Beşir Fuad and His Opponents: The Form of a Debate over Literature and Truth in Nineteenth-Century Istanbul

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One and a half months after Victor Hugo died in 1885, Beşir Fuad (d.1887) published a biography of him, in which Fuad defended Emile Zola’s naturalism and realism against Hugo’s romanticism. This resulted in the most important dispute in nineteenth-century Turkish literary history, the hakikiyûn (realists) and hayâliyyûn (romantics) debate, with the former represented by Beşir Fuad and the latter represented by Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir (d.1903). This article focuses on the form of this debate rather than its content, and this focus reveals how the tension between classical and post-classical Islamic intellectual history had become deeply embedded in Ottoman Turkish literary history by the late 1800s. This particular event demonstrates two points: (a) that dialectical disputation (edel) was viewed negatively as a return to the seemingly primitive practices of an antiquated mentality, as opposed to the relatively enlightened apodictic argumentation (mûnâzara); and (b) that trajectories of Ottoman Turkish literary history can be understood within the context of general Islamic intellectual history.

Almost directly following the death of Victor Hugo in 1885, Beşir Fuad1 published, in Istanbul, his critical biography of Hugo, which was the first such work in Turkish literary history.2 This publication resulted in the most important controversy in nineteenth-century Turkish literary history, known as the hakikiyûn (realists) and hayâliyyûn (romantics) debate. Even though there had been other debates on the teaching of literature (talîm-i edebiyyat) and on Ottoman rhetoric (belagât-i Osmanîye) prior to this debate, the romanticism and realism debate proved to be the most important discussion to take place up until Fuad’s suicide, and even after his death. Fuad’s unexpected suicide
in February 1887 left a permanent mark on Turkish intellectual history, even becoming a subject of political controversy in the Turkish parliament in 2010, when Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu brought it up.\textsuperscript{3} Evidently, Fuad persists in being a hot topic even in modern-day Turkey.

Although Orhan Okay’s 1969 classic \textit{Beşir Fuad: İlk Türk Pozitivisti ve Naturalisti} ("Beşir Fuad: The First Turkish Positivist and Naturalist") remains the most detailed scholarly study on Fuad to date,\textsuperscript{4} his analyses, like those of many others,\textsuperscript{5} do not extend further than the idea of Fuad as a positivist, materialist, atheist,\textsuperscript{6} and one of the alienated elites. Ahmet Mithat Efendi (d. 1912), in his biography devoted to Fuad, portrays him as "a broke loser", in both the material and the spiritual senses of the term.\textsuperscript{7} Fuad, therefore, was seen as a product of the "irreligious" Western civilization\textsuperscript{8} (especially the Jesuits)\textsuperscript{9} which had infiltrated Turkish/Islamic civilization, though this was obviously a failure, since Fuad’s suicide was seen as a symptom of the materialist fiasco.\textsuperscript{10} Only Selahattin Hilav (d. 2005) has provided an alternative analysis of Fuad.\textsuperscript{11} For Hilav, even though a materialist may necessarily be irreligious (or vice versa), there is no causal relationship between being irreligious (or materialist) and committing suicide. If there were, every person who committed suicide would be irreligious, and this would certainly contradict all statistical studies on suicide.

So far, most scholarship has focused on Fuad’s positivist and materialist ideas or provided explanations for his suicide. One aspect of this scholarship has highlighted Fuad’s influence by exploring his introduction of positivism and materialism into a predominantly Muslim society. However, preoccupation with Fuad’s "negative aspects" has caused scholars to overlook an underlying characteristic in the controversy that Fuad created with his biography on Hugo: the form (rather than the content) of the debate.

Although the content of this debate is also a salient feature of Turkish literary history, its form perfectly demonstrates a very important conceptual tension in post-classical Islamic intellectual history: dialectic versus apodictic demonstration. Based on this context, this article will show how trajectories of Ottoman Turkish literary history can be viewed within the larger context of Islamic intellectual history by using Fuad and his opponents in this debate as a core sample. This article, therefore, also challenges the general perception of Fuad as a positivist and as one of the materialist elite, obsessed with European ideas and unaware of the real problems in his society.

Before delving into the form of the debate and Fuad’s opponents, I will briefly outline the content of the debate. In 1885, Fuad published his biography on Victor Hugo, which was divided into fourteen chapters, but more generally consisted of three
parts: (a) the first part, which deals with Hugo’s life, his works, the beginning of romanticism and romantic works in this period, and Hugo’s worldview and its echoes in his works; (b) the second part, which looks at the appearance of realism beginning with the Encyclopedists; and (c) the third part, which addresses the emergence of Emile Zola (d. 1902) and the naturalist school. In the final section of the book, Fuad adopts the clear position that realism (and naturalism) is superior to romanticism. This awakened the fervor of contemporary scholars, who accepted Hugo as “the master” (iṣṭad) and who had been unaware of Emile Zola up to that point.

Fuad’s fundamental opposition was to the dominance of romanticism in Ottoman literature up until the nineteenth century, as he saw romanticism as removed from reality and full of exaggerations and questioned the notion of hayâl (the unreal, imagination) as opposed to hakikat (reality, truth) in his famous writings on the subject of “poetry and truth”, collected in Şiir ve Hakikat. He proposed that Ottoman poets put too much value onto and meaning into hayâl in their poetry and neglected to represent hakikat. Two decades before Fuad, the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (d. 1831) also criticized Islamic poetry in this respect by introducing examples from Persian poetry in his Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik (Lectures on Aesthetics).

Fuad’s criticism of Ottoman poetry and poets received its first negative response from a student of Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem (d. 1914), Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir (d.1903). His contribution involved other prominent men of letters in the debate. However, for the purposes of this article, it is the form of the debate between Beşir Fuad (representing the hakikiyûn, or realists) and Mehmet Tahir (representing the hayâkiyyûn, or romantics) that is relevant, rather than its content. This debate is important because it introduces the terminology of ādâb al-bâhth wa’l-munâzara (the theory of inquiry and argumentation) in practice, and addresses how the legacy of the struggle over the language of demonstration, as opposed to the language of dialectic, in post-classical Islamic intellectual history also triggered intellectual clashes in literary history. I will now consider the ideas that Fuad inherited from Islamic intellectual history, in order to see how he responded to them.

I should clarify at this point that, by “the language of demonstration” I refer to munâzara and bâhth, and accordingly, by “the language of dialectic”, to jadal. In pre-modern (Aristotelian) Islamic philosophy, demonstration was used by the Arab Aristotelian philosophers as a tool against the Muslim theologians’ tool, which was dialectic. However, demonstration prevailed in the battle against dialectic (jadal), as is evident in works on the ādâb al-bâhth wa’l-munâzara from the fourteenth century on up until the twentieth century. The ādâb al-bâhth—literally, the arts or rules of
investigation—arose in the Islamic world at the end of the thirteenth century and provided for the first time a complete and systematic argumentation theory that was based on the theories set out in Aristotle’s *Topics*.

From this time on, the expression ʿadāb al-baḥth came to be used synonymously with the expression ʿilm al-munāẓara to denote the new science. The choice of the two names, baḥth and munāẓara, over jadal is not accidental. The terms baḥth and munāẓara are found exclusively throughout the post-classical period in the titles of most tracts on argumentation theory. The word ʿadāb—literally, “etiquettes”—is a plural form of adab, a word which implies courtesy, refinement, culture, or enlightenment. There is a conscious and determined effort amongst post-classical argumentation theorists not to use the word jadal (dialectic) for the new argumentation theory. From the tenth century onwards, there was an emphasis on “good” (mahmūd) and “bad” (madhmūm) dialectics, but in the post-classical period, beginning with Shams ad-Dīn Samarqandī (d. 1302), the discussion no longer questioned whether dialectic (jadal) was good or bad; indeed, the issue was considered to have been concluded. Jadal, understood as “the spirit of winning”, was therefore perceived to be negative, as opposed to “the spirit of finding the truth”, which was considered to be more positive.

The reason why dialectic was deemed negative can be attributed simply to the dialectician’s (mujādat) objective: not to find the truth, but rather to win. Samarqandī defines munāẓara as “a discussion between two sides in order to reveal the truth”. “If it is not done to reveal”, writes Samarqandī, “it is dialectic (mujādalā).” This statement exposes the limits of munāẓara for Samarqandī—i.e., that something is no longer munāẓara if it is not done to reveal the truth—and demonstrates the clear shift that Samarqandī formulates in the post-classical period: jadal is not munāẓara and vice versa. By the nineteenth century, the lines between jadal and munāẓara had become very clear, as writings by Ottoman theorists such as Saçaklızâde (d. 1737), Gelenbevi (d. 1791), and Ahmet Cevdet Paşa (d. 1895) demonstrate.

Within this context, Beşir Fuad responded positively to the argumentative discourse that was bequeathed to him by his predecessors. He consciously divided his work on poetry and truth into two parts: (a) Münâzara (the Turkish pronunciation of the Arabic munāẓara) and (b) Cedral (jadal), and he says:

This book *Şair ve Hakikat* [“Poetry and Truth”] contains two sections. The first section is under the heading of “Münâzara” and includes my two correspondences with Menemenlizâde Mehmet Tahir, which I wrote free from personal matters (sahîyyât). The title of the second section, on the other hand, is “Cedral”, and is confined to three pieces that I published elsewhere: *Yetmiş Bin Beşitli Bir Hicâye* (Seventy Thousand
This great tension between *jadal* and *münâzara* is most evident in Fuad’s work; for example, if Fuad’s opponent argued against only him (and not his thesis), Fuad would respond in *cedel* style, disregarding the rules of *münâzara*. In other words, according to Fuad, if his opponent’s point was not his opponent’s thesis but the opponent (Fuad) himself, then he should not waste his time following the rules of *münâzara* with someone who did not understand what *münâzara* was: instead, he would employ *cedel*-style argumentation. All the participants in the debate over poetry and truth complain that their opponents are not following the rules of *münâzara*. For example, Fuad says that:

For participants who do not respect the rules of *münâzara* (*hâde-i münâzara*), who violate its etiquette (*dâire-i edeb*), direct criticism towards their opponents instead of their theses, and employ tools and techniques in order to manipulate the argumentation (*münâbâhes*), there is only one response that can be given as directive: no stooping or lowering oneself (*adem-i tenazzül*).

For this reason, Mehmet Tahir says that he withdrew himself from this debate due to powerful attacks against him by Hüseyin Rahmi (1864–1944), one of the proponents of *bakıkiyyân*. Tahir, thus, wrote the following to the board of the journal *Mizân*:

If they objected to my ideas within the limitations of the rules of argumentation (*edeb-i münâzara*), I could have given my answer accordingly. But in this case, there can be no better response than silence (*sükâh*) for now.

Silence does not solve the problem for Namık Kemal (d. 1888), who participated in this debate as a proponent of *hayâliyyân*, because “if my response is also silence”, he says:

There is a possibility that this could be interpreted as losing (*mağlubiyet*) the argumentation. On the other hand, if it is countered (*mukâbelê*) with proof (*delîl*), then the opponents (*ahbâb-i itirâz*) are employing whatever weapon they have at hand because they feel that they cannot win the argumentation if the rules of *münâzara* are thoroughly employed [...] What they are doing is no more than cursing; i.e., using bad language (*ezvûmle söğûylorlar*).

Namık Kemal is right in his concern about silence being interpreted as losing the argumentation, as we know that, in the classical period of argumentation theory,
silence (sükûh) was considered to be one of the signs of defeat (dala‘îl al-ingıta‘) and incapacity (‘ajzâ) in disputation. On the other hand, Muallim Nâci (d. 1893), the son-in-law of Ahmet Mithat Efendi, asks whether this dispute per se even exists by making a distinction between “dispute” (mübahse) and “quarrel” (münâza‘a):

I wonder if the argumentation (mübahse) itself exists among our intellectuals. Two participants of debate (mübâhis; i.e., the questioner and the respondent) appear and start an argument by writing; one participant “rapes the debate”; and then the other counterattacks him in the same way (mükâbele-i bi‘l-mist). Argumentation then takes on the colour of a quarrel (münâza‘a). The debate loses its real objective (maksad) and then the squabble goes on and on (bir durulダー gider).[33]

Given that argumentation was becoming more and more personal instead of serving the real subject matter—i.e., the tension between imagination (hayâl) and truth (bakikat)—Nâci, one of the supporters of realism, used the following to clarify his position, so as not to be labelled as an “enemy of poetry (adiyy-i şiîr):[34]

We need more proponents of consciousness (sûriyyûn) rather than of poetry (süriyyûn).
In fact, I am not against poetry, but rather I am against the idea of limiting poetry to exaggeration (mübalâqa), imagination (hayâl), and delusions (evbâm).[35]

The lack of concern for the rules of argumentation to be followed in this debate led Fuad to suggest that the “losers” should be proud, since the protocols of debate were not being followed in practice in line with the theory propounded in works of ədâb al-baḥth wa‘l-munâzara:

Instead of showing the truth (sâvîd) or falsity (sakîn) of an opinion (fikîr) in debate (mübahse), silencing the opponent (muârîz), using every tool whether they are wrong or right, has become the path of feeling proud (medâr-i ifthîbar) among participants. To me, it is the exact opposite; i.e., the loser (mağûb) should feel more proud than the winner (gâlib) at the end of this debate. The reason for this is that participants start argumentation in a polite manner (edibâne), but later this produces an effect of insulting one another (müṣâlåme) because the debate is mixed with enmity (kın), animosities (ağrâz), and personal matters (sübîyyâl). As a result, the arena of argumentation (meydan-i mübahse) falls into the hands of those who rape the boundaries of the debate protocols (düri-re-i edeb).[36]

Then, in 1890, came the aforementioned Ahmet Mithat Efendi, one of the fathers of modern Turkish literature, who also wrote a book on Fuad in which he called the whole debate “useless, since the nature of literature, by definition, was based on imagination (hayâl) not truth (bakikat), and therefore, nobody should look for reality or
truth in literature”. To him, the participants in this debate were failing to see the central problem: the “definition” of literature (edebiyat). This focal point made him dismiss the dispute over poetry and truth as redundant.37

Whatever the final results of the debate may have been, the focal point was the underlying structure of this debate and its meaning. We see that words which are constant formulas in the works of argumentation theory in the post-classical period were used very extensively in this debate. Moreover, Fuad employs these words in their technical senses found in works of ādāb al-baḥth, rather than with their everyday meaning; for example: (a) “hakki zahire șakarmak”, equivalent to izhâr al-haqq (“to reveal the truth”); (b) “isbat-i miidde”, meaning “to prove the argument”; (c) dava (“thesis”), suqra (“minor premise”), kiibra (“major premise”), and netice (“conclusion”); (d) sawab (“truth of a thesis”), sakim and hata (“falsity of a thesis”) and delâl-i akliye (“rational proofs”).41 Sawab refers to the fact that the main objective of argumentation theory is “to find out the truth (izhâr al-sawab or izhâr al-haqq) in order to protect one from falsity (saqim)”.42

In conclusion, the form of the realist-romantic (bakikiyûn-bayâliyyûn) debate reveals without doubt that dialectic (cedel) was viewed negatively as a return to primitive practices, especially in comparison with the relatively enlightened apodictic demonstration (miinâzar). Some even argued that Ottoman society was in stagnation because the people were living a lifestyle of cedel (cedel-nâmâ) while Western countries (akvâm-i garî) were progressing by means of positive science (fenn).43 As is clear from this example, the argumentative discourse that had shifted in the thirteenth century left a permanent imprint on Islamic intellectual history, which was surrounded by the concepts, terminology, and objectives of this discourse from that time up until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The struggle that Beşir Fuad endured with his opponents, therefore, was not only a result of “European materialism or positivism”, as has been suggested, but also arose from the problems and anxieties of Islamic intellectual history.

NOTES
1 Beşir Fuad (d. 1887) was born in Istanbul in 1852. He attended the Fatih Secondary School (rüştiye), the Syria Jesuitical School, and, in 1871, military high school. Two years later, he graduated from the War Academy and served as the camp assistant for Sultan Abdülaziz, subsequently going to the Montenegro (1875) and Russian (1877) wars as a volunteer. After he left the army, Fuad worked as the editor of the newspaper Ceride-i Hâvâdis and finally committed suicide at an early age (35). He took notes on his deathbed up to the point of losing consciousness in order to prove that everything, including death, could be explained through science.
The first examples of this genre (biographical works) are Namık Kemal’s _Evrik-i Perişan_ (1886, Istanbul); Beşir Fuad’s _Vilter'in Tereme-i Hali_ (1886, Istanbul); Ahmed Mithat Efendi’s _Fatma Aliye Hamam Yabsub bir Muharrire-i Ormânêyenin Nesiyet_ (1895, Istanbul) and _Beşir Fuad_ (1912, Istanbul); and Fatma Aliye Hanım’s _Ahmet Cevdet Paşa ve Zaman_ (1914, Istanbul). Unlike traditional modes of biographical works, the above-mentioned authors employ a Western style of writing analytical biographies using modern narrative techniques. The authors are instrumentalist in their approach; i.e., they support their ideas through these biographies.


In his recent article, Okay sarcastically mocks Fuad as an atheist: “Beşir Fuad, whom we examined in our discussions of deviations from religious thinking, when it comes to the subject at hand [positivism and realism] is clearly a knowledgeable, self-aware and unquestioning materialist and positivist. It is not difficult to label Beşir Fuad, a star graduate of the War Academy and a patriotic officer who rose to the rank of adjutant major (kolağası), as an atheist of the same degree.” See Orhan Okay, “An Exploration into Intellectual Life during the Period of Westernization,” in _History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilization_, edited by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2002), vol. 2, p. 149.

Ahmet Mithat, _Beşir Fuad_ (İstanbul, 1304/1887), pp. 87–133 and 150–55.

Okay, _Beşir Fuad_, p. 184.

Cemil Meriç, _Mağaralardaki_, p. 148.

Ahmet Mithat, _Beşir Fuad_, pp. 133–155.


Beşir Fuad. _Vıctor Hugo_. İstanbul: 1302/1885: 233.

Fuad’s writings on poetry and truth were edited and published by Handan İnci in 1999; see Beşir Fuad, _Şair ve Hakikat_ (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999). Henceforth Beşir Fuad, _Şair ve Hakikat_.


Menemenlizade Mehmet Tahir (1862–1903), born in Adana, was a student of the prominent Turkish writer Recaizade Mahmut Ekrem (1847–1914). Tahir’s poems were published in journals such as _Terimânsı Hakikat, Ensâr-i Zeka, Mir’ât-i Âlem_, and Berk. He also worked with Beşir Fuad for _Haver_ magazine—because of their conflict, the magazine’s publication was terminated—as the director of correspondence writings in the Ministry of Education, and as a teacher of literature in a number of high schools and colleges. For further reading on Tahir, see the comprehensive study by Necati Birinci, _Menemenlizade Mehmet Tahir: Hayatı ve Eserleri_ (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1988).


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19 Ibıd., p. 124.
22 Çevir kesiz yannmasın—literally, “turn the goose so it does not burn”—is an idiom used in Turkish referring to someone who changes his/her side or opinion after realizing that his/her initial argument was wrong and claims that he/she in fact defended the second argument in the first place. This changing behavior has the negative connotation of being contradictory, and people who manifest such behaviours are seen as cunning and crafty. See Hasan Pulur, Olaylar ve İsanslar (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1993), p. 91. In this sense, çevir kesiz yannmasın has a sense of “turning a cat in a pan”, according to Harrison William Weir in the following: “Toone says: ‘The proverbial expression, ‘to turn a cat in a pan’, denotes a sudden change in one’s party, or politics, or religion, for the sake of being in the ascendant, as a cat always comes down on its legs, however thrown’”. See Harrison William Weir, Our Cats and All About Them: Their Varieties, Habits, and Their Management (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1889), p. 180.
23 Beşir Faud, Şiir ve Hakikat, p. 493.
24 Aristotle defines peevishness in argumentation as “disputing agonistically”, and claims that to use anything at hand is to argue against the opponent and not the thesis. See Aristotle, Topikes, 161a:15–25.
25 Beşir Faud, Şiir ve Hakikat, p. 156; idem, “Üdebadan İstirhamum”, Saadet, issue 402 (1886).
26 “Fünnun ve Edebiyat: Mebahis-i Edebiyatı”, Miğân 4 (1886); Beşir Faud, Şiir ve Hakikat, p. 21.
27 Namık Kemal (1840–1888) was born in Tekirdağ in the Ottoman Empire, the son of the court astrologer Asım Bey. He was one of the pioneers of Turkish nationalism, a member of the Young Turks, a poet, a novelist, and a playwright. He served in the Translation Office of the Porte in Istanbul and fled to Europe in 1867, where he was the editor of the newspaper Hürriyyet (“Freedom”). Upon his return in 1870, he worked as the editor of the paper İlet (“Warning”) and was exiled to Cyprus in 1873. In 1876, he was invited to assist in preparing the constitution, but he was soon banished to the island of Lesbos, this time by Sultan Abdülhamid II. See the entry “Namık”, in EP, vol. 4, pp. 875–79.
29 The verb Kemal uses, söğmek, means “to use curse words in conversation”.
31 Muallim Naci (1850–1893), born in Istanbul, was a poet, a literary critic, and the compiler of a dictionary known as the Lâğat-i Nâcî. For Muallim Naci and his works, see Abdullah Uçman, Muallim Naci: Hayatı, Kıştlığı, Eserleri, (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1998).
32 Naci uses the word tevârail, which literally means “rape”; however, in this context, it means “breaking the rules of argumentation”. This idea of “raping the debate” seems metaphorical, but it is significant in that it may loosely correspond to the usurpation called ghast in âdâb al-hašt.
33 Cited in Beşir Faud, Şiir ve Hakikat, p. 395.
34 Beşir Faud, Inîkâd, ed. with Muallim Naci (Dersaadet, 1304/1888), p. 27; cited in Beşir Faud, Şiir ve Hakikat, p. 25.
35 This can be likened to the tension between Sunnis and those whom Taftazâni (d.1389) calls “the Sophists (sufasta Şay) and “the mulish school (al’-inâdîya)”. He says that “[s]ome of the Sophists deny the ‘real essences of things’ and maintain that they pursue ‘fancies (awham) and vain imaginations (khayalât) […] They assert that they are in doubt and that they are in doubt even of their doubt, and so on”. See Earl Edgar Elder, A Commentary on the Creed of Islam: Sa’d al-Dîn al-Taftazâni on the Creed of Najm al-Dîn al-Nasaffi (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), pp. 13–14. Abû Sulaymân al-Mantiqî (d.981), as
quoted by Abū Hayyān al-Tawhīdī (d.1023) in his Muqābāsat, describes the Mu'tazilites as dialecticians and sophists and the ḥalāṣa as those who are concerned with "essential problems". See the section on the difference between the method of theologians (dialecticians) and of philosophers (ji'l-faqh bayna tarīqat al-mutakākalimīn wa tarīqat al-falāṣa) in Muqābāsat (Cairo: Dār Sa'ūd al-Sabāh, 1992), pp. 223–24. For waḥm and waḥmiyyāt, see Ta'rifāt, pp. 310–11. In the context of Arabic philosophy, see Deborah Black, Logic, pp. 204–7.

38 Beşir Fuad, "Letter to Ahmet Mithat", in Ahmet Mithat, Beşir Fuad, p. 75.
39 Ibid., p. 62.
40 Beşir Fuad, Voltaire (İstanbul, 1304/1887), pp. 92–3.

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