

Accountability and Community on the Internet: A Plea for Restorative Justice

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Abstract:

In this paper, I analyze norm enforcement on social media, specifically cases where an agent has committed a moral transgression online and is brought to account by an internet mob with incongruously injurious results in their offline life. I argue that users problematically imagine that they are members of a particular kind of moral community where shaming behaviors are not only acceptable, but morally required to “take down” those who appear to violate community norms. I then demonstrate the costs that are associated with this strategy; the most worrisome being those that distort the nature of moral dialog and the purpose and effectiveness of accountability practices online, creating a vitriolic and polarizing online environment. Because of these negative consequences, I suggest that we ought to hold others accountable for restorative ends. I argue that restorative accountability practices can help us cultivate new norms online that rely less for their enforcement upon negative acts such as shame, and more upon positive acts that focus upon the most appropriate way to make amends to the victim(s) and the community. In this sense, restorative accountability incorporates important elements from the ethics of care, a relational ethics that values creating, promoting, and restoring good social and personal relationships. I conclude by arguing that accountability practices premised on the ethics of care produce better outcomes for the victim(s) of a moral violation, the transgressor, and the community.

At 2:45am on May 29, 2018, Rosanne Barr, then the leading actress of the popular television show *Rosanne*, tweeted a racially-motivated, offensive description of former White House Senior Advisor Valerie Jarrett: “*muslim brotherhood & planet of the apes had a baby=vj*”.¹ Her tweet received rapid responses from a multitude of Twitter users and news outlets calling for Barr to apologize. Initially, Barr followed her post with quick, dismissive explanations – most notably, she wrote that she had been “ambien tweeting” when she posted the offensive message, ostensibly referring to a supposed side effect of the sleep aid.² Soon after, she offered an apology: “*I apologize to Valerie Jarrett and to all Americans. I am truly sorry for making a bad joke about her politics and her looks. I should have known better. Forgive me--my joke was in bad taste.*”³

This explanation and apology fell flat, however. The initial calls for an apology were quickly replaced with calls for Barr to be fired from her television show and terminated by ABC, the network airing *Rosanne*. This demand was ultimately met: less than 13 hours after the publication of her initial Tweet, the television show *Rosanne* was abruptly cancelled, effectively terminating Barr's employment (as well as the employment of all other cast members and crew).⁴

Barr's public and professional fallout recalls a number of similar cases that have made headlines over the past decade. For instance, in 2012, a photograph taken and posted by a friend on Facebook of Lindsey Stone posing with an offensive hand gesture and mimicing a scream at Arlington National Cemetery – part of a “running joke” between the two friends to take “stupid photographs” in public places – triggered an uproar that resulted in Stone losing her job and suffering from harassment both online and offline.⁵ Similarly, in 2013, just before boarding an 11-hour flight to Cape Town, Justine Sacco tweeted, “*Going to Africa. Hope I don't get AIDS. Just kidding. I'm white!*”⁶ Sacco meant for her Tweet to be interpreted sarcastically and, thinking nothing of it, turned off her phone for the duration of the flight. Upon landing, she turned her phone on and discovered that her world was suddenly in shambles: her Tweet had been shared thousands of times, prompting an onslaught of public shaming and calls for termination, which, in turn, led to her employer publicly terminating her from her job.⁷ In 2017, Kenneth Storey, a former Visiting Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Tampa, Tweeted about Hurricane Harvey, “*I don't believe in instant Karma but this kinda feels like it for Texas. Hopefully this will help them realize the GOP doesn't care about them.*”⁸ Storey was immediately subject to public shaming, death threats, and calls for the University to terminate his contract. Within two days of his Tweet, Storey was terminated from the University of Tampa.⁹

Internet shamings have become commonplace, contemptuous, and dangerous. The cases above provoke a range of emotions, sentiments, and judgments about how we ought to respond to morally questionable behavior online. On the one hand, we might feel that Barr, Stone, Sacco, and Storey *deserve* the sanctions imposed upon them by their employers, and that Twitter users had a *standing to demand* such sanctions. We might feel a similar kind of outrage, and feel *justified* in demanding that they be held *accountable* because their transgressions have the character of being *moral violations* in our *moral community*. On the other hand, we might feel that the sanctions imposed upon Barr, Stone, Sacco, and Storey were excessive when compared with their initial offenses. We might wonder what we are trying to achieve when we demand punishment for offensive behavior, and just *who* gets to decide the aim of punishment.

In this paper, I will analyze the practices and principles at work in the Barr, Stone, Sacco, and Storey cases. First, I examine recent accounts suggesting that our interactions online are shaped by *imaginal relationships* involving those whom we take to comprise our actual and potential audiences on Social Network Sites (SNS). Since knowledge about our audiences online is elusive, social media users strategically create and attend to a collapsed, imagined audience that reflects their most frequent interactions, using this audience as a benchmark for assessing socially appropriate behaviors. Second, I argue this this strategy of collapsing audiences is problematic because it leads users to imagine that they are members of a particular kind of moral community where shaming behaviors are not only acceptable, but morally required to “take down” those who appear to violate community norms. I then demonstrate the costs that are associated with this strategy; the most worrisome being those that distort the nature of moral dialog and the purpose and effectiveness of accountability practices online, creating a polarizing and erratic online environment. Because of these negative consequences, I suggest that we ought to hold others

accountable online for *restorative* ends. We might think about restorative ends as focused on improving our relationships with those whom we interact with most frequently, with an eye toward closing the knowledge gap that misaligns our imagined and actual audiences online. Restorative accountability practices promote dialog, respect, and understanding. I argue that these practices have the potential to help us cultivate new norms online that rely less for their enforcement upon negative acts such as shame, and more upon positive acts such as dialog about the substance of a transgression and the most appropriate way to make amends to the victim(s) and the community. In this sense, restorative accountability incorporates important elements from the *ethics of care*, a relational ethics that values creating, promoting, and restoring good social and personal relationships. I conclude by arguing that accountability practices premised on the ethics of care produce better outcomes for the victim(s) of a moral violation, the transgressor, and the community.

Imaginal Relationships and the Online Community

Kathryn Norklock has recently argued that online shamings on Social Networking Sites (SNSs) such as Twitter are shaped by *imaginal relationships* that we “endow with imaginative content which includes their import, meaning, and membership.”¹⁰ These imaginal relationships involve those whom we assume to be the actual and the potential readers of our online writing, as well as those whom we take as the objects of our online writing. Our imaginations are engaged in these circumstances because of the distance we have – both physically and epistemologically – from others with whom we communicate with online (our audience). The less that we know about our actual audience, and the less visible that audience is to us, the more we depend upon our imaginations to conceptualize the people with whom we are communicating.¹¹

Imaginal relationships affect more than our conceptualizations of others, though; they also affect our behaviors and our beliefs about what constitute acceptable behaviors. In offline encounters, our interactions with actual audiences (friends, family members, co-workers, and so on) determine how we adapt our behavior to the particular context. For instance, we do not typically discuss our love lives with our bosses, and while we might undress ourselves for an exam at the doctor's office, we do not typically undress at a holiday party. In this sense, "Knowing one's audience matters when trying to determine what is socially appropriate to say or what will be understood by those listening. ... Without information about audience, it is often difficult to determine how to behave."¹² The characteristics of SNSs make it challenging to understand the scope, parameters, and composition of our online audience, especially since SNSs "collapse" contexts and audiences that were once physically and explicitly distinct offline.¹³ Since knowledge about the audience in online contexts is elusive, Norlock and others suggest that social media users create and attend to an imagined audience that reflects their most frequent interactions. In other words, users "collapse" their audiences to reflect what limited knowledge they do have about their potential interlocutors. This collapsed, imagined audience becomes the benchmark for assessing whether or not certain online behaviors are socially appropriate.¹⁴

Given the largely invisible nature of one's audience on Twitter (especially), this framework explains a plausible strategy that Twitter users employ when they compose their own Tweets and respond to the Tweets of others. This strategy, however, comes with a number of costs. First, this strategy dilutes the value of privacy. In dismissing the importance that distinct contexts play in our communicative and developmental endeavors, social media users may come to believe that performing differently for different audiences (both offline and online) constitutes something akin to fraud or deception (we are not ever are 'true selves' around others) and should be avoided.

However, privacy is important *because* it enables us perform differently for different audiences. When we have the ability to control access to information about ourselves, we are able to create and maintain a variety of meaningful relationships with others because we have the freedom to perform differently within those various contexts: I perform differently with my family than I do with my colleagues, yet I am still myself in both contexts. Losing this freedom may diminish the rich diversity of our relationships with others.¹⁵

A more worrisome cost involves the shortsightedness of our performance when we fail to take into account the potential diversity of our audience. Because social media users rarely preface their online writings with a narrative biographical history or publicly acknowledge the biases and assumptions that influence their online writings, any misalignment between the user's imagined audience and the actual audience will produce significant differences in the interpretation of the online performance. By collapsing contexts and imaging an audience comprised largely of those who reflect our own assumptions and biases, users mistakenly believe their online writings will be acceptable to their audience wholesale. As Eden Litt argues, a large enough misalignment between one's imagined audience and one's actual audience may lead to negative consequences.¹⁶ We can see how this strategy backfired for Justine Sacco, who Tweeted a number of "acerbic little jokes about the indignities of travel" in the hours leading up to her most fateful Tweet.¹⁷ Imagining that her audience would interpret her Tweet about Africa and AIDS with the same acerbic bent, Sacco's online behavior illustrated what happens when a large enough misalignment between one's imagined audience and one's actual audience produces ruinous consequences.

A related worry involves the intersection between scope of one's collapsed, imagined audience and one's imagined relationship to that audience. Early analogs of collapsed, imagined audiences point to more traditional social structures and forms of media: public speaking

engagements, novel authorship, news reporting, television broadcasting, and the like. In each of these analogs, speakers, authors, reporters, and broadcasters imagine their potential audiences with the help of “audience research” related to previous performances (broadly construed), market trends, and professional norms.¹⁸ This research influences what public speakers, authors, reporters, and broadcaster view as acceptable performances in their respective fields. At the same time, these research practices shape the relationships *between* the performers and the collapsed, imagined audiences. Public speakers, authors, reporters, and broadcasters remain distinct from their audiences; they are performing *to* their audiences rather than *with* their audiences. By contrast, social media users generally perform *with* their audiences: online writings solicit immediate feedback and often build in response to ongoing feedback. In this sense, social media users see themselves as a member of the audience as well.

Norlock suggests that the, “wide audience of social media provides that which shamers really seek, that is, the social recognition on the part of other fellow shamers. ...online shaming is a form of ... instrumental cyber-mobbing for the further end of enjoying imaginal relations with fellows mobbers.”¹⁹ I want to suggest that these imaginal relations are not to the individual mobbers themselves, but to the idea of a community - a *moral community* – of which the user is a member, a participant, and, increasingly, a judge.²⁰

The notion of ‘community’ already frames our popular understanding of SNSs; for example, MySpace and Facebook have heralded themselves as places to connect with others using the language and imagery of ‘community’, while internet researchers have pointed to the myriad ways we could understand SNSs as ‘virtual communities’ by introducing conceptual frameworks such as *networked publics* and *social capital*.²¹ While the notion of ‘community’ remains unsettled, a recent shift in the literature has paved the way for more a direct application to online contexts:

theorists have moved away from conceptualizing community as geographically dependent to conceptualizing it in psychological terms, as a quality of sociality.²² In response to this shift, Malcolm Parks suggests that a general sense of ‘community’ can be gleaned by appealing to common practices that appear in the literature more broadly. On SNSs, the most relevant requirements are, “engaging in shared rituals, social recognition, and collective action through patterned interaction and the creation of relational linkages among members that promote emotional bonds, a sense of belonging, and a sense of identification with the community.”²³ In the context of online shamings, Norlock argues that our imaginal relations do not extend equally to everyone in cyberspace; those who participate in shaming behaviors become vigorously engaged with their connections to fellow shamers, seemingly forgetting about the individual act that drew ire to begin with.²⁴ I will argue that this is the result of shamers’ imagined membership in a particular kind of online *moral community* that values retributive accountability and sees shaming those who violate perceived visible social standards as a required response to such transgressions.

At the point in the progression of online shaming practices, shaming behaviors have become ritualized (there is a pattern and a rough playbook for the way that online shamings are carried out), garner social recognition (especially to the respondents that offer most brutal and cutting responses²⁵), require collective action to be effective (a few dozen shamers does not an online shaming make), and provide a platform for shamers to establish a sense of belonging with one another. Further, the chorus of righteousness that temporarily bonds shamers together casts a distinct moral overtone that adds fuel to the fire of shaming: shamers are exposing the transgressor to public disapproval, holding the transgressor accountable to the community for violating the visible standards of the community.²⁶ Understood as such, the strategy of collapsing contexts in one’s imagined audience leads users to imagine that they are members of a moral community

where retributive practices like shaming are not only acceptable, but morally required to “take down” those who appear to violate community norms.²⁷ This third cost, which will inform the remainder of this paper, distorts the nature of moral dialog and the purpose and effectiveness of accountability practices, creating a polarizing and erratic online environment.

Accountability and a Perceived Standing to Intervene

An online shamer’s imaginal membership in a moral community is characterized by an understanding of community that involves engagement in shared rituals, social recognition, and collective action that creates relational linkages among members, promoting a sense of belonging and a sense of identification with the community. Norlock’s insight into the recognition that online shamers seek from one another illustrates how this imaginal community membership manifests in practice: shamers engage in (now firmly established) shared rituals of shaming, they seek one another’s approval, and their collective participation is what makes such prevalent shaming possible. Still, this illustration offers little in the way of explaining a shamer’s motivation to engage in shaming in the first place. What gives a potential online shamer the inclination to expose another individual’s behavior? The answer lies in what an imaginal membership in a *moral* community that values retributive accountability endows upon its members: a perceived *standing to intervene* in the behaviors of others.

Membership in a *moral* community, much like membership in a community more generally, involves a deliberate sharing of beliefs, values, and/or practices that shape how members of the community behave and identify themselves. In a moral community, these shared beliefs, values, and practices comprise a shared morality that involves community norms and standards for what behaviors are acceptable and social appropriate in given contexts. A norm is a widely known

and widely observed rule of conduct that is less official than a law, but may be just as improper to violate.²⁸ Although the question of how community norms are initially established is relatively unexplored, the practices involved in enforcing already existing norms in a community are well documented.²⁹ For instance, Lord Patrick Devlin has argued that a moral community is only sustained through practices that work to preserve the shared values of community members: “Society is not something that is kept together physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common thought. If the bonds were too far relaxed the members would drift apart.”³⁰ To prevent the bonds of common thought from relaxing too far, members of a moral community hold one another accountable through established *accountability practices* that can take many forms.³¹

Accountability norms and practices are discovered, learned, and taught as means for developing social competence and sustaining a shared cultural universe.³² They motivate behaviors that enforce and reinforce cultural, moral, and legal norms that are oriented toward maintaining the community and the values of said community. Accountability practices also range in scope and severity, from those that minimally interfere in a transgressor’s life to those that interfere greatly. For instance, Anita Allen argues that accountability practices impose requirements on those who violate moral norms, such as an obligation to *report* their actions and thoughts to others (accountability in an *information-emphatic* sense), to *explain* and *justify* their thoughts and actions to others (accountability in a *justification-emphatic* sense), to submit to *sanctions* and *punishments* (accountability in a *punishment-emphatic* sense), or to lead a *transparent, conformist lifestyle* for the sake of others.³³

Moral accountability demands are frequently experienced in day-to-day life, often taking the form of the information-emphatic sense or justification-emphatic sense of accountability.³⁴ This is because violations of shared *moral* norms are (often, but certainly not always) less

egregious than violations of *legal* norms, so proportionate responses to such violations are less severe than legally imposed sanctions, such as imprisonment or disenfranchisement. That being said, Jennifer Jacquet notes that, in general, imposing sanctions on a transgressor carries a cost to the punisher, such as the energy needed to perform the punishment or the risk of retaliation.³⁵ These costs make it less desirable to punish transgressors accordingly. By contrast, shaming – the act of exposing the transgressor to public disapproval – is less costly to the one doing the shaming than carrying out an actual punishment.³⁶ The emergence of online shaming as a social option further reduces the cost of punishment: *virtual* exposure is even less costly to the shamer and makes possible an accelerated and expanded scope of exposure. This makes shame a desirable form of punishment and even more salient to public life since the power to use shame is in the hands of all social media users and not solely in the hands of public opinion leaders or similar authorities.³⁷

Whereas the standing to impose legal sanctions is possessed only by a limited number of community members with sufficient (and sufficiently recognized) authority to impose and carry out such sanctions, sanctions for violations of moral norms (including shaming) can be imposed by any member of a moral community.³⁸ In principle, all of the members of a moral community possess a *standing to intervene* in the behavior of others because of a collective judgment rendered by the community about the acceptability of some norm and the communal authority to enforce that norm.³⁹ While it is possible to characterize the act of accepting of Twitter's Terms of Service at the outset of joining Twitter as a binding act that commits one to the collective judgment of the Twitter community with respect to acceptable behaviors (including appropriate sanctions for violations of acceptable behaviors)⁴⁰, I want to suggest that, at the very least, Twitter users perceive themselves as possessing a standing to intervene as a direct result of their imaginal membership in

a moral community that values retributive accountability. In this sense, there is no appreciable difference whether or not the moral community in question is itself imaginal or actual; what matters is the *perception* that one is a part of a moral community and derives their standing to participate in shaming behaviors from this perception. I contend that many Twitter users indeed believe they are engaged in the important practice of retributive norm enforcement when they participate in collective shamings, and that they believe the norm enforcement practices are an effective means for bringing moral justice to those who have been harmed by offensive Tweets. However, without real and sufficient standing, in execution these shaming practices fail to do any real justice and in fact cause additional harms to the victim(s) of the transgression, the transgressor herself, and to fellow shamers.

The Effects of Misaligned Accountability

Accountability practices are generally intended to sustain moral norms that individuals find useful and valuable.⁴¹ Shaming can be an effective means for promoting and sustaining norms, if done properly. Jennifer Jacquet has outlined seven habits for effective shaming that she contends have the highest likelihood of changing behavior positively: *the transgression* should 1) concern the audience, 2) deviate widely from desired behavior, and 3) not carry the expectation of formal punishment; *the transgressor* should 4) be part of the group doing the shaming; and *the shaming* should 5) come from a respected source, 6) be directed where possible benefits are the highest, and 7) be conscientiously implemented.⁴² Jacquet's effective shaming habits signal the importance of knowing one's audience (both on the part of the transgressor and the shamers) or, at minimum, taking steps to ensure that one's imagined audience is as closely aligned to the actual audience as possible. Additionally, they signal that the aim of shaming is to positively change behavior going

forward. To this end, Jacquet suggests that successful shaming ought to be followed up by giving those who have been shamed the chance to reintegrate into the community (and perhaps even be rewarded for demonstrably changed behavior). Unfortunately, most online shaming practices do *not* adhere, either intentionally or unintentionally, to these recommendations, producing some very troubling consequences, including disproportionality, the villainization of the transgressor, and attacks on human dignity.⁴³

For instance, the transgressions in question – poorly performed jokes that were in bad taste in the cases of Stone, Sacco, and Storey⁴⁴ – do not deviate widely from what is otherwise considered acceptable behavior on Twitter. As Norlock notes, jokes and sarcasm are the primary currency of approval on Twitter.⁴⁵ That Stone's, Sacco's, and Storey's jokes landed poorly is not evidence of widely deviant behavior, but of the misalignment between imaginal and actual audiences on SNSs. By collapsing contexts and imaging an audience comprised largely of those who reflect our own assumptions and biases, users believe that their online writings will be acceptable to their imaginal online community.

Relatedly, this strategy also leads users (in this case, potential shamers) to believe that their individualistic assessments of unacceptable behaviors are widely shared among those in their imaginal moral community. However, whenever any action is taken to bring a transgressor to account, it is *actually* reflective of the individualistic assessment only (not the imaginal community assessment), and therefore lacks sufficient standing. More importantly, accountability practices based in individualistic assessments are likely to produce disproportionate responses to transgressions, as those imposing sanctions lack adequate understanding of shared norms. Julia Driver has termed this *hyperactive ethics*, which is the practice of imposing one's sincerely held moral beliefs on others.⁴⁶ This practice stems from the desire to promote one's own values (or at

least to prevent one's own values from being undermined) by intervening in the behavior of others. The desire to promote one's values may reflect what one believes to be the morally correct thing to do. However, Driver argues that this kind of impositional behavior is widely held to be morally *inappropriate*, even by those who share the value(s) in question. In fact, Driver argues that most people wish to see the moral zealot *restrain* their hyperactive behavior because the justification for such behavior is problematic.

Driver argues that the moral zealot either views punishment as valuable in itself, or regularly misjudges how much punishment is proportionately appropriate for a given violation. If the moral zealot views punishment as valuable in itself, she may feel that the violator *deserves* to be the subject of punishment, or she may find punishment itself as having some kind of extra positive moral significance. Driver argues that these attitudes about punishment *fetishize* it, and confuse the *aim* of holding someone accountable with the *means* of doing so.⁴⁷ Morally hyperactive behavior, then, is morally costly – both for the subject of accountability as well as the agent holding another to account – and coercive in nature.

If we examine some of the tactics used against Stone, Sacco, and Storey, we get a glimpse of what this disproportionality and fetishization might look like. For instance, two days after Storey's original Tweet, ABC News reported that he was receiving death threats:

*"It's scary," Storey said. "I've received numerous death threats. Right now, I am not at home because of threats, that do look credible, of people that identify as white supremacists who stated they are 'coming down from Georgia to kill me.'"*⁴⁸

Sacco received similarly disproportional and coercive responses. For instance, shortly after being terminated and photographed at the airport when she landed in South Africa, Sacco quickly decided to return home because, "workers were threatening to strike at the hotels she had booked if she showed up. She was told no one could guarantee her safety."⁴⁹

Zealots may argue that Storey and Sacco *deserve* such responses, and try to justify their responses as appropriate. They might argue that they have the standing to respond to Storey's and Sacco's transgressions in such an aggressive manner, as well as the standing to demand their respective losses of employment, since their imaginal membership in a moral community that values retributive accountability requires such responses. Norlock argues that caricaturizing the target of shame as a powerful transgressor that deserves to be "taken down" is necessary for shamers to feel as though they are in league with one another.⁵⁰ In this sense, shamers imagine themselves as being on the correct side of the moral divide; they are participating in important norm enforcement practices that necessitate shaming as an appropriate moral response to transgressions.⁵¹ However, the misalignments characterizing these imaginal relationships push shaming behavior beyond mere exposure of the transgression to deep, personal, and lasting attacks on the transgressor herself. Such vicious shaming behaviors fail because they are not conscientiously implemented, they target (and villainize) the transgressor instead of the transgression, and they push for a variety of formal punishments that are disproportionate when compared to the transgression in question (and, in fact, in all of the aforementioned cases, the transgression were met with formal punishments in the form of job terminations). Norlock argues that such reactions are evidence of an additional misalignment (a "magnitude gap") that sees "some distance between the shamers' perceptions of their objects' great deservingness of harm and light suffering as a result of shaming, and the shamed persons' experiences with actual harm and the deep and lingering effects of online shaming."⁵²

For instance, Ronson notes that that the "gleeful savagery" of punishment has become itself part of the routine of online public shamings. He surmises that when shamings are delivered through SNSs like Twitter, no one worries about how merciless and brutal the power of collective

shaming may be, or whether such shaming actually produces appropriate feelings of guilt and concern for those who have been offended.⁵³ In fact, Stephen Darwall and Brendan Dill argue that shaming actually leads the target of the shaming to *avoid* responsibility for her offense.

Instead of eliciting empathy and a concern for others (especially those that one has wronged through their offensive behavior), shame turns the offender's focus inward, toward their own self-image and public reputation.⁵⁴ To that end, shame leads to negative interpersonal consequences, such as aggression and social withdrawal. For instance, in the months and years following their controversies, both Sacco and Stone focused on resetting their reputations online and re-establishing themselves professionally. Their public shamings and employment terminations did not spark any significant or impactful conversations about the struggles that Veterans face after returning from combat, or about the on-going AIDS crisis in Africa. In this sense, their shamings were ineffective because they not directed where possible benefits are highest. Instead, the actions of the shamers were guided by inducing a feeling of shame and isolation into the violators; to coercively turn them into pariahs, unwelcome from participating in community life both online and offline.

By contrast, Darwall and Dill argue that accountability practices directed toward producing *guilt* will lead the subject of such practices to *take responsibility* for her offense, and will motivate her to make amends with the victims of her offense.⁵⁵ Guilt is claimed to be more civilized, less awkward, and more likely to lead to atonement than shame, and it sometimes construed as even “cheaper” to produce than shame since it doesn't require sustained attention on the part of the audience.⁵⁶ Because guilt is other-directed, in the sense that it highlights the victim(s) of the offense, it has the potential to elicit empathy and to motivate the offender to make amends, to correct future behavior(s) and to take responsibility for what they have done.⁵⁷

As we have seen, if the aim of shaming behavior is to positively change the behavior of transgressors and potential transgressors going forward, current online shaming practices have been largely unsuccessful. While public shaming in some contexts produces valuable and desirable effects – for instance, by changing problematic corporate behaviors and harmful governmental policies – the frivolous nature of online shaming has reduced shame to a tool of social abuse that, at best, instills fear and paranoia and, at worst, weakens the sting of shame to create a culture of shamelessness.⁵⁸ This is certainly due to the overuse of shame, but it is also the result of using shame as a norm enforcement tool in an imaginal moral community that values retributive accountability. Doing so distorts the nature of moral dialog and limits any progress that might be made toward the adoption of collectively endorsed moral norms online.

Marina Oshana argues that moral accountability must be predicated, “on a history free of factors such as coercion, manipulation, and intimidation as well as assorted deviant environmental and psychological phenomena where these are sufficient to compromise the voluntary character of the action.”⁵⁹ These kinds of *responsibility-undermining phenomena* affect one’s ability to engage in the exchange of *reasons*, which disrupts the source of one’s values, beliefs, desires, and an appreciation of the consequences of one’s actions.⁶⁰ Responsibility-undermining phenomena take the place of moral interlocution – dialog about moral norms and the exchange of reasons about moral norms and actions – which is an essential component for arriving at collectively endorsed moral norms. In doing so, they create a polarizing, erratic environment where dialog about moral norms is replaced with coercive norm-enforcement behaviors lacking collective endorsement.

Further, the coercive nature of current shaming practices dehumanizes transgressors, views them as incapable of sharing reasons for their actions, and prevents their possible reintegration into the community by refusing to acknowledge apologies or changed behavior. Peter Strawson argues

that accountability practices ought to instead be premised on continuing to view transgressors as members of the moral community.⁶¹ By continuing to view the transgressor as a member of the moral community, we respect the moral capacity of the transgressor to 1) recognize, *for himself*, why his behavior warrants intervention, and 2) adopt the corresponding attitudes of *responsibility* and *guilt* in an effort to hold himself accountable to the moral community.⁶² Stephen Darwall argues that this is what makes reactive attitudes⁶³ like indignation *reactive* and not *objective*: reactive attitudes hold an agent responsible by treating her as though she has the capacity and standing to be addressed in this way.⁶⁴ More pointedly, moral indignation comes with an implicit demand for accountability *and* an acknowledgement that the authority of this demand is grounded in collectively endorsed norms.

Additionally, Jacquet argues that the overuse or misuse of shame has the potential to reshape social norms for the worse by normalizing problematic behaviors (including problematic shaming behaviors).⁶⁵ And indeed, we may already be witnessing the normalization of worsening social norms online, as frivolous shaming practices have helped contribute (along with fake news, filter bubbles, and algorithms that radicalize) to toxic and polarized environments across the web. If we want to improve these online environments, we ought to seriously consider abandoning shame as a primary norm enforcement tool and instead encourage regular and ongoing dialog about moral norms that is not dependent upon a transgressive act serving as a catalyst for discussion. By regularly discussing moral norms online with myriad others, we stand to gain a number of important benefits. First, by treating others as capable of dialog and reason exchange, we may improve our relationships with those whom we interact with most frequently. Second, we increase the possibility that our imagined audience will be more reflective of our *actual* audience if we regularly engage in the discussion of moral norms with others online – that is, we may potentially

close, to a significant extent, the knowledge gap that currently misaligns our imagined and actual audiences. Third, if we *reimagine* our relationship to a moral community that values restorative justice instead of retributive accountability, we may cultivate new norms online that rely less for their enforcement upon negative acts (such as shame) than upon positive acts such as dialog about the substance of a transgression and the most appropriate way to make amends to the victim(s) and the community.

Laying the Groundwork for Restorative Accountability Online

It is clear that every act has some *social meaning* – a meaning determined by the act’s relationship with moral norms – whether it is an act that upholds a moral norm or violates a moral norm.⁶⁶ Kate Klonick argues that moral norms enable communities to compel members to behave in certain ways by attaching social meanings to various actions they take. Crucially, this means that the acts that constitute accountability practices also have distinct social meanings, as they are part of the relationship between moral norms and the enforcement mechanisms for those norms embraced by one’s imaginal moral community.

Revising accountability practices online requires a shift in how we characterize our relationships with others online. Specifically, what I want to suggest in this last section is that we fundamentally change how we view our imaginal membership in a moral community, as well as the imaginal relationships we have with others in these communities, to bring more positive social meaning into accountability practices through restorative accountability. Accountability practices with positive social meaning are those that are derived from collectively endorsed norms and work to restore the community after moral transgressions. These are positive practices because they view all members of one’s imaginal and actual communities as participants in ongoing moral discourse

and therefore worthy of inclusion and respect, even in instances of moral violation. This recharacterization project is made possible by appealing to the ethics of care, which has historically challenged more impartial, justice-oriented approaches to moral accountability. These challenges lay the groundwork for restorative accountability in online contexts.⁶⁷

A central claim made by care ethicists is that morality cannot be separated from social life; in order to understand moral norms and practices, we must examine the particular contexts in which moral norms and practices arise, consider how such norms and practices are reproduced by interactions between moral agents, and acknowledge that relations of authority and power hold such norms and practices in place.⁶⁸ As we have seen, the location of the authority to enforce moral norms matters significantly when determining the aim and effectiveness of such enforcement. Left to powerful moral zealots who claim moral superiority, norm enforcement produces shame and fear; when grounded instead in collective endorsement, norm enforcement produces guilt and a feeling of responsibility to others. In highlighting the contextual (social) nature of moral norms and practices, care ethics challenges the notion that there is some universal standard for morality that certain individuals have knowledge of, and which others must be coerced into following. It rests the authority to enforce moral norms with participants in the community, who are each involved in creating and sustaining those norms.

Another central tenet of care ethics is the weight paid to the relationships among moral actors, especially in more intimate contexts such as the family. Virginia Held argues that care ethicists see persons as relational and interdependent, both morally and epistemologically, such that many of the responsibilities we have to others are derived from our embeddedness in these relationships.⁶⁹ In this sense, care ethics is a *relational* ethics; it places the highest value on creating, promoting, and restoring good social and personal relationships.⁷⁰ It implores us to focus

on the needs of others – including the needs of those who have violated moral norms – in an effort to reshape existing relations and to cultivate new ones.⁷¹ Whereas justice-oriented moral theories promote competing individual interests and rights, the ethics of care sees the interests of persons as being intertwined and dependent upon cooperation and social bonding. This focus emphasizes the importance of how we respond to others as constitutive of our responsibilities to others. As Carol Gilligan argues, moral questions are changed from the impersonal, "*What is just?*" or, "*What is deserved,*" to more other-directed, "*How to respond?*" queries that focus on the relationship between self and others.⁷²

Last, the ethics of care focuses upon the moral significance of attending to and meeting the needs of particular others for whom we are responsible for.⁷³ For many care theorists, the scope of responsibility has traditionally involved familial and friendship relationships. More recently, care theorists have extended this responsibility to communities, both on local and global scales.⁷⁴ In this sense, attending to and meeting the needs of particular others in the community does not just extend to physical or emotional needs, but also to the needs that others have as community members: to be included and considered morally capable, and to be acknowledged participants in shaping and enforcing community norms. Even if this membership is imaginal, it is an imaginal membership that participants have some control in constructing, such that it reflects more frequent positive interactions with others.

There are important parallels between the ethics of care and restorative accountability. For instance, Margaret Urban Walker argues that restorative justice efforts are organized around moral ideas indistinguishable from care-oriented thinking, such as holding individuals and their communities responsible for assessing and responding to the needs of others, and affirming the dignity of others.⁷⁵ Restorative accountability aims to repair the harm caused by some

transgression by placing the standing to demand in the hands of the “stakeholders,” which includes the victim(s), the transgressor, and the community. According to Howard Zehr, restorative justice, “is a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms, needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as possible.”⁷⁶ Importantly, a central aim of restorative justice involves making sure that the offender understands *why* their action was harmful, and *to whom* it was harmful.⁷⁷ This process of *understanding* must assume a connection between victim and transgressor, between transgressor and community, that allows for dialog and reason-exchange.⁷⁸ By treating others as capable of dialog and reason exchange, and by regularly discussing moral norms and norms of accountability with others, we stand to close, to a significant extent, the knowledge gap that currently misaligns our imagined and actual audiences. Closing this gap can produce the kind of understanding that restorative justice requires, while continuing to see the transgressor as a member of the imagined moral community enables all stakeholders to see that understanding is possible.

Proponents of restorative accountability are concerned that the needs of the victim(s), the transgressor, and the community are not being met through retributive accountability practices. Retributive accountability practices give the transgressor what they “deserve” and typically give the victim(s) of the offense nothing more than the satisfaction of seeing the transgressor punished.⁷⁹ As we have seen, satisfaction of this sort fetishizes punishment and imbues accountability practices with negative social meaning, such as dehumanization and isolation. Retributive processes do not encourage transgressors to understand the consequences of their actions, or to empathize with the victim(s). Transgressors are denied an active role in “setting things right,” and, as Walker argues, are treated as, “spectators to the harm they have done and even to some of its consequences for them.”⁸⁰ What’s more, as we have seen, retributive processes

encourage transgressors to deny responsibility and to focus instead on repairing self-image. In this sense, retributive punishment does not offer real accountability to the victim(s) of the offense or to the community.

A crucial goal for restorative justice is to reintegrate both the victim and the offender into the community, rather than to ostracize and isolate the transgressor.⁸¹ Restorative practices acknowledge the initial connection among the parties – in online cases, that the victim(s) and the transgressor are both involved in imaginal relationships that are influenced by one another's behaviors online – and focus on determining the steps needed to reconnect the parties to the community.⁸² The reintegration process recognizes that the victim/transgressor relationship changes both parties, as well as the community in which both belong. For successful reintegration to occur, an understanding about the nature of the offense and the hurt it caused are necessary for the transgression to achieve closure. By supporting transgressors “while encouraging them to understand, accept, and carry out their obligations,” restorative justice continues to treat transgressors as members of the moral community instead of isolating them, and provides real accountability to the victim(s) of the offense and to the community.⁸³ By engaging in regular dialog and debate about moral norms and norms of accountability online – in effect, taking steps to close the knowledge gap that currently misaligns our imagined and actual audiences – we lay the foundation to *reimagine* our relationship in a moral community that values restorative justice instead of retributive accountability. In doing so, we can cultivate new norms online that rely less for their enforcement upon negative acts (such as shame) than upon positive acts such as dialog about the substance of a transgression and the most appropriate way to make amends to the victim(s) and the community.

In practice, restorative accountability practices on Twitter would involve more meaningful dialog and fewer egregious sanctions. Most importantly, if any sanctions were to be imposed, they would be the kinds of sanctions that could be collectively endorsed by Twitter users more generally and could inform the imaginal relationships that Twitter users have with one another.

Returning to Barr's case, members of the Twitter community could debate about and ultimately call for Barr's Twitter account to be put into Read-Only mode or be suspended, indefinitely or permanently.⁸⁴ A temporary suspension may be in order, if other users determine that it constitutes a proportionately appropriate response to Barr's transgression. Reintegration to the Twitter community after suspension would acknowledge Barr as a continued member of the community, and would treat Barr humanely, leaving open the possibility that her behavior could improve going forward. Acknowledging Barr's apologies and viewing her as capable of moral progress may motivate Barr to make amends to the Twitter community and to Valerie Jarrett. If Barr were involved in the reason-exchange process, she may come to feel appropriate feelings of guilt and change her behavior after considering the points of view of those who were offended by her Tweet (as well as those who were offended on behalf of others). In short, treating Barr as capable of dialog and reason exchange, adopting practices of understanding that work to close the knowledge gap between our imaginal and actual audiences, and reimagining our moral community membership as one focused on restoration rather than retribution may produce more positive norms of engagement and lead to genuinely positive changes in online behaviors.

While hypothetical, this outcome is indeed preferable to the outcome that transpired in 2018, especially for Barr, but also for social media communities in general. The recent proliferation of articles, opinion editorials, and blog posts about our current online shaming practices demonstrates that many members of social media communities find these practices

deeply troubling. By adopting restorative aims for accountability practices online, we stand the chance of making our imaginal online moral communities less polarizing and erratic. If Twitter users recognize that they are part of an on-going conversation about moral norms and practices, they may feel the appropriate standing to hold *themselves* accountable to such norms and practices and promote dialog and reason-exchange over the imposition of harsh sanctions. Moreover, by using shame as a last-resort tactic, we increase the likelihood that shame will be used effectively when it is employed.

Notes

- ¹ Gardner, Abby, 'ABC Cancels 'Roseanne' After Racist Twitter Rant,' *Glamour*. May 29, 2018. <https://www.glamour.com/story/abc-cancels-roseanne-racist-twitter-rant>.
- ² Ducharme, Jamie, 'Roseanne Barr Blamed Her Racist Tweet on 'Ambien Tweeting','' *Time Magazine*, May 30, 2018. <http://time.com/5295104/roseanne-barr-ambien/>.
- ³ Gardner op. cit.
- ⁴ Gajanan, Mahita, 'ABC Cancels 'Roseanne' After Roseanne Barr's Racist Tweet,' *Time Magazine*, May 29, 2018. <http://time.com/5294313/roseanne-cancelled-abc/>.
- ⁵ Ronson, Jon, "Overnight, Everything I Loved Was Gone": The Internet Shaming of Lindsey Stone,' *The Guardian*, February 21, 2015b, sec. Technology. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/21/internet-shaming-lindsey-stone-jon-ronson>.
- ⁶ Ronson, Jon, 'How One Stupid Tweet Blew Up Justine Sacco's Life,' *The New York Times*, February 15, 2015c, sec. Magazine. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html>.
- ⁷ Realizing that Sacco was in the air with no internet connection, the Twitter hashtag #hasjustinelandedyet became a trending topic on Twitter, furthering Sacco's public shaming. Ronson op. cit.
- ⁸ Paluska, Michael, 'UT Professor Fired after Harvey Tweet,' *WFTS*. August 29, 2017. <https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/university-professor-apologizes-for-tweet-implying-hurricane-harvey-was-karma-for-voting-for-trump>.
- ⁹ The University of Tampa later reversed the decision to terminate Storey, but Storey immediately tendered his resignation. McNeill, Claire, 'UT Fires Teacher Whose Tweet Blamed Harvey on Texas GOP Vote,' *Tampa Bay Times*. August 29, 2017. <https://www.tampabay.com/news/education/college/ut-condemns-teacher-whose-tweet-blames-harvey-on-texas-gop-vote/2335504>.
- ¹⁰ Norlock, Kathryn J, 'Online Shaming,' *Social Philosophy Today*, 33 (2017): 187–97. P. 188.
- ¹¹ Litt, Eden, 'Knock Knock. Who's There? The Imagined Audience,' *Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media*, 56, 3, (2012): 330–45. P. 331.
- ¹² boyd, danah, 'Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications,' in Zizi Papacharissi (ed.) *A Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on Social Network Sites*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), pp. 39–58, p. 50.
- ¹³ Litt op. cit. p. 332. In our offline, un-broadcasted lives, it is easier to compartmentalize contexts. For instance, a political personality in the 1960's would be able to deliver speeches and addresses to different audiences, using different rhetorical styles depending on the particular audience. This changes, however, when those speeches are recorded and aired on television for a wider audience – the distinct audiences have now been collapsed into one. While the political personality may still have a somewhat informed idea about the composition of this larger

audience, a social media user has even less information at her disposal and an even greater collapsed context to navigate. boyd op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁴ Litt op. cit., p. 333.

¹⁵ Rachels, James, *Can Ethics Provide Answers? And Other Essays in Moral Philosophy*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1997), p. 147.

¹⁶ Litt op. cit., p. 333.

¹⁷ Ronson 2015c op. cit.

¹⁸ Litt op. cit., p. 335.

¹⁹ Norlock op. cit., p. 190.

²⁰ With the framework I am providing, it is not strictly significant whether or not the moral community in question is itself imaginal or actual; what matters is the perception that one (a shamer) is a part of the moral community and derives their standing to participate in shaming behaviors from this perception.

²¹ boyd op. cit. Parks, Malcolm R., 'Social Network Sites as Virtual Communities,' in Zizi Papacharissi (ed.) *A Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on Social Network Sites* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2011), pp. 105–23, p. 106.

²² Parks op. cit., p. 107.

²³ Parks op. cit., p. 111.

²⁴ Norlock op. cit., p. 192.

²⁵ Ironically, those who post the most brutal and cutting shame responses – those involving threats of violence, sexist, racist, or other discriminatory overtones, and so on – are themselves rarely subject to shame, even though the content of their responses are worse than the original offending post.

²⁶ Jacquet, Jennifer, *Is Shame Necessary? New Uses for an Old Tool* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 2015), p. 12.

²⁷ Norlock op. cit., p. 192.

²⁸ Solove, Daniel J, *The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), p. 84.

²⁹ See Jacquet op. cit.; Gilbert, Margaret, *Joint Commitment: How We Make the Social World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Tuomela, Raimo, *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Darwall, Stephen, *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Oshana, Marina, 'Moral Accountability,' *Philosophical Topics*, 32, 1 & 2 (2004): 255–74.; Allen, Anita, *Why Privacy Isn't Everything: Feminist Reflections on Personal Accountability* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003); Strawson, Peter, 'Freedom and Resentment,' in John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (eds.) *Perspectives on Moral Responsibility* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 45–66.

³⁰ Devlin, Patrick, *The Enforcement of Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 10. H. L. A. Hart has termed this view the *disintegration thesis*, wherein a shared morality constitutes the cement of society and a bond, "without which men would not cohere in society." Hart, H. L. A., 'Social Solidarity and the Enforcement of Morality,' *The University of Chicago Law Review*, 35, 1 (1967): 1–13, p. 1.

³¹ Daniel Solove argues that if a norm never gets enforced, it will cease to be a norm. Solove op. cit. p. 85.

³² Allen op. cit., p. 29.

³³ Allen 2003 op. cit. p. 17. Allen, Anita, 'Privacy Isn't Everything: Accountability as a Personal and Social Good,' in Adam D. Moore (ed.) *Information Ethics: Privacy, Property, and Power* (University of Washington Press, 2005), pp. 398–416, p. 408.

³⁴ For instance, explaining a broken promise or justifying one's failure to fulfill an important responsibility.

³⁵ Jacquet op. cit., p. 14.

³⁶ The act of shaming (which is to be treated separately from the *feeling* of being ashamed) is a form of punishment that is used to enforce norms by attacking a particular asset: one's reputation. Jacquet op. cit., p. 13.

³⁷ Jacquet op. cit., p. 19.

³⁸ My neighbor cannot send me to jail for stealing his car (even if he can ask me to *explain* myself or to *justify* why I have stolen his car), but he can call for the local police to make an arrest and for the local judge to impose an appropriate sanction.

³⁹ In this sense, all members bind themselves to one another to follow such norms and to hold one another accountable for doing so. Gilbert op. cit., p. 185.

⁴⁰ Although in a majority of cases, potential Twitter users do not actually read the Terms of Service agreement and often click 'accept' without having any knowledge of what the agreement states (Obar and Oeldorf-Hirsch have demonstrated that a significant proportion of the population – upwards of 90% - do not read privacy policies or terms of service agreements yet click accept anyhow), Benbunan-Fich argues that click-through agreements, like

the ones found on Twitter and other SNSs, may constitute a binding action that could serve as a ground for collective judgments. Benbunan-Fich, Raquel, 'The Ethics of Online Research with Unsuspecting Users: From A/B Testing to C/D Experimentation,' *Research Ethics*, 13, 3–4 (2017): 200–218, p. 208; Obar, Jonathan A. and Anne Oeldorf-Hirsch, 'The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services,' *Information, Communication and Society*, 23, 1, (2020): 128–147, p. 135.

⁴¹ Solove op. cit. p. 86.

⁴² Jacquet op. cit., pp. 85–86.

⁴³ Jacquet op. cit., pp. 20, 93.

⁴⁴ I believe that Barr's case is different, here, with respect to the fact that her Tweet deliberately referenced racist sentiments in an attack on a particular individual. Her "joke" was not engaged in social commentary, as Stone's, Sacco's, and Storey's were.

⁴⁵ Norlock op. cit., p. 192.

⁴⁶ Driver, Julia, 'Hyperactive Ethics,' *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 44, 174 (1994): 9–25, p. 9.

⁴⁷ Drive op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁸ Paluska, Michael, 'UT Professor Speaks out after He Was Fired for Tweeting Harvey Was 'karma' for Trump Voters,' *ABC Action News* (blog). August 28, 2018. <https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/university-professor-apologizes-for-tweet-implicating-hurricane-harvey-was-karma-for-voting-for-trump>.

⁴⁹ Ronson 2015c op. cit. Stone had experienced similarly jarring responses: "Lindsey hadn't typed her name into Google for 11 months. The last time had been a shock: it was Veterans' Day, and she found some ex-army people "wondering where I was, and not in a good way". "They were thinking about tracking you down so they could re-destroy you?" [Ronson] asked. "Yeah," she said. She hadn't looked since." Ronson 2015b op. cit.

⁵⁰ Norlock op. cit., p. 193.

⁵¹ It is useful here to note the moral overtones present in shaming behaviors, signaling that shamers do believe they are engaged in the important work of norm enforcement on behalf of their imaginal moral community. For instance, Ronson provides responses aimed at Sacco that highlight the problematic racial connotations of her Tweet: "In light of @Justine-Sacco disgusting racist tweet, I'm donating to @care today" and "How did @JustineSacco get a PR job?! Her level of racist ignorance belongs on Fox News. #AIDS can affect anyone!" However, as we have seen, these Tweets (and those like them) did not motivate any dialog on moral norms that could be relevant to the subject of Sacco's Tweet, as noted by one Twitter user: "The world worked harder to get #JustineSacco fired than it has to fix the #AIDS epidemic. Take a bow mankind #HasJusticeLandedYet." Ronson 2015c op. cit.

⁵² Norlock op. cit., p. 190.

⁵³ Ronson, Jon, *So You've Been Publicly Shamed* (London, UK: Picador, 2015a), p. 80.

⁵⁴ Darwall, Stephen and Brendan Dill, 'Moral Psychology as Accountability,' in Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson (eds.) *Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Philosophical Essays on the Science of Ethics* (Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 40–83, p. 66.

⁵⁵ Darwall and Dill op. cit., p. 65.

⁵⁶ Jacquet argues that guilt is believed, by and large, to be an emotional construct of the West – a product of liberal individualism that promotes an individual's use of guilt to police himself so that the group or the state doesn't have to. Jacquet op. cit., pp. 30, 38.

⁵⁷ Darwall and Dill op. cit. p. 65; Jacquet op. cit., pp. 30, 135–156.

⁵⁸ Jacquet (notes that one of shaming's biggest liabilities is the high chance that has to further isolate transgressors from a community, rather than reintegrate them. Isolating transgressors in such a manner could lead them to continue living as transgressors rather than as members of the group. Jacquet op. cit., pp. 140–141.

⁵⁹ Oshana op. cit., p. 257.

⁶⁰ Oshana op. cit., p. 257.

⁶¹ Strawson op. cit., p. 63.

⁶² Strawson op. cit., p. 62.

⁶³ Strawson argues that *reactive attitudes* – such things as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, indignation, and the like – arise when one party to a transaction is offended or benefited by the action(s) and intention(s) of the other party. These attitudes are unavoidable features of our relations with others because of the importance we attach to the attitudes and intentions that others have toward us. Strawson op. cit., p. 48.

⁶⁴ Darwall op. cit., p. 72.

⁶⁵ Jacquet provides an example of this potential change for the worse: in states that require convicted drunk drivers to put brightly colored license plates on their cars, some see this punishment as a source of pride and refer to the plates as "party plates." Jacquet op. cit., p. 140.

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- ⁶⁶ Klonick, Kate, 'Re-Shaming the Debate: Social Norms, Shame, and Regulation in an Internet Age,' *Maryland Law Review*, 75, 4 (2016): 1029–65, p. 1036.
- ⁶⁷ They also lay the groundwork for restorative accountability practices in other contexts, such as criminal law. See, for instance, Gilligan op. cit.; Walker 2006 op. cit.; Zehr op. cit.
- ⁶⁸ Walker, Margaret Urban, *Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics*, Second Edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 11, 82; Robinson, Fiona, *The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2011), p. 26.
- ⁶⁹ Held, Virginia, *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 14.
- ⁷⁰ Walker, Margaret Urban, 'The Curious Case of Care and Restorative Justice in the U.S. Context,' in M. Hamington and D.C. Miller (eds.) *Socializing Care: Feminist Ethics and Public Issues* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) pp. 145–163, p. 152.
- ⁷¹ Held op. cit. pp. 14-15.
- ⁷² Gilligan, Carol, 'Moral Orientation and Moral Development,' in Virginia Held (ed.) *Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), p. 35.
- ⁷³ Held op. cit., p. 10.
- ⁷⁴ Held op. cit.; Robinson op. cit.
- ⁷⁵ Walker 2006 op. cit., pp. 151-152.
- ⁷⁶ Zehr, Howard, *The Little Book of Restorative Justice: Revised and Updated* (New York, NY: Good Books, 2014), p. 68.
- ⁷⁷ Zehr op. cit., p. 69.
- ⁷⁸ Gilligan op. cit., p. 43.
- ⁷⁹ Walker 2006 op. cit., p. 154.
- ⁸⁰ Walker 2006 op. cit., p. 156.
- ⁸¹ Zehr op. cit., p. 69.
- ⁸² Walker 2006 op. cit., p. 156.
- ⁸³ Zehr op. cit., p. 74.
- ⁸⁴ <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-options>