth*, but he had used the term a decade before, and the term was actually used first by Paul de Rousiers in 1884.[44] But the ideas underpinning the term were clearly in use while Reclus and Kropotkin were in Clarens together. The basic underpinnings are class struggle, the search for equilibrium and the sovereign decision of the individual.

Closely related to their approach to geography is the importance attached to science in general. Here it is impossible to disentangle the source of their ideas but without question Reclus and Kropotkin were the foremost advocates of a scientific approach to anarchism.[45] Along with the environmental ideas and their views on the distribution of the products of labor, the centrality of science in the advance of anarchism are the three most original contributions Reclus and Kropotkin made to anarchism, to which might also be added Reclus' antiracism and his promotion of equal rights for women.

The third pioneering contribution Reclus and Kropotkin made to anarchism concerns how the products of labor are to be distributed. The fundamental difference between Bakunin's collectivist anarchism and the anarcho-communism of Kropotkin and Reclus can be found in the difference between the slogans, "From each according to his ability, to each according to the work done," and "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need," or in Reclus' preferred formulation, "From each according to his ability, to each according to the principle of solidarity." In the Bakuninist formulation, only the means of production are collectivized; in the anarcho-communist formulation both the means and the products of production were to be collectivized.

When Kropotkin and Reclus met, Reclus had already abandoned his early embrace of the producers' cooperative movement. Perhaps because of his reading of Proudhon and also because of his brother Elie's enthusiasm for cooperative ventures, Elisée also joined and helped found several cooperatives. Elie was always more directly involved in their cooperative ventures, but Elisée lent his active support and also wrote for the journal *Coopération*. By the time of the Paris Commune, however, Elisée had come to oppose such efforts on the grounds that such cooperatives reinforced rather than tore down the existing order. By making money, the workers became property owners, and had to operate under the laws of the capitalist order. Rather than exacerbating class relations, cooperatives serve to smooth the rough edges. Such economic relations tended toward the creation of a privileged class within the working class, a class which would have more in common with the bourgeoisie than their impoverished brothers with nothing but their labor to sell.

Kropotkin came to a somewhat similar conclusion, and, of course, it may have been Reclus who prodded him along. In "The Wage System," a polemic against the collectivists, Kropotkin wrote:

The same with regard to the wage system. After having proclaimed the abolition of private property and the possession in common of the instruments of production, how can they sanction the maintenance of the wage system under any form? And yet this is what the Collectivists are doing when they praise the efficiency of labor notes. . . . That the English Socialists of the early part of this century should invent labor notes is comprehensible. They were simply trying to reconcile Capital and Labor. . . . If later Proudhon took up this same idea, that again is easy to understand. What was he seeking in his Mutualist system, if not to render capital less offensive, despite the maintenance of private prop-

erty, which he detested to the bottom of his heart, but which he believed neces-
sary to guarantee the individual against the state? . . . The Collectivists begin by
proclaiming a revolutionary principle—the abolition of private property—and,
as soon as proclaimed, they deny it, by maintaining an organization of produc-
tion and consumption springing from private property. . . . No hard and fast line
can be drawn between the work of one and the work of another. To measure
them by results leads to absurdity. To divide them into fractions and measure
them by hours of labor leads to absurdity also. One course remains: not to
measure them at all, but to recognize the right of all who take part in productive
labor first of all to live, and then to enjoy the comforts of life.[46]

This critique of the wage system is rooted in the critique of the labor theory
of value and it is Reclus who first developed the anarcho-communist critique of
the labor theory of value and who noted the negative consequences of the wage
system even if wages were paid in labor notes. Arguing that since it was impos-
sible to calculate the contribution of previous generations to the current
production of new goods and services, it was just for individuals to take from
the common stock as appropriate to their needs. To allocate resources along Ba-
kuninist lines would, according to Reclus, produce a privileged class of workers.
   The person credited with the first use of the term "anarchist communism"
was "François Dumartheray on behalf of a group of refugees from Lyons in
1876."[47] Also that same year Errico Malatesta, Carlo Cafiero and Andreas Costa
began agitating in favor of anarchist communism. What is significant, however,
is that there is evidence that Reclus collaborated with Dumartheray in produc-
tion of the pamphlet which introduced the concept. Dumartheray himself
pointed to a speech by Reclus in March 1876 in Lausanne as laying the founda-
tion for anarcho-communism, describing the speech as "a completely anarchist
communist speech."[48] At the time, Reclus was the most important among the
Geneva anarchists, and whether or not he collaborated directly on the published
pamphlet, he clearly set ideas in motion. Dumartheray went on to become Kro-
potkin's stalwart comrade in the founding and operation of Le Révolté in early
1879.[49] It was not until 1880 that Kropotkin committed himself fully to the anar-
cho-communist ideal. As noted, Reclus and others had been agitating for a new
conception of anarchism from early 1876 onward. Kropotkin embraced anarcho-
communism as a goal in 1879, but saw collectivism as a necessary transitional
stage, Not until 1880, at the La Chaux-de-Fonds meeting did Kropotkin fully
embrace anarcho-communism both in terms of means and ends.[50]

Conclusion

There are many other ideas seemingly originating with Reclus that end up being
adopted by Kropotkin that deserve fuller exploration, but for current purposes,
the fact that Reclus transformed Kropotkin from a physical geographer into a

social geographer, from a collectivist to a communist, and from an adherent to the labor theory of value to a critic, should be sufficient to elevate Reclus to at least equal status with Kropotkin as the founders of the anarcho-communist school of thought. Together the two men firmly grounded the anarchist movement in science, bio-regionalism, and communalism and put forward an alternative interpretation of the labor theory of value emphasizing the impossibility of accurately calculating the contribution of previous generations to current generations' productive efforts. When one considers that Reclus also was the more forceful advocate of equality between the races and sexes, Reclus stands as an even more inclusive and influential force in the history of anarchism than someone of even Kropotkin's stature.

Notes

1.   Reclus, quoted in Marie Fleming, *The Geography of Freedom: The Odyssey of Elisée Reclus* (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1988), p. 36.

2.   Like Godwin's family, Reclus' family followed the Dissident Protestant tradition with its profound insistence on being governed by the dictates of one's own conscience.

3.   Gary Dunbar, *Elisée Reclus: Historian of Nature* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1978), p. 16.

4.   Fleming, p. 28.

5.   Dunbar, p. 93.

6.   Joseph Ishill, *Elisée and Elie Reclus: In Memoriam. Including: tributes, appreciations and essays by Elie Faure, Prof. Albert Heim, Jean Grave [and others] fragments, letters, and woodcuts by Louis Moreau.* Compiled, edited, and printed by Joseph Ishill (Berkeley Heights, NY: Oriole Press, 1927), p. 55.

7.   He was not in Siberia continuously during the period, but Siberia was his base.

8.   Peter Kropotkin, *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1899), p. 154.

9.   M. A. Miller, *Kropotkin* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 84.

10.   Alfred Cobban, *A History of Modern France*, v3. 1871-1886 (London: Penguin, 1965), p. 23.

11.   Dunbar, p. 63.

12.   Godwin and Proudhon, themselves, were almost two chronological generations apart from the foundation of the first historical generation of anarchists. Bakunin, who was only five years Proudhon's junior, was both his student and the founder of a new school of anarchist thought, the collectivist branch. Kropotkin, a full chronological generation younger than Bakunin, and Reclus, a half generation younger than Bakunin, founded a third wave of anarchism, anarcho-communism.

13.   Elisée refused to go, but Elie Reclus eventually did go to Spain, but seemingly assiduously avoided following Bakunin's directives, much to Fanelli's annoyance. Indeed, the trip became a source of friction between Bakunin and both brothers for Elie seems to have been willing to contact people of all political stripes while in Spain. Bakunin had hoped Elie would join Fanelli in evangelizing among radicals, bu his contacts with republicans and Fouierists, and a later submission to a "Bourgeois" journal created a

dustup in the relationship between Bakunin and both brothers who Bakunin regarded as two peas in a pod.

14.   The other eulogies were delivered by Guillaume, Schwitzguébel, Zhukovsky, and Brousse. See David Stafford, *From Anarchism to Reformism: A study of the political activities of Paul Brousse within the First International and the French socialist movement 1879-90* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 72.

15.   "I did not see him, and now I regret it very much . . ." (Miller, p. 82).

16.   Kropotkin also learned a great deal about the Commune from Benôit Malon, the author of *History of Socialism*, whom Kropotkin had met and talked with extensively during his first trip to Switzerland.

17.   Miller, p. 83.

18.   Max Nettlau, *Elisée Reclus, la vida de un sabio justo y rebelede*, trans. V. Orobón, 2 vols. (Barcelona: Publicaciones de "la Revista Blanca," 1928), pp. 193-4.

19.   Miller, p. 136.

20.   *Ibid.*

21.   Fleming, p. 90.

22.   *Ibid.*, p. 105.

23.   *Ibid.*, p. 93.

24.   *Ibid.*, p. 105.

25.   *Ibid.*

26.   Kropotkin, p. 63.

27.   Miller, p. 138.

28.   Certainly, he never again conducted any original research in the field. He did, of course, contribute to Reclus' monumental opus, *La Nouvelle Géographie Universelle*, became associated with the Royal Geographical Society in the UK, and published several notes on geographical issues to support himself during his exile in Britain, but all such activity was based on research conducted before his exile from Russia.

29.   Quoted in Dunbar, pp. 90-91.

30.   *Ibid.*, p. 87.

31.   *Ibid.*

32.   Reclus, in Kropotkin, p. 16.

33.   Ishill, p. 60.

34.   *Ibid.*, p. 64.

35.   *Ibid.*, p. 23.

36.   Here is the full quotation: "Here, aided by my wife, with whom I used to discuss every event and every proposed paper, and who was a severe literary critic of my writings, I produced the best things that I wrote for *Le Révolté*, among them the address 'To the Young,' which was spread in hundreds of thousands of copies in all languages. In fact, I worked out here the foundation of nearly all that I wrote later on. Contact with educated men of similar ways of thinking is what we anarchist writers, scattered by proscription all over the world, miss, perhaps, more than anything else. At Clarens I had that contact with Elisée Reclus and Lefrançais, in addition to permanent contact with the workers, which I continued to maintain; and although I worked much for the Geography, I could produce even more than usual for the anarchist propaganda" (Ishill, p. 23).

37.   Miller, p. 140.

38.   *Ibid.*, p. 141.

39.   *Ibid.*, p. 143.

40.   *Ibid.*, p. 146.

41.   *Ibid.*, p. 147.
42.   Martin Buber, *Paths in Utopia* (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1958), p. 38.
43.   Dunbar, p. 113.
44.   Fleming, pp. 1-9.
45.   Bakunin, too, promoted science, but more for its practical application than for advancing understanding of social conditions.
46.   Peter Kropotkin, "The Wage System" in *Freedom Pamphlets No. 1, New Edition* (London: Freedom Press, 1920).
47.   Fleming, pp. 1-9.
48.   *Ibid.*, p. 110.
49.   G. Woodcock and I. Avakumovic, *The Anarchist Prince: A Biographical Study of Peter Kropotkin* (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), pp. 173-176.
50.   Fleming, p. 110.

13

Proudhon, Pragmatist

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Translated by Vernon Cisney and Nicolae Morar

At first glance, it seems peculiar to speak of Proudhon as a pragmatist, insofar as pragmatism, as a current of American philosophy,[1] is subsequent to this author.[2] Philosophical pragmatism, generally speaking, grants a central place to action. It makes action, among other things, the criterion for evaluation of cognitive statements. Nonetheless, some commentators on Proudhon have remarked that he could be viewed as a precursor to pragmatism. This was the case in particular with G. Gurvitch and J. Bancal.[3] However, these authors have mainly insisted on what Bancal has called "the labor pragmatism" of Proudhon. If the father of anarchism "is the first to arrive at a position which will receive the name of pragmatism"[4] this would be because of his view regarding the relation between labor and idea. For Proudhon, ideas have their source in labor as action.

In this chapter, I would like to show that the pragmatist motifs in Proudhon's work do not limit themselves to the question of labor. If, in the sixth study on labor in *Of Justice*, one finds the most complete outline of his labor pragmatism, it is also in this work, in part, that Proudhon develops a certain number of other themes from a perspective that one might also call pragmatist. To carry out this reading of Proudhon is to investigate the question of the relation between theory and practice. If ideas are products of action, what consequence does this have for the relation between economic conditions and political action, within the framework of a theory of social transformation and collective revolutionary action? Do economic conditions determine revolutionary action? Should the latter be thought using the model of insurrection? Is it organized by an avant-garde? Are discursive and juridical practices determined by economic ones? Proudhon's philosophical pragmatism makes action, understood simultaneously as both material and intelligent, a central notion of his political theory and this allows him to think, in an original way, the relation between the economic and the political.

The goal of such an analysis is to attempt to show in what way the work of Proudhon gives us the elements for thinking a renewal of contemporary anti-authoritarian political action that might be an alternative to Marxism-Leninism. In effect, the resurgence of interest in both the work of this author and in philosophical pragmatism seems to me to come together in the theoretical instruments that these philosophies offer.

A Pragmatist Conception of Philosophy

In announcing his conception of philosophy in the first study of *Of Justice* (1858), Proudhon presents a pragmatist theory. "Philosophy must be essentially practical."[5] Philosophy for Proudhon does not have a purely speculative function. But just because it is not of the order of pure speculative thinking, this does not mean, contrary to what the Platonic tradition would have us think, a rupture with common sense. On the contrary, if philosophy investigates the reason for things, this reason is common reason. By opposing to the philosophical tradition a conception of philosophy in line with common sense, it is a question of defending a democratic theory that Proudhon calls the "democratic tendency"[6] of philosophy. This relation between philosophy and democracy constitutes a theme that one may call pragmatist. One finds, in Dewey in particular, a conception that connects pragmatist philosophy to democracy. Dewey shows, in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, that the *implementation* of a pragmatist method in science and in philosophy has played a role in the sudden rise in revolutionary democratic movements. The pragmatist method, by calling into question the authoritarian method in science, situates itself against the authoritarian organization of society.

The second point that Proudhon emphasizes is that philosophy, on his view, denies all forms of transcendence. It is based upon an empiricist method, which is to say, it is from observation that philosophy springs forth. There again, he proceeds from a common ground with pragmatist philosophy since, for Dewey, it is a question of moving from experience, and for James, pragmatism is a radical empiricism. For classical pragmatist philosophers, it is experience that permits us to break away from interminable metaphysical disputes. But what is undeniably pragmatist in Proudhon's conception of philosophy is that, for him, "philosophy is essentially utilitarian."[7] If philosophy is in line with common sense, it cannot be at odds with the concerns of the vast majority of human beings; philosophy would not know how to be an elitist activity, reserved for an aristocratic class. For Proudhon, as for Dewey, the *implementation* of a practical and empirical philosophical method is, in a word, pragmatist, driven to calling into question the conception of philosophy inherited from the Greeks, who made it into a speculative pastime. Through this questioning, philosophy becomes a democratic activity.

A Labor Pragmatism

The thesis after which Proudhon conceives labor pragmatism has already been pointed out by Proudhon's commentators, as we have shown. So J. Bancal writes,

> pragmatism historically finds its first formulation within a great socialist current of thought. . . . Benès, in Proudhon's moral conception, sees him as the initiator of this philosophical current . . . as do Pirou and G. Gurvitch.[8]

It is certainly G. Gurvitch[9] who offers on this point the most elaborated commentaries in his *Proudhon* and *The Founders of Contemporary French Sociology*. He writes,

> labor which is both collective and individual is more than a collective force. It is effort and action, it is the general producer, both of collective forces and of mentality, of ideas, and of values. . . . Labor does not solely produce forces and economic values, but man, groups, societies, and ideas, including justice. In short, it is "society actualized" as a whole that is produced by labor. . . . Thus, pragmatism, in some of its turning points, becomes for Proudhon, as for the American philosopher Dewey, an instrumentalism.[10]

It seems that the first expression of labor pragmatism that one finds in Proudhon's work is, following J. Bancal, in *On the Creation of Human Order* (1843). There, Proudhon defines labor as "an intelligent action of man upon matter, deliberately aiming at personal satisfaction."[11] Thus, labor is defined as an action. This action is performed by man, by means of material instruments, appealing to intelligence.

This action has the particularity of bringing into play a collective force inside the framework of the division of labor. The concept of "collective force" that Proudhon borrows, as he says, from Marquis G. Garnier, has already been emphasized in *What is Property?* (1840):

> the capitalist, it is said, has paid the days of laborers; for the sake of precision, it must be said that the capitalist has paid as many times *a day*, as many laborers it has employed each day, which is definitely not the same thing. Because, this huge force which results from the union and the harmony among laborers, of the convergence and simultaneity of their efforts, it has not been paid at all.[12]

The collective force is not simply the sum of individual forces. What the division of labor produces is not a simple acceleration of labor that a single person could produce but it supposes abilities and talents that one person could not put together. Even singular talents are in large part the result of solidarity and of a

collective force of society. Similarly, Dewey criticizes liberal individualism for justifying the appropriation of the collective intelligence by a minority.[13] What Dewey calls intelligence means "impressive methods of observation, experimentation, reflection, and reasoning which are in constant evolution."[14] Moreover, intelligence is not individual, for him, because the spirit is a social production.

But the most complete account of Proudhon's labor pragmatism is in the sixth study of *Of Justice*, dedicated to labor. Proudhon begins by showing that "the idea, with its categories, is born of action, and must return to action, at the risk of the degradation of the agent."[15] Proudhon's philosophical pragmatism leads him to think that all ideas, including metaphysical ideas, have their origin in action. As a result, the very idea of justice itself is a product of action. Proudhon's pragmatism allows him to surpass the opposition between idealism and materialism. Action is at the same time material and intelligent. Justice, for example, determines itself in the reciprocity of exchanges. Economic exchanges, as well as the exchanges of ideas, are actions. Exchanges of ideas are not phantasms that might be explained by reducing them to the economic sphere, but both types of exchange are real actions that have their conditions of possibility in the matrix of properly human actions, namely in labor. Proudhon, contrary to Marx, does not oppose materialism to idealism, but speculation to action.

Thought is found even in the activity of animals. Proudhon's labor pragmatism is a continuist naturalism. Human intelligence, which is illuminated in labor, is but the natural product of the evolution of instinct.

> The characteristic of the first form of the instinct of thought is to consider things synthetically, the characteristic of intelligence, to consider them analytically. In other words, instinct, having acquired the power to contemplate itself ... constitutes intelligence.[16]

The same continuity enlivens the productions of the manual laborer and that of the intellectual laborer. Beginning with the tool, animal instinct was transformed into intelligence, and activity into labor.

Given this distinction between instinct and intelligence, one cannot help but wonder if Bergson, who in *Creative Revolution* institutes an analysis quite similar, and who was close to the pragmatist philosophy of W. James, did not read this text of Proudhon. Proudhon adds that the genius of man "is not specialist, it is universal,"[17] that what differentiates the man from the animal, for him, is therefore what Rousseau had called perfectibility. But not only is the idea a product of action, but the idea must also return to action. This means that labor and technology must be informed by theoretical knowledge and scientific research. Proudhon, like Dewey, grants an important place to reflection on education. He rejects the distinction between intellectual speculation and manual labor. Education must be "at the same time an education from the parts of the body and from the understanding."[18] Which means that, for Proudhon, manual labor assumes the prior acquisition of a forced theoretical knowledge. In this

sense, the formation of the polytechnician is for him the model that corresponds best to his pragmatist theory.

Public Reason

Another pragmatist concept that one finds in Proudhon is that of "public reason." This concept appears as particularly developed in the seventh study of *De la Justice*, dedicated to "Ideas." Public reason[19] appears in Proudhon as the concept which allows the elimination of the notion of the absolute in philosophy. It is an approach that one may qualify as pragmatist, insofar as it is possible to escape the idea of absolute foundation by way of a procedure of collective argumentation.

> Now it is a question of giving to this collective being whose power and reality we have demonstrated, an intelligence, which we shall reach by a final elimination of the absolute, from which the effect will be to create public reason.[20]

Communicational intersubjectivity, "communicative action," or what Proudhon calls "collective or public reason" becomes, as for Habermas, the way to avoid the absolute of monological conscience. It is made possible by the creation of a true public space. "This is not difficult however: it is what one commonly calls freedom of opinion or freedom of press."[21] It is possible to escape the absolute by posing the opinions against each other. In effect, each individual opinion tends to present itself as absolute. It is possible to attain to the knowledge of reality by the contradiction of opinions. Proudhon therefore develops an intersubjective and realist conception of truth which would therefore put him more in line with Habermas or Putnam than with Rorty in the contemporary debates. Proudhon's philosophy appears as fundamentally anti-Cartesian since it concerns escaping the absolutism of individual conscience by the confrontation of opinions. In effect, for Proudhon, as for Peirce,[22] man is right away a social being: "the freest man is he who has the greatest relation with his fellow creatures."[23]

Public reason constitutes itself, like collective force, beginning with "the group of laborers." For Proudhon, reason finds its condition of possibility in his labor pragmatism—just as we have seen with labor, that is to say action, which is born from reason. Reason is not constituent, but constituted; moreover, it is constituted by the material action of men. Proudhon's public reason recalls Dewey's notion of "collective intelligence,"[24] which also presupposes a theory of the public.[25] In effect, for Proudhon, public reason implies the formation of a public: "every meeting of men, in a word, is formed for the discussion of ideas and the search for legal order." Certainly, public reason transcends individual reasons: "it will reach collective ideas, quite often contrary to the conclusions of

the individual self."[26] But public reason cannot establish itself without the pre-supposed reason of individuals: "in principle, the impersonality of public reason entails as an *organum* the greatest contradiction, the greatest possible multiplic-ity."[27] The exact opposite of public reason would be the absence of contradiction: "without a free and universal public polemic, reaching the point of provocation, there is no public reason, and no public spirit."[28] The opposite of this public spirit is the religious spirit, resting on the argument of authority, in which absolutist reason triumphs to the detriment of public reason.

The refusal of the argument of the majority leads Proudhon to establish a procedural theory allowing the determination of truth and justice:

> 1) to institute, on every issue, a vote and a counter-vote, in order to understand the ratio of opinions to contrary interests; 2) to seek the higher idea, synthesis or formula, in which the two opposing proposals balance each other out, and find their legitimate satisfaction; then to carry out a vote on this synthesis, which, voicing the ratio of opposite opinions, will naturally be nearer to the truth and to the law [*droit*] than any one of them individually.[29]

In effect, it appears that in Proudhon there is a vast difference between an "opin-ion poll" vote and a vote springing forth from a contradictory debate. In the latter case, the individuals argue their positions. From these reasoned positions, it is possible to try to establish a synthesis that rests upon the force of arguments of each party and which is not the simple sum or juxtaposition of different opin-ions.

Proudhon's public reason is pragmatist to the extent that it is at the same time theoretical and practical. It seeks the just and the true in a common im-pulse. At this point, there is no Kantian separation between theoretical reason and practical reason. It is a question of simultaneously establishing the truth in its correspondence with reality, and with that which is just, which is to say, not only to determine an individual morality, but to establish collective rules that govern relationships between individuals.

Revolution as Experimentation

Proudhon develops throughout his work a theory of revolution which by its ex-perimentalist aspect could, compared with the Deweyan experimentalism developed in *The Public and its Problems*, be characterized as pragmatist. As D. Colson emphasizes, "The social revolution likewise ceases to identify itself only with the protests of the masses, with only 'insurrectionary days,' with revolu-tionary conjunctions, as rare as they are ephemeral."[30] In the conference on "Proudhon et le syndicalisme révolutionnaire" ["Proudhon and Revolutionary Trade-Unionism"], D. Colson shows how revolutionary trade-unionism and the

cooperative movement of the beginning of the twentieth century seem to accord
with the Proudhonian conception of social transformation:

> in a certain sense it goes back to the analyses of Proudhon on the capacity of
> the workers . . . to constitute from now on an alternative on the economic ter-
> rain, the real affirmation of future self-management . . . they ignore too often
> the importance, in France at the very least, of the cooperative movement, a very
> powerful movement, often present in the small village, a movement which by
> combining with union activity would without a doubt have contributed to re-
> solving the difficulty with which revolutionary trade-unionism met and so, in
> another sense, would have given a form to the meeting between this trade-
> unionism and the thought of Proudhon.[31]

The Marxist concept, inherited from Blanqui, of the revolution as *coup
d'etat* by an enlightened minority is imposed in history by the accomplishment
of Leninism. Nevertheless, one forgets that Proudhon has produced a different
theory of revolution in opposition to Marx. Proudhon works out a theory that
breaks with the insurrectionary model that is either that of the organized minor-
ity or that of the spontaneous crowd. On the contrary, it is a question of thinking
a transformation in depth of the economic and political structures by putting in
place experimentations breaking as much with the state as with the capitalist
system. The idea being that if a political revolution can take the form of a *coup
d'etat*, an economic and social transformation, putting in place a federal indus-
trial and agrarian democracy, this requires changes in depth. In the capture of
power by a group of revolutionaries, burdened with executing the passage from
the capitalist society to the communist society, Proudhon opposes the *implemen-
tation* of experimental alternatives to the state and to capitalism.

Proudhon opposes Marx's notion of revolution, understood as a *coup d'etat*.
In effect, he refuses revolutionary violence which risks creating martyrs, which
could only lead to the reinforcement of the bourgeoisie. What Proudhon has in
mind, which he critiques frequently throughout the works of Rousseau, is the
politics of the "Reign of Terror" of the Jacobins. He understood well that the
implementation of terror exercised through the bias of the dictatorship of a revo-
lutionary party could result only in the disservice of the cause of socialism. But
does that therefore mean that Proudhon might be a reformist author who has
abandoned revolution, as Marx asserts? In the reading of this letter (1846), one
might think so. Nevertheless, this would make a mere trifle of the fact that
Proudhon is the author, in 1851, of a work entitled, *The General Idea of the
Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*. It is therefore really another concept of
revolution which is at stake for Proudhon.

In his letter, Proudhon makes reference to a work that he is in the process of
writing. This would be the work, *The Philosophy of Poverty*, which, as we
know, was violently attacked by Marx in *The Poverty of Philosophy*. In this
work, Proudhon analyses, as he himself says, "the laws of society, the way in

which these laws are realized, the progress according to which we manage to discover them."[32] In 1848, he participates in the February revolution, which led to the inversion of the July monarchy and to the implementation of the Second Republic. Proudhon has suffered from the physical acts of violence of which he was a witness during this period and, in particular, the repression of the June riots.

In March, Proudhon writes *A Solution to the Social Problem*. This text represents a good illustration of Proudhon's experimentalism. He proposes to try out the implementation of an exchange bank which allows proletarians the access to free credit. The difference between Proudhon's theory, and what today is called micro-credit, is that for Proudhon, this experience has to be understood as part of a more general approach which calls into question capitalism and the state. Thus, Proudhon explains in a letter to F. Bastiat:

> If house capital, as well as money capital, were free, which means, if their utilization were paid as exchange, not as loan, land capital would not take long to become free as well. . . . Consequently, there will neither be farmers nor landlords, there would solely be laborers and vintners, like there are woodworkers and mechanical workers.[33]

At the moment of the foundation of the Bank of the people in 1849, Proudhon writes:

> [I]f I were mistaken, public reason would soon disprove my theories, the only thing left to me would be to withdraw from the revolutionary arena . . . after this refutation of the general reason and of experience.[34]

It is interesting to point out in this statement that Proudhon makes public reason and experience the two criteria which determine the success or the failure of his revolutionary theory. Thus, Proudhon's theory appears as an experimental pragmatism. It seems difficult to determine whether the failure of the Bank of the people comes from experience in itself or from Proudhon's condemnation to a fine and to prison for having insulted the President of the Republic.

In *The General Idea of Revolution* (1851), Proudhon formulates the most widely followed form of his theory of social revolution. His conception of revolution is characterized by the refusal of political authority and of all forms of popular government. He refuses even the notion of direct democracy. The revolution has to set up the Republic or the positive anarchy. Thus, the social revolution, as defined by Proudhon, consists in "substituting the economic or industrial regime by a governmental, feudal, and military regime."[35] He writes, "I want the peaceful revolution, but I want it, prompt, decisive, and complete [. . .] not for reforming the government, but for revolutionizing society."[36] Proudhon's revolution has the function of eliminating the government for the benefit of an economic auto-organization of the society based upon an economically contractual theory of justice. "We will replace political powers by

economical forces."[37] After the French revolution, as a political revolution, which has abolished privileges, one has to achieve the economical revolution by calling into question the social inequality caused by the industrial revolution. This implies the experiment of new forms of economic organization which call into question social inequalities and capitalist property.

> His forms of action are: a) the division of labor, through which it is opposed to the classification of people by caste, or by industries; b) The collective force, principle of Labor companies, replacing armies; c) Trade, concrete form of the contract, which replaces the law; d) Equality of exchange; e) Competition; f) Credit which centralizes the interests, like the governmental hierarchy centralizes obedience; g) The balance of values and properties.[38]

One might be surprised by the apparently liberal character of the Proudhonian social revolution. It is one of the differences between Proudhonian anarchism and the communism of Marx. Indeed it concerns the setting of a society of economic equality, but also a society of freedom.

> The social contract must amplify for each citizen her well-being and liberty. . . .
> The social contract must be freely discussed, individually agreed, signed, *manu propria*, by all those who participate therein.[39]

It is the fear of the implementation of a liberticide society that leads Proudhon to also reject communism. The risk, according to him, is to see the entire society organized according to the same authoritarian model as the Christian monasteries.[40]

One could note that R. Westbrook,[41] with respect to Dewey, resolves the ambiguity of a Dewey liberal and a Dewey socialist, by a libertarian reading of Dewey. For Dewey, it might be a question of reflecting upon the possible experimentation of a socialism without a State. But this elaboration of an experimental theory of social revolution does not end there. In reality, Proudhon appears to not be satisfied with his conception of social revolution where the political is reduced into an economic republic. In 1863, he adds a theory of federalism to his mutualist economic theory. Consequently, to his theory of social revolution as economic revolution, Proudhon adds a political aspect. The juridical notion of contract serves in the political domain, every bit as much as in the economic domain, in determining the form of just organization. Nevertheless, the political contract, as Proudhon defines it, is not the political contract of classical liberalism. This contract does not serve to explain the origin of society, but, as in Rousseau's *Social Contract*, to think what might be a just society. The notion of contract, as much economic as political, in Proudhon serves as a pragmatic idea of experimentation. But Proudhon's federalist political contract is opposed nevertheless to the political contract of the "Jacobin" Rousseau:

The political contract acquires its dignity and morality only on the condition: 1)
that it is synallagmatic and commutative; 2) that it is closed in, as in its object,
within certain limits . . . So that the political contract would fulfill the synal-
lagmatic and commutative condition that prompts the idea of democracy; so
that, closing itself in within these wise limits, it remains profitable and conven-
ient for all, it is necessary that the citizen, in entering into the association: 1)
would have as much to gain from the state as she would sacrifice to it; 2) that
she would retain all her freedom, her sovereignty, and her initiative, minus that
which is relative to the special object for which the contract is formed, and of
which one asks for the security of the state. Thus regulated and comprehended,
the political contract is what I call a federation.[42]

Proudhon's federalist[43] political contract assumes that the villages, which are
the base of the contract, retain more power than the federation. The consequence
of Proudhon's position is the possibility for a basic unity to secede from the fed-
eration. One could consider *Of the Political Capacity of the Working Class*
(1865) as a synthesis of hypotheses concerning revolution, which are elaborated
for experimentation by Proudhon. In this work, Proudhon produces the theory of
a mutualist and federalist working class democracy. Through the reference to
mutualist working class movement, contained in *The Manifesto of the Sixties*,
Proudhon's ideas appear to be at the same time the product of this movement
and a source of inspiration for this movement. "The majority of them are mem-
bers of societies of reciprocal credit, reciprocal aid."[44]

Proudhon's mutualist theory constitutes a theory of economic justice based
upon the principle of contractual reciprocity. It is a question, through the de-
mand of Justice, of setting up an economic system free of capitalist exploitation
and state-governed charity.

> We are interested in knowing how the ideas of mutuality, of reciprocity, of ex-
> change, of Justice, substituted for those of authority, of community, and of
> charity, have come, in politics and in political economy, to construct a system
> of relations which holds nothing less than the transformation of the social order
> from top to bottom.[45]

Within the political domain, federalism responds to mutualism in economic
theory:

> transported in the political sphere, what we have hitherto called mutualism or
> guarantism, takes the name of federalism [...] In working class democracy, the
> political is the corollary of economy, that both are treated by the same method
> and the same principles.[46]

I think that by enriching Proudhon's revolutionary theory with a political
component, Proudhon is no longer arguing for the notion of the Republic, under-
stood as the economic republic, but the notion of the working class democracy.
But this democracy, such as Proudhon conceives it, unlike the authors of *The*

Manifesto of the Sixties rejects political electoral representation. "Political unity is not a question of territory and borders, or a question of will or vote."[47]

On what principles then do Proudhon's mutualist and federalist working class democracy rest?

> And first we observe that, just as there is no freedom without unity, or, what amounts to the same, without order, similarly, neither is there unity without variety, without plurality, without divergence; no order without protestation or antagonism.[48]

According to Proudhon, the political system must be organized in such a way as to guarantee the greatest autonomy to each individual, and to each village. It is this autonomy of individuals and of municipalities that guarantees federalism such as Proudhon defines it. It is that which, in the introduction to *The Theory of Property* (1862), Proudhon calls "anarchy, or humankind governing itself." It is this same political ideal of self-government that Dewey also develops in *The Public and Its Problems*. The expression of this diversity on the political plane implies, moreover, as we have seen, the *implementation* of a public space in which decisions can be handled according to the rules of public reason.

I have attempted to draw out what appeared to me as the principal pragmatist themes of Proudhon's philosophy. It seems that through this approach, one could attempt to draw out a certain unity of reading in the work of this author. Even its very mode of elaboration itself is pragmatist. It is a work that unfolds itself in the thread of historical experience that Proudhon acquires. It constructs itself in departing from a theory of action in which labor is the matrix. It is in beginning from labor that ideas are produced, in particular the idea of Justice. Revolutionary action has as a function in history the realization of the idea of Justice by means of the notion of contract and by means of exchange. The justice of the contract establishes itself in beginning with public reason which has as its foundation the collective force constituted by the laborers. There exist two forms of contract: the one that rules economic activities, called mutualism; and the one that rules the political contract, called federalism. The *implementation* by revolutionary action of these alternatives to the centralized state and to capitalism allows for the realization of a just society in which the different exchanges are carried out in a free and egalitarian manner. The revolutionary philosopher is characterized by her conception of philosophy as both practical and democratic. Her theories consist in searching for hypotheses of solution in experimentation. It is thus not a question of setting up a dogmatic utopia, but of experimenting with hypotheses that might be revised[49] contingent upon experience and public reason.

Consequently, Proudhon's political theory unfolds itself by starting with a theory of action which does not reduce discursive and juridical practices to economic practices. In making action the basic notion of his theory, Proudhon can

thus think in their specificities all actions, whether they are economical, juridical, or political. He therefore escapes the aporias of the determination of the superstructure by the economic foundation. Indeed, labor is the condition for the possibility of all other actions, but these are not reducible to relations of production. It is a question of transforming all at once the relations of production, economic exchanges, political organization, and the ways of handling collective decision. This transformation of the ensemble of economic and political relations implies progressive experimentation of new relations by the laborers themselves. Moreover, the notion of action thus affords to Proudhon the escape from the contradiction between an economic determinism and a political revolutionary voluntarism of the Leninist sort.[50]

Notes

1.   There exists a French pragmatist current, without connection to the American philosophical current, represented by M. Blondel. This author has outlined the doctrine in his work *Action* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993 [1893]).

2.   The article by C. S. Peirce, "How to make our ideas clear" (1878), marks the beginning of the American philosophical movement.

3.   Proudhon died in 1865.

4.   Even if the latter, in the preface to his edition of Proudhon's *Selected Works*, seems to lean towards a use of the term "pragmatism" that might perhaps return more to the pragmatism of Blondel rather than that of James or Dewey. This point might perhaps be explained by the somewhat personal character of Bancal's reading.

5.   G. Gurvitch, *The Founders of Contemporary French Sociology* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945), p.65.

6.   Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *On Justice* (Paris: Fayard, 1990), p. 22.

7.   *Ibid.*

8.   *Ibid.*, p. 23.

9.   J. Bancal, *Proudhon: Pluralism and Self-Management*, vol. 2 (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1970), p. 218. Among Proudhon's commentators who highlight this point we can quote J. Langlois, *Acting with Proudhon* (Paris: Petite Bibliotheque Payot, 1976).

10.   Gurvitch has an interesting pragmatic reading in the ninth study of his *Proudhon* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965) entitled "Progress and Decadence." "Thus, one could say that if for Bergson, concerning strictly speaking the biological life, the idea of evolution is overcome by the idea of creative evolution, for Proudhon, regarding the social life, the idea of progress is overcome by an unceasing recourse to revolutions always new whose success is never guaranteed. He links the idea of progress to its pragmatic orientations. Thus, he writes, 'progress is the justification of humanity by itself under the excitement of an ideal.' But then, [. . .] would not this be a species of ideology, if not a myth, which would inspire the action in the way Sorel has conceived the idea of general strike? [. . .] Similarly, why would the idea of progress, born of action, 'not return to action as project or plan?' [. . .] But, the moral order is tied up to labor and to collective action, progress presents itself one more time as a pragmatic idea, capable of inspiring a maximum of effort, of freedom, of labor, and revolutionary action. Finally,

progress is for Proudhon [. . .] like a pragmatic hypothesis meant to encourage collective action" (pp. 30-31).

11. Gurvitch, *Proudhon*, pp. 27-28.

12. Proudhon, *On the Creation of Human Order* (Bibliolife, 2008), p. 296.

13. Proudhon, *What is Property?* (Boston: Adamant, 2001), p. 215.

14. Cf. John Dewey, "Authority and Social Change" (1935), reprinted as "Science and the Future of Society" in *Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy*, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Modern Library, 1939), pp. 343-63.

15. Proudhon, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Adamant, 2002), p. 19.

16. Proudhon, *On Justice*, book 2, p. 78.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

18. *Ibid.*

19. *Ibid.*, p. 96.

20. On the history of this concept in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see the work of B. Bensaude-Vincent, *Science Against Public Opinion* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993).

21. Proudhon, *On Justice*, p. 108

22. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

23. Cf. C.S. Peirce, "Evolutionary Love," *The Monist* 3:1 (1893), pp. 176-200.

24. Proudhon, *Confessions of a Revolutionary* (Boston: Adamant, 2002).

25. Cf. J. Dewey, *Liberalism and Social Action* (Paris: Farrago, 2003).

26. Cf. J. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000).

27. Proudhon, *Confessions*, p.114

28. *Ibid.*, p. 134

29. *Ibid.*, p. 118

30. *Ibid.*, note J p.112

31. "Social Revolution" in D. Colson, *Glossary of Philosophical Anarchism* (Paris: Le Livre de Poche, 2001), p. 291.

32. D. Colson, "Proudhon and Revolutionary Syndicalism." Available at the site, *Recherches sur l'anarchisme*: http://raforum.info/article.php3?id_artic le=3475

33. Proudhon, "Letter: Proudhon to Marx" (1846), in *Correspondence of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon* (Bibliolife, 2008).

34. *Ibid.*

35. Proudhon, *A Solution to the Social Problem* (Boston: Adamant, 2002), p. 260.

36. Proudhon, *The General Idea of Revolution* (Boston: Adamant, 2001), p. 176

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 192-3.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 262.

39. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

41. Proudhon and Bakunin have rejected communism as a mode of authoritarian organization. Kropotkin will later theorize, by way of such concepts as "grappling in the heap," a libertarian communist society.

42. Cf. Robert Westbrook, *John Dewey and American Democracy* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).

43. Proudhon, *On the Federal Principle* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), ch. 7.

44. In the contemporary juridical sense of the terms of federalism and confederalism, Proudhon is confederalist to the extent that, for him these are basic unities, the

villages, who determine the power of superior groups, and not vice versa. One should note that it is the idea of a federal society, built upon a communal democracy, which constitutes the hypothesis of experimentation that Dewey also formulates in *The Public and Its Problems.*

45. Proudhon, *On the Political Ability of the Working Class* (BiblioBazaar, 2008), p. 89.

46. *Ibid.,* p. 90.

47. *Ibid.,* p. 143.

48. *Ibid.,* p. 286. See also "Letter of Proudhon to the Workers" (March 8, 1864), in *Correspondence.*

49. *Ibid.,* p.186

50. "But for God's sake! After having demolished all *a priori* dogmatisms, let us not dream, now when our turn comes, to indoctrinate the people [. . .] I applaud, from the bottom of my heart, your thought of bringing all opinions to light; let us make a good and loyal polemic; let us give to the world the example of a learned and cautious tolerance, but since we are at the head of a movement, let us not make the heads of a new intolerance, let us not put in place apostles of a new religion; this religion should be the religion of logic, the religion of reason. Let us receive, let us encourage, all protests; let us wither away all exclusions, all mysticisms; let us never look at a question as exhausted, and when we have used up our final argument, let us begin again if need be, with eloquence and with irony. On this condition, I shall enter with pleasure in your association. Otherwise, no!" (Proudhon, "Letter to K. Marx," 1846, in *Correspondence.*)

Part 5: Anarchism and Social Science

14

An Anarchist-Sociologist Research Program:
Fertile Areas for Theoretical and Empirical Research

Dana M. Williams

In this chapter I propose a general research program for sociologically-inclined anarchist individuals and collectivities. This research program may also be of interest to others, particularly radical sociologists, social movement participants, and other interested parties. My goal is to present a broad framework for what could be a potentially productive and textured exploration of the linkages between anarchism and sociology. Although there are some sociologists with an anarchist-bent and many sociologically-minded anarchists, a thorough merging of two has only been briefly (although tantalizingly) explored.[1] Below I detail possible directions for such thinking and research.

Sociology aims to interpret society, anarchism aims to transform society. Is it possible that a symbiotic relationship between the two lies submerged and dormant below the surface? This question is not answered by this essay. Instead, the following essay attempts to narrow the gap between sociology and anarchism by addressing certain commonalities. First, anarchism's insights are applied within sociology. Second, sociology is used to attempt an interpretation of the anarchist movement. A rudimentary foundation already exists for kind of program.

Before beginning it is important to take note of the nature of such a project. Both anarchists and public sociologists strongly emphasize that their viewpoints, ideologies, or disciplines should not be monopolized by a priesthood of "all-knowing," supposedly smart people. In fact, both suggest that *everyone* is capable of using anarchism and sociology to benefit their lives and communities. It is a fundamental tenet of anarchism that no one else is more qualified to know your own needs or desires than yourself. Likewise, public sociology suggests

that our intellectual lives ought to be lived in conjunction with our political lives. As Martin writes, information, knowledge, theorizing, and research has been sequestered away by academics working within hierarchical institutions (universities) and rigid disciplines (such as Sociology).[2] To truly liberate this information, the entire practice of knowledge creation and dissemination must be radicalized, decentralized, and democratized. Everyone can and should be able to participate in a program like the one that I now present.

Barriers to Anarchist-Sociology Research

An anarchist-sociology research program faces a number of sizable challenges. Purkis identifies a number of structural constraints upon academic scholarship, particularly critical and radical research.[3] Scholarship is evaluated on the basis of relevance to state and corporate interests. Sociology has tended to focus on social problems within a very narrow scope, which is usually more descriptive than proscriptive. As such, Sociology is more at home critiquing or explaining the inequality of the world, but very poor at offering alternative visions or strategies.

There are also problems related to the sociological study of anarchism in particular. First, there is confusion over the definition of "anarchism." Many academic disciplines have profoundly different views of the term. Economists use it to refer to free-market capitalism, uninhibited by any external regulation (a usage most social movement anarchists themselves feel is a scandalous application). Political scientists see anarchism as the international framework for state-interaction, without a centralized arbitrator (e.g., the US vs. Germany vs. Japan vs. South Africa vs. Chile vs. Vietnam vs. India . . .). Philosophers are apt to use "anarchism" to refer to any rule-less paradigm of understanding. Historians get closer than most to the anarchist activist use of the terms, but often resign themselves to studying anarchism during its "Golden Age" in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Compound this confusion with outright misinformation over the definition and actual practice or anarchists. Various authorities and media mediums have tried to manipulate public opinion to oppose such radical ideas. There is a growing literature on past and more contemporary campaigns of misinformation to smear anarchism.[4]

Other problems commonly stalk anarchism in academia. As alluded to above, some radical free-marketers assume the label "anarchist" for their desire for an ultra-competitive and uninhibited economy. Ideological competition with the far-right—who by no means constitute a "movement" in the sense that sociologists understand it—means that many people see anarchism as being confused. "Are anarchists for capitalism or are they against it? Are they individualists or are they collectivists? Do they want to screw the poor or empower the poor?" Additionally, a general fear of "radical" things can repel the study of

anarchism. If anarchism is assumed to be violence-prone and "crazy," who would want to train a favorable eye to it? Many academics shy away from anarchism since it has no established niche in universities. Marxists have found a niche in Sociology, and have been able to protect themselves by developing obscure and dense analyses that are utterly unusable by others, especially non-academics.[5]

Still, even given the above limitations, using an anarchist framework for analyzing society might prove easier than studying *anarchists themselves*. There are quite a few potential problems with studying anarchists and the anarchist movement, problems that are largely related to access to anarchists as a population. First, anarchists are usually few in number; they represent a super-minority of most populations. Second, there are trust issues—often warranted given the inclination of state bureaucracies to infiltrate, spy upon, and disrupt radicals—which cause many anarchists to be secretive, perhaps almost paranoid of outsiders who want to come into certain circles to "see what's going on." Third, in terms of principles and practice, many anarchists are part of decentralized organizations and networks that can be difficult to locate and detect, especially if those anarchists *wish* to be difficult to find. Anarchists lack access to mainstream communication channels, thus limiting their ability to present their message to others. They tend to be politically marginalized, sometimes marginalized by other activists, but often self-marginalized. Consequently, polls look past anarchists and their issues. Pundits do not present anarchists' radical demands, politicians and political parties do not articulate or formulate policies based on anarchists' sentiments, nor do politicos attempt to attract anarchists into such halls of power. Finally, many anarchists are hesitant to self-identify as such. In part this is because of the risk involved in such an action. To identify with a demonized ideology is often to willingly exile oneself from family and friends, not to mention provoke neighbors, classmates, and employers to act critically (or harshly). Other anarchistic people resist labeling themselves because they wish to avoid labels themselves. Why identify as an anarchist, when other labels, such as "feminist," "anti-racist," "radical," "anti-authoritarian," "autonomist," etc. would be equally appropriate? For such folks, to act in an anarchistic fashion (or to act in line with values that anarchists also tend to share) is the important issue.

Outline

However, even given the aforementioned problems and the fact that a program for the systematic analysis of society using an anarchist lens has yet to be developed, that does mean an anarchist-sociological scholarship is impossible. Anarchism offers a steady, comprehensive critique of hierarchical, authoritarian, and oppressive social relationships and institutions. In response to these, anar-

chism advocates a world filled with cooperative, horizontal, and egalitarian social relationships and institutions. These two opposing poles may be viewed not as what anarchists themselves do, whether as individuals or in an anarchist movement, but rather what an anarchist critique of society is and what an anarchist society might instead look like. Both poles—opposition and support—may be analyzed at three levels of analysis: macro- or structural-level, meso- or organizational-level, and micro- or individual- and situational-level. An anarchist-sociology research program could focus on various elements of each level. See Table 1 for a presentation of such a potential analysis.

Table 14.1: Template for a Multi-Level, Anarchist Analysis of Society

Level	Realm	Anarchist Against	Anarchist For
Macro	Institutions: economy, politics, family, culture	Capitalism, the state, patriarchy, militarism, White supremacy	Free love, multiculturalism, feminism, community self-defense, cooperative economics, federated/decentralized decision-making, bioregionalism
Meso	Organizations: social movements, work organizations, voluntary associations	Top-down, bureaucratic, management, reformist	Directly democratic, cooperatives/collectives, rotating/non-existent leadership, transformative values
Micro (1)	Relationships (to/between people): Amorous, familial, random/incidental	Male domination, violent/oppressive, exploitive	Female empowerment, loving, fulfilling, solidaritous
Micro (2)	Situations/ Interactions: public life, private life, mass/collective events	Alienation, mob mentality, individualism	Community-directed, intimate, connectedness

This proposed research program consists of a number of components, all of which need to be oriented toward discovering practical understandings of the world that can be useful for everyone, from normal, disengaged people to social movement participants. Thus, this program flows from major areas within the

"sociological canon" that can be useful in this applied fashion. First, I will present an application of major sociological perspectives and theories to anarchist philosophy. Second, an anarchist critique of the process of socialization is offered, with the intention of exploring how people come to resist. Third, at the heart of sociology, the intricate research developed about forms of inequality need to be applied to anarchist social change strategies. Fourth, existing research on both mainstream and alternative organizational structures and practices are discussed. Fifth, and finally, I explore the connections between the anarchist movement(s) and current sociological social movement theories.

Sociological Perspectives, Theories, and Anarchism

Sociology includes three major perspectives that help to frame sociological understanding, as well as other smaller-range theories that attempt to explain social phenomena. First, the three main sociological perspectives that are introduced in most Introduction to Sociology classes include: functionalism, conflict, and symbolic interactionism. In the following section, each perspective will be presented and discussed in the context of anarchism, with a critical eye towards potentials for future research.

Functionalism was the dominant perspective within American sociology during the middle part of the twentieth century. The perspective has a strongly conservative (pro-status quo) nature, which led community organizer Saul Alinsky to remark: "Asking a sociologist to solve a problem is like prescribing an enema for diarrhea."[6] The perspective attempts to explain why society is organized as it is and assumes that the dominant features and institutions of society, since they persist, must serve some purpose for the common good. If something exists, it must be universally important and good. For example, surgeons earn large incomes and enjoy high status because they have made incredible sacrifices (by spending long years in medical school), possess highly-trained skills, and are vitally important for the stability and security of society. Thus, it is just, appropriate, and necessary for surgeons to be paid so much, in order to attract that best potential surgeons.

But, according to this logic, trash collectors or child-care workers are paid less money and have lower status because their jobs are less valuable. Societal arrangements do not, of course, benefit all equally. For example, having highly-paid surgeons in society (and lawyers, bonds-traders, accountants, etc.) does not usually benefit those without health insurance, the poor accused of crimes, or those with very little income. In fact, poverty and crime can and are often explained in terms of their "functionality": they reinforce ideologies of individualism and self-worth, encourage people to work harder to avoid slipping into poverty or crime, and employ large number of people to deal with the detrimental side-effects (like social workers, administers of welfare benefits, police,

bailiffs, court employees, prison-constructors, and prison guards). In this view, anarchism itself is an unwelcome disruption in unity and balance; if anarchists serve any purpose for the system at all, it is as a reason to employ spies and police for the purposes of suppression. Anarchists also serve as a warning to those who value "Order" and thus indicate what could happen if change were introduced. Thus, those who value and cherish the unequal status quo utilize anarchists as bogeymen to scare the public. The system's equilibrium is central to functionalist concerns—large blows to social balance need to be avoided.

It is possible to *use* the functionalist perspective in a critical fashion, however, as indicated above. If we want to understand how society remains stable, relatively unchanging, and unequal, we need only look at the different roles, occupations, and institutions that people fill. Take the military-industrial complex (MIC) as an example. The various elements that constitute the MIC have particular functions. American empire is enabled by a large, diverse, and well-funded military. Military contractor corporations aim to provide the military with well-functioning technology and equipment that must be repeatedly replenished as it is used by the military (and preferably produced at the highest cost possible to tax payers). The Department of Defense works to coordinate military strategy, long-term policy-planning and technological development. Different military branches (Army, Air Force, Navy, Marines) do the physical work to execute military orders, establish bases, fight wars, and occupy foreign territory. Each element of the MIC is playing a certain role (or function) to guarantee that the steady drive of empire continues.

By removing the moralistic element that assumes that a given arrangement is just, correct, and permanent, functionalism can be used to analyze *why* an arrangement exist. Then, those who may oppose such arrangements—like anarchists—can determine the best ways to target various institutions for disruption. Functionalism can help explain how inequality, hierarchy, and authority can last for long periods of time. These phenomena exist and endure because they (and the ideology that justifies them) rely on stability and the maintenance of the status quo. Elites find it important to create and justify the existence of such phenomena in order to maintain society and its organization. Anarchists would be wise to consider how such institutions and ideologies are reinforced and re-created generation after generation. Then, it would be important to develop strategies to dismantle the functional components of American empire (for example) and thereby permit society to break-free from its presently unequal and oppressive arrangements.

The second dominant perspective in sociology, often set-up as a counterpoint to functionalism, is what is loosely called the "conflict" perspective. Both perspectives address macro-societal relationships, but conflict assumes that society is not based on consensus, but rather struggle and different interests. Classes, races, genders, occupations, parties, neighborhoods, generations, and countries often have interests that are at odds with each other. There is continual conflict between workers and employers, politicians and citizens, generals and soldiers,

and people of all kinds. Change, struggle, and inequality are endemic to society, and this conflict even manages to hold society together. The conflict perspective challenges the functionalist assumptions by asking *which* individuals and groups are actually benefiting from current arrangements, since there is no monolithic thing called "society," nor any abstraction that represents all equally. Some have more resources, income, status, power, training, and influence than others, and this leads to conflict. As a consequence, there are organized movements (labor, feminist, anti-imperialist, etc.) opposed to elite interests that struggle and compete for greater equality (or even supremacy or autonomy). Less organized conflict arises in the form of crime, riots, and other forms of less organized antagonism.

Anarchism is about changing the unequal power relationships that exist in society. By appreciating the different interests invested in society, anarchists can strategically determine more appropriate ways of reorganizing society to lessen conflict while simultaneously increasing cooperation, justice, autonomy, and self-determination. For example, anarchists could view the problem of resource distribution in a town through various relevant actors. In the US, large chain grocery stores tend to come into areas and push out local chains. Anarchists could choose to support workers at the local grocery stores who may be attempting to unionize (supporting workers against bosses), join with neighborhood residents who are opposed to the outside chain since it might create environmental hazards (community interests against external control), or help organize food cooperatives and community gardens (self-determination against dependency). By appreciating the individuals and organizations in conflict, anarchists can throw their support behind struggles or projects that aim to accomplish compatible goals and are in-line with their values.

A third perspective, generally called symbolic interactionism (SI), differs from the first two since it is more micro-focused. The perspective concerns itself with the ways in which people exchange symbols (language, signs, information, or other communication) via inter-personal relationships and encounters. Symbolic interaction argues that society exists and is created during these interactions. The relationships, situations, and exchanges we have with other people constitute our sense of self-worth, our roles, our interests, and our very means of verbal and non-verbal communication.

Anarchism, like many movements, exchanges symbols (black flags, circle-A's, images of black cats, "power fists," etc.) amongst themselves to signify "this person/organization is also anarchist." People at demonstrations wearing black clothes or sporting banners with words like "resist," "smash," "overthrow," and "liberation," represent the values and practice of anarchism. According to symbolic interactionism, such "symbols" are indicators that represent anarchism without having to explicitly mention anarchism.

A major conclusion of this perspective is that seemingly small and insignificant items, encounters, and routines have large and significant consequences for

people and their lives. The presentation of reality—through words, artifacts, or even actions—by anarchists can have meaningful consequences for how others perceive anarchism. Frequently, anarchists attempt to illustrate and attack hierarchy in society by creative actions that illustrate how such hierarchy works to exploit, degrade, and inhibit people. Dramatic, colorful, and symbolic direct actions are not only limited to protest, though. Direct action can also be a means to demonstrate alternative ways of organizing society—through collectives, consensus decision making, cooperation, etc.

The symbolic interactionist perspective could lend insight into practical strategies for anarchists. For example, a micro-level analysis of the ways in which anarchists present their ideas to fellow-travelers, liberals, and the apolitical could help suggest stronger approaches—perhaps different analogies, imagery, or approaches would be more effective. Anarchism offers an important analysis of oppression, which carries with it another example of SI's utility. Oppression resides in large scale institutions such as patriarchy, the state, capitalism, and organized religion, but it is most often observed and summoned in daily life's interactions with others who fill positions within those institutions. How could anarchism critique these routinized performances of oppression (official titles, language, uniforms, derogatory slang, etc.) while at the same time using such insights to overcome symbolic practices of oppression in such interactions? Anarchists have belabored themselves by putting their politics into action—the personal is political, as the feminists say—and scholarship ought to consider how this is done.

Additional research could consider other sociological theories and how anarchism could contribute towards their development (or how anarchism might challenge their premises). The following are some examples.[7]

- Social capital: considers the social ties and trust between individuals and groups, and how the strength of such connection facilitates advantage or disadvantage.[8] Do anarchists cultivate such ties? How is trust managed amongst radicals? Do those activists with higher levels of trust engage in more successful organizing?

- Strain: how individuals respond to the acceptable institutionalized means to acquire cultural goals.[9] Anarchists could easily be viewed as rejecting the dominant cultural goals (to increase one's income) and striving to create new ones (to create community economic self-determination). Likewise, anarchists are apt to reject the institutionalized means to acquire goals (work hard at one's job) and use other means (organize cooperatively with neighbors and co-workers).

- World systems: the relationships between countries depend on their relative position to each other in a world economy, where some countries are dominant (core) and others are dominated (periphery).[10] The anti-imperialist critique of anarchists suggests that periphery countries attempt to break free of military control by the core, but also economic exploitation, kept in place by a system of multinational corporations and

international organizations (like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization). The role of anarchists in core countries has often been to either form anti-war and anti-capitalist movements that oppose foreign interventions (see the recent global justice movement), or to provide various amounts of support for movements for national liberation or autonomy (such as the EZLN in Mexico).

The Problems of Socialization

Socialization is another central theory within Sociology. The theory argues that humans are born as relatively blank-slates. We all have the potential to possess, assume, and develop a wide variety of beliefs, tendencies, skills, and life trajectories. But, how do we all end up slightly different, yet largely similar? The answer offered is "socialization." From an early age, everyone is socialized by their families, peer groups, schools, mass media, etc. to adapt them to common belief systems, practices, and modes of operation. Socialization functions to integrate children (and adults) into the pre-existing conditions of society. There is a large amount of research on socialization that may be more or less relevant here. Gordon suggests that

> Regimes of domination are the overarching context that anarchists see as conditioning people's socialization and background assumptions about social norms, explaining why people *fall into* certain patterns of behaviour and have expectations that contribute to the perpetuation of dominatory relationships.[11]

The task for anarchist-sociologists is to discover how the processes of socialization limit alternatives and how we may be break free from well-established hierarchies and oppressive institutions. There are some anarchists who have "mass-rejection" ideologies, including the opposition to any work (zero-work) or industrial society itself (primitivism). Others do not have a mass-rejection ideology and advocate a somewhat "insider" relationship, at least towards work (such as anarcho-syndicalism).[12] What facilitates some individuals "dropping out," but not others? What drives some to live in communes and housing coops, work with collectives and cooperatives, and to practice horizontal decision-making? How do such individuals differ from those who live in hierarchical and mainstream society? Is it the influence of education, ideology, family background, or experiences with community organizations? Sociology would benefit from directing attention to these issues, since it could re-cast such untraditional behaviors in a non-deviant light. Anarchists would also benefit from a greater understanding how to reinforce and spread resistance-oriented beliefs and tendencies.

What are the impediments to non-hierarchical modes of existence? There seem to be a variety of things that prevent individuals from "breaking free" of

capitalism, including training and formal education, the use of money, and dominant ideologies. An important question that flows from these experiences is: Why doesn't *everyone* just abandon capitalism and live more sustainably and simply? What are the challenges to breaking free of hierarchical socialization? An important question for anarchist-sociologists to answer is how does the avoidance of dominant socialization happen . . . and how can we guarantee that it happens more often?

Why is it so challenging for people to become free of hierarchical ways of thinking and acting? First, there is an overwhelming lack of alternative examples. Cooperatives, unions (radical or not), and collectives are a minority of organizations and rarely as visible as hierarchically, top-down organizations. Liberal-ish and "professionally run" non-governmental organizations are often very well-funded, while community-run and anti-hierarchically projects rarely receive grants, foundation money, or media coverage. Second, there is no positive reinforcement for so-called "deviant" thinking and action. Schools do not teach alternative modes of existence and rarely non-mainstream beliefs/theories. Mass media ridicules, ignores, marginalizes, or attacks alternatives. In fact, negative reinforcement is the common response for most forms of "deviance." Propaganda regularly demonizes alternative examples. For example, society is awash in anti-union media, the distancing of women's right to choose an abortion, messages suggesting that environmentalists are "kooky," and that to be anti-war is to hate your homeland. Third, the status quo is simply comfortable. Privilege and its benefits are not easily shunned or shed. It is easier to be a macho man than a feminist man, easier to be "color-blind racist" than a militant anti-racist White, easier to have a 9-to-5 job than organize a union, cooperative, or go on strike, and definitely easier to pay taxes than risk arrest for tax evasion. Fourth, there is the strong tendency (or desire, even) to confuse many people's legitimate concerns and translate them into fuzzy-liberalish concern for certain values (equality, human rights, justice, etc.) but, in the process, to avoid any real systemic change. For example, we hear much about "representative democracy" and how "America is a middle-class country," but rarely are told how these marginalize large portions of the country, specifically the most disadvantages. Problems that afflict women and racial minorities are presented as problems of the past. We are told that the best way to achieve a better world is through individualistic and self-important charity. And, most rampant—particularly during Republican-dominated government—is the sentiment that progressives, radicals, and the Left should support the Democratic Party that "cares" about "social welfare." Fifth, the welfare system itself absorbs societal strain and re-directs it into bureaucracies. Piven & Cloward's well-known argument is relevant here: the State's welfare policies serve to buffer the extremely poor from engaging in direct conflict with the extremely rich. Then, when the time of crisis is over with, the State tends to roll-back welfare protections.[13] Thus, instead of articulating radical demands and creating radical alternatives, pressure is defused through populist rhetoric and bureaucracies.

Due to all of these dynamics, it is difficult for people to free themselves from hierarchy. There is a vital need for research that explores these issues related to socialization. Understanding how this "bad" type (i.e., non-liberatory) of socialization happen and how "good" types of socialization are inhibited can perhaps lead the way to strategies for anarchists to overcome the deep-seated issues facing every new generation of radicals.

Finally, how do anarchists re-socialize their fellow-travelers and kindred spirits to think and act differently? How are new anarchists brought into the "anarchist fold"? Research that is aimed at exploring the entrance points to anarchists (or political radically-folks, generally) could be infinitely valuable here. There may be things that could be emphasized and expanded upon in this regard. But, such research may also uncover certain patterns that suggest that only certain types of people—youth, males, White folks, middle-class people, etc.—are those who are being more attracted to anarchism. Given such a research finding, it would seem imperative to explore how people belonging to such (often privileged) categories can best work with those who are not attracted to anarchism and work with them in a fashion that avoids being akin to missionary work. Also relevant is to identify the ways in which anarchist organizations re-socialize members to remove their hierarchical ways of thinking. Does this occur through workshops, teach-ins, re-formulations of "points of unity," propaganda efforts, or through informal culture (events, socializing, living together, etc.)? Or are there other potential approaches?

Research on Inequality Informing Anarchist Struggle

At the heart of Sociology is the notion that the world is replete with vast inequalities. Similarly, anarchism is largely oriented towards addressing and overcoming various forms of inequality—class, gender, and race being the most dominant forms. In the following discussion, anarchism's analysis and response to inequality is connected to the inequality literature in Sociology. Principally, the central characteristics of anarchist ideology—e.g., anti-authoritarianism, solidarity, self-determination—are integrated into research on social inequalities.

From its beginning in the labor struggles of mid-nineteenth-century Europe, anarchism has held a deep critique of class inequality. The root of class inequality is the hierarchy inherent in capitalism. Attempts to ameliorate inequality that stop short of eliminating capitalism are bound to fail. As such, anarchists have consistently argued that workers have the right to join a union (even if it is a flawed and frequently reformist organization) and struggle to remove their bosses. To this end, anarchists have advocated revolutionary tactics ranging from general strikes, syndicalism, factory expropriations, and worker cooperatives. Thus, anarchists are not merely concerned with the gap in income within a workplace or economy, but the very relationship between order-givers and or-

der-followers.[14] Workers should themselves direct their own efforts. Here, anarchists diverge from classical Marxist understandings of class inequality. Relying on the state or even union leadership to solve problems like poverty or wealth gaps is to ignore the need to remain autonomous from other centers of power. One cannot truly determine the nature of one's own work if not making the decisions directly. So-called "leaders" or bureaucracies cannot and will not liberate people from their subordinate positions in a hierarchy, since power is best served by keeping the powerless dependent upon the powerful. Political democracy means little without economic democracy and self-determination in the area of people's productive work.

However, some anarchists have also advocated the right of people to avoid work itself. Such "zero-work" and "post-left" anarchists see class as less of an important battleground, but still see the same culprit in people's misery and inequality: capitalism. This perspective raises the important anarchist concern of not just leveling the "playing field," but abolishing "the game" itself. To merely equalize everyone's income and wealth levels without drastically changing the nature of work or economic enterprise will not address the central causes of class inequality. Similarly, most sociological work on mobility deals with *individual* mobility *within* the class structure; instead, an anarchist-sociology would likely not even focus on class-wide mobility, but class-wide autonomy from the class structure itself.

Anarchism's critique of gender inequality has grown over time and expanded since the time of William Godwin and, later, Emma Goldman. Radicals from feminism's Second Wave—including anarcha-feminists—noted the role that patriarchy plays in replicating unequal gender relations, including career, marriage, child care, and public participation—all of which are structured by patriarchy. Gender inequality does not just derive from dominating men (or from women who reinforce patriarchy), but via society's very norms, rules, roles, opportunities, and values. Thus, women must be free of patriarchy in order to direct their lives. Women must be able to grow in ways they choose, determine the course of their lives, and decide freely whether or not they wish to be married, have children, or choose an abortion. In fact, radical feminists also argue that women are not the only ones who need to be freed from pre-decided gender roles and expectations, but also queers and even men. Anarcha-feminists, dating back to their influence in the anti-nuke movements of the 1970s, have also influenced the ways that radical movements go about making decisions in less macho and dictatorial ways, by influencing ideas of consensus decision making and anti-sexism in organizing.[15]

The anarchist view of gender inequality goes beyond the Marxist-feminist view of inequality that usually presumes that class is the main way in which people are unequal, or that capitalism and economics is the source of women's exploitation by men. Capitalism surely takes advantage of women's subjugation and works in concert with that oppression, but this is an impartial explanation. Thus, the patriarchal arrangement of social order interacts with class inequality.

It is not enough to say that capitalists exploit workers, some workers are men and some capitalists are women. However, the general pattern is the opposite—male capitalists usually exploit and dominate both workers and women. Here the non-anarchist ideas of many third-wave feminists—like Patricia Hill Collins—are informative, as they look at the intersection between various forms of oppression. It is impossible to consider one form of oppression in a vacuum, with no consideration of other forms.

One central contribution of third-wave feminists is the inclusion of race into the discussion of class and gender inequality. Anarchism also considers the oppression of non-Whites by Whites in society to be a central locus of struggle, not just in the US, but throughout the world. In order to serve society's elite-dominated political economy, racial differences have been emphasized and exaggerated, and a racial hierarchy has been constructed. This hierarchy endows those higher up the ladder (Whites) to have greater opportunities, wealth, power, and status than those lower on the ladder (especially Blacks). Like with gender inequality and patriarchy, this system of racial difference is a social construction—it has no real basis in biology, but is instead a superficial and superimposed system.

Just as workers, women, and queers should be able to make the important decisions that affect their own lives, so should people of color. To this end, anarchists advocate collective struggle against the racial hierarchy and White supremacy, including its more pungent forms—like White Power and Nazism—but also its more subtle manifestations—like "law enforcement" and the so-called "criminal justice system." Again, just as with class and gender inequality, racial inequality is not the result of individual bad White people. Yes, there are "bad White people," but it is the entire system of racial hierarchy and White supremacy that anarchists aim to topple. In the immediate short-term, groups like Anti-Racist Action confront fascists and supremacists in order to prevent them from organizing. Other groups, like the Anarchist Black Cross Network aim for the long-term goal of abolishing the racist prison industrial complex.

In all efforts to overcome forms of inequality, anarchists have created a variety of organizational structures that not only critique existing inequalities and aim to redress them, but also attempt to create small pockets of egalitarian freedom within organizations where class, gender, and race justice can be practiced and replicated.

Organizations and Anarchism

To struggle against inequality, anarchists have often formed organizations. Here, I suggest avenues for exploring the relationships between anarchists and organization, in terms of both theory and practice. Anarchists are not outright rejecters of organization, regardless of critics' assumptions. The old joke "Anarchists of

the world . . . unite!" is said in jest and is intended to ridicule the assumption
that anarchists are capable of (or interested in) talking civilly to each other, let
alone participating in some sort of formal group. Yet, this pro-chaos stereotype
is not the case. Anarchists belong to a plethora of organizations, ranging from
the large to small, formal to informal, radical to less-radical, diverse to homoge-
neous, and global to local. A quick look at the international directory of
anarchist organizations, the Anarchist Yellow Pages, shows thousands of differ-
ent organizations, collectives, federations, networks, and centers organized on
anarchist principles (and many more could clearly be included). It is obvious
that anarchists are often very "organized," even if their actions and words seem
to suggest things that may seem, superficially, to be more spontaneous, decen-
tralized, or less *organizable*.

A systematic, powerful, and modern anarchist critique of bureaucracy has
yet to be written. Bureaucracies are the dominant organizational form in today's
modern society: they are ubiquitous in the economy (corporations, business lob-
byist groups, the IMF, World Bank, etc.), politics (regulatory agencies, tax
collecting agencies, political parties), the military, organized religion, education
(high-schools, universities), health care (hospitals, insurance companies), and
elsewhere. Yet, reform movements often target the figureheads of these institu-
tions: Bill Gates or other corporate leaders, rather than the corporate form itself;
George Bush or other state executives, rather than the entire arrangement of vio-
lent, monopolized, and centralized state power itself; the Pope, not patriarchal
religion and its institutional mechanisms. As Weber's view of legal-rational au-
thority indicates, the particular figurehead is of little significance compared to
the long-lasting and powerful office they occupy. The true problem is in the
position (not the people) and its privileges, power, oversight, and unaccountabil-
ity. The anarchist critique of these institutions should be far-reaching and
radical, and could be further developed with possible strategies for subversion
and re-routing in mind. How does bureaucracy serve to undermine creativity,
self-determination, and autonomy, while reinforcing hierarchy, oppression, and
competition?

Equally important are the theories by various sociologists and organiza-
tional scholars that deserve anarchist reflection, particularly because the theories
have direct relevance to anarchist's activism. Robert Michels' analysis of or-
ganizations that increase in size and thus become less and less accountable to
their membership (the "iron law of oligarchy") speaks directly to the anarchist
concern of guaranteeing self-determination, which appears to be reflected in the
usually small organization size of anarchist groups.[16] Paul DiMaggio and Walter
Powell's description of "institutional isomorphism" refers to how organizations
replicate past organizational models (a good example of this is the plethora of
commonly-named organizations like Food Not Bombs, Earth First! or Anti-
Racist Action), via various processes. How does this occur with anarchist or-
ganizations and is it desirable?[17] Less known is Harvé Laroche's argument that
organizational decision making is mere social representation—organizations

first make decisions and *then* try to develop justifications for those decisions after the fact. Is this prevalent in anarchist organizations, particularly when emphasis is given to protest planning first-and-foremost, before all other efforts?[18] Anarchism's dual focus on criticizing the existent status quo, while trying to formulate workable alternatives is a particularly keen vantage point for such critiques.

The anarchist-sociologist need not just focus on mainstream organizations. Research should be conducted on the plethora of anarchist and anarchistic organizations that exist, throughout the world. Much of this research has focused on a variety of what could be called "anarchistic franchise organizations," which share common names, ideologies, and goals, but are otherwise only loosely connected to each other (e.g., Anarchist Black Cross, Homes Not Jails, the Earth Liberation Front, Catholic Worker, and many others). A good deal of this scholarly work has focused on Earth First! both in the US and UK context.[19] The equally wide-spread organization Food Not Bombs could also be the target of such thorough research. Some organizational research has focused on other anarchist groupings, including the Independent Media Center[20] and Peoples' Global Action[21] to name just a few. Research of this nature could focus not only on membership (who, for how long, motivations, rules), but also decision making, campaigns and actions, propaganda, interactions with other organizations, and many other issues that often left unexplored by organizational scholars.

Finally, can an anarchist-sociology lend greater substance to the research on alternative organizations (which are less likely to identify as "anarchist")? Regrettably, the academic field of organizational studies has been utterly dominated by researchers obsessed with corporations and workplace organizations.[22] While this is an important area of study—especially when critical—such research does not easily lend itself to the understanding or creation of non-hierarchical counter-institutions. The most well-known and intriguing contributions thus far have come from Joyce Rothschild, particularly her work on "collectivist democratic" organizations.[23] Yet, her work needs re-verification, more attempts at clarification, and an expansion of current organizational variety. There is little research on cooperatives (producer or consumer) with a few rare exceptions, like the well-known Mondragón Cooperative of Spain. Almost no research has focused upon internal dynamics of radical collectives or affinity groups. Sparse research has been done on radical networks or federations.[24] A sizable gap also exists in the understanding of how organizations have worked to collectively, democratically, and horizontally make decisions. Most research on decision making—mainly centered in organizational research and pre-occupied with capitalist enterprise—tends to focus on "leaders," "representation," and "authority structures," to the neglect of consensus decision making, direct democracy, affinity groups and clusters, *encuentros*, working groups, *consultas*, and spokes-councils. Since cooperatives, collectives, and networks constitute a large part of the forms that anarchist organizing takes, it would seem imperative

to develop an analysis of how these organizations operate. Are these alternative forms really inefficient as critics suggest? Even if so, what does such inefficiency do for members of these organizations, in terms of democracy, participant commitment, flexibility, value realization, etc.?

Unsurprisingly and perhaps due to the corporate-oriented focus of academia, most critique of anarchist organization is found within movement literature, not the academic literature. Here, I list just a few examples. James Mumm's essay on "dual power" explores potential organizational and institutional strategies for going beyond and replacing hierarchical forms.[25] Jo Freeman's critique of "structurelessness" is still pertinent today, as is Cathy Levine's response to Freeman.[26] Both essays discuss walking the line between chaotic counterproductivity and rigid conformity. Many others could also be included in a list of activist discussion of organization strategy and tactics.[27]

Anarchism and Social Movement Theories

Organizations—of various kinds—tend to form the backbone to social movements, and as such need to be a central part of the study on modern movements. However, anarchist social movements are often only studied in academia as movements of the past. Anarchism's "Golden Age" from the 1890s to 1910s is the small range in which the anarchist movement tends to be bounded by scholars. The movement's decline began in the late-1910s with the victory by the Bolshevik Party in Russia, but the anarchist movement remained strong in many countries in subsequent decades (particularly Spain through the 1930s). In addition to this temporal short-sightedness, there is a tendency for academics to ignore radical movements. Jeff Shantz writes:

> Conventional analyses of social movements continue to overlook the emergence of unconventional manifestations of resistance. . . . Analyses have been constrained by a rather myopic preoccupation either with organizational structures and resources which allow for access to the state or with civil actions (including civil disobedience) by which activists might register dissent or popularize claims. . . . Left out of conventional theorizing are movements which want no part of world order, new or otherwise, which they view as authoritarian, hierarchical, and inevitably genocidal (or "eco-cidal").[28]

How to overcome this theoretical deficit? One way is to integrate radical movements into the very "myopic" theories Shantz criticizes. Although this approach is not without serious problems, it is a worthy topic of discussion. There are a wide-variety of social movement theories that could be applied towards the movements that anarchists create or participate in. Here, there is sure to be much

of interest and contradiction. Some scholars have explored these social movement theories from an anarchist perspective[29] but have not considered the application of these theories to the anarchist movement itself. Below, I will detail some possible areas for further exploration that could unite social movement theories and the anarchist movement specifically.

Some of the major theories still used in sociological research include relative deprivation (or strain), resource mobilization, political opportunities, frame alignment, and new social movements. All of these have potentially beneficial ideas to offer in regards to the study of anarchist movements.[30] Although the following discussion clearly searches for the easiest and best connection between theory and the anarchist movement, the theoretical shortcomings of each should not be overlooked.

Relative deprivation might be the most commonly accepted notion among many anarchists: people resist when they become more impoverished, put-upon, and oppressed. In fact, most revolutionary advocacy is premised on this assumption. Yet, much research shows this is not always the case. Often the most exploited are the least politically active. Additionally, those who are most active in today's social movements tend to come from more stable, middle-class and educated backgrounds. Other research has suggested that it is only when conditions have been continually improving—but experience a sudden drop-off –that revolutions occur.[31] The main problem with such theories is that many people (even the rich) claim to be "deprived" in one way or another. This psychological state has little bearing on whether they act on the "deprived" sentiments. So, what qualified as deprivation? Grievances seem to be a consistent factor in all movements, regardless of success, not to mention revolution. Perhaps a more appropriate and applied question is: how can sociological understanding help to inform the approach of anarchists within disadvantaged communities to foster greater resistance?

Resource mobilization theory emerged in response to relative deprivation. The theory considers how movements are able to gather useful resources (however broadly defined) and deploy them successfully. By declaring these priorities, the theory assumes a somewhat entrepreneurial approach to movements - participants are rational actors who act similarly to small businesses and consumers. So, how do anarchists utilize organizations, physical resources, financial assets, and people power to engage in social struggle? Anarchists often do not have as many resources as other groups in society (particularly capitalists). Edwards and McCarthy present a useful typology of diverse resources that could be connected to anarchist practices.[32] Instead of just viewing resources as money, buildings, or volunteers (as typically done), Edwards and McCarthy broaden the notion of resources to include moral, cultural, social-organizational, human, and material resources. When viewed in this regard, many resources are frequently deployed by anarchists: moral resources that highlight injustice, organizational resources that permit flexible yet empowering decision-making,

and even the puppets, guerrilla theater, black masks, and other protest paraphernalia. Of particular utility to the modern anarchist movement is the Internet and its ability to facilitate cheap and easy networking across space and national boundaries, via email, mailing lists, and web pages. In this vein, many radical and anarchist technology collectives have sprung-up to provide corporate- and state-free tools for activist communities.

Political opportunity theory, a modification of resource mobilization, sees external influences in the wider society—especially the state—that facilitate movement success. The theory argues that greater access to decision making, elite allies, changing alignments in ruling elites, and decreased repression all tend to lead to movement victories. As a decidedly anti-state movement, does anarchism really benefit from such opportunities? Is it true that anarchist organizing increases in times of decreased repression? In many respects, this may be true. Witness the suppression of the anarchist movement in the late 1910s and early 1920s in the US by the focused repression of the Palmer Raids. Likewise, Bolshevism cracked down on and drove anarchists underground in Russia during the 1920s, as did Stalinists forces in the Spanish Civil War. Improved economic conditions and more "liberal" democracy in many industrialized countries during the 1950s and 1960s allowed movements to push the boundaries of acceptable norms, human rights, and to challenge the use of authority in the workplace, university, and home. It was during the liberalizing 1990s and post-USSR era that anarchism grew rapidly, especially in Eastern Europe. In fact, there is a relationship between the density of anarchist organizations and the rights of a country.[33] However, do such patterns actually suggest that anarchists are actively lobbying the state—perhaps with "Abolish Capitalism" bills? Hardly. Instead, such findings suggest that a certain amount of pre-existing freedom is necessary in order to facilitate greater struggles for freedom.[34]

A popular symbolic interactionist theory, frame alignment, considers how movements present their goals to those they wish to attract and convert, as well as to those they oppose. Snow and Benford argue that movements present diagnostic frames that describe the problems (i.e., the state, capitalism, patriarchy, etc.) and prognostic frames that offer solutions to the problem (i.e. decentralization, cooperation, mutual aid). Also, motivational frames are used to inspire people into action (anarchists are known for their use of fiery language and graphic imagery to provoke reaction and radical sentiments).[35] Frames are the discursive tools used by activists to lead people through an analytical process of critiquing social, economic, and political arrangements, considering workable reactions and alternatives, and then provoking *action*. How anarchists actually go about the process of frame alignment is an important area for research. In what ways could anarchists improve their framing as to include new demographic groups and to increase the attention for and adoption of ideas?

Finally, the new social movement (NSM) theories descend from a European tradition that suggest the loci of movements and conflict itself has moved from being economic struggle to that of cultural and political struggle. The "new

middle-class"—composed of educated and social service, public sector, and professionals—are now the major actors of social movements, not masses of working class people in labor unions. Does this diagnosis hold true for anarchists today? Are anarchists more motivated by their cultural identities than by working class interests?[36] NSM theories also emphasize radical decentralization, direct action, and a self-limiting radicalism that stops short of seizing the reins of the state. Much could be explored in this strain in regards to anarchism and anarchist movement, particularly empirical research that could buttress or challenge the relatively theoretical claims of NSM theories.[37]

Instead of challenging or growing already existing theoretical traditions, another anarchist-sociologist approach to study anarchist movements would be to work inductively and consider the issues and problems anarchists face.[38] Anarchists themselves would also benefit from trying to answer these questions, too. For example:

- Why are most active anarchists younger than the average population? Why the movement burnout? Why is there less commitment/attraction with this movement compared to other movements? And, how can this problem be remedied?

- Do anarchists buy into the false dualism—also present in broader society—of having to choose between preserving the natural world or having jobs and worker rights? In the US (and elsewhere) there is debate between "greens" and "red," i.e., those who focus on the environment or on class. How does this debate transcend mere issue focus into larger matters of organization (loose networks vs. federations) and debate over working outside the system or within its major institutions (such as labor unions)?

- How do anarchists choose between above-ground organizing and private, internal decision making? How do anarchists avoid police surveillance? What of the debate between having a strong "security culture" that limits outsider access and the position for open-transparency where anyone can view and participate in decision making? How is the line between willful recklessness and paranoia negotiated?

- How do anarchists envision and go about the tasks of creating of "dual power" institutions? To what extent do anarchists deem it worthwhile to operate within "mainstream" or reformist organizations or structures? What strategies have been employed to avoid the pitfalls faced by other former attempts to transform society?

- Do anarchists *ever* vote? Do anarchists tend to have experience with voting before coming to identify as anarchists? Do they continue to vote after their "conversion"? And if so, in what way do they vote? On candidates? Alternative parties? Only in local elections? Only on non-candidate/party issues or referendums? As a protest? Do anarchists participate in organizations or coalitions with those who have electoral strategies? And if so, how do they negotiate the tension between direct action and electoral action?

- What are the most commonly used methods of decision making? Consensus or direct democracy? Other movements have greatly influenced a wide variety of radical methods for formulating campaigns, strategies, and tactics used by anarchists. What are the downfalls of each method and how do anarchists propose transcending such issues? Do some organizations use modified forms of either consensus or direct democracy?
- How do anarchists formulate their positions towards questions of tactics, in particular in regards to "nonviolence" and "violence"? In what ways do anarchists differentiate between these two positions, as well as pacifism, civil disobedience, direct action, self-defense, armed struggle, etc.? How frequent of a concern is this general question in day-to-day organizing?

There are various approaches social scientists (or activists!) could take to explore these questions. First, anarchist movement literature could be examined. Discourse or symbols that frame the movement and its organizational strategies, goals, and values could be sought out and analyzed. Second, surveys could be administered. The easiest approach here could be to survey members of a particular anarchist organization or participants at an event (a protest or conference, for example). A more ambitious approach could be to develop a survey that could serve as an anarchist "census," aiming to gather data on anarchists, their values and actions, and other information throughout the world. Ideally, a multi-country census, perhaps available via a private and secure webpage, could gather basic socio-demographic information, organizational participation, anarchist ideology and values, strategy and tactics, and other questions of particular relevance to current anarchists, such as the ones above. Third, in-depth interviews could be conducted with anarchists within particular "scenes" or organizations to get a rich understanding of matters related to anarchism and the anarchist movement. These three methods vary in terms of their passivity, resource requirements, and quality of data. Each also would have unique short-comings in relation to each other.

Conclusion

Assuming that these research programs (or others) are carried forward, then what? If academics do the research, will it just appear in obtuse, inaccessible journals, hidden away on the shelves of other academics? Perhaps. But, this is a very undesirable scenario.

Here again, public sociology has advice to offer. Burawoy argues that public sociology is a way to transcend the academy and expand sociology's insights to the mass population.[39] To do so, there are a number of approaches he suggests. One is "traditional public sociology" that tries to popularize sociological research through either distribution in the mass media or prepare it in such a way

as to be more digestible by a non-sociologist audience. Another approach is "organic public sociology" where the sociologist is personally active in community organizations, social movements, or "the public," and practices and applies their sociological knowledge in such domains.

Reflecting on these arguments, it would seem imperative to take any knowledge garnered from the above research program and make it relevant and usable by not only anarchists and the anarchist movement, but also the everyday public. As with the practice of much academic literature, much research will have to be reformulated to be decipherable by a lay-readership. Also, the medium of presentation ought to be considered. Written articles are surely interesting to some, but other formats should be pursued: pamphlets, newspapers, and zines—to say nothing of music, radio, public performance, TV or video, and the Internet.

But, our research should not just be unidirectional, like that implicit in traditional public sociology. A truly organic public anarchist-sociology research program would embed itself *within* social movements for radical change. Some sociologists have done this. Ehrlich was involved in efforts with other colleagues who served as a radical research institute for social movements, called Research Group One, by providing their expertise to solve applied problems and answer questions that social science research methods could address.[40] Martin goes further, by arguing that social scientists should help movement organizations conduct *their own research*, by assisting with study design and other resource needs, but allowing research goals and labor be done by the movement actors themselves.[41] Clearly Ehrlich and Martin's approaches both empower movements to utilize research for their own ends. It would be naïve to assume that movements can survive, let alone achieve victories, without having such important resources at their disposal. Anarchism's many enemies—government, the military, corporations, and all manner of other hierarchical institutions— regularly employ research to serve their ends. A truly anarchist-sociology would need to serve the interests of the masses struggling for radical change. Much needs to be done to develop strategies for liberating not only sociological research from the Ivory Tower, but also its practical methods of research to be used towards the quest for liberation itself.

It is easy to imagine many other elements of an anarchist-sociology research program, perhaps including elements of deviance, sociology of education, social-psychology, work and occupations, sexuality, environmental sociology, and urban sociology. I think such areas could be equally fruitful and useful for anarchists. However, I leave such research programs to other interested parties for development.

Notes

1. Jonathan Purkis, "Toward an Anarchist Sociology," in *Changing Anarchism: Anarchist Theory and Practice in a Global Age*, ed. J. Purkis and J. Bowen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 39-54.

2. Brian Martin, *Tied Knowledge: Power in Higher Education* (Self-published, 1998b). Available at http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/98tk/.

3. Purkis, 2004.

4. For classical cases of anti-anarchist propaganda campaigns, see Nathaniel Hong, "Constructing the Anarchist Beast in American Periodical Literature, 1880-1903," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 9 (1992), pp. 110-130; and Linda Cobb-Reiley, "Aliens and Alien Ideas: The Suppression of Anarchists and the Anarchist Press in America, 1901-1914," *Journalism History* 15:2-3 (Summer/Autumn 1988), pp. 50-59). For more contemporary examples, see the work of Douglas McLeod, including: James Hertog and Douglas McLeod, "Anarchists Wreak Havoc In Downtown Minneapolis: A Multi-level Study of Media Coverage of Radical Protest," *Journalism & Mass Communication Monographs* 151 (June 1995), pp. 1-47; Douglas McLeod, "Communicating Deviance: The Effects of Television News Coverage of Social Protest," *Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media* 39:1 (Winter 1995), pp. 4-19; and Douglas McLeod and Benjamin H. Detenber, "Framing Effects of Television News Coverage of Social Protest," *Journal of Communication* 49:3 (1999), pp. 3-23.

5. Martin, 1998b.

6. Saul Alinsky, "Empowering People, Not Elites," *Playboy* (1972). Available at http://www.progress.org/2003/alinsky5.htm.

7. These are called "theories of the middle range" that do not aim to develop "grand theories" that try to explain all of society, but rather focus on less sizable, but still substantial areas of society. See Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968).

8. James Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988), S95-S120.

9. Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," *American Sociological Review* 3:5 (October 1938), pp. 672-682.

10. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

11. Uri Gordon, "Anarchism Reloaded," *Journal of Political Ideologies*, 12:1 (2007), pp. 29-48. Quote from p. 38. Emphasis in the original.

12. Various theories of deviance may be relevant here, as they suggest how people take non-traditional, illicit, or rebellious trajectories.

13. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public Welfare* (New York: Pantheon, 1971).

14. The critique of inequality within organizations between "order-givers" and "order-takers" (and not just between owners and non-owners) comes from Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959).

15. See Barbara Epstein, *Political Protest and Cultural Revolution* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991).

16. Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy* (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1949).

17. Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields," *American Sociological Review* 48 (1983), pp. 147-160.

18. Hervé Laroche, "From Decision to Action in Organizations: Decision-Making as a Social Representation," *Organizational Science* 6:1 (1995), pp. 62-75.

19. Timothy Ingalsbee, "Earth First! Activism: Ecological Postmodern Praxis in Radical Environmentalist Identities," *Sociological Perspectives* 39:2 (1996), pp. 263-276. Timothy Luke, "Ecological Politics and Local Struggles: Earth First! As An Environmental Resistance Movement," *Current Perspectives in Social Theory* 14 (1994), pp. 241-267; Jeffrey Shantz and Barry D. Adam, "Ecology and Class: The Green Syndicalism of IWW/Earth First Local 1," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy,* 19:7/8 (1999), pp. 43-72.

20. The Indymedia movement has received a lot of scholarly attention from journalism and communication academics, but none who consider the socio-organizational aspects of the IMC structure itself.

21. Hermann Maiba, "Grassroots Transnational Social Movement Activism: The Case of Peoples' Global Action," *Sociological Focus* 38:1 (2005), pp. 41-63. Lesley Wood, "Bridging the Chasm: The Case of Peoples' Global Action," in *Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order,* ed. J. Brandy and J. Smith (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 95-117.

22. Ehrlich considers this corporate-state influence upon organizational research to be wholly consuming and warping, making any alternative analysis of organizations next to impossible. Howard Ehrlich, "Anarchism and Formal Organization" in *Reinventing Anarchy, Again,* ed. H. J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1996), pp. 56-68.

23. Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, "The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic Models," *American Sociological Review* 44 (August 1979), pp. 509-527.

24. A notable exception is Polletta's research on the Direct Action Network; Francesca Polletta, *Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

25. James Mumm, *Active Revolution.* Available at: http://www.infoshop.org/texts/active_revolution.html.

26. Both essays are collected in Dark Star Collective, *Quiet Rumours: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader* (Edinburgh, UK: AK Press, 2002).

27. I would also recommend the following for critique: "Anti-Mass: Methods of Organizing for Collectives" (Red Sunshine Gang), "On Conflict & Consensus: A Handbook on Formal Consensus Decision Making" (Butler & Rothstein), and "Organizing Communities: Building Anarchist Grassroots Movements" (Tom Knoche).

28. Jeff Shantz, "Beyond the State: The Return to Anarchy." *disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory* 12 (2003), pp. 87-103. Quote from p. 90.

29. See Purkis, 2004 in particular.

30. We could also speak of "anarchist movement" (to use bell hooks' idea of feminist movement), that suggest not one wholly perfected movement that is ideologically uniform (such as "*the* anarchist movement"). hooks' usage also indicates a theory and practice that is in motion and a state of constant evolution. bell hooks, *Feminism is For Everyone: Passionate Politics* (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2000).

31.   James Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* 27:1 (1962), pp. 5-19.

32.   Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy, "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization," in *The Blackwell Companion for Social Movements*, ed. D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 116-152.

33.   Dana M. Williams and Matthew T. Lee, "'We Are Everywhere': An Ecological Analysis of Organizations in the Anarchist Yellow Pages," *Humanity & Society* 32 (February 2008), pp. 45-70.

34.   For more on political opportunity, see Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Doug McAdam, "Conceptual Origins, Current Problems, Future Directions," in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, ed. D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 23-40.

35.   David Snow and Robert D. Benford, "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization" *International Social Movement Research* 1 (1988), pp. 197-217.

36.   Past anarchism was strongly embedded in working class movements and was, in many places, synonymous with the labor movement. However, this is no longer the case in modern labor movements.

37.   For a good introduction to NSM theories, see Steven Buechler, "New Social Movement Theories," *The Sociological Quarterly* 36:3 (1995), pp. 441-464.

38.   See Lofland for a brilliant advocacy of "problem-solving" oriented social movement research. John Lofland, "Theory-Bashing and Answer-Improving in the Study of Social Movements," *American Sociologist* 24:2 (1993), pp. 37-58.

39.   Michael Burawoy, "For Public Sociology," *American Sociological Review* 70 (2005), pp. 4-28.

40.   Howard Ehrlich, "Notes from an Anarchist Sociologist: May 1989," in *Radical Sociologists and the Movement: Experiences, Lessons, and Legacies*, ed. M. Oppenheimer, M. J. Murray, and R. F. Levine (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), pp. 233-48.

41.   Brian Martin, *Information Liberation* (London: Freedom Press, 1998a).

Sabotaging the System! Bringing Anarchist Theory into Social Studies Education

Abraham P. DeLeon

If it's a war the anarchists want, then damn it, it will start here.
— Jim Gilchrist, founder of the Minutemen Project, Sacramento Bee, 10/30/05

I am learning that criticism is not nearly as effective as sabotage.
— Anonymous

Being a radical teacher and scholar requires a certain amount of creativity when trying to express the importance that radical critiques serve towards making our classroom practices more participatory and democratic. The opening quote, made by the founder of the highly xenophobic group The Minutemen that was founded along the U.S.-Mexican border in response to a supposed "influx" of "illegal" immigration, shows the direct influence that anarchists contribute in confronting a racist organization. Linked to what are at the foundations of both of these quotes is the power of social action and its importance in our attempt in trying to make our world a nicer place to live. For teachers, this is quite profound. In education, there have been significant gains made towards advancing theory about schooling as an oppressive social institution.

At the same time, critical scholars have also opened up much needed intellectual and discursive "space" for radicals to have a framework in which to situate their research, teaching, and their own political commitments towards social justice. In my own field of social studies, this is especially relevant as history, sociology, and civics allow for teachers to teach critically about society and history, injecting important questions about racism, sexism, classism, and other social ills. As a body of knowledge, the social studies have remained fairly conservative.[1] There has been important work done in the social studies, with some scholars exploring critical and democratic approaches to how we conceive

of and should teach subjects like history, sociology, civics, and economics.[2] But, how can this be done when critical teachers have been arguing for the same types of changes over the past twenty-five years?

Fortunately, radical scholarship has provided us with plenty of examples how a critical pedagogy and classroom can be conceived.[3] Also, critical pedagogy has also been engaged by other voices in academia, pushing the theory in new directions[4] and has even engaged the vicious attacks by right-wing organizations against academic freedom and progressive professors within the United States.[5] New approaches need to be conceived towards how we teach social studies to our students, but also "radicalizing" the current debate in social studies education towards including social justice, political activism, and working towards systemic awareness and change. This falls in the tradition of the current literature on democratic social education and a transformative and empowering social studies pedagogy.[6] This last point is what I want to address in this chapter.

Although there are several edited volumes that deal with radical theory in social studies education they glaringly omit praxis inspired by anarchists and eco-activists: two groups who are responsible for cutting-edge political and social action today.[7] These radical groups utilize a variety of means to achieve their goals: such as direct action techniques that help solve community and social problems *directly* that may fall outside "acceptable" or "safe" forms of social protest. Sabotage, boycotts, graffiti, sit-ins, and marches are examples of direct action techniques that have been used by anarchist groups. Anarchists unapologetically do not look to positions of power or authority for "permission" to protest or conduct other actions. Richard Day[8] defines direct action as, "communities of various sorts working together in a circulation of struggles that are simultaneously *against* capitalism and *for* the construction of alternatives to it."[9] Direct action in the context of my argument means anti-capitalist actions and working towards a more just society, whether that means feeding the homeless, cleaning up parks, or other praxis that makes our communities nicer places to live. Although critical pedagogy has pushed us towards seeing the inherent political nature of schools, it has fallen short in engendering social protest while also exploring how to combine classroom actions with larger political projects. Critical pedagogy also falls short in its theoretical traditions.

Critical pedagogy is grounded in a neo-Marxist tradition, but the influence of feminist, poststructuralist, and postmodern theories have been acknowledged.[10] But, there are radical theories that have been glaringly omitted from how we have conceptualized "critical pedagogy." Critical pedagogy forces us to conceptualize how we can teach against the status quo and empower students in positive ways. Unfortunately, critical pedagogy lacks the urgency that is needed to counter the onslaught of neo-liberal and neo-conservative discourses, or what Michael Apple has aptly coined the "conservative restoration" of the United States.[11] This is also true as NCLB is dictating what teachers should and can teach, while other forms of high-stakes testing dominate the ideological landscape of publicly funded schools. When I describe theory that is urgent, I am

specifically referring to an urgency that includes radical action *now*. Social protests and other political actions have been a central component to social, political, and economic change throughout history. Although more progressive and radical theory exists in the academy, it is not finding its way to the public arena of discourse. This means that we as critical teachers need to expand our theoretical traditions and look to models that are occurring outside of traditional education.

Anarchist theory and its conceptions of non-authoritative, autonomous, and direct action bode well for teachers that need radical ideas on systemic change now. Although plenty of articles and books deal with making social studies education more empowering and culturally inclusive, they fall short in providing teachers and students a framework for actually making these goals a reality without committed political and social actions. Historically and globally, there have been anarchists who have participated in democratic schooling, as well as helping to organize and run alternative schools.[12] Anarchist theory has been established in the literature for some time now, and its inclusion into radical educational discourse is necessary. The global destruction of the environment, the current carnage in Iraq, the suffering and exploitation of indigenous populations worldwide, the immoral treatment of animals in research facilities and slaughterhouses, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons all demonstrate the necessity for critical teaching and scholarship. Because of this, I believe that anarchist theory can fundamentally inform the way we teach social studies and make us rethink our roles and functions as social studies teachers committed to social and ecological justice.

What Do I Mean By Anarchist Praxis? A Brief Introduction and Summary

Anarchists and anarchism are widely misrepresented by the popular media. Anarchism is not easy to define, so this short summary includes anarchist theory from a wide variety of perspectives, so I am in essence referring to "anarchisms." Anarchism, or being labeled an "anarchist," carries with it serious implications. Violent, destructive, dangerous, and chaotic are some of the descriptors that have been used to describe and categorize anarchist actions historically.[13] Although some of the methods that anarchists use may startle or alarm people (destroying corporate property responsible for environmental destruction, or confronting police brutality at protests), they have been quite effective in calling attention to their causes (see: the Animal Liberation Front, "The Battle of Seattle" of 1999, or other global protests for anarchist or anarchist-inspired social action). But, what separates anarchist theory from other radical theories of liberation?

Anarchists contend that the state, in any form, inhibits the ability for people to build critical consciousness. The state, with its official discourses, apparatuses, punitive measures, hierarchical organization, and totalizing existence does not allow human beings the ability to coexist peacefully with their environment, form meaningful relationships, or participate in how we are governed in real or substantial ways.[14] The state and its protective measures (such as the military or police) are structured to oppress and subvert individual and group rights, especially those from non-dominant groups. Historically, if we examine the atrocities that have occurred in the name of "states" and their "security," it is easy to understand why anarchists would contend with a system that helps perpetuate human suffering and misery. But, as anarchists argue, this only happens for certain segments of the population who are not part of the dominant culture or who do not have access to key resources. This also includes issues of social class, as the state specifically benefits those from the ruling class by shaping laws to meet their interests, as well as structuring social institutions to reflect their values and beliefs. Besides excluding and coercing people, states also have complex and rigid hierarchies.

Hierarchical systems, to anarchists, do not allow for true participation or allow people the opportunity to make their own decisions without forced coercion. Hierarchies help keep in place traditional power structures that exclude specific groups of people. These types of top-down social structures have been responsible for subverting individual and group rights. Anarchists contend that human beings need to have the freedom to make decisions, participate in the political process, and opportunities to build real community through activism and democratic participation.[15] This can assume many forms. Protesting at the meeting of the World Bank or IMF, sabotaging corporations that destroy our environment, liberating animals from cages in research facilities, or feeding the homeless on a Saturday afternoon have all involved anarchist conceptions of participation and resistance.

Power is another important component of anarchist theory. Poststructuralist conceptions of power and how it operates has influenced anarchist theory and has been a main concern for anarchists looking to dismantle oppressive institutions. Power is not something that we necessarily possess per se (although this is always a component to how we conceptualize power), but power instead works through everyday interactions, the social roles we assume, decisions we make at work, to believing a news reporter on the television about the plight of refugees in Darfur. Whatever the context, there is a power relationship that exists.[16] As Todd May[17] writes,

> power, as we have seen, constitutes for the anarchists a suppressive force. The image of power with which anarchism operates is that of a weight, pressing down—and at times destroying—the actions, events, and desires with which it comes in contact.[18]

Rethinking and re-imagining institutions that perpetuate unequal power relationships are concerns for anarchists that want to confront how power operates in a society.

Although this review covers more of an academic approach to anarchist theory, it would be unethical not to mention the actions that are not being published by mainstreamed journals and academic publishers. Eco-activists, and members of autonomous groups like the Earth Liberation Front or the ALF have been very effective in calling attention to the destruction corporations and animal research facilities have been responsible for. Although they release communiqués that cover their visions and justification for their actions, their importance lies in what they are doing that fits outside what most people are comfortable with today. They destroy property that is responsible for environmental destruction (such as setting fire to Hummers for example) or they conduct clandestine sabotage methods against research facilities. Although these types of claims will make some liberals cringe, radical theory in education *should include* room for civil disobedience, sabotage, and direct action.

AK Press publishes books that cover direct action techniques and authors such as Steven Best and Anthony Nocella have covered eco-activism.[19] Their work contains a milieu of examples of direct action techniques that have emerged in the radical environmental movement. Although we have to seek out this information through alternative media outlets (such as through online independent media sources) and publishers (AK Press for example), anarchist actions and ideas need to be included in a radical critique. Anarchists inspire me in ways that earlier radical theory in education was unable to do. Critical pedagogy needs to include ideas and debates for teachers who wish to conceptualize how anarchist strategies such as sabotage and civil disobedience can be included in building a new and urgent critical pedagogy. Radical theory in education has recently included new approaches from feminism, cultural studies, or new qualitative approaches, but anarchism has been glaringly omitted, other than a few authors.[20] This is unfortunate, as anarchists have many ideas easily applicable to educators and why they should be included in working towards social justice.

With this introduction, it is important to say that I have only included aspects of anarchist theory specifically applicable to my argument about its inclusion in how we teach and conceptualize social studies education. Anarchism is a wide and diverse body of knowledge and I encourage the reader to explore other aspects and incorporating anarchism into their own content areas and research. But, how do power, hierarchy, and the state fit within a critical social studies pedagogy? This will be the central question as we explore how I conceive of incorporating anarchism into a social studies pedagogy. But I want to stress that these ideas are also easily applicable in the Sciences, English, and literacy and I urge the reader to apply these to her/his own content area.

Anarchist Theory and Social Studies: Informing Practice in a New and Urgent Way

Fortunately, the social studies allows us to combine several academic traditions into one content area, but also allows the integration of social issues occurring outside of the classroom. As earlier scholars have argued, the social studies allows teachers to explore issues that are of pressing social concern, such as civic participation, historical memory, or cultural understanding.[21] There is a wide body of established literature that explores the importance of including a more democratic, social, and cultural awareness to how we interpret and understand our world.[22] The same literature argues that these types of democratic educational goals should be a vital component to any social studies pedagogy; and is especially true for teachers who wish to engage in democratic and non-authoritarian teaching.

Some critical teachers have cited the social studies as a prime example of a content area that can become more critical, democratic, and multicultural. Although conservative and liberal discourses on school "reform" have focused on curriculum standards and establishing a national "standards-based" social studies curriculum within the United States, there have been scholars who have seriously questioned these narratives. Often steeped in racist, classist, or sexist representations, the traditional social studies content is often filled with bland assignments, blind nationalism, oversimplifies complex issues, and omits accomplishments of groups with little social, economic, or cultural power.[23] To counter this, socially committed teachers have devised a variety of ways of resisting these hegemonic frameworks.

For example, scholars such as E. Wayne Ross have called for a more inclusive and open approach in conceiving the social studies, as well as incorporating serious work in establishing a democratic social studies curriculum, while Cameron White has advocated for a new and transformative approach to social studies education.[24] Other scholars have pushed for including lesser-known histories, including primary sources in studying historical eras, and modeling how democratic decisions are made.[25] Although multicultural education has been hijacked by liberal and conservative discourses, it still provides an avenue for teachers to explore with students how systems of oppression are perpetuated.[26] According to David Hursh,[27] a goal of a multicultural social studies should include ways in which students can, "analyze cultural, political, economic, and historical patterns and structures so that students will not only better understand society, but affect it."[28] These types of goals for a social studies curriculum need to be revisited, as we counter the onslaught of neo-liberal and conservative discourses surrounding what should be taught in schools today.[29]

Unfortunately, in the current ideological climate in the United States, *NCLB* has effectively restructured curriculum so that schools are not only preparing

students for tests at a much earlier age (Kindergarten in some public school districts!), but also shapes *what* will be taught in schools.[30] Stressing the Sciences, Math, and a specific definition of reading places schools in a difficult position, as they are judged based on students' scores in these content areas. Despite the work of progressive and radical teaching, this has not moved the conversation forward in a meaningful and substantial way. This is where I believe that we as social studies educators can look to more radical theories for new ideas and inspiration.

Anarchists contend that the state is illegitimate, created to sustain the privileges of wealthy social elites, while also maintaining strict social control over subordinated groups.[31] Although other "critical" traditions have also argued about the problems of states and hierarchies, they sustain dominant misconceptions about the function of states and its complex bureaucracies. Resting on the same ideological justification of the state, social structures (like education) depend upon legitimacy and are reinforced through "official" discourses that emerge from these institutions. Although critical pedagogy as a body of theory has addressed state institutions and the necessity for changing these structures, they have not fully linked it to classroom practice. The state will not simply "wither away," but must occur through specific actions. If we are seriously committed to systemic change, a critical pedagogy must include teaching people how to organize against larger and more powerful organizations. This means modeling strategies that directly confront these institutions. This may mean peacefully protesting in front of buildings, writing letter campaigns to mainstreamed and independent media outlets, but may also include direct action techniques such as sabotage, sit-ins, or similar types of actions. Although this may make some teachers cringe at the thought of even suggesting actions that fall outside of "accepted" forms of social protest, we must look to historical examples that demonstrate the importance of more direct forms of resistance and the role they have played in social movements.

Before I describe some historical examples, let me define exactly what I mean by the terms that I employ as uniquely "anarchist." Various forms of protest have been effective in bringing about social change and groups have outlined effective strategies. Social studies teachers interested in these should explore the literature.[32] Traditionally, "critical" methods in education have meant pedagogical practices specifically applicable to the classroom. A vital component to critical pedagogy happens in the classroom, but we must do actions outside of the school if we are serious about social change. This means examining successful strategies and employing them against oppressive institutions and structures. I have used the term "sabotage" and unfortunately, sabotage has been framed as "violent." Although this has been a component to this type of action historically, I am framing sabotage strictly as a form of direct subversion (this can assume many different forms), meaning that social studies teachers should include sabotage as a viable classroom strategy. Sabotage liter-

ally means disruption, and it can be framed as classroom practice that students uncover and discuss oppressive social practice (sabotage as a *form* of critical pedagogy), while also framing sabotage as direct action outside of schools (organizing a sit-in at Wal-Mart for example). With the conditions that now exist because of statewide high-stakes testing, it is even more imperative to challenge the conditions that give rise to these tests. Teachers, dogged by pedantic and scripted curriculum, will find their time limited in classroom to only material covered in these tests. By necessity, teachers will have to "break the rules" to even include opportunities for outside learning experiences. "Sabotaging" *NCLB* and other high-stakes tests can be a successful strategy in resisting standardized curriculum.

Although critical pedagogy has included calls for teachers to resist in certain ways, sabotage as a "method" rings more clearly and urgently than similar positions in critical pedagogy, while also giving students a more activist framework for engendering social change. Using the discourse of "street" activists will also introduce these concepts to students in a much more open way, instead of depending on mainstreamed news outlet or other hegemonic discourses. This also supports the notion that social change will have to occur both within and outside of established educational structures, echoing Anyon's call for economic change to accompany urban educational revitalization.[33] Sabotage (as a conceptual framework) allows teachers to model direct action strategies in their classrooms and using the discourse that happens in radical circles also allows students to become familiar with key concepts and strategies used by radical groups, a fact often overlooked or omitted in critical educational discourses.

Social studies teachers can also combine the concept of sabotage easily within the parameters of a critical pedagogy. An example that I use comes from my own teaching. As part of a Foundations course and Social Studies methodology courses, I always include literature, examples, and dedicate classroom projects towards understanding and employing ideological critique. Informed by critical discourse analysis, I guide students in unpacking how ideology manifests itself through various educational discourses. My students continually comment about the power of critique, and often share with me how this has changed their television habits forever! For teachers, critiquing popular culture (magazines, television, political speeches, or local events) should be a vital component to their classroom practice. Thus, sabotage does not just include outside actions, but has real classroom value.

Historically, sabotage has taken many forms. For example, Miles Horton's Highlander School demonstrated the importance that education and teaching can have towards social movements.[34] In his school, civil rights leaders attended Highlander where they learned strategies for resistance and organizational techniques. These techniques included learning about the law in relation to voting rights, but also included social protest techniques, such as sit-ins, marching, and boycotts. As a social studies teacher dedicated to social justice, I must include methods of resistance that fall outside of the "law." I am not advocating for

mayhem and destruction, but am realistic about the necessity of direct action. As Miles Horton believed,

> I think the problem is that most people don't allow themselves to experiment with ideas, because they assume that they have to fit into the system. . . . I just think most people can't think outside the socially approved way of doing things and consequently don't open up their minds to making any kind of discoveries. I think you have to think outside the conventional framework.[35]

These "conventional frameworks" that Horton mentions have seriously impeded our ability in producing a new society, as we are dogged by hegemonic discourses about what are "acceptable" forms of social protest. Although Highlander is a very specific example (and Horton *never* uses the term sabotage) this can have important implications for social studies teachers. Through the social studies, teachers can use history to help demonstrate how and why people have acted in resisting oppressive social practices, such as during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. More recent examples, such as the protests against the IMF and the World Bank during the 1990s, also provide examples for social studies teachers to examine with their students. Social studies teachers interested in political action can mentor and nurture their students in working towards positive social change, such as what occurred at Highlander.

For example, in a Freshmen Global Studies course that I taught, one of the main components of that course was examining world cultures. Focusing on Asia, Africa, and South America provided me the opportunity to discuss the effects that global capitalism has had on these areas. But, I did not model ways in which students can fundamentally change these same conditions that they are reading about. I pushed students to recognize cultural differences and oppressive practices, but I failed to include ways in which students can change these conditions. Without providing or modeling strategies for change, I could have engendered a hopeless or defeatist attitude in my students. Instead, I could have provided examples of how sweatshop labor is regulated in these countries, while also exploring with students the corporations that benefit most from this labor. Then, we could discuss strategies to confront and change this problem. This could mean boycotting specific products, organizing sit-ins at retail stores that sell their products, or some type of action or teach-in to highlight the problems that these corporations cause. Whatever the action or strategy, students would be learning direct action and sabotage.

This could also occur in different contexts as well. For example, one of the problems highlighted in Jean Anyon's[36] study of urban schooling in Newark, New Jersey is that of corporate flight and the decay that often follows in its wake. Working with a teacher committed to social justice, as an anarchist, I could assist a teacher in creating and teaching workshops that explore this issue with the students, or design field learning assistantships that allow for work in the community. This could be linked with theoretical and historical coursework

that explores corporate flight and its links to urban poverty. Whatever the context, anarchist principles of direct community action have feasibility in a social studies classroom.

It is essential to model for students how to change structural and systemic oppression. Too many people are politically unaware of how to go about enacting change either sanctioned or unsanctioned by our society. Too many times, political participation entails liberal notions of writing letters to the President, to the Senate, and other futile examples of how people can be become "politically active." This is also true for voting, as going to the ballot at a pre-determined time is considered being involved. Although we cannot generalize about anarchist actions, most strategies fall outside these socially sanctioned parameters. This is especially relevant for social studies teachers, as often times we reify the political process in the United States as something valid and appropriate. More time needs to be dedicated towards critiquing these structures, but combined with this, modeling other forms of participation that have been used historically by social movements worldwide. The Montgomery Alabama Bus Boycott and the incident with Rosa Parks are excellent examples of how people organized and refused to support a company that enacted racist policies, even though that meant personal hardships for the protestors. Although history books have distorted the story of Parks, teachers can still use her and the protestor's dedication in standing up to the public transit system as a model for building resistance.[37] Predictably, the bus company folded after economic pressure and the bad publicity that the boycott caused.[38] This example is highly relevant, as citizens today do not understand or realize the transformative potential of radical actions. The bus boycott could serve as a case study for social studies teachers to explore the function of economic boycotts on producing change from greedy corporations. It can also be modeled as an action that uses the concept of sabotage very effectively.

Although their social studies pedagogy is by no means "anarchist," Levstik and Barton[39] argued for the importance for including history as a central component to any social studies pedagogy. They fundamentally understand the role that historical thinking and understanding needs to play in social studies classrooms across educational settings and contexts.

> Shifting the focus of the history curriculum to a pluralist perspective presents a more inclusive and authentic vision of the futures available to all students. Studying a range of perspective helps students understand discrimination, marginalization, and opposition, as well as power and privilege. It opens up a broader range of possible ways of acting in the world—and acting in the future.[40]

These ideas are important for anarchist academics and social studies teachers. As an anarchist, history is a tool in addressing how social problems have manifested themselves in human society. These historical examples also include

strategies for resistance that have worked in the past in engendering transformative social action. The Montgomery Bus Boycott, the worker strikes of the 1920s, the anarchist actions during the Spanish Civil War, and the recent IMF and World Bank protests could all be historically examined for their impact and significance. Primary sources could be investigated, and teachers and students could combine ideas and strategies that have worked in the past that emerge from these historical case studies. By doing this, students are not only learning strategies of resistance, but also a more historical frame of reference needed to participate in a vibrant and socially committed society.

Where Should We Go From Here?

Radical scholarship in education needs to be expanded to include theory that sits outside of traditional "educational" research and theory. This is doubly true for social studies teachers, as *NCLB* and other "assessment" strategies are not including social studies as a key concept, which has meant less time for social studies in elementary schools.[41] Starting in elementary school, students are not given adequate tools in becoming socially aware and committed citizens. Without a strong social studies program, a school curriculum can lose its potential for historical inquiry and understanding and encouraging social change and awareness in our students. Anarchist theory provides examples that social studies teachers can utilize within their classrooms, such as direct action, sabotage, and protesting. Using historical events as "case studies," a radical social studies teacher can demonstrate the importance of cooperative social action. But, this also means giving students educational opportunities to critique dominant ideology, question dominant narratives, and rethink new possibilities. Combined with activism, a social studies curriculum can become a powerful tool for ideological critique and transformative educational change.

But, this will not come without dedicated work from everyone involved in social justice. Theory, without praxis, cannot change structures of domination. Praxis means *action* and *theory*, which we can build new social organizations and arrangements together. If we have learned anything from our past, it is the difficulty that confronting oppressive structures means for communities dedicated to social change. We need to learn this hardship and the resolve needed to be successful, but we must also learn how to act more communally and cooperatively. Combining anarchist theory and critical pedagogy moves us towards action and provides a framework for critiquing dominant ideology and building a new social movement in education. We are at a pivotal moment in our historical development and as Noam Chomsky[42] has asked, will we choose "hegemony or survival?" I choose the latter and my classroom teaching and research will be dedicated toward this goal.

Notes

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6.   Hursh and Ross, 2000; E.W. Ross, *The Social Studies Curriculum: Purposes, Problems and Possibilities,* 3rd ed. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

7.   Hursh and Ross; A. Segall, E. Heilman, & C. Cherryholmes (eds.), *Social Studies – The Next Generation: Researching in the Postmodern* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006).

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16

Whither Anarchist Geography?

Anthony Ince

> Geography ... must teach us, from our earliest childhood, that we are all brethren [*sic*], whatever our nationality"[1]

Geographies and Anarchisms, Old and New

Whither Anarchist Geography? or, *Where is Anarchist Geography Going?*— what a peculiar title.[2] It suggests that there is such a thing as "anarchist geography," that it is going somewhere and, indeed, that it has also come from somewhere. In this piece, I will attempt to show that there is indeed such a thing as anarchist geography, that it has a rich history and potentially vibrant and exciting future. Reuniting the two is a task that has been for a long time both necessary and systematically ignored in the geographical academy, bar a handful of brave souls.[3] Anglophone geography's most famous and wide-ranging conference, the *Association of American Geographers Annual Meeting*, exemplifies this beautifully. In its 2008 program, only one paper in a conference of several thousand participants lists "anarchism" or "anarchist" as a keyword. The previous year, there was only one panel out of several hundred that considered the links between anarchism and geography.

Meanwhile, over the last decade or so, anarchists have been pioneering exciting, spatially-sophisticated modes of critically engaging with contemporary capitalism. Anarchists" ongoing attempts to reconfigure both everyday and spectacular spaces of political praxis became for a while the focus of widespread media and popular attention, particularly during the "anti-capitalist" era of the early 2000s. One cannot begin to list the myriad ways in which anarchists and anarchist-inspired tactics and ideas have influenced the political and cultural terrains of contemporary society. From "fluffy" Critical Mass, Reclaim the Streets parties and radical samba, to the "spiky" Stop the City direct action tactics and black bloc street warfare, to everyday anarchist(ic) practices such as

those practiced by anarcho-syndicalist unions, community—focused radical social centers and autonomous migrant support networks—virtually all of the many innovative tactics and strategies created, used and inspired by anarchists can be said to have a powerful geographic current running throughout. And yet, in the geographical academy, the few anarchists that are active in geography do not receive the recognition that more established and institutionalized radical and progressive schools of geography, such as Marxists and feminists, enjoy.

This is in stark contrast to a hundred years ago, when geography and anarchism were united by two men: Elisée Reclus and Peter Kropotkin. These were two eminent geographers, masters of their field, who were also two of the great classical anarchist thinkers. They integrated their two passions, wrote works that still resonate more than a century later, and acted upon them without compromise. Their arrival in the public eye of their native lands, and their writings that spread rapidly throughout the globe, signaled the first and, so far, the *only* great era of anarchist geography. Yet, as I will seek to show, the story of anarchist geography does not end when these grand old figureheads died. Far from it.

Here I will interrogate, through a handful of themes used as examples, the rich historical and conceptual connections between anarchism and geography. This is sometimes explored through geographers, sometimes through anarchists, and sometimes through observations of my own. I want to reawaken these connections and synergies in the specific context of our times. Anarchism has a significant contribution to make when education's role as an institution in society is to train future wage slaves in the art of being a wage slave, and to reactively criticize from a distance when and where it is safe to do so. This form of academic knowledge is produced by reacting to the world, with this reaction itself strangely verifying and affirming of the status quo. The geography of this reciprocity itself is interesting and labyrinthine, and given the position of academics as (re)producers of knowledge and ways of knowing, it is of the utmost importance that these links between academia and revolutionary anarchist thought are made explicit so that their disjunctions and conjunctions can be seen in magnified, exploded view.

It is often hard to explain to most non-geographers what geography "is," just as it is hard to explain to most non-anarchists what anarchism "is." Both are clouded with popular misunderstandings and simplifications, yet both are fascinating and powerful frameworks for understanding the world and our place within it. Indeed, as I hope to show, the two are complimentary and explicitly or implicitly intertwined with each other at virtually every point in their long histories.

I take geography as a broad brush stroke in this chapter, but confine it solely to what one might call "human geography." (Human) geography, put simply, is the study of people's relations with their environment. This "environment" is not only our cartographic location or position within broader ecosystems of life, but rather, it extends to our social, cultural, economic, and political environs. It focuses on the two key notions, of *space* and *place*, and seeks to understand the

way in which we shape—and are shaped by—the spaces and places we inhabit, pass through, and circulate within. Although a discipline in its own right, geography is inherently interdisciplinary, straddling the breadth of the social sciences as well as incorporating elements of the natural sciences, the arts and philosophy. It is a messy, mongrel discipline, and is especially exciting because of it.

Since geography is a discipline that extends throughout all other fields that utilize space and place as factors of analysis, this chapter will be engaging with and drawing from a range of disciplines. This includes fields such as architecture and planning, whose topics and methods of enquiry are only a stone's throw from even the narrowest definition of geography, imbued as they are with the study of space, and human interactions with each other and the built and natural environment that they inhabit. Similarly, sociologists and anthropologists will be discussed also. Perhaps, then, in light of geography's refusal of constraints, its seeping borderlands and broad scope, this chapter might have been better entitled *Whither Anarchist Spatial Studies?*

Parallel to misunderstandings surrounding the nature and scope of geography are disagreements over the nature of anarchism, even among anarchists. Given the decentralized way in which anarchists and anarchist groups operate, discuss, create and act, it is not surprising that anarchists tend not to ascribe to the sort of specific "party line" that, say, many socialists do. Some say that within a group of ten anarchists, there is a good chance of finding ten anarchisms. As such, the conception of anarchism predominantly discussed here is relatively narrow as far as anarchism is concerned. It is arguably the most popular, most organized, and most theoretically grounded of all anarchisms. One might say that it is the "orthodoxy" of anarchism, if such a thing could exist.[4]

This anarchism is the anarchism that has its roots in the tradition of the First International[5] and, to a lesser extent, the *Platform* of Diela Truda.[6] This is *anarchist communism*. It is based upon the struggle between the working class and the employing/ruling class and its concomitant modes of control and domination (e.g., capital, the state and its apparatus). Its eventual replacement is envisioned as a classless, stateless society premised on mutual aid, equality in all aspects of life, and a networked, global, moneyless gift economy facilitated through mass participatory workplace and community organization. This has also been known as "libertarian communism" by the likes of Maurice Brinton, who wished to disassociate anarchism from its popular reputation as representing chaos and destruction.[7]

This form of anarchism is particularly important since there is a general lack of interest from many academic milieux[8] that further represents the divide between the academic realm and the rest of society. Academia in recent years has, in the few moments in which it has engaged productively with anarchism, spent much of its time exploring perhaps less well established forms of anarchism in the popular realm, such as post-anarchism. Of course, this is not to say that postmodern forms of anarchism, as an example, are somehow useless. On

the contrary, as other chapters in this volume indicate, they are exciting and fruitful areas of investigation and action. Indeed, this chapter attempts to disrupt these divisions—"practical" and "academic," "popular" and "unpopular," "useful" and "useless"—drawing from academic, strategic, cultural, theoretical and activist sources and original thought as often co-constitutive and mutually beneficial to engage with.

I will explore a number of themes relating to these connections, and will posit tentative conclusions as to what an anarchist geography—one of a number of possible anarchist geograph*ies*—might look like. Some obvious themes are missing, such as the classical anarchist debate regarding the nature/culture dialectic. This is explored in other chapters of this volume, and is one of the few areas in which anarchism has made headway into the academy. As such, emphasis will be laid on less well-researched topics.

Spaces of Work/Play/Other

Work for anarchists, as with Marxists, is a peculiar beast. It is the tip of a massive, global industrial iceberg of production and distribution. It is arguably our most direct interface with capital and, as such, occupies a prominent role in theorizing both tactics of resistance to capital, and strategies of reorganization in envisioned post-capitalist worlds. It also occupies both ends of geography's spectrum, engaging with highly functional questions of multiscalar economic systems, resource management and distribution, as well as the personal microgeographies of the work-life balance and its effects on the mundane practices of everyday life under capitalism.

In his classic work of economic geography, *Fields, Factories and Workshops*,[9] Kropotkin lays the bedrock on which anarchist debates regarding economic organization and the nature and value of work would build upon for decades. In it, he examines the various geographies of production under early Fordist capitalism, analyzing in great detail the spatial distribution of core productive industries. He bemoaned "our miserably organized society,"[10] seeing massive organizational inefficiency in the way that production is organized in large clusters of activity, leading to the development of regions that specialize in producing certain commodities. This inefficiency was measured by Kropotkin in terms of use, and efficacy of distribution, contrasting with the claims of capitalist market logic that this clustering was very efficient. Kropotkin feared that industrial specialization in certain areas would not only be economically unstable, as experience has shown through uneven deindustrialization patterns in much of the minority world over the last few decades,[11] but also that it leads to a lack of dignity and pride in one's productive activity that is inherent in capitalist modes of production:

precisely in proportion as the work required from the individual in modern production becomes simpler and easier to be learned, . . . [it becomes] also more monotonous and wearisome.[12]

On a micro-level, human specialization in certain work-skills enacts a process that a Marxist or a more contemporary anarchist might call *alienation*. It is this alienation that is imbued within capitalist labor processes that is organized according to the clustering and specializing spatial dynamics mentioned above. This alienation is, however, not only produced by the Marxist process of alienation through the disassociation with the fruits of one's labor caused by the production of surplus capital for one's employer. It is also created, according to Kropotkin, through a structural, systematic process of *the denial of creativity*.

Creativity, denied by these specialized capitalist geographies of production, is a distinct factor for Kropotkin the teacher, since it is intimately linked to education. Kropotkin argues that education must be all-encompassing, constant, voluntary and non-institutional. This linking of creativity with capitalist modes of production is also deeply connected to the role of play in society. The unique subversiveness of play, as an economically meaningless, "non-productive" activity,[13] is inevitably entrenched in any anarchist geography, as a spatial disruption between spaces of *production* and spaces of *creation*. This said, play as a sort of carnivalesque[14] "moment," has often been cited as something that also subverts the structure and logic of work by hinting at an alternative meaning of "productivity." The transformation of space—if only momentary—from capitalist production to noncapitalist creation is fundamentally a rethinking of the uses of space, and can be used to interrogate how the use of space correlates with prevailing socio-economic definitions of "(mis)use."[15]

The libertarian-leaning Marxist, Herbert Marcuse, in fact argued in favor of the *integration* of work and play.[16] In a society where alienated work dominates, Marcuse argued, our very psychological wellbeing is hollowed-out. Play becomes another commodity to be bought and sold. Just as Kropotkin argued that alienation can only be destroyed through the transformation of productive spaces from specialization to education, Marcuse argued that alienation can only be destroyed through the transformation of productive spaces from work to play.

Murray Bookchin emphasizes the interconnectivity of the elements in this process:

Work is removed from the home and assimilated by giant organizations. . . . It loses its comprehensibility to the individual not only as a result of the minute division of labor but also owing to the scale of commercial and industrial operations. Play becomes organized and the imaginative faculties are pre-empted by mass media that define the very daydreams of the ego. The individual is reduced to a vicarious spectator of his own fancies and pleasures. . . . Almost every aspect of urban life today, particularly in the metropolis, fosters this ego impoverishment.[17]

Thus alienation in work and play is enacted through a process of institutionalization, compartmentalization and division. Borders are imposed upon what would otherwise be the free interaction of productive and creative activities and currents. It is in the context of this spatial and psychosocial division of the everyday that spaces and places are ascribed meaning and, as Bookchin notes, this is significantly intensified in large urban areas.

Kropotkin sees the *integration* of post-capitalist production as the solution to the impoverished economic and cultural geography of capitalism. Reorganization, according to Kropotkin, requires a massive overhaul in how we look at production and distribution, and how the work ethic of capital accumulation and job specialization influences—or even dominates—our everyday practices and the spaces in which we enact them. This integration is multidimensional, incorporating shifts in absolute geographical location of productive spaces, their distribution and individuals" relation to them. He attempts to ascribe production with broader social and educational meaning through integrating not only the different arms of production (e.g., agriculture, heavy industry, manufacturing, cultural industries, etc.) but also by integrating manual labor with intellectual advancement:

> Political economy has hitherto insisted chiefly upon *division*. We proclaim *integration*; and we maintain that the ideal of society . . . is a society of integrated, combined labor. A society where each individual is a producer of both manual and intellectual work; . . . and where each worker works both in the field and in the industrial workshop.[18]

The literature concerning the organization of work in the anarchist areas of Spain in 1936-1937 can be seen as a lens into the practical application of such principles. Since Spain's war-torn terrain was such a harsh one, it is hard to imagine how work might have differed in peace-time and under an entirely anarchist communist system, but an example[19] of one of the more successful collectives gives glimpses into the anarchist mindset:

> The smallholders who, in times gone by, could scarcely feed themselves . . . at first wanted to hold onto their lands: but, at a general assembly, the need to pool their harvests was explained to them and they agreed unanimously. We have to respect people's wishes and win them over without pressure by the power of example.

> We are perfectly familiar with the workers in work and the supply delegate, who keeps a family register in the food store, issues every family with whatever it needs. Distribution is effected as fairly as possible . . . and we shall ensure that we demonstrate the superiority of our system in every regard.

> As far as education goes, Amposta was very backward; at present, there are thirty-eight schools in the town, a figure representing an increase of fifteen schools on pre-revolutionary days. Schooling is compulsory. . . . Six adult

classes have been started. Within a short time, an Arts and Crafts school and a school canteen are to be founded. . . . [S]ocial lectures have been given and a choir and a theatre troupe are to be set up, with the object of nurturing a taste for the arts.

Here we can glimpse the local organization of a functioning anarchist commune. It is important to note how collectivization of workplaces takes place hand-in-hand with establishment of educational and artistic institutions for the proliferation of "non-productive" activity. Questions might be raised about the conditions under which the educational projects, in particular, have been implemented with regards their relation to top-down bureaucratic models of education. However, the point here is the way in which such projects have been integrated in order to disrupt the dichotomy between "productive" and "non-productive" activity. Contemporary anarchists, too, have attempted to disrupt this dichotomy, seeing it as a mode of spatialized control that establishes work and workers as productive, honorable and fair, and play—when not enacted through the passive consumption of Spectacle and commodity forms—as "free" or "wasted" time.[20]

Time, in capitalist economics, is something that we do a sort of schizophrenic dance with—in the workplace, at home, at the shops, even in our political groups—in every sphere of everyday life. It is something that workers at once tend to race against to complete tasks, and "egg on," in the hope that time will run faster and the shift will end sooner. Similarly, it is something that businesses fight in their race to understand and follow the paths and contours of capital flow around an increasingly nonscalar and spatio-temporally "compressed"[21] global economy. Slowness means inefficiency, and inefficiency means a low profit margin. Time, being enveloped within spatial patterns of behavior and activity, traced between locations, (inter)actions and relationships, is therefore a key means of analyzing, from an anarchist perspective, the geographies of work.

The temporal structures of the Fordist workplace, however, differ markedly from those of newer, knowledge-based industries. Under a Fordist regime, as the anarchist George Woodcock,[22] and others such as the Marxist EP Thompson[23] have noted, the "tyranny of the clock" is ever-present, rigidly structuring a workers" activities and very clearly demarcating between times—and spaces— of work and non-work. Using the contemporary IT industry as an example, the anarchist sociologist Aileen O'Carroll has closely analyzed the time-space patterns of activity, noting that the differentiation between work and non-work is "fuzzy."[24] Capitalism, she argues, develops a system of blurring the boundaries of the two, extracting maximum productivity from workers, minimizing the incentives and possibilities of workplace organization, and producing a system of self-discipline that operates through deadlines and peer pressure, rather than through traditional worker/boss power relations.[25] Examples of this fuzzy time might include working through lunch to finish a task, or updating a blog on

work time. O'Carroll alludes to an alternative notion of work in the knowledge economy thus:

> If we develop an awareness and understanding of the multiple times involved in knowledge production, then the possibility emerges of producing knowledge in a way that resists the rationalist logic of the capitalist workplace. . . . A production process built on an understanding of the rhythms and the collaborative nature of knowledge production would be one that is more capable of mobilizing the creativity and inventiveness of the human mind.[26]

Anarchism, Urbanism, and the Built Environment

As Kropotkin's *Fields, Factories and Workshops* has shown, anarchists recognized from the start the importance of the material environment in which humans circulate. It is even possible to retrace the history of anarchism's emphasis on the social effects of environment back to the early romantic utopian anarchism of William Godwin[27] and the libertarian socialism of William Morris.[28] Likewise, anarchists of Kropotkin's era recognized that humankind's effects on the environment were as much an expression of life under capitalism and the state as more obvious and quantifiable indicators such as material and financial impoverishment. Elisée Reclus[29] poetically explains:

> Every people gives, so to speak, new clothing to the surrounding nature. By means of its fields and roads, by its dwellings and every manner of construction, by the way it arranges the trees and landscape in general, the populace expresses the character of its own ideals. If it really has a feeling for beauty, it will make nature more beautiful. If, on the other hand, the great mass of humanity should remain as it is today, crude, egoistic and inauthentic, it will continue to mark the face of the earth with its wretched traces. Thus will the poet's cry of desperation become a reality: "where can I flee? Nature itself has become hideous!"

Of course, Reclus' metaphor of beauty goes beyond aesthetics. It goes to the heart of geography itself—how do/should/can humans as individuals and as societies interact with their built and natural environments? In what ways, and to what extent can we create and develop anarchistic spaces? Throughout the last hundred years, anarchist and anarchist-inspired planners, architects and critics have focused on this relation between humanity and the built environment as a means of physically constructing material and social spaces of anarchy in the present.

The early planning movement, often (rightly) criticized for its tendency to be manipulated in the interests of right-wing and colonialist spatial disciplinary tactics,[30] had its roots firmly planted in anarchism and broader notions of radical and utopian urbanism. Both Kropotkin and Reclus had a profound influence on

the ideas of the likes of Patrick Geddes and Ebenezer Howard. As Peter Hall[31] explains,

> [many of the] early visions of the planning movement stemmed from the anarchist movement. . . . That is true of Howard, of Geddes and of the Regional Planning Association of America, as well as of many derivatives on mainland Europe. . . . The vision of these anarchist pioneers was . . . an alternative society, neither capitalist nor bureaucratic-socialistic: a society based on voluntary co-operation among men and women, working and living in small, self-governing commonwealths.

Inspired by Reclus' and Kropotkin's fusion of anarchism and geography, their approach to urbanism attempted to cross the theory-practice divide where these anarchist geographers had stopped short. Whereas Reclus and Kropotkin analyzed the planet's geography from an anarchist perspective, the planners laid out concrete strategies for designing spaces and places that would help to shape the course of human history in a more communitarian and egalitarian direction. It is, of course, true that many of their ideas were either manipulated for reactionary ends, or would come to be seen as simplistic and morally dubious. Nevertheless, their experiments in shaping concrete spaces of everyday emancipatory life paved the way for future developments and practitioners, such as Giancarlo De Carlo.

De Carlo, a libertarian communist architect, took to task the urban structures of Italy's poor south in the mid-to-late twentieth century, and listed his influences as including "Kropotkin, Godwin, Morris, Bakunin and Malatesta."[32] De Carlo's approach to architecture and the built environment comes partly out of his activities as an anti-fascist partisan during the Second World War, where he gained a keen understanding and critique of architectural structures as walls and containers with which individuals could hide from each other. Architecture, for De Carlo and other anarchist architects such as John Turner[33] and David Sheen,[34] must be specifically and deliberately designed "to open the process of transformation of the physical environment, *to ameliorate the human condition.*"[35] This "human condition" to which he alludes is, of course, based heavily upon the alienation of humanity under capitalism.

He proposed that places must be viewed as inherently "layered" with multiple histories, events, activities and trajectories. For a modernist architect, especially one so heavily influenced by Marx, his nuanced view of multiple co-constitutive histories and their effects on the future was unusual and fuelled his libertarian political and architectural practices. To follow the footsteps of other modernist architects, creating monolithic, futuristic buildings, jutting out without consideration for the sociality and flow of the community and interwoven histories of the place would be undemocratic and arrogant. Awareness of how buildings shape and are shaped by social life is a key element in this approach, as is the enlistment of the *vernacular* in form and mindset. Recognizing these,

and following the likes of Kropotkin and the Spanish collectives, De Carlo's concept of "layered" places involved the careful interweaving of intellectual and manual endeavor into the structures of the urban fabric. McKean provides one of many possible examples:

> Commissioned to design the scientific faculties for Pavia University, De Carlo centered on an ambitious plan to knit city and university together, clustering university sites in a way which formed central places for cultural services open to the citizens as well as students, [and] suburban places where the university would observe and test ideas linked with the everyday context.[36]

De Carlo's emphasis on decentering architectural production from the individual architect's artistic imaginary to social usefulness served as a building block from which future radical and progressive architects would launch themselves. His principle was clear: "that architecture, if it is to find its most authentic essence, must be disentangled from the requirements of power."[37] Power, of course, is a key concept in architecture. The anarchist-inspired conceptual architect Lebbeus Woods focuses heavily on power in parts of his most well-known book *Radical Reconstruction*. In it, he advocates a mode of architectural production that is intimately linked to a particular activity enacted by both humanity and the environment: *destruction*. Echoing Bakunin's famous axiom, "the passion for destruction is a creative passion too,"[38] he endeavors to create new architectural forms and structures in earthquake zones and war-torn cities such as Sarajevo.

Woods' concern with power is one that resonates with anarchists and post-structuralists alike. Power (exhibited most explicitly through destruction), for Woods, has a profound effect on the *nature and uses of knowledge*:

> War leveled old cities in much more than a physical sense. It reduced their multi-layered complexity of meanings to one-layered tableaux, embodying the monologic, monomaniac of hierarchy at its most logical and terrible extreme. . . . Old cities continue to be reduced by the same violence, and for the same old reasons. They will become new cities. When they are rebuilt, on what forms of knowledge will it be, and to what—and whose—ends?[39]

Rupturing events such as wars, therefore, bring a range of futures into potentiality, and the scarred structures of post-war cities can be key elements in a reconstruction that is based on what Woods calls "heterarchies"—multidimensional, egalitarian and bottom-up systems of knowing, acting and creating. Furthermore, his argument that "the financial convenience of commercially viable reproduction impoverishes our conceptual abilities"[40] at once points towards a critique of the capitalist framework of contemporary architectural practice and alludes to debates in geographical, anarchist, and Marxist literatures concerning the commodification of space.[41] Unfortunately, Woods is somewhat vague in terms of concrete visions of what a heterarchy might actually involve.

This notion is most closely analyzed by libertarian-leaning Marxist geographers such as Henri Lefebvre and Don Mitchell, but anarchists such as Jeff Ferrell have also explored the geographies of commodification. Ferrell is especially concerned with cultural spaces, such as the soundscapes of radio and the effects of so-called cultural regeneration:

> Redeveloped downtowns, gentrified residential neighborhoods, the singing certainty of the city's approved airwaves, the insulated interior of one's own automobile all constitute cultural spaces in which relations of power and control are produced and reproduced. . . . The containment of people and their identities within these spaces, the constitution of their choices around agendas of obedience and consumption, emerge within a subtly dangerous dynamic whereby such choices are marketed as appropriate, desirable decisions within an always more attractive way of life. . . . Just how redeveloped does Belsen have to be, how upscale and entertaining, before no-one realizes it's a death camp?[42]

Thus, just as the likes of Woods and De Carlo attempt to reconfigure space to encourage certain behaviors, emotions and associations, capitalist planning and architecture is so thoroughly institutionalized that its power in shaping popular epistemic frameworks and social life far surpasses these few radicals. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of capitalist disciplinary architectures amounts, to these anarchist(ic) spatial practitioners, not to a call to bask in the glory of capitalist spectacle, but to a *call to arms*. In some senses, however, these are often only theories, ethereal and distant from the everyday experience, but as anarchists like Colin War[43] have proved, this call to arms can be engaged with in a distinctly down-to-earth, bread-and-butter manner. Ward's long-standing career has engaged with the everyday, mundane elements of public policy, including public architecture, housing and schooling, arguing for communitarian and autonomous social lives in the here-and-now as a practical prefigurative step towards a future anarchist urbanism. His marriage of immediate demands and revolutionary anarchist principles has helped bridge the gap between the utopian spaces of future anarchist urbanism, and the messy, lived spaced of contemporary capitalism. He makes this explicit, stating that "the technical criterion for the anarchist house [in the present] is "long life, loose fit, low energy," but the political demand is the principle of Dweller Control."[44]

Anarchist Geographies of Gender and Sexuality

Beyond these rather material and structural issues within geographic theory and practice lie more human, corporeal "microgeographies." Feminist geographers have for a long time emphasized the importance of geography in understanding and combating structural and cultural discrimination against women. Their

works are wide-ranging and relatively well-known and well-established in the geographic field. Currently, anarchafeminism's keen eye for not only these gendered power relations but also their integration into larger structures and dynamics of exploitation and inequality under capitalism and the state has a sophistication that is yet to be widely recognized within the broader feminist movement. This may be, as one writer explains, the state of contemporary feminism and its effects on anarchists" perceptions of feminism:

> Feminism can be particularly alienating to anarchists if they are unfamiliar with its radical roots and activist practices. This is largely because the feminism we most often see has been co-opted by capitalism and ridiculed by popular culture.[45]

Anarchafeminists tend to hold, contrary to many Marxist and liberal feminists, that class, gender and (institutional) power are intimately entwined, yet also important factors of analysis and action in their own right.[46] They are feminists, socialists, and anarchists, at once separated and integrated. Given this combination of these key determinants of the nature and experience of gender, anarchafeminism can provide a basis for profound new angles on gender issues, despite lacking in the "big names" that other feminisms enjoy.

In particular, anarchafeminists are developing a powerful critique of the institutional spaces of love and relationships. The spaces of state regulation and legal binding of monogamous relationships, in particular, call out for an anarchist analysis.[47] Not only does this concern the cartographies of these institutional spaces—the church, the registry office, the solicitor's office, the home—but it also concerns the production of these spaces as sites within the frameworks and circuits of capitalist exploitation of desire itself.[48] These various sites of commodification serve also as loci for the extension of state apparatus as well as the continuing sexualization of capital through gendered relations of emotional value and taste. Present-giving, romance, flattery, sentimentality, lovemaking, and so on—these produce a gendered geography of value based on multiple interconnected relationships between sites of exploitation, consumption, reproduction and potential liberation that lie at the heart of both feminism and anarchism.

Circulation of people through these institutional spaces also creates "filters" for assessment and surveillance, especially for couples in which one or both partners is a migrant, in which one's relationship itself is approved or denied by the state. Issues of migration, capital and gender are, of course, also bound up together within anarchism, feminism and geography. It is no surprise, then, that Emma Goldman, perhaps the most famous anarchafeminist, once wrote a lengthy study on the uneven geographies of women's suffrage around the world. She concluded that statist politics, capital and gender imbalances are all entwined throughout all states, despite varying levels of suffrage, all of which continue to operate largely for the benefit of rich men.[49] More recently, the left-libertarian

sociologist Nadita Sharma has explored the relations between migration, the state and feminism, critiquing the statist and legalist framework of some contemporary liberal feminist "anti-trafficking" campaigns:

> Realizing the crucial importance of the creation and maintenance of juridico-legal national borders allows us to analyze immigration regimes that foster the legal, economic, social and physical vulnerability of women who come to be labeled as "trafficked.
>
> It is important to recognize how the "help trafficked victims" approach intersects with the state project of "getting tough on migrants" to shore up the legitimacy of the national state as it continues to aid the operation of global capitalism.[50]

Thus borderlands are, as anarchists already know, crucial geographical demarcations imbued inherently with statist and capitalist dynamics. But, more than this, Sharma shows that borders produce disciplinary functions that allow good-willed movements to become sucked into the discourse of anti-immigration sentiment. In response, Sharma argues for the creation of autonomous spaces of political praxis that are international, empowering to migrants and women, and critical of statist forms of politics.

The rise in recent times of queer anarchisms has also brought autonomous political and sexual spaces to the fore. Queer anarchism challenges standardized, state-sanctioned and capital-marketed black-and-white gender and sexual boundaries. Heteronormativity (and, indeed, *homo*normativity), queer anarchists argue, is not only biologically and socially restricting, but also a mechanism for commodification of sex(uality) under capitalism. To be queer means, therefore, to actively challenge capital"s tendency to divide individuals into ideal-type marketing categories, providing an autonomous "third space" beyond these restrictions.

Gavin Brown, a queer anarchist geographer has explored these autonomous spaces in depth.[51] He analyses both physical and theoretical spaces of queer anarchism, including the networks of praxis and organizational structure. This production of queer anarchist space takes place through social and cultural processes and activities, concretized through formal and informal networks and praxis itself. These spaces, says Brown, are a form of commons, being neither/both collectively and/nor individually "owned" in the traditional sense of the word, and this mode of conceptualizing and performing a certain space or place without a clear notion of ownership can be considered an implicit critique of the logic of both state socialism and market capitalism. Thus, according to queer and feminist libertarians like Brown and Sharma, the geographies of the body, of sex, and gender are fundamentally mutually constitutive with more general anarchist principles, and modes of social and political organization. In-

deed, as has been noted throughout, anarchist organization, critique and analysis are intimately *implicated within* one another.

Concluding Thoughts

This chapter is an introduction to an unexpectedly large, and predominantly un-recognized, body of work that connects anarchism and geography through discussion concerning work, the built environment, and sexuality and gender. In it, I have barely scratched the surface, yet clearly a rich seam of material has been tapped, ripe for future discussion and analysis. However, I might just as easily have discussed other issues such as geopolitics, political economy or the nature-culture dialectic from the perspective of an anarchist geography. I say "*an* anarchist geography" very deliberately, as there are myriad possibilities of a variety of anarchist geographies, just as there is now a variety of Marxist geographies.

In this concluding section, in part following the lead of David Graeber who has done the same within a framework of anarchist anthropology,[52] I will explore the possible contributions that an anarchist perspective might provide in geographical study. Furthermore, I will bring together the threads teased out in this chapter, outlining general themes and some specific examples inspired by the anarchist geographies discussed here, as future constituents in the creation of what might be called an anarchist geography.

Integrated Geographies

It has been said that anarchism combines a socialist critique of liberalism and a liberal critique of socialism. Its refusal to focus merely on "economics" or "freedom" or "culture," and so on, means that anarchism is inherently multifac-eted and arguably even *holistic*. Anarchism's holism—its recognition of the many different factors that influence and feed off each other as interrelated and inseparable in capitalist systems—means that it is ideally suited to an analysis of capitalism's contested geographical terrain. Whereas Marxist geography has for decades focused mainly on economic questions—commodification, circuits of capital, primitive accumulation, gentrification, monopoly—anarchists are able to integrate such class-based analyses with concomitant social and cultural dynam-ics that are distanciated from, or more or less independent of capital.

One example of this integrated approach is a much-needed anarchist geo-graphic critique of the state. Debate within geography concerning the nature and significance of the state as a political institution are increasingly less promi-nent,[53] despite its ongoing significance in socio-political life at all scales of governance and everyday activity. An anarchist geographer would not only cri-

tique the state's geographies of control and surveillance, but would move beyond other critical engagements with the state by critiquing the concept of the state *per se*. Not only would an anarchist geographer ask "in what ways do states and their apparatuses perpetuate unfreedoms and economic inequalities?" but s/he would also, crucially, ask "what is it about the geographies of the state as a political institution that *inherently* perpetuates unfreedoms and economic inequalities?" Similarly, an anarchist geographer would ask "how and why are borders operated and controlled by the state in certain ways that *necessarily* benefit state governance and the free movement of capital?" in response to other geographers asking "what is the place of borders in global geopolitical decision-making processes?" Moreover, an holistic anarchist geography would consider the multi- and inter-scalar effects of a statist and capitalist socio-economic order, and might attempt to fuse seemingly disparate compartmentalized analytical subjects of the state—public policy, national and cultural identity, devolution, regional health inequalities, and so on—into analyses that recognize the connectivity between multiple state-oriented phenomena.

An integrated anarchist perspective on environmental and resource management would also provide a fresh new perspective on the old "government or private enterprise" debate. An anarchist approach to these issues might include participatory mapping in local areas to explore resource usage patterns in different regions or among different demographics. This could productively be intersected with discussion on the moral geographies of use and value, and the potentially emancipating process of grassroots decision-making in providing autonomous, prefigurative and non-exploitative methods for resource use, allocation and distribution.

Autonomous Geographies

Autonomy has also been a key theme running throughout. Anarchist emphasis on autonomy, be it class autonomy, gender autonomy, or any other form of autonomous self-organization, would have a profound effect on the theory and practice of any anarchist geography. Indeed, a number of left-libertarian geographers have already begun exploring this highly geographical concept,[54] in a range of contexts.

As Chatterton[55] has shown, autonomous geographies need not involve subcultural stereotypes such as punk or skinhead scenes; rather, autonomy as both a phenomenon and a concept can be a fruitful tool for geographic analysis of any form of political organization or perspective. Indeed, autonomy as an "interstitial" spatial locus for action need not even manifest itself as a movement or organization: one area in which anarchist geography can thrive is in the realm of *autonomous knowledge production*. Although participatory and action research methods are increasingly *en vogue* in geography,[56] there remains space for an

anarchist geography of autonomous knowledge production that is more militant and engaged than the majority. Infusing grassroots participatory research methods with principles of mutual aid and direct action would bring a new layer of radical endeavor to geography and to the academy more generally. An autonomous anarchist-geographic methodology could also be used to disrupt the borderlands between academia and the "rest of the world," as some radical geographers have attempted over the years.[57]

A key element of any co-constitutive research agenda is the ability to have an empowering effect on participants.[58] For starters, then, an autonomous methodology would expect to forge or contribute to already-existing real-life spaces of autonomy with participants through the research process that will continue to be both radical and effective once the research ends. Specific to an anarchist geographic research agenda would also be recognition of how geography and authority are necessarily tied up together in the research process. In particular, the institutional capitalist spaces of the academy provide a fruitful topic for an anarchist perspective on knowledge discipline within a relatively liberal or even "progressive" capitalist framework. Thus, along the lines of such principles, one might attempt to both produce autonomous modes of knowledge production within the academy, and foster the creation of autonomous spaces without. It is no surprise that this dual-militancy closely resembles the autonomist Marxist notion of "exodus"[59]—an engaged, partial withdrawal from institutional spaces of negotiation between capital and labor—that has already found a footing within the academy through theorists such as Toni Negri and Paolo Virno.

Everyday Geographies

A third key theme in which anarchism and geography converge is in everyday life. Anarchism's tendency to foreground the everyday as crucial to the revolutionary project combined with geography's tendency to foreground the everyday as a primary terrain of human (inter)action provide a potent theme of synergy for the two. An anarchist geographer would be ideally positioned to produce a powerful critique of the spaces of capitalist everyday life, and similarly, they might use this critique as a platform from which to engage with the question of how and why people's everyday practices form the bedrock of future societal organization.

To a geographer, nothing says "everyday" more than the concept of the *community*. This complex, elusive notion involves exclusion and stereotyped, artificial, inward-looking mindsets, while also comprising of possibilities, sociality, togetherness and hope, and is significant as another key space of everyday practice along with spaces of work and home. It is riddled with questions: what is community? Where are its boundaries? What or who does it contain? How does one identify with a community? What is its political signifi-

cance? What are its institutional and cultural spaces? How does it relate to different scales of governance and legislation? It is, therefore, highly geographical.

Similarly, it is of particular interest to anarchists due to its affinity to notions of grassroots community organization, both now and as part of imagined futures. Thus an anarchist geographer's job might be to critically analyze the everyday political significance of the community under capitalism, asking for whom it works, who controls it, and how our experience of it relates to our alienation found in other everyday spaces and practices. The other job of an anarchist geographer is to explore the revolutionary possibilities. How can community forms of political organization inform our understanding of political action against capital and the state? In what ways can communities connect at a grassroots level to address desires and aspirations independently of institutional spaces of community-scale power such as local government?

Related to this is the role of the built environment in the political terrain of the everyday. As we have seen above, architecture and planning are pivotal in shaping the actions and experiences of people who come into contact with them. Thus these, too, are important to an anarchist understanding of the geographies of the everyday. Anarchist geographers, not content to merely critique the controlling effects of certain architectural forms, would go beyond these "merely" physical elements, critiquing the political economy of architecture itself as a capitalist industry which is often in close contact with institutions of authority through policy, public contracts and arms of the state apparatus such as the police and army. An anarchist critique of this system of production of our built environs would inevitably extend throughout all everyday spaces, from the design and functioning of learning and educational institutions, to workplaces or healthcare establishments. This, of course, links back to the first theme of anarchist geography, that of integration of multiple facets and processes.

Anarchic Hinterlands

If anarchists are to be taken more seriously in academia, they need to engage with a variety of topics from an explicitly anarchist perspective. This chapter has dealt, fairly superficially, with a mere handful. There are many other subjects that anarchism can contribute to, and many other awkward and incisive questions anarchists can ask in the social, behavioral and physical sciences more broadly. This chapter has asked a lot of questions and has been somewhat forced to give few answers. This is partly down to the paucity of anarchists within geography, and, concomitantly, perhaps partly down to the way in which Marxist geographers have usually maintained a reasonably anti-authoritarian line, thus somewhat encroaching on the traditional stomping grounds of anarchism.

On the other hand, it is clear that not only is an anarchist angle in geography still relevant and necessary, but also that it never really went away (if you

looked hard enough and in the right places). The anarchist tradition in geography and associated disciplines like planning and architecture provides a poignant alternative voice to liberals and Marxists alike, and the long history of anarchist spatial analysis illustrates the longevity of these ideas and their ongoing relevance to both revolutionary strategy and social science research. These thinkers provide a subtle spatial analysis that is neither artificially totalizing nor fragmenting; multifaceted, yet single-minded and purposeful.

The study of geography is riddled with power struggles and class struggles because space itself is such a contested notion. Even the most "factual" elements of geography such as cartography are hotly contested and blurred around the edges. It is a discipline that refuses to conform to the very notions upon which it is based—demarcation, borders, location, territory. This, perhaps, is why it appears so suited to anarchism. The hard task now for anarchist geographers is to refuse the constraint of such larger-than-life historical figures as Kropotkin, Reclus, De Carlo and Woods, and forge a new anarchist geography building on their foundations but not falling prey to the allure of fetishizing tradition. I have attempted to lay a base for this new anarchist geography, utilizing only a part of a much bigger body of work, in the hope that exposing these half-lost connections can produce a future anarchist geography informed by history but by no means limited to it. Anarchism, of course, is oriented towards the future. Anarchist geographers, likewise, must look forwards if there is ever to become a *second* great era of anarchist geography.

Notes

1.   Peter Kropotkin (1979 [1885]) "What Geography Ought to Be" *Antipode* 10/11 (3/1), p. 7.
2.   Many thanks are due to Jane Wills and Jill Fenton for very useful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter, as well as David Pinder, whose ongoing support has been of great use in general. This chapter is an offshoot from a PhD studentship funded by the Economic and Social Research Council.
3.   For example, see Bob Galois (1976) "Ideology and the Idea of Nature: The Case of Peter Kropotkin" *Antipode* 8(3), pp. 1-16; Alison Blunt and Jane Wills (2000) *Dissident Geographies: An Introduction to Radical Ideas and Practice.* Harlow: Pearson Education; John P. Clark and Camille Martin (2004) *Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: The Radical Social Thought of Elisee Reclus.* Lanham: Lexington Books; Nik Heynen (2008) "Bringing the Body Back to Life through Radical Geography of Hunger: The Haymarket Affair and its Aftermath" *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies,* 7(1), pp. 32-44.
4.   Of course, Ursula LeGuin, in her groundbreaking novel *The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia* (1974, New York: Harper Collins) argued that an anarchist(ic) orthodoxy could indeed be envisioned.
5.   Particularly those inspired by the works of Bakunin, who was arguably the figurehead of the First International before the anarchists and Marxists split.

6. Diela Truda (1926) *The Organizational Platform of the General Union of Anarchists* (Draft). [Online] Available from: http://www.anarkismo.net/ne wswire.php?story_id=1000 [Accessed 9 April 2007].

7. See Maurice Brinton (2004) *For Workers' Power: The Selected Writings of Maurice Brinton*. Ed. David Goodway. Edinburgh and Oakland, CA: AK Press.

8. Aside, perhaps from historical studies of the twentieth century, such as the Spanish Civil War where anarchists collectivized massive swathes of Spain along anarcho-syndicalist lines before both the Francoist and USSR-controlled forces turned on them. Another less-well researched area is the Ukranian Makhnovists in the 1917 Russian revolution, whose story is similarly inspiring and tragic.

9. Peter Kropotkin (1968 [1913]) *Fields, Factories and Workshops, or, Industry Combined with Agriculture and Brain Work with Manual Work*. New York and London: Benjamin Blom.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

11. For example, Ray Hudson (2005) "Rethinking Change in Old Industrial Regions: Reflecting on the Experiences of North East England" *Environment and Planning A*, 37(4), pp. 581-596.

12. Kropotkin, *Fields, Factories and Workshops*, pp. 20-21.

13. This is also linked to what Guy Debord called "dead time." See Conrad Russell (2002) "Against Dead Time" *Time and Society* 11(2/3), pp. 193-208.

14. See especially Mikhail Bakhtin (1984) *Rabelais and His World*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

15. For example, Quentin Stevens (2004) "Urban Escapades: Play in Melbourne's Public Spaces" in Lees, L. [ed.] *The Emancipatory City? Paradoxes and Possibilities*. London: Sage.

16. Herbert Marcuse (1998 [1955]) *Eros and Civilisation: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud*. London: Routledge. For another perspective see David Pinder (2005) *Visions of the City: Utopianism, Power and Politics in Twentieth Century Urbanism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

17. Murray Bookchin (1986) *The Limits of the City*. Montreal and Buffalo: Black Rose Books, pp. 101-102.

18. Kropotkin, *Fields, Factories and Workshops*, pp. 22-23.

19. CNT Document (1936) "Some Local Examples of Collectivisation" in Guerin, D. [ed.] *No Gods, No Masters: An Anthology of Anarchism*. Edinburgh and Oakland: AK Press, pp. 449-452.

20. See, for example, Jeff Ferrell (2001) *Tearing Down the Streets: Adventures in Urban Anarchy*. New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

21. David Harvey (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*. Oxford: Blackwell.

22. George Woodcock (1944) "The Tyranny of the Clock" *War Commentary – For Anarchism* [Online]. March 1944. Available from http://www.spunk.org/texts/wri ters/woodcock/sp001734.html [Accessed 12 May 2008].

23. E. P. Thompson (1991) *Time and Work Discipline: Customs in Common*. Middlesex: Penguin.

24. Aileen O'Carroll (2005) "The Long and the Short of it: Working Time in the Irish IT Sector" in G. Boucher and G. Collins [eds.] *The New World of Work: Labour Markets In Contemporary Ireland*. Dublin: Liffey Press; Aileen O'Carroll (forthcoming,

2008) "Fuzzy Holes and Intangible Time: Time in a Knowledge Industry" *Time and Society*, 17(2).

25. This said, she maintains that this worker/boss relationship is still pivotal, but it now operates largely through these more subtle mechanisms.

26. O'Carroll, "Fuzzy Holes and Intangible Time."

27. For example William Godwin (1971 [1793]) *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern Morals and Manners*. Wotton-Under-Edge: Clarendon Press.

28. William Morris (2003 [1890]) *News from Nowhere, or An Epoch of Rest: Being some Chapters from a Utopian Romance*. Ormskirk: Broadview Press.

29. Elisée Reclus, *Histoire d'une Montagne*, quoted in John P. Clark and Camille Martin (2004) *Anarchy, Geography Modernity: The Radical Social Thought of Elisée Reclus*. Lanham: Lexington Press, p. 28.

30. For example, see Nihal Perera (2008) "The Planners' City: The Construction of a Town Planning Perception of Colombo" *Environment and Planning A*, 40(1), pp. 57-73.

31. Peter Hall (1988) *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the 20th Century*. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 3. See also Colin Ward (1996) *Talking to Architects: Ten Lectures by Colin Ward*. London: Freedom Press.

32. De Carlo, quoted in Ward, *Talking to Architects*, p. 8. All of the names quoted are of anarchists: Peter Kropotkin, William Godwin, William Morris, Mikhail Bakunin and Errico Malatesta.

33. See John Turner (1991) *Housing by People: Towards Autonomy in Building Environments*. London: Marion Boyars. This monograph is inspired by anarchism but dates from after Turner lost his explicit affiliation with anarchism and began working for the World Bank. For some time in the 1950s he wrote for the London-based anarchist newspaper *Freedom*.

34. See www.davidsheen.com. Sheen's works on what he calls "GRaB architecture," an abbreviation of green (for environmentalism), red (for socialism) and black (for anarchism) architecture. He is particularly fond of vernacular "cob" structures as environmentally friendly and sturdy structures that can be easily molded into unconventional forms for communal living.

35. Giancarlo De Carlo, quoted in John McKean (2004) *Giancarlo De Carlo: Layered Places*. Stuttgart and London: Axel Menges, p. 31.

36. McKean, *Giancarlo De Carlo*, p. 31.

37. De Carlo, quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 169.

38. Bakunin (1842) *The Reaction in Germany*. [Online] Available from: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1842/reaction-germany.htm [Accessed 6 May 2008].

39. Lebbeus Woods (1997) *Radical Reconstruction*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press, p. 15.

40. Aleksandra Wagner (1997) "The Nature of Demand" in *Ibid.*, p. 10.

41. For example, Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell; Richard Peet (1985) "An Introduction to Marxist Geography" *Journal of Geography* 84(1), pp. 5-10; Don Mitchell (2000) *Cultural Geography: A Critical Introduction*. Oxford: Blackwell.

42. Ferrell, *Tearing Down the Streets*, pp. 225-226.

43. See, for example, Colin Ward (1996) *Talking to Architects: Ten Lectures by Colin Ward*. London, Freedom Press; Colin Ward (1983) *Housing: An Anarchist Ap-*

proach. London: Freedom Press; and Colin Ward (1989) *Welcome, Thinner City.* London: Bedford Square Press.

44. Ward, *Talking to Architects*, p. 109.

45. "Anarchist" (2007) "Anarchafeminisms are everywhere" *A Pause for Breath* 1, October 2007, p. 8.

46. Deirdre Hogan (2007) "Feminism, Class and Anarchism" *RAG* 2, Autumn 2007.

47. See E. Moraletat (N.D.) *Women, the State and the Family.* Johannesburg: Zabalaza Books.

48. See, for example, Carol Erlich (2002) "Socialism, Anarchism and Feminism" in Dark Star Collective [eds.] *Quiet Rumours: An Anarcha-Feminist Reader.* Edinburgh and Oakland: AK Press. See also "Tara" (2006) "Suicide Girls, Burning Angels and the Commodification of Punk Aesthetics" *Slingshot* 89, Winter 2006.

49. Emma Goldman (2006 [1917]) "Women's Suffrage" in Emma Goldman, *Anarchism and Other Essays.* New York: Cosimo.

50. Nadine Sharma (2003) "Travel Agency; A Critique of Anti-Trafficking Campaigns" *Refuge*, 21(3), pp. 57, 61.

51. See Gavin Brown (2007) "Mutinous Eruptions: Autonomous Spaces of Radical Queer Activism" *Environment and Planning A* 39(11), pp. 2685-2698.

52. David Graeber (2004) *Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology.* Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.

53. This said, some scholars do continue to engage with the state as a geopolitical actor. For interesting contemporary analyses of the state, see Neil Brenner (2004) *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood.* New York: Oxford University Press; Bob Jessop (2002) *The Future of the Capitalist State.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

54. For example Jenny Pickerill and Paul Chatterton (2006) "Notes Towards Autonomous Geographies: Creation, Resistance and Self-Management as Survival tactics" *Progress in Human Geography* 30(6), pp. 730-746; Paul Chatterton and Stuart Hodkinson (2006) *Autonomy in the City? Reflections on the UK Social Centres Movement.* Leeds: Self-Published title; Gavin Brown (2007) "Autonomy, Affinity and Play in the Spaces of Radical Queer Activism" in K. Browne, L. Kim and G. Brown [eds.] *Geographies of Sexualities: Theory, Practices and Politics.* Aldershot: Ashgate.

55. Paul Chatterton (2005) "Making Autonomous Geographies: Argentina's Popular Uprising and the "Movimento de Trabajadores Desocupados" (Unemployed Workers" Movement)" *Geoforum* 36(5), pp. 545-561.

56. See, for example Sara Kindon, Rachel Pain and Mike Kesby [eds.] (2007) *Participatory Action Research Approaches and Methods: Connecting People, Participation and Place.* Oxford: Routledge.

57. Most notably, Bill Bunge and the *Detroit Geographical Expedition.* See William Bunge (1971) *Fitzgerald: Geography of a Revolution.* Cambridge, MA: Schenkman. See also Heyman, R. (2007) "Who's Going to Man the Factories and be the Sexual Slaves when we all get PhDs? Democratizing Knowledge Production, Pedagogy, and the Detroit Geographical Expedition and Institute" *Antipode* 39(1), pp. 99-120.

58. Mike Kesby, Sara Kindon and Rachel Pain "Participation as a Form of Power: Retheorizing Empowerment and Spatializing Participatory Action Research" in *Ibid.*

59. Paolo Virno (2002) "General Intellect, Exodus, Multitude: Interview with Paolo Virno" *Archipelago* 54 [Online]. Available from: http://www.generation-

online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm [Accessed May 7 2008]. See also Dave Eden (2006) "Multitude/Exodus/Disobedience: A Critical Reading of Paolo Virno." Presented at *Class: History, Formations and Conceptualizations*, Second Workshop of the Hegemony Research Group, University of Wollongong. 3-4 March 2006. Available from the author.

17

An Ethnography of Nowhere: Notes Toward a Re-envisioning of Utopian Thinking

Stevphen Shukaitis

> We have no interest in abilities apart from the revolutionary use that can be made of them, a use which acquires its sense in everyday life. . . . Wherever the new proletariat experiments with its liberation, autonomy in revolutionary coherence is the first step toward generalized self-management.
>
> —Raoul Vaneigem[1]

Face it. Anarchists on the whole have not articulated any sort of coherent alternative vision of what a society not based on capitalism and the state might look like. We have produced copious amounts of political, economic, and social critiques—but a comparatively smaller amount of work has focused on developing alternatives to what we're critiquing. Least of all has there been any clearly sketched out version of how a liberatory economy might function. This has not to say there has not been thought or work put into these subjects, which there clearly has been. But when faced with the question "I understand what you're against, what are you for?" far too often radical activists and organizers on the whole are stymied; at best we end up mumbling something about a world of autonomous or semiautonomous communities based upon mutual aid, self-organization, and voluntary association. And those are all very well and good, and could form the basis of a liberatory society—but for many people such statements mean virtually nothing. It's one thing to say that we want a world where people manage our own lives, the environment isn't destroyed, and life is life desolate and alienating—but it's another to start talking about what such might actually look like. And starting to actually create forms of cooperative practice, to re-envision utopian thinking as lived reality, is another.

It is a common observation among radicals that the order of the world easily becomes naturalized, normalized, and reified. Why do things work they way they do? Because that is how they operate. Perhaps the most striking way to examine how this phenomenon works is by trying to imagine alternatives, or

even to imagine how previously existing social orders (such as Bronze age Greece or the classical Greek and Roman eras) operated. Chances are what you'll find is that most people have a relatively easy time imagining what a different political order might look like, how a different religion might work, and perhaps even how a family might be structured differently. But chances are they will find it difficult to imagine how a different economic arrangement or society not based around the state would work. Try it a few times. Ask someone how an economy would run if not based on private ownership. Ask them describe economics relations in Greece. Ask them how society would operate without a state. Chances are they will find it very difficult to describe, which is odd considering that for thousands of years of human history there was no state or a market economy. But yet such has become so normalized that thinking outside of such is nearly impossible for many people. Such "stateness" (and "market-ness") has become so normalized in political theory that it is argued that that democracy itself cannot exist without a state.[2]

Clearly if one wants to seriously put forward the idea of revolutionary social change one has to move conceptions of how such an alternative arrangement might work out of the realm of inconceivable thought and into the realm of possibility. This can help to explain why it is musicians, writers, and artists who have been commonly drawn to radical politics—the flexibility of creativity makes it easier to imagine that alternative social arrangements are possible. The task at hand for those of us who advocate radical social change is making that sort of flexibility and utopian social vision seems like an achievable possibility to the vast majority of the population—and that will happen not through saying or proclaiming that is so, but through a concrete demonstrations that such forms have existed and present a realistic alternative to the current social order. It is this task that Pierre Bourdieu spoke of he said that,

> We need to invent a new utopianism, rooted in contemporary social forces, for which—at risk of seeming to encourage a return to antiquated political vision— it will be necessary to create new kinds of movement.[3]

And that is the role of visionary thinking: to seize the creative latitude and inspiration of existing forms of non-hierarchal organizing to create webs of knowledge, skills, and experience that can be constantly redefined according to the needs of situation and time.

But Why Utopian Vision?

If you dream alone, it's just a dream. If you dream together, it's reality.
                                                            —Brazilian folk song

To this there will be many objections: Isn't utopian thinking just a frivolous waste of time better used with pragmatic forms of organizing and action? Isn't there a danger that one could recreate the same class based structures of power and domination in one's vision that exist now, as Foucault was fond of constantly objecting with an almost defeatist tone? Isn't it classist to be engaged in this kind of visionary thinking? These are objections with varying degrees of validity. It would be silly to say that one should be spending time coming up with utopian visions instead of engaging the day to day struggles to alleviate the wretched conditions which face large segments of the world's population. But it also equally true that even when there exists a period where revolutionary change becomes possible unless one has some idea of what sort of arrangement one wants to create, it is all the more easier for such situations to recreate the same oppressive structures or become dominated by the most malicious "liberators." The Russian, Cuban, and Chinese experiences should be sufficient examples of such.

The point here is not that one should have a blueprint for exacting details of a new social order. Such would be silly and more destructive than helpful. But unless one has at least a rough idea of how such an alternative social arrangement might work it would extremely difficult to convince others that such is desirable or achievable. Marx knew that he was going to fish in the morning and hunt in the afternoon, but other than the functioning of a post-capitalist society was at best anyone's guess, at worst the decision of those with the most guns. The question then becomes how one can best approach the task of creating a utopian vision in a way that does not recreate current forms of domination and brings the utopian vision put forth into the realm of possibility in a way that show avenues for how that order can be brought into existence in the here and now. It is part of trying to sketch out the functioning of what Raoul Vaneigem described as generalized self-management, or when the logic and methods of the worker's councils could be extended over society as a liberated whole.

The problem is that you can't study utopia. The study of utopia is the ethnography of nowhere. There is no ready-made existing liberatory society which one can go study, takes notes on, and then return and try to recreate here. It is also debatable even if one could find such an existing situation that trying to recreate such out of the context where such emerged would be the best of ideas. And that's the problem of utopian vision, is that it doesn't exist anywhere—that's implicit in the word. But there have existed a multitude of examples of cooperative structures and non-hierarchal social practices that have existed throughout history. Little slices of liberation and non-alienated experience—what Pierre Clastres describes as the

> vast constellation of societies in which the holders of what elsewhere would be called power are actually without power; where the political is determined as a domain beyond coercion and violence, beyond hierarchal subordination.[4]

And that's the starting point of reformatting a non-vanguardist approach to the creation of utopian social theory.

The typical approach to considering radical social and economic change is to select a set of values and ends and then try to create some social structures based upon those values. For example, we could say that we want a society based upon solidarity, mutual aid, voluntary association and so forth—so what would social institutions look like based upon those values? One example of this sort of approach is found in the example of Parecon, or participatory economics. Parecon and its founders should be praised for articulating a vision, as at the very least regardless of what you think of their ideas they at least offer up some sort of overall vision which can be looked at and evaluated as to whether or not such would ultimately be desirable and effective. However, I think that when you look at this formulation (and not just Parecon in particular) you can see the flaw in this approach.

The problem is that such an approach to envisioning radical alternatives is that it begins with abstract concepts and ideals as its founding basis, and then proceeds to try to fit life to those ideals. The danger of beginning with abstract values and goals as the basis for trying to plan social reality is that it's very easy to get caught up in ideological conflicts through such a process, to get involved in conflicts over theoretical systems and interactions that may or may not occur when the new vision hits the pavement of actual existence. Conversely, such a process of going from abstractions can overlook very real pragmatic issues that can be glossed over in abstract models. And perhaps most important is that people don't act like theoretical constructs—they act like people, whose behavior can never be fully described by any model of any kind. Among the areas which modern economics can be criticized for is that it is very good at creating abstract models of how an economy functions, but such do not describe (and really cannot describe) the actual functioning of the world. Similarly, if the radical intellectual or theorist cannot formulate alternatives from a position separated from social struggle and their experiences. From such a position radical social change is itself an abstraction.

Libertarian municipalism, most commonly associated with Murray Bookchin and related theorists, in general takes the position of subsuming the economic sphere as a part of a political critique. Thus the arrangement of economic relations becomes something that will be arrived upon after the newly created directly democratic polity (or the decentralization and further democratization of an existing political structure) decides upon it. This is not to say that the community should not have a role, most likely a large role, in their economic affairs—but visions put forth thus far have used this reasoning more as an excuse for not having a coherent conceptualization of an alternative economic arrangement. The debate between Michael Albert and Peter Staudenmaier is representative of this.[5]

Another general style of approaching social change might be summed up as doing so through focusing on the methods of achieving this change, such as with syndicalism. Such are often very useful for particular social milieus and arrangements, but often do not correspond to any broader reconstructive vision and are difficult to use applicably beyond the specific circumstance of their formation. For instance, what good does the call to take over the factories mean if you live somewhere where there aren't any factories? What if you don't want factories at all? This criticism can be directed at much of the "canon" of anarchist theory, which for the large part is from the nineteenth to early twentieth century European thinkers. Not surprisingly, we live in a much different and more complex world then 1890s Europe—so it would be absurd to think that our notions of social change and strategy for working for such might not need some radical rethinking. Kropotkin, for instance, outlined a number of important principles to consider in radical economic visioning: the integration of manual and mental labor in the organization of production, the importance of space and decentralization in the reduction and elimination of hierarchy, and so on.[6] Although it makes a great deal of sense to continue to draw ideas and inspiration from such works, it is important to realize that the principles drawn from such need to be reworked to be practically applicable in today's world.

The alternative approach that I would put forward for creating a radical vision would be to look at the existing forms of cooperative economics and social practice that have existed throughout human history and around the planet, and to try to draw out their underlying logic into a more generalized pluralistic vision. Such an approach draws from an ethnographic practice and approach (though trying to dispense with the more noxious forms and tendencies that such has exhibited by the less ethical of researchers). This would not be just a shift in one's approach, but the beginning notes of what very well could be an extensive and on-going project. Thus instead of asking "how can we run the economy so that it creates solidarity?" or "how can we manage individual interests and communal interests?" the question becomes looking at different existing forms of practice and drawing from them, rather than trying to impose upon them. The role of vision through this becomes not declaring what should be based upon utopian abstraction, but trying to figure out what could be based upon the experiences contained within existing forms of social relations.

Just sit back for a second and list some of the examples of cooperative structures that you can think of: local community gardens, multitudes of cooperative an worker collectives, the Mondragon, time stores and labor exchanges, collective farms from the US to Russia, the Mararikulam cooperatives in India, the Kibbutzim, neighborhood assembleas from Argentina to New England, the ejidos and autonomous communities in Chiapas, gift economies and exchange clubs, free stores, squats, alternative currency systems, cooperative water management in Bali, communes and intentional communities, practices and concepts such as guanxi (China) and the potlatch (Kwakiutl), and

so forth. Perhaps the question should not be whether a world based on cooperation and without hierarchy can possibly work, but why the many examples of how such structures haven't been looked at in terms of creating a more holistic version before?

The Non-Vanguardist Social Researcher and the Task of Utopian Vision

> Rather than value being the process of public recognition itself, already suspended in social relations, it is the way people could do almost anything (including in the right circumstances, creating entirely new sorts of social relations) assess the importance of what they do, in fact, do, as they are doing it.
>
> —David Graeber[7]

The task then becomes looking at the different existing forms of cooperative enterprise and social structures and asking they might fit together into a more general social vision or system. How might the different elements interact? If one applied the logic of the Argentinean neighborhood assemblies to the economic structure of a factory in Prague, what might that look like? How would these different cooperative structures work between communities, between regions, and globally? How would it be possible to best coordinate resources and create forms of cooperation across regions while maintaining the highest possible level of autonomy? How can one start creating these types of structures now in a fashion where they form a sustainable community infrastructure?

This approach has multiple benefits. The first and most obvious is that since you are starting from cooperative structures and practices that have existed, one does not have to argue that such are possible. Clearly they are. They have existed and continue to exist throughout the world. As noted by frequently by Chomsky, the prospect of a workable alternative is a greater threat to the system than just opposition. For instance, why was the US government so threatened by the Black Panthers? There are many reasons, but one of the generally least mentioned ones is that through their breakfast programs, community clinics, and other programs the Black Panthers started creating an infrastructure that showed that those communities didn't need the state to take care of them—they could do it for themselves. The threat of a workable alternative cannot be underestimated. The task of radical vision is not of the "great thinker" or learned sage, but of the ability to listen attentively to the desires and experience of those who struggle for their liberation—and to learn from them. This is the task not an of an elite vanguard, but a role that we all can take part in, as diplomats of struggle, pagans, prophets, and dreamers bringing utopia into our lives every day.

Secondly, from that position it becomes possible to conceive of anarchism not as a philosophy that was invented by a specific set of eighteenth-century patriarchal bearded white guys, but as the struggle and practice for the creation of freedom and liberated experience that has existed throughout human history. As observed in regards to African societies,

> To a greater or lesser extent all of these traditional African societies manifest "anarchic elements" which upon close examination lend credence to the historical truism that governments have not always existed. They are but a recent phenomena and are, therefore, not inevitable in human society.[8]

This is not to say that one should go around declaring that Balinese tribes are really anarchists and just don't know it—but that one can learn from the vast historical experience of the cooperative institutions and practices which have existed. Such grounds utopian theory and hopes not in wild speculations, but in the lived realities of daily experience, in the extension of what people already know to a broader vision.

Utopian theory is not then abstractions and ideals that are designed to be imposed upon the world, dreams that will come into existence after the revolution, but is the collected experience of cooperative structures that can be generalized into a broader vision. This broader vision, however, is not an imperial vision or one that exists in some abstract universal space. It is a utopian theory that is more a process of coordinating, collecting, and connecting the experience and knowledge created through experience in a way that can be adapted and applied in varying situations and contexts in pluralistic fashion. The task of the utopian theorist is that of acting as a diplomat between struggles, sharing wisdom and experiences, connecting and synthesizing ideas created through everyday experience, and offer such back to the community.

This is not to suggest that we can envision radical alternatives in a "value free" or neutral manner, at least not in any fashion resembling such claims usually made by the social sciences. It would be silly and possibly dangerous to pretend that our choice of liberatory social relations to study would not be based upon personal concepts of freedom, solidarity, autonomy, and so forth. The point is to avoid the error of giving precedence on abstract values of pragmatic organizing or of divorcing pragmatic efforts from a larger liberatory vision. The goal becomes to highlight the liberatory nature of existing social relations and practices and to draw from them new ideals and theories: to create liberatory visions not in terms of definitions themselves, but through looking for the causal relationships in such forms of practice.

There are many possible avenues that this type of an approach and project could take. And to emphasize the point, the goal would not be to formulate the "one true and correct plan" for radical social change, but to amass the experience and knowledge of existing projects and cooperative forms—to gather a knowledge base that can be drawn from according to the needs and particulars

of the situation and setting. This is the task not of creating a rigid or deterministic blueprint for social change, but developing a toolbox of knowledge and skills that can be utilized and adapted in changing circumstances. These type of conversations and projects are beginning to crop up with greater frequency as that post-action let down leaves many with a sense of wanting to create sustainable forms of resistance, projects which are grounded within our communities and the daily lives.

It would be the elaboration and theorization of what James Scott called mētis, or the informal rules and processes that sustain and support community practices and institutions. Scott contrasts this more informal "rule of thumb" knowledge to analytical and rationalistic knowledge that is characteristic of bureaucratic institutions and centrally planned efforts of social reconstruction; he argues that much of the failure of centrally planned and engineered efforts lies in how they fail to incorporate, and most often relegate and deny the validity of the forms of cooperative and informal practices that support the formal social order.[9] The horror and atrocity of such "revolutionary states" emerges when such centrally planned schemes come to be backed by an authoritarian state apparatus willing to implement them by force.

What this gets to is reformulating one's approach to the task of utopian thinking and vision. The challenge is not to contemplate and brood in some library until one is finally structure with a grand vision of truth and wisdom that will enable the creation of a vision to lead and direct the masses in the radical struggle for freedom. The task of utopian vision is to examine the already existing liberatory practices, structures, and forms which exist and have existed through the course of human history, and to draw from them a broader vision of how particular forms of freedom might be generalized into an overall social vision. The task is to network and connect multiple and divergent struggles and practices in a mutually complementary and beneficial manner. The goal is not to lead the masses, to create a new human nature or state of being, but to identify existing forms of freedom, and to draw out the underlying logic and generalize them into a pluralistic reconstructive vision. It is to reconceptualize utopian thought not as a static end but as a flexible and adaptable process.

Through this process knowledge and vision are created through experience, through the result of human experience and creation. The goal of utopian thinking should not be to come up with impractical schemes of a how a future society might work or to formulate plans that preclude them from starting to be created now. When Marx labeled his socialist predecessors as "utopian" that was his objection, that they had plans and dreams which were unobtainable, and therefore to a large degree useless in trying to alleviate the totally unnecessary suffering brought about by capital and the state. While neo-liberals like to pretend that the market is autonomous and self-supporting, working off of principles inherent to itself, such conceals the inventory of ideas, practices, and values which underlie it and allow it to adapt to continually changing circumstances. Similarly, the long-term success of building movements against

the state, capital, and all forms of oppression, is to create those reserves of knowledge, experience, and ideas that will enable us constantly redefines the specifics of non-hierarchal organizing based upon the changing circumstances of time and place.

The struggle for liberation isn't about creating unrealizable plans or visions, but about bringing ideas about cooperation and non-hierarchal organizing into our daily lives. Utopian thinking becomes looking at forms of liberatory social relations, extending their logic, and beginning to implement such notions and ideals within the way which we live our lives now. We create the space for revolutionary thought and action by creating those spaces where community grows, where our lives and political and struggles can be sustain in an ongoing fashion. It is the task of bringing what Durruti called "the new world we carry in our hearts" into existence as a tangible reality, even if only in a piecemeal fashion. The reformulation of utopian thought is not finding a better way to imagine a future revolution, but drawing from human experience in finding way to live liberation now.

Notes

1.   Raoul Vaneigem, "Toward Truth as a Practical Goal," in *The Situationist International Anthology*, ed. & trans. Ken Knabb (Berkley, CA: Bureau of Public Secrets, 1981), p. 218.

2.   Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 164.

3.   Pierre Bourdieu and Gunter Grass, "The 'Progressive' Restoration: A Franco-German Dialogue," *New Left Review* 14 (March-April 2002), p. 67.

4.   Pierre Clastres, *Society Against the State: The Leader as Servant and the Human Uses of Power Among Indians of the Americas* (New York: Urizen Books, 1977).

5.   Michael Albert and Peter Staudenmaier, "Participatory Economics & Social Ecology," available at http://www.socialecology.org/forums/.

6.   Peter Kropotkin, *Fields, Factories, and Workshops Tomorrow,* ed. Colin Ward (London: Free Press, 1985).

7.   David Graeber, *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 47.

8.   Sam Mbah and I. E. Igariwey, *African Anarchism: The History of a Movement* (Tuscon, AZ: See Sharp Press, 1997), p. 27.

9.   James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

Part 6: Anarchism and Ecology

18

Free from Nature or Free Nature?
An Anarchist Crititique of Transhumanism

Elizabeth Kolovou and Stavros Karageorgakis

Presently we are concerned with examining the ideas of transhumanism, which is a movement that seems to be gaining increased support. According to one of the definitions provided by its advocates:

> Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradually over the past two decades, and can be viewed as an outgrowth of secular humanism and the Enlightenment. It holds that current human nature is improvable through the use of applied science and other rational methods, which may make it possible to increase human health-span, extend our intellectual and physical capacities, and give us increased control over our own mental states and moods. Technologies of concern include not only current ones, like genetic engineering and information technology, but also anticipated future developments such as fully immersive virtual reality, machine-phase nanotechnology, and artificial intelligence.[1]

Transhumanism does not express the visions of some insane techno freaks influenced by science fiction, but the ideas of well acknowledged philosophers and scientists of the West. Among others, we could mention Nick Bostrom and David Pearce, who are co-founders of the World Transhumanist Association, James J. Hughes, Raymond Kurzweil and Hans Moravec. Many of them actually work in the fields of research and development that correspond to the technologies on which the transhumanist project relies. Furthermore, there are several different versions of transhumanism, such as extropianism, singularitarianism, etc. According to the "Report on the 2007 Interests and Beliefs Survey of the Members of the World Transhumanist Association," among the members of World Transhumanist Association one finds a 2 percent of self-determined left anarchists, a 4 percent of Greens and a less than 0.5 percent of radicals.[2]

Transhumanism is more or less presented as a holistic theory as well as a liberatory panacea. Transhumanist ideas already underlie the research agenda of fields such as contemporary biomedicine, nanotechnology, biology etc. Furthermore, elements of the transhumanist thought may also be found in official statements,[3] and many of their proposed directions of technological development are significantly funded.[4] Transhumanist thought poses a challenge to various fields of philosophy, such as bioethics, environmental ethics, political philosophy and political ecology. The challenge for anarchism derives from the fact that transhumanism is presented as politically neutral,[5] thus generating an issue of compatibility between them. This is becoming more compulsory, given the liberatory ends ascribed to transhumanism by its advocates. Furthermore, the transhumanist call for an accelerating technological progress generates crucial ethical and political issues that should be elaborated in the context of anarchism, if the last is to claim applicability under contemporary global conditions.

The prism that we adopt in what follows in order to examine transhumanistic ideas could be characterized as green anarchist. What is distinctively green about such an anarchist account is the idea that human and nonhuman emancipation are inseparable ends. In other words, a green anarchist perspective extends the core values and ideals of anarchism, to include nonhuman nature. Furthermore, it acknowledges a close relation between the domination of humans by each other and the idea or practice of controlling the natural world.[6]

From such a standpoint then, we intend to examine transhumanist ideas concerning current human nature as well as their ideal for the evolution of the human being. Furthermore, we attempt to estimate the kind of relation between humans and nature that this ideal is likely to correspond to. The task that follows concerns the critical examination of some declarations of transhumanists, in respect to their relation to nonhuman nature, from which we draw some more general conclusions about the transhumanist idea of value in nature and eventually its compatibility with the emancipation of the last. In the following section, we test the liberatory possibilities of transhumanist technologies for human society. Our final concern is the defense of our green anarchist viewpoint against the accusations of "bioconservatism" and "bioluddism" that are usually used by transhumanists as responses to any objections that are raised against their thought.

Human Nature

According to Clark, among the defining features of anarchism as a political theory is a conception of human nature that would justify the hope in progressing toward the anarchist view of an ideal society.[7] Anarchist thinkers have often been accused of endorsing a naively optimistic or scientifically ignorant view of human nature, in an attempt to present the realization of their views as feasible.

In the objections that correspond to the first case, raised even from within anarchism, the anarchist view of human nature is described as essentialist, where "goodness" is its supposed essence. For example, in his review of Newman's work, Cohn writes:

> Kropotkin found resistance on a certain notion of human nature as an "outside" to power—a pure origin of resistance. Power, as incarnated in the State, represses and distorts the goodness of humanity; once it is eradicated by the revolution, "human essence will flourish" and power will disappear. For Newman, however, power is ineradicable, and any essentialist notion of "human nature" is the basis for a new domination.[8]

On similar grounds, Eckersley argues that the desire that ecoanarchists have for humans to cooperate more than they do and the conviction that this could be the case in the appropriate social environment, results in the conflation on their behalf, of human *potential* nature with human *essential* nature.[9] As a result, they tend to present a better version of our nature, namely the potential, as the norm or the essential human nature.

According to the second set of objections, it is claimed that anarchists assume that human nature is almost infinitely malleable, or socially determined,[10] which is quite distinct from the first set of objections (at least if it is the case that essentialism implies that some elements, which constitute the essence of human nature, are indeed fixed and universal). This would be true, for example, of Godwin's view of human nature, which he claims is a product of the environment, the alteration of which can bring to the surface either the innate inclination toward self-interest or, alternately, the innate social (benevolent) behavior, that coexist in human nature.[11] The objection raised in that case is that anarchism reactively ignores contemporary scientific evidence that suggest a degree of determination of human behavior by genetic factors.[12]

To sum up, it is argued that in order to claim feasibility for the realization of their ideas, anarchists either tend to reject any element of biological determination in human nature, or accept it as long as it supports convenient conclusions that could be revealed under the conditions of an anarchist society. It is indeed the case that such a tendency on behalf of anarchists would be justified, if the political implications of neo-Darwinian views are taken under consideration. The last generally hold a genetic fixity of a competitive and selfish human nature, and their trademark is the "selfish gene" metaphor.[13] Such a viewpoint is very likely to result in fatalism, quietism, and social relinquishment, which would be essentially incompatible with any attempts to make the world better. Furthermore, it would justify statist coercive means of social control and domination. Additionally, such a view of human nature naturalizes an attitude of hostility towards the rest of nature, since the speciesist struggling for existence is seen as inescapable and universally justified. As we will return to the evaluation of objections concerning the anarchist views of human nature later on, let us

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now introduce the transhumanist idea of human nature, which seemingly circumvents some of the aforementioned conceptual problems.

In transhumanist thought, human nature is depicted as work in progress that is our job to improve. The limitations that our current condition poses render us imperfect beings, reflecting thus the imperfection of nature. Transhumanists exhort humanity to take evolution into its own hands, and by employing all "rational means,"[14] to reach a state of posthumanity that will include beings "with vastly greater capacities than present humans."[15] To our understanding, transhumanists assume a degree of genetic fixity in human nature which defines much of what is significant for human existence. At least, this is how we interpret statements as the following:

> Evolution, despite our efforts, has channeled our behavior in particular directions built into our neurology. Our bodies and brains restrain our capacities. Our creativity struggles within the boundaries of human intelligence, imagination, and concentration. Aging and death victimizes all humans. To transhumanists, in the words of Alan Harrington, death is an imposition on the human race and no longer acceptable.[16]

In other words, transhumanists perceive the factors of chance and finitude that are beyond the realm of their control as significantly restrictive to their free will. The limitations posed by nature are hostile to their ideal of freedom. As we understand it, their view is best described as "genetic essentialism," a term initiated by Nelkin and Lindee to describe the attribution of all that is important about people—their basic traits, their moral potential, their general behavior—to the their genomes.[17] On these grounds, transhumanists rather discard non genetic factors that partake in personality structuring, as well as the role that social institutions can play in improving a human being. The following statement of Bostrom illustrates this inclination:

> Among the most important potential developments are ones that would enable us to alter our biology directly through technological means. Such interventions could affect us more profoundly than modification of beliefs, habits, culture, and education.[18]

It seems, then, that if anarchists seek an optimistic vision of human nature in order to ground their movement toward an ideal, transhumanists seek to present human beings as hopeless puppets in the hands of an unjust natural fate. Indeed, if human nature is biologically determined and educational means are inadequate, then the technological enhancement of humanity seems to be the only way out of "imperfection." This has as a consequence the proclamation of their proposed enhancement of human nature as the only realistic possibility of escaping this natural fate.

More Natures

We have claimed so far that transhumanists seek to free humanity from a restrictive fate that is supposedly imposed upon us by nature. Let us now shift the terms of our discussion slightly and turn to the ancient distinction between the first—or biological—nature and the second—or cultural, social, and political—nature, which has been reinitiated by Bookchin and other contemporary thinkers.[19] We may then term as "third nature" the next step of evolution, and examine the possibilities that derive from transhumanism as well as the relation between the three natures in the transhumanist project.

Transhumanists seem to believe that the first nature is dominating the second nature to an unacceptable degree, as is suggested by More's previously quoted statement. Nature is depicted as a tyrant from whom technology will free us.[20] For this to be achieved, transhumanists propose the merging of the natural and artificial into a third, posthuman nature that will allegedly free our second nature from the boundaries of the first. Note that the proposed merging of natural and artificial is likely to gradually lead to the elimination of the natural. At least this is our interpretation of the intention underlying transhumanist visions such as "wireless exoselves,"[21] selves "uploaded"[22] on computers, different versions of "cyborgs"[23] and the like. In other words, when transhumanists describe the merging of the natural and the artificial, they clearly side with the artificial,[24] which represents their ideal liberating alternative to our embodied existence.

To put it in another way, the conception of second nature in transhumanism stands in clear opposition to the first nature. Furthermore, in the transhumanist project the liberation of second nature not only presupposes the domination of first nature, as was the case in its ancestral Enlightment project, but moves further to propose its gradual elimination, at least at the level of the human body. We may thus describe the transhumanist ideal's third nature as artificial inasmuch as the domination of the first nature by the second takes its more radical manifestation in the form of dehumanization. To the point that the described dehumanization involves the reduction of human being into an artificial product or machine, third nature signifies the domination of both the first and the second nature.

However, transhumanists seek to naturalize their project, as statements like the following indicate:

> Yet we *should* regard transhuman transcendence as natural. Nature embodies within itself a tendency to seek new complex structures, to overcome itself to take on new, more effective forms. Nietzsche recognized this in his view of the universal will to power. More recently, we have partly uncovered this drive towards complexity through complexity theory, evolutionary theory, artificial life, and neurocomputing. Overcoming limits comes naturally to humans. The drive to transform ourselves and our environment is at our core.[25]

And:

> From a transhumanist point of view, humans and our artifacts and enterprises are part of the extended biosphere. There is no fundamental dichotomy between humanity and the rest of the world. One could say that nature has, in humanity, become conscious and self-reflective.[26]

Of course, it may be plausibly objected that the boundaries between the natural and the artificial are blurred as a result of extended human activity. Or, it could be claimed that second nature already embeds the loosening of this distinction. It is, however, an exceptionally distinct enterprise to base the elimination of the natural on such grounds.

The reinterpretation of everything there is in artificial terms has already been initiated by transhumanist thinkers. This, for example, is the plea of Max More, whose "Beyond the machine," is committed to arguing that humans are dignified machines, however unpleasant this may strike us.[27] In his same work, he introduces a new conception of life, consistent with the reversed relation between the natural and the artificial, in which is embedded the third nature of transhumanism:

> Simple biological organisms such as enzymes and viruses certainly count as machines, while an advanced artificial intelligence would not count as a machine. . . . The statement "humans are machines" cannot decisively be declared true or false. We can draw no sharp line between machines and complex systems that are not machines, just as we cannot draw a sharp line between life and non-life or between night and day.[28]

To the degree that the most immediate level through which a human being connects to nature is its body, then the artificialization of fundamental expressions of corporeality, such as birth and death—and eventually its whole existence—unavoidably leads to the alteration of individual self-perception. In particular, human beings would perceive themselves as artificial rather than natural entities. Additionally, it is likely that the self-understanding of the species will change, as Habermas argues:

> With the genetic programming of human beings, domination of nature turns into an act of self-empowering of man, thus changing our self-understanding as members of the species- and *perhaps* touching upon a necessary condition for an autonomous conduct of life and a universalistic understanding of morality.[29]

Following Sagoff, according to whom there is a strong relationship between understandings about human nature and those of nonhuman nature,[30] we may argue that dominant ideas about the human/nature relationship will unavoidably follow shifts in the self-understanding of humanity. The further distancing from nature—that is, according to our understanding the outcome of artificializing

human existence and abolishing natural embodiment—will result in the further obstruction of any attempt to justify moral duties towards nonhuman nature as well as any restriction of human activity on such a basis.

Devaluing Nature

Having presented our view of the indirect implications that the transhumanist project holds for the human/nature relationship, we may now examine some of the explicit transhumanist views concerning this issue. What value, if any, does transhumanism ascribes to nature? When one considers that the roots of transhumanist philosophy are in the Enlightenment, which is interwoven with the idea of human exceptionalism, transhumanists surprisingly declare that they dismiss speciesism and anthropocentrism. Bostrom states that transhumanists reject speciesism,[31] while Hughes seeks common ground between transhumanism and the animal rights movement on the basis that they both oppose anthropocentrism.[32]

Transhumanists focus on the criterion of enjoyment/suffering, thus being consistent with utilitarian ethics. At the seventh point of the "Transhumanist Declaration," one reads that "Transhumanism advocates the well-being of all sentience (whether in artificial intellects, humans, posthumans, or non-human animals)."[33] Then, in terms of the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value, transhumanists declare that they value sentience intrinsically. In other words, they seem to support that sentience is a necessary and sufficient condition for bearing moral status.[34] This is certainly not the place to engage in a discussion concerning the adequacy of the criterion of sentience as a basis for environmental ethics. Besides, even if the criterion of sentience is considered sufficient, it is not actually what transhumanists have in mind.

A closer look reveals that sentient life in general is not what concerns transhumanists, unless that life is combined with intelligence. Indeed, Hughes makes this point clear when he states that

> rather than rights for all life, transhumanist ethics seeks to establish the solidarity of and citizenship for all intelligent life. Transhumanists look forward to a society in which humans, post-humans and intelligent non-humans are all citizens of the polity.[35]

This remark could be inferred from Bostrom's definition of *existential risks*, as "events that would cause the extinction of *intelligent life* (emphasis added) or permanently and drastically cripple its potential."[36] Nature, he explains elsewhere, poses such risks, but the greatest existential risks are anthropogenic in their origin and arise from present or anticipated future technologies.[37] Although we could not agree more with his last point, it is striking that Bostrom does not

exhibit any concern or make any reference at all to the possibility of the extinction of non-intelligent forms of life, due to the realization of the enormous[38] anthropogenic risks that he describes.

It seems, therefore, that the implicit transhumanist criterion of moral consideration narrows the scope for the ascription of moral status from sentient to intelligent life. But we are not done yet, as, eventually, it is Hughes who reveals the transhumanist idea of value in nature:

> the goal of transhumanism is precisely to supplant the natural with the planned, replacing chance with design. The key to transhumanism is faith in reason, not in nature.[39]

According to our reading, the transhumanist ideal of the human/nature relationship is reflected more consistently in this last statement than in the aforementioned declarations. In other words, it seems that transhumanists actually value only distinctively human properties and capabilities—namely intelligence in its manifestation as reason. As such, we are tempted to conclude that transhumanist are anthropocentrists of the strongest degree, if their repugnance of the natural did not include human nature, as we previously attempted to show. Therefore, we may term their perspective "mis-naturalism,"[40] which differs only in kind and not in degree[41] from any and all anthropocentric and speciesist attitudes known so far.

If transhumanists disvalue the natural in general, then what is left in their moral sphere? Some future artificial nature is our answer. It seems to us that transhumanists are eager in their attempt to secure a moral status for their artificial "children," as these will be the seed from which transhumanist values and ideals will stem. This can also be inferred from the idea of the "transhumanist imperative"[42]—i.e., "the prospect of there being great values outside of the human sphere,"[43]—that is provided as a reason for the redesign project. To our understanding this is an indication of the fact that transhumanists do not actually find meaningful and therefore sufficient values in existing modes of being, human or otherwise Even if this is not the case, we are left with no realistic grounds to suppose that in a transhumanist polity any kind of life would be valued intrinsically, or as an end in itself, or not merely as a means for the actualization of transhumanistic fantasies of the general redesign of nature.[44] The "mis-naturalism" that underlies transhumanist ends leaves us with no illusions about the moral responsibilities that they think they have—or, more accurately, don't have—towards nature, and the rights that they ascribe to various life forms. It seems that the right to limitless instrumental appropriation and redesign is the only one left.

To conclude, Bostrom's assertion that "not only are transhumanist technologies ecologically sound, they may be the only environmentally viable option for the long term,"[45] does not alleviate any concerns about transhumanism raised from a perspective of green anarchism. We hope to have provided some suffi-

cient reasons to support our conclusion that, both indirectly and directly, the transhumanist project deepens and hardens the idea of the domination of nature, and therefore any emancipatory ideal that would seek to reject the domination of nature is incompatible with transhumanism at a fundamental level.

Technology and Society

Having suggested that the transhumanist project is likely to contribute to the emancipation of nature in a radically negative way, we will now turn to the argument that this is the case for humanity as well. Apart from the aforementioned reduction of human existence to a machine, more reasons derive from the consideration of the technological innovations involved in the transhumanist utopia of generalized artificialization, as well as the status of technology in a transhumanist polity. In other words, our concern at this point is to examine the liberatory potential of the means by which transhumanists intend to reach their ends. For our purposes, we use as an example the proposed biotechnological interventions in the human genome, but the discussion may be apply generally to the social and political implications of other technological forms.

Transhumanists depict the technology involved in their project as a value-neutral tool, a result of the application of objective science. Such an apolitical, a-historical and amoral conception calls to mind the utilitarian risk rhetoric that is used to alleviate public concerns during the process of imposing a novel technological innovation. This consists of depicting the involved risks as insignificant or similar to precedent technological forms, and the benefits as enormous.[46] Transhumanists seem well aware of the improbability of the equal distribution of the alleged benefits,[47] as well as of the possibility for increased social inequalities as a result of the application of their project. For Bostrom, though, "a technology leading to an increase in unjust inequalities is not a sufficient reason for discouraging the development and use of that technology; we also have to consider its benefits."[48] However, it is rather clear to us that those who are to benefit from the technologies in question are by definition distinct from those that will suffer most from its potential unjust and inegalitarian consequences.

Bostrom ultimately vindicates our view in a statement that is strikingly indicative of the terms with which transhumanists conceive the possibility of establisging new hierarchy at the genetic level. In an article in which he unfolds dystopian scenarios concerning the next step of human evolution (which for him could become a reality unless the latter is manipulated), we read:

> Just as current human beings benefit from other species, which pose no serious threat to the human species, so too may technologically more advanced agents benefit from the existence of an ecology of non-eudaemonic agents. Such non-

eudaemonic agents could serve economically useful functions. The goal is to maximize the total quantity of resources possessed by eudaemonic agents, or at any rate to prevent this quantity from falling to zero.[49]

In other words, new kinds of social hierarchy are likely to be generated at the level of our genomes,[50] but transhumanists are not worried since "our attitudes, lifestyles, and ways of relating to each other may have adjusted in the meantime. When the anticipated consequences eventually occur, they may fit naturally into the kind of lives that are being lived at that time."[51] However, doesn't this statement of Bostrom's indicate that technology, instead of being a value-neutral tool, actually plays a more profound socio-political role? In our understanding, Bostrom unintentionally describes the way in which technology reorganizes social roles and institutions, decision rules and structure, and, indeed the whole of society around new goals and rationales.[52] Significant thinkers such as Mumford, Ellul and Heidegger[53] have shown, each one in his own distinct manner, that technology consists in more that just artifacts and corresponding technical knowledge. Values are embedded in the design of technology and the essence of technology itself reflects a worldview.[54] Which particular forms of technology—machines, techniques, and social organizations—are spawned by a particular worldview depend on its perception of life, death, human potential, and the relationships of humans to one another and to nature.[55] In other words, the technological means discussed are the vehicles by which transhumanist values and "needs" are to be imposed. Hopefully we have made explicit by now that the latter are far from being oriented towards the freedom of either human or nonhuman creatures.

Whether one supports an Ellulian view of autonomous technology[56] or not, it is time to reconsider his ideas in view of the fact that transhumanists actually do aim at establishing the autonomy of technology in the fullest sense. The transhumanist vision of "Singularity," which Hughes parallels with the Marxian revolution,[57] is exactly the point where technology gains an autonomous "life," replicating itself and organizing its own further progress. Under such circumstances, the conception of technological dependency gains a new meaning, as technology mediates every single dimension of human existence at all levels. Needless to say, to the degree that society will have been organized around the transhumanist technologies and their implied values, freedom even as it is conceived in transhumanism (i.e., as an increase in the number of available individual choices) will be out of question.

Finally, there are additional reasons that render the technologies under discussion incompatible with any anarchist account of a liberatory technology. We could also mention the fact that they are highly specialized, thus privileging a scientific elite that are involved in their design and production. Even in the absence of such a high specialization and *ceteris paribus*, there would be no reasonable grounds on which to assume that the control of these technologies would ever be publicly exercised at a human scale. Surely such a thing would

never be spontaneously allowed by the powerful global technological lobby of multinational corporations. In other words, transhumanist technologies are likely to perpetuate the pancapitalistic[58] status quo and establish new kinds of hierarchies. The transhumanist fantasy goes hand in hand with the further centralizing of power. Bostrom's suggestion regarding the kind of political organization that would be necessary for controlling our evolution is enlightening:

> Taking control of our evolution . . . would require the development of a "singleton," a world order in which at the highest level of organization there is only one independent decision-making power (which may be, but need not be, a world government).[59]

It sounds like the nightmare of every anarchist.

Neither "Bioconservatives" Nor "Bioluddites"

Transhumanists dismiss any objections to their project as either "bioconservative"[60] or "bioluddite,"[61] arguing that they hold back progress and serve the perpetuation of a status quo which will lead society to stagnation. At this point we will defend a green anarchist alternative that is, in fact, neither. Green anarchism can offer genuinely liberatory options for both human and nonhuman nature without being outdated and obscurantist. In this attempt we are especially beholden to the work of Murray Bookchin.[62]

As was claimed earlier, transhumanists hold that our current human nature (or second nature) carries within it an enslaving imperfection. Thus they propose a transcendence conceived in terms of negative freedom,[63] or "freedom from nature." A "bioconservative," according to these terms, is one that holds that the status quo of our second nature should be perpetuated. Therefore, a statement such as the following—"it is essential to emphasize that second nature is, in fact, an unfinished, indeed inadequate, development of nature as a whole"—would sound particularly transhumanistic. However, it derives from Bookchin, who offers an alternative to the third nature of transhumanists described earlier. In his words:

> Humanity as it now exists is not nature rendered self. The future of the biosphere depends overwhelmingly on whether second nature can be transcended in a new system of social and organic conciliation, one that I would call "free nature"—a nature that would diminish the pain and suffering that exist in both first and second nature. Free nature, in effect, would be a conscious and ethical nature, an ecological society.[64]

In other words, instead of denaturalizing nature and dehumanizing humanity in the name of their liberation, as do transhumanists, Bookchin suggests their reconciliation and unification in the next evolutionary step.

It can be inferred that, although imperfect, current human nature entails the necessary and sufficient potential for the next liberatory step of evolution and therefore, no biotechnological enhancement is needed. This is the point to remember from our previous discussion concerning anarchist views of human nature that have often been accused of being either naively optimistic and essentialist or else connive at scientific evidence that support a degree of biological determinism. Our claim is that neither of the two is, or needs to be, the case in order for the justification of green anarchist ends.

Take, for example, the objection against Kropotkin's idea of human nature, which is most usually taken to be *the* anarchist view on the issue[65] and influences much contemporary green anarchist thinking.[66] This can be said to stem from a misreading of Kropotkin. Macauley argues that Kropotkin equally criticizes both a Hobbesian depiction of human nature as essentially selfish and competitive, and the opposite Rousseauan one that views human nature as naturally one of "love, peace and harmony," since neither is an "impartial interpretation of nature."[67] In other words, instead of inclining to a naively romantic conception of human nature as essentially "good" at its core, Kropotkin acknowledges the reality of competition,[68] but he gives primacy to cooperation, especially as a normative goal.[69] Similarly, a supposedly essentialist view of human nature can possibly be defended if it is accepted that our essential nature entails our unrealized potential.[70]

On the other, hand, there is absolutely no reason for green anarchists to maintain a view of human nature as an exclusive product of cultural determinism, and thus to be accused of making selective use of science in respect to their usual appeal to the science of ecology. For example, according to evolutionary psychology, there is no conception of "innateness" that would justify "hard" determinism which, in turn, would justify fatalism and quietism.[71] Garvey, explains that the culturally specific items of our experience are comprised of basic constituents, and these are the legacy of evolution. But this does not mean that we cannot modify the way we experience our world by means, for example, of therapy or self-discipline.[72] Thus it is perfectly plausible that we can transcend any negative disposition by increasing our efforts.[73]

Bookchin's conception seems to surpass such problems,[74] as for him human nature is real, biologically grounded, and formed through an organic process that involves consociation.[75] The transcendent synthesis of first and second nature into a *free* nature and ecological society would allow human nature to be realized fully, along with the flourishing of nonhuman nature. For Bookchin then, the achievement of human wholeness is achieved through the reintroduction of the natural world into human experience.[76] Freedom here is conceived in its positive form (*freedom to*), namely as the ability of both first and second nature to act in order to fulfill their potential. This is to be contrasted with the transhu-

manist conception of negative *freedom from* nature,[77] which only involves the absence of limits and constraints. According to Carter, the latter conception of freedom tends to be individualistic, while the positive conception of freedom tends to be socialistic,[78] and this seems to be verified in the case of transhumanist and green anarchist thought, respectively.

Any detailed discussion of the extensive work of Bookchin is far beyond the scope of this essay.[79] Our intention at this point is to argue that there are green anarchist alternatives to the transhumanist project that are genuinely liberatory for both human and nonhuman nature, showing, on the one hand, that they are not mutually exclusive goals, and on the other, that the alternatives need not be outdated, conservative, or misguided.

Similar grounds could provide a response to the transhumanist argument concerning the supposed "bioluddism" that underlies objections to their proposed technologies. It needs to be emphasized that this argument rests on the pseudodilemmatic transhumanist rhetoric which presents the proposed technologies as a one-way panacea for the problems of humanity. In other words, whoever disagrees with the particular technological innovations, is not necessarily an anti-technologist. Even thinkers that define themselves as neo-luddites, such as Chellis Glendinning, distinguish between neo-luddism and anti-technologism.[80] We hope to have made clear that, to our understanding, the transhumanist project is identified with the omnipresence of technology and the artificialization of everything that exists. This will deepen and extend technological dependency and eventually render technology a mediator in all human relationships.

It is again Bookchin that elaborates an alternative idea of a liberatory technology[81] from a green anarchist perspective. His relevant work leaves no space for any accusation of luddism, as he emphasizes the role of technology for the achievement of the goal of a free nature and an ecological society. He argues that a purely quantitative approach of technological forms, such as the transhumanist in question, is lagging behind technological developments that carry a new *qualitative* promise, "the promise of decentralized, communitarian lifestyles, or what I prefer to call ecological forms of human association."[82] In direct opposition to transhumanist thought, the issue for Bookchin is whether a technology can help to *humanize* society and whether besides liberating humans from want and work, it can lead them to an ecocommunity that would promote their potentialities.[83]

In other words, Bookchin's conceptions of free nature and liberatory technology constitute a coherent alternative to the transhumanist project, without being either "bioconservative" or "bioluddite." It is indeed the case that an "ought" implies a "can,"[84] and this is acknowledged in the context of green anarchism, as is confirmed by the work of Bookchin. In other words, green anarchism can offer an alternative orientation supported by a realistic conception of the potential of human nature, a meaningful idea of the desirable ways to re-

late with nonhuman nature, and a view of technology that acknowledges its potentially significant role for the achievement of liberatory ends. On the contrary, limitless technological progress is the cornerstone of the transhumanist kingdom of ends. As their means become the end itself, transhumanists derive their "ought" from their "can," calling for an amoral exercise of power in the course of a limitless acceleration of technological progress.

Conclusion

Our intention has been to examine transhumanist ideas as they are expressed in the work of some of the most well known transhumanists thinkers. In particular, we attempted to approach the transhumanist conceptions of humanity and nature as well as the meaning of freedom in transhumanism. We conclude that transhumanism cannot be viewed as compatible with a green, or indeed any other, version of anarchism. On the contrary, we have attempted to show that it is domination, and not freedom, that permeates the transhumanist project, rendering the latter hostile to any account of anarchism, especially if it includes considerations about nonhuman nature. The manifestation of domination for both human and non human nature occurs both at the level of transhumanist ends and the proposed technological means.

To our understanding, the problem is not that the human realm of values has become obsolete, as the transhumanist imperative implies, but that it has become colonized by the capitalistic values of consumerism, individualism, utilitarianism, and progressivism. As long as transhumanist thought rests on these values, it ensures their perpetuation in the transhumanist kingdom of "new" posthuman values. What is actually at stake, then, is the sacrifice of the natural on the altar of a transformed capitalism which already calculates the profits of transforming the human body into a commodity. The "grow or die" imperative is now masked under the imposed "need for automorphing" which offers unlimited options in a brand new market and threatens to drain human life of meaning and exhaust the human species in some version of artificial *Homo faber* or *Homo economicus*. Furthermore, transhumanist rhetoric reinforces distraction from the real, essentially political factors that restrict the freedom of both human and nonhuman nature. Then, instead of religiously investing in some future superhuman consciousness, we may preferably explore the human realm of value that carries a remarkably hopeful and sufficient potential, to consciously allow the evolution of a free nature at all levels. Green anarchism can indeed provide genuinely liberating proposals towards this direction.

Notes

1. N. Bostrom, "In Defense of Posthuman Dignity," *Bioethics* 19:3 (2005), p. 1.
2. J. Hughes, "Report on the 2007 Interests and Beliefs Survey of the Members of the World Transhumanist Association," *World Transhumanist Association* (January 2008), p. 14.
3. For example, see Sir C. Clothier, *Report of the Committee on the Ethics of Gene Therapy—the 'Clothier Report'* (London, HMSO, Cm.1788, 1992), Introduction, p. 1, where genes are identified with the essence of life; President's Council on Bioethics, *Beyond therapy: Biotechnology and the pursuit of happiness* (New York: Dana Press, 2003), p. 17, where the transhumanist transcendence seems to gain justification.
4. M. More, "On Becoming Posthuman," *Free Inquiry* 14:4 (1994), pp. 38-41.
5. J. Hughes, "The Politics of Transhumanism," Society for the Social Studies of Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 25 October 2001.
6. David Macauley, "Evolution and Revolution: The Ecological Anarchism of Kropotkin and Bookchin," in *Social Ecology after Bookchin*, ed. A. Light (New York-London, The Guilford Press, 1998), p. 299.
7. J. Clark, "What is Anarchism?" in *Nomos XIX: Anarchism*, ed. R. Pennock and W. Chapman (New York: New York University Press, 1978); quoted in Macauley, p. 299.
8. J. Cohn, J. "What is Postanarchism 'Post'?" *Postmodern Culture* 13:1 (2002).
9. R. Eckersley, *Environmentalism and Political Theory: Towards an Ecocentric Approach* (New York: UCL Press, 1992), p. 171.
10. T. Martin, "Anarchism and the Question of Human Nature," *Social Anarchism* 37 (2006), available at http://www.socialanarchism.org/mod/magazine/display/128/index.php.
11. D. Pepper, *Eco-socialism: From Deep Ecology to Social Justice* (London-New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 169
12. Martin (2006) provides a thorough discussion of these evidence and their relation to the anarchist conception of human nature.
13. *Ibid.*
14. For example, N. Bostrom, "Transhumanist Ethics," available at http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/transhumanist.pdf, p. 2.
15. N. Bostrom, "Transhumanist Values," in *Ethical Issues for the 21st Century*, ed. A. Frederick (Philosophical Documentation Center Press, 2004b). Available at http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/values.pdf, p. 1.
16. More, 1994.
17. D. Nelkin & M.S. Lindee, *The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon*, (New York: Freeman, 1995), quoted in M. Sagoff, "Nature and Human Nature," in *Is Human Nature Obsolete? Genetics, Bioengineering, and the Future of the Human Condition*, ed. H. W. Bailie & T. K. Casey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 71.
18. N. Bostrom, "The Future of Humanity," in *New Waves in Philosophy of Technology*, ed. J.B. Olsen & E. Selinger (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2007b), available at http://www.nickbostrom.com/papers/future.pdf, p. 16. However, note that at several points transhumanists appeal to a hypothetical analogy between education and genetic interventions at the level of human genome, in order to gain justification for the last.
19. The term "second nature" has been used in a variety of senses by thinkers such as Aristotle, Cicero, Hegel and John McDowell. For a brief historical account of the no-

tion of "second nature" see M. Gubeljic, S. Link, P. Müller, & G. Osburg, "Natur Second Nature in McDowell's Mind and World," in *John McDowell: Reason and N* ed. M. Willaschek (Lecture and Colloquium in Münster, 1999), pp. 41-43.

20. J. Hughes, "(Trans)humanism & Biopolitics," PowerPoint presentation, available at www.transhumanism.org/resources/biopolitics.ppt, slide 35.

21. World Transhumanist Association, "What is Transhumanism," Powei Presentation, available at www.transhumanism.org/resources/IntroWTA.ppt, slide 2.

22. See, for example, More, 1994.

23. A "cyborg" is defined as an organism that is a self-regulating integration tificial and natural systems. See http://en.wikipedia.org.wiki/Cyborg.

24. This is a remark made by Landon Winner in his reading of Haraway in "I tance is Futile" in Bailie & Casey, p. 402. In our view it applies to the major transhumanist writings.

25. More, 1994.

26. N. Bostrom, *The Transhumanist FAQ* (World Transhumanist Associ 2003), p. 38.

27. M. More, "Beyond the Machine: Technology and Posthuman Freedom," in *Proceedings of Ars Electronica 1997*, Ars Electronica Center, Wien (New Springer, 1994), available at http://www.maxmore.com/machine.htm.

28. *Ibid.* One could wonder: if the limits between life and non-life are so blur described, then what does the transhumanist obsession with the transcendence of stand for?

29. J. Habermas, *The Future of Human Nature* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2 pp. 47-48.

30. Sagoff, 2005.

31. Bostrom, 2003, p. 31.

32. J. Hughes, "Democratic Transhumanism," *Transhumanity* (28 April available at http://www.changesurfer.com/Acad/DemocraticTranshumanism.htm.

33. World Transhumanist Association (2002), *The Transhumanist Declar* available at http://www.transhumanism.com/declaration.htm.

34. M.A. Warren, *Moral Status, Obligations to Persons and other Living 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 51. This is discussed as the "Sentience View."

35. Hughes, 2002.

36. N. Bostrom, "Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenario Related Hazards," *Journal of Evolution and Technology* 9 (2002), availab http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html.

37. N. Bostrom, "The Future of Human Evolution," in *Death and Anti-Death Hundred Years After Kant, Fifty Years After Turing*, ed. C. Tandy (Palo Alto, CA University Press, 2004a), pp. 339-371.

38. In Bostrom (2002) he provides an estimate according to which there is than a 25 percent possibility of the described anthropogenic existential risks to realiz

39. Hughes, 2002.

40. This is our term, analogous to "misanthropy."

41. It is Habermas who argues that the "biotechnological attitude" is a categor distinct kind of action, in Habermas, 2004, p. 47.

42. Bostrom, "Transhumanist Ethics," p. 15.

43. *Ibid.*

44. For example, W. T. Anderson, *To Govern Evolution: Further Adventures of the Political Animal* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987), as discussed in M. Bookchin, "Recovering Evolution: A Reply to Eckersley and Fox," *Environmental Ethics* 12 (Fall 1990) (Online) Available at http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/Anarchist_archi ves/bookchin/recover.html.

45. Bostrom, 2003, p. 38.

46. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28.

47. In "Transhumanist Ethics," Bostrom estimates that human germ-line genetic enhancements will likely be obsolete before they have been implemented on a wide scale. In other words, the dreamed acceleration of technological progress will always widen the chasm of inequality (p. 30).

48. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

49. Bostrom, 2004a, p. 11.

50. In our understanding there is domination involved in the "production" of designer babies, due to the imposition of preferences and values upon the next generation, thus generating a form of intergenerational hierarchy.

51. Bostrom, "Transhumanist Ethics," p. 31.

52. D.M. Freeman, *Technology and Society* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 85-88, cited in L. Camacho, "On Technology and Values," in *The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas*, ed. G.F. McLean and O. Pergoraro (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989).

53. L. Mumford, *The Myth of the Machine*, vol. 1, *Technics and Human Development* (San Diego-New York-London: A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1967); J. Ellul, *The Technological Society*, trans. J. Wilkinson (New York: Vintage, 1964); M. Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1987).

54. For example, C. Glendinning, "Notes Toward a Neo-Luddite Manifesto," in *Philosophy of Technology: An Anthology*, ed. R.C. Scharff and V. Dusek (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 603-605.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 604.

56. Ellul, 1964.

57. J. Hughes, "The Politics of Transhumanism," Society for the Social Studies of Science, Cambridge, Massachusetts, October 25, 2001.

58. This is a characterization borrowed by an exceptional analysis of Critical Art Ensemble, "The Promissory Rhetoric of Biotechnology in the Public Sphere," *Digital Resistance*, Autonomedia available at http://www.critical-art.net/books/digital/index .html, p. 57, as well as Critical Art Ensemble, *The Flesh Machine*, Autonomedia, available at http://www.critical-art.net/books/flesh/index.html.

59. Bostrom, 2004a, p. 3.

60. For example, in N. Bostrom, "Dignity and Enhancement," paper commissioned for the President's Council on Bioethics, forthcoming, 2007a, p. 3.

61. For example, Hughes 2001 and 2002.

62. We skip the discussion of the fact that Bookchin has distanced himself from anarchism. See M. Bookchin, "The Communalist Project," in M. Bookchin, *Social Ecology and Communalism* (Oakland-Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007), pp. 77-116.

63. We adopt the loose characterizations of positive and negative freedom as presented by Carter. The distinction between positive and negative freedom was introduced by Sir Isaiah Berlin. See I. Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in *Political Philosophy*,

ed. A. Quinton (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), discussed in A. Carter, *A Radical Green Political Theory* (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 82-88.

64. M. Bookchin, "A Philosophical Naturalism," in M. Bookchin, *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectic Naturalism* (Montreal-New York London: Black Rose Books, 1996), pp. 1-36).

65. Pepper, p. 169.

66. For a thorough analysis of the interpretation of Kropotkin's ideas in terms of modern environmentalist perspectives, see G. Purchase, *Peter Kropotkin, Ecologist, Philosopher and Revolutionary*, Ph.D. Thesis (Sydney: The School of Philosophy, The University of New South Wales, 2003), available at www.library.unsw.edu.au/~thesis/adt-NUN/uploads/approved/adt NUN20041011.094306/public/02whole.pdf.

67. P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (London: Freedom Press, 1998), p. 5.

68. As remarked by several thinkers, see e.g., Martin, 2006, and Macauley, 1998.

69. Macauley, p. 305.

70. This is based on one of Macauley's responses to the argument of Eckersley (p. p. 306).

71. B. Garvey, *Philosophy of Biology*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), pp. 219-239.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

74. However, Keulartz insists in characterizing Bookchin's idea of human nature as "cheerful." See *The Struggle for Nature, A Critique of Radical Ecology* (New York, Routledge, 1998), p. 109.

75. Macauley, p. 305.

76. M. Bookchin, "Towards a Liberatory Technology," in M. Bookchin, *Post-Scarcity Anarchism* (Montreal-New York: Black Rose Books, 1990), pp. 105-161.

77. Carter, p. 84.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 85

79. Bookchin elaborates his liberatory proposals particularly in *The Ecology of Freedom, The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy* (Montreal-New York: Black Rose Books, 1991).

80. Glendinning, p. 604.

81. Bookchin, 1990.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

83. *Ibid.*

84. Garvey, p. 236. Garvey here discusses the relation between empirical considerations concerning human nature and ethical questions.

19

Zerzan, Primitivism, and the Value of Culture

Rodrigo Gomes Guimarães

To sow and to harvest in personal deficiencies.—Men as Rousseau know how to use their weaknesses, gaps and vices as manure for their talent, so to speak. When he laments the corruption and degeneration of society as a sad consequence of culture, this has at its base the personal experience; the bitterness of that provides sharpness to his general conviction and poisons the arrows that he shoots; he un-oppresses himself initially as an individual, and thinks about searching a remedy that is useful directly for society, but also indirectly, by the way of it, for himself.

<div align="right">—Friedrich Nietzsche</div>

What is Primitivism?

This chapter will contest primitivism by critiquing its foundations, especially as these have been established by one of its leading proponents, John Zerzan. Close attention will be paid to Zerzan's writings and other primitivist texts with a mind to unearthing their internal contradictions. The chapter also seeks to analyze primitivism as a cultural discourse with reference to a variety of social theorists including Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and several anarchist authors. We will begin our discussion by focusing on John Zerzan.

Born in Salem, Oregon, Zerzan pursued an academic career for a long while, obtaining an undergraduate degree from Stanford University and a master's degree from San Francisco State University, and completing some doctoral work at the University of Southern California before dropping out to join the countercultural movement of the 1960s. As an active member of the San Francisco counter-culture, Zerzan was willingly arrested for protesting the Vietnam

War. This experience never recurred, a fact which Zerzan regrets. Around the same time Zerzan helped organize a worker's union of which he was elected vice-president and later president. During this period he was called a "leftist bureaucrat" by a Situationist-inspired group but later became a student and devotee of Situationism himself. His subsequent discovery of the work of Fredy Perlman, David Watson, and other radicals impelled him to renounce his past: his attraction to academic life, his participation in union struggles, and his active involvement in leftist political movements. The political trajectory of John Zerzan may thus be described as a progressive negation: a progressive renunciation of his own past, of his own life. Deeply frustrated with his own political actions and the response they received, he found in primitivism a site within which to negate everything. As we shall see, this all-encompassing negation would form the heart of his political philosophy.

Over the past twenty years, Zerzan has enthusiastically developed and promoted primitivism, contributing numerous articles on the subject to *Green Anarchy, Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed, Fifth Estate*, and other American anarchist publications. He has been part of the Green Anarchy Collective, based in Eugene, Oregon, where he currently lives. His work belies a deep interest in, and knowledge of, anthropological and archaeological research and theory; it is also heavily influenced by the Luddite movement of the nineteenth century, which opposed industrialization and campaigned against rural unemployment, as evidenced most famously by their practice of machine-wrecking. Other major influences include Marxist and anarchist theory, Western critiques of capitalism, environmentalism and Deep Ecology, aboriginal studies, and, perhaps most importantly, the so-called green anarchist movement. "Green anarchism" is a catch-all term which refers to a wide range of political tendencies. It is commonly argued that primitivism is the most "radical" form of green anarchism because of its categorical rejection of all human civilization save foraging cultures and other "indigenous" cultural forms. This assertion, however, is frequently challenged by green anarchists as well as primitivists, who often argue that green anarchism has little to do with primitivism, and vice versa.

Naturism, vegetarianism, nature worship, and similar lifestyle choices/ political identities have intermittently appeared in Western societies throughout the twentieth century. Because the West Coast of the United States has long been the epicenter of such cultural forms, it comes as no surprise that primitivism has been able to flourish and establish a more or less stable home there. Although anarchism was traditionally a working class political movement, more recent anarchist movements have come to be associated with "lifestyles" of the sort described above. These newer anarchist denominations, moreover, trace their roots to earlier historical periods and frequently claim to represent "true" or "authentic" anarchism—a phenomenon all too common within sectarian politics. Though many contemporary primitivists do, in fact, abide by the lifestyle principles attributed to their forebears, others are somewhat less rigorous inasmuch as they partake of, and benefit from, many of the privileges of the American way

of life. This is partly what motivates my focus on the primitivism of John Zerzan; in order to explore primitivism in the United States, we need to take into account both primitivist philosophy (of which Zerzan is, again, the chief representative) as well as the actual lifestyle choices of those who claim allegiance to this philosophy.

The global justice movement, also known as the anti-globalization movement, has brought about a renewed interest in anarchism. This is due in part to the heightened visibility of anarchists in the media as well as the sensationalization which often accompanies coverage of their activities. It is also due, sadly, to the tragic violence that has often erupted at anarchist-led demonstrations, such as the murder of an Italian anarchist by riot police in Genoa in 2001. In the West Coast of the United States, where reformism and lifestylism have prevailed among white middle- and upper-class activists, the sensationalization and demonization of anarchist direct action (and confrontational forms of resistance to power more generally) have reinforced the long-held and deeply erroneous notion that anarchism is against everything, or, worse, that it endorses nothing save wholesale chaos and destruction.

That said, it is clear that primitivism, especially as it has been articulated by John Zerzan, is indeed a negative or negating philosophy, rejecting as it does everything but a totalized concept of "Nature." Michael Albert, an American radical and proponent of Parecon,[1] summarizes the principles of Zerzan's primitivism as follows:

> Terminating just short of this species suicide, Zerzan's agenda, or hope, seems to me to be that we should end divisions of labor, reject technology, discard institutions, silence language, eliminate numbers, reject time, and perhaps dispense consciousness—though not reproduction—returning to prehistoric relations. And the mainstream media says Zerzan is an exemplar of anarchism. No wonder.[2]

While Albert's critique of primitivism draws chiefly from the anarchist tradition of the last two centuries, my own critique proceeds through the lens of Nietzsche. Zerzan, ironically, is also fond of Nietzsche, though like the Nazis, he tends to quote Nietzsche out of context, neglecting the vastness of Nietzsche's work and instead selecting small phrases on the basis of their perceived compatibility with his own dogma (I say "ironically," of course, because Nietzsche is unquestionably one of the most anti-dogmatic thinkers in the history of Western thought). My critique is also indebted to Michel Foucault, whom Zerzan rejects outright, as well as "classical" anarchist authors such as Mikhail Bakunin. Zerzan has a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the latter, sharing Bakunin's rejection of authoritarianism but disagreeing with him on the issues of specialized knowledge, nature, and freedom, *inter alia*.

David Watson has explored the extent to which Zerzan has become more "radical" over time (though we should note in passing that that the term "radi-

cal," like most political terms, is essentially contested and so lacks a single, overarching definition). According to Watson, Zerzan and other authors such as John Moore have defined primitivism in ways that create an illusion of total coherence. In his chapter "Swamp Fever," wherein Watson seeks to distance himself from the primitivism of Zerzan and Moore, he criticizes their frequent use of "[p]hrases like 'From the perspective of anarcho-primitivism' and 'according to anarcho-primitivists'" which, he thinks, "marginaliz[e] crucial, definitive differences between ostensible members of this apocryphal school."

Primitivists have often managed to portray themselves as the *de facto* representatives of anarchism in the media, particularly after John Zerzan publicly supported Ted Kaczynski—"the Unabomber"—in a piece written for *The New York Times*.[3] Zerzan relishes media attention because, like many other Western metaphysicians, he believes that nothing can prevent Truth from gradually achieving victory once it appears. If Truth appears through destruction, so be it. If people are killed in that destruction, what a shame! All such misfires, however regrettable, are ultimately justified insofar as they are means to achieving the *telos* of history (a concept not dissimilar to that of "collateral damage" within military contexts). The idea that history progresses toward a final goal—viz., the goal of primitivism—is repeated again and again in Zerzan's writings. Simply put, the future *just is* the primitive for Zerzan. This is ironic, since many of the words and concepts here employed (history, progress, time, signification, etc.), and which Zerzan himself uses, are among those things he wishes to abolish, their abolition being necessary for primitivism to exist and flourish.

The point, in any case, is that Zerzan has effectively managed to co-opt and misdirect serious discussion on anarchism and its different legacies. To the limited extent that the media discusses anarchism, they have tended to rely on long-established prejudices and misconceptions—a tendency, again, which Zerzan has helped reinforce by making one branch of so-called "anarchism" (viz., primitivism) exhaustive of the entire anarchist tradition. The same *New York Times* piece mentioned above defined what they called "the anarchist movement" as "a small and obscure network of intellectuals, labor organizers, and political idealists who share a darkly apocalyptic view of Western civilization." This may be an apt description of Zerzan and his followers, but it is scarcely an accurate portrayal of anarchists as a whole, both in today's world and in centuries past.

Primitivism is a discursive force for the rejection of desires, and for this very same reason, as Nietzsche has shown in the case of Christianity, it establishes itself as a strong desire. In expressing desires that are regarded as shameful within contemporary Western society, primitivism provides its adherents with a feeling of independence and authenticity, especially as concerns matters of lifestyle choice. The fact that many people do not share primitivist values or else regard them as bizarre or even abhorrent reinforces the primitivists' sense of moral superiority. (This is one reason for primitivism's appeal within the media, which thrive on these sorts of conflicts.) Another reason is that primitivism establishes itself as oppositional, even though it has no party or po-

litical organization besides journals and collectives. It also wishes to be a sectarian representative of the total society, and in this way it reproduces partisan ideology. As everyone knows, partisan ideologies are fodder for media attention if anything is.

One other point we can make in relation to Zerzan and his relative success as a media spokesperson concerns his similarity to the Unabomber: they are both architects of metanarratives. For Zerzan and Kaczynski, society is a closed system, a totality. The idea that society is a closed system cannot be proved nor refuted, and from this it gathers its discursive power in a culture that prizes metanarratives. With media attention so heavily focused on the spectacular, as even Zerzan agrees, it should come as no surprise that Zerzan's call for an end to almost every aspect of social life gathers so much attention. Anything that appears as total rejection is something which the general populace, through forms of dominant culture, readily understands: it is a normalized, naturalized discourse. Zerzan claims that the postmodern critique of such forms of "opposition" renders resistance obsolete or impossible. In fact, thinkers such as Nietzsche and Foucault—if one permits me to call them "postmodern"—have emphasized that political and cultural opposition exist necessarily in every system of political and cultural hegemony. At the same time, however, they have endeavored to show that every form of resistance carries within itself the seeds of domination. The point is not that genuine political or cultural opposition is impossible; one can and should oppose in practice everything that oppresses. Rather, Nietzsche and Foucault remind us that certain forms of social discourse and action that seem liberatory are in fact repressive, or at least have the strong potential to become so. This is especially true when a particular form of discourse or action becomes dogmatic, blinding its practitioners to the internal dynamics of power and excluding new and possibly better alternatives.

Although Zerzan asserts that the "reigning culture . . . recognizes neither origins nor estrangement,"[4] I contend that it precisely because dominant culture is so enamored with stories of origins (which in turn provide certainty and the erasure of all doubt) that primitivism can be recognized as representative of anarchism. What is more, although Zerzan accuses "postmodernism" of lacking conceptual foundations, he himself is unable to provide such foundations. Most of his work attempts to establish the foundations of "civilization" which is in turn identified as the origin of global decline. For Zerzan, civilization engendered "alienation"—a Hegelio-Marxist category, incidentally—which he identifies as the major problem of contemporary social life today. Alienation can be seen in "time, language, number, art, agriculture." He also says, continuing: "On the other hand, maybe there are no foundations of alienation to be found in these categories, or anywhere else."[5] Below, we will question these foundations a bit further than Zerzan does.

Time as Refusal

Zerzan himself is ambivalent on the question of origins. He says "the beginning of time ... constitutes the Fall: the initiation of alienation, of history."[6] If alienation is the beginning of time, time is also the beginning of alienation. This is the circular reflection of Zerzan throughout all of his work. He searches for the foundations of alienation, identifies time as one of these, then rediscovers alienation, among many other things, exactly where he looked for its foundation. He searches for the familiar, and, not surprisingly, finds it. Yes, time is a cultural construct, but nothing has prevented Western anthropology, for example, from recognizing that non-Western cultures have their own constructions of time, many of which are cyclical conceptions exhibiting a link to natural, seasonal events. Even when a culture has a conception of "what kind of time" it is rather than "what time" it is, we can nonetheless understand these as different constructions of time, and through this understanding promote better cultural dialogue and ensure the survival of cultural diversity. But these are not Zerzan's concerns.

We must recognize, as Zerzan does, that many forms of social domination involve the control of time. Throughout the history of capitalism, workers have had to fight for reduction of work time. Even today most jobs prize time over worker health and capitalism still prioritizes production and profit over quality of life. The problem occurs when Zerzan equates time as such with a *specific* cultural construction of time, thereby throwing the baby out with the bathwater: "The project of annulling time and history will have to be developed as the only hope of human liberation."[7] In response, Michael Albert asks: "Why throw out the baby of productivity and individuality/diversity with the bathwater of alienation/hierarchy?"[8]

Zerzan critiques the idea of time as progressive, yet he clings to this very notion when he says, for example: "Our time on earth, characterized by the very opposite of those qualities [of primitive wholeness and grace], is in deepest need of a reversal of the dialectic that stripped the wholeness from our life as a species."[9] Thus, a reversal of time is what he asks for, even though he also wants to get rid of time. Interestingly, Nietzsche shows that the rejection of time is a fundamental characteristic of Christianity: "The 'hour of death' is *not* a Christian concept—the 'hour,' time, physical life and its crises, simply do not exist for the teacher of the 'glad tidings.'"[10] The rejection of time, therefore, is not at all new; it has been preached by Christianity in conjunction with the idea that the whole of material existence is not "as real" as spiritual existence. In rejecting the concept of time, Zerzan unwittingly reproduces the Platonic/Christian belief in the opposition of the apparent to the real, one of the main recreations of the secular Christian culture of which Zerzan is a part (though he does not reflect upon it).

Certain aspects of Zerzan's critique are valid, as when he inveighs against the introduction of the use of clocks. To be sure, time as managed by clocks has

made possible very serious forms of domination, including time-sensitive con-
tracts and production schedules that are opposed to real social necessities and
people's actual desires. If "revolution can only be redefined against progress"[11]
as he claims, Zerzan succeeds at redefining revolution—albeit in a very reactive
way—and therefore reproduces the very same power relations he critiques. In
fact Zerzan goes the other way by redefining revolution against progress alone,
thereby forgetting that revolution is based on social and environmental needs
that change, as society and nature inexorably do, from place to place, no matter
how universal a struggle might be. Finally, why is opposition to progress the
same thing as limiting the search for liberatory actions to the past (or to the be-
yond, the future) and not present? Why is there such an all-out negation of the
present in Zerzan's primitivism?

The Real of Language

We surely can agree with Nietzsche, as cited by Zerzan, that "words dilute and
brutalize; words depersonalize; words make the uncommon common." How-
ever, Nietzsche could very well have ended his commentary by saying:
"nevertheless, words are necessary, and violence towards them is necessary to
make them say what one wishes." For Zerzan, language is "artificial communi-
cation."[12] But if this is so, why should we believe anything that he writes? He
notes that there are two kinds of human experience: the immediate, non-separate
reality, and separate, mediated experience. He recognizes that time and language
are historical and cultural constructions, but does this in order to claim a higher
order of being whence all forms of mediation fade away and all contingencies
disappear. For Zerzan, reality as the natural must be actualized the annihilation
of the unnatural. Language itself would be cast aside in favor of an alternative
natural and universal communication, since all forms of language allegedly lead
to thought-control, domestication, and a "world of unfreedom."[13]

Expectations of a "real"[14] language have circulated within anarchist circles
throughout the world for a long time. In Brazil this language was believed to be
Esperanto, created in 1887 and heralded as an international *lingua franca* to be
used for cross-cultural communication. Some anarchists in Brazil and other
countries argued that the use of Esperanto would somehow make people more
free. It was a high expectation to be assigned to language alone. Clearly this
belies a preoccupation with the extent to which power and domination both
work upon and through language. However, the critique is ultimately a bridge
too far, creating many more problems than it seeks to solve; it becomes a me-
chanism for suppressing cultural differences, for example, in willing that the
whole world should learn to speak a single language. But if it is true that lan-
guage grants a certain amount of power to the bearer of language, then even the
primitivist assumes power for herself in referring to language and culture as

"Civilization" and "Civilization" as "domination." Thus, even the act of identifying "Civilization" as "domination," insofar as it involves the taking up of power and the exercise of power, is itself domination. The primitivist cannot articulate her critique of domination without engaging in an inherently dominatory act—the act of speaking itself.

In Zerzan's work, thought, language, and culture are all forms of "mediation" which distort the true essence of nature (human and otherwise). If the world outside of the self is problematic, and if there are ways that this external world obstructs the true vision and experience of the world, what we need to do is to annihilate these external maladies. When we do so, only the "good" human nature will remain and "direct experience" will triumph over "mediated experience." Such a possibility is founded on belief in continuous history, a "system of thought" explained by Foucault:

> Continuous history is the indispensable correlative of the founding function of the subject: the guarantee that everything that has eluded him will be restored to him; the certainty that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity; the promise that one day the subject—in the form of historical consciousness—will once again be able to appropriate, to bring back under his sway, all those things that are kept at a distance by difference, and find in them what might be called his abode. Making historical analysis the discourse of the continuous and making human consciousness the original subject of all historical development and all actions are the two sides of the same system of thought. In this system, time is conceived in terms of totalization and revolutions are never more than moments of consciousness.[15]

For primitivists, the world is filled with choices among continuous possibilities of life. These continuous possibilities exist in a culture that possesses a "system of thought" in which life appears primarily as defined by consciousness. Some choose domestication, the division of labor, and technology (the False Path), whereas others refuse these continuous possibilities, choosing instead to restore its original purity (the True Path). This is what I shall call "The Great Division" of primitivism. It is based on a cultural characteristic of Western culture—its fundamental tendency toward dualism.[16] Because Zerzan speaks from within a dualist discourse, a Western discursive practice,[17] he is legitimated by it and reproduces the very dimensions of reality he critiques—dimensions of reality to which we all belong precisely because there is no possibility of discussing them outside of language. By critiquing the fundamental dualism of Descartes' mind/body split, Zerzan shows his own alliance to this tradition, his continuity with it. He and many other primitivists fail to reflect upon their own cultural upbringing. For them, the human being is born natural, suffering from childhood an abandonment of the natural path of life. All that is recognized by Zerzan as "the right way to live" is declared instinctual, while all that is not is artificial. Thus he plays right into the most fundamental dualisms of modern philosophy

from at least since Descartes until today. In order to play the game of contemporary human science, in order for knowledge to be recognized as legitimate, it has to speak in terms of these dualisms—*innate vs. acquired, nature vs. culture, heredity vs. upbringing*, etc.—and thus to reproduce them.

Changes can and do occur in cultural matters. But to position oneself as reacting against Western dualism, is ultimately to reproduce this same discourse and its practices. When Zerzan states that his thought is a better configuration of Western dualistic interpretations of the world, he only rearranges the discourse, which otherwise remains embedded within his thought. Holistic or total representations of reality, in departing from Western dualisms and their metaphysics, can only promise to keep dualisms alive in discourse and in practical life. It is in practice that the problems posed by dualisms must be challenged, as practical problems, not as problems of language.

Zerzan's critiques go very much hand in hand with what he dismisses. Poststructuralist—or postmodern, as he prefers to call it—thought has rendered problematic the notion that time, space, culture, language, etc. are stable or essential Zerzan, however, cannot live in an unstable or contingent world; he wants a new and cozy theory. He says "the origin of all symbolizing is alienation."[18] He denies all symbolic culture, and through this fails to perceive how symbolism is exactly why some cultures have tended to revere natural ecosystems and take care of them, whether consciously or not. As Brian Oliver Sheppard[19] cunningly noted, Zerzan's assertion that language is a form of alienation tries in the end to alienate every response to this very claim. Zerzan wishes to deny language while playing with it, and this because he fears being refuted. He wants to denigrate reason in order to cling to his convictions. This, as Nietzsche shows, is to believe in absolute truth and to provoke violence as an effect.[20] To consider culture as only symbolic is to believe in the cultural universal; it is not to understand cultures as composed of social practice, complex and irreducible to a unified narrative. It is to do metaphysics, a very specific—Western—cultural practice that seeks to speak for all (and therefore to do violence to cultural difference).

On the "Primitive"

The discourse of the "primitive" relies on Western perceptions of itself in order to define, to construct its Other, the "primitive."[21] The notion of the "Primitive" is a cultural bias origination in Western colonization. In this discourse, a self is constructed for the "primitive" through an oppositional, dualistic, and metaphysical logic even as another one is constructed for the Westerner, who many times is the occult subject, or logic, in narratives. This logic functions not only in the construction of the "primitive," but of the "Oriental"[22] as well, besides many other constructions of identities. The "whole" is an assumption of human

experience, the "oceanic,"[23] a discourse that is very present in New Age, mostly white-privileged culture.

Zerzan uses the concept "primitive"—a big bulk to put wholly different ethnicities and cultures inside—in opposition to "Civilization." This is a discourse that dominated until the 1970s but has since been replaced both in anthropology and archaeology by particular regional, ethnic, and cultural studies. Zerzan thus brings to the twenty-first century an obsolete discourse with roots in late nineteenth-century colonialism. Primitivism cannot achieve its vision of a total return to "primitive" life because it cannot come to terms with the pleasure many people—especially the socially and economically privileged—experience living in so-called "Civilization." Primitivism claims that "play, freedom, affluence"[24] are only possible in the "Paradise Lost" of Civilization. In fact, they are not only possible but real for many people in the world (however small this group may be in comparison to the the rest of the global population). The failure to recognize—or should we say, the denial of—this fact is a fundamental problem for primitivism.

Hunter-Gatherers or Gatherer-Hunters?

Sure, we want more play, joy, nature—many of us do, at least. And sure, images of a very different form of life refresh our imagination and have done so since the first encounters between different cultures. We can learn a lot from other cultures: how to think, to live, to relate to nature, etc., and that is why, after graduating with a degree in ecology, I went on to study anthropology (which Zerzan likes very much, though he is guilty that it is written in "civilized" language). Anthropology, perhaps more so than any other academic discipline, has taught us to understand difference in complex ways. It has taught us that any name we may give to a group, any attempt to label or describe human communities always fails to accomplish its task satisfactorily. Human cultures are internally divergent, and many cultures or societies that look and sound alike have similar customs, etc., may nonetheless diverge radically on specific points. This is why the task of the anthropologist nowadays has become extremely difficult and problematic, and has been reevaluated in many ways.[25]

Within current discussions of anthropology, it is not wholly acceptable to say that "forager band and agriculturalist village are opposed societies with opposed values."[26] This is to disregard cultural variety, since many other cultural forms exist, and resource use is not the only possible characterization of societies. Many societies were and are real hunter-gatherers which place foremost emphasis on hunting, such as the Shavante, with whom I lived between 1999 and 2000. This culture, however marginalized by Brazilian society and rendered sedentary by force at least from the 1960s, maintains a tradition of hunting from time immemorial. In the 1950s, when the Shavante were still a nomadic people,

anthropologist David Maybury-Lewis noted: "I have never met a Shavante who would not drop everything to go after wildpig and Pahiriwa was no exception."[27] The Shavante are also a very warlike people and have managed to survive until this day with a considerable population (more than ten thousand people) in great part because of their fierceness.

Life with the Shavante is hard. Today, everything is changing and culture does not fare well in the face of these changes, whether imposed or availed by interethnic contact. Maybury-Lewis describes his experience:

> I sometimes felt, when I was alone with the Shavante encampment, like a limpet on a rock. The whole universe seemed to be made up of hardness. The ground we slept on was hard. The food we ate was hard and had to be torn apart by fierce teeth or held captive in the mouth and sawn off with a knife. The glare was hard by day and the cold was hard by night. The ways were hard to travel, hard underfoot as we approached high summer and hard to tear a path through.[28]

Compare the fieldwork of anthropologists with the imagination of Zerzan, which follows another path: "Eden was clearly the home of the hunter-gatherers and the yearning expressed by the historical images of paradise must have been that of disillusioned tillers of the soil for a lost life of freedom and relative ease."[29] Zerzan wants us to believe that foragers always lived peaceful lives, with no war or struggles for foraging territories or group conflicts, plus a life of comfort. Nevertheless, conflict in hunter-gatherer societies not only has existed between different ethnicities, but also, and sometimes chiefly, between political/familial groups of the same ethnicity. Maybury-Lewis—and I as well during my stay with the Shavante—witnessed conflict between different families of the same ethnic group. A major anthropological work on the subject of tribal wars was written by Lawrence H. Keeley, who affirms: "Even today, most views concerning prehistoric (and tribal) war and peace reflect two ancient and enduring myths: progress and the golden age."[30] Zerzan harshly critiques the former, only to embrace the latter. The myth of progress is the belief that in the primitive condition, violence, war, and ignorance prevailed. It is the belief of Hobbes. On the other hand, the myth of the golden age presupposes a Fall from natural grace. It is the myth of Montaigne, Rousseau, and present-day romantics such as Zerzan. They can be precisely defined as myths if by this we mean a full-blown exaggeration suited to a particular tradition (of thought in those examples).

We need not enter into detail here regarding the relationships between these myths. Suffice it to say that Rousseau's Noble Savage was a direct, reactive response to Hobbes. It was created as an oppositional myth. If Hobbes contended that humans are naturally cruel, Rousseau responded that at bottom, in its natural state, the human being is gentle. As Keeley showed, peaceful societies cannot be claimed as having been the norm in human history. Perhaps quite the contrary is true. Even the !Kung bushmen of the Kalahari Desert, much acclaimed by Zer-

zan as a peaceful people, had a "homicide rate from 1920 to 1955 [that] was four times that of the United States and twenty to eighty times that of major industrial nations during the 1950s and 1960s."[31] Between war and peace there is much variation, and it is hard to define when one begins and the other ends in many cases, particularly with regards to people that don't exist anymore and that left almost nothing—sometimes nothing at all—of vestige.

As a book that covers current anthropological knowledge of hunter-gatherer societies makes clear, academics are aware that the "hunter-gatherer" concept is problematic as an object of knowledge. They have come to the conclusion that "such an *invented category* has produced sufficient insights for CHAGS[32] conferences to continue!"[33] In fact, if the category "hunter-gatherers" has provided any benefit at all, it is with respect to actions directed towards the societies thus labeled, most of all research and forums of discussion that have taken place. There is no consensus, however, on what constitutes a "hunter-gatherer society" within academia; there is only a discourse produced around it, (re)producing institutions and social actions towards the alleged "hunter-gatherers."

The same book includes an article by Mark Pluciennik which shows how the interest in "subsistence-based societies" has been pervasive in European culture and not in other cultures, and how this has to do precisely with European myths of progress and salvation. Other cultures in Asia for example do not necessarily believe in a unilinear, progressive history. The high interest in "hunter-gatherer societies" as symbolic of an Other began with European discourses on progress. It is tainted with this origin and so today, every time one discusses those societies as examples, a whole history of economic narratives (or the lack thereof) is reborn. In other words, everything those so-called hunter-gatherers represent comes to life whenever they are discussed. Thus, calling another society—even a non-existent one—"gatherer-hunter"[34] an example for the world is actually a discourse that can have power only in cultures where the preconditions for this belief already exist. Western capitalist societies are particularly prone to the images of "hunter-gatherers" or "gatherer-hunters," because economic development has helped define their identities. Non-Western and semi-Westernized societies with less economic development will pretty much continue to ignore primitivism, as they have already been doing.

Primitivists argue that prehistoric cultures represent anarchy (meaning that they are examples of anarchism in practice—not to be replicated, so much as emulated). Primitivist John Moore, for example, says: "Although primitive cultures provide intimations of the future, and that future may well incorporate elements derived from those cultures, an anarcho-primitivist world would likely be quite different from previous forms of anarchy." Primitivism is not wholly flawed in romanticizing prehistoric and native cultures. In looking to indigenous cultures for examples, there is not only a critique of existing cultures—particularly those geared toward capitalism—that need to change so as to make life better for more people, but also a genuine concern for the survival of cultural diversity. However, there is also an outright disrespect for cultural diversity

in claiming to know "the right way to live" that is particularly violent in Zerzan's dogmatic morality—a morality of cultural disintegration.

Civilization and Industrialism

In his critique of industrialism Zerzan is of a piece with with Derrick Jensen, who has been very influential in primitivist circles. Zerzan also imitates Jensen's writing style, which interweaves different ideas and speculations about aspects of Western culture, bringing in indigenous life as a foil to it owing to its allegedly direct access to natural truth. Zerzan, to say the least, uses Civilization as an all-encompassing, catch-all term for everything he regards as disposable, false, and/or dominating. By doing this (also to say the least) he fails to specify practices with relation to their cultural field. Therefore, when he says that "Nietzsche saw the training of memory, especially the memory of obligations, as the beginning of civilized morality," he forgets—better, he denies naming this morality for its proper category, Christian morality, and thus is violent to Nietzsche and to non-Christian cultures. Again, it could not be otherwise, since he is not preoccupied with cultural difference.

Feral Faun, a primitivist author, describes Civilization as "everything that comes between us and the direct, participatory experience of the wild world."[35] For him, Civilization impedes "a life filled with intense pleasure and wild adventure." In order to affirm this, one has to disregard that capitalism does not, in fact, completely impede pleasure and adventure. It even encourages these very images, judging by how many people regard themselves as living exactly by these standards (e.g., TV hosts of tourism, adventure, or other shows). Movies push these buttons all the time. Primitivists will argue here that these are false versions of pleasure and adventure. In this, however, they fail to recognize that the sense of pleasure and adventure derived, say, from hunting a wild boar, is also present within capitalism. Therefore, primitivist images of wild life do not constitute a different discourse; they are within capitalist discourse. Their claims about about wild life, moreover, remain vague because most people in the world will not have the same images of a life filled with pleasure and adventure that primitivists have. We must also ask how much of the wish for these things was instigated by capitalism itself, for the same people that argue for primitivism have for the most part very pleasurable—or at least privileged—lives.

The negative use of the term "Civilization" is a reactive response to its traditional use as an index of all that was considered positive by European elites, at least since the end of the 18th century.[36] It was originally used to refer to positive aspects of European life and was constructed in opposition to barbarism or savagery, which were supposedly negative and inferior. What primitivism does is to use this discourse, constructed by European colonialism, and invert it. This

inversion, in Nietzsche's account, is an aspect of "slave morality."[37] It is simple reactionary force and, to this extent, does not transvaluate the values of colonialism and European culture; it simply uses them differently. Primitivism does not reflect on its cultural origins. As a distinguished Brazilian thinker, Paulo Freire, would say: "those who don't reflect, repeat."

Zerzan shows there is no foundation for equivalence between Civilization and domination—or rather, he claims one foundation, only to claim later that there is another foundation:

> There hasn't been unanimity as to civilization's most salient characteristic. . . .
> But domestication stands behind all these manifestations, and not just the taming of animals and plants, but also the taming of human instincts and freedoms.
> . . . To name, to number, to time, to represent – symbolic culture is that array of masteries upon which all subsequent hierarchies and confinements rest.[38]

Since his mission is to destroy domination, and since he cannot find an adequate singular foundation for it, his way out has been to call every partial foundation an aspect of Civilization and every aspect of Civilization a form of domination. Within actions proposed against Civilization, the revolt against industrialism is a must for primitivists. This is best represented for Zerzan by the Luddites, "groups of English workers that, between 1811 and 1816, rebelled and destroyed textile machines, for they believed that they were responsible for unemployment."[39] Zerzan asserts, however, that the resistance to work was also resistance to discipline, to the control of time and spontaneity. The Luddites were already familiar with unionism but many rejected it. Their "machine-breaking of this period cannot be viewed as the despairing outburst of workers having no other outlet."[40] For Zerzan, the Luddites serve as an example of "calling the whole of capitalism into question."[41] Is this a surplus claim with regard to the Luddites? The Luddites represented, for Zerzan, the negation of centralized organization and resistance. However, there is little evidence today that can confirm this, for a reason similar to the problem of the hunter-gatherers Zerzan likes: they are all dead, cannot speak for themselves, cannot be interviewed. By his rejection of command, Zerzan can be called a proper twenty-first-century anarchist, since much of anarchist discourse today, especially in the United States, is centered on "spontaneous organization." It is the politics of This versus That, of Spontaneity versus Command. This politics certainly has its important effects, but also its limits of action, as any politics. More importantly for our analysis of Zerzan's theory is the fact that to avow spontaneity is a form of political discourse—thus his call for the dissolution of politics cannot be sustained in his own social practice.

Murray Bookchin, expressing a major problem within anarchism today said: "I have seen anarchists disrupt meetings and even break them up because they objected to orderly discussion."[42] Lifestyle anarchists are against any organization (though many still organize collectives, journals and websites) because they

cannot stand to bear their own hypocrisy of egotistic non-participation. Primitivism argues for the abolition of work as a means to justify its apathy and disengagement from the problems of actual communities and social groups that need active alliances, especially participatory ones.

Zerzan shares with Marx the assumption that divided labor is a fundamental aspect of domination. He writes about the "inner logic of civilization, which is, at bottom, division of labor."[43] While Marx stressed this point in order to critique class domination and believed that division of labor would be washed away by the progressive history of capitalist development, Zerzan—perhaps reacting to Marx—denies that more is better. On this account, history has proven him at least partially correct, since capitalist development has not led to more workers' organization and the appropriation of the means of production in any international, sustainable way. Division of labor, and its corollary, alienation, have brought about problems that require change. This change certainly does not have to be final, and it would be delusional to think that in human matters anything is. We certainly do not depend on any one social theory in order to act for social change, though thinking is always necessary. Zerzan's most scathing critique of Marx is this: "Despite his analysis of alienated labor, much of the explicit core of his philosophy is virtually a consecration of work as tyranny."[44] Division of labor makes the worker weak, dependent, and subordinate. Anarchists can agree to this. But anarchism also has shown that not all work is monotonous or assembly-line, as Zerzan believes. Zerzan's failure to realize that work involves pleasure for many people—however few or privileged, or however few examples of anarchist work we have—challenges any critique of work as bad *per se*. To understand work without understanding the pleasure involved for many is the same as trying to understand crime in societies without understanding that there is also pleasure involved in many crimes.

Another major critique Zerzan makes of industrialism is when he echoes the ecological movements in their critiques of environmental devastation, of consumerism, of production for its own sake. He shows that consumerism and production are not advances of society, or progress in itself, that they were pursued consciously and instigated. Needs are fabricated, even the need for specific kinds of food are instigated and promoted, and advertisers know this all too well.[45] Industrialization creates its own markets.[46] This is known by many environmentalists, of course, but to deal with the environmental problems of today, which are real, Zerzan has only one solution: to go primitive—his one and only solution for everything. Since he sees the Problem as one thing, Solution will also be one for each and every problem human societies have created. To argue for a limit to profit, to a negotiation on real people's needs with regards to production, would be regarded by Zerzan as reform, not revolution, and therefore as unworthy. On this subject, it is worth citing his colleague Derrick Jensen:

> The whole reform versus revolution question is just bullshit because if we all
> sit around and wait and plan and get ready for the great warrior's revolution

there's going to be nothing left once we get there. At the same time, if all we do is reform work there's nothing going to be left anyway.[47]

Art and Religion

Desire, in discourse, is a claim that cannot be easily contested. Because desire is a part of human interiority we only have limited access to it. Therefore, any claim made about human desires is unfalsifiable because, if we are to believe Freud, desire is linked to unconscious elements. And since the unconscious is unknowable, so is desire. For Zerzan, we will have "art refused in favor of the real,"[48] since for him art is a false relation to reality: nature is the domain of the True. Art is False. Nietzsche, one of Zerzan's favorite thinkers, prefers art to truth claims. When Nietzsche says this, he means that truth claims are dangerous and a will to power, primitivist claims to truth included. Zerzan misreads Nietzsche for his own ends, and this is why he says that art is a consolation that takes the place of "the genuine article."[49] However, Nietzsche views art as power externalized; that which makes something truly genuine for someone is the way it corresponds to her will to power. Instead of asking "Is this true?" like all metaphysical culture has done, Nietzsche asks "What is the value of this truth?" "Who speaks and what does it want from its truth claim?" Art is certainly not neutral, and speaking and writing are forms of art, in Nietzsche's understanding. Therefore, the will to truth is will to power, in Zerzan's work. And power, as truth, has multiple and contradictory effects that are both liberatory and dominating, as Foucault makes clear. Art is not, and cannot be by its nature, simply dominating, as Zerzan claims. That is why Nietzsche preferred the "artist" to the "man of convictions."

Zerzan reactively inverts the value art has for today's common Westerners. Art has been traditionally discussed in the West as opposed to science. Thus if science in the Western world has spoken for absolute truth (and Zerzan likes this very much, especially when a certain truth serves his taste), art has been speaking for deceit and ambiguity and—what is reprehensible for Zerzan—it has also symbolized various aspects of life. In this symbolization, art has helped to commodify life, with its various effects, and in this regard Zerzan is somewhat coherent in his analysis when he writes that "today culture is commodity and art perhaps the star commodity."[50] One can hardly disagree, if thinking from within anarchism, with his contention that "the critique must be of culture itself, not of its alleged control." This, again, would be to throw the baby (culture, including liberation within it) away with the bathwater (forms of cultural domination). Art has been responsible for enlivening liberatory movements worldwide, including the hippie, anti-war movement Zerzan was a part of. Art includes the power to represent, and therefore to represent resistance, and to embody it in a collective force.

Zerzan conflates art, religion, language and culture as "symbolization." He does this, he says, because they all depart from reality, they miss it. Actually, there are many understandings of symbol as referring directly to reality. Zerzan wants to negate symbols, but he has to say they exist to claim they must go. He makes no effort, however, to show what thought or communication is without symbols or language, except when he refers to telepathy as such an example. Clearly, here is another indication that Zerzan does not find any allies in his rally against symbolization. At least Derrick Jensen, when searching for the root of all cultural domination in culture, identifies Western culture as the greatest threat to nature rather than Culture *per se*.[51] To speak of Culture without defining it is to make an abstraction *ad absurdum*.

The undefinability of the concept of art is common contemporary element. Art is not an object in the sense of a definable social practice anymore, since the object of art can be almost anything today, and almost any material can be made into an art object. However, in order to make his critique work, Zerzan needs to reactivate the sense of art as object with definable characteristics. To be able to critique art, postmodern artists sometimes even ignored the concept altogether. Contrary to this trend, Zerzan needs to believe in art as a universal in order to critique it. He reproduces the very same notions of art and culture as universals in his critiques of them. This is where he starts from in all his critiques: at base culture, art, religion, language, etc. are universals that enable his critique as such. His belief in Utopia also stems from his universalism. All kinds of Utopian myths or discourses are for him evidence of the same needs and desires: a longing of a period of non-Civilization. That different cultures express these "places" differently does not matter. Differences in the content or uses of myths never enter into his deliberations. Clearly, if the longing of different cultures for a better life appears to Zerzan as the same longing, he must be indifferent to cultural difference as a whole. What if cultural difference was an inextricable link to understanding ecological variation and the promotion of biodiversity, as Ethnoecology has been claiming for decades now? Universalism is neither a base on which to fully understand cultural desires for a better world, nor a way for different cultures to have their survival and living strategies unmistakably respected. Resistance always bearing the mark of universality is a creed of Enlightenment heritage that today still proves its strengths and weaknesses in social practices. Within anarchism, so-called "post-anarchist" authors, with their own strengths and weaknesses, have questioned the basis on which anarchism reproduces the subject of the Enlightenment and its effects.[52]

There is clearly a problem with the rush to so-called progress without environmental and social accountability. Our industrial *apparati* have obviously been devastating resources and the lives of communities worldwide. Technology has been claimed as a solution to everything. There certainly are forms of culture to critique, within these preoccupations. We may generalize in our critiques, and in this we will always be putting different vegetables in the same bundle,

some of them clean, some poisonous. Can alliance with people's concerns, care with people's needs, and engagement with suffering, hardship, day-to-day necessities exist within a renewed anarcho-primitivism? I believe it can only if anarcho-primitivism is critically revised and starts its preoccupations with social change from real life and not from Utopian futures, refusing to aggressively and irresponsibly charge others, whose life maybe primitivists know nothing about, with the toil of making life better.

Primitivism as it exists today could only have gained such voice and support from California, one of the richest places in the world. It is only from a privileged standpoint that a primitivism can regard anarchy as living in our bones and claim, at the same time, that we've somehow been led astray. The Zerzanian critiques of Reason, Linear Time and Progress, by producing a reactive account of human life and of the "correct" way to live, reproduce the very same actions in the world that it critiques. "Civilization is a huge target" say many primitivists. That is all it really is, nothing much. "Organic anarchy" is the myth many want to replace Civilization. This would entail the destruction of all forms of culture, leaving the Noble Savage alone in his natural state. The idea of a Savage without culture itself belies the prejudicial cultural belief that cultures does not exist within "less civilized" societies. In anthropology, such notions have long been debased, since there is no clear idea as to when nature ceases and culture begins in human action.[53] Perhaps we will never be able understand this split, or the lack of it, since the scientific exploration of human behavior is always and already situated within, and so partially determined by, social, cultural, political, and historical context. No human science is a neutral science, thus Zerzan is partially right in saying "neutral" universal principles came to the fore to justify increased coercion. However, even "neutrality" is not an object with an intentionality of its own: in itself it does not produce an automatic effect of domination. Cultural, political, historical contexts are important in defining the effects of knowledge. No one cultural assertion—whether to neutrality or otherwise—can speak for itself. But this is to speak about the relative unpredictability of the effects of social actions, something of which Zerzan is not very fond. Like a metaphysician, he is keen on full predictability.

Anthropology, or the discourse of cultural difference, cannot escape its impossible objectivity and inevitable unpredictability.[54] "Freedom" and "state of nature" are synonyms for primitivists and this is their culturally established language for things. They are not wrong, in the moral sense, but they are not right either. Since freedom and nature differ with culture, they have never been, and probably never will be, defined or practiced in the same manner universally. This does not mean, though, that we do not need to discuss the nature of freedom or of nature itself. Since they are never totally and finally established (Mikhail Bakunin for example believed freedom was an ongoing process), we will always have things to do, to struggle for, and that is for many a blessing of life, not a curse of it. Zerzan preaches the immortality of freedom and of truth. This is one of the main foundations of Christianity, the effect of which is to cre-

ate a cult around himself The cult to his self, his "soul," is the effect of his demonizing of culture: "Salvation of the soul—in plain words: the world revolves around me."[55]

Agriculture and Technology

Zerzan wrote: "Agriculture is the triumph of estrangement and the definite divide between culture and nature and humans from each other," it is "that duality that cripples the soul of our being."[56] For him, agriculture is at the origin of culture as the domestication of animals and plants, which progressed to the domestication of humans. As I have argued above, following contemporary anthropological knowledge, the divide between nature and culture is an abstraction, a tentative grab of truth where nothing can be finally established. To state that agriculture is at the beginning of culture is scientifically flawed and reductionist (remember that Zerzan dislikes science but still uses it). Nor can culture be reduced to a Durkheimian discourse, as coercion only (the old sociological perspective). Although cultural acts have always had reasons of power, this does not mean they have all been consciously chosen by, or consciously known to, people. Were it so, Zerzan would not make the mistake, as he does so many times, of decrying technology, culture, language and industry through technological, cultural, linguistic, and industrial media.

But Zerzan can't really decide if time, language, number and art brought agriculture about, or if agriculture brought them about. As with all of his arguments on origins, the origin of agriculture blurred together with the origins of everything else he critiques. His important and relevant critique for today is of conventional agriculture, however shallow it is. It is now an established ecological fact that the standardization of the landscape cuts off the biological diversity necessary for the continuous flux of energy, material, and life. The problem with caring for the environment has been mostly how to apply knowledge, how to propose alternatives, and how to act on ecological issues that differ from place to place and society to society. Zerzan wants nothing to do with this because he is too busy waiting for a primitivist revolution that will never come. The division of labor brought with it new forms of domination. Modern farming brought with it an unprecedented devastation of forest and green areas, soil depletion, and pollution. Zerzan is aware of this, but then so are a great number of school children around the world.

Zerzan believes that technology began with agriculture. He also regards technology as inherently oppressive. Yet he contradicts himself when he accepts Permaculture as a collection of "simple techniques" to live, for example, "as in a garden."[57] Surely Zerzan grants that humans might have a need for techniques to make life easier and better, and Permaculture has certainly been proving itself an interesting and ecologically-friendly conjunction of such techniques. But most

of the time he asserts that technology, and all forms of technique as well, are perverse because they allegedly reproduce the values of society and of culture. Societies cannot exist without values. All societies have values, and all technology is imbued with values, but are social and technological values necessarily contrary to life or oppressive by definition? Granted, technology can be regarded as external to things and to people—at least there is no magical way to do away with this thought. Sometimes external character of technology is over-signified, particularly when an authoritarian component is claimed to be present in technology. Technological advancement is surely to blame for a great part of environmental degradation, pollution, loss of contact with natural surroundings in all urban centers of the globe, etc. Zerzan certainly does not exaggerate in his analysis of environmental destruction. The market, commodification, the transformation of everything into a medium of exchange: all enhance consumerism and production not based on actual needs of people. Natural energy and material things are given quantitative and utilitarian value. These problems have to do with how technology has come to be produced, organized, and put to work in capitalism, that is to say, with a very low or absent consideration for the environment or for people's long-term needs. The critique is coherent and relevant. What most people tend to disagree about is what to do about this, and in all events it's never as simple as being "for" or "against" technology *as such*. To be "against" technology would seem to involve preventing other people from *building* technology. Otherwise, as we will discuss below, it is to believe in the primacy of human interiority over the external world.

For Zerzan, technology is an expression of class domination. In capitalism it has been geared towards making profit, and thus it does have a class rule component. Depending on the technology we point to, some, such as agribusiness machines, have certainly been built on the basis of profit and class rule. Technology is not neutral, not merely a tool. On this, anarchists will agree. Technology is not something over which one can have full control. Zerzan claims it can be controlled (although he watches television because he needs to be narcotized, he says).

Zerzan and the Power-Vacuum: Anarchist?

Zerzan clings to the notion of power as repression. He writes that "quantity has been mastering us,"[58] thus showing that the subjective or qualitative realm has no genuine place in his understanding of power. He demonstrates that he is not free from objectivism, positivism, and the negation of subjectivity, even though he repeatedly critiques all three orientations throughout his work. This happens because, in his thinking, subjectivity cannot be rejected, only approved; its essence is true and positive by definition. If something is to be rejected, it must have come from the exteriority of subjectivity. If something such as an apprecia-

tion for a form of art exists, for Zerzan this came from an exterior imposition of Civilization, not from any interior sense. In this fashion, he negates everything that cannot fit his theory, which posits a human interiority devoid of instincts for language, culture, art, or any form or craftsmanship. These, he claims, are all products of alienation.

Alienation is certainly real and appears in most or all capitalist relationships. It is real, although it is not an explanation for everything, since its understanding depends on the situated-ness of the subject within real social, cultural, historical, economic, and political contexts. Ironically the people labeled "alienated" have had little say in this labeling within many liberatory discourses. In many ways, postmodern thought has been—and Zerzan is right in saying this—a continuation of alienation: first, because it infuses specialization linked to capitalist production with a new impetus. Particularly, it does this when it tries to negate wants and desires of total understandings and practices towards life. When participating in current discussions about resistance and identity, for example, we must realize that people many times need to assert their totalizing views on resistance and identity, however partial, problematic, and even authoritarian these might be to other standpoints and realities. In order to defend what matters to people, many groups and communities have constructed meta-narratives on the way. In this chapter, for example, I give myself this permission by allowing it to say more than it should say for the sake of difference and cultural understanding. However, who first thought that cultural differences and their encounters really need to always be gentle? Colonization, for example, was certainly considered gentle before, during, and after it happened.[59]

Zerzan attacks Michel Foucault, as many contemporary scientists have done, for not providing a macropolitical analysis or the correct path to resistance. In a somewhat anarchistic manner, Foucault openly rejected such paths, which would have been easy and yet utterly problematic. He respected the reader's ability to make his own path through the power relations he came to analyze. But Foucault cannot be blamed for the reification of "micropolitics" and the "decentered subject" that is happening within postanarchism and postmodern thought. In another chapter, I wrote:

> That power is not formed by a simple opposition between rulers and ruled, that it relates to other forms of sociability, and that it is always already historical and therefore non-subjective in the sense of a subject as origin, are all contributions made by Foucault to broader definitions of power. Postanarchist authors have regarded these definitions as *truly* anarchist, as if anarchism had been waiting for its own revelation in history of its true self.[60]

Foucault was mostly preoccupied in destabilizing particular power relations, not in providing a framework within which to criticize all power relations in all institutions. He aimed, in large part, to understand how specific forms of

subjectivity are formed within power relations and truth discourses. To be so-
cialized into any act or form of subjectivity is the greatest nightmare for Zerzan.
The external world determining the internal: that is his foremost fear. Unfortu-
nately he can do nothing about it, because the external and the internal are not
without relations. On the other hand, many primitivists tend to recognize that
domination does not amount to a center. They may just be showing that they,
too, contradict themselves, like everyone else. Or perhaps they are recognizing
the limits of discourse, their own included, in explaining freedom. In this regard,
Feral Faun writes that there is "no single center that can be overthrown," which
is consistent with a Foucauldian view of domination and power relations.[61]

The most absurd aspect of Zerzan's view of power is that he fails to per-
ceive (in part because of his fixed definition of organization-as-domination) that
primitivism, in order to create a revolution, needs more organization than has
ever been imagined by radicals, with the exception perhaps of those who pro-
pose total collective suicide. This organization is more radical than a normal
collective organization in the sense that it is self-organization, springing from
individuals. However, for this reason it is dependent on a spontaneity never seen
in the world, through which the whole world would be changed. Faun, in accor-
dance with this view, says: "In a very general way, we know what we want. We
want to live as wild, free beings in a world of wild, free beings."[62] All we can
say is "Go Ahead!" However, these primitivists might claim that if a large part
of the world does not destroy industrialism, the revolution might amount to very
little, and they are right. They will wait, then, until a large part of the world
spontaneously, and without considerable organization, decides to go primitive.
They will wait until everyone acts on "feelings and experiences,"[63] oblivious to
the fact that these same foundations of theirs are always partially constructed by
Civilization, or by any culture, and are not just "givens" of a Nature that has its
own divine intentionality. Zerzan prescribes the way to a primitivist revolution
through "the personal" which is for him, "of course the real terrain of revolu-
tionary axis."[64] Zerzan thus believes in the primacy of human interiority, a very
Western cultural account of action in the world, one of the main critiques made
of this culture by Nietzsche.

Bookchin has stated: "Those who prescribe mystical neoprimitivism are less
concerned about changing society than in changing people's inner lives."[65] The
human sciences have struggled to figure out where culture ends and nature be-
gins, and vice versa, for centuries now, without ever completing this impossible
task. That is why we need to agree with Bookchin in stating that "human beings
are social beings."[66] One cannot completely separate any human from its whole-
ness in being both natural and social/cultural. I must assert here that this is only
a predicament on the impossibility of certain knowledge as final, not of absolute
truth residing in a metaphysical synthesis or holism whatsoever.

For primitivists, meaning can flow straight from Nature or from reality.
Subjectivity has no place, at least a subjectivity where human creativity does not
have to be represented as Natural. Therefore, the destruction of symbolic cultu

preached by Zerzan is a form of representation represented as non-representational; that is, a representation falsified as reality. In order to clear ourselves from Civilization, or from symbolic culture for example, we should develop a symbolic culture of this "freeing." Zerzan recognizes this but fails—whenever convenient, it seems—to explain what this means for anarcho-primitivism as well. If all symbolic culture is corrupted, so is anarcho-primitivism. If meaning can only come from Nature, the subject is already known, it knows itself and the world, and it does not create anything.

Primitivism for Zerzan is beyond all power relations. It is supposedly more anarchist than any anarchism that has ever existed, since anarchism would be against power relations. Though anarchism may be interpreted as such, it has not stood against power *per se*, but against domination, a form of power. This is because power relations are not a choice. If anything is inherent in social relations, it is power. Primitivism understands power reductively as domination, as power for domination and never as power of freedom, therefore it is doomed to reproduce domination in the world, since it will negate any assertion of difference (of way of life, of culture, of opinion, etc.) as one's will to dominate, when it can mean for that person or group a will to be freer. Primitivism can never be a radical alternative if it does not recognize its own limits and how it needs to always revaluate alternatives. This would be a type of anarchist praxis, done in the collective, public sphere, not simply springing from a fictive interior self.

Anarchism has stood, at least since Peter Kropotkin and Mikhail Bakunin, for the collectivization of decision-making and production. This in no way has meant that it has set up a unique platform on which how to do this were finally settled. Exactly because it stands for these things, it cannot offer these final solutions. The anarchist tradition being thus, primitivism cannot be called anarchist without any violence being done to its memory. The Green Anarchy Collective has stated: "For anti-authoritarian transformation, many struggles are necessary and need to be respected along with an awareness of the underlying connectedness."[67] What is missing here is that the connectedness may not be readily and easily available to knowledge, it may not be available at all. Anarchisms need, if they can survive it, to rethink the cultural assumption that power can be completely known and discussed. This would mean, of course, a radical reshifting of anarcho-primitivist Utopia to work from life as lived instead of life as solely imagined.

Zerzan explains anarchy as "a rejection of government but of all other forms of domination and *power as well*."[68] According to Zerzan, it is possible to live in a power vacuum. The idea that the human world can function totally spontaneously is a direct, reactive response to ideologies that have preached the correct ways to run the world. As a reactive response, it reproduces the same universal command as to "the right way to live," and nothing could be less anarchic. Primitivism makes the dominant power structures and culture an Other,[69] and in this way reproduces the very same dominant.[70] The critique of state power, party

politics, of representation in general, are critiques made by many anarchists, from the 19th century to the present, even the current postmodern and poststructuralist anarchists. Anarchism is not, and never will be pure though. It cannot stand up to its own principles and tradition if it declares itself final and the solution to all social ills. As it stands, therefore, John Zerzan's primitivism cannot be easily declared anarchist.

Conclusion

If Civilization is the problem, how is it that civilized people can have the solution? There is a fracture in the acknowledgement of the problem, so there must be one regarding the solution as well. Zerzan acknowledges that the problem of Civilization is not a consensus. However, he clings to the notion that the solution to it is—or needs to be in any case—a *consensus gentium*. This is in line with his view of Nature, as one, unmistakable experience (maybe not in accordance with Nature itself).

Primitivist Richard Heinberg notes that "it can be argued that civilization *per se* is not at fault, that the problems we face have to do with unique economic and historical circumstances."[71] This is an important recognition of the complexity of social systems, of their internal breaks and inconsistencies that permit even some primitivists to argue that they speak from the "outside" of civilization, however impossible this is to be proven. Heinberg continues saying: "But we should at least consider the possibility that our modern industrial system represents the flowering of tendencies that go back quite far." The problems of the industrial system, its ecological, social and cultural effects, cannot be denied without leaving us with many problems. We should learn from these realities. What to do with them, though, cannot be a final solution, which tends to transform itself in history into another way for domination. The anarcho-primitivist critique builds its own object of critique—Civilization—from the standpoint of an "overall crisis."[72] A total, coherent object of *consensus gentium* can only exist form a standpoint of metaphysical culture. This cultural discourse can and does produce violence.[73]

Civilization is a way to nominate our present that so unclearly defines what we mean that one can argue with Bookchin[74] and Sheppard[75] for example that the solution to social and political domination rest on people being more, not less, civilized. This denominates a belief in hidden or potential behavior that humans have not yet engaged fully in the present. It is a recurrent discourse of resistance traditions of the West, to claim civilization a both a process and an outcome. It reinstates a creed in human knowledge as governing the world, as "civilizing" or "humanizing." Anarchists such as Bookchin have also believed in knowledge as primary for an anarchist movement to flourish when he wrote for

imple: "In short, we need criteria for determining what is rational, in a logic development whose internal consistency gives us the basis for ethical behav- and an ethical direction toward which society should advance."[76] This will to higher order of justice is not very different from what is desired by many mitivists such as Zerzan. Bookchin, as much as Noam Chomsky,[77] equates ason with Liberty and Progress, likening themselves to a particular Enlight- ment tradition. Thus they reproduce the creed, however they might speak to : contrary many times, in liberation that comes from knowledge, *primarily*. In s respect, they might critique primitivism as much as they want, but the claim it human interiority will govern existence—however a controversial claim for primitivist or an anarchist to make—abounds in the discursive practice of the ial Revolution, in which primitivists and many anarchists alike participate.

All of these will call me postmodern now, because I regard texts as action. I it want this to be a conversation with anarchisms, in the plural. Power is eve- where, yes, but not equally distributed, and not equally productive of effects her. Such that anarchists may claim to be social, but still rely on pillars of estern individualism like the creed—and practice—of knowledge being at the igin of every human action. By this referent, we should wait until further owledge, The Program, or the full rejection of programs as well in order to t. If postmodernism is the rejection of all coherence, as Zerzan contends, then im not a postmodernist, since my thought is coherent in explaining the inac- ns and unaccomplished ends of dominant political resistance discourse. I also not accept capitalism's "fragmentation"—a concept used to describe post- odernism—if that means social and political alienation. Surely, this agmentation" has been interpreted by many as full irresponsibility and politi- l impossibility. Many primitivists and anarchists, drawing on ideas such as agmentation," have emphasized the interpretation of "postmodernism"— other catch-all term—as one singular tradition of thought, disregarding all that : thoughts of various thinkers might point to, as points of possibility for dif- rence, liberation, or struggle. Even internal differences within so-called stmodernism or post-structuralism have been glossed over. That is because archism still begets to get rid of its arrogance, its belief in itself as vanguard of human liberation. If there are so-called postmodern thinkers that fail to help elucidate social and political problems, their thought must be questioned. But ey cannot be judged from Platformist[78] standpoints, because this would be to y that everyone needs to have the same goals in life, and that they must be iguaged the same. We can critique each other as much as we want, but to fail see how our critiques always already come from our own standpoints—and at they are not much more than this, standpoints—is authoritarian. It seems e one of the main problems of anarchism today remains that of the past: how deal with its own authoritarian views, values, and actions in the world. In or- r to debase capitalism, anarchism must debase itself as the sole presumptuous omoter of freedom, justice, or equality, whatever they might mean in practice.

John Landau explains Civilization for us, and he could well explain primitivism the same: "Civilization is Envy, it hates itself, the other side is greener, we must have it, the greed that comes from worthlessness, the desperate blotting out of the whole, therefore the feigning of superiority to save face, whoever saves the most face wins."[79] The "other side" here could be the primitive; Civilization could be read as primitivism. If Primitivism is "the perennial belief in the necessity of a return to origins,[80] it is just another form of symbolic culture, fraught with potentials for domination. If one single way of life, "who now make up less than one hundredth of one percent of the world's population"[81] should be the guide for the rest of the world, surely this ideology cannot be called anarchist in the sense of the struggle for freedom and possibilities for difference. To speak for the other is a dangerous thing. To deny that the other always speaks from a certain cultural—and symbolic—context is to miss opportunities for intervention.

Primitivism is a form of *cultural resistance* much more than *political resistance*, even when it claims to be against all forms of culture, as Zerzan does. It is thus because it determines the right way to live, to live culturally without engaging in the change of power relations. Cultural resistance is not at all separate from political resistance: it affirms identity and community (only what can be discoursed as "primitive") although it does not engage in the transformation of societies and forms of domination except through cultural discourse. Zerzan recognizes resistance in work relations. What if he recognized resistance in cultural relations? Many of his critiques could remain the same, such as that regarding the negativity of environmental destruction. Others would need a total change, such as the total destruction of symbolic culture he preaches. More fundamentally, Zerzanian primitivism as a doctrine could be thus radically revised. Civilization exists as cultural forms, which can be changed from inside. Primitivism is this want of struggle, in particular to change forms of domination, and any such want is laudable, but not when disengaged from assessing its effects on particular lives as lived.

Primitivism according to Zerzan remains what it set itself to be. As a realization, it would like to be total, that is, everything that it says would need to be actualized. It would be the actualization of the "spirit of refusal."[82] Refusal would be its main camp, actually its dominion, over which it would dominate. This way, Zerzan's primitivism is not totally different from the Civilization it argues against. It also wishes to dominate. Zerzan is against culture, against "human and social creation, and deciding that this commonality somehow inevitably infects them with harmful aspects."[83] Even though there exist needs of breaking up with cultural values for many, one can only do this by means of a new culture. The culture that primitivism is setting forth is the one of self-indulgence, and it cannot do any different, since it does not discuss any collective endeavor besides a call for destruction. It is therefore highly asocial, therefore untenable, unrealizable, since humans are social, as most of anarchist history recognizes. Also for this reason, it will unfortunately continue to rouse

attention, but for my part, this is the first and last time I will act to respond to it, probably.

After Nature, Culture could soon be the next thing to be highly valued in Western societies' liberation discourses. This Zerzan's primitivism has shown: by its negation of all culture, it will arouse, like it has here, the defense against destruction of cultures much underway under capitalism. The struggle for Nature though, has dominated Western liberatory discourses. This domination has appeared gentle because discoursed as love and respect for Nature, which supposedly represents communion with real life more than any other thing.

For Nietzsche, for example, moments of high communion with life are rare, if ever they reach full expression. Real life cannot be one of fullness and wholeness for all as Zerzan argues. His contention cannot be proven totally wrong or right, however, because he was witty enough to ascribe fullness and wholeness to human interiority, about which not much can be ascertained. What he wants is to have dominion, and by his persecution, to have pleasure in the thought that, after all, as I have done here for example, he will be commented upon and through this be engraved, however painfully, in history, which he surreptitiously critiques. It is a retarded action, but still nevertheless effective, for gaining power. The power he will gain is undesirable, he may ascertain. However, not as intention, but as effect of his actions, power—however limited—is what Zerzan, and primitivism, strives for.

Notes

1.   Parecon stands for Participatory Economy and has been proposed by the author as a means of reshifting power relations and production. See Michael Albert, *Moving Forward: Program for a Participatory Economy* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2000).

2.   See Michael Albert, "Anarchism = Zerzan?" Available at <http://www. insurgentdesire.org.uk/albert.htm>. Accessed on 02/18/2008.

3.   On May 7, 1995.

4.   John Zerzan, *Elements of Refusal*, 2nd. ed. (Columbia, MO: C.A.L. Press, 1999), p. 7.

5.   *Ibid.*, p. 8.

6.   *Ibid.*, p. 15.

7.   *Ibid.*, p. 29.

8.   *Ibid.*

9.   Zerzan, 1999, p. 31.

10.   F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols / The Anti-Christ* (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 159.

11.   See Zerzan, "Why Primitivism?" Available at http://www.insurgent desire. org.uk/whyprimitivism.htm. Accessed on 02/18/2008.

12.   Zerzan, 1999, p. 37.

13.   *Ibid.*, p. 34.

14.   *Ibid.*, p. 39.

15. Michel Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," in *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1993a), p. 12.

16. See M. Foucault, "Revolutionary Action: Until Now" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993b).

17. Discursive practices, according to Foucault (1993b) are characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.

18. Zerzan, 1999, p. 57.

19. B. Sheppard, *Anarchism vs. Primitivism* (Tucson, AZ: See Sharp Press, 2003), p. 7.

20. See Nietzsche, *Human All Too Human*, aphorism 630.

21. Zerzan, 1999, p. 31.

22. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978).

23. See M. Torgovnick, *Primitive Passions: Men, Women, and the Quest for Ecstasy* (São Paulo: Editora Rocco, 1999).

24. Zerzan, 1999, p. 40.

25. See Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson, *Anthropological Locations: Boundaries and Grounds of a Field Science* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); George Marcus & James Clifford, eds., *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Gupta & Ferguson (1997).

26. John Zerzan, *Future Primitive* (New York: Autonomedia, 1994), p. 45.

27. David Maybury-Lewis, *The Savage and the Innocent* (Boston. MA: Beacon Press, 1965), p. 184.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

29. Zerzan, 1994, p. 83.

30. Lawrence Keeley, *War Before Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 4.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

32. Conference on Hunting and Gathering Societies.

33. Alan Barnard, ed., *Hunter-Gatherers in History, Anthropology and Archaeology* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2004), p. 4 [italics mine].

34. See Zerzan, 1994.

35. Feral Faun, "Feral Revolution," *Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections*, ed. John Zerzan (Los Angeles, CA: Feral House, 2005), p. 227.

36. See Raymond Williams, *Keywords* (São Paulo: Boitempo Editorial, 2007).

37. See F. Nietzsche, *On The Genealogy of Morals* (New York: Vintage Books, 1989).

38. Zerzan, 2005, p. 3.

39. E. Hobsbawn, *The Age of Revolutions: 1789-1848* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1977), p. 65.

40. Zerzan, 1999, p. 107.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 109.

42. M. Bookchin, *Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left: Interviews and Chapters, 1993-1998* (San Francisco: AK Press, 1999), p. 127.

43. Zerzan, 2005, p. 2.

44. Zerzan, 1999, p. 104.

45. See for example Naomi Klein, *No Logo* (New York: Picador, 2002).

46. Zerzan, 1999, p. 97. See also Hobsbawn, 1977.

47. For more, see "Interview with Derrick Jensen." (Online) Available http://www.abolitionistonline.com/interviewissue04_welcome.to.machinederrick.jensen.p t1.shtml. Accessed on 01/11/2008.

48. Zerzan, 1999, p. 71.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

51. See interview with Derrick Jensen.

52. I have written on this subject in an article entitled "Anarchism after Metaphysics," still unpublished.

53. See C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: LTC Editora S.A., 1989).

54. See Marcus & Clifford, 1986.

55. See Nietzsche, 1990, p. 168.

56. Zerzan, 1999, p. 73.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

58. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

59. See Partha Chaterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

60. From Guimarães, "Anarchism after Metaphysics" (unpublished).

61. Faun, p. 228.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 229.

63. *Ibid.*

64. Zerzan, 1999, p. 205.

65. Bookchin, p. 121.

66. *Ibid.*

67. From the Green Anarchy Collective website, http://www.greenanarchy.org.

68. [italics mine] From Zerzan, "What is Anarchism?"

69. See Derrida, 1978.

70. A point Richard Shapiro, a professor of Anthropology at the California Institute of Integral Studies, consistently makes.

71. 2005:116.

72. Zerzan, 2005:1.

73. See J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978).

74. Bookchin, p. 130.

75. Sheppard, 2003.

76. Bookchin, p. 140.

77. From Noam Chomsky, "Notes on Anarchism," in *Anarchism: From Theory to Practice*, ed. Daniel Guérin (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970).

78. An anarchist Platform is usually discussed as "ideological unity, tactical unity, collective action and discipline, and federalism." See for example: <http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Platformism>.

79. John Landau, "Civilization and the Primitive?" in Zerzan, 2005, p. 111.

80. Richard Heinberg, "Was Civilization a Mistake?" in Zerzan, 2005, p. 118.

81. *Ibid.*

82. Zerzan, 1999, p. 131.

83. See Albert, "Anarchism = Zerzan?"

20

New Remedies or New Evils?
Anarchism and the Scientific
Revolution

Thomas Martin

They that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils.

—Francis Bacon

I suppose nearly all anarchists agree, by now, that to be an anarchist one must be a radical environmentalist as well (not to mention a feminist, but that's another issue). Peter Kropotkin first made the connection, and Murray Bookchin developed it to the point of irrefutability. Government and hierarchy are by nature artificial, static and inorganic, the very antithesis of the way nature organizes itself. Whether by nature or nurture or some combination of the two (yet another issue), the minority of the human race which administers governments and hierarchies has now created a world hurtling towards eco-meltdown. Anarchists have long said, and today many others are beginning to admit, that the trashing of the planet is causally linked to war, genocide, racism, poverty, and a host of other human ills. Political theorists tend to ridicule the anarchist vision as a romantic yearning for some Edenic golden age. Anarchists, of course, do not want to be Rousseauian noble savages. A society more attuned to anarchist views would be organized, and there would still be regulations and order—and even technology. But it would prevent the accumulation of power in the hands of a few. Such centralized power is a prerequisite for the rape of the environment, for human domination, and for the sort of science and technology that can produce ecocatastrophe. Today every nation, across the whole bogus political spectrum, is contributing to the ecological crisis. What more proof do we need that it is government *per se*, not any particular form of government, which is at fault?

No one has yet come up with any method of structuring authority that is ecologically sound. The definitive reason for that was discovered by Peter Kro

potkin over a century ago. In his studies of nature and evolution, Kropotkin concluded that ecosystems (as we call them; he didn't know the word) are self-organizing, dynamic equilibria; order is not imposed on them from outside, and they are never static. It follows that human society, to be consistent with nature, should be organized the same way. "Stability is not the result of a fixed web of cooperation and symbiotic interrelatedness," as Graham Purchase writes. "Nor does Kropotkin idealize nature, for in nature, areas of sustained interconnectedness and symbiosis are typically counterposed by areas of 'reaction,' 'conflict' and 'opposition.'"[1] The state, by contrast, strives to impose a permanent and static order for the benefit of those in charge of it. The biosphere does not work like an authoritarian human institution; it is an incomprehensibly complex web of interrelationships. Nature is a network, not a hierarchy. Imposing any form of hierarchy on it—any system in which some members of the biosphere are unnaturally given domination over other members—can bring only destruction. And humans are, of course, part of nature.

How Did We Get Into Such a Mess?

The answer, in two words, is "modern science." Well, all right, four words: "modern science and capitalism." They are Siamese twins, after all, and must be considered together if we want the full picture. But science is our concern here.

In spite of its essentially entropic and necrophilic tendencies Western civilization still, as recently as five hundred years ago, saw the world as alive and conscious in a sense that was entirely destroyed by the Scientific Revolution. The world-view of most people was what Morris Berman calls "participating consciousness," which involves "merger, or identification, with one's surroundings, and bespeaks a psychic wholeness" now lost.[2] Many volumes have now (but only recently) been written about the real meaning of the seventeenth-century "scientific revolution," a great secondary paradigm shift of Western civilization.[3] To understand why a radical environmental movement is even necessary (the idea would have seemed absurd to our ancestors), we need a bit of history. We need to understand how deeply and thoroughly modern science has alienated us from the real world out there.

At the risk of oversimplifying (as I often do in my Western civilization courses), we can lay the blame at the doors of three men, the unholy trinity of Francis Bacon, René Descartes and Isaac Newton.

Bacon and Descartes are commonly presented as though their world-views were diametrically opposed. This is not the case, as Morris Berman has brilliantly demonstrated. Bacon insisted on describing the world empirically, and was the father of modern scientific method; Descartes believed in the primacy of mind and reason (expressible mathematically), and thus helped found the Enlightenment. Certainly the two men had rather different views on Aristotelian

logic and the nature of consciousness; but they were both products of the Western paradigm that sees the object, not the process. Empiricism and rationalism have long been regarded as mutually exclusive, largely because they were taken up by two different philosophical lineages and developed mainly in England and France, ancient enemies whose incommensurability with one another extended even to the intellectual realm. But in fact empiricism and rationalism are a false dichotomy. The first method tells us to collect sense data and make some order and sense of them. One of the easiest (and most dangerous) ways to do this is to apply the logical and mathematical principles cultivated by rationalism. The vast chaotic confusion that comes crowding uncontrollably into our consciousness can be organized rationally *if* we pick out and save only the data that can be made to fit the logico-mathematical framework. Everything else must be discarded. Of course it is not "scientific" to ignore data, but this had to be done if the Scientific Revolution was going to work. (As Thomas Kuhn pointed out, every knowledge paradigm ignores certain contrary data until they reach a critical mass and can't be ignored any longer; then a paradigm shift occurs.) Therefore the data that didn't fit were declared to be no data at all, but mere illusion and legerdemain. Alchemy had to be converted into chemistry in order to make it "objective," in both senses of the word. All the mystery and magic had to be siphoned out of the world. In the end even human consciousness had to be explained mechanistically. To Bacon's famous four "idols" of misunderstanding, Berman suggests an addition: the "idol of the head," or the delusion that knowing takes place only from the neck up.[4]

The most extraordinary passage in Bacon's *Novum Organum* comes in a discussion of scientific method. How does one discover the "secrets" of nature? Let us ignore for the moment the question of whether there are any "secrets," or if there are, what business we have discovering them, and listen to Bacon:

> For even as in the business of life a man's disposition and the secret workings of his mind and affections are better discovered when he is in trouble than at other times; so likewise the secrets of nature reveal themselves more readily under the vexations of art than when they go their own way.[5]

The phrase "vexations of art" is most telling. By "art" Bacon means of course technology, or human (non-natural) activity; the word was commonly used with that meaning in the seventeenth century. But "vexations"? To "vex" means to trouble, interfere with, annoy; Bacon's era used it in much the same way we do. Latin *vexare* has more the connotation of shake up or disturb. It comes from IE *wegh-*, to move something or carry it in a vehicle (also from *wegh-*); one thinks of the very bumpy ride our distant ancestors must have suffered in their wagons (again, from *wegh-*). As several ecofeminists have pointed out—Karen Warren in particular—Bacon's use of the English language is full of patriarchal, almost misogynist and dominative nuances—"virgin" nature is "penetrated," and so on.

The implication is clear: to understand nature, we must interfere with it in a malign way, place it under duress, dominate it in much the same way that patriarchy dominates women, turn it upside down and shake it and see what falls out. Only a culture that separates humans from nature could possibly recommend such a course—for if we are *part* of nature, we will injure ourselves with this vexatious behavior.

Descartes' fundamental distinction between mind and body—so influential in all future science and psychology—was in fact based on a rather silly chain of reasoning. Starting from the famous *cogito, ergo sum* assertion—in itself highly suspect—he argued that it was possible to imagine his mind without a body but impossible to imagine that his mind itself did not exist. Hailed by many philosophers and scientists as a profound insight, this is really not much more than a monument to Descartes' deficient imagination. From it he built up a complicated theory of the irreconcilability of mind and body. One is material, has extension and limited duration; the other is immaterial, immeasurable and possibly eternal. Human beings are unfortunate enough to possess both, and are consequently always at war within themselves. What is better described as a vexing but manageable conflict between different evolutionary layers of the brain was, to Descartes, a Manichaean battle fought out on the vast and dreary plains of the pineal gland. Descartes" ultimate goal is the same as Bacon's: to understand nature. He merely starts from a different place. The first step is to learn how to think correctly (that is, logically), and to do so we must be free of the vexatious distractions of empirical sense data. "Let us, then, block out the external world and sort out the nature of right thinking itself." This means forgetting everything we have so far believed, except for the irreducible existence of ourselves: *Cogito, ergo sum*. It does not seem at all strange to Descartes that after evacuating the entire contents of our minds, we will have nothing to work with; the mind is sufficient unto itself. "For Descartes, thinking was identical to existing."[6] Recent scholarship has attempted to humanize and complexify Descartes, emphasizing his traditional roots and his interactions with the other thinkers of his time. Certainly he was more interesting and multilayered than his starkly simplistic mind/body dualism would suggest; but let's not endow him with *too* much humanity. Remember, this was the guy who thought all animals were robots, incapable of feeling pain. It should be clear by now that what Bacon and Descartes have in common—what they together inflicted on the modern world—is *mechanicism*. For both, to comprehend the world means to picture it as a machine, and then dissect it piece by piece until one understands how it was put together.

The synthesis of Bacon and Descartes was accomplished by the Third Person of this unholy trinity, Sir Isaac Newton (with a bit of help from Galileo, Copernicus and others). We customarily view Newton's work as an attempted refutation of Descartes; in fact, he came to exactly the same conclusions as his nemesis. The difference between the two philosophies lies in *how* the mechanical universe works, not in *whether* it is mechanical.

Newton began from the assumption that the universe consists only of matter, and that all its astonishing variety and mystery arise merely from the motion (or lack of motion) of that matter. Various types of motion and inertia can be described, but all boil down to one simple force, universal gravitation. The flaw at the heart of Newton's work is that he could not explain what gravity is, only how it works. His critics immediately pointed this out, and Newton himself admitted privately that they were right. If one cannot explain the ultimate force that drives the universe, then one might as well go back to occult explanations like *mana* or Fate or even (God forbid) God. Newton and all his successors have weaseled out of this quandary by simply re-defining science as the art of explaining *how*, not *why*.[7]

The image of Newton that projects from most popular books and texts is incomplete—or perhaps even false, as John Maynard Keynes first noticed half a century ago. The archetypical mechanicist, the father of modern physics and mathematics, was secretly preoccupied with alchemy and the occult during most of his life. He spent at least as much time thinking about Solomon's temple and the Great Pyramid as about gravitation. He not only believed in the transmission of *gnosis* down the centuries through a chain of hidden masters, but even convinced himself that he was the latest in the succession. Some of his contemporaries pointed out the paradigmatic inconsistencies in his theories, and Newton deliberately altered his published work to cover his esoteric tracks. All this is well documented, but in a collection of manuscripts that was kept from public scrutiny for more than two centuries. Consider the anagram found in one of his alchemical notebooks—*Isaacus Neuutonus* becomes *Ieona sanctus unus*. By the standards of modern psychiatry Newton was certainly neurotic, with delusions of grandeur and frequent deep depressions; his work even hints at symptoms of schizophrenia. If (as Morris Berman wonders) the founder of the modern Western scientific paradigm was crazy, what does that tell us about the world we live in?[8]

Berman sums up the Scientific Revolution as a shift in emphasis "from quality to quantity, from 'why' to 'how.'" The universe, once seen as alive, possessing its own goals and purposes, is now a collection of inert matter, hurrying around endlessly and meaninglessly, as Alfred North Whitehead put it. What was the purpose of this secondary paradigm shift? It did not

"just happen," nor was it the semi-conscious result of the combining of various new methods and ideas. It was quite deliberate. Its purpose was *control*. . . . Not holism, but domination of nature; not the ageless rhythm of ecology, but the conscious management of the world.[9]

Modern scientific method and the entire paradigm that developed around it were not so much a new invention as a sorting out, from an enduring esoteric or magical tradition, of the principles and techniques that were useful to the new capitalist order. What was left on the "other side" of the breach was either relig-

ion or witchcraft—the former if it was under the management of the ruling classes, the latter when it was not.

· Goldsmith believes that scientists still prefer the mechanomorphic model not because the evidence supports it, but because it is simple and predictable: machines invariably follow known laws of physics and chemistry; they behave exactly as we expect them to, even when isolated from the larger systems of which they are a part. In fact inductive scientific method only works when applied to machines—therefore everything must *be* a machine, since scientific or logical induction is by definition applicable to everything.[10] I would suggest that the problem lies deeper than mere scientific laziness. We want the world to be a machine because machines can be *controlled*. Organisms are less predictable, and will often do things that we do not wish them to do (such as, disobey the second law of thermodynamics). Here is a frightening truth about our late-Western worldview: the only way to make a living entity behave like a machine is to kill it. Gaia is not dying of neglect or ignorance: she is being deliberately murdered. This unpleasant fact undermines the entire Western project of control and domination.[11]

Ken Wilber refers to the modern or Cartesian world-view as the *representational* paradigm, because in all its varied forms it attempts to map or represent reality in some fashion. The postmodern philosophers (and to some degree their predecessors, like Kant and Hegel) attack this world-view on the grounds that "it fails to take into account the self that is making the maps in the first place." That is, the modern paradigm takes *subject* and *object* for granted; it assumes that we can somehow stand outside the world and objectively evaluate it. "So," Wilber continues, "the great postmodern discovery was that neither the self nor the world is simply pregiven, but rather they exist in contexts and backgrounds that have a history, a development."[12]

A Way Out of the Nightmare

The escape route from the nightmare of the Cartesian paradigm is not a return to a "primitive" pre-logical mentality à la Zerzan, nor even the surrender to the world unconscious offered by Zen or contemplative Taoism. Our history does not permit us the luxury of simply choosing between these two alternatives—and anyway, that's the sort of dichotomous thinking that got us into the present mess. The answer is a dialectic blending of the two. We need not give up political and social interaction, or even technology as such; we only—*only!*—need to alter fundamentally our attitudes toward them. Threshold post-Western thinkers like Nietzsche, Kropotkin, Whitehead, Jung, Reich, and Bookchin have attempted to outline these new attitudes, but the task is more difficult than one might imagine. Jung, Reich and Nietzsche tended to fall over onto the anti-intellectual side of this continental divide; Whitehead, Bookchin and Kropotkin

slide off down the opposite slope. I am not so conceited as to think I can balance on the ridge and thus move forward (rather than down and toward the left or right); I suspect this is a feat that will have to be accomplished by society as a whole (with Kropotkin and his interpreters, like Purchase, leading the way). There is after all a "critical mass" for such transformations, as everyone from the "hundredth-monkey" theorists to Maharishi Mahesh Yogi has been telling us for a long time now.

The post-Western theory of life and evolution begins with Charles Darwin, but it is only a beginning. (We can of course see foreshadows: Buffon's critique of Linnaeus' overly-logical and compartmentalized taxonomy, for instance.) As most educated people now realize, what Darwin said was quite different from "Darwinism," as developed by his fanatic followers (and perverted by the scientists of the Soviet world). Only in recent years have we begun to realize the revolutionary potential of Darwin's work. Any new theory of evolution must deal with several issues usually marginalized or ignored by Western science: the question of purpose or *telos*, serious flaws in the accepted definition of the "gene" and its role, explaining how consciousness evolved, and the connection between evolution and entropy, to name a few. As we have seen, post-Western ecology cannot be neo-Darwinist: as a simple reminder, consider Richard Dawkins' work again: Dawkins' science (by the usual definition of science) is unimpeachable. Of course every living organism is just a vehicle for the replication of successful genes. But wait a minute—*just?* The problem with the selfish-gene theory is one of perspective or approach. Dawkins' choice of the term "survival machines" is telling. He is a Cartesian at heart: organisms are *machines*.

Dawkins repeatedly insists that his use of "consciousness" terminology is mere metaphor. He writes of genes "wanting" to replicate themselves, or "cheating" organisms that carry competing genes, "recognizing" closely related organisms and behaving altruistically toward them, adopting "strategies," and the like. To maintain that all of this apparently conscious behavior is only figurative stretches one's credibility to the breaking point. Can't we simply apply Occam's razor and say that genetically-driven behavior *appears* to be conscious and deliberate precisely because it *is* conscious and deliberate? Dawkins and other traditional scientists cannot concede such a possibility because it turns their paradigm on its head.[13] If consciousness is the basic stuff of the universe, it makes sense for genes to "know" what they are doing. If matter is basic, it does not—any scientists who suggested that genes, or rocks or Sequoia trees or galaxies "know" anything would be laughed out of the academy.

Much of Dawkins' theory is based on "strategy" games in which points are arbitrarily assigned for various sorts of behavior. For example, successfully raising viable offspring may be worth fifteen points, but the cost of bringing the child to maturity may be twenty points (in terms of time and energy expended, etc.). This would make it unprofitable for one parent to raise progeny alone,

since the costs outweigh the benefits. But if both parents work together, each is "down" only ten points, and each gains fifteen, because their genes will be passed on equally. Dawkins of course says that no organism consciously analyzes its behavior in this way, but nevertheless natural selection has favored genes that behave in this manner. The argument seems a good one until one remembers that word "arbitrary." If the points are assigned by the theorist, any value at all may be used. I might as well say that raising a child is worth twenty-five points, and then suddenly it *does* become profitable for the mother to boot the father out of the nest and take care of the infant alone. As has been wisely said, you can use numbers to prove anything you want to prove.[14]

Ludwig von Bertalanffy, the father of systems theory, had this to say about neo-Darwinism:

> I think the fact that a theory so vague, so insufficiently verifiable and so far from the criteria otherwise applied in "hard" science, has become a dogma, can only be explained on sociological grounds. Society and culture have been so steeped in the ideas of mechanism, utilitarianism and the economic concept of free competition, that instead of God, Selection was enthroned as ultimate reality.[15]

We can take this thought further, and ask about the scientific attitude toward *telos*: Why is modern science so determined to eliminate purpose from every aspect of evolution (not to mention other natural processes)? The law of cause and effect is fundamental to Western science and philosophy, and causality needs no purposiveness to explain it: A happens, B is the result. Is the scientific-paradigm horror of God and religion really a horror of something deeper: of admitting that world has in some sense *telos* or purpose? Or worse yet, one that is incompatible with its partner, capitalism?

Edward Goldsmith, drawing on Lovelock and the Gaia hypothesis, insists that "ecology has to be teleological, for purposiveness is possibly the most essential feature of the behaviour of living things."[16] It would be of benefit to the continuing Western project if nature did not contain any purposive goal, because if natural processes are in any sense random, then we are doing nature a favor by imposing order on it. We are making it useful, giving it a much-needed purpose. If we once admit that nature has its own goals and objectives, then it becomes suddenly much more difficult to justify interfering with its processes.[17]

Jacques Monod, one of the leading theoretical biologists of this century, sees a fundamental self-contradiction in his own scientific discipline. The Cartesian paradigm, he says, requires that nature have no *telos* or purpose: evolution is not "going anywhere." Yet it is obvious to nearly anyone who bothers to look that purpose *does* exist in nature. The sense organs of an embryo are useless in the womb, but who would say that they have developed to no purpose? Do squirrels squirrel away walnuts, do spiders spin webs, to no purpose?[18] In fact

there is almost nothing in living nature that can be called random or without purpose.

While statistical mechanics quite accurately describes the behavior of large numbers of atoms (or photons passing through apertures, or people, or whatever) it *explains* nothing. Why is it impossible to predict heads or tails in *one* coin toss, but easy to predict that in ten thousand tosses, about half will be heads, half tails?[19] The more we learn about probability, systems and chaos theory, the more we realize that there is an overarching *telos* in nature, though it is not—as the religious would argue—imposed from outside by some deity. Rather, it is a function or product of the way systems operate across time. Complex systems in general—and most obviously, living systems—appear to violate the law of entropy. Physicists continue to insist on the universality of the Second Law because it solves some of the embarrassing contradictions of the Newtonian paradigm—the theoretical reversibility of time, for example. But we can "prove" that the existence of life does not invalidate the Second Law by arguing that an increase of order in an evolving organism or an ecosystem comes only at the expense of vastly greater disorder as the organism or system takes in energy and matter from its environment and discharges waste and heat. To put it another way, life can survive in an open system such as Gaia but its very existence increases the entropy of the larger closed system, the universe. But is the universe really a closed system? We have no evidence whatsoever that this is the case. If I say that "the universe is a closed system" I am merely expressing a tautology: the universe cannot be an open system because then it would have to exist in some sort of larger environment, and by definition nothing is larger than the universe.[20]

We can look to non-Western spiritual traditions for at least some of our new science of ecology, as the deep ecologists have already recognized. Throughout most of human history most people have known, without even thinking much about it, that the maintenance of cosmic order—or Gaia's homeostasis, if you will—is absolutely critical. Balance and harmony were essential to the continuation of life, and it was quite possible (though not easy) to destabilize the biosphere if one failed to observe certain behaviors, relationships and rituals. Even today most indigenous people understand that we humans, because of our capacity for innovation, must take exceeding care and caution not to screw up the planet for ourselves and everyone else.

Native Americans did not "know about" or even "understand" the biology of the plants, animals and ecosystems that surrounded them; rather, they *interacted* with them, with a respect and veneration that implied equality and a shared consciousness. Living in the world meant participating in a complex multidimensional web of obligations. Every species and phenomenon had its proper place in the system, and any attempt to arrogate a larger share of the system could lead to catastrophe. Hence the astonishment and pity that the Indians felt

toward the white invaders, people whose ignorant, selfish actions were bound to pull down Deep Heaven on their heads.[21]

All efforts to wring some sort of environmental ethic out of the great Yahwist religions are doomed to failure, the new "stewardship theology" notwithstanding. Only in Baha'i do we find even a hint of holistic ecological awareness. Abdul-Baha and Baha'u'llah were concerned mainly with the unity of the human race, but they recognized the applicability of the concept to the larger world. "All parts are subordinate and obedient to the whole," wrote Abdul-Baha. "The contingent beings are the branches of the tree of life while the Messenger of God is the root of that tree." True, God is still "supernatural" or transcendent; but "among the parts of existence there is a wonderful connection and interchange of forces, which is the cause of the life of the world and the continuation of these countless phenomena." The operative principle is "mutual aid and helpfulness."[22] More to the point, today's Baha'i leadership recognizes that the goal of world unity depends upon ecological sustainability. It is a specifically *organic* goal, requiring much more than a mere "world government" or shared religion. It requires a fundamental change of consciousness, much like the "Self-realization" fostered by deep ecology.

Buddhist biology/psychology (the two are not separable) view the human being and all other entities as clusters of phenomena that, running like threads through time and space, temporarily knot together to form a unique individual. The Sanskrit term is *skandha*, meaning "heap," but one is reminded of the English word "skein," which probably shares an Indo-European origin with *skandha*.[23] As Brian Brown puts it,

> no person or thing is an independent, self-subsisting reality, but comes into being, persists, and deceases as a given function of other factors: life perdures only as a complex aggregation of multiple conditions.[24]

As many radicals and environmentalists already recognize—in particula the deep ecologists—Taoism is probably the closest thing the world now has an anarchist and ecological religion. A number of anarchist writers have e plored the affinities, notably the novelist Ursula Leguin and the form Bookchinite, John Clark. We also see similarities with postmodernism, for ample in the assertion that "there has been a tendency in recent holistic anarch thought to explicitly use the term 'individual' to refer to that degraded self fal cated over the long history of social domination, and finally perfected in mod capitalist, statist, technobureaucratic society." And Taoism is naturally anti thoritarian: "the *Lao Tzu* proclaims the ironic truth that attempts to control to disorder, and that as the degree of control becomes more extensive, the w becomes more chaotic."[25] The more we study non-western culture and relig the more we come to realize that nearly every human society in nearly every has rejected domination and hierarchy in all their forms. It is only Western

lization, and a handful of others like the Aztecs and the Japanese, which have succumbed to the selfishness which evolution hard-wires into us.

At the risk of drifting too far off topic, I must mention Rupert Sheldrake. This controversial and much-maligned Cambridge biologist (dates) is not even regarded as a proper scientist by many of his traditionalist colleagues—surely a point in his favor. Some thirty years ago he began to formulate an entirely new explanation for the persistence and evolution of life, and in so doing unified a number of theories that had been previously thought unrelated, if not antithetical. Sheldrake's idea centers on what he calls "morphic fields." These are not an entirely new idea; Sheldrake's application is what is startlingly post-Western.

In the early 1920s the concept of "morphogenetic fields" (under various names) was arrived at independently by Hans Spemann, Alexander Gurwitsch, and Paul Weiss. C. H. Waddington a decade later added the idea of "chreodes," channels or paths of least resistance within fields that make movement in some directions more likely than in others.[26] In a gravitational field, for example, a star "sinks in" because of its great mass and creates a basin, into which neighboring bodies inevitably slide. Planets may whirl around the edges of the basin for a very long time before finally falling to the center—this is what we call "orbits." The sun, in Waddington's term, is an "attractor." Whatever lies at the bottom end of a chreode may be called an attractor; this idea has long been familiar in philosophy as "entelechy." Traditionally, however, we have been asked to believe that the entelechy is *something*, perhaps even God—the Great Attractor toward which everything is ultimately drawn. Western thought, with its strong tendency to reify, has trouble seeing attractors in any other way. However, an attractor may be "nothing" at all—simply a direction, or tendency, which unfolds as the system evolves. There is not something at the "end" of the chreode, for the simple reason that the chreode has no end until the process or entity gets there.

Morphogenetic fields have almost always been interpreted in the language of one or another Western philosophical tradition—Aristotelian, Platonic, materialistic, what have you. The results are unsatisfactory, since morphogenesis contradicts the fundamentals of the Western world-view. Rupert Sheldrake's hypothesis of "formative causation" is the first attempt at a post-Western definition. In spatial terms, he says, these fields organize matter in particular ways. In a temporal sense they develop along chreodes toward attractors of some sort. But "what is new in the hypothesis," Sheldrake writes, "is the idea that the structure of these fields is not determined by either transcendent Ideas or timeless mathematical formulae, but rather results from the actual forms of previous similar organisms."[27] This is close, but no cigar. The word *previous* is the sticking point. Sheldrake is still assuming linear time, even if time is neither fundamental nor transcendent. A cyclical or even a "presentist" view of time might go further to explain how physical entities and organisms acquire their characteristics. As you can see by now, this is yet another (and decidedly post-

Western) theory of evolution, one that sees genes as byproducts, not transmit-
ters, of information. Bateson takes the idea further into the realm of Psyche.

It makes sense to think of the motive process of morphogenetic fields as
"memory." What exists now is shaped by similar entities or processes in the
past—morphic resonance consists of "remembering" what has happened before
(or perhaps we should say, "in another time") and repeating it. A Western scien-
tist or philosopher would want to know immediately what it is that
"remembers." But the question in fact has no answer; memory is not the by-
product of any mind. Nor, for that matter, of any sort of material or physical
entity. It is just the reverse: the entities are the product of memory, which is just
about as fundamental as anything can be in a bootstrap universe. Note, however,
that we still have a Western view of linear time in the morphic resonance theory.

What does all this have to do with evolution? Here it helps to know Gregory
Bateson's insight that evolution and learning—that is, processing and making
use of information—are really the same thing. Morphic fields "can indeed be
regarded as *fields of information*. Thinking of information as contained in mor-
phic fields helps to demystify this concept, which otherwise seems to be
referring to something that is essentially abstract, mental, or mathematical, or at
any rate non-physical in nature."[28] A field is not a *thing*. The Western mind na-
turally pictures it as a sheet or cloud of particles or energy charges; for a field to
exist there has to be something *there*. In the early nineteenth century scientists
hypothesized aether, a substance no one could really identify but which had to
be there for the field to consist of. Faraday glimpsed the truth more than a cen-
tury ago; Einstein spelled it out for us: a field is merely a piece of space/time
configured or textured in a certain way that differentiates it from another chunk
of the universe. Quantum physics refined the concept. Now Sheldrake has taken
another step, because morphic fields appear to have characteristics not explain-
able by accepted field theory. Morphic fields must be "probability structures"—
that is, they are configured in such a way that they are more likely to give rise to
one sort of "material" phenomenon than another. Different kinds of fields may
be nested together to generate higher-level fields.

> The morphic field of an organism organizes the parts, or holons, within it; and
> the fields of these holons in turn organize the lower-level holons within them.
> For example, an organ field organizes tissues, and a tissue field organizes cells,
> and a cell field organizes subcellular holons such as the nucleus and the cell
> membranes.[29]

This hypothesis, incidentally, explains some difficult aspects of other fields
whose existence is already confirmed, such as quantum fields.

Everyone knows that the cells in our bodies are constantly dying and being
replaced, some more rapidly than others. After a few months, or perhaps years,
our bodies are entirely "new"—made up of cells that did not exist at all in the
recent past. This phenomenon, at first glance prosaic, is in fact one of the great

mysteries of science and philosophy. If every cell in my body is replaced, how can I still be *me?* But obviously, I am still me; even the scars and other imperfections are faithfully replicated. The total replacement of every cell in my face and the underlying bone and muscle structure is not going to make me better looking (probably in fact it will do the opposite, due to aging). Morphic resonance easily explains this conundrum. My body is in resonance not only with the structures of past human organisms (especially my genetic ancestors) but also with itself. No Platonic Form called "my body" need exist in the mind of God or anywhere else. All that is required is the persistence of a field, whose chreodes will cause incoming matter and energy to organize themselves in familiar ways. And, of course, that field evolves; that is why my body does not remain the same over the long haul, though it will always unquestionably be my body. As Sheldrake points out, morphic resonance is inherently undemonstrable by the methods of Western science, which demand "repeatability" of experiments: "for if nature is habitual, it will not be possible to study the growth of any particular habit over and over again, because the habit will already have grown."[30] This is not to say that morphic resonance cannot be proved, but only that the canons of scientific method need changing.

We can see now that morphic resonance explains how our bodies can maintain their identities as they pass through what we are pleased to call "time," in spite of constant changes at every level of our being. It also explains much about evolution, and relieves DNA and genes of the burden placed on them by the neo-Darwinists. When we reproduce, we get a new entity that is very much (but never exactly) like us. A "memory" (in the form of a morphic field) of what the parents are like is passed on to the offspring. Western assumptions demand that this memory which transmits genetic information from one generation to the next must reside in something physical, and the convenient discovery of the gene provided the necessary repository. But Sheldrake argues that the gene is a mere epiphenomenon or side-effect of morphic resonance among forms and patterns. "Memory need not be stored in material memory traces if it results from morphic resonance; the past can exert a direct influence on the present."[31]

The Darwinian and neo-Darwinian habit of seeing individual animals and plants as more or less discrete beings prevents a truly holistic theory of evolution. Certainly the organism interacts with its environment and with other organisms, but this interaction is defined as conflict resulting in "survival of the fittest." Even Kropotkin, who saw cooperation rather than conflict, believed in the same sort of subject-object exchange. But morphic fields, if they are indeed the carriers of evolutionary information, interpenetrate one another so densely and completely that no reasonable distinction can ever be made between the individual organism and its environment. There is no "me in here" as opposed to "everything else out there." This of course is also Arne Naess' point, arrived at along a wholly different philosophical route.

The interpenetration of fields and entities may be lush and impenetrable as any jungle, but it is never complete: that is, no two morphic fields ever coincide exactly. If they did, they would by definition be one field; indeed the whole universe would collapse into a single undifferentiated field. The *difference*, in Bateson's meaning of the word, is what makes evolution possible. "Morphic fields in general have a stabilizing and conservative effect; they cannot in themselves account for the initiation of change." This does not seem like an insurmountable problem. Change will be generated when the resonance between two entities is anything less than perfect. "But once new patterns of activity have arisen, the spread and adoption of these innovations may well be facilitated by morphic resonance."[32]

Morphic fields have this in common with genetic mutations: some are more viable than others. That is, some will resonate easily with the fields surrounding and interlocking with them, and some will not. These "defective" fields will set up dissonance rather than resonance, and the principle of dynamic equilibrium will push them aside and discourage their repetition or propagation. Those fields which are able to reproduce themselves will necessarily grow stronger and become established, since morphic resonance is autopoietic and cumulative. I see a possible problem here, one that needs further exploration: how can a new pattern occur even twice—let alone many times—if the new morphic field has not been established? Is one occurrence of a phenomenon enough to establish a morphic field? If not, Sheldrake may have to concede that morphic field theory alone cannot account for creativity or "difference" in the systems sense. Sheldrake does admit that evolution is not simple, and can be explained only in terms of a number of interrelated processes.

The perceptive reader may already have noticed that if Sheldrake is correct, we must re-open a door slammed shut long ago: Lamarckianism. If the gene is the true and only transmitter of evolutionary information, then the so-called Weismannian barrier makes inheritance of acquired characteristics quite impossible. But if the gene is only one aspect (that is, the physical manifestation) of that transmission, then we must reconsider. This is the sort of statement that has got Sheldrake into so much trouble with his colleagues:

> Acquired characteristics can be inherited, but not because of modifications of the DNA. Rather, they depend on modifications of morphic fields, which are inherited non-genetically by morphic resonance. Through repetition, new patterns of development and behaviour become increasingly habitual. Organisms do indeed inherit habits of behaviour and of bodily development, as both Lamarck and Darwin supposed.[33]

Morphic fields are changing all the time, and if they change enough we may choose to call them "new" fields. If we looked in turn at each generation in our ancestry from *Australopithecus afarensis* down to *homo sapiens sapiens* (a most arrogant self-description, by the way!) we would probably detect no difference

at all between mother and child. And yet Lucy did not look much like Heather Locklear. We must decide arbitrarily where to draw the line between one species and the next one it evolves into. My point is simply that when we talk about "new" morphic fields we must recognize the subjective nature of that adjective.

Perhaps these agonies over the genesis of new morphic fields are unnecessary. As is so often the case with philosophical Gordian knots, the solution is semantic: in this case, the connotation of the word "new." The ultimate morphic field—that of the living universe itself—has been evolving for at least fifteen billion years (or, more precisely, fifteen billion years of time have been generated by the evolution of that field). The evolution of the universe is expressed in many ways, most of which we may never find out about; but one of them is surely *differentiation* or individuation. The One becomes the Many. No morphic field is really *de novo* or *ex nihilo* in the philosophical sense; it is just a new variation on an old and universal theme. Admittedly, we are still left with the problem of where *that* came from.

A side note: as the appearance of new morphic fields explains the slow seamless unfolding of evolution, it also accounts for discontinuities in evolution, or what some Darwinists (in particular, Stephen Jay Gould) call "punctuationism." This is because such fields "are wholes, and precisely because of their irreducible integrity they have to appear suddenly. Wholes at all levels of complexity, like the quanta of quantum physics, either exist or do not; by their very nature they cannot come into being gradually."[34] The long-running argument between the punctuationists and the gradualists is thus shown to be artificial and unnecessary.

We can sum up the foregoing in a few words: the driving force of evolution is not the gene (which provides only the basic structure) but the ordered environment or morphic field. The field enfolds and pervades the individual organism, directing its development according to the laws of systems dynamics. The principles of evolution are in themselves quite simple, but—as chaos theory has shown—the interaction of only a few "initial conditions" can quickly become so enormously complex as to be unpredictable and incomprehensible. Darwinism and its later avatars, having failed to see the environment as an ordered system generating its own *telos*, have been forced to fall back on the gene as its *primum mobile*.

> It all makes much more sense, once we see the environment or field as the highly organized environment provided by the Biosphere itself, being, like all its constituent sub-systems, endowed with the control mechanism required for controlling and coordinating the homeotelic behaviour of its constituent parts.[35]

One other aspect of the anarchist response to the ecological crisis induced by the Scientific Revolution needs to be addressed briefly: the question of appropriate technology. While some extremist deep ecologists would like to reject all modern technology—"back to the Pleistocene!" is their motto—most anar-

chists recognize that the human society requires technology, and something more sophisticated than axes and levers. Murray Bookchin, who saw the ecological crisis coming fifty years ago, was long a leading advocate of what he called appropriate technology: wind and solar power, harnessing the tides, and the like.[36] But such technologies are "appropriate" not merely because they are environmentally sound, but because they can provide a decent quality of life on a small-scale, local, decentralized level. Giant power plants, whether fueled by the sun or by uranium, can only be capitalistic monopolies. No libertarian society can tolerate them, because they give a few power over the lives of the many. Solar panels or windmills, in contrast, can be built in any back yard. Bookchin suggests, and is surely right, that such technologies have been strangled in the cradle because they represent a profound threat to the political and economic elite. As alternative technologies emerge they must be integrated into a decentralized, co-operative, humanistic world view. Much of Bookchin's writing is concerned with the ethics of technology, and this contribution to anarchist thinking is unique and priceless. He hopes to see

> technical *ecosystems* that interpenetrate with the natural ones in which they are located. . . . The principal message of an ecological technics is that it is integrated to create a highly interactive, animate and inanimate constellation in which every component forms a supportive part of the whole.[37]

He also believes that an "ecotechnology," because it will require cooperation and participation, will heal many of our social wounds: appropriate technologies

> are the mortar that will serve not only to unite age groups, sexes, and town and country with each other in a non-hierarchical society; they will also help to close the splits in the human spirit and between humanity and nature.[38]

Let us hope that Bookchin's cautious optimism is well founded. No one likes to think about it, but the extremists just may be right—if we somehow survive the collapse of modern industrial society, it may be back to the caves for all of us.

Many of the deepest philosophers of systems theory recognized the danger in an organic holistic world networked together by computers or any other technology. Since the universe is fundamentally organic, not mechanistic, any such cyber-culture will end in sterility, uniformity and perhaps tyranny. "Such a world would be the *end* of diversity and freedom," Morris Berman warns—"a homogenization of the globe under man's dominion—or rather, under the dominion of a small, powerful elite."[39]

The message is clear: use science and technology, but don't let them use you. A real challenge for any post-Western, non-authoritarian civilization.

Notes

1. Graham Purchase, *Evolution and Revolution: An Introduction to the Life and Thought of Peter Kropotkin* (Petersham, Australia: Jura Books, 1996), p. 137. Reading Purchase is a "must" for anyone interested in the role systems and chaos theory will play in the post-Western paradigm. In several books and articles he has demonstrated Kropotkin's foresight in regard to anarchism and these cutting-edge ideas, which had not even been formulated scientifically when Kropotkin died. See also Graham Purchase, *Anarchism and Ecology* (Montréal: Black Rose, 1997).

2. Morris Berman, *Reenchantment of the World* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 16.

3. By "secondary" I mean that it did not overthrow the civilization itself; that would require a "primary" paradigm shift—something that the West has not seen since the invention of agriculture.

4. Berman, *Reenchantment*, p. 187.

5. Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Book I, Aphorism 74.

6. Berman, *Reenchantment*, pp. 32, 33.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 120-121.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 46.

10. Edward Goldsmith, *The Way: An Ecological World-View* (Boston: Shambhala, 1993), p. 122.

11. For a fascinating fictional account (subtly Christian, no less) of what happens when we trust machines too much, see C. S. Lewis' science fiction trilogy, *Out of the Silent Planet, Perelandra*, and *That Hideous Strength*—particularly the last, published in 1945. A similar theme underlies Frank Herbert's *Dune* novels.

12. Ken Wilber, *A Brief History of Everything* (Boston: Shambala, 1996), p. 60.

13. While I am as militant an atheist as Dawkins, I must question his "scientific" dismissal of the "spiritual" (for want of a better word) side of human nature. For a good critique see Lakshmi Chaudhry, "The Godless Fundamentalist," in *In These Times*, December 2006.

14. Richard Dawkins, *The Selfish Gene* (Oxford: University Press, 1976), p. 151ff.

15. Arthur Koestler and J. R. Smythies (eds.), *Beyond Reductionism* (London: Hutchinson, 1969), p. 66.

16. Goldsmith, *The Way*, p. 27.

17. cf. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 185-186.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 390.

21. The line is from C. S. Lewis, *That Hideous Strength*, and is in fact the key to the novel.

22. Robert A. White, "A Baha'i Perspective on an Ecologically Sustainable Society," in *Worldviews and Ecology: Religion, Philosophy, and the Environment*, ed. Mary Tucker & John Grim (New York: Orbis, 1994), p. 97.

23. This is conjectural. The root may be *skel-* or *skeng-*, "crooked," or *skamb-*, *sker-*, *skerbh-*, all meaning "turn" or "bend," or even *skeup-*, a tuft of hair.

24. Brian Brown, "Toward a Buddhist Ecological Cosmology," in Tucker and Grim, p. 126.

25. John Clark, "The Tao of Anarchy," *Fifth Estate* Summer 1998.

26. It should be noted that Richard Dawkins, the neo-Darwinist, has written extensiv on "memes," non-physical versions of genes that transmit and reproduce culture. He has b widely credited (by his admirers) with an astounding insight which, in fact, has already b made long before his time by Waddington. A recent improvement on the "meme" idea can found in Robert Aunger, *The Electric Meme: A New [sic] Theory of How We Think and Co municate* (New York: Free Press, 2002).

27. Rupert Sheldrake, *Presence of the Past: Morphic Resonance and the Habits of I ture* (New York: Vintage, 1988), p. 108.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 120.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 160.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 246.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 279.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

35. Goldsmith, *The Way*, p. 233.

36. See his attack on the enemies of technology in chapter six of his *Re-Enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit against Anti-Humanism, Misanthropy, Mysti-cism and Primitivism* (London: Cassell, p. 1995).

37. Bookchin, *The Ecology of Freedom*, p. 265.

38. Bookchin, *Toward and Ecological Society* (Montréal: Black Rose, 1980), p. 95.

39. Berman, Re-enchantment, p. 285.

21

The State of Nature: The Political Philosophy of Primitivism and the Culture of Contamination

Mick Smith

To understand Political Power right, and derive it from its Original, we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a *State of perfect freedom* to order their Actions and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man.[1]

The philosophers, who have inquired into the foundations of society, have all felt the necessity of going back to a state of nature; but not one of them has got there.[2]

Despite its wholesale orientation towards the future modernity has still looked to the past to explain, justify or critique the contemporary "order of things." For modernity's early political theorists the crucial point of origin and difference was that "state of nature" which existed prior to, and could be compared and contrasted with, their own ideal of civil(ized) society. Since the purpose of such theories was to elucidate culturally binding principles of *governance* and *moral law* the state of nature was almost always envisaged as an anarchic and amoral realm. It was a "state of perfect freedom" where human nature was fully expressed and as yet unconstrained by socio-political conventions. The exact manner in which this pre-historic existence was envisaged depended upon the particular theorists' tendency toward an optimistic or pessimistic assessment of human nature and human society. Thus for Hobbes this anarchic state was famously characterised by "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."[3] For Rousseau, driven as much by pessimism about the parlous state of his contemporaries as optimism about human nature, this primitive anarchism had distinct advantages. Life was (generally) marked by individual isolation, indolence, robust health and heart's

ease because the "produce of the earth furnished him with all he needed, and instinct told him how to use it."[4]

Optimist and pessimist alike agreed that civilization was to be defined in terms of this distinction between nature and culture and by the movement of the latter away from the former. Humanity was driven to distinguish and distance itself from its previously animal-like existence, something that could only be achieved through hard work and the employment of that unique human faculty "reason." The "irrational" anarchism characteristic of the "state of nature" was superseded, whether from necessity or choice, by a rational agreement, a "social contract." This contract was an agreement to enter into the moral and political order of civilization, to limit one's inherent freedoms and control one's inherent nature in the name of reason and social progress.

This then is modernity's key foundational narrative. It has been employed in numerous ways and to justify diverse political ends, from monarchism to regicide, but its epistemological status remains ambiguous. For Locke the "state of nature" was a historical and geographical reality, a matter of established fact, "the world never was, nor ever will be, without Numbers of Men in that State."[5] For Rousseau it "perhaps never did, and probably never will exist."[6] But whatever its ontological status, its ideological effects were real enough and all theorists alike were happy to introduce the current conditions of those peoples they regarded as either "civilized" or "primitive" as evidence for their contrasting speculations. What is clear is that Rousseau remained in a minority, the dominant ideological perspective of modernism has always regarded this divisive yet "civilizing" movement away from nature in an entirely positive light. It is, after all, what constitutes progress. Perhaps then it is not surprising that this progressive "just so story" has also been pressed into service on numerous occasions to justify the "brutal" treatment of that which is deemed "primitive." John Locke himself had financial interests in the slave trade.

Locke's own version of this story mentions three critical moments, which mark stages in the change from a state of nature to that of civil society. The first is the appropriation of nature transforming it from God"s common gift to humankind to personal property; the second is the invention of money, the third the social contract itself. In the first instance nature is altered through the admixture of human labor. Since the

> Labor of his Body, and the *Work* of his Hands we may say, are properly his [individual property]. Whatsoever then he removes out of the State of Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his *Labor* with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his *Property*.[7]

Nature thus becomes parceled up, wilderness becomes tamed, domesticated, transformed and owned through individual labor. (Though even Locke might be thought politically and ecologically astute enough to add the proviso that this holds true only where there is "enough, and as good left in common for

others.")[8] Labor has "put a distinction between" the commonalty of natural objects and personal property, it has "added something to them more than Nature."[9] In instrumental terms this addition is also a necessary improvement "without which the common is no use."[10] It is however ironic that Locke, so familiar from his Puritan upbringing, with the bible's Edenic narratives, should chose to illustrate his case *for* private property with the example of picking apples.

The invention of money allows a second qualitative change to take place, because it marks both the beginning of the commodification of nature and the introduction of a hierarchical social organisation. Originally, the extent of an individual's personal property was limited by their labor power, by the amount of land it was physically possible for them to make use of, which "did confine every Man's *Possession*, to a very moderate Proportion."[11] But "the *Invention of Money*, and the tacit Agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced (by Consent) larger Possessions, and a Right to them."[12] Money, unlike nature's products, does not spoil, it can be stored and accumulated indefinitely and so if people consent to take money "in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of Life"[13] then by default they have "agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth."[14] Ironically then, from Locke's perspective, civil(ized) society arises out of the need to protect inequalities. There is little point in stealing others' perishable property if one already has all one can use, but money provides an imperishable motive. And so people "sign up" to the social contract. They agree to give up their natural freedoms and to submit to the authority of "a common establish'd Law and Judicature . . . with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish Offenders."[15] This contract is, Locke makes plain, the final and most important aspect demarcating civil society from the state of nature.

Whether one calls this political philosophy or merely regards it as the manufacture of a modernist myth, Locke clearly spells out the key elements that are taken to distinguish civil(ized) society. First, and most importantly, the transformation of nature by the admixture of human labor. Second, the commodification of nature and human labor through its symbolic incorporation in a monetary economy (clearly vital for a nascent capitalism). Third, the development of a hierarchical social organization and that rational political/legal authority necessary to maintain and secure the conditions necessary for the reproduction of civil society over time. There is also another, less explicit, element here, a moral expectation best described as a "work ethic." Since it is human labor that improves (adds to) nature then productive labor becomes a moral duty of civilization's citizens, idleness and unemployment a sin. These mutually supportive and interacting elements constitute the necessary conditions for the ongoing trajectory of progress, for leaving the state of nature further and further behind. Perhaps all Locke really overlooked was the extent to which that other instrumentally directed facet of human reason, the scientific knowledge and

technology that can convert mere industriousness into actual industries, would become so important.[16]

As Kurt Vonnegut might say "so it goes."[17] Triumphant in its war against all forms of traditionalism, the centuries following Locke see "progress" roll hopefully onward, a juggernaut that crushes those that fall beneath its wheels. Its accompanying and increasingly dominant ideology pervades every aspect of our life. Most people don't question the need to continue transforming nature, to make more money, experiment further, enact more laws or work harder. "Progress" comes to operate, like all ideology, largely "behind our backs," hardly entering consciousness but still ensuring our "interpellation" into an ever more complex, expansive, and self-referential civil society.[18] And, of course, progress can only do this because the civilization with which it is associated seems to have delivered certain material benefits, to have fulfilled certain needs (even if many of those needs were first created by those with vested interests in their fulfilment). Thus, as Marcuse argues, a "comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom predominates in industrial civilization, a token of technical progress."[19] Which is not to say that "progress" always proceeds smoothly and without opposition, but to point out that it is only when *things go wrong*, fail to meet expectations, or run into unexpected opposition that a society's ideological presuppositions are brought to full consciousness. Such problems require those wishing to retain the status quo to formulate and defend what had been an implicit social doxa as an explicit orthodoxy. Once codified, this orthodoxy can and will be opposed by heterodox critiques. In the modern world the ideology of progress had become second nature to us but it is only "when the social world loses its character as a natural phenomenon that the question of its natural or conventional character . . . of social facts can be posed."[20]

Radicals, including anarchists and radical environmentalists, have always attempted to fracture the aura of inevitability that helps obscure the origins and actualities of the modern state and capitalism. They reject any orthodoxy that seeks to justify hierarchy and authority. They point out that the state and its philosophers, having retrospectively sold us a social contract we never saw nor signed, seems anyway to have reneged on their side of the bargain which was to protect our lives and liberties. The new institutionally guaranteed "freedoms," to democracy, free speech, individual liberty, so dearly brought, constantly fail to live up to expectations. What does it mean to have political freedom when the parties on offer are ideologically identical clones? What kind of intellectual freedom is it that brands all those who dare to think differently dangerous extremists? What kind of individuality expects us all to conform within such narrow limits? What freedoms are even possible when the very air we breathe is poisoned and the food we eat contaminated with the so-called by-products of progress? In such circumstances it is surely not surprising that some might choose the dream of a pre-contractual state of natural innocence to the increasingly nightmarish "reality" of Locke's post-contractual culture.

Anarcho-Primitivism and the Culture of Contamination

When we say we want green anarchy, a stateless society, free and in harmony with Nature, people tell us that "it's a nice dream but it'll never happen" as "it's against human nature." The point is that it *has* happened—green anarchy was how *all* people lived for a good 90 percent of history . . . how some *still* live better than we do today. When we point this out, people start pissing and whining about "going back to the caves" and getting protective about their TVs, cars and other fruits of "Progress," particularly Lefties and "anarchists" who don't know the difference and who think "Progress" is some inevitable law of Nature and not part and parcel of State society and the self-serving elites ruling it. We'll demolish those myths.[21]

Life was better before sliced bread.[22]

nitivism, is, as the anonymous writer in *Green Anarchist* admits, clearly a ·ginal political perspective even within leftist and anarchist circles. Its call for destruction or dismantling of civilization is about as extreme and compresive a solution to current environmental problems as it is possible to gine. (Although some associated with primitivism have also been accused of)ouring even more extreme Malthusian tendencies that might regard humanitself, not just civilization, as the source of our environmental problems).[23] : explicitly primitivist strand in environmental anarchism has coalesced since early 1980s around journals like *Fifth Estate, Green Anarchist* and *Anarchy: ɔurnal of Desire Armed* and the writings of Fredy Perlman[23] and John Zer-ᴴ amongst others. While those associated with primitivism hold a variety of ipectives, and often question or even eschew the label "primitivism,"[25] their ıments share a family resemblance in terms of their fundamental critiques of lization and technology, which are regarded as instigating and perpetuating ı social inequalities and the environmental crisis. Thus "George Bradford" *Fifth Estate*) claims that there "a growing recognition that the environmental s is the crisis of a civilization destructive in its essence to nature and human-, [26]

It would be relatively easy to delineate a rather narrow or exclusive notion rimitivism that set it in some kind of absolute opposition to other forms of :al environmentalism and ecological anarchism like the deep ecological vi- of many in Earth First! or Murray Bookchin's "social ecology." Certainly it ı seems from the intensity of the debates between adherents of these posi- ı (and a thousand others), and the personal invective that abounds, that there be little common ground between them.[27] But this would be a mistake be- e while the debates of the late 1980s and early 1990s over biological ctionism, population control, nature mysticism, and so on, are by no means

resolved there are broader similarities in their analysis of our current situation.[28] One way of characterising these similarities might be in terms of the depth of their critique of the ideology of "progress" and the degree to which they reject what I will term our "culture of contamination." The differences between these varieties of radical environmentalism can be characterised in terms of their analysis of and responses to what they regard as this contaminating culture.

From the perspective of radical ecology modern society is inherently, rather than accidentally, a culture of contamination. The oil slicks that polluted Puget sound, the clouds of radioactivity released from Chernobyl, devastating mud-slides from deforested hillsides, the ozone hole, global warming, asthmatic smogs, and so on, are accidental only in the very trivial sense that they were not (usually) the intended consequences of the social activities concerned. These events, though often unforeseen, are by no means accidental "by-products" of modernity but a necessary and inevitable corollary of modern modes of production. "Progress" is powered by and requires that society continually, and on an ever increasing scale, transform everything with which it comes into contact, that it leave nothing untouched, that it makes of everything something that it previously was not. Progress necessitates the constant re-ordering and re-configuration of the world about us and since we are neither omniscient nor omnipotent it is *inevitable* that such changes will have unforeseen or unwanted consequences. The greater the scale of our interventions the more such consequences proliferate and interact and since modernity is now a global phenomenon so too the effects have become world-wide. This globalization of unforeseen consequences "systematically produced as a part of modernization" is, of course, the basic premise of those who now refer to modernity as a risk society.[29]

The modernist tendency is to refer only to the *unintended* consequences of modernity as contaminating. The oil slick is regarded as polluting because in Mary Douglas'[30] terminology it is "matter out of place." It has escaped the bounds of the tankers holds that were meant to contain it and flowed beyond its culturally determined place into that realm which modernity has defined as its Other, that is, nature.[31] Many environmentalists might go further and see this in Durkheimian terms as a form of sacrilege, as a profane encroachment on what they regard as a sacred realm.[32] But, if the analysis presented above is correct, then such profanities are not accidental but part and parcel of progress itself. Modernity is a culture of contamination since, as social theorists from Weber onwards have argued, modernity eventually leaves nothing as sacred or sacrosanct, everything becomes disenchanted, a mere means to continuously shifting ends.[33] (Although of course "progress" too can declaim itself in terms of a discourse of purification or even Puritanism, namely as dispelling the contaminating impurities of a base nature in order to reach a "higher" plane.) And in one sense this brings us back to Locke whom, as we have seen, regards modern civilization as dependent upon the transformation of nature via human labor. This transformation makes nature useful for humanity and, one might add,

simultaneously transforms nature into use-value. The first step towards a civilized society entails making nature a mere resource, what Heidegger refers to as a "standing reserve" (*Bestand*).[34] The second moment of this transformation then appears with the arrival of money and (in Marx's terms) the commodification of nature whereby it is further transformed from use-value to exchange-value. In other words the "state of nature" is dissolved in the acid-bath of progress and replaced by the "real-world" of contemporary capitalism.

This process has occurred on such a scale and reached such a state in late modernity that it now seems that all nature has been reduced to its use or exchange value, that there is no nature that has not been transformed and contaminated in some way. In Bill McKibben's best selling words, we may have witnessed *The End of Nature*.[35] Nowhere on, above, or below the Earth's surface remains in its "pristine" state, everywhere is affected. DDT and nuclear fallout are found even in Antarctica's uninhabited wastelands, acid rain drips from mountain trees into near lifeless pools; the oceans are trawled and their depths riven by military sonar that shatter the eardrums of its mammalian inhabitants.[36] As Lefebvre points out, although nature

> obsesses us, as do childhood and spontaneity, via the filter of memory . . . everything conspires to harm it. The fact is that natural space will soon be lost from view. . . . Nature is also becoming lost to thought. For what is nature? How can we form a picture of it as it was before the intervention of humans with their ravaging tools? . . . True, nature is resistant, and infinite in depth, but it has been defeated, and now waits only for its ultimate voidance and destruction.[37]

In other words it seems that every aspect of nature too, has been, or soon will be, irredeemably transformed by its association with modernity and its incorporation within what Guattari[38] refers to as Integrated World Capitalism (IWC).

Thus the features Locke regarded as indicative of the change from the state of nature to civilization reoccur in terms of this culture of contamination. There is *ecological contamination* marked by the destruction of wilderness and its transformation into a standing reserve for human labor. There is *economic contamination* marked by the commodification of the life-world and the massive and immoderate increase in the consumption of the natural world this allows and promotes. And there is also *ethico-political contamination* in terms of the globalization of an anthropocentric ideology and discourses of moral and political governance justified through the myth of the social contract.[39] Each of these features feeds upon and supports an ideology of progress that permeates every aspect of the contemporary life-world. This then is why it is possible to define modernity as a "culture of contamination"; pollution is not its by-product but the systemically produced counterpart of progress itself. Postmodernity too might be defined in this framework as marking modernity's limit, the moment when nothing sacred is left, when the state of natural innocence and the unmediated

relation between nature and humanity envisaged by modernity's early political
philosophers finally sinks "below the horizon behind us."[40] That is, postmoder-
nity begins where discourses about the end of nature and the loss of the sacred
are taken as serious descriptions of the world's actual ontology.

Primitivism is then an attempt to recuperate the purity of the state of nature
by rejecting the culture of contamination in its entirety.

> Ideologies such as Marxism, classical anarchism and feminism oppose aspects
> of civilization; only anarcho-primitivism opposes civilization, the context
> within which the various forms of oppression proliferate and become perva-
> sive—and, indeed, possible.[41]

In almost every way primitivism reverses the "progressive" values associated
with the Lockean myth privileging the state of nature over civil(ized) society.
Primitivism's Edenic narratives clearly regard the movement away from the
primitive gatherer-hunter societies embedded in nature as the anarchist equiva-
lent of the biblical Fall.

> [L]ife before domestication/agriculture was in fact largely one of leisure, inti-
> macy with nature, sensual wisdom, sexual equality, and health. This was our
> human nature, for a couple of million years, prior to our enslavement by priests,
> kings, and bosses.[42]

Zerzan, like other primitivists, draws heavily upon the work of Marshall
Sahlins and anthropological studies of contemporary hunter-gatherer societies
like the !Kung and the Mbuti to argue that such "pre"-agricultural economies
were "the original affluent society."[43] It wasn't lack of intelligence or lack of
ambition that stopped Paleolithic cultures "advancing" rather the "the success
and satisfaction of a gatherer-hunter existence is the very reason for the pro-
nounced absence of "progress."[44] Such societies were non-hierarchical, largely
non-violent and non-competitive, had no conception of private property and
inordinate amounts of free time which they spend socializing. "The state of na-
ture is a community of freedoms."[45] The people were healthier and happier in
complete contrast to the current "landscape of absence . . . the hollow cycle of
consumerism and the mediated emptiness of high-tech dependency."[46]

In tackling the productivist and contractarian myth of modern origins head-
on primitivism certainly provides a counter-modern analysis that has important
implications for radical environmentalism *insofar* as it reminds us that this cul-
ture has to be critiqued at source. We don't just need to criticize the commodity
fetishism associated with the predominance of exchange values but must also
reject Locke's initial anthropocentric invocation of the instrumental and proprie-
tal effects of human labor and the consequent reduction of the natural world to
use-value. The attempt to speak of the return to the state of nature also marks the
rejection of those varieties of postmodernism characterised by a resigned (or less
often a celebratory) acceptance of a future that cannot escape from an evanes-

cent hyper-reality. In both these ways anarcho-primitivism has much in common with, and adds a socio-political dimension to, deep ecology and its championing of various forms of intrinsic value in human and non-human nature.

But this is precisely where difficulties begin to arise. Leaving aside the complex question of "intrinsic" value (but see Smith)[47] serious issues emerge with the wish to recuperate a state of nature, of absolute freedom and natural purity, of a lost innocence unsullied by civilization. While it may make sense to refuse to accept "the death of nature and renounce what once was and what we can find again"[48] not everything that has been lost *can* be recovered. Once lost, primal innocence, like those biological species driven to extinction, is gone forever. There may indeed be much to be mourned about such losses but it is vital that mourning does not become reduced to a repetitive and self-absorbing melancholy, an unrequitable yearning to retain that which is no longer present.[49] In addition to this there are of course many drawbacks with the Palaeolithic lifestyle and many positive aspects of civilization. Without some major catastrophe it is simply ludicrous to believe that even those most critical of this culture of contamination would choose to lose all of societies material comforts and revert to gatherer-hunting. There is therefore a danger that in emphasizing the return of the primitive, Zerzan et al are in danger of forcing "pre-history" to repeat itself in a manner that may be both tragic and farcical.

Such difficulties have been recognized by other environmentalists who share something of primitivism's analysis of civilization. Figures like Edward Abbey, self-proclaimed ecological anarchist and author of texts like The Monkey Wrench Gang[50]—so inspirational for the current generation of ecological activists—was forthright about needing to retain at least some of civilizations products. Abbey, like the primitivists, claims that "humanity made a serious mistake when our ancestors gave up the hunting and gathering life for agriculture and the towns. That's when they invented the slave, the serf, the master, the commissar, the bureaucrat, the capitalist, and the five-star general. . . . Nothing but trouble and grief ever since, with a few comforts thrown in here and now, now and then, like bourbon and ice cubes and free beer on the Fourth of July, mainly to stretch out the misery."[51] But in many of his writings Abbey also makes plain that there is a surprising amount he regards as worth retaining.

> Ah yes you say, but what about Mozart? Punk Rock? Astrophysics? Flush toilets? Potato chips? Silicon chips? Oral surgery? The Super Bowl and the World Series? Our coming journey to the stars? Vital projects, I agree, and I support them all. (On a voluntary basis only.) But why not compromise? Why not—both? Why can't we have a moderate number of small cities, bright islands of electricity and *kultur* and industry surrounded by shoals of farmland, cow range, and timberland, set in the midst of a great unbounded sea of primitive forest, unbroken mountains, virgin desert? The human reason can conceive of such a free and spacious world; why can't we allow it to become—again—our home?[52]

Abbey too argues that our environmental and political problems are constitutive of, rather than merely accidentally associated with, the current social order. His response however is rather different. He rejects the all or nothing approach characteristic of both the advocates of progress and the puritanical primitivists.

> But we cannot pick and choose this way, some technophiles may insist—it's the entire package, plagues and all, or nothing. To which one must reply: If that is true then we have indeed lost control and had better dismantle the whole structure. But it's not true: We *can* pick and choose, we can learn to select this and reject that. Discrimination is a basic function of the human intelligence.[53]

But while Abbey weighs the pros and cons of aspects of modern life (in a manner, it must be admitted, so atheoretical that it sometimes constitutes little more than an arbitrary wish-list) he too seeks to regain and retain the pristine innocence of the state of nature. His solution is to contain the culture of contamination within isolated pockets away from the "free and spacious" natural world, to give those people willing to make the effort the option of leaving the guilty comforts of civilization and re-enter the state of nature on a part-time basis.

Deep ecologists take a slightly different tack toward "the protection of wild species and habitat against the onrushing 'artificial environment' and man's [sic] complete domination of the planet."[54] Like the primitivists many, though by no means all, deep ecologists also argue that "research has clearly shown the advantage of the hunting-gathering life over both the agricultural life and modern industrial culture."[55] They too envisage modernity as a culture of contamination and, despite differences of emphasis, almost all speak of resacrilization of the relationship between small scale ecosystem cultures[56] and the environment in which they reside. Even those sceptical of the neo-pagan or pantheistic revivalism often associated with deep ecology agree that a "truly deep spirituality acknowledges . . . a depth certainly not discernible in the world system of modern materialism."[57] Deep ecologists differ from anarcho-primitivists and writers like Abbey mainly in emphasising the existence of and need to follow natural or ecological laws. For them the state of nature is not anarchic but ordered by nature itself and our ethico-political systems should reflect and respond to this natural ordering (although it should be born in mind that some anarchists have also regarded nature as a sphere of *spontaneous* natural order).

Social ecologists like Murray Bookchin have still less in common with the primitivist critique. Bookchin also criticizes the deep ecologist's wish to follow (what they suppose to be) the natural order of things. He rejects both the idea of humbly subjecting ourselves, like ants, "to the dicta of 'natural law'"[58] just as he rejects modernity's Promethean urge to dominate and conquer nature. (Indeed Bookchin sometimes seems to read anarcho-primitivists as similarly positing a

"natural law" thesis.) But while social ecology also regards Enlightenment myths of the state of nature as deeply implicated in our current environmental predicament the state of nature is clearly not something to which Bookchin wants to return. Although our

> "civilization has turned into one vast hurricane of destruction" the danger of this is precisely that "it threatens to turn back the evolutionary clock to a simpler world where the survival of a viable human species will be impossible.[59]

Indeed Bookchin clearly regards some radical environmentalists as promoting a very "anti-social" ecology and instead espouses model of evolutionary social change that is much closer to the dominant progressivist ideology—and thus appeals to many as both more moderate and "reasonable." The problem is though that Bookchin entirely misses the ethico-political point of trying to conserve or recuperate the innocence associated with the state of nature (and by default also absolves the culture of contamination from much of its constitutive guilt).

Innocence and the Culture of Contamination

> A Klee painting named "Angelus Novus" shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, to waken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is called progress.[60]

> Through a curious reversal peculiar to our age, it is innocence that is called on to justify itself.[61]

All innocence seems lost in an age of progress. As Benjamin's parable makes clear, even angelic innocence seems at the mercy of this raging storm. And, given the unprecedented scale of the human and environmental catastrophe we face, modern civilization must be deemed guilty in a manner not easily absolved because it is not acquired accidentally but is constitutive of progress itself. What is more, that which has been "smashed" in the name of progress has all too often been destroyed knowingly and in full recognition of its consequences.

Primitivism and its radical environmental allies can, I have argued, be re- ·
garded as engaging in a fundamental critique of this culture of contamination
from the perspective of the (lost) innocence of the state of nature. But this is
problematic precisely because if McKibben, Lefebvre and others are right the
state of nature, and the innocence associated with it no longer exist, they are
now left irretrievably behind as modernity's contaminatory processes—
ecological, economic and ethico-political—come to effect every area of life.

Primitivism is doubly problematic because, to modern eyes innocence, like
unsullied nature, is an impossible ideal. Indeed it might be fair to say that inno-
cence is far from being regarded a virtue, that it is anathema to progress, in
almost every way its opposite and its opposition. Political, epistemological and
ethical progress are all predicated on the end of innocence. Knowledge and in-
nocence cannot, we are told, coexist. While progress pins its hopes on an
unspecified future, innocence always lies in the past, as something lost in child-
hood or left behind in Eden, and once gone it cannot, so it is claimed, be
regained. To be in a state of innocence is at best a mixed blessing, since it sug-
gests a blissful ignorance about the difficulties that must be overcome in the
"real world" and a failure to understand the requirements of *realpolitik*. From
the point of view of progress the innocent is a dupe, a gullible simpleton un-
aware of the future's myriad possibilities and always open to manipulation by
the Machiavellian activities of others. The loss of innocence is then, the progres-
sive claims, a small price to pay to secure intellectual, individual and political
"freedoms." Since the time of Hobbes and Locke this has been modernity's alibi
for the horrors it continues to commit; this is the Faustian (social) pact that, from
the perspective of primitivism, may yet condemn us all to an ecological hell here
on Earth.

Innocence is that which would remain outside civilization's social, eco-
nomic, and moral order and so the innocent is, by definition, unable or unwilling
to *contract* with others. Innocence is that which remains disassociated from the
world of use, exchange, and even moral values. Innocence defies (capitalism's)
logic; it claims to but simply cannot (be allowed to) exist. And so innocence
must, as Camus remarks, be made to justify itself, brought to trial, because of
the danger it poses to the all encompassing (post)modern order. Innocence must
be presumed guilty, it must in some way be made complicit, for only then can
modernity assuage its own guilt, transferring and dispersing it, shifting it as (the
market's) needs require from one place to another in order to continue, to "pro-
gress." And so modernity conspires to eliminate the very possibility of
innocence. Progress, embodied in the form of Integrated World Capitalism[62] and
wearing the mantle of democracy strives to be ever more "inclusive," to eradi-
cate or incorporate whatever resists the incessant pressures to be used,
commodified and transformed. Nothing must be allowed to stand outside the
vortex of capital's circulation, everything and everyone must have a price. And
so the "democracy" peculiar to our age must ensure that all this destruction has
been carried out in *our* name and that, to some extent, we are all implicated in

this guilt. Our taxes are used to buy yet more weapons of destruction. Our attempts to buy happiness serve only to bury entire ecosystems under mountains of rubbish and rising sea-levels. And this voluntary and enforced complicity is very much to the advantage of those who profit most from modernity's and capitalism's depredations since, being guilty ourselves, who amongst us can throw the first stone?

Let us be clear what is being argued here. Innocence is that which is external to, or precedes, the moral order. It is amoral and anarchic, neither knowing nor respecting "right" or "wrong," but acting only according to desire and need. As Kierkegaard argues, knowledge of good and evil is the sign of Adam's *loss* of innocence, it is a distinction that can only "follow as a consequence of the enjoyment of the [forbidden] fruit" of knowledge.[63] "It appears, at first view, that men in a state of nature, having no moral relations or determinate obligations one with another could not be either good or bad, virtuous or vicious."[64] Rousseau recognizes that such amorality may seem terrible to his "civilized" readers but, he argues, we must not prejudge the issues. We must look and see whether post-contractual life is any better—"whether virtues or vices preponderate among civilized men: and whether their virtues do them more good than their vices do harm."[65] Innocence is an ideal, like "the state of nature" and Eden itself, that encapsulates that which is lost through progress, and it survives only to the extent that it has not been compromised. Thus innocence (amorality) always and everywhere threatens to expose the guilt (immorality) of the social order that would destroy it. That which is innocent cannot enter into the moral compromises entailed by the social contract and survive. And, since the dominant political philosophy of modernity presupposes (and requires for its legitimacy) that this social contract be *all*-inclusive, the survival of innocence threatens its totalizing ambitions.

I am arguing then that primitivist discourses about freedom, naturalness, and so on can also be read as a knowing or unknowing parable of innocence (as Rousseau's was). From this perspective modern civilization is premised upon and requires the end of innocence. Let me give just one example that has nothing (and everything) to do with the primitivist critique. Despite, indeed because of, the social and technological contract with "progress" our towns and cities are not the places of free association that real liberty requires. We are watched by technology's eye in the service of the state and IWC. Of course, those who "police" us argue that "the innocent have nothing to fear." "If one is really innocent," the argument goes "then why be concerned about even the most constant and intrusive surveillance; it's only the guilty that are caught." But this is not true nor, as Foucault argues, is this the rationale behind panopticism.[66] We are all *captured* on CCTV and it is precisely our innocence that is lost through this constant observation. We are all deemed (potentially) guilty. None of us is beyond the camera's suspicions and all are made subject to and must internalize the moral norms it imposes. In other words we are all on trial and presumed

guilty and we are never *proven* innocent since these observations proceed into an indefinite future. (Onora O'Neill has recently described this situation in terms of a "culture of suspicion.") Our voluntary or involuntary compliance entails the loss of innocence, the acceptance of one's potential guilt in the eyes of others and the right of the state and Integrated World Capitalism to sit in judgement over you. This "democratic" dispersal of guilt contaminates everyone; the amorality of innocence is transformed into a kind of moral capital to be traded on camera in the market of the mall. Guilt is shifted onto others and accumulates around the real "innocents," those that cannot or do not recognise the malls' moral order, those that pose a danger by persistently refusing to shop or by treating the shopping centre as something other than a space for consumerism. These people are followed, harassed and moved on in the name of moral "security." Thus, as Camus argued, it is indeed innocence that it is called upon to justify itself, to justify why it should (but will not) be allowed to survive outside the panopticon's vision—a vision extending well beyond the confines of the mall into every aspect of contemporary life.

Those who would try to retain or regain an ideal of innocence, those who rebel against the burden of guilt that "progress" would place upon them, thus disturb the silent acquiescence that the proponents of progress and capital expect and demand. The mantra of the rich and powerful is always that we must move forward, must have freer markets, more economic growth, more technology, more control, more capital, more of the same. There is no (reasonable) alternative, no going back. Thus those who challenge the "progressive" rationale of modernity must be guilty of the most terrible of modernity's crimes, "irrationality." Innocence is a most *unreasonable* ideal for it suggests that somewhere, something might yet stand outside of modernity's (im)moral order, that something might survive the storm we call progress intact.

The real importance of primitivism, despite its political impracticalities, is that it goes to the root of modernity's self-serving ethico-political justifications, it revisits its myth of origins and challenges its "progressive" presuppositions. The innocence and purity of the state of nature—its amorality—provides a clear point of contrast to the immorality of the culture of contamination. *This is always and everywhere the role of innocence, to stand as a mythic contrast to the corrupting influence of work, money and realpolitik.* Without innocence (amorality) then morality itself becomes meaningless as anything other than compliance with social norms. It ceases to share in what Eliade refers to as the "transhuman life, that of the cosmos or the Gods."[67] Without an ideal of innocence then the new Orwellian world order of Integrated world Capitalism can indeed adjudge us all guilty all of the time and act upon this judgement as and when its requirements demand. Similarly, without an ideal of pure nature then all nature risks being reduced to its human functions (as a standing reserve) and can and will be transformed as and when the system requires. This is why claims that nature is no more are wrong and dangerous and signify compliance with the current world order.[68]

But where many primitivists go wrong is in thinking that innocence is a state of being, a life that can be lived; that the state of nature is something we can actually inhabit, a future possibility. Ironically, like Locke, and contra Rousseau, writers like Perlman and Zerzan think that such a state is a straightforwardly *mundane* reality rather than a meaningful mythic account of the human predicament.[69] They call upon archaeological evidence and employ anthropological accounts of contemporary indigenous populations to support the *everyday reality* of past and present primitivist communities. But, as Eliade argues this is not the purpose of a myth. To "tell a myth is to proclaim what happened *ab origine*"[70] and thereby make of this telling an "apodictic truth," a "sacred reality." The myth of the social contract, of leaving behind the state of nature through progress is the apodictic truth, the sacred modernist shibboleth that (ironically) underlies its program of desacrilization. Reading this myth literally means that the primitivist finds themselves limited to reversing modernity's evaluations thus explicitly endorsing the modernist dichotomy between (the state of) nature and culture. Surely a more important critical point can be taken from primitivism's attempt to go "back to the beginning," namely that whatever its rationalistic and de-mystifying pretensions modernity too relies upon its own myths to justify its existence, myths that arbitrarily counter-pose progress and innocence, culture and nature.

Where modernism feeds off and seeks to eradicate innocence and nature, where it judges its progress by the distance it puts between itself and the state of nature, the primitivists regard themselves in Hegel's (disparaging) term as "buried in nature."[71] What both parties fail to recognize is that *all* cultures, even the most "primitive," are *moral* worlds that transcend (go beyond) but can *never* entirely leave behind nature. The primitivist must recognise that the amorality (innocence) of the state of nature is not something that can exist in its pure form where human social life is concerned. As Rousseau recognized innocence is something that could be maintained, if at all, only in absolute isolation from everyday life and our fellow humans. This of course is why attempts to retain innocence have always revolved around trying and failing to keep the "innocent" absolutely separate from and uncontaminated by everyday life. It is also why nature purists have all too often insisted on removing all human inhabitants from those idealized islands of untrammelled nature like Yosemite in order to preserve them. On the other hand, the important message from primitivism's analysis of the "culture of contamination" has to be that a genuinely moral and civil(ized) society requires ideals of natural innocence and pure nature. These ideals, which embody a world that transcends (goes beyond) the everyday realities of contemporary culture, cannot be erased without dire consequences. The ideal of amorality (innocence) is what sustains moral worlds; *it is in the dialectic between innocence and guilt that ethical choice exists*. In eradicating all semblance of the sacred and the natural modernity genuinely leaves us without

ethical alternatives, reducing us to a (brave) new realm of necessity rather than choice.

Of course, such ideals cannot exist in isolation. The state of nature may be a myth but it is not simply fictional, it is a sacred (ethical) ontology. It is an ethical expression of the desire and wonder we can still experience in relation to human and non-human Others. And since, as Rousseau so rightly remarked the state of nature "perhaps never did, and probably never will exist" then perhaps the claims of Lefebvre and McKibben need not seem quite so apocalyptic. Nature still survives and re-emerges on modernity's margins and innocence, like Benjamin's angel, continues to critically survey the results of modernity's storm. The "angel of history," like the remnants of the rainforests, stands as an unanswerable indictment of the destruction wreaked in progress" name. Despite modernity's best efforts, we still do inhabit and can experience a world of incredible cultural differences and (bio)diversity. We still have the choice of how to respond to that world. Insofar as it helps to emphasise such choices primitivism need not necessarily be regarded as either extreme or entirely naïve.

Notes

1. John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True, Original Extent and End of Civil Government" in *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 269.

2. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages" in John H. Moran and Alexander Gode, *Two Essays on the Origin of Languages* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 50.

3. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), p. 82.

4. Although in other writings Rousseau's account seems much closer to Hobbes. Rousseau sometimes suggests that it was really only the fact that there was little social interaction between widely separated individuals that stopped the war of one against all. "These barbaric times were a golden age, not because men were united, but because they were separated. . . . His needs, far from drawing him closer to his fellows, drove him from them. If you wish men would attack each other when they met, but they rarely met. A state of war prevailed universally, and the entire earth was at peace" (Rousseau, 1986, p. 33).

5. Locke, 1988, p. 76.

6. Rousseau, 1986, p. 44.

7. Locke, 1988, p. 288.

8. *Ibid.*

9. *Ibid.*

10. *Ibid.*, p. 289.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 292.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 293.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 301.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 302.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

16. By this I mean that while Locke may have been influenced to some degree by prevailing scientific attitudes and even contributed to the "evolution of a mechanistic materialism" [Arran Gare, *Nihilism Incorporated* (Bungendore NSW Australia: Ecological Press, 1993) and the "cultural assimilation of Newtonianism" (Freya Mathews, *The Ecological Self* (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 20], his philosophical references to the new science and technologies are few and far between. Locke was not, in any straightforward sense, a Baconian (Richard Aaron, *John Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1971), p. 12.

17. Kurt Vonnnegut, *Slaughterhouse Five* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969).

18. Louis Althusser, *Essays on Ideology* (London: Verso, 1993).

19. Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (London: Routledge, 1991).

20. Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 169.

21. Anon, *Green Anarchist* 63 (2001).

22. Luddites On-Line http://www.anticode.com/luddites/index2.html accessed 21/6/01.

23. Fredy Perlman, *Against His-story, Against Leviathan!* (Detroit: Black and Red., 1983).

24. Blissett and Home, n.d

25. John Zerzan, *Future Primitive and Other Essays* (New York: Autonomedia, 1994) and *Elements of Refusal* (Columbia: CAL Press, 1999).

26. There are problems with using the terms primitivism and primitivist. First, because they may over-emphasize similarities between a heterogeneous community of writers, theorists and activists. Second, because such labels often become unnecessarily limiting. *Green Anarchist* magazine, for long the main proponents of primitivism in Britain, has recently dropped the phrase "for the destruction of civilization" from its masthead announcing that it was "sloughing of the millstone of primitivism" (Anon, 2001: 8). Third, because "primitive" has certain derogatory connotations. Thus Fredy Perlman states "I wouldn"t use the word Primitive to refer to a people with a richness of life. I would use the word Primitive to refer to myself and my contemporaries, with our progressive poverty of life" (Perlman, 1983).

27. George Bradford, *How Deep is Deep Ecology* (Ojai, California: Times Change Press, 1983), p. 3.

28. See for example Zerzan, 1994, pp. 164-6.

29. Bradford, 1983; Murray Bookchin and David Foreman, *Defending the Earth* (Boston: South End Press, 1991).

30. Though here the analyses of the ecological modernists like Beck and Giddens and radical environmentalism part company, since the former's solution is merely a more "reflexive" version of the same global and technical managerialism. It still wishes to transform all about it in the name of human progress.

31. Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of the Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (London: Routledge, 1992).

32. Val Plumwood, *Feminism and the Mastery of Nature* (London: Routledge, 1993); Michael Thompson, "The Management of Hazardous Wastes and the Hazards of

Wasteful Management," in *Dirty Words: Writings on the History and Culture of Pollution*, ed. Hannah Bradby (London: Earthscan, 1990).

33. Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968); Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane. The Nature of Religion* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1987).

34. Mick Smith, *An Ethics of Place: Radical Ecology, Postmodernity and Social Theory* (New York: SUNY, 2001).

35. M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology" in *Basic Writings*, ed. David Farell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 322.

36. Bill McKibben, *The End of Nature* (London: Penguin, 1990).

37. Richard Norton-Taylor, "Navy's anti-sub frigates to fire shots as warnings to dolphins," *The Guardian* (Aug. 21, 2001), p. 4.

38. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 31.

39. Felix Guattari, *The Three Ecologies* (London: Athlone Press, 2000), p. 47.

40. Some environmentalists might also wish to highlight the epistemological issues that Locke confined to his supposedly "non-political" writings, that is the extreme empiricism of his essay on human understanding [John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996)]. Locke's approach could be read as undermining traditional varieties of knowledge in favor of the constantly "progressing" accumulation of information that supposedly underpins and justifies the language and practices of modern science. Indeed commentators like Vandana Shiva speak of the extinction of traditional worldviews and the predominance of a language of techno-science precisely in terms of a form of "epistemological contamination" [Vanda Shiva, *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development* (London: Zed Books, 1994)]. This however is a complex question that cannot be addressed fully here.

41. Lefebvre, p. 31.

42. John Moore, *A Primitivist Primer* http://www.eco-action.org/dt/primer.html 2001, accessed 21/06/01, p. 2.

43. Zerzan, 1994, p. 16. "The structure (non-structure?) of egalitarian bands, even those most oriented toward hunting, includes a guarantee of autonomy to both sexes," p. 38.

44. Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (London: Tavistock, 1974). "The !Kung people miraculously survived into our own exterminating age. R.E. Leakey observed them in their lush African forest homeland. They cultivated nothing except themselves. They made themselves what they wished to be. They were not determined by anything beyond their own being—not by alarm clocks, not by debts, not by orders from superiors. They feasted and celebrated and played, full-time, except when they slept. They shared everything with their communities: food, experiences, visions, songs. Great personal satisfaction, deep inner joy, came from the sharing," Perlman, 1983, p. 38.

45. Zerzan, 1994, p. 23.

46. Perlman, p. 38

47. *Ibid.*, p. 144.

48. Mick Smith, "To Speak of Trees: Social Constructivism, Environmental Values, and the Futures of Deep Ecology" *Environmental Ethics* 21:4 (1999), pp. 359-76.

49. Zerzan, 1994, p. 46.

50. Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia" in *On Metapsychology* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991) and Mick Smith, "Environmental Anamnesis: Walter Benjamin and the Ethics of Extinction," *Environmental Ethics*, 23:4 (2001b), pp. 359-76.

51. Edward Abbey, *The Monkey Wrench Gang* (New York: Avon, 1979).

52. Edward Abbey, *Abbey's Road* (New York: Plume, 1991a), p. 141.

53. Edward Abbey, *Down the River* (New York: Plume, 1991b), p. 237.

54. Edward Abbey, *The Journey Home* (New York: Plume, 1991c), p. 47.

55. George Sessions, "Ecological Consciousness and Paradigm Change" in *Deep Ecology*, ed. Michael Tobias (San Marcos, California: Avant, 1988), p. 40.

56. Dolores La Chappelle, "Sacred Land, Sacred Sex" in *ibid.*, p. 105.

57. *Ibid.*, p. 107.

58. Michael Zimmerman, "Possible Political Problems of Earth-Based Religiosity" in *Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in Deep Ecology*, ed. Eric Katz, Andrew Light and David Rothenberg (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 191.

59. Murray Bookchin, *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialectical Naturalism* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1990), p. 98.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

61. Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations* (London: Fontana, 1992), p. 242.

62. Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984), p. 12.

63. Guattari, p. 47.

64. Soren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Idea of Hereditary Sin* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 44.

65. Rousseau, 1986, p. 71.

66. *Ibid.*

67. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1991).

68. Eliade, p. 167.

69. Smith, 2001c.

70. Not all primitivists follow this line. "My outlook is not premised on the lifeways of specific primitive groups or a belief in the existence of a past golden age of humanity in harmony with nature (although this may have occurred). It's based on trying to achieve the kind of world I desire" [Michael William, "Why I am a Primitivist" http://www.insurgentdesire.org.uk/amaprimitivist.htm (2001) accessed November 23, 2008].

71. Eliade, p. 95.

72. Hegel, quoted in Eliade, p. 166.

Part 7: Anarchism and Culture

22

What Is Anarchist Cultural Studies? Precursors, Problems, and Prospects

Jesse Cohn

Beyond Banality?

For many readers, the more obvious question pre-empted or prompted by the question in my title—depending on where one is standing—might be: what on earth has cultural studies got to do with anarchism? Many anarchists are so suspicious of the pretensions of the academy as to find the very notion of an "anarchist cultural studies" ridiculous on the face of it. On the other hand, many academics, comfortable with the notion that their scholarship constitutes a sufficient form of political practice, are inevitably surprised to hear that there is or ever has been a radical politics outside of the theoretical categories with which they are familiar. Debates within cultural studies have so long shuttled back and forth between two poles that most seem to have assumed that the question of cultural studies' politics can only be a matter of finding the right ratio between them. As Juliana Spahr writes:

> One the one hand, much of the criticism called "cultural studies" fetishizes resistance by locating it in all sorts of acts, from wearing nose rings to participating in the black power movement; on the other, those who deny the efficacy of resistance point to large structures of power that co-opt through reification any move towards freedom. Both positions have their seductions and their problems. The resistance school, despite its egalitarian pursuits, is sometimes guilty of what Meaghan Morris calls "banality." The reification school, despite its needed attention to structures of power, leans toward a vision of an equally banal world that allows no room for agency.[1]

On the one side, then, we have what Jude Davies calls "the celebrative mode of cultural populism," for which the consumer always actively appropriates the commodity and decides its meaning, so that, in effect, we always already live in a "semiotic democracy"; on the other side, we have the "primacy of political economy" school, for whom a totality of vast social structures and forces more or less completely overdetermine the supposed choices of the supposedly individual consumer-citizen.[2] We might reduce these to a chart:

Resistance	Reification
Choices	Forces
Textuality	Materiality
Subversion	Hegemony
Agency	Structure
Plurality	Totality
semiotic democracy	semiotic totalitarianism
Optimism	Pessimism

While these might seem to represent two mutually incompatible accounts of culture, they are in certain ways rather too close to one another, as Spahr suggests. David Graeber argues that they are indeed flip sides of the same coin: "if everything is equally corrupt, then pretty much anything could be open for redemption. Why not, say, those creative and slightly offbeat forms of mass consumption favored by upper-middle-class academics?"[3] It's easy to see, then, why Morris was ready to grumble, by the late 1980s, that "somewhere in some English publisher's vault there is a master disk from which thousands of versions of the same article about pleasure, resistance, and the politics of consumption are being run off under different names with minor variations."[4]

The experience of banality blunts criticism. For those who have lived for so long within the resistance/reification binary, the notion that there could be any political position outside of it is likely to elicit a skeptical dismissal.[5] Perhaps this skepticism can even be read, as Alan O'Connor suggests, as a kind of cynical reflex, the symptom of cultural studies' institutional origins as "a product of revolution blocked"—the historic retreat of radical critique from the streets to the safe haven of the university.[6]

I don't intend to invent anything here; that is, I will not propose, *ex nihilo*, to establish some new variety of theory (an as-yet unexploited brand?) that would be called "anarchist cultural studies." What I want to show, rather, is that anarchists have pretty much always been interested in and actively theorizing about and investigating the kinds of things that now get called "cultural studies"; that, moreover, this interest, this theorizing, this investigation have assumed some significantly regular, coherent forms (if perhaps not coherent enough to warrant the singular form of the verb, "is," as dictated by convention); that, in

short, something that could be and has been called "anarchist cultural studies" *already exists.*

The Politics of What?

What *is* now called cultural studies? There are significant differences between varieties, and its practitioners have insisted, from the moment the institutional status of the field began to gel, that "cultural studies is not one thing; it has never been one thing."[7] Nonetheless, one might characterize it as

a) an interdisciplinary field of study (formed primarily of bits of all the humanities and social sciences, with literary studies, communications, and critical theory as primary influences)

b) that takes as its object all manner of "cultural" phenomena, i.e., those phenomena of *meaning-making* and *identification* entailed in what Richard Johnson calls "historical forms of consciousness or subjectivity, or the subjective forms we live by,"[8]

c) including (in a departure from the literary model) what was once called "mass culture" but which is now generally called "popular culture," and

d) finding these cultural phenomena not only in the form of distinct, unique artifacts but also (even primarily) disseminated throughout the fabric of ordinary experience, or "everyday life."

In this sense, while cultural studies is often thought of as a transformation of literary studies by the application of literary theory to pop-cultural "texts," it might be better thought of as a kind of ethnography that has come home (to the West, that is) to roost, isolating bits of mundane experience that we (Western subjects, that is) have come to take as normal or natural, and employing an entire bag of interpretive tricks to unmask their artificial character, i.e., their "cultural" being, making them seem strange again.

Some of these themes—a certain anti-disciplinarity, a populist stance, a keen interest in debunking the normality of the normal—might already seem to present areas of overlap with anarchism. Indeed, this is not entirely accidental. George Orwell, "arguably the grandfather of British cultural studies,"[9] had long since paid his *Homage* to the Catalonian anarchists, and some of the Centre's founders—like their primary philosophical point of reference, Antonio Gramsci—were informed by encounters with anarchism.[10] Raymond Williams's work bears traces of this influence, albeit deliberately obscured and forgotten;[11] early in his career in the New Left, Stuart Hall could wistfully remark that "the anarchist case . . . is weak largely because it has not been put."[12]

On the other side of the Atlantic, too, we can find anarchist influences are to be found in the foundational archives of cultural studies. In the case of Gilbert Seldes's pioneering analysis of popular culture, *The Seven Lively Arts* (1924),

this influence was literally parental, reflecting the democratic egalitarianism of his upbringing by immigrant anarchist parents.[13] A recent anthology, *Growing Up Postmodern: Neoliberalism and the War on the Young* (2002), pays explicit tribute to another cultural-studies forebear: the work of Paul Goodman, author of the widely appreciated *Growing Up Absurd* (1959), among numerous other works of what can be seen retrospectively as cultural studies *avant la lettre*. A prototypical cultural-studies scholar, Goodman, reflecting on the "impressive list of topics that I spread myself thin over"—in lectures, articles, and books on cinema and city planning, pornography and the philosophy of language, Kafka and queerness, television and therapy—refused to call his work "interdisciplinary," as this term still recognizes the legitimacy of "disciplines."[14] In the 1940s, this attitude endeared Goodman, as well as fellow anarchist intellectuals such as George Woodcock, Donald W. Calhoun, and Nicola Chiaromonte, to Dwight Macdonald, who increasingly sought to make his influential journal, *politics* (1944-1949), into a forum for a kind of broad-ranging "non-Marxist social criticism"—another prototype for American cultural studies. Significantly, it was the "Popular Culture" section in *politics* that debuted Goodman's signature piece, "Notes on Neo-Functionalism," with its playful and perceptive analyses of the values embedded in bits of everyday life (a "Theory of Packaging," a "Theory of Home Furnishings," of "Time" and "Advertising," of "Public" and "Private" spaces, etc.).

Anarchist Precursors

What does not appear in this archive are a number of notable precedents set by anarchists of previous generations, dating from the very origins of the movement. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon's work, it is worth remembering, began with *De l'Utilité de la Célébration du dimanche* (*The Utility of the Observance of Sunday*, 1839),[15] an examination of what is, on the foregoing terms, a classically cultural-studies subject: a bit of "everyday life" singled out for scholarly attention, seen as a repository of historically-constructed collective meaning.

Beginning in something like the mode of a more traditional history of the institution of the Sabbath, Proudhon's study ventures ever farther afield, propelled by a pragmatist agenda for which even a religion that one refuses to take at its word, "from a purely human point of view," may be seen to hide "rational contents [*choses raisonnables*]."[16] These contents are taken to be the work of a "spontaneous genius,"[17] the product of interplay between attempts by religious agencies to exercise control and discipline and the sometimes inchoate desires of peoples for free self-development, for the expression of personality and identity. The result is something that is not quite a conventional history of ideas, for which Sunday expresses the thoughts of one or several thinkers,[18] nor only a

materialist sociological survey, for which Sunday merely expresses class inter-ests and commercial imperatives:[19]

> No other living creature suspends its work: man alone will stop for one day. What will he make of his long and floating thoughts? Hardly is he torn from sleep, and already his inertia weighs on him: the evening arrives, and the day appears to him to have lasted two suns. . . . For frivolous types, Sunday is a day of an unbearable relaxation, of a dreadful vacuum: they complain of the ennui that overpowers them: they blame it on the slowness of these unproductive hours, which they do not know how to spend. If they flee into polite visits and worldly conversations, they only add the emptiness of others' thoughts to the emptiness of their own. From this come the inventions of vice and the monstrous joys of the orgy. . . . They draw from it only the numbness that stupefies them, this inconsistency of the heart and the understanding that depletes them, the dumb paralysis that gnaws at them. When its companion is unemployed, the soul only goes faster: take care, if you do not know how to give food to its devouring activity, that it does not consume itself. . . . Blessed is the man who knows how to shut himself within the solitude of his heart! There, he keeps himself company; his imagination, his memories, his thoughts suffice him. Whether he then walks along the busy streets, lingers in public places, visits monuments, or whether, more felicitously, he wanders through fields and meadows and breathes the woodland air, it matters little; he meditates, he dreams; everywhere his thought, sad or happy, elegant or sublime, belongs to him. Thus it is that he judges everything soundly, that his heart is detached, that his conscience is fortified, his will sharpened, that he feels virtue surge in his breast. [20]

This is also an inquiry into the phenomenology of Sunday, into the range of felt, experienced, and lived meanings. Assumptions embedded in this account can be seen to include the ideas that

- people's identities are formed not only by work, but by the time and space for *leisure* or *play*, which likewise give scope to various human possibilities and powers;
- culture is to be found not only in texts or artifacts produced within a purportedly self-contained "cultural" sphere ("art"), but everywhere that we find *signifying practices* in operation—that is to say, in *everyday life*;
- that the meanings and identities produced by signifying practices are not a foregone conclusion, but something *variable*—even, at times, unpredictable.

Thus, as Pierre Ansart observes, "social activity is permeated by meanings or, in Proudhon's words, ideas."[21] More so than Marx, then, Proudhon engages with something like the twentieth-century anthropological conception of culture as "a particular way of life" rather than the more bounded conception of culture as "the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity."[22]

Proudhon's shift from a restricted to a general conception of "culture" was the very maneuver by which cultural studies declared its freedom from the limits

of canonical tastes as well as academic disciplines. In a similar move, Voltairine de Cleyre, in an 1910 essay on "Literature as the Mirror of Man," proposes "a more inclusive view of Literature" as "the entire body of a people's expressed thought, preserved either traditionally"—i.e., orally—"in writing, or in print": "you see I would have it extended both up and down—*down* even to the advertisement, the sporting page, and the surrepetitious anecdote—*up* to the fullest and most comprehensive statements of the works of reason."[23] This meant treating as "literature"—and as such, an expression of "Man's Soul"—"not only standard novels, stories, sketches, travels, and magazine essays of all sorts, but the poorest, paltriest dime novel, detective story, daily newspaper report, baseball game account, and splash advertisement."[24] The point of such an exercise was to subject both "high" and "low" culture to an analysis that would be both pluralist—open to the multiplicity of possible meanings—*and* critical, skeptical, resisting.[25]

De Cleyre demonstrates: a fragment of an Old English chronicle can be read the same way as a contemporary newspaper, not only for its explicit statements, but for the value judgments implicit in what the authors of both texts had found worthy of "chronicling." Why do the Anglo-Saxon scribes record the career of bishops and not those of shoemakers? Why are the front pages of Philadelphia's dailies covered with news of the Jeffries-Johnson fight? "Literature" as traditionally understood is no less susceptible of this kind of inquiry: Why are the most prominent modern novels, products of an age of scientific reason, so preoccupied with the irrational and the perverse?[26] Asking questions like these, we read "with one eye on the page, so to speak, and the other . . . looking for the mind behind the work, the things which interested the author and those he wrote for."[27]

Whose "Popular Culture"?

The result of this "reading with a double intent"[28] is not unrestrained enthusiasm for mass culture as the *vox populi*. "Consider the soul reflected on the advertising page," de Cleyre writes: "Oh, the gull, the simpleton, the would-be getter of something for nothing whose existence it argues!"[29] Indeed, there are grounds here for a cultural pessimism: if we can read the texts of high and low culture next to one another, it is perhaps a sign that both are thoroughly imbued with the preeminent ideologies of their time and place, whether the form of this ideology should happen to be feudalist or commercialist. There is indeed a strong note of such hostility to culture in the anarchist tradition, which Jude Davies dates back to Mikhail Bakunin's fulmination against the ruling classes as "systematic poisoners, interested stupefiers of the popular masses."[30] Herbert Read, too, in his attack on the "culture" of the 1940s, used the metaphor of poison, quoting from his friend, the radical artisan Eric Gill: "'culture' is dope, a worse dope than

religion; for even if it were true that religion is the opiate of the people, it is worse to poison yourself than to be poisoned."[31] Long before Macdonald's attack on "Masscult," Édouard Rothen attacked the mass culture of the early twentieth century as "bread and circuses":

> For a long time, the workers . . . had no better means to to satisfy their need for art than the degradation of the tavern, pompously called "the salon of the poor" by the demagogues, the garbage of café-concerts, the unliterary silliness of serialized fiction. To this has been added the cinema, rendered as stupid as possible, then boxing matches and bullfights. The so-called "sovereign" people of the 20th century find, in the poisoned slums where social diseases devour those whom war has spared, and in the circuses, the existence and the joys that were those of the Roman plebs: *Panem et circenses!*[32]

Rothen's preference is for the "popular and collective" culture which he finds typified by the "oral literature" of folktalkes—an integral part of a "social life that integrated individualities into a single whole of thought and activity shaped by corporative spirit and solidarity."[33] The invocation of orality here is significant: while anarchists have generally been enthusiastic, even zealous propagators of literacy,[34] anarchist models of a genuinely *popular* culture—a culture which is *by* and *of* "the people" as well as *for* it, in contrast to commercial or mass culture—tend to valorize oral cultures. Even in some of the most powerful anarchist *writing*, that of such supreme propagandists as Jules Vallès and Émile Pouget, there is a certain return of the oral, an appeal to the fluidity and immediacy of the spoken word—what Paul Goodman calls "the animal, spontaneous, artistic, and populist forces in speech."[35]

It is not accidental that the kinds of human community whose lifeways have most resembled modern conceptions of anarchism have been by and large oral communities: small, decentralized, close-knit, held together by informal ties rather than formal institutions. Conversely, as Macdonald suggested, we might look at mass culture as a (failed) *surrogate* for a defunct "community."[36] Whereas an oral culture lacks many "less than convivial" means for the circulation of ideas, images, and information,[37] one of the preconditions for a mass media, as Rudolf Rocker points out, is the decline of informal, oral communities, creating the need for some force to hold together millions of anonymous strangers: "In the modern great cities and centres of industrial activity live, closely crowded, millions of men who by the pressure of the radio, cinema, education, party, and a hundred other means are constantly drilled spiritually and mentally into a definite, prescribed attitude . . ." This "attitude," of course, will tend to be the kind of attitude favorable to the "capitalist industrialism" of which these media are extensions, evoking the spectre of "the possibility of national mass suggestion in a measure undreamed of before."[38]

Consequently, anarchist models of a genuinely popular culture tend to be premodern—e.g., for Kropotkin and Read, that of the medieval and Greek city-states.[39] De Cleyre, too, valorizes the vitality of oral culture:

> A people which shall be fully permeated with the spirit and word of Science will never conceive great poems. They will never be overcome long enough at a time by their wonder and admiration, by their primitive impulses, by their power of simple impression, to think or to speak poetically. . . . No, the great poems of the world *have been* produced; they have sung their song and gone their way. Imagination remains to us, but weakened, mixed, tamed, calmed. Verses we shall have,—and *many* fragments—fragments of beauty and power; but never again the thunder-roll of the mighty early song. We have the benefits of Science; we must have its derogations also.[40]

Here, anarchist cultural critique seems to approximate a technological determinism that would seem to allow for very little in the way of hope for the future indeed. Indeed, these conclusions do not sit easily with anarchist aspirations to social transformation: thus, responding to George Bradford's gloomy meditations on "Media: Capital's Global Village," Murray Bookchin accuses Bradford (aka David Watson) of succumbing to an "intellectually paralyzing reductionism" that "regards capitalism as . . . a mere expression of a supposed technological imperative."[41]

Spaces of Transformation

However, the cultural critiques voiced by anarchists such as de Cleyre and Bradford are not only backward-looking, nor are they unqualified in their pessimism. Bradford looks to the interstices of the modern world—to *spaces* such as "people's houses" or "the street"—for areas "where it is still possible to transgress the code of media" in "unmediated, face-to-face dialogue."[42] Bookchin, too, finds in the modern city a repressed but as yet unextinguished potential for the re-emergence of "a genuine public sphere and a vital body politic."[43] While Bookchin draws his sense of the potential of urban space largely from such forerunners as Kropotkin,[44] this interest in spatiality has even deeper anarchist roots, extending back to Proudhon himself.

The space as well as the time of leisure drew Proudhon's attention. Witness his indignation, in *De la Justice* (1858), at the forced closing of taverns by the police ("at the request of the Church") on public-morals grounds:

> What, you ask, do morals have in common with the tavern?—First, a tavern is a property, and I have never heard that the police or the factory, after pulling out the corks, has compensated the owners. But I do want to take the thing in its most frivolous aspect, the pleasure of the consumer. For thirty years, I have frequented cafés, taverns, diners, pubs, restaurants; the *casino*, or club, is above

my means. When I was single, I had no salon other than the café; as a married man, from time to time, I find there a distraction that is always pleasant with a company that I encounter nowhere else. Since the Revolution, the café and the tavern have entered increasingly into the lifeways of the peasant. Not everyone is able to get his wine or beer in his cellar: the public establishment is necessary. Let the father be taught not to be drunk, not to devour the livelihood of his wife and children. . . . But I would argue that these venues have done more for the progress of civilization than the house of prayer. . . . It is true that one learns there less adoration than freedom: that is why the church, the aristocracy, and power hate them. Their security requires that citizens live alone in their homes, kept in solitary confinement. Ban on open meetings, obstruction of morality.[45]

Quite apart from the issue of property rights with which he is often conflated in Anglo-American accounts of his work, Proudhon is keen to inquire into "the pleasure of the consumer": what *kind* of pleasure comes from sitting in a tavern and drinking? It is partly the comfort of having a semi-protected space in which to relax, a surrogate "salon" or living room; indeed, Proudhon's personal experience appears to have been representative on this score. As W. Scott Haine remarks in his history of the café:

The Paris working class coped with a severe housing crisis by appropriating the café. Workers as individuals and families lacked the money necessary to own private property and enjoy the accompanying prerogatives of privacy, but they did have the strength of numbers . . . for a collective appropriation of space. By continually frequenting a neighborhood, a group, or even a couple, could make a café into their own space. Such frequentation could lead to a sense of belonging, a sense of being "at home," as shown by the much greater ease with which nineteenth-century Parisians let private emotions and family matters become part of café life.[46]

While Haine here stresses the motive provided by a lack of "private" space, Proudhon gives greater emphasis to the wish for "company." Here, Proudhon perhaps betrays the influence of Charles Fourier, whose works he proofread while working in a printer's shop. In Fourier's terms, the pleasure of sharing space and comfort with others might be called an "affective passion"—specifically, "the desire for groups."[47] The pub as a (semi-)public space is called into being by unmet needs for togetherness and association; filling these needs, it helps to catalyze the growth of a kind of "public" distinctly at odds with the interests of the powerful.

Retrospectively, this observation proved largely correct: cafés, in particular, turned out to be crucial to the development of working-class movements in France, including the anarchist movement.[48] In Spain, too, cafés were crucial meeting places for *tertulias*, social gatherings of anarchists whose discussions formed shared convictions, producing the ideological basis for *grupos de afini-*

dad, intensely solidary groups of friends who formed the backbone of the pow-
erful Federación Anarquista Ibérica.[49] Thus, in their small way, taverns and ca-
fés, as *popular institutions*, form part of a larger historical narrative in which, as
Proudhon says elsewhere, "in the shadow of political institutions, out of the
sight of statesmen and priests, society is producing its own organism, slowly and
silently; and constructing a new order, the expression of its vitality and auton-
omy, and the denial of the old politics, as well as of the old religion."[50]

Against Spectatorship

If society is in the process of constructing a new order for itself, what need is
there for cultural studies? Proudhon contends that ideas are present within social
practices, that societies in action are themselves like minds in cognition; what
role does this leave for intellectuals of any kind? One might be tempted to con-
clude that this anarchist conception of critique as immanent to society returns us
to the kind of cultural populism for which the intervention of a critic is unneces-
sary, even elitist: after all, "the people" can do no wrong. Anarchism is often
supposed to consist in just such naïve optimism. However, this is a catastrophic
misreading of the anarchist tradition, which does indeed attribute considerable
importance to intellectual work, to education, to the unmasking of ideologies,
and so on.[51] Pierre Ansart clarifies:

> If the idea is given simultaneously with the practice, it is not necessarily con-
> scious for the subjects which take part in the action. There is by no means a fit
> between the practice and the consciousness of its meaning: people can engage
> in an action the real meaning of which they understand not at all or very in-
> completely. . . . Consequently . . . the essential function of the revolutionary
> thinker will be to extrapolate from the practice of social classes the implicit
> ideas immanent to their action. . . . [Moreover,] [t]o bring practice into con-
> sciousness, into the idea, is to participate directly in a revolutionary practice,
> since a class that has arrived at consciousness and theory has the elements
> which will enable it to direct its enterprise of historical change in a coherent
> manner.[52]

If anarchist cultural studies can be said to have a common project—that is, if it
can be said, as I ventured to suggest at the outset, to *exist as such*—then this is
it. It seems to me that contemporary anarchist cultural studies displays a few
distinguishing characteristics. First of all, we try to avoid reducing the politics of
popular culture to a simplistic dichotomy of "reification" versus "resistance."
It's not that we haven't got any warm feelings for either school of cultural stud-
ies. Anarchists have not always been charitable—to say the least—toward the
pretensions of mandarin "high culture" to be the last bastion of authentic thought
and feeling against a wholly barbaric "mass."[53] The affirmation of high art's

autonomy from mundane commercial pressures may have preserved a certain space for dissent,[54] but in the end, as Pierre Bourdieu suggests, it produced a second marketplace, a sphere of "cultural capital," all too closely tied to economic capital, for which it has served as an alibi. Conversely, we have always looked for spaces of liberty—even momentary, even narrow and compromised—within capitalism and the State. The attention paid by active-audience studies to possibilities for the subversion and appropriation of capitalist consumer culture was a welcome relief from the unremitting monologue of despair produced by media-effects theories. Nonetheless, we are not content to find the reflection of our desires in the mirror of commercial culture. Nor is it enough for us to affirm the mere *possibility* of certain resistant readings or subversive appropriations of cultural objects.[55] As Jeppesen argues, it is not enough to demonstrate that, contrary to the pessimism that would situate a mass-market movie like *The Matrix* into the capitalist totality (the "matrix" of which it is undeniably part and parcel—a product of AOL Time/Warner!), this product "actually does provide a temporary space where the audience can imagine a different world"; rather, "anarchist culture needs to *make* [the pessimist] wrong," to actively *colonize that space.*[56]

We deny, then, the notion that a "semiotic democracy" is something *already simply present* in capitalist modes of consumption—and we insist that any theory which celebrates capitalism as democratic has performed its own *reductio ad absurdum*. What we can affirm is that democracy, in its legitimate senses, remains a *potential* that is intermittently visible within the forms of order that *constrain* it, and that these orders cannot constrain it *completely*. In other words, we assume a *plural conception of the real*, for which, as Daniel Colson explains, a "plurality of possible worlds" subsist *within* "this existing world"; "the possible is already there, as real as the order that prohibits it from expressing what it is capable of."[57] We are critical realists and monists, in that we recognize our condition as beings embedded in a single, shared reality; at the same time, we hold that this reality is in a continuous process of change and becoming, and that at any given moment, it includes an infinity—bounded by, situated within, or "anchored" to the concrete actuality of the present—of emergent or potential realities.[58] Cleaving too firmly to one ontological pole or the other distorts reality: one ends up in the doldrums of a materialism for which nothing can move, so that identities and meanings seem forever fixed in a rigid totality, or in the vapid daydream of a textualism for which all solidity has really melted into air, selves are constructed at will out of floating signifiers, and nothing can matter.

Secondly, we tend to be highly critical of "sender-receiver" models of communication, reified caricatures of actual dialogue with little relevance to the asymmetrical, conflictual conditions in which communicative action unfolds. The schema of communication as "transmission" regnant during the formative period of British cultural studies, which it subsequently took on board, as Jack Bratich points out, without substantial modification, raises several problems for

anarchist cultural studies.[59] We object to the way it positions the "audience" as essentially passive consumers, their creative action confined to "a thin notion of interpretation."[60] Moreover, the mechanistic image of communication as a "conduit" or "conveyor belt" betrays technocratic impulses.[61] In place of this tidy picture, Farr suggests that we attend to the role played by "hostile informatives"—agents of authority, formal or informal, under whose surveillance dialogue must take place. Where the speaker-addressee model privileges "clarity" and "transparency," the complications Farr introduces focus attention on "strateg[ies] of concealment" such as the invention of subcultural code-languages and slangs.[62] Here, anarchist priorities suggest a reorientation toward what Bratich calls "occultural studies," i.e., the investigation of "popular secrecy": "tactic[s] of disappearance not identity."[63]

Finally, we resist theoretical models for which capitalism absorbs the entire field of social relationships. Take, for example, the not infrequent application of Pierre Bourdieu's notions of "symbolic capital" or "cultural capital" to the analysis of popular culture, both in its commercial and anticommercial forms (e.g., various subcultures, alternative media, and cultures of resistance).[64] Bourdieu developed the concept to analyze the ways in which even practices and institutions that purport to be beyond mundane utilitarian considerations—e.g., the scholarly pursuit of knowledge, or art for art's sake, or gift exchange—can be analyzed in terms of the utility-maximizing strategies of capitalist economics. Graeber warns that Bourdieu's bid to "extend economic calculation to *all* the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction" quickly returns us to the capitalist economist's "assumption . . . that 'objective' or 'scientific' analysis means trying to cut through to the level on which you can say people are being selfish, and that when one has discovered this, one's job is done."[65]

Indeed, this is exactly what Alan O'Connor finds in the case of Sarah Thornton's *Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital* (1995), wherein Thornton assumes that the "*subcultural*" cultural capital" accumulated by hip young Londoners—knowledge of "music and clubs that have not yet appeared in the mainstream press"—will ultimately reduce to another exercise in the disguised, deferred accumulation of economic capital. Although "rewards might come in [the form of] personal status within the scene, friendships and sexual relationships," O'Connor objects, "it is difficult to see any institution (other than those just mentioned) which will reward the investment in cultural capital with actual economic income [. . .] [P]articipation in the subculture doesn't provide them with cultural capital that has an effect on their class position or economic income."[66] Similarly, Sandra Jeppesen argues that the anticapitalist communities she studies do not merely create another mirror-image of capitalist relations (e.g., the competitive accumulation of exchangable symbols of rebellion, creating a hierarchy of radical chic) hiding behind a false "disavowal of commercial interests and profits."[67] Rather, Jeppesen's activists consistently ward off the potential for (meaningful) acts of rebellion to become commodified into (empty) symbolic goods by insisting that these symbols be

continually tied back to (legitimated by) actions, and by finding ways of circulating these symbols—cultural "spaces" and "modes of distribution"—that are consistently horizontal and egalitarian.[68]

In the Belly of the Beast

Anarchist cultural studies is not always pursued within the academy; the Insti-. tute for Anarchist Studies, for instance, sponsors scholarly research primarily by people who do not fit the traditional profile of an "academic." Nonetheless, a lot of anarchists doing work on cultural studies—e.g., Randall Amster, Chris Atton, Jack Bratich, Jude Davies, Jeff Ferrell, Karen Goaman, David Graeber, Judy Greenway, Gavin Grindon, Anja Kanngieser, Josh Lukin, Neil Nehring, Sandra Jeppesen, Alan O'Connor, Jon Purkis, Audrey Vanderford, Susan White—are based in university campuses. What kind of "space" is the academy, and what is its "mode of distribution"?

An anarchist insistence on engagement in cultural transformation, an aspiration also present at the roots of the Birmingham school of cultural studies, sits uneasily with the institutional context that cultural studies has come to inhabit. Academia encourages –to some degree, enforces—a spectatorial stance;[69] state-funded schools are required to maintain an appearance of political neutrality, and private institutions (unless they are religiously sponsored) still tend to frown on practices that would endanger their official legitimacy, which remains tied to epistemological notions of objectivity and disinterestedness in which no one quite believes anymore. Anarchists, from Proudhon on forward, have insisted on a more pragmatist account of knowledge. For us, as Proudhon insisted, *"the idea . . . is born from action and must return to action."*[70]

Inevitably, a consideration of the prospects for anarchist studies of any kind in the university will invite analogies with the marxist and feminist experiences there. Such comparisons, from the perspective of a prefigurative politics, cannot be encouraging; while academia has preserved a certain domain of relative autonomy for radical thought, a necessity for survival in the political wintertime of the past quarter of a century, it has also facilitated the amputation of thought from practice, of intellectual life from community life. The more radicalism comes to resemble its "fundamentally conservative (and self-perpetuating)" institutional surroundings, the more its content has come to resemble the form.[71] Playing the game of the institution, we become engaged in the competition for symbolic currency; we become "academic capitalists," competing for prestige and privileges. Nor is this just a matter of (personal, individual) corruption or hypocrisy; to survive within the system is to be complicit in it. To a certain extent, then, the perennial anti-intellectualism of many anarchists is justifiable.

My own work—and this chapter—are not exempt from these problems. Some of what I do in the way of anarchist-oriented research I disseminate for

free; some of it I commodify, like my first book, which is probably the main thing that got me tenure. It was published by an academic press, which means hardbound, sold at a stupidly high price, etc. I did reserve the right to publish a cheap edition two years after release, but there's no escaping the irony of being somebody who believes that words, ideas, and information should be free, and at the same time, selling the expressions of this very belief. That this is more or less the same irony faced by anybody who opposes the wage system while working for a wage[72] is really not very comforting. The fact is, without entirely negating the truth-value of everything we have to say, academic capitalism does vitiate it. Ultimately, it is possible for anarchism to become just another academic fad, another way to pose as the most extreme, cutting-edge penseur on the block.

The challenge for anarchist practitioners of cultural studies is to find ways to prevent or at least limit the conversion of anarchist work in the academy into purely symbolic goods. Even if we have to produce symbolic goods for the academic market, we need to make sure that they remain "dual-use": recognizable and legitimate within an academic context, but also relevant and useful in a wider sphere. Attention to the concrete realities of political practice outside as well as inside the academy can keep us reflexive and honest; pragmatist tests of use-value (asking, for instance: Does this special term really serve as a tool useful enough to warrant the loss of transparency, or does it just serve to exclude potential listeners without contributing anything to our understanding?) can help shut down the more ridiculous kinds of competition that academics can get caught up in, which often boil down to a contest over whose special theoretical vocabulary for describing some phenomenon is the best.

Anarchist cultural studies practitioners are compelled, then, to imagine and invent ways to collaborate with people living and working outside the university. Thus, Bratich argues that we should engage in concerted skill-sharing with activist organizations,[73] while Susan White proposes that we seek to "open dialogues *outside* the academy," resituating our contributions within spaces such as "coffeehouses and bars, alternative and even mainstream presses, classrooms, and living rooms": "The large foyers of multiplexes would be a great forum for protest or discussion of films."[74] An even greater degree of active engagement would entail attempts, in the words of Neil Nehring, "not only [to] recover moments of dissent in lived or 'ordinary' culture . . . but . . . to propagate them, as the avant-garde did."[75] Thus, O'Connor advocates an "activist cultural studies" model: "Instead of theorizing about encoding and decoding," for example, "students can learn by trying to create and find an audience for an alternative television program."[76] Bratich concurs: rather than functioning purely as critical interpreters of media, we can and should "be the media," helping to produce alternatives.[77] This kind of engagement is, in fact, a kind of double inoculation against the sorts of error that fetishize "resistance" *or* "reification": on the one hand, actively tinkering with the stuff of culture elicits the optimism of the will as an antidote to the pessimism of the intellect, while on the other hand, as

O'Connor points out, a "cultural producer or political activist used to arguing against a dominant common sense" will be immune to the "naïve[té]" of the cultural populists.[78] Call it resistance/knowledge: the hard form of knowing won from wrestling with the organized will-not-to-know.

Autocritique

While anarchist scholars decline to play the role of a Leninist vanguard dictating correct "theory" to activists charged with "practice," this does not mean that they have no critical function. On the contrary: much of anarchist cultural studies is a kind of self-study, a reflection by anarchists on the conditions and possibilities of their own activity. Among the best work we have produced are studies of contemporary as well as historical anarchist tactics of cultural resistance—studies of Indymedia and infoshops, anti-roads camps and Reclaim The Streets parties, collectively-produced journals and giant puppets. Rather than simply affirming these practices, however, a number of these studies raise significant questions about their potentials and their limitations. By way of conclusion, I would like to list a few of what I would consider to be the most urgent of such questions.

An undeniably important direction in anarchist cultural studies has been the attempt to break away from the Gramscian heritage of the Birmingham school, with its orientation toward "hegemony" not only as the target of criticism (i.e., the hegemony of the ruling classes) but as the horizon of revolutionary aspirations also (i.e., the goal of "counter-hegemony," or the instauration of a proletarian hegemony).[79] Where Marx and Engels attacked Bakunin for his infatuation with secrecy and conspiratorial organization[80]—a predilection for which previous generations of anarchist historians have felt compelled to apologize, ascribing it to Bakunin's erratic temperament[81]—contemporary anarchist "occultural studies" tends rather to vindicate this orientation toward "the internal, the private, and the secret, as opposed to the external, the explicit, and the public."[82] This is linked to the theme of "exodus" as strategy:[83]

> The theory of exodus proposes that the most effective way of opposing capitalism and the liberal state is not through direct confrontation but by means of what Paolo Virno has called "engaged withdrawal," mass defection by those wishing to create new forms of community.[84]

As Richard Day has pointed out, a strategy of "withdrawing energy" from oppressive institutions and reinvesting it in liberatory counter-institutions is a classically anarchist practice, with a theoretical heritage dating back to Proudhon's theorization of "society . . . producing its own organism."[85] It also neatly bypasses the entire problematic of hegemony and counter-hegemony, since exo-

dus can be practiced on a small scale, and it can be scaled up to the dimensions of a mass movement when conditions are ripe. Nonetheless, some anarchists have questioned whether such a "withdrawal" is always "engaged" enough, or whether it can amount to simply abandoning "the social domain" for a privatized, largely subjective realm: this is precisely the danger Murray Bookchin famously (or, in certain quarters, infamously) denounced as "lifestyle anarchism."[86] From this perspective, the turn away from "mass-based organizations"—such as were the old anarcho-syndicalist unions at their strength—is part of the problem, not a solution.[87]

It is true that attempts to flood public space, with anarchist messages are fraught with perils: it is easy to become caught up in the quest for "visibility," to succumb to manipulation *by* media in the process of seeking its attention and "recognition." However, there remain serious qualms about the resort to anonymity: as Bratich acknowledges, tactics of masking and clandestinity are by no means confined to anti-authoritarian movements.[88] Removing oneself from the public gaze can also mean placing oneself beyond public scrutiny, effectively assuming a new and unchecked authority.

A related problem concerns what Roger Farr has felicitously called "protest genres"—formats, such as "campaigns, demands, marches, sit-ins, leaflets, etc.," which are generally aimed at exactly the kinds of communicative visibility and publicity that occulture refuses. Quite apart from their choice of targets—the authorities to whom "demands" are addressed, from whom "recognition" is sought—such protests are inherently limited by their format, which not only tends to evoke popular boredom more than popular enthusiasm, but which can easily be anticipated, accommodated, and managed by the authorities themselves.[89] Anarchist protest tactics—from the "parodic, postmodern camp" of the Radical Cheerleaders[90] to the subversive "playful negation" enacted by the Hamburg and Berlin Umsonst campaigns[91]—attempt to "[break] with the generic conventions of political speech . . . in favor of unpredictable and unreadable poetic acts, acts that do not 'represent' an anarchist critique but perform it."[92] At their best, such carnivalesque pranks and stunts have successfully confused authorities and defused or baffled violent responses from the police. However, they may also elicit confusion and alienation from the public at large, which sees (through the media lens) only an "unreadable," and therefore unintelligible, chaos—either ridiculous (hence to be ignored) or threatening (hence to be repressed by the forces of "public order").[93] From a communicative standpoint, the problem facing anarchists is what it has always been: as Proudhon stated it, "to live without government, to abolish all authority, absolutely and unreservedly, to set up pure *anarchy*, seems to [ordinary people] ridiculous and inconceivable."[94] For practicioners of "poetic" anarchism, however, communication may be beside the point; rather, the point is to enact desires, to create a subjective experience for oneself. "If we dare to throw ourselves into the unknown and unpredictable," the CrimethInc Workers' Collective declares, "we can break free of the feelings of inevitability and inertia that constrain our

lives."[95] As Regina Cochrane worries, this quest for "self-liberation" may terminate in an "aestheticized individualism"—or, in the words of Ramor Ryan, in "a form of self-imposed exile."[96]

What are the prospects for an anarchist counterculture that is *not* fundamentally interested in becoming a "popular culture," as were the class-based anarcho-syndicalist movements of the past? A number of observers, both anarchist and non-anarchist, have noted a distinct insider/outsider dynamic in anarchist communities.[97] To the extent that these communities tend to be homogeneous, largely composed of young white males from middle-class backgrounds, an inward-looking culture would appear to be an ideal mechanism for perpetuating this homogeneity and blocking the articulation of affinities with other potentially or actually insurrectionary social groups. In a climate of paranoia and surveillance, however, welcoming strangers also means opening the way to infiltrators and provocateurs—no small concern for anarchists.

I would argue that an important dimension of anarchist cultural studies research, for the near future, will consist in historical research: a thorough reexamination of the role of cultural resistance in the anarchist movements of the "classical" period, from the First International through the Spanish Civil War. Without turning this history into hagiography, and without neglecting the gaps and differences between past and present, we need to seek a better understanding of precisely what made anarchism susceptible of mass appeal (and for whom); of what the limits of anarchist popularity really were, and why; of the possibilities manifested by earlier experiments in the construction of an anarchist popular culture, from the parodic songs of Joe Hill to Armand Guerra's short-lived "Cinéma du Peuple" film cooperative, the "Novela Ideal" and "Novela Libre" paperback series edited by Federica Montseny, Émile Pouget's satirical *Père Peinard*, and the workers' theater of Alberto Ghiraldo.

Rifling through this dusty cabinet of magic tricks, it may be, we will rediscover the secret of the optimism that animated the earliest anarchist theorists of culture. It was Voltairine de Cleyre, for instance, who argued for a "conception of mind, or character" which is "not . . . a powerless reflection of a momentary condition of stuff and form, but an active modifying agent, reacting on its own environment and transforming circumstances."[98] This "active modifying agent" can be recognized, retrospectively, as the very prototype of the subject—so full of creative possibility, of the potential for autonomy—who appears in contemporary cultural studies.

Notes

1.   Juliana Spahr, *Everybody's Autonomy: Connective Reading and Collective Identity* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 2001), p. 154.

2.   Jude Davies, "Anarchy in the UK: Anarchism and Popular Culture in 1990s Britain" in *Twenty-First Century Anarchism: Unorthodox Ideas For a New Millennium,*

ed. Jon Purkis and James Bowen (London: Cassell, 1997, p. 70); John Fiske, *Television Culture* (New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 95.

3.   David Graeber, *Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001), p. 30.

4.   *Ibid.*, p. 21.

5.   Davies, p. 72.

6.   Alan O'Connor, "Who's Emma and the Limits of Cultural Studies," *Cultural Studies* 13.4 (1999), p. 693.

7.   Stuart Hall, "The Emergence of Cultural Studies and the Crisis in the Humanities," *October* 53 (1990), p. 11.

8.   Richard Johnson, "What Is Cultural Studies Anyway?" *Social Text* 17 (Winter-Spring 1987), p. 43.

9.   John Rodden, *Scenes from an Afterlife: The Legacy of George Orwell* (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2003), p. 2004). "Memorial for a Revolutionist: Dwight Macdonald, A Critical American." *Society* 44.5 (2007): 51-61.

10.   Carl Levy, *Gramsci and the Anarchists* (Oxford: Berg, 1999), p. 4.

11.   Alan O'Connor, "Raymond Williams and Anarchism" in *Raymond Williams* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), pp. 109-112; Jerald Zaslove, "We Shall Act: We Shall Build: The Nomadism of Herbert Read and the Thirties Legacy of a Vanished Envoy of Modernism" in *Recharting the Thirties*, ed. Patrick J. Quinn (Susquehanna University Press, 1996), p. 33.

12.   Stuart Hall, "*Lady Chatterley's Lover*: The Novel and Its Relationship to Lawrence's Work," *New Left Review* 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1960), p. 35.

13.   Michael Kammen, *The Lively Arts: Gilbert Seldes and the Transformation of Cultural Criticism in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 19, 107, 144, 190, 399.

14.   Paul Goodman, *Crazy Hope and Finite Experience: Final Essays of Paul Goodman*, ed. Taylor Stoehr (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997), p. 53.

15.   Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *De la célébration du dimanche considérée sous les rapports de l'hygiène publique, de la morale, des relations de famille et de cité* [1839] in *Œuvres complètes de P.-J. Proudhon*, 2 (Paris: Librairie Internationale, 1868) 117-192.

16.   *Ibid.*, p. 123, trans. mine.

17.   *Ibid.*, p. 119, trans. mine.

18.   *Ibid.*, p. 133.

19.   *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 133-134.

20.   *Ibid.*, p. 159, trans. mine.

21.   *Ibid.*, p. 162, trans. mine.

22.   Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 90.

23.   Voltairine de Cleyre, *Selected Works of Voltairine de Cleyre* (New York: Mother Earth Publishing Association, 1914), pp. 361, 359, 379.

24.   *Ibid.*, p. 375.

25.   *Ibid.*, pp. 379-380.

26.   *Ibid.*, pp. 371, 375-376.

27.   *Ibid.*, pp. 378-380.

28.   *Ibid.*, p. 379.

29.   *Ibid.*, p. 376.

30.   Qtd. in Davies, p. 66.

31. Herbert Read, *To Hell with Culture: And Other Essays on Art and Society* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 10.

32. Edouard Rothen, "Art," in *Encyclopédie anarchiste*, ed. Sébastien Faure (Paris: Librairie internationale, 1934), p. 143, trans. mine.

33. Rothen, "Littérature," in *Encyclopédie anarchiste*, p. 1295, trans. mine.

34. Javier Navarro Navarro, *A la revolución por la cultura: Prácticas culturales y sociabilidad libertarias en el País Valenciano, 1931-1939* (Valencia: Universitat de Valéncia, 2004), p. 147.

35. Luke Bouvier, *Writing, Voice, and the Proper: Jules Vallès and the Politics of Orality* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998), pp. 17-20; Howard Lay, "Reflecs d'un Gniaff: On Émile Pouget and *Le Père Peinard*" in *Making the News: Modernity and the Mass Press in Nineteenth-Century France*, ed. Dean de la Motte and Jeanenne M. Przybylski (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999), p. 86; Paul Goodman, *Speaking and Language: Defence of Poetry* (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 55.

36. Dwight Macdonald, "Masscult & Midcult" in *Against the American Grain* (New York: Random House, 1962), p.8.

37. Neil Birrell, "Notes on Culture and Ideology," *The Raven* 10.3.39 (Summer 1999), pp. 193-194.

38. Rudolf Rocker, *Nationalism and Culture*, trans. Ray E. Chase (Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1946), p. 253.

39. Peter Kropotkin, *The Conquest of Bread*, ed. Paul Avrich (New York: New York University Press, 1972), pp. 139-142; Read, pp. 10-11.

40. de Cleyre, pp. 374-375.

41. Murray Bookchin, *Anarchism, Marxism, and the Future of the Left* (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 1999), p. 178.

42. George Bradford [a.k.a. David Watson], "Media: Capital's Global Village" in *Reinventing Anarchy, Again*, ed. Howard J. Ehrlich (Edinburgh, Scotland: AK Press, 1996), p. 263.

43. Murray Bookchin, *Urbanization Without Cities: The Rise and Decline of Citizenship* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1992), p. 11.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

45. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *De la Justice dans la révolution et dans l'église* (Paris: Rivière, 1930-1935), 2.237-238, trans. mine.

46. W. Scott Haine, *The World of the Paris Café* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 57.

47. Charles Fourier, *Harmonian Man: Selected Writings of Charles Fourier*, ed. Mark Poster, trans. Susan Hanson (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1971), pp. 80-82.

48. Haine, p. 56. It would be unkind but cogent to point out that the tavern society that Proudhon praises is predominantly male and homosocial, as is his idea of the public. So was the Spanish *tertulia*. However, many other forms of alternative consociation invented by anarchists emphasized the mixing of genders. Mary Orgel documents the way in which Spanish anarchist youth of both sexes took up the traditional pastime of *excursionismo*, hikes in the countryside, and "imbued [it] with radical meanings," using it not only as a source of collective enjoyment, but also as a form of naturalist pedagogy—and cover for political meetings held outside the scope of government surveillance ["*Excursionismo:* An Anthropological and Anarchist Method for Exploring the Past," *Contemporary Justice Review* 5.1 (2002), pp. 35-36].

49.   Murray Bookchin, *The Spanish Anarchists: The Heroic Years, 1868-1936* (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1998), p. 105.

50.   Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, *The General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. John Beverly Robinson (London: Pluto Press, 1989), p. 243.

51.   See Judith Suissa's instructive essay on this subject ["Anarchy in the Classroom" *New Humanist* 120.5 (Sept./Oct. 2005) <http:// newhumanist.org.uk/1288 > Sept. 30, 2008] as well as Dave Morland's ["Anarchism, Human Nature and History: Lessons for the Future" in *Twenty-First Century Anarchism*, ed. Jon Purkis and James Bowen (London: Cassell, 1997), pp. 8-23] and David Hartley's ["Communitarian Anarchism and Human Nature," *Anarchist Studies* 3.2 (1995), pp. 145-164].

52.   Pierre Ansart, *Sociologie de Proudhon* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 144-145, trans. mine.

53.   Susan White, "Anarchist Perspective on Film" in *Reinventing Anarchy, Again*, ed. Howard J. Ehrlich (San Francisco: AK Press, 1996), pp. 274-275.

54.   Dwight Macdonald, "A Theory of 'Popular Culture,'" *politics* 1:1 (Feb. 1944), p. 20.

55.   Davies, p. 72.

56.   Sandra Jeppesen, "The Matrix: Revolution or Simulacrum in Hollywood?" *Social Anarchism* 36 (Spring 2004), p. 55, emphasis mine.

57.   Daniel Colson, *Petit lexique philosophique de l'anarchisme de Proudhon à Deleuze* (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 2001), p. 246, trans. mine.

58.   Colson, pp. 154, 198; Murray Bookchin, *The Philosophy of Social Ecology: Essays on Dialetical Naturalism* (Montréal: Black Rose Books, 1996), p. 27.

59.   Jack Bratich, "Activating the Multitude: Audience Powers and Cultural Studies" in *New Directions in American Reception Study*, ed. Philip Goldstein and James L. Machor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 37.

60.   *Ibid.*

61.   Roger Farr, "The Strategy of Concealment: Argot & Slang of the 'Dangerous Classes,'" *Fifth Estate* 375 (Spring 2007), p. 19; Goodman, *Speaking and Language*, pp. 218-19.

62.   Farr, pp. 19, 54.

63.   Jack Bratich, "Popular Secrecy and Occultural Studies," *Cultural Studies* 21:1 (Jan. 2007), pp. 42, 49).

64.   This term, ironically, has an unacknowledged anarchist pedigree: although Thorstein Veblen had debuted the related concept of "conspicuous consumption" in 1899, the notion of "cultural capital" was developed by Jan Waclaw Machajski as early as 1898 to describe the emergence of a new class of "intellectual workers" and the system he dubbed "state capitalism" [Lawrence King and Iván Szelényi, *Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), pp. 24-25]. Machajski's conceptions are drawn fairly directly from Bakunin's critique of Marxian "science" and "dictatorship" [Marshall Shatz, *Jan Waclaw Machajski: A Radical Critic of the Russian Intelligentsia and Socialism* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989), pp. 34-36].

65.   Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline for a Theory of Practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.178; Graeber, *Towards an Anthropological Theory*, pp. 28-29.

66.   Alan O'Connor, "The Eagle and the Hummingbird: Questions for Cultural Studies," *Pretexts: Literary and Cultural Studies* 10:1 (2001), pp. 98-99.

67. Bourdieu, qtd. in Sandra Jeppesen, "do make think: anarchy and culture," in *Culture and the State, Vol. 4: Alternative Interventions*, ed. James Gifford and Gabrielle Zezulka-Mailloux (Edmonton, Canada: CRC Humanities Studio, 2003), p. 67.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-73.

69. O'Connor, "Eagle," pp. 94-95; Neil Nehring, *Flowers in the Dustbin: Culture, Anarchy, and Postwar England* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), p. 34.

70. Proudhon, *De la Justice* 3.69, trans. mine.

71. White, "Anarchist Perspective," p. 273; Jack Bratich, "From Embedded to Machinic Intellectuals: Communication Studies and General Intellect," *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 5.1 (2008), p. 39.

72. As Luigi Galleani, one of the foremost Italian anarchist leaders of the turn of the century, ruefully admitted: "By accepting a wage, by paying rent for a house, we, with all our proclaimed revolutionary and anarchist aspirations, recognize and legitimate capital . . . in the most tangible and painful way." Anarchist "zeroworkers" attempt to circumvent these contradictions by living in squatted housing, dumpster-diving for food, and finding other ways of making do. Nonetheless, this means accepting, as the price of autonomy from wage-work, a greater degree of precarity—and, in the end, amounts to living on the periphery of industrial capitalism, not outside it.

73. Bratich, "From Embedded to Machinic Intellectuals," p. 38.

74. White "Anarchist Perspective," pp. 274-275, italics mine.

75. Nehring, *Flowers*, p. 73.

76. Alan O'Connor, "The Problem of American Cultural Studies," *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 6 (Dec. 1989), p. 409, 409n9.

77. Bratich, "From Embedded to Machinic Intellectuals," p. 38.

78. O'Connor, "Eagle," p. 95.

79. Richard Day, *Gramsci Is Dead: Anarchist Currents in the Newest Social Movements* (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 8-9.

80. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, ed. Lewis S. Feuer (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959), pp. 445-446.

81. George Woodcock, *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview, 2004), p. 123.

82. Colson, p. 165, trans. mine.

83. Bratich, "Popular Secrecy," pp. 52-53.

84. David Graeber, *Fragment of an Anarchist Anthropology* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm, 2004), pp. 60-61.

85. Day, p. 124

86. Murray Bookchin, *Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm* (San Francisco: AK Press, 1995), p. 2.

87. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

88. Bratich, "Popular Secrecy," p. 51.

89. Roger Farr, "Anarchist Poetics," *Fifth Estate* 373 (Fall 2006), pp. 34-38.

90. Regina Cochrane, "(Eco)Feminism as a 'Temporary Autonomous Zone'?" *Women & Environments International Magazine* 56/57 (Fall 2002), pp. 24-26.

91. Anja Kanngieser, "Gestures of Everyday Resistance: The Significance of Play and Desire in the Umsonst Politics of Collective Appropriation," *Transversal* (Feb. 2007), http://translate.eipcp.net/transversal/0307/kanngieser/en, Oct. 4, 2008.

92. Farr, "Anarchist Poetics."

93. Joshua Atkinson, "Analyzing Resistance Narratives at the North American Anarchist Gathering," *The Journal of Communication Inquiry* 30.3 (2006), p. 255.

94. Proudhon, *General Idea*, p. 245.

95. Qtd. in Ramor Ryan, "Days of Crime and Nights of Horror: Review of *Days of War, Nights of Love: CrimethInc for Beginners* by the CrimethInc Workers' Collective and *Days and Nights of Love and War* by Eduardo Galeano," *Perspectives on Anarchist Theory* 8.2 (Fall 2004), p. 17.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

97. Atkinson pp. 265, 267-269.

98. de Cleyre, p. 84.

23

The Past, the Period Drama, and Mutual Aid

Karen Goaman

My starting point is the upsurge of interest in period drama on British television. Dramatizations of classics from Jane Austen to Flora Thompson follow one another thick and fast. I explore this in terms the way in which such period dramas depict a world of interconnected social relations and more tightly interwoven communities. I analyze in particular Flora Thompson's *Lark Rise to Candleford* (1939, 1941, 1942/1972), in which the reciprocal relations of community, conceptualized in classical anarchist terms as "mutual aid," are underpinned by the remnants of a more subsistence-based economy.

There may therefore be an anarchist impulse in the popularity of contemporary period dramas. Their appeal may reflect a longing for a community connected to place, reciprocity and mutuality, and interwoven through husbandry, that advancing modernity increasingly unravels. H.J. Massingham, in an introduction to *Lark Rise to Candleford*, writes of the "utter ruin of a closely knit organic society that had defied every change, every aggression, except the one that established the modern world."[1] Drawing on a critical evaluation of notions of the "organic society" and the "golden age," and on the work of Ivan Illich, I explore these issues, which are relevant for the conceptualization of anarchist philosophy and mutual aid. Anarchist discourse could further address the workings of more traditional communities and notions of autonomy and self-reliance that are undermined by modernization and development, in order to develop a more nuanced grasp of the workings of different social and economic orders. If we can identify the workings of modernity, industrialism and the nation-state as an encroachment on autonomy, we can imagine alternative ways of forming reciprocal relationships and a more sustainable relationship to nature, allowing for but not confined to primitivist perspectives.

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In the last decade or so, there has been an intense interest in the period drama in film and television. The works of authors including Jane Austen, Mrs. Gaskell, and Flora Thompson have captured popular interest. To give one anecdotal illustration of this, while on a bus from Salisbury, Wiltshire, in southern England, I overheard two teenage girls discussing the television serialization of Flora Thompson's *From Lark Rise to Candleford* with intense interest. I was surprised by this since the girls presented themselves in every other way as conforming to the contemporary fashions and self-identity that are shaped by media culture and consumerism. Yet the portrayal of life in rural England had clearly aroused their curiosity and involvement in the narrative of the intertwined lives of different classes in a Victorian village.

The source of this interest undoubtedly has many facets. The attention to detail in the costumes and interiors reflects an interest in a more organic world of handcrafted material culture: from the elegance and elaborateness of the middle class world of Jane Austen's characters, to the simplicity of material culture reflecting the communities of the poorer classes in the world portrayed by Flora Thompson. Period dramas depict a society which, though rapidly changing, still exhibits a strong social cohesion and an identity of interests and purpose. This is strong in Jane Austen's portrayal of affluent families intensely engaged in the process of securing for young females a suitable husband who can support them both emotionally and financially. Jane Austen shows the wealthy country family moving seasonally to the cities of Bath or London, with the affluent already showing early forms of the mobility of modernity. The poorer rural people of Flora Thompson's *Lark Rise to Candleford* show a community rooted in a hamlet and village. Other dramas are sometimes titled by the place, such as Cranford, Middlemarch, Gosford Park, showing the connection to place, as well as a set of cultural traditions weakened or removed in the contemporary urban-industrial context.

It may seem surprising that an article in an anthology of articles on anarchism, would explore the world of period drama, which in many ways exemplifies the deeply hierarchical world of Victorian Britain, with its solidifying state and society divided by class. Yet the novels now enjoying such interest in contemporary dramatizations still depicts a world with identifiable vestiges of community, reciprocity and mutual aid. These bonds of mutuality and obligation intertwined relations within and between social classes, were further dissolved in the acceleration of industrial capitalism and intensification of power (nationally and transnationally). These intimate connections between people are also bound up with a more intimate relationship with nature amongst the poorer rural classes, whose lives, though increasingly impoverished by the inroads of indus-

trialism and capitalist markets, carried on in much the same manner as in previous centuries.

Recent debates in anarchism have tended to polarize between the primitivist critique of civilization, particularly industrial civilization, and the view that some form of modernity and industrialism is both inevitable and desirable and has the potential to be reworked in a more anarchistic fashion. The primitivist critique sees large-scale and in particular industrial society as intrinsically destructive in terms of social relations and the environment and other life forms. Small-scale hunter-gatherers and horticulturalists seem to offer us living examples of anarchism in action: a lack of centralized power and hierarchy, and a way of life without the state and the intensive exploitation of people and nature that is a feature of cities, states and empires. John Zerzan looks to the division of labor as strongly implicated in the demise of autonomy. Interestingly, there is an allusion to the power of this division to create inequalities in *Lark Rise to Candleford*, when Thompson distinguishes the life of the hamlet where there lived only one class of people who did similar work, where "all were poor and all equal,"[2] with that of the small country town nearby in which the varied occupations created a complicated and ranked social order.

In the spectrum of societal forms, hunter-gatherers, at least those who maintain a more egalitarian way of life, tend to offer the most inspiring examples of non-hierarchical and reciprocal living. In Europe, however, we are many thousands of years away from the existence of such forms. And yet we are little more than a century away from a way of life in which social relations were more entwined and embedded in other spheres of life with a self-reliant pattern maintaining the ancient skills of husbandry. Those also can form a source of inspiration and learning about more autonomous ways of life.

My key interest, then, is in the particular impact of industrialization on social relations and local economies. This identifies more clearly what specific ways of life have been eroded and changed. Few today, whether conservative, conformist, socialist or anarchist, would aspire to re-create the rigid class system and hierarchy of nineteenth-century England. But what was still in evidence at the time was the entwinement and connectedness of social relations and relations with nature that have been a continuous feature of rural life for thousands of years, and which has relevance for us today, whatever our political stance.

Lark Rise and the Period Drama

I've already alluded to one key source of the current appeal of period dramas—the depiction of strongly entwined, tightly knit social relations. In the case of Flora Thompson's *Lark Rise to Candleford*, a subtext and subconscious element at work in their appeal is the further entwinement of these social relations with a more traditional order where dwelling and husbandry remained tied to the tradi-

tional structure of rural life. The self-reliance and autonomy of these remnants of the subsistence economy are an intrinsic element in the recreation of more anarchistic relationships. Massingham argues that, though husbandry itself plays little part in the trilogy *Lark Rise to Candleford*, the work is nonetheless the story of "the irreparable calamity of the English fields."[3] What is left out of the TV dramatization is the story of the vast changes that the text explores—the impact of industrialism and the Enclosures that was gathering pace in the nineteenth century (Flora Thompson focuses particularly on the 1880s).

Massingham identifies key elements of the work's importance which are also relevant to the popularity of the TV dramatization: the way in which Flora Thompson captures the richness of a living culture still connected to an earlier way of life,[4] showing a local self-acting society connected to the land,[5] with the survivals of a community of cooperative self-help which was destroyed by the Enclosures.[6] For Massingham the community depicted still carries on a rural peasant way of life even though, by the 1880s, they had been divested of land.[7] Massingham is clear too on what destroyed this "organic" community:

> It was not poverty that broke it—that was a secondary cause. It was not even imported cheap and foodless foods. It was that the Industrial Revolution and the Enclosures between them demolished the *structure and pattern* of country life.[8]

The TV dramatization of *From Lark Rise to Candleford* evokes something of the *pattern* of country civilization that is portrayed. The detailed settings and interiors present the charm and simplicity of a bygone age, with its thick-walled cottage dwellings limewashed and decorated with the well-scrubbed table and a few pieces of old furniture. Though the continuation of ancient customs of husbandry is little conveyed in the TV drama, being limited to odd references such as to beehives, the social order depicted, with its strong neighborly connections and earthy village setting, is underpinned by the rural life in the background, and therefore forms a subtext in its appeal.

The "Organic Community"?

Before I move to a more detailed analysis of Thompson's depiction of a way of life that was on the brink of being destroyed, I want to address the notion of an "organic" community that found favor with earlier writers, including some, such as F.R. Leavis, in the tradition of literary studies. In *Culture and Environment* (Leavis and Thompson 1933/1960), Leavis and Thompson lament the loss of an old order, an "organic community" and the "living culture it embodied":

> Folk songs, folk-dances, Cotswold cottages and handicraft products are signs
> and expressions of something more: an art of life, a way of living, *ordered and
> patterned*, involving social arts, codes of intercourse and a responsive adjust-
> ment, growing out of immemorial experience, *to the natural environment and
> the rhythm of the year.*[9]

Leavis and Thompson note even the way speech was still an art—"the cultiva-
tion of the art of speech was as essential to the old popular culture that local
variations existed throughout the country as song, dance and handicrafts."[10] Pe-
riod dramas on TV, including *Lark Rise to Candleford*, pay detailed attention to
the pattern of speech in the era depicted, which suggests this art of speech forms
an element in the period drama appeal.

Leavis and Thompson outline the agents of change that have destroyed this
way of life rooted in the soil—the machine, mass production and the standardi-
zation of goods, mass media, wage labor and factory work.[11] On the effects of
these changes, they cite the writer George Sturt, who was also known as George
Bourne, and who wrote *Change in the Village* and *The Wheelwright's Shop*:
"That they were upsetting old forms of skill—producing a population of wage
slaves in place of a nation of self-supporting workmen—occurred to nobody."[12]
They also quote Sturt's analysis of the loss of intimacy in the switch to industry:

> But no higher wage, no income, will buy for men that satisfaction which of
> old—until machinery made drudges of them—steamed into their muscles all
> day long from close contact with iron, timber, clay, wind and wave, horse-
> strength . . . these intimacies are over.[13]

Leavis and Thompson argue that everyone, not just the newly formed working
class, suffers from the loss of the organic community, and they make a case for
the connectedness of people and environment in the old village society:

> Sturt's villagers expressed their human nature, they satisfied their human needs,
> in terms of the natural environment; and the things they made—cottages, barns,
> ricks and wagons—together with their relations with one another constituted a
> human environment . . . their ways of life reflected the rhythms of the seasons,
> and they were in close touch with the sources of their sustenance in the neigh-
> boring soil.[14]

Leavis has been roundly criticized by Raymond Williams and later by Terry
Eagleton (1983).[15] Williams, in *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (1958/1963)
argues the case for a socialist modernity, calling Leavis's version of history a
"myth," and accusing him of "characteristically industrialist, or urban, nostal-
gia."[16] His rejection of Leavis's notion of the "organic community" is based on
two central points. Firstly, he cites the fact that pre-industrial societies had ex-
tremes of inequality in poverty and wealth, and power and oppression. The fact
that modern society has the most extreme examples of these injustices is glossed

over by Williams, but presumably he would argue that a socialist society would eliminate these. Secondly, he assumes that technology and machinery is neutral—that it can be used equally for good. This is an assumption also made by anarchist/libertarian socialist Noam Chomsky.[17] Industrial technology is arguably not neutral[18] and is a form of social, political and economic relationship: industrial society and its intrinsic elements of machinery, mass production and industrial work, separates people from the land and create an urban, suburban and deracinated society with a wage labor force based on factory or service industry work.

Proponents of modernity point to the negative aspects of "tribal" societies—for example gender inequalities—to argue for the positive aspects of modernity. In a similar manner, Williams highlights the negative elements in non-industrial rural communities—"the penury, the petty tyranny, the disease and mortality, the ignorance and frustrated intelligence which were also among its ingredients."[19] I will address each of these. "Penury" was an increasing problem through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and was the result of structural changes connected to the move to a society based more and more on power and capitalistic profit, and was never as pronounced as in the city slums of early industrial areas. The people depicted in *Lark Rise* comforted themselves that they were better off than the city poor.[20] Poverty is a relative concept and connects to modern development, inequality and comparative wealth.[21] The "petty tyranny" Williams refers to can be a feature of many forms of society from small-scale to large. Interpersonal relations between humans are subject to social stresses and conflict; the Khng San, hunter-gatherers of southern Africa, have patterns of communication that tend to discourage boastfulness and arrogance and also have the option of moving to a different group if a conflict is not resolved. "Petty tyrannies" take different forms in different societies, but can be addressed as a single "ingredient"[22] without justifying a complete restructuring of rural society to that of modernity. The concept of disease and mortality needs to be put in context: modern industrial society has a plethora of diseases (cancer, heart disease, diabetes, etc.) that are on the increase. Life expectancy figures in modern society are partly the result of lower infant mortality, but the downside of this is population pressure which always spirals upwards with industrialization. The concepts of "ignorance" and "frustrated intelligence" that Williams cites as "ingredients" of peasant or rural society are also relative: those successful in the context of modernity and capitalist competition can also be "ignorant" and have "frustrated intelligence" in different ways. Flora Thompson in *Lark Rise* shows that there was thoughtful intelligence in the rural people who by that time were reduced to farm laborers. Could it also be that cases of poor intelligence amongst the rural and city poor of the nineteenth century were the result of the long hours of work by children, which hampered their intellectual development, and that this brutalization has been handed down through the

generations to create the stupefied (rather than stupid) individual particularly associated with poorer classes?

Williams accuses Leavis and Thompson of "the taking of aspects for wholes."[23] Yet this is precisely what Williams, and many proponents of modernity in both right, left and anarchist circles, do when they justify urban-industrial modernity by the proposed increase in "democracy" that is experienced by people "freed from the land." There is no justification for the dispossession of people from the land and all the skills for creating abundance—of food, culture, community. This dispossession is the precondition of, and essential ingredient in, the restructuring of society that creates industrial modernity in all its forms, whether capitalist, communist or fascist. Contemporary anarchists who reject primitivist critiques and embrace a form of egalitarian industrial modernity with divided labor share some of the difficulties that beset Williams' position. Williams, in embracing a socialist modernity, embraces by implication also the sharp divisions of labor that characterize modern society, and the fact that a small number of inevitably lower status individuals will be producing the essential food needed. I was always struck by a Russian illustration that appeared on the cover of George Woodcock's *Anarchism* (my edition does not appear to cite the origin of the drawing):[24] the drawing shows a tiered structure with capital at the top, then the rulers, then the ideologues, followed by the army, the wealthy middle classes eating at their table, and holding the structure up is the peasants with the caption "We feed all." The illustration could be reconfigured for proponents of industrial modernity, whether left-socialist or anarchist, so that all the different occupational divisions that make up modern society appear on the top tier, with the land-based class supporting the edifice and still feeding all. Given the tendency in human societies to accord differential status and recognition to different groups, it would be likely that those in urban centers, which inevitably suck the life (in the form of goods and raw materials) out of rural areas where things live and grow, would be given a higher status than rural communities. And those in rural communities would be unable to carry out a self-reliant independent subsistence economy because they would be forced to supply food and other stuff for processing, to those in urban areas.

To return to Williams, he rightly criticizes Leavis for his elitism, but then confuses this elitism with the organic society that Leavis praises. Williams tends to ignore the relationships of mutual aid and reciprocity that are an essential part of a more egalitarian way of life, as well as the environment and the natural world that he ignores. He writes, "If there is one thing certain about 'the organic community,' it is that it has always gone."[25] Williams was writing at a time when less was known about the lives of hunter-gatherers and small scale horticulturalists and farmers. The perception of "primitive" life was generally of something difficult and harsh, from which agriculture, civilization and industrial society had freed us. But, as Marshall Sahlins argued,[26] hunter-gatherers studied from the 1960s—for example, by Colin Turnbull[27] and Richard Boyshay

Lee[28]—were found to have a rich, leisurely, and cultural life and that they spent just a few hours a day on what we would call "work"—the getting of food, making of tools and crafts and homes, but that this activity for them was part of their enjoyment of life.

If the golden age is always what went before, this is hardly surprising given our past: we spent most of our existence as humans enjoying the riches of the natural world we inhabited just as other species do. It has been only in the last 10,000 years that we have changed that world significantly with the development of more intensive agriculture, urban centers and finally industrialism. Recent excavations on a site in Gobekli Tepe, Turkey indicate a lush natural world, a kind of "garden of Eden," lived in by hunter-gatherers that was rapidly transformed 11,000 years ago to an arid depleted one through the development of farming at a site of ceremonial significance where large gatherings were held. Some Victorian writers, such as Ruskin, looked back to medieval society as exemplifying a more satisfying way of life. This is interesting, in that the medieval period was the last in Europe before the many changes that together created the modern nation state and industrial capitalist society. But the medieval period is the product of many thousands of years of hierarchy and fairly intensive farming. There was certainly more oppression in medieval society than in a small-scale hunting-gathering society. Yet it was a time when peasants experienced more autonomy than their eighteenth- and nineteenth-century counterparts, who were reduced to farm laboring even though, as Flora Thompson shows, they carried on the same subsistence skills of old on the farms on which they were employed, on their allotments and in their gardens.

My son, at the age of fourteen, once described his perception of history as "the pursuit of power by the few." This anarchistic conception neatly conveys the processes of change that have made the golden age or the organic community always seem to be, as Williams points out,[29] the one that has already gone. History, particularly the last few hundred years in Europe, has been the process of dispossession and expropriation. We start out with community, nature, a region we inhabit and know intimately with all the skills to enjoy its abundance. We end up as a cog in the machine—the artisan, peasant or slave of the older civilizations, or the wage laborer or disconnected owner of wealth and power in the modern version. Leo Baxendale, the anarchist writer and creator of the Bash Street Kids in the comic *The Beano*, has picked out in an original way the processes of what he calls the Encroachment—the formation of the modern state and industrial capitalist society and its attendant appropriation of what was once held in common by those who dwelt in the land.

Lark Rise and a Pattern of Living

I look now in more detail at Flora Thompson's evocation of, as Massingham puts it, the "old order of rural England surviving rare but intact from a pre-industrial and pre-Enclosure past almost timeless in its continuity."[30] The way in which Thompson reanimates[31] this old order, still hanging on in the 1880s, with such tenderness conveys the tragedy of the course of industrial progress in destroying the beauty and simplicity of a way of life, a structure and pattern, rooted in land, place and rural and subsistence tradition. The TV dramatization, in omitting the narrative that engages with the *structure* of the changes taking place, does not convey the demolition process going on. We view it as a time when people barely know what their scarcely distant ancestors experienced and lost; a time when media and commodity culture and the competitive job economy have erased knowledge of and longing for an era of connection between people and nature. Perhaps buried in the subconscious, however, is a sense of the uprooting and dislocation of people from an old order: as Massingham puts it: "the utter ruin of a closely knit organic society with a richly interwoven and traditional culture that had defied every change, every aggression, except the one that established the modern world."[32] The story of *Lark Rise* takes place in the 1880s when old people of the hamlet had lived there from the days when it stood in the middle of "a furzy heath—common land—which had come under the plough after the passing of the Enclosure Acts."[33] By the 1880s, when the processes tied up with industrialization and urban expansion were impoverishing the lives of rural people, the enjoyment and relish of the "country civilization" is conveyed in the narrative: Thompson writes:

> But, in spite of their poverty and the worry and anxiety attending it, they were not unhappy, and, though poor, there was nothing sordid about their lives. "The nearer the bone the sweeter the meat," they used to say, and they were getting very near the bone from which their country ancestors had fed. Their children and children's children would have to depend wholly upon whatever was carved for them from the communal joint, and for their pleasure upon the mass enjoyments of a new era. But for that generation there was still a small picking left to supplement the weekly wage. They had their home-cured bacon, their "bit o' leazings" [gleaned wheat], their small wheat or barley patch on the allotment; their knowledge of herbs for their homely simples, and the wild fruits and berries of the countryside for jam, jellies, and wine, and round about them as part of their lives were the last relics of country customs an the last echoes of country songs, ballads, and game rhymes. This last picking, though meagre, was sweet.[34]

Though this fabric of people's lives forms only a backdrop to the TV dramatization, it forms an essential element that feeds its appeal to a contemporary

audience. With that is also the interconnected community which provides its own interest and gossip. As Thompson puts it "The discussion of their own and their neighbors' affairs took the place occupied by books and films in the modern outlook."[35] This element is skillfully dramatized in the TV series, and makes the most of what Thompson observes: that

> the lives of all human beings, however narrow, have room for complications for themselves and entertainment for the onlooker, and many a satisfying little drama was played out on that ten-foot stage.[36]

In this respect the television drama embellishes and invents elements in the narrative plot: for example, the romantic association between Miss Lane, the postmistress, and Sir Timothy, the key figure of the gentry in Candleford, is an invention by the writers for the TV dramatization.

It is interesting that the section of the trilogy *Lark Rise to Candleford* that is selected for adaptation to a television drama is the last section, in which the autobiographical character, Laura, becomes an employee of the Post Office in a neighboring large village (though characters and scenes illustrated in earlier sections are pulled into the dramatization of the later part of Laura's early life). The earlier sections of the trilogy focus on Laura's childhood in a smaller hamlet in which the natural world and the skills of husbandry were closer to people's lives.

The first part of the trilogy *Lark Rise* introduces the people of the hamlet who died in the period of the 1880s in which the narrative is set. Living in a thatched house built by their grandfather on common land, Old Sally and Dick were the survivals of the days before the Enclosures had cut the open heath into fenced fields.[37] The house was one remaining from the original six that stood in a ring round a green, "all with large gardens and fruit trees and faggot piles."[38] The descriptions of the house evoke the subsistence husbandry that Sally and Dick continue—the water crock, brewing beer, potatoes in sacks, apples on racks, and peas and beans spread out to dry,[39] with the beehives sheltered in the flower garden behind a yew hedge.[40] Sally and Dick as children lived in a time when commoners still had rights to turn animals out to graze and collect fuel and turf. They made butter, for themselves and for selling, and candles for lighting. As a girl Sally minded the cow and drove the geese to the best grass.[41] After Sally and Dick died in the 1880s, their house remained empty for many years, and it was demolished some decades later.[42]

Thompson writes of another couple also descended from the original squatters on the pre-Enclosure common lands: they owned a donkey and cart which they used to carry their vegetables, eggs and honey to the market town.[43] She alludes too to a descendant of one of the original squatters (i.e., Commoners) who owned the ancestral cottage and the strip of land. He is one of the last to use the breast plough (pulled by a piece of shaped wood over the breast).[44]

Queenie represents a different phase of hamlet life—after the breakup of the commons but with the burgeoning cottage industries. Queenie had made a decent living making lace—a craft that was soon to be replaced by cheaper machine made lace.[45] Yet Queenie continued many of the old activities, such as keeping bees.

The life of the hamlet described in the 1880s was one much impoverished compared with the comfortable lives of Sally and Dick, but one still made up of an "open-air life"[46] and a thriving robustness of health ("There was no cripple or mental defective in the hamlet, and . . . no invalid."[47] Compare this with Raymond Williams' perception of the non-modern world as one rife with disease and mortality.)[48] Traditional husbandry continued in the tending of the vegetable garden or allotment[49] and with the family pig which was periodically killed and its meat preserved for family use with some given to neighbors on reciprocal terms;[50] and work on the land—ploughing, haymaking, harvesting wheat, gleaning (women and children collecting the heads of wheat that remain in the stubble after the wheat is cut); with roads with scarcely any traffic (and what there was being horse-drawn) flanked by hedgerows and grass verges.

The relationship to nature evoked particularly in the earlier parts of the trilogy is rather overlooked in the television dramatizations but tenderly described in the book. While out walking the children would gather and eat wild food "not so much because they were hungry as from habit and relish of the wild food":[51] they would eat the young green leaves from hawthorn hedges in spring (called "bread and cheese"), and blackberries, sloes and crab apples in autumn. Here the relationship to nature and to the enjoyment of gathering wild food is clear. They would also sneak into nearby fields and take turnips, peas and ears of wheat, and prepare them for eating raw there and then. Older boys would catch birds to take home for their mothers to cook. Women also would trap birds with crumbs and sieves in the garden. Hunting and gathering, then, lingered on into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the regular addition of a rabbit or pheasant caught from the wild to the pot was an important contribution to the family sustenance through much of the twentieth century.

Children also collected from the wild on their way home from school, to feed the family pig which kept them supplied with meat. They would pick sow thistle, dandelion and choice grass, and collect snails in a pail, to bring back to the pig.[52] Thompson writes of the hamlet children that "They had no need to ask the names of the birds, flowers, and trees they saw every day, for they had already learned these unconsciously."[53] The children had a good deal of freedom for roaming and playing around the lanes where traffic, horse-drawn, was rare. Thompson writes that they were "strong, lusty children, let loose from control"[54] and, "like little foals turned out to grass," grew up strong and hardy.[55] The natural world featured strongly in their games, which included hunting for blackberries and birds eggs in hedges and pulling trails of bryony to decorate hats, as well as games with marbles and pebbles.[56]

Teenage girls could walk miles alone and return in the twilight,[57] demon-
strating their freedom; as Thompson remarks, "(so Victorian young ladies were
not always as carefully guarded as they are now supposed to have been!)."[58] The
Puritanism associated with Victorian life was, according to Massingham, a
product of the town,[59] and certainly the country life seemed remote from puritan
morality. Thompson writes of how children too young to go to school would be
told to go and play outside: their games included making mud pies from the dust
in the road, "moistening them from their most intimate water supply."[60] When
Laura sees a bull performing his service to the cows, she goes the other way but
only so as to save the men in the farmyard from any embarrassment in the pres-
ence of a girl.[61] A mother suckles her baby in church.[62] It was common for first
babies to be born before their parents married, and thought little of by other vil-
lagers,[63] though adultery was frowned on.[64] In the fields the men told stories that
were ribald and lewd and took the form of "a kind of rustic Decameron."[65]
These observations add up to a community connected with each other and with
the natural world in an earthy relationship that shows a good deal of liberty and
gives a different picture of Victorian life than the stereotype suggests.

Women cultivated herb gardens for medicines and teas as well as picking
from the wild to make beers and mead and crab apple jellies.[66] Men worked in
the vegetable gardens,[67] mainly in the early evenings after their supper. Thomp-
son evokes the engagement and enjoyment the men experienced in their gardens
and allotments:

> The energy they brought to their gardens after a hard day's work in the fields
> was marvelous. They grudged no effort and seemed never to tire. Often on
> moonlight nights in spring, the solitary fork of someone who had not been able
> to tear himself away would be heard.[68]

Thompson shows how people of the hamlet participated in working in the fields
at times, for example, of harvest and haymaking and, even in the larger village
of Candleford, children could participate in the harvest, dragging sheaves of
wheat and taking care of the men's beer-cans and dinner baskets (while also
playing hide-and-seek and riding on top of the wagon), and being invited by a
vast tea made by the farmer's wife, with ham, eggs, cakes, scones, stewed plums
and cream, jam, jelly and junket.[69]

Thompson makes several references to the outdoor life and the robust health
of the people of *Lark Rise*. She writes that people's favorite virtue was endur-
ance and they took pride in keeping going;[70] that children were sturdy and grew
up hardy by playing outdoors, and took parental discipline in their stride;[71] "Per-
haps," Thompson writes, "with a large proportion of peasant blood in them, they
were tougher than some."[72] In addition to singing in the pub, most of the men
sang or whistled as they hoed in their gardens and allotments.[73] It was customary
for most to sing while they worked

> Men with horses and cart sang on the road; the baker, the miller's man, and the fish-hawker sang as they went from door to door; even the doctor and parson on their rounds hummed a tune between their teeth.[74]

Thompson writes wistfully of the decline of songs and singers in the 20th century, with wireless music in their place.[75] This prefigures the Situationist critique of the spectacle, the replacement of participatory culture with a spectacular one. Equating happiness with a participatory culture with a simplicity of life, Thompson surmises that "people were poorer and had not the comforts, amusements, or knowledge we have today; but they were happier, which seems to suggest that happiness depends more upon the state of mind—and body perhaps—than upon circumstances and events."[76] Thompson observes what was to come later "when the luxuries of the few were becoming necessities of the many,"[77] an insight into the incipient consumer society in which each class chases the other for all the accoutrements of wealth.

There was a reciprocal arrangement for exchanging roots and cuttings of plants, and seed was saved rather than bought.[78] In those times of increasing poverty, all women borrowed items of food at some time and usually repaid,[79] showing the mutual aid and non-market relationships still in existence. Even in the larger village of Candleford Green, which was later to be annexed to a small country town,[80] the subsistence economy lingered on and there was plentiful food. As Thompson writes:

> The community was largely self-supporting. Every household grew its own vegetables, produced its new-laid eggs and cured its own bacon. Jams and jellies, wines and pickles, were made at home as a matter of course. Most gardens had a row of beehives. In the houses of the well-to-do there was an abundance of such foods, and even the poor enjoyed a rough plenty. The problem facing the lower-paid workers was not so much now to provide food for themselves and their families as how to obtain the hundred and one other things, such as clothing, boots, fuel, bedding and crockery wares, which had to be paid for in cash.[81]

Despite the vast changes taking place with the advent of industrialism, the "old country civilization" lingered on:[82] people still sang, told stories, still ate the old country fare, preferring it to factory made products and the older men still wore the traditional smock with its elaborately stitched yoke.[83] Households still ate together, even as affinities linked by an economic relationship, and this element forms a feature of the television adaptation of *Lark Rise to Candleford*, in which those employed by the postmistress, Miss Lane, all eat together at the same table.

Miss Lane the postmistress employs, as well as her housekeeper Zillah, several blacksmiths to work in the smithy she inherited from her father. The foreman Mathew for the smithy, and the three young unmarried blacksmiths,

live in Miss Lane's house and all, including Laura the assistant postmistress (but not Zillah the housekeeper) eat at the same table in Miss Lane's house,[84] with the exception of the five o'clock meal which the men took separately. This intertwinement of relations, symbolized by the sharing of a meal at the same table, may form an element of the appeal of *Lark Rise* for contemporary television audiences. In the household there was abundant good food.[85]

Though living in a state of relative poverty as a result both of industrial modernization, state power and social hierarchy, the people of the hamlet of Lark Rise experienced a sense of equality: "In the hamlet there lived only once class of people; all did similar work, all were poor and all equal."[86] They regarded themselves as poor but for them hamlet life was normal life—the real poor lived in city slums.[87] They recognized no other division of classes. The gentry "flitted across the scene" and Thompson suggests that their attitude to the gentry allowed for a certain amount of private irreverence: they find it fun to imitate the gentry calling to each other in high-pitched voices at the hunt, an observation that hints of an attitude none too deferential.[88]

The farm laborers took pride in their craft and saw those who drove the new farm machinery as mechanics, nomads and social outcasts—in short inferiors, lumped together with sweeps and tinkers. They also looked down on clerks and salesmen: "Their recognized world was made up of landowners, farmers, publicans, and farm laborers, with the butcher, the baker, the miller, and the grocer as subsidiaries."[89] This notion of recognition, identified here by Thompson in relation to those still working on the land, is an important one. She contrasts the equality of the hamlet Lark Rise, with the greater variety of occupation, and therefore ranking and division, between people in Candleford Green, the larger village, where the strata of wider society were more represented—from the clergy, doctor and gentlewomen, to the shopkeepers, schoolmaster and builder, to the artisans and laborers (who were not as poor as those in the hamlet): in Candleford Green, "Every member of the community knew his or her place and few wished to change it."[90] Thompson observes of the laboring class: "'I know my place and I keep it,' some man or woman would say with a touch of pride in the voice, and if one of the younger and more spirited among them had ambition, those of their own family would often be the first to ridicule and discourage them." Thompson's take on this fixed hierarchy is not one of approbation but she intends to show that "it had some pleasant aspects and not everything about it was despicable."[91] This is something that proponents of modernity, with its apparent weakening of the rigid class structure and greater mobility, could take on board. Anarchist philosophy aims for an ideal of egalitarianism that is easier to envision in a society in which there is little division of labour than the complicated occupational divisions of a large-scale and in particular modern industrial society.

In *Lark Rise to Candleford*, Thompson shows that there was a contrast between the relationships of the hamlet and those of the village: Thompson

observes that in the hamlet the farm laborers were close neighbors, known by name, and "reigning kings," whereas in the village they were more distant, not known by name and not reigning kings but "mere men who lived by farming."[92] These are important insights for anyone concerned with equality and in envisioning a society in which people experience mutual recognition:[93] the greater the heterogeneity of occupation and distance divided by scale (village, town, city in contrast to the country), the less contact, recognition, mutual respect. In the hamlet the farm laborers are known for their skill and their place in the community. In the village they are "mere men who lived by farming," and not recognized or known by name. The consequences are enormous. Thompson's choice of words is interesting—for her the farm laborers feel like "reigning kings," suggesting they have a sense of the importance of themselves and their work and of this being recognized in their community. Oddly enough, contemporary popular culture illustrates this desire to be recognized and known by name—think of the theme song and storyline of an American sitcom like Cheers (a key line in the theme tune is, "You want to be where everyone knows your name").

Thompson observes the commonality in the lives of the farm laborers—they earned the same, and "their circumstances, pleasures, and their daily field work were shared in common."[94] But she also observes that the farm laborers (who still spoke the dialect of Oxfordshire) differed from each other in terms of intelligence, vivacity, and degrees of kindness and selfishness,[95] just as those in any walk of life. The perception of many proponents of modernity, whether anarchist, socialist or those of more conservative persuasions, is that no-one would choose to work on the land, and that urban life and industrialism freed people from that obligation. There is evidence that many would choose to work on the land if it were accessible to them: Naomi Klein, for example, in her research on industrial zones in the Philippines, finds that many of the people would have stayed in rural areas if they had not have lost their farms, "displaced by golf courses, botched land-reform laws and more export processing zones";[96] a teenage girl is quoted as saying, "If we had land we would just stay there to cultivate the land for our needs. . . . But we are landless . . ."[97] J.M. Neeson shows the way in which those with access to land and the commons in England resisted wage labor and also enjoyed bonds of reciprocity and customs of mutual aid.[98]

There is also a key section in *Lark Rise* in which Flora Thompson describes how her autobiographical character, Laura, at the age of thirteen, expresses a desire to work on the land, as does her younger brother. They hatch a plan in which they would live in a cottage and both work on the land, with Laura keeping house. They were both aware that their parents would be horrified at this choice of what then was increasingly seen as a demeaning task and a life of poverty; their mother bears this out by admonishing them, when she finds out about this "low-down idea," with the words "leave working on the land to

them as can't do better for themselves."[99] Thompson also alludes to the lack of appreciation and low pay given to work on the land:

> "the wages were ridiculously low and the farm laborer was so looked down upon and slighted that the day was soon to come when a country boy leaving school would look for any other way of earning a living than on the land."[100]

But at the time in which the narrative was set, the 1880s, there were still those who loved their work and did not yet "feel the pinch of poverty"—in fact they laughed scornfully at the occupations of some who looked down on them.[101] This illustrates the sense of pride and dignity felt by those who worked on the land—even though by the 1880s they were farm laborers rather than commoners. The land for those in the hamlet was where they "reigned"—were recognized, respected and were in their domain.

Thompson's autobiographical character Laura too feels a connection to the fields that the hamlet brings her. Laura finds that none of the pleasures of the town of Candleford entirely satisfied her: "She missed—missed badly and even pined for—her old freedom of the fields."[102] Though she could see around Candleford Green the fields, meadows and woods, "mere seeing from a distance did not satisfy her; she longed to go alone far into the fields and hear the birds singing, the brooks tinkling, and the wind rustling through the corn, as she had when a child. To smell things and touch things, warm earth and flowers and grasses, and to stand and gaze where no one could see her, drinking it all in."[103] This suggests that an element in Laura's experience of connectedness with nature was both in her own solitude and also in living close to nature—nature on her doorstep rather than outside the village.

Massingham and the Language of Anarchism

H.J. Massingham, the writer of the introduction to *Lark Rise to Candleford*, was a contemporary of Flora Thompson: Flora Thomspon lived 1876-1947, and Massingham 1888-1952. In his work on *The English Countryman* (1942),[104] what is remarkable is the degree to which Massingham adopts a language and vocabulary akin to that of anarchist texts. Massingham's analysis of the decline of the rural English life shows an adherence to liberty, freedom, mutual aid and self-help. He refers to the owner farmers as "held together as parts of a regional organism by the interacting and intergrating (*sic*) forces of independent ownership and *mutual aid*"[105] and "self-acting and each other aiding."[106] On the eighteenth-century yeomen, he quotes an Irish writer, George Russell, who argued for "*self-help*" and a "natural alliance between *co-operation and independence*" and who believed that "the soul of a nation resided in the *small free communities of country life*."[107] He conceptualizes the new forces of mod-

emization and capitalism in terms of "power and profit" (key terms for any anarchist), and is conscious of the psychological as well as economic effects of this new development. He writes:

> For the yeoman the general consequences of the new orientation of society from the *idea of plenty* to that of *power and profit* were even more psychologically than economically serious. The novel conception of the land as an *investment for the extraction of wealth* was quite foreign to him. . . . [H]e regarded [land] in terms of produce, not money, as a livelihood, not as a means to affluence and social position.[108]

Massingham analyses the consequences resulting from "the growing complexities of international trade and fiancé, themselves derived from a new parasitism *in place of the old self-support*."[109] He writes a trenchantly critical account of the impact of the enclosures and the growth of commerce on the whole way of life of the yeoman farmer and peasant farmer, and on their psyche.[110] He outlines the impact of the earlier Tudor enclosures, which created a landless class of countrymen "exposed for the first time to what Tawney calls "the bitter breath of modern commercialism."[111] These uprooted peasants became a class of vagabonds and beggars. The second more intense wave of enclosure from 1750 to 1845 created a new dispossessed class of wage laborers, on the land and in the factories—paupers alike.[112] Quoting the "peasant poet" John Clare, Massingham writes of "Freedom's cottage demolished for the workhouse—this is the succinct history of the Enclosures."[113]

Massingham also highlights the rupture created between past and present—a rupture that underpins the contemporary ignorance of the past and the ideology of (industrial modernizing) progress: "The revolutionary precedent of the Enclosures . . . drove a wedge between peasant and laborer, past and present (just as the modern theory of Progress does)."[114] He quotes the writing of Lord Ernle in *English Farming Past and Present*, in a passage which, though written by a member of the elite class, shows great insight into the processes taking place and the destruction of the old way of life:

> Enclosure destroyed the inherited traditions of the peasantry, their ideals, their customs, their habits, their ancestral solutions of the problems of life—all, in fact, that made up the native home-bred civilization of rural England. . . . It is not surprising that . . . they should have remained stupefied by the shock, gradually realizing the full meaning of the change, and then either stolidly acquiescing in their new existence, or impatient to escape on the first opportunity.[115]

Massingham makes a case for the self-reliant and conservationist rural economy, arguing that the yeoman's

> whole philosophy of self-sufficiency is necessarily antipathetic to the attempt on a large scale of the town to control and organize the production of food from

the country and to the inherent wastefulness of the modern economic scheme. He sees things from his window and so conserves them. The urban mind sees things over vast distances and so wastes them.[116]

Massingham shows other anarchistic persuasions: in his sympathy for the Dorset men who in the Civil War rose against both Cavalier and Puritan armies for trampling their fields and looting their barns and livestock—as Massingham writes, fighting their own war to keep the peace of the fields;[117] and in his critique of "mass-regimentation, whether collectivist as in Russia, racial and corporative as in Germany or by way of the profit-making combine as in England."[118]

Ivan Illich and the Tools of Autonomy and Conviviality

Ivan Illich is a writer who can hardly be described as anarchist but who nonetheless offer insights relevant to my argument. His focus is not on a critique of the state and hierarchy, as in the anarchist tradition, nor on a critique of capitalism as purveyed by Marxists seeking to create, at least in the "dictatorship of the proletariat," a communist version of modernity. Illich's interest is in the shift that began from the twelfth century in Europe to a society in which autonomous relations were gradually eroded. Autonomy for Illich is the means of subsistence—the means of getting food, culture, shelter, ways of getting around, means of education and healing. His critique is of industrialization, development, and the modern institutions that erode a people's autonomous means of providing these for themselves. He explores the dispossession of people from the commons—the fields, roads, houses, healing and learning practices—that people have enjoyed in non-industrial societies. He uses the notion of conviviality to denote ways of life that offer well-being, independence, autonomy and connectedness with others. For example he describes how the road was once the organically created track that connected houses, fields and villages, and was both a means of getting around on foot or by horse-drawn carts as well as the place in which children played, people talked, animals grazed on verges. The development of motorized transport dispossesses people from this aspect of the commons. They are forced off the roads by the speed of vehicles, and lose the means of independent movement and travel that allowed them to go where they pleased on foot or by horse.

There are numerous sections of *Lark Rise* which illustrate the freedom of mobility that the roads and paths offered then. The children walk eight miles to the nearest town and women thought nothing of walking six to seven miles to purchase tea or meat or a reel of cotton at the market town. There was the option

of going with the carrier's cart for sixpence, but most women would prefer to keep the sixpence to spend when they got there, and walk the dozen miles there and back.[119] Illich's critique of mechanization and wage labor is illustrated in the character Uncle Tom, a cobbler who took pride in his craft and in making and selling well-made shoes. Thompson writes that, "Had Uncle Tom lived in these days, he would probably have been manager of a branch of one of the chain stores, handling machine-made footwear he had not seen until it came from the factory . . . subject to several intermediary 'superiors' between himself and the head of the firm and without personal responsibility for, or pride in, the goods he handled: a craftsman turned into a salesman. But his day was still that of the small business man who might work by his own methods at his own rate for his own hours and, afterwards, enjoy the fruit of his labor and skill. . . . It was a simple life and one which many might well envy in these days of competition and carking care."[120]

<p style="text-align:center">***</p>

I started out with the current popularity of period dramas in the media. One source of their appeal is in the depiction of a more cohesive social world which exhibits an intimacy we have lost in our modern world. In *Lark Rise to Candleford* the relations between people are further entwined through contact with nature and the remnants of husbandry and subsistence. I use the word "nature" rather than environment to denote a rich living world used by humans and other life forms for their sustenance and pleasure. I was struck by the words of a Yanomami man: "We do not use the word *environment*. That is your word for what is left of what you have destroyed."[121] It is interesting that postmodern discourse has been so influential in academia: and convenient for the prevailing system that terms such as "nature" can be deconstructed even as nature is being destroyed.[122]

Flora Thompson depicts a still remarkably self-sufficient world more rooted in the land and nature just as it was passing. The autonomy afforded by having the skills to get food and crafts self-reliantly from nature is of importance to anyone interested in anarchist philosophy. Thompson shows the equality and mutuality of those who did the same work in the hamlet; though reduced to farm laborers and already affected by high levels of poverty as the machines of capitalist commerce sucked the commons and the income from craft from rural areas, they felt a dignity and connectedness that is a far cry from the hierarchy and alienation of the institutions of modern life and its factories and offices. How is the population of an urban modernity to be organized along the lines of egalitarianism and mutuality, given the heterogeneity of occupation and division of city and rural regions? And how will the urban population spend their time and get the food and other stuff they need? I have sometimes asked those (anar-

chistic) proponents of modernity what they would do in the anarcho-modernity they envisage and some claim they would be a variety of things—doctor, tofu-maker, and writer. Nothing is said of those others who (presumably) would choose to work on the land; the rural class would still be there, holding up the tier of the divided class of city dwellers and other occupational specialists; still those at the bottom proclaiming "We feed all." Flora Thompson's autobio-graphical character Laura pines for "her old freedom of the fields," the rural life on her doorstep rather than seen from a distance, outside the village. Anarchists have something to learn from that.

Notes

1.   H.J. Massingham, "Introduction," in Flora Thompson, *From Lark Rise to Candleford* (London: Penguin Books, 1972 [1939; 1941; 1943]), p. 10.
2.   Thompson, p. 416.
3.   Massingham, "Introduction," p. 10.
4.   *Ibid.*, p. 7.
5.   *Ibid.*, p. 9.
6.   *Ibid.*, p. 11.
7.   *Ibid.*, p. 13.
8.   *Ibid.*, p. 14, emphasis mine.
9.   F.R. Leavis & D. Thompson, *Culture and Environment: The Training of Critical Awareness* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1960 [1933]), pp. 1-2, emphasis mine.
10.   *Ibid.*, p. 2.
11.   *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 88.
12.   *Ibid.*, p. 88.
13.   *Ibid.*, p. 90.
14.   *Ibid.*, p. 91.
15.   Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory* (London: Blackwell, 1983).
16.   Raymond Williams, *Culture and Society 1780-1950* (London: Penguin Books/Chatto & Windus, 1963 [1958]), pp. 252-3.
17.   Karen Goaman, *The Old World is Behind You: the Situationist and beyond in anarchistic currents*, PhD thesis (Department of Anthropology, University College London, 2002); to be serialized in forthcoming US Journal *Modern Slavery*.
18.   Ivan Illich, *Tools for Conviviality* (London: Calder & Boyars, 1973).
19.   Williams, p. 253.
20.   *Ibid.*
21.   Teddy Goldsmith, "Poverty—the Child of Progress," *Ecologist* 31:6 (2001), pp. 44-55.
22.   Williams' term, p. 253.
23.   *Ibid.*
24.   George Woodcock, *Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1983 [1962]).
25.   Williams, p. 253.

26.   Marshall Sahlins, *Stone Age Economics* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1974).

27.   Colin Turnbull, *The Forest People* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961).

28.   R. Lee & R. Daly, *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Hunter-gatherers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

29.   Williams, p. 253

30.   Massingham, "Introduction," p. 9.

31.   *Ibid.*

32.   *Ibid.*, p. 10.

33.   *Ibid.*, p. 18.

34.   Thompson, pp. 32-33.

35.   *Ibid.*, p. 252.

36.   *Ibid.*

37.   *Ibid.*, p. 78.

38.   *Ibid.*, p. 79.

39.   *Ibid.*, p. 77.

40.   *Ibid.*, p. 78.

41.   *Ibid.*, p. 79.

42.   *Ibid.*, p. 81.

43.   *Ibid.*, p. 18.

44.   *Ibid.*, p. 96.

45.   *Ibid.*, pp. 83-4.

46.   *Ibid.*, p. 19.

47.   *Ibid.*

48.   Williams, p. 253.

49.   Thompson, p. 22.

50.   *Ibid.*, p. 26.

51   *Ibid.*, p. 173.

52.   *Ibid.*, p. 24.

53.   *Ibid.*, p. 21.

54.   *Ibid.*, p. 173.

55.   *Ibid.*, p. 41.

56.   *Ibid.*, p. 173.

57.   *Ibid.*, p. 40.

58.   *Ibid.*

59.   Massingham, "Introduction," p. 9.

60.   Thompson, p. 41.

61.   *Ibid.*, p. 46.

62.   *Ibid.*, p. 211.

63.   *Ibid.*, p. 138.

64.   *Ibid.*, p. 140.

65.   Thompson., p. 56.

66.   *Ibid.*, pp. 113-15.

67.   *Ibid.*, p. 114.

68.   *Ibid.*, pp. 62-3.

69.   *Ibid.*, p. 341.

70.   *Ibid.*, p. 50.

71.   *Ibid.*, p. 46.

72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
74. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-4.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 432-33
82. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 399.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 416.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 253.
88. *Ibid.*
89. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
91. *Ibid.*
92. *Ibid.*, p. 341.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 53.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
95. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.
96. Naomi Klein, *No Logo* (London: Flamingo, 2001), p. 220.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
98. J.M. Neeson, *Commoners: Common Right, Enclosure and Social Change in England, 1700-1820* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 255.
99. Thompson, p. 382
100. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*, p. 503.
103. *Ibid.*
104. H.J. Massingham, *The English Countryman* (London: Batsford, 1942).
105. *Ibid.*, p. 50, emphasis mine.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 49
107. *Ibid.*, p. 44, emphasis mine.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 47, emphasis mine.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 46, emphasis mine.
110. *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 69.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
112. *Ibid.*
113. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
114. Massingham, p. 67.
115. *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.
116. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 41.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

119. Thompson, p. 254.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

121. Jay Griffith, *Wild: an elemental journey* (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 94.

122. John Zerzan, "Twilight of the Machines," *Anarchy: a journal of desire armed* (Fall/Winter 2002-3), p. 38.

24

Crisis of Authority Aboard
the Battlestar *Galactica*

Lewis Call

SF does not project us into the future; it relates to us stories about our present, and more importantly about the past that has led to this present. Counterintuitively, SF is a *historiographic* mode, a means of symbolically writing about history.

—Adam Roberts, *Science Fiction*

The "re-imagined" *Battlestar Galactica* started production in early 2001, but the terrorist attacks which occurred on September 11 of that year took the show in a dramatically different direction. *Rolling Stone*'s Gavin Edwards argued that by its second season, "this remake of the 1978 camp classic has become—no joke—TV's most vivid depiction of the post-9/11 world and what happens to a society at war."[1] Ironically, it is *BG*'s status as science fiction which permits it to "get away with" relevant, timely discussions and debates about contemporary politics. As executive producer Ronald D. Moore notes, "the networks are terrified of controversy. But in sci-fi, they don't notice or care so much—you get a free pass."[2] It is even more ironic, then, that Moore has consistently and deliberately promoted a "naturalistic" approach to SF. "A casual viewer should for a moment feel like he or she has accidentally surfed onto a '60 Minutes' documentary piece about life aboard an aircraft carrier until someone starts talking about Cylons and battlestars," Moore has argued.[3] So Moore and his colleagues have the best of both worlds: the Sci-Fi Channel (and its parent company, MSNBC) will tolerate shockingly frank discussions about politics, because *BG* is "only" a science fiction program. Yet by promoting a cognitive environment which is recognizably similar to that of the United States in the early twenty-first century, Moore and company can provide commentary that is entirely relevant to contemporary American political culture. It turns out that anti-SF prejudice on the part of television executives may be the Achilles heel of American corporate TV censorship.

And here is the best irony yet: the producers of *BG* have exploited that prejudice to unleash a political argument which is surely anathema to conservative America. For the political narrative of *BG* is radical, and specifically anarchistic, in at least two fundamental ways. First, the program performs a "doomsday scenario" which has been repeated endlessly since 9/11 by American conservatives, notably a circle around Norman Ornstein and the right-wing American Enterprise Institute. After a devastating terrorist attack wipes out most government officials and military commanders, authority in *BG*'s Colonial state passes to a minor cabinet official (Laura Roslin) and an equally minor Commander (William Adama).[4] By virtue of their prior positions in a pre-existing chain of command they become, respectively, President of the Twelve Colonies and head of the Colonial military forces. Yet as the narrative progresses, it becomes painfully clear that Roslin and Adama are only paying lip service to a statist political order which actually died the moment the Cylons nuked the Colonies. As these two leaders gradually realize, the old statist system of hierarchy, command, rank and discipline no longer makes sense after the apocalypse (if indeed it ever did). Laura and Bill (as they come to call one another) slowly abandon the dead political forms of the modern state. In place of those forms they create and nurture a kind of postmodern family. This strangely compelling kinship system eventually emerges as an entirely viable alternative to the state. Its merits include flexibility, durability and the kind of fierce cohesion which only comes with love. In this sense, *BG* presents us with the anarchy of a post-apocalyptic society—and suggests that this anarchy is not a bad thing.

Second, *BG* enacts a thorough, compelling critique of modern military discipline. Postmodern philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have described the modern military institution as one which harnesses, but by no means tames, the primitive violence which they name the "war machine." Michel Foucault has identified discipline as the major mechanism by which modern militaries attempt to regulate this violence. But Deleuze, Guattari and Foucault understood that this regulation could never be completely effective. In the real world, this lesson became painfully clear to Americans during the Vietnam war. During the Vietnam war, the U.S. military endured combat refusals, desertions, widespread drug use, and even assassination of officers. *BG* describes a similar breakdown of military discipline. In the universe of *Battlestar Galactica*, legitimate authority no longer derives from the priniciples of rank and command. And again, the truly radical aspect of this representation lies in its normative claim: the erosion of traditional military discipline is consistently portrayed as a good thing. The Colonials typically prosper when they rely on instinct, trust and personal relationships (especially those of the family). When they rely on the rules of rank and command, they typically falter. This argument-that hierarchical systems of command and coercion are not only unethical but counter-productive—is also deeply anarchistic.

"All Ministers and Officials Should Now Go to Case Orange": The Terminal Crisis of Modern State Authority

Ever since the dark days of the Cold War, American conservatives have been concerned about the problem of presidential succession. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought about a renewed interest in the succession problem. In 2004, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) introduced a resolution which held that "the American people deserve a Government that is failsafe and foolproof."[5] Cornyn described this as a "profoundly nonpartisan issue," and took great pains to emphasize that he was simply endorsing the recommendations of the "bipartisan blue ribbon Continuity of Government Commission, sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution." The fact that this Commission was sponsored by two of the most prominent conservative think tanks in the United States did not exactly enhance its "bipartisan" credibility. The Commission itself acknowledged that "the first to identify and pursue these issues was our senior counselor, Norman Ornstein of AEI."[6]

Writing in *The Atlantic*, Michelle Cottle suggested convincingly that the Commission was, in fact, the product of Ornstein's "endless phoning, lobbying, and writing on the subject."[7] Although the Commission initially focused on the continuity of Congress, the issue of Presidential succession clearly loomed large in the minds of the commissioners. "Nothing is more important than having a credible and legitimate president leading the nation in the aftermath of a catastrophic attack,"[8] they declared. Under Ornstein's leadership, the Commission envisioned the kind of paranoid doomsday scenario that was becoming increasingly popular among American conservatives after 9/11: "It is 11:30 A.M., inauguration day . . . suddenly the television screens go blank! Al Qaeda operatives have detonated a small nuclear device on Pennsylvania Avenue . . . the American people are asking who is in charge, and there is no clear answer. . . . Perhaps the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, or another lesser-known cabinet member, was not in the area; then he or she would become president."[9]

Here the real issue began to emerge. While mouthing pious homilies about the "bipartisan" need to maintain continuity of government, American conservatives were clearly concerned that if a "lesser-known cabinet member" were to assume the Presidency, that person might lack the political capital necessary to serve as an effective President. Behind this was the clear implication that such a person might also be unable or unwilling to advance the political agenda of the recently deceased President; the underlying concern was that a minor Cabinet secretary might lack the conservative credentials which the American right would regard as a vital pre-requisite to serve. After midterm elections gave Democrats control of both houses of Congress in 2006, Ornstein became remarkably open about his agenda. He argued in *The Washington Post* that

"having congressional leaders in the presidential line of succession is wrong for more than constitutional reasons. . . . First, congressional leaders frequently are of the opposite party and viewpoint of a president."[10] Ornstein explicitly called on House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-San Francisco) and Senate President Pro Tem Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia) to "take themselves out of the succession queue."[11] Not only did Ornstein believe that issues of ideological purity should be taken into account when establishing the line of succession; he actually felt comfortable developing that argument on the Op Ed page of a major left-leaning American newspaper.

Ornstein's attempt to preserve the ideological purity of the Presidency was cynical and undemocratic, but he and his fellow conservatives were actually right about one thing. In the post-9/11 world, Americans can no longer assume that their government is stable, viable or sustainable. Rather than attempting to escape from this unfortunate fact, *Battlestar Galactica* confronts it head-on, in dramatically naturalistic terms. *BG* tells a political story which will be immediately recognizable to American conservative activists, those who follow Congressional debates and, at this point, anyone who reads *The Washington Post*. A well-organized society of religious fanatics launches a massive nuclear attack against a civilization which looks very much like ours. The Cylon terrorists are not space aliens or even Islamic fundamentalists; they are nominally Other, but they look and act like (mostly) Western humans. This is the first thing which should make conservatives uneasy: the Cylons are a home grown enemy, more Timothy McVeigh than Osama bin Laden.[12] The Cylon attack wipes out the President and most of his Cabinet.

The program thus enacts precisely the doomsday scenario envisioned by Ornstein and company. Moore's naturalistic approach immediately and forcefully locates the show within the contemporary American political context, making *BG*'s political narrative highly visible and easy for American audiences to access. But conservatives will surely not be pleased by the shape which that narrative quickly takes. For *BG* argues in remarkably clear and consistent terms that the complete breakdown of conventional political forms is hardly the nightmare scenario which conservatives would have us believe. On the contrary, the survival and relative success of the human civilization which resides aboard *Galactica*'s fleet indicates an anarchist reading. It turns out that a small (circa 50,000) human society can function perfectly well even after terrorists enact conservative America's worst doomsday scenario. However, *Galactica* and its fleet are able to enjoy this success only when they abandon the shattered remains of the modern state. When they cling to those remains, they inevitably fail; when they embrace the destruction of the state and choose to live instead as a postmodern family, they succeed. The program's narrative argument is, in important ways, anarchistic.

Secretary of Education Laura Roslin is on her way home from *Galactica*'s de-commissioning ceremony when she learns that Caprica and at least three other colonies have been nuked. In all probability, the capitol of the Twelve

Colonies has been destroyed. Roslin immediately recognizes what this might mean. When it's time to inform the other passengers about the attack, she says "I'll do it. I'm a member of the political cabinet, it's my responsibility."[13] However, Roslin is immediately reminded that her political position is precarious in the extreme. When Doral demands to know who put her in charge, she admits "that's a good question. The answer is no one. But this is a government ship and I am the senior government official, so that puts me in charge." Here Roslin acknowledges the essentially arbitrary nature of her authority. She is the senior official of a dead government; she claims jurisdiction over the ship in the name of this deceased state. When Roslin gets a hold of someone from the Ministry of Defense, the first thing she wants to know is "Where is the President?" (One is reminded here of Vice President Dick Cheney's notorious penchant for remaining in an "undisclosed location" following 9/11). Doral begins voicing the conservative view: "I'd feel a lot better if someone qualified were in charge around here." Doral is a perfect surrogate for the American right, and the fact that he turns out to be a Cylon supports the anarchist reading: Moore and company are certainly not endorsing the conservative line, for they put it in the mouth of the least reliable narrator they can find. Certainly Captain Lee Adama isn't buying it: "Lady's in charge." And so she is, at least for now. The left-leaning Secretary of Education may indeed take charge (but only if the highest ranking military officer present recognizes her authority).

With its dying gasp, the modern state struggles to maintain itself. Roslin's ship picks up an "official Colonial government broadcast" (which could be interpreted, in retrospect, as the last official broadcast that government ever sent). This broadcast states that "all ministers and officials should now go to Case Orange." We are immediately reminded of the absurd system of color-coded "alert levels" introduced in the wake of 9/11—and ably parodied by anti-war organization Code Pink. Roslin explains that

> it's an automated message. It's designed to be sent out in case the president, the vice president and most of the cabinet are dead or incapacitated. I need you to send my ID code back on the exact same frequency.

While she awaits the inevitable result, Roslin informs Lee Adama that she's forty-third in the line of succession—the *reductio ad absurdum* of Ornstein's "lesser known cabinet official." She also admits that she never really liked politics. This fact will turn out to be very helpful to her, as she gradually abandons the dead political forms of the modern state in favor of a more personal postmodern politics. Roslin is sworn in as President of the Twelve Colonies, in a ceremony which closely resembles the one that made Lyndon Johnson President of the United States after the assassination of John F. Kennedy.[14] Roslin's swearing-in ceremony will remain in the show's title credits, establishing her ascension to the Presidency as one of the show's major political narratives. Thanks to an obsolete system of succession, a left-leaning schoolteacher with

terminal breast cancer just became President. And everything's going to be OK. The ship's pilot, whose hand trembled as he handed Roslin the print-outs which would make her President, has a newfound confidence: "this is Colonial Heavy 798. No, strike that. This is Colonial One."

Commander Adama, however, isn't buying it. He confronts his son Lee over the wireless: "you're talking about the Secretary of Education. We're in the middle of a war, and you're taking orders from a schoolteacher?" Nor is this the last time that Roslin's previous occupation as an educator, together with the progressive political views which are presumed to accompany that occupation, would be taken as evidence of her lack of qualification for the Presidency. "Do you plan to declare martial law?" Roslin demands bluntly when she meets with Adama. "Take over the government?" Adama's indignant "of course not" is extremely ironic in light of subsequent events.

Roslin's political situation is rendered even more precarious by the arrival of Tom Zarek. "The terrorist?" asks Petty Officer Dualla. "He's a freedom fighter," claims Billy the Presidential aide. Zarek demands "the immediate resignation of Laura Roslin and her ministers," followed by "free and open elections." Roslin falls back on the liberal state's ever-reliable refusal to consider alternatives: "we don't negotiate with terrorists." But even she can see that he has a point. "Who voted for Laura Roslin?" Zarek demands. "You? Did you vote for her?" Lee Adama replies, rather unconvincingly, that "she was sworn in under the law." He's still living in the old world, and Zarek rightly ignores him. "The answer is: no one voted for her. No one! And yet she's making decisions for all of us, deciding who lives and who dies. Is that—is that democracy? Is that a free society?" Captain Adama becomes increasingly frustrated. "We need a government. We need rules. We need a leader." Now he's getting somewhere: his first two "need" statements are false, but the third one is actually true. Lee's political education will require him to understand the very different status of these three claims. By the end of "Bastille Day," Captain Adama has committed Roslin to holding elections. He tells Zarek "you were right about democracy and consent of the people. I believe in those things and we're gonna have 'em." When Roslin objects, Lee replies that he is simply requiring her to obey the law. Although he still invokes the (now defunct) Colonial state as the ultimate source of political authority, he has begun to understand that real power derives from the perception of legitimacy. He confronts the President and the Commander: "I swore an oath . . . to defend the Articles [of Colonization]. The Articles say there's an election in seven months. Now, if you're telling me we're throwing out the law, then I'm not a Captain, you're not a Commander and you are not the President. And I don't owe either of you a damned explanation for anything." This is what's truly important about a successful basic law, whether it is the Articles of Colonization or the U.S. Constitution. What is important about these laws is their ability to convey an aura of political legitimacy (and hence authority) upon those who claim to uphold them.

Steven Rubio is quite right to point out that Commander "Adama and Roslin assume that the philosophy of an established chain of command will be accepted by the people. Thus, if the people do not believe in that philosophy, the authority of Adama and Roslin will not be considered legitimate."[15] Clearly Tom Zarek understands this important point, and he is willing to take political advantage of it. Rubio suggests that "Zarek calls on Roslin and her government to step down, as she was never elected to her post but merely assigned to it after the death of other elected officials. (This is also an argument against accepting the pre-existing line of succession, thus hinting at anarchy.)"[16] Zarek's rejection of Roslin's Case Orange "authority" does indeed have anarchistic implications. Rubio is also one of the few commentators to recognize that in the universe of *BG*, "anarchy" does not have a pejorative connotation.

> The humans of *Battlestar Galactica* believe in the legitimation of authority through consensus. . . . There have been times in the past when brute force, via the military, has been used in an attempt to impose order and require obedience to authority. But these attempts have never worked. Compromise and consensus are what seem most successful.[17]

The principle that legitimate authority is established not through coercion but through consensus is the prime directive of anarchist political philosophy. Adam Roberts rightly describes *BG* as an "antidote to fascism" which "consistently represents politics as a process of negotiation and compromise."[18] When the Colonials pursue consensus, they typically succeed; when they resort to coercion, they usually fail. In this way *BG* provides a subtle but persistent argument in favor of anarchist political theory.

It is "Colonial Day," however, which reveals the full depths of the authority crisis which the Case Orange scenario has initiated. By now it's clear that, regardless of Roslin's putatively progressive political views, there is nothing particularly "liberal" or "democratic" about her government. Indeed, both Roslin and her government exhibit an interesting postmodern political ambiguity.[19] By now, "ruthless terrorist" Tom Zarek has been rehabilitated, and now sits in the Colonial legislature, the Quorum of Twelve. He can do this because "Sagittaron law"—unlike, say, Florida law—"allows a prisoner to regain his citizenship once he has served his time." At the first meeting of the Quorum, Zarek drops a major political bombshell. "If, gods forbid, anything should happen to you, Madame President, we have no designated successor. The civilian branch of our government would be paralyzed, leaving the door wide open for a military dictatorship. Sagittaron moves that the first item on the Quorum's agenda should be nominations for Vice President." Shockingly, left-wing populist Tom Zarek has seized the right's doomsday narrative regarding presidential succession. He is now using that narrative for his own purposes, in a bid to become Vice President himself. Thus we learn that both the right and the left are willing to manipulate paranoia regarding continuity of government for cynical political purposes. Za-

rek's move has an interesting cognitive effect on the audience. Viewers who were previously sympathetic to his charismatic critique of Roslin's authoritarian regime suddenly see Zarek as just another power hungry politician. The easiest move to make at this point is to reject all statist alternatives, including both the Roslin/Adama "Case Orange" state and the oppressive quasi-populist state which (we now suspect) would develop if Zarek and his "revolutionary vanguard" managed to seize the levers of state power. Zarek's descent from the moral high ground, in other words, authorizes the audience to reject left-wing "populist" states as well as military-backed right-wing states. The anarchist alternative would seem to be the only one left standing.

Dr. Gaius Baltar defends the "power mad school teacher" on talk wireless. "History is full of examples of leaders, um, who have come from the most humble beginnings and have risen to meet the challenge posed by cataclysmic events." Baltar's speech is oddly comforting, especially for Americans, whose recent history is full of leaders who came from privileged backgrounds and failed to rise to the challenge posed by cataclysm. Roslin finally recognizes Baltar as a potentially powerful ally, and taps him for the Vice Presidency. Of course it was Dr. Baltar, a hallucinating mad scientist in the vein of Dr. Timothy Leary, who unwittingly helped the Cylons destroy Colonial civilization. Baltar's ascension to the Vice Presidency greatly advances the erosion of the Colonial state.

The crisis of the Colonial state culminates in Adama's military coup. Adama discovers that Roslin ordered Lieutenant Kara Thrace to take the captured Cylon raider back to Caprica and retrieve the Arrow of Apollo. Adama argues that this was a "military decision"; thus, as the head of the military, it should have been his decision to make. Adama asks for Roslin's resignation; she refuses. "Then I'm terminating your presidency, as of this moment," Adama growls over the wireless. Here the ethical and political bankruptcy of the post-apocalyptic Colonial state stands starkly revealed. It has been implicit throughout the series that Roslin may continue to serve as President only as long as she enjoys the support of the military. That tragic fact now becomes explicit. In a way, Adama's coup clears the air. Up until this moment, Roslin has been the civilian face of what was essentially a military regime. At last, Adama is being honest about the power configuration.

At the very moment when the failure of the modern state becomes undeniable, *BG* begins to develop its alternative model. This is perhaps the show's most radical move. It's easy enough to critique the failures of the modern American military-state complex. (Given recent developments in Iraq and elsewhere, that's shooting fish in a barrel.) But *BG* also attempts to articulate a viable alternative model for the exchange of political power, and that is a far more ambitious project.[20] *BG*'s post-apocalyptic narrative argues that the modern state is no longer sustainable after the Cylon attack (or 9/11). The program responds with a tactical retreat into the premodern. Specifically, *BG* begins to argue that family or kinship structures may serve as a viable alternative to the

discredited institution of the modern state.[21] As Colonel Tigh attempts to execute the military coup by placing Roslin under arrest, Lee Adama puts his gun to Tigh's head. Tigh accuses him of mutiny. Lee replies: "You can tell my *father* [Commander Adama] that I'm listening to my instincts, and my instincts tell me that we cannot sacrifice our democracy just because the President makes a bad decision." In a world where our official institutions have failed us, it makes perfect sense to return to those institutions which served the human race so well for thousands of years prior to the establishment of the modern state. The family is particularly important in this context. In theory, *Galactica* is a military vessel which follows an established chain of command. But in practice, the senior officers constitute a family, and when they make their most important decisions, they behave like a family, not like a military institution. In this schematic, William Adama is obviously the father, and Lee is his son. Kara Thrace is a kind of daughter to William Adama, and a kind of sister to Lee. (The latter relationship includes both playful sibling rivalry[22] and incestuous desire.) Colonel Tigh is the embarrassing drunken uncle. The *BG* family is moderately dysfunctional, to be sure, but no moreso than any other fragmented, postmodern family. And it is a remarkably strong family. Through crisis after unbearable crisis, this family holds the crew of *Galactica* together and keeps the ship going. As the Colonial officers slowly abandon the world of military discipline and hierarchy, they learn to trust their instincts and their family. That is when they are most successful.

Of course, it takes them a while to learn these important lessons. With Commander Adama in critical condition following Boomer's assassination attempt, Colonel Tigh takes command. He's the senior officer, and so traditional military logic says that's what should happen. But Tigh's command is a complete disaster. Unable to cope with inconvenient questions from the Quorum of Twelve and the civilian news media, Tigh declares martial law. Predictably enough, when the drunken XO finds himself in command not only of *Galactica* but of the entire government, he quickly reveals himself to be a swaggering, petty dictator. Civilian ships refuse to re-supply Galactica until martial law is lifted. Colonel Tigh decides to send in the marines. Short on manpower, he puts inexperienced officers in command of the boarding parties, with predictably horrific results. Troops open fire on rioting civilians aboard the *Gideon*, resulting in four civilian casualties. The "*Gideon* massacre" inspires Lee to spirit Roslin off *Galactica*, where she forms an alliance of convenience with Tom Zarek (!) and leads a third of the fleet back to Kobol. When Commander Adama finally recovers from emergency surgery, he continues to follow the disastrous course which he chose when he overthrew Roslin: "I'm not interested in people who decide to join up with a religious fanatic [Roslin] and a terrorist [Zarek]." But he can no longer sustain the façade of legitimacy.

Interestingly, it is Petty Officer Dualla who makes Adama see the error of his ways. Dualla is a working class African American woman from the colony

of Sagittaron. Sagittaron is consistently portrayed as the Mississippi of the Twelve Colonies: impoverished, predominantly black, and highly religious. Dee originally joined the military over her father's objections, because she "just wanted to believe in something" ("Final Cut").[23] Maybe Dee joined up to get away from her own family, or to get off Sagittaron. In any case, it's pretty clear she was looking for a new family. She thought she had found one aboard *Galactica*, but then her surrogate father betrayed her trust.

> You let us down. You let us down. You made a promise to all of us . . . to find earth, to find us a home. Together. It doesn't matter what the President did or even what Lee did, because every day that we remain apart is a day that you've broken your promise.

Adama has been a poor Commander, but Dee doesn't give a damn about that. The problem is that he has been a bad father. The solution to this problem is clear, although it's hard for Adama to hear. He tries to dismiss Dee: "Thank you, petty officer. You may leave now." But Dee won't go, because she's not a petty officer talking to her Commander. She's a brave child, working up the courage to challenge her father's poor leadership. "It's time to heal the wounds," she declares. Adama again tries to dismiss her; again she holds her ground. "People have been divided," Dee concludes. "They're separated from their parents." In the end, Adama listens to Dee, not to Colonel Tigh. He makes peace with Roslin, puts fleet and family back together, and heals the wounds.

"Rumor Has It That I Know Very Little about Military Protocol": The Breakdown of Modern Military Discipline and the Emergence of the Postmodern Family as an Anarchist Alternative

Ironically, the nineteenth century's most precise and powerful critiques of modern militarism came from the Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, who was notorious for his endorsement of violence. Some would see this as a contradiction, but in fact Bakunin's views on violence were perfectly consistent. For him, violence could be ethical and even morally uplifting, when carried out in the service of an authentic revolutionary project ("propaganda of the deed"). Military violence, on the other hand, was for him inherently unethical. Bakunin was especially interested in (and concerned about) the psychological effects of violent militarism. He saw the modern military as a profoundly hierarchical structure dedicated to the systematic production and distribution of violence:

> ambition is the principal inspiration of the military hierarchy. Every lieutenant wishes to be a colonel, every colonel a general. As for the soldiers, who are

systematically demoralized in their barracks, they dream of the noble pleasures of war: massacre, pillage, theft and rape.[24]

Bakunin thus identified an intimate connection between coercive hierarchy (the major organizing principle of all modern militaries) and anti-social violence. He was remarkably precise in his description of the problem:

> if there is a devil in human history, the devil is the principle of command. It alone, sustained by the ignorance and stupidity of the masses, without which it could not exist, is the source of all the catastrophes, all the crimes, and all the infamies of history.[25]

Here Bakunin offered a telling critique of modern statism in general and military hierarchies in particular. He convincingly identified *command*—the very essence of modern militarism—as a principle which was dangerous, destructive and deeply unethical. Bakunin was a surprisingly perceptive amateur psychologist; he noted that command harmed the commanders as well as their soldiers.

> Nothing is as dangerous for man's personal morality as the habit of commanding. The best of men, the most intelligent, unselfish, generous, and pure, will always and inevitably be corrupted in this pursuit.[26]

Bakunin introduced remarkably effective critiques of the military hierarchy and its principle of command. But it was the post-structuralist and postmodern anarchists of the twentieth century who fully developed these anarchist critiques. In his groundbreaking 1975 work *Discipline and Punish*, Michel Foucault emphasized the anti-individualistic nature of military discipline (a very anarchist theme). Foucault recognized the awesome importance of rank: "in discipline, the elements are interchangeable, since each is defined by the place it occupies in a series, and by the gap that separates it from the others. The unit is, therefore, the *rank*: the place one occupies in a classification."[27] In order to be effective, Foucault argued, modern discipline required "a precise system of command."[28] The elements of discipline, including the principles of command and rank in particular, capture the essence of the modern military structure. They are also the elements which systematically break down and fragment aboard the Battlestar *Galactica*. *Galactica*'s officers and crew routinely disobey orders, disregard rank, and in general violate the principles of military discipline. A modern militarist ideology would therefore predict disaster for the Colonial fleet. But such a prediction would be entirely wrong. In fact, the fleet thrives in inverse proportion to the effectiveness of Colonial military discipline.

In their 1980 "Treatise on Nomadology," postmodern anarchists Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari provocatively but persuasively argued that "*The State has no war machine of its own*; it can only appropriate one in the form of a military institution, one that will continually cause it problems."[29] Deleuze and

Guattari recognized that Foucault's work had identified the Achilles heel of modern militarism. To the extent that the modern military project requires discipline, the breakdown of this discipline undermines the military institution itself. Furthermore, if Deleuze and Guattari are right, then the collapse of the military as an institution could occur in a rather spectacular and dramatic fashion, since the breakdown of discipline would threaten to release the pent-up violence of the primal war machine: "discipline is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated them. The war machine answers to other rules."[30]

The history of the twentieth century clearly demonstrates the breakdown of discipline and the corresponding collapse of militarism. The United States learned this lesson during the Vietnam War. The principle of rank was one of the major casualties of the war. Loren Baritz writes:

> The rapid turnover of their immediate officers—usually every six months, often less—led to the conviction that the grunts knew better than anyone else, especially better than the six-month wonders, the shake-'n'-bake lieutenants, how to stay alive.[31]

James F. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi confirm that in Vietnam, "the officers were less prepared than the troops they led," and point out that many U.S. officers in Vietnam "would not have qualified for a commission just a few years earlier."[32]

Richard R. Moser has noted the remarkable breakdown of the command principle during the Vietnam War. "As early as 1965 the expression of soldier discontent began to increase, with growing individual refusals to follow orders."[33] At times, entire units would refuse to accept combat orders.[34] Probably the most extreme evidence of a breakdown in military discipline comes from "fragging"; i.e., assassination of a superior officer, frequently via fragmentation grenade. The astonishing practice of fragging clearly illustrates the failure of rank, command and discipline. Moser describes "an epidemic of assassination attempts" in the U.S. military after 1968, and estimates that there were as many as a thousand fragging attempts by the war's end.[35] Dunnigan and Nofi characterize fragging as "an extreme manifestation of a breakdown of discipline" which also manifested in desertion and drug use.[36] Interestingly, Moser reads it as an inversion or reversal of discipline: "whether actually used or not, the threat of fragging was a means by which soldiers tried to discipline their commanders."[37] Either way, fragging epitomizes the failure of modern military discipline, and of the military institution which that discpline underwrites.

Failures of military discipline become evident early on in *BG*. In "Litmus," Commander Adama appoints Sergeant Hadrian to investigate security breaches as an "independent tribunal." He promises her a free hand. By appointing a non-commissioned crew member to head up the investigation, Adama makes a crucial mistake, for Hadrian lacks the military authority to pursue her investigation. Adama eventually halts the investigation, claiming that Hadrian has lost her

way. When it comes right down to it, however, Adama can only stop the investigation by invoking the principle of rank. Sergeant Hadrian orders the Corporal of the Guard to return Adama to the witness stand, while Adama orders the Corporal to escort Sergeant Hadrian to her quarters. The guard hesitates, and Adama's authority seems to be hanging by a thread. The tension in this scene comes from the Corporal's dilemma: two superior officers have given him conflicting orders, and he must now decide whom to obey.[38] The principle of rank dictates that he obey Adama, but the principle of command might seem to favor Hadrian: after all, she is theoretically acting in her capacity as "independent tribunal," and so she is the one who has the authority to issue commands in this context. The Corporal finally sides with the Commander, and so rank trumps command (at least for now). At the same time, the purely arbitrary nature of both rank and command stands starkly revealed.

BG's most dramatic depiction of the breakdown in military discipline occurs in the aptly titled "Fragged." A group of *Galactica* crewmen find themselves stranded on Kobol, under the command of Lieutenant "Crashdown." Crashdown is the ultimate "shake-'n'-bake Lieutenant": arrogant, inexperienced, inflexible, and too deeply committed to the tactics he studied in command school. It soon becomes painfully clear that Chief Petty Officer Galen Tyrol is the group's most capable leader, and yet the principle of rank requires him to submit to the disastrous decisions of the "Ell Tee." Crashdown orders an assault on a Cylon position. "We have equal numbers. We have the element of surprise. Therefore, we have the initiative." The attack makes sense, according to the curriculum he studied in command school. In the real world, it's suicidal. His "platoon" includes people like Specialist Cally, who is an able deckhand and a skilled Viper mechanic, but no soldier. ("I just joined to pay for dental school.") Chief Tyrol objects to the planned assault: "We can't go up against an armed and defended position like that. They'll wipe us out in the first two minutes." Crashdown ignores his objections. He proceeds to outline the attack plan, using the stilted "five paragraph order" format which he learned at command school. (This is similar to the "five paragraph essay" frequently employed by American college freshman, and it demonstrates the same tendency to stifle independent critical thinking.) When Baltar suggests that Crashdown has lost his mind, Tyrol actually defends his "superior" officer, even though he knows Crashdown is about to get them all killed: "This is not a democracy! The El-Tee's in charge!"

Crashdown is all swagger and bluff as he orders the attack: "Saddle up. It's time to junk some toasters." He thinks he's Robert Duvall in *Apocalypse Now*. But when he orders Cally to advance, she's too terrified to move. Crashdown puts his sidearm to Cally's head. "You're going out there, Cally. You're going out there or I'm gonna blow your brains out. Right here, right now." This is too much for Chief Tyrol, who points his own weapon at the El Tee. "This is crazy!" shouts Specialist Seelix, and she's right. Seelix is witnessing the fatal rupture of modern military discipline. Axiom: the modern military functions if

and only if the highest ranking enlisted man in each unit is willing to accept orders from the lowest ranking officer in that unit. The moment that stops happening, the military ceases to function as a coherent institution. The Chief starts giving orders to the Lieutenant: "Put it down right now." It's Gaius Baltar who finally frags Crashdown, but the damage was done before Baltar pulled the trigger. Military discipline fragmented ("fragged") when the Chief turned against his commanding officer, and there is no recovery from that kind of radical fragmentation.

If the military command hierarchy was strained by events on and around Kobol, the arrival of Battlestar *Pegasus* brings that hierarchy to the breaking point. When Admiral Cain steps off her raptor and onto *Galactica's* flight deck, she welcomes the crew of *Galactica* "back to the Colonial fleet." This produces a remarkable vertigo in the audience (and, presumably, in *Galactica's* crew). Until this moment, *Galactica was* the Colonial fleet (as far as anyone aboard her knew), and Adama was in undisputed command. The sudden arrival of a flag officer changes all that. "I sometimes forget about the rules of military protocol," Laura Roslin muses—as well she might, when she only had to deal with Adama. But Adama has not forgotten these rules. "Admiral Cain is my superior officer. She will take complete command of the entire fleet." At first, Adama continues to follow the old habits he has developed during his long military career. "She outranks me. It's as simple as that." But it soon becomes clear that the situation is anything but simple. Rikk Mulligan has argued quite persuasively that although the rules of military protocol place Cain in command,

> this is a military protocol established before the fall of the Colonies and one based on a history and a tradition that has ended, casting some doubt on Cain's automatic assumption of control.[39]

Cain is quick to argue (facetiously, as we soon realize) that "while the chain of command is strict, it is not heartless." She promises not to interfere with *Galactica's* internal affairs—a promise she almost immediately breaks, when she makes the catastrophic decision to dismantle Adama's postmodern family by reassigning Lee and Kara to *Pegasus*. Father Adama protests: "I have a team that works very well together." He has moved heaven and Kobol to keep his family together, and he is not prepared to let Cain break that family apart, even if she does outrank him. Although she has only just arrived, Cain seems to understand quite clearly what has happened aboard *Galactica*: Adama and his officers have systematically moved away from a conventional system of rank, command and discipline (because they understand, if only at the unconscious level, that this system can no longer work in the post-apocalyptic world). They have replaced that system with an informal but highly effective system of family relationships. For Cain, this is a serious problem. "I'm saving your command, Bill. You're way too close to these officers, and it's blinding you to their weaknesses and to the damage that they're doing to unit cohesion and to morale."

When Lieutenant Agathon and Chief Tyrol find the sadistic Lieutenant Thorne about to rape the Caprica Sharon, they kill him in a violent struggle. Cain has them court martialed, finds them guilty, and orders their execution. When Adama learns of this, he immediately abandons the principles of rank and command. Adama orders a marine strike team to retrieve Agathon and Tyrol from *Pegasus*. "I'm not going to let you execute my men," Adama tells Cain over the wireless. His choice of words is important: they are "his" men, i.e., part of the family he has built aboard *Galactica*. Cain tries to re-invoke the principles of rank and command: "I don't take orders from you." But Adama is done with all that now. "Call it whatever you like. I'm getting my men." Again, they are "his" men, and Adama makes it quite clear that he is even willing to mutiny in order to protect his family. Laura Roslin tries to defuse the situation by meeting with Cain and Adama aboard Colonial One. She declares that "what happened out there today was the result of failure in leadership of everyone in this room." Cain continues to take the traditional militarist line, arguing that "under regulations" she has "complete authority to try, convict, and sentence" Agathon and Tyrol. Roslin replies that "the spirit of the law requires something more here than summary executions." Cain gazes at her in disbelief.

> Is this what the two of you have been doing for the past six months? Debating the finer points of colonial law? Well, guess what? We're at war! And we don't have the luxury of academic debate over these issues.

Cain occupies a very interesting position here. *Galactica* and its fleet have been on the run for months, and Cain has just now "found" them. Changes which were slow, subtle and complex from the point of view of Adama or Roslin appear very dramatic to Cain. And because Cain has maintained traditional military discipline aboard her ship (in her mind, at least), she views these changes as nothing less than disastrous. Jacob Clifton has argued that Cain's "point, valid in many ways, was that the actions these two leaders had taken throughout the Fleet's journey effectively diluted and warped the chain of command to incomprehensibility, and that this must necessarily have a detrimental effect on the survival of the fleet as a whole."[40] This is actually two quite distinct points. The first one—that Adama and Roslin have distorted the chain of command to the point where it has become radically incoherent—is incontestable. The question of what impact this might have on the fleet's chances of survival, however, is very much open to debate. Cain sees that Adama and Roslin have basically abandoned the traditional statist and militarist forms of structure and organization. What Cain cannot see is that Adama and Roslin are now relying upon an informal system of postmodern family relations to organize their society and their politics. Cain cannot recognize the fact that this move made perfect sense within their narrative framework, nor can she understand that this new political system is actually working reasonably well. "How the two of you have survived this long, I will never know," Cain fumes. Clifton seems to

share her frustration: Where Cain put the survival of her crew above all other concerns, via the military hierarchy as an ideal, the leaders of the *Galactica* Fleet made compromise after compromise in order to protect the Fleet and its people, even when doing so could damn the entirety of their population."[41] But Clifton is too quick to accept Admiral Cain's version of events. As I have been arguing, the compromises which Roslin and Adama constantly make constitute important evidence of a fully functional informal political structure. This structure is anarchistic in its political orientation, and takes the form of a postmodern family. Far from "damning" the Colonial population, it offers them their only realistic hope for survival. The decision to abandon conventional political hierarchies in favor of flexible, adaptable family relations is (perhaps ironically) a fully rational and pragmatic decision, which perfectly suits the needs of post-apocalyptic Colonial society.

Shortly thereafter, Roslin tells Adama that he must kill Cain. Such a move would have been absolutely unthinkable in any remotely functional liberal state: the President has just ordered the assassination of the highest ranking military commander. Adama hesitates, until he learns that *Pegasus* once had a civilian fleet of her own. It seems that Admiral Cain stripped that fleet's ships for parts, and left the civilians for dead. Here at last is the proof Adama needed: blind adherence to the dead forms of military discipline leads to the destruction of the civilian population. The abandonment of those forms in favor of kinship systems (i.e., the strategy which he and Roslin have been pursuing, if only unconsciously) actually represents Colonial civilization's only realistic survival option. Adama eventually orders Starbuck to kill Cain. But if Adama has decided that Cain is too dangerous to live, the feeling is mutual: even as Adama orders Cain's death, Cain orders her XO to station marines aboard *Galactica* and, on her command, "signal the marines to terminate Adama's command. Starting with Adama." It is fascinating to note that the command which will trigger the assassination of Adama is "execute case orange." It seems we've come full circle. It was Case Orange—the decapitated modern state's stubborn, zombie-like determination to haunt the remnants of humanity—that got us here in the first place. Now we see the full implications of the Case Orange scenario: the two highest ranking military officers in the Colonial Fleet have just ordered each other's assassinations. The breakdown of military discipline (and the corresponding breakdown of modern state power) is now complete.

Ever the moral son, Lee questions his father's decision. "Assassination. That's your decision. That's how you resolve your differences with your superior officers." Commander Adama also has an interesting conversation with the Caprica Sharon. Sure, she's a Cylon, but Adama's a good father: when one of his boys brings his pregnant girlfriend home, Adama understands on some level that she must be part of the family now. After his conversation with Sharon, Adama decides to call off Cain's assassination. As Sharon told him, "it's not enough to survive. One has to be worthy of surviving." In a slightly too convenient plot twist, Number Six escapes from the *Pegasus* brig and kills Cain. This

resolves the military power struggle, but it does leave some very important questions about the *nature* of political power in the post-apocalyptic world unanswered. Those questions are addressed at the very end of the *Pegasus* story arc ("Ressurection Ship, Part 2"). Roslin and Adama meet aboard Colonial One. Roslin returns to the initial problem: the structure of military and political power.

> Rumor has it that I know very little about military protocol, but I do believe that someone who commands more than one ship is called an admiral. Congratulations, Admiral Adama.

A statist would like to read this as evidence of the military institution's infinite resilience: after the Admiral's tragic death, the next man down is promoted into the top position, and all is well. However, the subtext of this scene does not permit such a reading. Adama is genuinely touched by Roslin's gesture, but in point of fact it doesn't change much: as Commander (and father), Adama would have been in charge anyway, and the chances of another Admiral showing up anytime soon are pretty slim. Still, Adama gives a rare smile. There is genuine warmth and affection between him and Roslin. They began their relationship as "Madame President" and "Commander"; now they are "Laura" and "Bill." Astonishingly, Bill even risks giving Laura a gentle kiss on the lips—and she is not at all displeased. Here at last is a viable politics for the post-apocalyptic world. Laura Roslin has now joined *Galactica*'s quirky, eccentric, loving family. As romance blossoms between her and Bill Adama, she will increasingly come to occupy the structural position of Mom. And everything really will be all right.

However, this intriguing postmodern family is only able to take the place of the dead liberal state because Adama and Roslin have folded their statist authority (as Admiral and President) into the new political structure. As usual, the problem is that the modern state doesn't have the sense to admit that it's dead. Adama and Roslin must hold onto their formal positions as they build their postmodern kinship system. Once that system is fully established, it may well stand as a viable anarchist alternative to the modern state. Until then, Roslin must remain aboard Colonial One, and Adama must remain the power behind the throne. The remainder of Season Two is therefore haunted by the specter of a Gaius Baltar administration. With Roslin critically ill, the hallucinating mad scientist is a heartbeat from the presidency. The stubborn, irrelevant legalism of the Case Orange scenario says Baltar *should* become President, because *somebody* has to be, but it's clear from the beginning that his administration will be a disaster. "Pull yourself together," Adama says contemptuously. "You're about to become President of the Colonies. You're going to be asked to make some very hard decisions. Act like you can handle it." Baltar's sanity may be dubious, but he does understand the basic political situation. "I will be the President, all right, but without the military support, I might as well be an anointed dog catcher." Perhaps it is partly this political calculus which inspires Baltar to develop a mi-

racle cure for Roslin's cancer. However, this move demotes him from immanent President back to Vice President. Baltar is perpetually excluded from the Adama/Roslin family (and must therefore establish his own bizarre alternative family with various Cylons, real and hallucinatory). Pathetically, he can only assert the minimal authority which derives from his essentially meaningless title. "Do you know who I am?" he demands when the Marines won't admit him into the quarters of the murdered Commander Fisk. "I'm the Vice President of the colonies!" When Lee Adama orders the guards to let him enter, Baltar claims miserably, "They were going to let me in."

If Baltar's star is falling, Lee's is rising. During the second half of Season Two, the breakdown of conventional command structures aboard *Pegasus* assumes almost absurd proportions. Commander Fisk turns out to be a deeply corrupt black marketer, murdered by a gangster. Command now passes to the *Pegasus*'s chief engineer, Barry Garner. Garner mounts an ill-conceived rescue mission, on his own authority. Lee tries to invoke his father's patriarchal authority: "Commander, this is in direct violation of the Admiral's orders." Garner orders Lee to "leave Combat." Lee declares in absurdly formal fashion that "this an illegal action on your part, sir!" Illegal it may be, but the *Galactica* family would never quibble about orders if one of their own were in danger; Lee himself was willing to put the whole fleet at risk to pursue a long-shot search-and-rescue for Kara ("You Can't Go Home Again"). Garner and Lee promptly relieve one another of duty. Viewers are once again treated to the familiar, ever entertaining spectacle of two officers competing for the obedience of a noncomm, while the fate of the ship hangs in the balance. Garner wins the struggle handily: he outranks Lee, and as he is careful to point out, Lee is not a member of the *Pegasus* crew. The Sergeant of the Guard starts to escort Lee from *Pegasus* CIC. However, the ship is about to be destroyed by Cylons, and so it's easy enough for Lee to leave custody: "Sergeant, I think you have better things to do." Lee assumes command, while Garner dies repairing the ship's FTL drive so they can escape.

Adama quickly confirms the inevitable, promoting Lee to Commander and giving him *Pegasus*. In "Razor," the outspoken Kendra Shaw describes the source of Lee's authority: "your daddy just gave you a Battlestar, like he was tossing you the keys to a new car." Blunt honesty is not confined to Shaw; "Razor" makes *BG*'s political argument in dramatically direct terms. At the end of the two-part episode, Adama discusses the reprehensible actions of Admiral Cain with his son:

> Now, you don't have any children, so you might not understand this, but you see yourself reflected in their eyes. And there are some things that I thought of doing, with this Fleet. But I stopped myself, because I knew that I'd have to face you the following day.

The argument is astonishing: Adama seems to believe that in the absence of Lee, he could have become another Cain. What is even more remarkable is that this assessment has a certain plausibility to it. The growth of the postmodern family as a viable political structure may be the only thing which prevents the disintegration of the modern militarist state from pulling humanity down into barbarism.

Meanwhile, the insecure, delusional Dr. Baltar is launching his disastrous bid for the Presidency. Baltar and Zarek sit around Baltar's lab trying to figure out how to appeal to "the mob." What the mob wants, as usual, is *Lebensraum.* Zarek summarizes the political strategy: "We needed an issue. Something to set us apart from Roslin. . . . This is it. Permanent settlement on this planet." When it becomes clear that Baltar's land-grant populism is likely to win him the election, Roslin employs one of the liberal state's most venerable tactics: she stuffs the ballot box. Adama confronts her: "you tried to steal an election?" Roslin is remarkably candid: "Yes, I did. And I got caught. But Gaius Baltar cannot become President of the Colonies, Bll. It cannot happen." Bill and Laura are not merely parents; they are plausibly *bad* parents, determined to over-discipline their uncooperative family. But Bill Adama, at least, realizes in the end that as a responsible parent, he must let his wayward children experience the consequences of their poor decisions. "The people made their choice. We're gonna have to live with it."

The Baltar administration is predictably catastrophic. Baltar refuses to take advice from Adama: "I don't have to listen. I'm the President." Baltar's new title gives him the appearance of power, and he mistakes that for genuine authority. As J. Robert Loftis has noted, Baltar may think that the Presidency gives him power to ignore advice, but as it turns out, he has to listen to *everyone.*[42] One year after the colonization of New Caprica, the Cylons return and occupy the planet. Naturally, Baltar collaborates with the Cylon occupiers. The "President" becomes a kind of Pétain.[43] Laura Roslin (now a "mere schoolteacher" once again) writes in her journal: "The colonial government under President Gaius Baltar functions in name only." And yet the Cylons preserve this façade of government, which is interesting. This suggests that by this point, the desiccated carcass of the Colonial state provides more benefit to the Cylon than it does to the Colonials themselves. "We're here as allies and friends of the legitimate government of the Colonies," Three explains as she and the other Cylons force Baltar to sign an order for multiple summary executions. "You are the President, so everything we do requires your signature." At this point the Colonial State's sole function is to provide a patina of legitimacy to cover the brutal violence of the Cylon occupation. One is reminded here of the relationship between certain puppet governments and their American overseers: South Vietnam in the 1960's, Iraq more recently.

From this point on, Adama consistently leads by invoking the language of family (and not the language of military authority). When it's time for him to

give his rousing "Crispin's Day" speech (just prior to the Exodus from New Caprica), he declares that "one day you will tell your children and your grand-children that you served with such men and women as the universe has never seen." The escape from New Caprica is complicated by the fact that Bill Adama has (albeit reluctantly) ordered Lee to hold *Pegasus* back, to guard the civilian fleet. But of course, Lee comes through in the end, jumping into battle just in time to rescue *Galactica* and bring off the Exodus. With their escape complete, father and son joke about the latter's disobedience. "I guess you didn't under-stand my orders, huh?" Admiral Adama asks with a smile. "Never could read your handwriting," Lee replies. It's a remarkably cavalier attitude, considering the fact that Lee has just lost his first command and sacrificed one half of hu-manity's Battlestar fleet. But military criteria are no longer relevant: what matters is that Lee was a good son, who came to his father's rescue.

The Baltar administration dies in the dust of New Caprica. Felix Gaeta nice-ly summarizes Baltar's political legacy: "Booze, pills, hot and cold running interns. He led us to the apocalypse." Laura Roslin slips back into the padded leather chair aboard Colonial One with amazing ease—and no constitutional authority whatsoever. At this point she has absolutely no formal position within what remains of the Colonial government: just her moral authority as the desig-nated mother figure. With Baltar missing and presumed dead, the Presidency goes to former terrorist Tom Zarek. Zarek's three day Presidency represents the *reducto ad absurdum* of the Case Orange scenario: even a raging radical like Zarek can be President because, once again, *somebody* has to be. Zarek is a self-described realist: "I never had any illusions about remaining in office for very long. And the Admiral's made it quite clear that he'd like nothing better than to put me in a cell if I try to hang on to power." Roslin agrees: "You and I both know how impossible it would be to govern this fleet without the backing of the military." What they mean, of course, is that the fleet can only be governed by someone who has the support of Father Adama. Roslin does; Zarek doesn't. And so Zarek appoints Roslin as his Vice President and resigns in her favor, at which point she turns around and names him Vice President. This ridiculous shuffling of portfolios finally reveals the liberal state for the house of cards it is.

<p align="center">✱✱✱</p>

The American right was quick to recognize the political implications of the New Caprica storyline. "The creative team of *BSG* moved the entire show to Bagh-dad," complained *National Review*'s Jonah Goldberg.[44] For conservatives, the main problem was the show's obvious sympathy for the human "insurgents" who fought bravely against the forces of the occupation. Goldberg denounced what he saw as the sudden introduction of a "strained and absurd moral equiva-lence" into the program. Where the right saw danger, the left saw opportunity.

Christian W. Erickson argued that "the very ambiguity in the representation of the tactics and strategies used by humans and Cylons must be understood as having great potential subversiveness."[45] *American Prospect*'s Brad Reed argued that "in its third season, the show has morphed into a stinging allegorical critique of America's three-year occupation of Iraq."[46] As a result, Reed noted, "many conservatives are feeling betrayed by one of their most important allies in the war on terror: *Battlestar Galactica*." However, it's important to remember that these conservatives were "betrayed" long before this. Indeed, the "alliance" between *BG* and the war on terror never existed, except in the feverish imagination of those whom Reed dubs the Galacticons. As I have been arguing, *BG*'s statist order started to crumble at the very beginning, when Laura Roslin heard the somber pronouncement of the Case Orange beacon. If *BG* models a war on terror, that war is stillborn, for the devastated Colonial state cannot sustain it. And if *BG* has a consistent argument about life after 9/11, it is surely this: the game of terror and counter-terror can never be won. The only rational response is to withdraw from this deadly game, and focus on building healthy alternative political structures to replace the corpse of the state. First among these structures will be the family, which served the political needs of premodern humanity for countless generations. If the family was forced to hibernate during the period which corresponds to the rise of the modern state, that hiatus now looks like a brief interruption, prelude to the rebirth of kinship systems which marks the postmodern. As *Battlestar Galactica*'s political narrative clearly demonstrates, these kinship structures represent a perfectly viable alternative to the discredited institutions of modern state power. The postmodern family thus enables us to hope that the future will be, in an important but surprising way, anarchistic.

Notes

1. Gavin Edwards, "Intergalactic Terror," *Rolling Stone* (9 February 2006), p. 32.
2. *Ibid.*
3. Ronald D. Moore, "*Battlestar Galactica*: Naturalistic Science Fiction or Taking the Opera out of Space Opera," *Battlestar Wiki*, <http://en.battlestarwiki.org/wiki/ Naturalistic_science_fiction>, accessed February 18, 2008. Late twentieth century approaches to both science fiction and SF criticism, on the other hand, understood SF as a genre which emphasized the difference or "estrangement" between the reader/viewer's own cognitive environment and the environment portrayed in SF. The classic statement of this position can be found in Darko Suvin, *Metamorphoses of Science Fiction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
4. The Colonial military rank of Commander is equivalent to the rank of Captain in the U.S. and most other real world navies. The Colonial navy also uses some ranks typically associated with real world land forces. Colonial officer ranks are, in descending order: admiral, commander, colonel, major, captain, lieutenant.
5. *Congressional Record.* 108th Cong., 2d sess., July 22, 2004.

6. Continuity of Government Commission. *Preserving our Institutions: The Continuity of Congress.* Washington, DC, 2003, iii.

7. Michelle Cottle, "Norman Ornstein's Doomsday Scenario," *The Atlantic Monthly* (June 2003), p. 30.

8. *Preserving our Institutions,* p. 4.

9. *Ibid.,* p. 1.

10. Norman Ornstein, "A Better Way on Presidential Succession," *The Washington Post* (3 March 2007), A15.

11. *Ibid.*

12. Cyborg theorist Natasha Giardina is quite right to argue that "the intriguing truth is that we are more like the Cylons than we are like the Colonists: at the beginning of the twenty-first century, humans are finally embracing the machine and slowly, ever so slowly, leaving the meat behind." ("The Face in the Mirror: Issues of Meat and Machine in *Battlestar Galactica*" in *So Say We All,* ed. Richard Hatch (Dallas: BenBella Books, 2006), p. 48.

13. This and other dialogue quotations from the 2003 *BG* miniseries are taken from the "So Say We All" transcript at http://www.geocities.com/elzj78/bsgminiseries.html. All other dialogue quotations are taken from Sadgeezer transcripts, available at http://www.twiztv.com/scripts/battlestar/. I have made a few minor punctuation changes.

14. Jacob Clifton, "Burdens: A Proof: The Stoic Value of the Cylon Threat" in Hatch, p. 147.

15. Steven Rubio, "Legitimate Authority: Debating the Finer Points" in Hatch, pp. 123-4.

16. *Ibid.,* p. 125.

17. *Ibid.,* p. 133.

18. Adam Roberts, "Adama and Fascism" in Hatch, p. 222.

19. Ronald Moore has described Roslin as "in essence a liberal-progressive character," but has also claimed that she was modeled after arch-conservative George W. Bush. (Leo Duran, "How a TV Show Fraks with Politics," *The Progressive,* August 2007, p. 40.) From time to time she even quotes Bush: "One of the interesting things about being president is you don't have to explain yourself to anyone." ("Epiphanies." See Edwards, "Intergalactic Terror.") Roslin's political position is thus similar, in some ways, to that of Senator Hillary Clinton (D-New York): vaguely progressive on domestic social issues, hawkish on foreign policy and security issues, and generally unwilling to consider alternative viewpoints.

20. This project parallels *BG*'s equally ambitious attempt to articulate radical post-capitalist economic forms. Carl Silvio and Elizabeth Johnston have argued, for example, that "the destruction of the Twelve Colonies has created the possibility of a large-scale, cooperative, and fully technologized society independent of the alienation created by the wage system." "Alienation and the Limits of the Utopian Impulse" in *Cylons in America: Critical Studies in Battlestar Galactica* (New York: Continuum, 2008), p. 42.

21. This is not as far-fetched as it might sound. Historians of the early modern period have noted that the relationship between the modern state and traditional kinship structures is a deeply antagonistic one. Lawrence Stone, for example, has argued persuasively that "the modern state is a natural enemy to the values of the clan, of kinship," since these values are "a direct threat to the state's own claim to prior loyalty." *The Family, Sex and Marriage in England 1500-1800,* abridged edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 99.

22. Clifton, "Burdens: A Proof" in Hatch, p.152.

23. She reminds us of Private Athena Johnson in John Sayles's excellent *Lone Star*, speaking of the motivations which might lead members of minority groups to enlist: "It's their country, and this is one of the best deals they offer." Michael Moore explored this theme more explicitly in *Fahrenheit 9/11*, when he pointed out that American military recruiters deliberately target economically devastated working class neighborhoods.

24. Mikhail Bakunin, *The Basic Bakunin: Writings 1869-1871*, trans. and ed. Robert M. Cutler (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992), p. 63.

25. Quoted in Peter Marshall, *Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 293.

26. *Bakunin on Anarchy*, ed. and trans. Sam Dolgoff (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 145.

27. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 145.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

29. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 355.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 358.

31. Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (New York: William Morrow, 1985), p. 292.

32. James P. Dunnigan and Albert A. Nofi, *Dirty Little Secrets of the Vietnam War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), p. 204.

33. Richard R. Moser, *The New Winter Soldiers: GI and Veteran Dissent During the Vietnam Era* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), p. 44.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 48. This startling figure only includes attempts using explosive devices.

36. Dunnigan and Nofi, p. 222.

37. Moser, p. 50.

38. American cinema has played with this paradox before, as in the 1995 military thriller *Crimson Tide*. In that film, the Captain and Executive Officer of an American nuclear submarine give conflicting orders to the Chief of the Boat, and so the fate of the world hinges on the dilemma of a non-commissioned officer caught in a command paradox.

39. "The Cain Mutiny: Reflecting the Faces of Military Leadership in a Time of Fear" in *Cylons in America: Critical Studies in Battlestar Galactica* (New York: Continuum, 2008), p. 54.

40. Clifton, "Burdens: A Proof," p. 149.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

42. "'What a Strange Little Man': Baltar the Tyrant?" in *Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy*, ed. Jason T. Eberl (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), p. 35.

43. Andrew Terjesen has noted the similarities between Baltar's administration and the Vichy regime which governed France on behalf of the Nazis during World War Two. "Resistance vs. Collaboration on New Caprica: What Would You Do?" in *Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy*, ed. Jason T. Eberl, p. 118.

44. Jonah Goldberg, "Tales from New Iraqica," *National Review Online*, 10 October 2006, http://article.nationalreview.com.

45. Christian W. Erickson, "Counter-Terror Culture: Ambiguity, Subversion, or Legitimization?" *Security Dialogue* 38:2 (2007), http://sdi.sagepub.com.

46. Brad Reed, "A close look at the right's scary affinity for sci-fi foreign policy punditry," *The American Prospect*, 27 October 2006, http://www.prospect.org.

25

Creating Guerrilla Texts in Rhizomatic Value-Practices on the Sliding Scale of Autonomy: Toward an Anti-Authoritarian Cultural Logic

Sandra Jeppesen

All it is is an idea of gradually working toward doing things without authorities. Under an anarchist system you would phase authorities out slowly, as much as could be.

—Jack Smith

For anarchists, cultural production is part of a larger struggle. It is a struggle against socially inherited forms of oppression and toward the creative production of liberation and social transformation even as we produce "guerrilla texts." Guerrilla texts are irregular non-uniform anti-authoritarian texts combating a much larger normalized authoritarian system of textual production that tends to be capitalist, patriarchal, heteronormative, racist and/or ableist. This combat is not just a discursive struggle over the content and aesthetics of texts, nor is it simply a material struggle over the economics of production seen as a refusal of profits and co-optation, nor is it just a careful attention to non-hierarchical cultural production processes; rather it is a struggle to be true to an entire range of anti-authoritarian principles and values, to produce non-didactic texts that open people's minds to new possibilities, to develop a sense of individual and collective autonomy and self-determination, and to produce cultural producers who experience liberation, joy overflowing, love without end, and other sustained outbursts toward transformative social relationships. This may be a rather ambi-

tious set of tasks to have before us when we are making a book, video or zine. Nonetheless it is this kind of profound transformative project that is at stake in anarchist culture as we "phase authorities out slowly."

Rhizome: Mapping Guerrilla Texts in the Field of Culture

Deleuze and Guattari's notion of the rhizome is helpful in mapping some of the principles of anarchist textual production. A rhizome is a spreading, underground, decentered network of roots that appear aboveground as sprouts and thickets like blackberry bushes or bamboos. Deleuze and Guattari begin to theorize a rhizome as follows:

> A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. Plants with roots or radicles may be rhizomorphic in other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life in its specificity is not entirely rhizomatic. Even some animals are, in their pack form. Rats are rhizomes. Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. When rats swarm over each other. The rhizome includes the best and the worst: potato and couchgrass, or the weed.[1]

Social movements have recently been compared to rhizomes. As Scott Uzelman notes,

> Like the bamboo garden, social movements are often rhizomatic organisms growing horizontally into new terrains, establishing connections just below the surface of everyday life, eventually bursting forth in unpredictable ways. And there, unseen amongst the grassroots, facilitating rhizomatic growth, work the media activists.[2]

Rather than simply facilitators of social movement growth, however, anarchist cultural texts may themselves be described as rhizomatic. Subterranean at times, like manifestos, zines or direct action communiqués, breaking out as "surface extensions" in many directions, like books by independent publishers or pamphlets distributed at protests, anarchist texts assume heterogeneous cultural forms beyond "media activism." Further, they are produced according to the specificities (geographical cultural racialized political sexual economic social relational collective textual artistic aesthetic) of situations and people who bring them to fruition.

There are several principles associated with rhizomes: cartography or mapping rather than tracing; multiplicities rather than unities, binaries or hybrids;

heterogeneities rather than homogeneity, diversity, or difference; connections both chronological and spatial, some of which are invisible and untraceable; and asignifying ruptures which do not stop the rhizome from replicating itself. Experimentation is an additional principle that reveals methods for making the other principles take flight.

To start mapping anarchist culture, we can consider culture as a set of overlapping fields. According to Pierre Bourdieu the field of cultural production breaks down into an "opposition between the sub-field of restricted production and the sub-field of large-scale production."[3] Large-scale production is the hegemonic capitalist model of culture that has been critiqued by Horkheimer and Adorno as the culture industry, generating desires and providing cultural commodities to fulfill them. The large-scale field of culture is based on capitalist exploitation, sexual objectification of women, racialization of bodies and identities, and heteronormativity which marks queerness as deviance or a target market. Against large-scale production, the avant-garde, according to Bourdieu, produces culture in "the sub-field of restricted production," which has at its heart the "disavowal of the economic."[4] The economic is disavowed by anarchists through explicitly anti-capitalist modes of cultural production, for example: lo-fi inexpensive productions such as zines, resource and skill sharing, trading or giving away texts, selling texts at cost, anti-copyrighting, free downloadable PDF's, and pirating.[5] Using these specific tactics, anarchists put into anti-capitalist values into practice, thus we can think of them as value-practices. And yet for anarchists, anti-capitalism is only one of the commitments of cultural production.

The process of empowerment through collective production is a second key factor. Chris Atton argues that zine-makers often operate as collectives attempting "to involve as many people as possible in [their] editing and production."[6] In anarchist publishing, a small non-hierarchical collective of people might share all of the tasks of a regular publisher (acquisitions, editor, proofreading, copyediting, marketing, printing, lay-out and design, etc.), and these tasks would not be done sequentially, linearly or hierarchically. This type of organization and skill sharing, which emphasizes non-professionalization, cooperation and self-expression, results in "the empowerment of activists in their communities of resistance."[7] People speak for themselves while making things together. Cooperation is a value shared by anarchists and its practice includes collectively organized cultural production. The long-term effects are thus non-economic, as Bourdieu argues, and progress beyond the accumulation of cultural capital to produce co-operative relationships based on creating equal spaces and voices for everyone through community-based collective production.

Linked to the values of collectivity and co-operation is the importance of community. Community for anarchists means that the audience and the cultural producer are often the same group of people. This is related to the value of mutual accountability, which will be addressed later. Here producers are much

closer, in anti-authoritarian culture, to their audiences. Bourdieu found that there were two different audiences for the two different sub-fields. The large-scale sub-field produced texts for a mass commercial market, whereas the small-scale sub-field of the avant-garde had a much more select audience. Bourdieu observed, for example, that some avant-garde poets wrote only for other poets, producing "art for art's sake." There is certainly something of this in anarchist culture—anarchists do write for other anarchists—but it is not that simple. Rather there is a range of audiences that include people who habitually consume more mainstream or large-scale cultural texts, the broader left, Marxists, socialists, radicals, liberals, people who read every obscure radical or anarchist pamphlet they can find, and even police or so-called intelligence agents, meaning that the audience for anarchist texts is beyond just anarchists. At the same time, though, not all anarchists read texts, and anarchists who do read texts do not all read the same texts. Some prefer poetry, others prefer theory, and others read exclusively non-fiction. Some anarchists like zines but some don't; some like videos while others staunchly prefer film; some read magazines, others books. Furthermore, many anarchists read non-anarchist texts. There is no single fixed audience for anarchist texts, nor is there a fixed set of texts for an anarchist audience.

However, in anarchist culture, participatory creation is another important value-practice linking audience and producer. All people are seen as potential textual guerrillas, meaning that as people produce art they become artists, as people write, they become writers, as cultural texts are produced, people become cultural guerrillas. The work produced is valued or legitimated by the community because it has been created by the community and speaks its own truths. Bourdieu sees the process of consecration coming from the avant-garde or literary establishment, but for anti-authoritarians, legitimation comes by participating in the process of cultural production combined with participating in direct action. Thus habitus is important, including the creative spaces of both participatory artist and anti-authoritarian activist. Legitimation thus carries with it the value-practice of mutual accountability—we hold each other accountable to this alternative system of values—which deconstructs rather than reifies the power and authority of established figures. Indeed "established" anarchist figures tend to deconstruct their own authority, teaching or modeling co-operation and non-competition, thereby encouraging everyone to become a cultural producer, sharing skills, knowledge and economic resources. The "elders" also learn from the younger generation, developing relationships of alliance and mutual exchange. There is an explicit sense of a shared political project among the old and new generation that belies hierarchies.

Value-practices such as skill and resource sharing, participatory creation, co-operation, mutual accountability and self-legitimation (among many others for which there is not space here) are values that most anarchist cultural producers struggle to achieve. The greater number of anarchist value-practices used in the production and distribution of each guerrilla text, the greater the specific

autonomy of that collective and the text produced. We can understand this as a *sliding scale of autonomy* whereby each text demonstrates autonomy with respect to several value-practices. This must not, however, be understood as a means to measure "how anarchist" a particular text is on a hierarchical scale, rather it is a way of making explicit how various textual producers engage anti-authoritarian struggles depending on their circumstances, skills, needs, desire, resources, collectives, and commitments.

For this reason any map of texts and their various anarchist commitments in the process of production and distribution must necessarily be incomplete. We can attempt to make a mapping, but the map keeps shifting. We may map various restricted sub-fields, but these fields will shift even as they are being mapped. We may map anarchist value-practices but there is no cultural or ideological system that is the same for everyone in anarchist culture; there is no single or even binary system of production to which everyone aspires or every text conforms. We must be wary of constructing a new hierarchy by reversing that which already exists. Indeed this seems to be what Bourdieu does in placing cultural capital above economic capital as the goal of the avant-garde. Bourdieu's field of cultural production thus remains a hierarchical, centered structure, with cultural capital and avant-garde artists at the center. Although the location of this center shifts, there is nonetheless always a center. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, it is more interesting to consider

> acentered systems, finite networks of automata in which communication runs from any neighbor to any other, the stems or channels do not preexist, and all individuals are interchangeable, defined only by their *state* at a given moment—such that the local operations are coordinated and the final, global result synchronized without a central agency.[8]

Local community creation must therefore not centralize its operations, but rather coordinate globally with many other local communities, none of which is the leader or natural authority, artistic, textual, political or otherwise. Power must not be centralized, indeed, must always be critiqued, analyzed, and challenged. At the same time, there may never be a "final, global result" or if there is, it should be a dynamic, acentered one. In other words, within this cartography we run the risk of returning to a single representation, based in one restricted sub-field. There is nothing in the mapping of the cultural field based on a cartography of anti-authoritarian value-practices that prevents it from becoming centralized. Anarchist communities may congeal around an urban location, a social center, a magazine, an anarchist free university, or any collective or space that begins to become central with informal hierarchies of cultural production developing around it. The map thus far has edges, boundaries, and limits. It is only one map, in spite of its claims to be more. To combat this potentiality, we must add multiplicity to the principle of cartography.

Multiplicities: Beyond Unity, Binaries, Trilogies, Multitudes, and Hybrids

We have already started to see the collapse of some of the binaries of cultural production. If we are careful in this collapse, binaries can become multiplicities. "A multiplicity," we are told by Deleuze and Guattari, "has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature."[9] As a multiplicity of fields of small-scale production which increase in number with every new textual product, process or production, anarchist culture must also change its nature. The multiplicity moves away from unity or binary conceptions of one field (of restricted production) or two fields (large-scale and small-scale).

> Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudomultiplicities for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. There is not even the unity to abort in the object or "return" in the subject.[10]

In fact, subject-object relations are replaced by a multiplicity of intersubjectivities.

Contemporary anarchist culture has moved beyond addressing capitalism and the state; it is becoming assemblages of assemblages: endlessly multiplying production of independently published books, magazines, comic books, vegan cookbooks, minizines, videos, posters, graffiti, guerrilla art installations, artistic events and so on. These are produced and distributed by autonomous groups or individuals who are anti-corporate and anti-statist, who move away from unity (corporate publishing), binaries (publisher/writer, consumer/producer), and reversed post-synthesis binaries (unionized corporate publishing) toward autonomy and multiplicities.

For an example of multiplicities we can consider independent publishers that play a role in anarchist textual production, producing a range of publications that separate them from the capitalist commerce of large-scale production. According to Bourdieu,

> [a] firm is that much closer to the "commercial" pole . . . the more directly and completely the products it offers correspond to a pre-existent demand, i.e., to pre-existent interests in pre-established forms.[11]

Independent publishers offer texts corresponding to the pre-existent demand for leftist or avant-garde writing. The cultural field that they enter includes pre-existent mainstream critics, awards, distributors, editors, printing houses, bookstores and the like—material and discursive producers of cultural texts.

These publishers are implicated in capitalist economics and segments of the large-scale field of production, as their long-term survival depends on *both* their cultural capital *and* their financial liquidity or economic capital. They occupy a complex interlocked group of sub-fields in the range of autonomous anti-authoritarian production. They "participate in domination, but as *dominated* agents: they are neither dominant, plain and simple, nor are they dominated (as they want to believe)."[12] They have some power in their interactions in the cultural field, although they may be working within and against cultural hegemony simultaneously. "[T]hey occupy a dominated position in the dominant class, they are owners of a dominated form of power at the interior of the sphere of power."[13] This access to power, albeit limited in specific ways, derives from privilege—white privilege, class privilege, gender/sex privilege—and puts them in a contradictory position in terms of achieving cultural autonomy and/or anti-authoritarian political goals. "This structurally contradictory position is absolutely crucial for understanding the positions taken by writers and artists, notably in struggles in the social world."[14] Socio-political struggles are precisely what is at stake in anarchist culture. If independent publishing by avant-garde presses or monographs were the only option in terms of autonomous production, Bourdieu might indeed be right. Anti-authoritarian struggles for social justice make uneasy allies with some independent publishers, particularly those who do not self-reflexively examine their own access to power but rather ignore or inadvertently benefit from it.

Their use of capitalist infrastructure, or modes of production and distribution, which may also be heteronormative, sexist, racist, environmentally destructive and the like, does not exclude them entirely from the field of anarchist culture. Indeed independent publishers' texts may challenge prevailing discourses, including binaries such as: legal/illegal, violence/non-violence, fiction/non-fiction and gay/straight, even though they do not challenge other binaries related to cultural production such as collective/individual, co-operation/competition, expert/layperson, resource-rich/resource-poor, writer/reader, boss/worker, producer/consumer. Their texts thus resonate with something beyond them, as Deleuze and Guattari intimate:

> Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities. The plane of consistency (grid) is the outside of all multiplicities.[15]

The plane of consistency in anarchist culture is the set of values toward which the multiplicities strive, but which is never completely achievable. In this sense it is outside the cultural product and its set of producers. "All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore speak of a *plane of consistency* of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this 'plane' increase with the number of connections that are made

on it."[16] Independent publishers are sometimes on the plane of consistency, and sometimes overcode it, filling more dimensions than exist, returning to capitalism and/or other forms of oppression. Indeed Bourdieu argues that relationships with external social factors, or Deleuze and Guattari's "outside," depend on the position of all parties involved within cultural hierarchies.

> All relations that a determinate category of intellectuals or artists may establish with any and all external social factors—whether economic (e.g. publishers, dealers), political or cultural (consecrating authorities such as academies) ... depend on the position occupied by the category in question within the hierarchy of cultural legitimacy.[17]

What is at stake here is the shifting of external social factors that influence the plane of consistency of the multiplicities of anarchist texts and publishers. If factors external to cultural production can be transformed by internally transforming modes of cultural production, then anarchist textual production is able to make serious challenges to hegemonic institutions that influence but also may be *influenced by* these external social factors. Anarchist cultural production, in its very multiplicities, both reverses the relationship of determinacy, and simultaneously provides space for the eradication of this relationship and "the hierarchy of cultural legitimacy" in its entirety. Independent publishers, although they may be multiplicities, are inadequate to the task, because they may be too closely connected to some of the hegemonic social factors that anarchist culture wishes to challenge (e.g., capitalist infrastructure, state granting bodies, straight white male privilege, etc.).

Multiplicities themselves thus do not block the possibility of being authoritarian. Multiplicities may be hierarchical through their homogeneity. Writers may risk speaking for others, appropriation of voice, silencing, or not representing certain groups at all. Independent publishing is not a linear either-or proposition, rather it has advantages (putting anarchist ideas into wider circulation, earning a living) and disadvantages (putting energy into a magazine or publisher that is not anti-authoritarian, replicating capitalist work relations, entrenching unequal power relations). Independent publishers are only the first step along the sliding scale of autonomy. According to Bourdieu, "[t]he literary and artistic fields attract a particularly strong proportion of individuals who possess all the properties of the dominant class *minus one*: money."[18] This is where independent publishers follow Bourdieu's model, as "the 'poor relatives' of the great bourgeois dynasties."[19] Bourdieu acknowledges this kind of socio-cultural privilege, but he does not explicitly investigate from where it derives. Issues of race, gender, sexuality, (dis)ability or global location can be determinants of social class and direct or indirect arbiters of economic and cultural capital. Bourdieu's avant-garde is a homogeneous sector of society (they are all "relatives," all from the same Oedipal family). There is thus a need for the anti-oedipal concept of heterogeneity, which will account for several axes of privilege/oppression ex-

plicitly, allowing guerrilla texts to make a move along the sliding scale of autonomy beyond proto-capitalist small publishers.

Heterogeneity: Anti-oppression Politics Beyond Equity and Diversity

Heterogeneity moves beyond the possible homogeneity of socio-economic class, race and sex/gender within independent publishing, past liberal notions of equity-seeking, tolerance and diversity to practice anti-oppression politics in anarchist culture. Deleuze and Guattari introduce the concept of heterogeneity as follows:

> semiotic chains of every nature are connected to very diverse modes of coding (biological, political, economic, etc.) that bring into play not only different regimes of signs but also states of things of differing status.[20]

Using this formulation we might remember that there may be independent publishers and bookstores that are queer, anti-racist, anti-capitalist or feminist, for example, which use "very diverse modes of coding" beyond social class—all partial determinants of habitus. Nevertheless they might not take an overall anti-authoritarian approach to publishing. Heterogeneity challenges not just homogeneity, but also false diversities such as "tolerance" and equity-seeking hiring practices. In the mainstream for example, ideologies such as multiculturalism herald diversity but nonetheless run the risk of homogenizing, binarizing, or hierarchizing people. For example the ideological acceptance of diversity may be based on "tolerance" which maintains particular groups or individuals in subordinate positions as objects to be "tolerated." Equity-based hiring practices tokenize people based on their belonging within a particular group marked as other based on a list of categories. Anti-oppression politics instead considers the complexities of a person's lived experiences in terms of variously intersecting or interwoven axes of identities that are not reduced to the trinity of race, class and gender, but extend to sexuality, bodies, nation, religion, age, (dis)abilities, mental health, geographical location, immigrant status, and beyond. Anti-authoritarian culture seeks not just to reverse certain over-coded binaries (tolerated/tolerant, multicultural/white, gay/straight, woman/man, with disability/without disability), but to challenge the systemic structures, institutions and ideologies that encode and reproduce these and many other intrinsically hierarchical binaries in order to maintain unequal power relations.

Anti-oppression politics is a crucial value-practice in anarchist cultural production. Anti-racist, anti-heterosexist, anti-sexist, queer-positive, anti-ableist, and other anti-oppression textual practices challenge systemic inequities more profoundly than liberal notions of equity by challenging a wide variety of "re-

gimes of signs" discursively produced by government legislation and policy. Governmental definition and organization of concepts or events removes from the populace the question of how they might responsibly enact anti-racism, queer-positivism, or other anti-oppressive practices in their daily lives. Heterogeneity as practiced in anti-authoritarian culture instead activates people, as these practices are an integral part of daily struggles that extend into and beyond texts.

We must therefore consider publications produced and distributed through anti-authoritarian collectives with a heterogeneity of members, genders, tactics and strategies, races, theoretical locations, and cultural practices. To take a concrete example, after the Anarchist People of Color (APOC) gathering in Detroit 2003, APOC self-produced a two-volume zine anthology called *Our Culture, Our Resistance (OCOR)*,[21] which expresses a multiplicity of heterogeneous experiences of anarchist culture for people of color, from parenting to joining political groups, from polyamory to being a trans person, from global struggles to local and particular struggles, from personal narratives to theory to poetry. In addressing several axes of oppression and liberation as they intersect with non-white identities, these zines are heterogeneous in content in terms of who is telling the stories. By publishing voices of non-white anarchists, a critique of the white domination of anarchism comes to the fore. The voices of anarchists of color are also internally heterogeneous, including people who are parents, transgendered, non-monogamous, theorists, artists, non-academics, activists, and a range of other identities that break down along non-uniform taxonomic lines (i.e., sex/gender, artistic production, social movements, family units, etc.). The deprofessionalized DIY approach taken by APOC in self-producing the *OCOR* zines lends greater autonomy of voice to anarchists of color who have been typically under-represented in independent publishing specifically and anarchist culture in general. It also provides access to publication and distribution for a more heterogeneous group of people than a homogenous (white) independent press might. In terms of form, it allows for self-expression beyond the traditional grammar and design styles typically reinforced by those with cultural capital. These transgressions of process, content and access coupled with intersectional identities issue crucial challenges to external hegemonic power structures, challenges which also transform—by heterogeneously multiplying—the anarchist sub-field of autonomous production internally.

Heterogeneity, however, like multiplicity before it, also comes up against its own limit. As we saw a multiplicitous proliferation of independent publishers, art and theatre that risked homogenization, heterogeneity risks disconnection. The anti-racist zines discussed, for example, were produced entirely by people of color. Other texts, such as *Quiet Rumours*,[22] an anarchafeminist anthology, are written and produced entirely by women. CrimethInc's self-produced texts consist for the most part of writing by white anti-authoritarian post-situationist post-punk middle-class folks.[23] There is thus the risk that, in spite of proliferating a wide range of political analyses articulated by a heterogeneous range of

people in terms of race, class, gender, ability, sexuality, and the like, the groups may internally remain somewhat homogeneous. At times there are good reasons for this separatist political strategy, including the creating of spaces and the valuing of voices by groups that might otherwise feel silenced or excluded.

And yet there are several risks. The first is that if marginalized groups are expected to produce their own books, zines and theories, then they will not be considered for inclusion in major publications or anthologies. The result may be that feminist, anti-racist or queer voices not being heard by audiences of these publications, leading to further marginalization. A second risk is that the separation of various streams of organizing and of cultural production can lead to further centralization and domination by groups or individuals with privilege based on their socio-cultural location or habitus (the dominated fraction of the dominant class, race, gender, sex, and/or sexuality). A third risk is that we overlook the need to explicitly recognize and investigate the intersection of categories of oppression so that these locations and experiences can be seen not as distinct entities but as inter-related in complex ways, as articulated by writers such as bell hooks and Gloria Anzaldua, among others.

A fourth risk is that we fail to see our own implication in roles of domination. Deleuze and Guattari call into question the separate categories of oppressed/oppressor, suggesting that there are "micropowers"[24] or "microtextures"[25] of political power centers that

> explain how the oppressed can take an active role in oppression: the workers of the rich nations actively participate in the exploitation of the Third World, the arming of dictatorships, and the pollution of the atmosphere.[26]

A fifth and related risk is an isolation in locality that prevents us from seeing these connections. APOC's zines articulate a range of oppressions against which anarchists struggle, extending the struggle beyond fighting only one issue and only locally, and thus they are potentially more effective not just within anarchist culture but also in the broader global geopolitical sphere. However their restricted scale of production might prevent them from reaching a heterogeneity of audiences in other parts of the world. Self-production, if done in isolation, in locally-acting collectives, or only by youth, can be dislocated from communities generally, from global networks of anti-authoritarians, and from inter-generational or historical influences, as many of the articles in the *OCOR* zines are quick to point out.

Self-production and heterogeneity can thus only take us so far along the sliding scale of autonomy. There is a risk of return to centralization along one axis of oppression. According to Deleuze and Guattari: "[C]entralization is always hierarchical, but hierarchy is always segmentary."[27] Anarchist struggles are not segmentary, disconnected, dislocated, separate, even in their separatist strategies, and cannot be. Rather, as cultural movements work anti-hierarchically rather than simply against capitalism, they increase the dimensions of their ap-

plicability. "An assemblage is precisely this increase in the dimensions of a multiplicity that necessarily changes in nature as it expands its connections."[28] It is only through the principle of connection that the heterogeneous multiplicity of anarchist guerrilla text networks can extend its nature—firstly, to be increasingly autonomous on the sliding scale; secondly, to avoid the development of micro-fascisms by fostering multiply connected anti-oppression practices; and thirdly, to connect chronologically with the multiplicities and heterogeneities of our memories and histories.

Connection: Links, Overlaps, and Intersections in Anarchist Culture

According to Marjorie Beaucage, "principles and values of connectedness are in our ancestral memory."[29] Accordingly, ancestral memories are one of the spaces to which anarchist cultural texts connect, drawing from them as sources and producing them as current memories that will one day be ancestral. Through these connections with other cultural guerrillas, past present and future, global and local, similar and different, freedom and autonomy increases. With the principle of connection, the logic of anti-authoritarian cultural finds the space to develop anti-oppressive social-cultural relationships between heterogeneous groups and collectives and within them. Texts record, remember, and connect to other cultural guerrillas in distant rhizomatic times and geographical places. Connections develop through cultural production, transforming texts by transforming inter-racial, inter-sexual, multi-gendered, inter-class multi-age and/or multi-ability collective relationships—and vice versa, transforming these collective relationships by changing the texts, including which texts are produced, by whom and how.

To understand the relationship between freedom or autonomy and connection, we might need to rethink the concept of autonomy itself. If we understand autonomy as the ability to live and produce culture according to one's own dictates and desires, then we might wonder if connectivity doesn't hinder this by holding the writer in a fixed relationship to other writers, or implicating cultural guerrillas in social relationships that might impinge on exactly this autonomy. At the same time, we know that autonomy does not mean isolation and cannot happen in isolation from others. Indeed it is only through others that we know who we are and our place in the world. We must incorporate Beaucage's understanding of the value of connectedness into an expanded notion of autonomy beyond the conception of individualistic autonomy (reinforced by alienation and isolation, exploited by capital) to encompass the notion of inter-connected collective autonomy. Connectedness is thus necessary to, rather than at odds with, autonomy. Understanding autonomy as a value that depends on community, anarchists work collectively, pooling resources rather than hoarding them, shar-

ing skills rather than guarding professional secrets, mutually supporting rather than denigrating each other's desires even if they contradict one's own. The active practice of co-operation, mutual aid, and an ethos of plenty means that the successful cultural production of one collective increases the effective cultural production of others. Connected autonomous cultural production thus inspires more cultural production.

Furthermore, it is only through connection to others that we learn how to replace oppressive behaviors and attitudes with anti-authoritarian value-practices. We unlearn internalized stereotypes, prejudices and assumptions about others and ourselves through engagement in creative practices with people who are different from and nonetheless closely connected to us. It is not only individual self-expression and survival that are at stake, but also the long-term health, regeneration and sustainability of the community.

Bourdieu asserts that, "the affirmation of the autonomy of the principles of production and evaluation of the art-work is inseparable from the affirmation of the autonomy of the producer, that is, the field of production."[30] Autonomy must therefore not be understood as autonomy *from others* but rather autonomy *of self* (self-production, self-expression, self-management, self-determination) where the self is always already part of a socius or collective habitus in and by which texts are produced. According to Deleuze and Guattari,

> There is no difference between what a book talks about and how it is made. Therefore a book also has no object. As an assemblage, a book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages and in relation to other bodies without organs.[31]

Guerrilla texts are always already connected to other cultural objects and other cultural guerrillas who are textual subjects. Similarly, Bourdieu emphasizes the connectedness of many elements in the field of culture, because "the 'subject' of the production of the art-work—of its value but also of its meaning—is not the producer who actually creates the object in its materiality, but rather the entire set of agents engaged in the field."[32] He names everyone from the famous to the unknown artist, to critics, collectors, distributors and curators, "in short, all who have ties with art, who live for art and, to varying degrees, from it."[33] In anarchist culture these "agents" are not defined by their isolated job within the field of culture, however, as everyone can play all of these roles; each person can be a reader, writer, book collector, vendor, bookstore volunteer, zinester, bookfair organizer, distributor, infoshop worker, editor, designer or curator.

Moreover, Bourdieu emphasizes this interconnectedness when he argues that artists "confront each other in struggles where the imposition of not only a world view but also a vision of the artworld is at stake, and. . . through these struggles, participate in the production of the value of the artist and of art."[34] The notion of vision is crucial within anarchist culture—visions of the world,

culture, art, everyday life, politics, the environment, the social. Within anarchist culture, the assemblages of these disparate elements articulate in anti-authoritarian ways. "[W]hen one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into, must be plugged into in order to work."[35] Guerrilla texts and guerrilla producers cannot function on their own, in isolation from other anarchist events, narratives, interpretations, or separate from elements that are not cultural at all but perhaps environmental, geographical, nuclear, sexual, illegal. These are the multiplicitous other machines into which the anarchist text machine must be plugged to ensure it functions, not in a specific way, say as a militant feminist autobiography or an anarchist historical document, but to ensure that it functions at all, that it is able to function.

We may also ask, after Deleuze and Guattari, "What is the relation (also measurable) of this literary machine to a war machine, love machine, revolutionary machine, etc.?"[36] In other words, how does it connect to the global anarchist movement, which posits both love and revolution as two pillars of its project? Anarchafeminist texts and collectives such as *Quiet Rumors* produced by the Dark Star Collective connect to anti-racist anarchist coalitions and texts such as the two-volume *Our Culture, Our Resistance* Anarchist People of Color (APOC) zine, which connects to CrimethInc's *Days of War, Nights of Love*,[37] which connects to the Elaho Valley Anarchist Horde and their eponymous zine.[38] But beyond texts and cultural production collectives, these texts form part of a broader anarchist assemblage that includes anti-logging direct actions which construct radical ecology networks and connect to indigenous solidarity movements, health care collectives that produce anti-medical establishment discourse and practices used in wilderness anti-logging camps, anarchist bookfairs and popular education workshops which produce anti-authoritarian pedagogical forms, anti-neoliberal protest convergences that challenge global capitalist economic discourses, No One Is Illegal's no-border organizing that forms part of the experience and discourse of human geography, and vegan diets or guerrilla gardening practices that circulate with food security politics. "[A]ny point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order."[39] An increased sense of collective autonomy is created through these multiplicities of connections. "A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles."[40] Guerrilla texts are implicated in all of these because they can serve both as elements to be connected and articulations in the assemblage of elements.

But even as connections develop among heterogeneous collectives, it is important that connections also bring together heterogeneous ideas and people within single collectives. Coalitions among groups that are internally homogeneous run up against limits of connectivity and mutual production. Building multi-racial currents, for example, is an important strategy taken up by many anarchist groups to address the internalization of racialized stereotypes and prejudices among white activists. Organizing in multiracial currents means devel-

oping what Joe Feagin, in *Racist America* (2000), calls "empathy across the color line,"[41] an important step for white people, which "requires a developed ability to routinely reject distancing stereotypes and a heightened and sustained capacity to see and feel some of the pain"[42] that racism inflicts on non-white people. It is thus crucial to develop groups that have multiracial composition, so that white anti-racist allies can work with and "think with" non-whites in combating racism and other forms of oppression that intersect with it, such as the prison system, racist policing, sexism, heterosexism, state violence, and poverty.

Relationships grounded in alliance form the basis of mutual-aid based coalitions that organize against intersecting oppressions; they are dependent upon the commitment of people and collectives to "unlearning" internalized systemic oppressive behaviours. This commitment forms part of the larger antifascist project of anarchism. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that

> it's too easy to be antifascist on the molar level, and not even see the fascist inside you, the fascist you yourself sustain and nourish and cherish with molecules both personal and collective.[43]

Racism, like sexism, heterosexism, ableism, and class oppression, derives from a set of learned behaviors and "[w]ith effort they can be unlearned by individuals and groups,"[44] and replaced by "a new cognitive framework."[45] Cultural production plays an important role in creating this cognitive framework both in the textual content and in the forms of production; this is exactly what is at stake in developing an anti-authoritarian cultural logic, as "microfascisms are what make fascism so dangerous."[46]

Mutual aid-based ally relationships move beyond hierarchical relationships of solidarity, which are what Deleuze and Guattari call "filiation." "The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance."[47] To develop anti-hierarchical mutualist relationships we must recognize realities such as systemic racism, which in practice might mean acknowledging that a predominantly white collective supporting a non-white anti-racist group does not erase racialized differences among the members of the two groups. While heterogeneity emphasizes difference, and maintains diversity (rather than attempting to erase it in the liberal democratic myth, for example, that "we're all the same"), connection emphasizes similarities within differences, and brings heterogeneous people and groups together.

Bourdieu's conceptualization of the cultural field doesn't consider the global context. This allows for a great deal of specificity in his argument, as he limits it to a consideration of the French avant-garde. But certainly texts circulate beyond national borders. Indeed in anarchist culture, national borders are seen as imaginary lines symbolic of state dominance to be challenged and resisted. In part this is done by circulating texts across them. Connections between the Global North and South are important, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, because those in the North are implicated in global relationships in specific oppressions

by geographical-national location. Anti-authoritarian texts such as zines facili-
tate global anarchist communication networks and social relationships as they
travel in person or digitally. A person traveling with zines may share them with
people they meet along the way. The role of economics is sublimated and in-
stead oral narratives are mutually exchanged with the zine, proliferating non-
hierarchical social relationships emphasizing the nurturing of connections across
difference. Zines can also travel across borders in other ways, through mail-
order distros, through the mail between friends, or as PDFs that can be posted in
one geographical location and downloaded and printed thousands of miles away.
Although downloadable PDFs do not foster direct social relationships directly,
nonetheless they do eliminate hierarchies as the author is not "authorized" by a
publisher through an economic purchase in which the reader is subordinated
through monetary exchange. Furthermore, for queer communities, to take an
example, sometimes the option of downloading a zine such as *Queerewind*[48]
may provide the safety of not having to come out publicly while learning about
that possibility, particularly important for trans and gender queer folks where
coming out is coupled with the intense threat of violence. In fact this mode of
textual circulation shifts the notion of the public sphere to be both a more global
and a more limited community, and creates important digital communities
among people who are geographically disparate, the impact of which is only
now beginning to be investigated.

Throughout our consideration of value-practices and rhizomatic principles,
the focus is on a redistribution of power through socio-cultural transformation.
In her large multi-issue zine *Race Riot*, Mimi Nguyen argues that anti-racist
anarchist "zines have as their goal deconstructing social relations and the exer-
cize of power."[49] She goes on to say that:

> [r]ace, gender, class, sexuality, geography, and what queer theorist Judith But-
> ler calls the "embarrassed et cetera' (because no list is adequate), are not cans
> in a cupboard, discrete *things* we might draw lines around to distinguish what's
> what. These are dynamic processes of making meaning of bodies, gestures, or
> movements.[50]

Power struggles take place on the body, through interpersonal social action, and
thus, although the oppressions named by Nguyen and others are systemic (mac-
rofascist), it is through anti-authoritarian cultural production that anti-oppression
politics are enacted (anti-microfascist) and cultural spaces are deterritorialized
by texts in relationship with bodies.

In developing long-term strategies of textual deterritorialization, one risk is
that as we deterritorialize in one direction, reterritorialization takes place in an-
other; as we attempt to build non-hierarchical spaces for practicing a multiplicity
of heterogeneous radical genders and sexualities, for example, we might fail to
account for race or differing abilities or geographical locations. A second risk is
that in our long-term strategies we might fail to adapt to changes in structural

oppressions, such as the development of racist anti-terrorist laws and unconstitutional practices in the US after September 11. If we do not respond to global crises we risk becoming irrelevant to global struggles, but also stagnant, and possibly even coercive or fascist with respect to the autonomy of other connected collectives in the global anarchist milieu. These responses are often tentative or experimental—new cultural practices for new global geopolitical moments. Experiments in form, shape, genre, sexuality, configurations, organizing styles, conversations, heterogeneities, multiplicities, lifestyles, illegalities—these are all potentially transgressive and transformative. The question is how to form an autonomous part of this cultural collectivity in ways that do not lead to domination, loneliness, stagnation, uniformity, oppression, reterritorialization, blocked desires or microfascisms.

Experimentation: Beyond Red Stars and Black Cats

This section will lapse into the experimental, while attempting to remain somewhat comprehensible, though that is not the only goal or even consistently a goal. One mode of experimentation is through challenges to textual and linguistic structures. Language is a system that requires us to read linearly, whereas texts such as the *EVAH* zine, *OCOR*, or CrimethInc's *Days of War, Nights of Love* challenge this linearity, combining drawings, graphics, photographs, nonlinear images, and fragmented narratives in assemblages that can be read or articulated in any order with respect to other assemblages. Examples include broken frames provided by two or three pages of texts to be read in reverse order, pictures that must be turned upside down, meme actions, journal pages, or drawings and poetry out of context. Histories are provided but not in chronological order. These textual experiments challenge ways in which, according to Deleuze and Guattari,

> [w]e are segmented in a *linear* fashion, along a straight line or a number of straight lines, of which each segment represents an episode or "proceeding": as soon as we finish one proceeding we begin another, forever proceduring or procedure.[51]

Rather than providing procedures, *Days of War, Nights of Love, OCOR, Queerewind, EVAH* and *Race Riot* provide maps, fragments, and rhizomatic sprigs that don't necessary lead anywhere, because they challenge conventional forms and encourage the reader to think both critically and creatively. As we know from Barthes or from post-movie conversations with friends, each reader assembles every text differently, producing their own disparate and divergent text-thoughts.

Thought contents are sometimes criticized for being too conformist. But the primary question is that of form itself. Thought as such is already in conformity with a model that it borrows from the State apparatus, and which defines for it goals and paths, conduits, channels, organs.[52]

Thought thinks differently without authority; when freed from linearity it can become, is becoming. The paths drawn by anarchist texts are not channels but destabilized, remakeable rhizomatic burrows. Anarchist zine-makers, through "[e]xperimentation, particularly with 'direct forms of control and alternativeness,'"[53] thus escape the microfascisms of linear goal-oriented textuality, also escaping recuperation through standardized commodity forms. Experimentation was important to the avant-garde, but the motivation was different. With avant-garde artists, the project derived from a rejection of old aesthetic forms. For anarchists, experimentation is not just an aesthetics, but also an ethics foundational to guerrilla texts and lives, in assemblage with principles and value-practices. There is an emphasis on points of articulation, spaces of between-ness. Between, capitalism, state, heteronormativity, racialization, ecocide, imperialism, and liberation, transversal transformational flight paths emerge as experimental, interconnected middles:

> *Between* things does not designate a localizable relation going from one thing to the other and back again, but a perpendicular direction, a transversal movement that sweeps one *and* the other away, a stream without beginning or end that undermines its banks and picks up speed in the middle.[54]

Autonomy thus is inside, outside *and everywhere in between*: doorstep windowledge chimneystack basementstairs fireescape skylight trapdoor falsebottom drawbridge moatwater threshold sandline whydidthechicken crossingguard ferryboat intersection segueway interruption intermission intratextual bordercrossing interracial intersexual speciestraitor timemachinic realms. Between-ness is a space experimental, a space of anarchy that is nonetheless not nowhere or no order. Experimentation is a movement, a form of motion and of thinking that prevents stagnation: "To think is to voyage."[55] These experiments link us to movements, are movement themselves, map us onto each other. As we experiment we enter struggle. As Not4Prophet narrates in *OCOR*:

> [W]e have mostly tried to make our art another part of the resistance struggle, the anti-authoritarian struggle, the struggle for freedom. We create political resistance murals on "private property," outlaw art, and we encourage the passerby, the ghetto dweller to join us, even if all they feel that all they can do [sic] is paint the red line on the Puerto Rican flag. . . . We always overstood the need for the people to take back the streets from the authorities, to not allow them to have authority over us, so we tended to utilize our art in this capacity.[56]

Art joins the struggle and art is the struggle itself. It is the crossing over, the speed differentials, the continuous variations, the changes in direction, the spaces outside—these are the guerrilla text experiments.

> Experimentation: not only radiophonic but also biological and political, incurring censorship and repression. Corpus and Socius, politics and experimentation. They will not let you experiment in peace.[57]

But we nonetheless continue to experiment, without asking someone else to "let us," and not necessarily with the goal of peace. Uprisings insurgencies insurrections resistances do not lead to peace textually or empirically. What is at stake here is not artistic forms, artistic content, what a text says or how it says it; rather the logic of the field of culture itself is under attack, cranking toward an anti-authoritarian cultural logic.

"[A]ll attempts to call into question the field of artistic production, the logic of its functioning and the functions it performs, through the highly sublimated and ambiguous means of discourse," will be condemned, according to Bourdieu,

> because in refusing to play the game, to challenge in accordance with the rules, i.e. artistically, their authors call into question not a way of playing the game, but the game itself and the belief which supports it. This is the one unforgivable transgression.[58]

Transgressing one line of flight we might follow another. Things fall down, break. In the end there is no end. In the beginning there is no beginning. What ruptures does not enter signification. What oversignifies does not rupture but is nonetheless overstood. "We" is imperceptible. There. Did you see it? What comes doesn't come next. We digress. We transgress. We do not desire to be forgiven. We desire for far more incendiary reasons than that.

Asignifying Ruptures: Things Break Up
Without Breaking Down

Experimentation with textual practices challenges accepted aesthetic forms. Collectives create experimental spaces gatherings events happenings configurations of people. These processes can as often as not result in failure or the collapse of the collective, the disbanding of the editorial group, the rupture of political strategies and/or tactics. The dynamism that leads to a greater achievement of autonomy through breaking with past forms also risks failure through the very nature of its experimentality. Hakim Bey, in his notion of the temporary autonomous zone, suggests that this disappearance of a group after the creation of an autonomous space is actually an effective intentional strategy. Social relation-

ships, be they polyamorous love relationships, affinity groups, art collectives, sexual liaisons, writing workshops, political commitments or friendships, don't cease to exist after these ruptures; they simply reconfigure, reassemblaging elsewhere and elsewhen.

Thus in anarchy things break up without breaking down. Single projects may break up without the larger global anti-authoritarian project breaking down. Ruptures or failed experiments are as productive as those that appear to be succeeding. In rhizomes, cuts in a stem, root or flower result not in death, but in more offshoots growing in new directions. Breaks and ruptures in the rhizome, "against the oversignifying breaks separating structures or cutting across a single structure,"[59] resist or sidestep the process of signification. The rupture may be productive, but it does not signify, it is asignifying. "A rhizome may be broken, shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines."[60] An anti-racist gathering such as APOC or Queeruption ends, but the lines that came together in the gathering, including geographically multiplicitous heterogeneous groups, might work together to produce a zine such as *OCOR* or *Queerewind*, meet in similar groups at subsequent gatherings, go back to old collectives and inject new organizing strategies, form new alliances with other anarchist groups, or start new collectives or affinity groups with people they've newly met. The "end" of the gathering is thus not an "end' at all, only a means. "An event can be turned around, repressed, co-opted, betrayed, but still something survives that cannot be outdated."[61] May 1968. Seattle 1999. We see nodes, but we need also to see lines, to see the in-between space of those thirty-one years, to make these constantly shifting lines visible to ourselves, to see the articulations between nodes in the assemblage. Rupture is in some way part of the organizing strategy. We enjoy rupture.

Indeed, ruptures are exactly what anarchists love to produce. This is no different in the cultural sphere. Cultural guerrillas rupture the hegemony of artistic or literary production through a disregard for hegemonic tradition and history. "On one side are the dominant figures, who want continuity, identity, reproduction; on the other, the newcomers, who seek discontinuity, rupture, difference, revolution."[62] We graffiti, jam culture, stencil, poster illegally, pirate zines, anti-copyright books, détourne art, remake public spaces, disrupt borders, rupture peace. If we are seeking to create revolution through cultural rupture, then do ruptures disappoint if they are asignifying, or is there more to them? Perhaps ruptures are asignifying *because* the events leading up to and moving away from the ruptures hold incredible significance and cannot be overcoded, underestimated or erased. "You can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed."[63] Anti-authoritarians are like ants; the anarchist rhizome is assemblage and reassemblage. An explosive event such as May '68 might be seen as "a splitting off from, a breaking with causality; it is a bifurcation, a lawless deviation, an unstable condition that opens up the new field of the possible."[64] The realm of possibilities created by this kind of destabilization continues once the moment is past,

goes underground, travels out in different ways, perhaps unseen, fermenting, resting, transmogrifying. Both the ruptures we create in the fabric of hegemony and the ruptures in our own cultural assemblages can extend these possibilities. An event, space or text "enters as much into the interior of individuals as into the depths of a society."[65] The consciousnesses of people who produce culture, spaces, and temporary autonomous zones are transformed, even as the consciousness of society peripheral to them is—parents, acquaintances, colleagues, strangers, witnesses, the public sphere. Not just the textual shifts.

> No signifiance, no subjectification: writing to the *n*th power (all individuated enunciation remains trapped within the dominant significations, all signifying desire is associated with dominated subjects). An assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows simultaneously.[66]

This works for cultural production at the macro level, but also signification at the micro level of the signifier-signified. "An intensive trait starts working for itself, a hallucinatory perception, synesthesia, perverse mutation, or play of images shakes loose, challenging the hegemony of the signifier."[67] Guerrilla zine production challenges the signified attached to the signifier "writer"—someone who has *had* a novel published (by someone else, a publisher, a corporation, someone who takes something from you and packages it for consumption by strangers mediated by several material, social, and labor exchanges). The zine "writer," on the other hand, attaches to a different signified—someone who has something to say and says it however they like, in any aesthetic form they can create. The signifier is thus unmediated by the field of cultural production.

Signifying and signification on some basic level are thus inadequate to anarchist or anti-authoritarian cultural guerrillas, who are constantly deterritorializing, rupturing, producing, smoothing, experimenting, fleeing. Not changing but eliminating the guard. This abandonment of signification is a risk (what if everything we do has absolutely no meaning?) but also one of the greatest strengths of anarchist culture. This is *because* it demands continual renewal.

Deleuze and Guattari remind us not to ask what a book means, but rather to examine the intensities it produces in relation to other intensities being produced by some books, bookstores, infoshops, zines, guerrilla art installations, bombings, spontaneous dance parties.

> Every rhizome contains lines of segmentarity according to which it is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified, attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees.[68]

The cultural field may attempt to reterritorialize anarchist books and the actions depicted, but the book itself flees this stratification, these attempts to make it signify not just something it does not signify but anything at all. We need

guerrilla texts to provide space for ruptures to happen, the political context creates the ruptures to hegemony of these events as they produce deterritorialized intensities that resonate with other events groups books zines guerrillas.

As we are freed in anti-authoritarian culture, through the series of principles from multiplicity, heterogeneity and connection to experimentation, from the need to signify, we move toward greater autonomy. The compulsion to signify, to make our lives make meaning, is the capitalist, statist, authoritarian mode. Instead anarchist texts create wildness, ask questions, experiment, rupture, make things up, make connections among wildly various people and things, develop alliances, build sociality into texts through texts open up spaces.

Conclusion: The Permanent Revolution of Anarchist Culture

With its asignifying ruptures, its experiments in form and social organization, its continual renewal and self-critique, its emphasis on DIY modes of production, multiplicities and heterogeneities among and within cultural production collectives, connections and alliances on a global scale—with all of this, anti-authoritarian culture is in a state of permanent revolution. This conclusion leads us back to the beginning (there thus is no beginning), in a continual recartographication of anarchist culture. It also leads us forward to challenge the future. Texts and culture are only revolutionary or transformative for so long. Guerrilla texts, like revolutions, demand continual renewal. The future has different needs desires interests passions philosophies histories politics; there will be new revolutions.

Sustainability, regeneration, and accountability are crucial to anarchist culture, as the *Green Anarchist* collective reminds us:

> The decentralisation of *Green Anarchist*'s organisation may be viewed as a realisation of its own desideratum for society as a whole. This break with hierarchy is stressed by one of the present editorial collective: "I don't see a society which is hierarchic ... is a viable or sustainable one."[69]

This is the constant struggle in the politics of anti-authoritarian cultural production. Guerrilla texts "have more to do with 'the search for community, and the construction of alternative value systems'"[70] than the desire to create avant-garde art. Thus anti-authoritarian cultural production is accountable to community and to an experimental system of values that profoundly challenge hegemony. "What counts is not the authoritarian unification, but rather a sort of infinite spreading: desire in the schools, the factories, the neighbourhoods, the nursery schools."[71] Sliding incremental increases in autonomy enable these desires to take wing, lighting up the permanent revolution of anarchist cultures.

Notes

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12.   *Ibid.*, p. 164.
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15.   Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p. 9.
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