**Ihor Karivets’,**

**Doctor of Science in Philosophy, Associate Professor at**

**Chair of Philosophy,**

**L’viv National Polytechnic University**

*sacre@ukr.net*

**SOCIAL VERSUS ANTHROPOCENE IN HUSSERL’S, HEIDEGGER’S AND MERLEU-PONTI’S PHENOMENOLOGY**

Phenomenology which is presented by three mentioned thinkers in the title of thesis, is non-anthropocene and non-individualistic. On the contrary, this phenomenology overcame anthropocentrism and individualism. This overcoming confirmed that their phenomenology doesn’t consider a human being as Cartesian subject. A human being always must be consider in the context certain structural relations, for instance, a human being-world, a human being-nature, a human being-God, I-Other and so on. If we try to isolate a human being and separate his/her from these relations means that we try to create a fiction: isolated and separated a human being, some kind of Robinson Crusoe. The phenomenological conceptions of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleu-Ponti are the good conceptions which resolve “the problem of a human being” as social being.

The Husserl’s a human being is the ontology of pure consciousness, i.e. the ontology of monad which is according to its nature intermonadic (*inter* is the inner part of each monad, therefore monads can communicate with one other). The Heidegger’s a human being is a being-in-the-world as Dasein. The Sartre’s a human being is the existence of project of consciousness’ spontaneity which is opened towards world of objects. The Merleu-Ponti’s a human being is “alive body” as a subject which is a part of nature and connected with it on the level of flesh (so from this thesis eco-phenomenology and “primordial” intersubjectivity of alive bodies are derived). We see that these philosophers try to eliminate from philosophy and social life the “classical” understanding of a human-being as isolated Cartesian subject and as individual atom with the help of wider structural relations, especially social.

Despite the accusations against Husserl in solipsism which we allegedly can find in his “Cartesian Meditations” (the title of work may persuade us to believe that Husserl is a follower of Descartes and recognizes the supremacy of thinking subject). But a deeper analysis of this work allows us to stress that in this work Husserl overcomes so called “transcendental solipsism”. He writes in 5th Meditation: “Das erste in Form Gemeinschaft Konstituierte und Fundament aller anderen intersubjektiven Gemeinschaftlichkeinten ist die Gemeinsamkeit der Natur, in ens mit derjenigen des fremden Leibes und fremden psychophysischen Ich in Paarung mit dem eigenen psychophysischen Ich” [Husserl E. Cartesianische Meditationen und Paizer Vorträge. Band 1. – Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. – s. 149]. The essence of a human being on the monadic level is intermonadic, and on the empirical level is intersubjective. This intersubjectivity constitutes by intermonadity. Everything is in relation to everything on each level: psychophysical, phenomenological, and transcendental. On these three levels the relations remain evident as relation Me-Other.

For Heidegger the intersubjective sphere is social sphere as “being-with-other”. He writes: “Auf dem Grounde dieses *mithaften* In-der-Welt-seins ist die Welt je schon immer die, die ich mit den Anderen teile. Die Welt des Daseins ist *Mitwelt*. Das In-Sein ist Mitsein mit Anderen. Das innerweltliche Ansichsein dieser ist Mitdasein” [Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit. 16 Auflage. – Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986. – s. 118] . Here we also find the necessity of sociality. Sociality is necessary condition of the presence of a human being in the world. Common being belongs to existential and ontological structure of Dasein.

Merleu-Ponti is also social thinker. According to him, a human being is a certain kind of social being. As he stresses: “We become what we are through our ‘incorporation’ of social structure, such as language, in the form of habit, but our actions, such as speech, are at the same time what gives life to those structures and facilities their reproduction” [see: Crossley Nick. The Social Body, Habit, Identity and Desire. – London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 2001. – p.4].

So we see that post Husserlian phenomenology re-thinking of social dimension of a human being and emergency of the social. Having been born a human being enters in social world. But what about a first human being which could entered in created by others social world? How he or she could become a human being when around him or her there were not similar creatures? So we can suppose that in a human being there are the beginnings of sociality and self which in the process of becoming are going to develop. Therefore a human being is social and autonomous entity at the same time. Or if we want to be more précis, a human being has social self. This elemental sociality is innate and we can find it on elemental level – the level of organic constitution of our body [see: Krueger Joel, Legran Dorothee. The Open Body – [Electronic document] – Access: http://www.joelkrueger.com /wp-content/uploads/2010/06/ Krueger-and-Legrand-2009-The-open-body.pdf]. This body’s organically openness makes possible any kind of intersubjectivity. Physical body is not only physical organism. It is one and other at the same time, respectively organism and subject. Our task is to clarify how this double nature of our bodies makes influence on the formation of social world. At the beginning a human being has organically open body towards other. The question what was first – my open body or other – is meaningless, because into me there is intersubjectivity; me already is intersubjective on the organic level of its body. I and the others are primordially connected.