by canvassing recent work on Kant's commitment to OIC. I diagnosed various mistakes in this literature, culminating in one common problem: none of them

If, with Kant, we maintain that what hinders imperfectly rational agents from acting perfectly rational

This principle is found in passage 5

world in which epistemic (or physical) hindrances to duty are not present.

”practical without hindrance” and so the “ought” of duty “is actually a will”, is a world in which

which he ought if reason had full, unhindered control over his will, would make little sense if the action that an agent was obliged to perform was physically

Passage 1 even uses modern terminology that is deployed when philosophers want to distinguish between the ability to perform a specific action and a more

entailed by being vertebrate. So in 3, Kant asserts that the set of marks analytic to the concept of duty includes all the marks associated with a good will. That

good will. This involves an appeal to Kant's understanding of logic and, in particular, concept containment. The idea is that each concept has various marks

because I think they are particularly suited to my purposes: dialing down to the specifics of Kant's understanding of this principle against the backdrop of a

I ought to D, then D must be logically and physically possible

stronger ‘ought implies physical possibility’: Kant is committed to ‘ought implies real possibility’, or ‘ought implies really can’. That is, on Kant’s account, if

deliberately making it impossible to fulfill one’s obligations) poses no problem for OIC on any interpretation because culpably self-incurred inability is

one’s money the day before it is due is constitutive of an abrogation of one’s obligation to repay a debt. As such, it makes no sense to assert that this is a way of

is partly to blame for the death of the victim should the murderer, as a result of this lie, discover the victim as the victim is hurrying away unbeknownst to the

luck; (B) OICi entails that there are such obligations whereas OICii does not; (C) Kant thinks that morality is immune to luck; therefore (D) OICi should not

seen that Kohl's second argument, like his first, fails to withstand critical scrutiny.

impugns only Meg’s