Introduction

Both Heraclitus’ *peri phuseōs* (On Nature) and Kant’s *Übergang* (Opus Postumum) enjoy the reputation of being intractable, difficult but also important works in the history of philosophy. We do not have complete versions of either and the style and content of these texts resist interpretation. In this book, we attempt to place these texts beside one another and to read them within a framework provided by Kant’s metaphysics of nature and third *Critique* on one side, and Nietzsche’s writings on the Pre-Socratics and aesthetics on the other. By supplementing the texts in this way it is hoped that they will gain internal consistency as well as a shared thematic orientation with respect to questions of aesthetics and of cosmology as the overcoming of ontology. To begin, we must first prove that *Opus Postumum*, Kant’s most Pre-Socratic work, is informed by cosmological rather than logical-ontological concerns and driven by the ambition to draw together material from diverse fields of philosophy under the aegis of a new thinking of *logos*.

In *Opus Postumum* Kant mentions a new discipline of thought that aims to explain the transition between the metaphysical principles of natural science and the concepts of physical moving forces. In this process of transition, the concept of motion is the active cause on which all elements of experience rely. The motion in nature and the movement occurring in the aesthetic faculties are essentially linked not only by means of their effects but also of their source. Prior to Kant, Wolff and Leibniz define cosmology as a division of metaphysics alongside natural theology, psychology and ontology. Kant develops his cosmology as a thought analyzing and defining the direction, time, quality, relation and modality of the moving forces of matter. He thereby attempts to systematically categorize and define these moving forces of matter throughout major works and other writings from his first published work, *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces*, to *Metaphysical Foundations of the Natural Science* and finally *Opus Postumum*.
Yet, with particular reference to Kant’s early works such as *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces*, one may rightly question the validity of the term “moving forces” in Kantian philosophy, considering also his rejection of Wolff’s notion of moving forces. Kant argues that motion and force are essentially unrelated, as force has to do with “being” and thereby deserves to be called *vis activa* or active force (as a better representation of the dynamic source). Active forces are the constructive elements of nature creating space, its structure and the universe and everything within by spreading and effecting out, in turn ruling everything from materially produced ideas to mentally intended actions. On the other hand, before Kant, Descartes states that “motion” rather than force is the constitutive principle of nature showing that force is essentially reducible to the quantity of motion. However, Leibniz defends the force-argument viewing force as the basic quality of nature. Modern science, through the empirical discoveries of momentum and kinetic energy, confirms the validity of both Cartesian reduction of force to motion and thus physics to kinematics, and Leibniz’s discovery of a new quantity of velocity (which he calls “living force” or *vis viva*) to expand physics into dynamics. It is Kant’s correct anticipation of the validity of both of these arguments that makes him reconcile motion and force through the term “moving forces” in his later philosophy of nature. This is one of the reasons why he freely uses “moving forces,” as the dynamic elements of nature, in *Metaphysical Foundations* and *Opus Postumum* while, unlike Wolff, providing this concept with a deeper and critical focus. Another reason for Kant’s choice of “moving forces” is his systematic aim to disentangle the particular forms or modes of force like attraction and repulsion. But since it is inappropriate to tell apart the particular or localized force from the dynamism of the whole, the term “moving forces” is used to represent the totality, accurately underlining both the dynamism of being as a whole and the presence of the multitude of forces (once they are localized within and between certain forms of matter). While motion is a generic term designating the dynamic unity of all matter, force is or at least seems to be the motion applied by/to a body of matter, or, motion that occurs between two bodies of matter (attracting, repelling each other). This is why it is possible to call attraction and repulsion “moving forces” instead of just forces. For when a body of matter applies force to another, it reveals its essential dynamism as well as its belongingness to the unity of forces and bodies of matter in one all-encompassing motion. The transition from these physical moving forces to the principle or idea encompassing them all is what Kant calls Übergang. Therefore, alongside a final clarification with regards to “moving forces,” *Opus Postumum* provides several clues about Kant’s ultimate views on the essential characteristics of the idea of nature.

While *Opus Postumum* informs the main principles (transition and motion) that constitute our arguments, the first *Critique* serves as a dictionary for defining and discussing the Kantian terms used throughout the book such as cosmological concepts, sense-intuitions, power of judgment (Urteilskraft) and “inner sense.” *Opus Postumum*, as Kant’s original voice, supersedes the first *Critique*, which is designed as a critical clarification of the philosophical tradition he in-
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herited, and as a systematic prolegomenon for future metaphysics. However, this does not alter the fact that these works are essentially related not only in terms of their descriptive qualities but also of their theoretical content. While both works conceive cosmology in a positive sense, in *Opus Postumum*, cosmology overtakes the entire realm of metaphysics in an attempt to reconcile it with the realm of physics. Similarly, Kant’s discussions on self-affection and inner sense in the first *Critique* seem to correlate his arguments in *Opus Postumum*. For instance, associating the doctrine of self-positing (Selbstsetzungslehre) with the doctrine of a priori self-affection, initially articulated in the first *Critique*, Friedman describes the transcendental synthesis as “an act of a priori self-affection” in which the active faculty of understanding affects the passive faculty of sensibility (*Empfindung*).8

On the general spectrum of the first *Critique*, Förster notes, “the fundamental a priori determinations of a ‘nature in general’ were the proper subject of this book, not the systematic unity of an empirical science.”9 This is also valid for *Opus Postumum*. But what is new in the latter? Why did Kant feel the need to write a post-critical *Opus* when everyone was convinced that his philosophical system was complete after the third *Critique* in which he attempts to reconcile natural necessity and rational spontaneity? Kant had actually found a new principle which would bridge his system of nature and the systems of pure understanding and reason. This new principle, I argue, is not a logical but a “cosmological” principle. It is not just transcendental (at least in the sense of its use in the first *Critique*) because its existence also relies on empirical intuitions. Tuschling rightly says that Kant is not content with his transcendental deductions in the first *Critique*; according to the new principle however, the concept of an object of possible experience begins to point at the universality of the experience. Förster too agrees that transition is the principle according to which basic forms and concepts can be thought within an all-encompassing system.10 Therefore, the reading of Kant must not begin with oppositions stemming from the dialectical reasoning but from the new principle introduced in *Opus Postumum*. For only in *Opus Postumum*, does Kant begin to question the validity of the dichotomies between object and subject, matter and form, phenomenon and noumenon, *physis* and *ethos*, nature and reason, world and God. For only there does he mention the necessity of an all-encompassing a priori principle (of transition) from which all these oppositions derive and through which they exist in unity and balance. This system is itself the demonstration of the unity of our pure intuitions of motion, space and time and the conceptual structure of our thought processes, of the primitive laws of nature and our aesthetic understanding and judgment.

It would also be appropriate to characterize the incomplete (yet rich and innovative) *Opus Postumum* as the continuation of both Kant’s theory of the sublime and reflective judgment in the third *Critique*, and his underlying motivation to integrate his physics, aesthetics, ethics and metaphysics into a single philosophical viewpoint as in the philosophical-cosmological systems of the Pre-Socratics. For this work contains not only Kant’s dynamical theory of matter
defining motion within the natures of space and time and the advanced version of his philosophy of natural science, but also his arguments for the phenomenal validity of the metaphysical foundations (or the essential unity of the theoretical and practical reason), his teachings on the aesthetic human faculties of judgment and Anschauung (sense-intuition), and the discernment of the transcendental philosophy from Platonic idealism carrying it to a rather cosmological level.  

Nevertheless, here, one might rightly question the legitimacy of associating Kant’s cosmology with Pre-Socratic and especially Heraclitean cosmology based on Kant’s extensive use of subjectum and obiectum. Kant knows Heraclitus only through secondary sources such as Plato’s Cratylus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics, though he admits (after Aristotle) in the first Critique that he always felt threatened by the major Heraclitean doctrine of panta rhei. Indeed, this doctrine makes it impossible to conduct a philosophical inquiry by assuming a self-conscious subject or “I,” as it rules out the possibility of a completely detached or disinterested reasoning which necessarily requires an unchanging state of mind. However, the shift in Kant’s later works (from the third Critique onwards) must not be overlooked. Above all, Kant’s attempt to generate a new cosmology based on the new principle of transition, which applies to the entire realm of philosophy from theoretical physics to metaphysics and aesthetics, demonstrates his endeavour to break free from the Cartesian dualisms. He focuses instead on the inquiry into nature as an aesthetically and cosmologically represented idea (as in the case of the Pre-Socratic historia peri phusêos). What shall we make of Kant’s cosmological-aesthetic approach in his two late major works, Critique of the Power of Judgment and Opus Postumum?  

To answer this, we need to understand why cosmology better relates and applies to aesthetics than to other divisions of metaphysics like psychology, theology and ontology. Any cosmological argument must also refer to the physically sensible moving forces and/or their apprehensible metaphysical foundations. Human sense-intuition and judgment are the primary tools for the transition from the phenomenal appearance of forces into intelligible concepts, which is necessarily an aesthetic process. To explicate Übergang, we need to reconcile cosmology, the oldest branch of philosophy that deals with the ways the forces of motion (phasis) structure kosmos and affect human life (ethos), with aesthetics, one of the youngest branches of philosophy concerned with the ways we perceive, sense and judge the form and motion of matter. Moreover, aesthetics does not solely investigate the appearance of physical objects but must extend its focus to active as well as passive human understanding, sense-intuitions (Anschauung) as well as sense-perceptions (Empfindung). The source of any aesthetic idea or judgment regarding nature lies in the way the cosmic forces communicate human inner- and outer-senses.

The English word “transition” perfectly preserves Übergang’s sense of “movement, passage, or change from one position, state, stage or concept to another.” The primary importance of “movement” in the definition of the word “transition” also supports the intrinsic relation between the cosmological principle of motion and the aesthetic principle of transition. In fact two different no-
tions of transition are developed in *Opus Postumum*: first, the transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics, and second, the transition from the metaphysical foundations to the transcendental philosophy. But it is possible to reconcile these two notions by adopting a *cosmologic-aesthetic* explanation. The necessity of the intermediary concepts as the components of the bridge between physics and metaphysics entails the demonstration of the essential relation between cosmology and aesthetics.

One of the structural arguments in the book concerns the theory of moving forces in *Opus Postumum*, revealing essentially a similar motivation that underpins both Kant’s theory of the sublime in nature and his theory of reflective judgment. For they proceed from the construal of nature as an aesthetic notion and systematic or non-systematic whole. While *ta panta* (everything or the whole) becomes the ordered whole or *kosmos* only as an aesthetic idea, any aesthetic notion about nature must handle and explain it cosmologically as an elementary system. The fruitful comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian constitutes the primary source of inspiration in our quest for a philosophy of aesthetics beyond the merely logical or rationalist accounts. Indeed, an elaborate understanding of the comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian requires higher criteria and principles by which we can observe the affinities and transitions between nature and art, forces and concepts, physics and metaphysics.

To attain the goals set above, I employ the method of amplification or *ampliative reconstruction* in my examination and presentation of the arguments of these three major philosophers. In this manner, their respective cosmological and aesthetic notions and theories such as *Übergang*, *sublime*, *logos*, *phusis*, *Dionysian* and *will-to-power* are extended by systematically positing them vis-à-vis each other under two main principles. This method helps generate new approaches to these notions and creates scope for further contemplation regarding their ontological or cosmological foundations. A Pre-Socratic reconstruction of the Kantian philosophy, for instance, renders it multi-dimensional and flexible (and thereby amplified). Similarly, a Kantian reconstruction of the Heraclitean philosophy would pave the way to its fuller understanding by bridging the gap between ancient and modern philosophical concepts. Indeed this is the method adopted by Nietzsche in his Schopenhauerian reconstruction of the tragic thought in *Birth of Tragedy* and his Heraclitean critique of modern philosophy in the later works. However, when using this method, one has to be careful not to remove an argument from its original context and thereby misinterpret and misuse the conceptions and ideas developed by the thinker. To avoid this kind of misrepresentation, we will resort to the Heraclitean philosophy to frame the main principles and ideas that prelude both chapters. Kantian terminology is used as a *dictionary* to substantiate the descriptive and critical qualities of the arguments. Nietzsche’s aesthetics (and specifically the Dionysian) constitutes the force that drives and guides cosmological aesthetics as an alternative philosophical approach. Furthermore, Heidegger’s early and late period works assist the critical assessment of the Pre-Socratic, Kantian, and Nietzschean thought.
while enriching the content of the book.

So, the first chapter delves into the principle of transition, associating it with the Heraclitean *logos* in the Prelude through the late nineteenth–early twentieth–century construal of *logos* as *Weltanschauung*, especially in Dilthey, Jaspers and Heidegger, the latter of whom contributes extensively to frame this work around the Heraclitean philosophy. After a preliminary philological and philosophical appropriation of the Heraclitean *logos*, we examine the principle of transition with reference to the cosmological and aesthetic arguments in Kant’s *Opus Postumum*. In applying the principle to Kantian philosophy in general, the faculty of sense-intuition (*Anschauung*) is regarded as the faculty through which the transition takes place. *Anschauung* transforms sensible appearances into unifying intuitions regarding nature by bridging the gap between the aesthetic perception of phenomena and the theoretical or cosmological ideas. Moreover, the power of judgment is posited as the faculty that regulates and determines the transition between the moving forces in nature and human freedom (as well as between the faculties of understanding and reason.) This chapter further explores the way Kant attempts to transform his transcendentalism in the later fascicles of *Opus Postumum* through the principle of transition into a cosmological worldview while preserving the moral being of man at the forefront of philosophical speculation. In an attempt to establish it as a primary philosophical and aesthetic principle, we expand on the principle of transition through the Kantian sublime, Nietzschean Dionysian (both construed as aesthetic theories representing the transition) and the ensuing idea of genius, revised in keeping with Kant’s new notion of *cosmotheoros*.

The second chapter explores the principle of motion with regard to the Heraclitean, Kantian, Nietzschean and Heideggerian cosmology, physiology and aesthetics. Following the pattern developed in the first chapter, the principle of motion is preliminarily grounded on the Heraclitean worldview this time revolving around his conceptualization of *phusis*. Here, the analysis of the principle of motion in Nietzsche’s lectures on the *Pre-Platonics* and late Heideggerian metaphysics supplements the philological and philosophical discussion regarding the term’s constitutive affinities with such notions as *kosmos*, *kinesis*, *arkhē* and *logos*. After this thorough grounding of the key components of the principle, the chapter examines Kant’s metaphysics of nature framing his theory of motion with regards to its unifying character as the primary cosmic principle, its consideration of nature as dynamic continuum, and its essentiality for the determination of the categories of time and space. The demonstration of the link between Kant’s Übergang and the principle of motion through a discussion of the role and necessity of transition in the communication of motion finalizes the section. Further, the Kantian sublime is construed as a cosmologic-aesthetic idea representing *phusis* or the motion in/of nature. Unlike the sublime, the Dionysian is not posited as a representative aesthetic concept but rather as a fully developed cosmological theory given that the later Dionysian comes to dominate Nietzsche’s entire philosophical standpoint. Therefore, an exploration of Nietzsche’s principle of motion, cosmology and physiology also entails an analysis
of the enhanced theory of the Dionysian alongside the originally Heraclitean elements. We then examine his theories of eternal recurrence and will-to-power respectively as the Heraclitean and Dionysian formulations of the principle of motion to strengthen the main argument. Finally, to demonstrate how these principles can be employed in the critique of actual artworks, we provide an extensive analysis of Van Gogh’s *The Starry Night* in an excursus. By referring to the painting as well as other artworks of genius, this section finalizes the comparison between the Kantian sublime and Nietzschean Dionysian as it outlines, exemplifies and reaffirms the philosophical grounding of cosmological aesthetics.

**NOTES**

3. Ibid., p.13.
4. Also see Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, pp.5-6.
6. Ibid.
7. In his *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Friedman describes this function of *Opus Postumum* as follows: “The problem of the Transition project is to build a bridge between the a priori doctrine of the universal properties of matter in general . . . and the empirical or experimental physics of the specific properties and interactions of particular types of matter . . . . Such a bridge is absolutely necessary if experimental physics is ever to amount to more than a mere empirical aggregate.” (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.242). Furthermore, Friedman states that this problem bears a striking resemblance to the way Kant poses the problem of reflective judgment. (Ibid., p.243.) He adds, “The analogy is striking indeed: as the universal principles of the *Metaphysical Foundations* stand to the particular phenomena of empirical physics in the *Transition* project, so the universal transcendental laws of the understanding stand to the empirical laws of ‘particular experience’ for the faculty of reflective judgement.” (Ibid., pp.243-4). This point is examined in the section on the regulative role of the faculty of judgment.
8. Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.332. Furthermore, Friedman rightly argues that in his formulation of the principle of transition, Kant illustrates the a priori self-affectation (self-determination) with the representation of motion: “The representation of motion in pure intuition—conceived as the realization of figurative synthesis—first grounds the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.” (Ibid., pp.333-4.)
10. Ibid., p.115.
11. This finding is endorsed yet purposefully not furthered by Friedman in his *Kant and the Exact Sciences* (Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Harvard University Press, 1992, p.213, fn.1).


13. In his third and last seminar in Le Thor in 1969 Heidegger exposes the shift operated by Kantian philosophy from the Greek philosophical tradition including Aristotle: “. . . in what way are *ta onta* and *ta phainomena* synonymous for the Greeks? Just how are what presences and what shows itself from itself (what appears) united? For Kant, such a unity is simply impossible. For the Greeks, things appear. For Kant, things appear to me. In the time between them, it has come about that the being has become an ob-ject (*obiectum*, or better yet: *res obstans*). The expression “object” simply has no correlate in Greek.” (Heidegger, Martin. *Four Seminars*, trans. Mitchell & Raffoul, Indiana University Press, 2003, pp.36-7.)


16. For a further discussion on the aesthetic character of the principle of transition from the sensible stratum to intelligible substratum, see section XI of Kant’s First Introduction to *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, where he explicitly shows the systematic foundations of his philosophy.

17. This point is extensively discussed and established in the second chapter.