FOURTH EUROPEAN BLUE SKY CONFERENCE

FAULTLINES AND FRONTLINES OF EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION
FAULTLINES AND FRONTLINES OF EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION
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*What possible futures await Europe and the EU? Are we moving towards more just and cohesive societies, or towards further breakdown and fracture? What and where are European values today? What is democracy today? Europe is in flux as we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Fall of the Berlin Wall, and 15 years of EU expansion eastwards. There is a lack of consensus on European values that underpin European institutions, and the question is whether we can reach a consensus today for a new European social contract or a European New Deal. Faultlines in Europe, East and West, North and South, are growing aggravating social upheaval, insecurity and political polarization. Has Europe lost its chance for global leadership in this new age of uncertainty and become increasingly irrelevant on the world stage? What are your visions for Europe’s future?*

*The 4th Annual Blue Sky Conference addressed these questions and many more. The event offered participants the chance to exchange views amidst increasing global and local, economic, political and social turbulence. In the panel discussions perspectives from Africa, Russia, Turkey and the Balkans are especially highlighted.*
We would like to dedicate this volume to the memory of our friend and colleague, Peter Schulze
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UNITY IN DIVERSITY? DEMOCRACY, CITIZENSHIP AND VALUES
Democracy of Incomplete Victories: 
State, Civil Society, and the Scientific Method 

Juozas Kasputis

Introduction

A few patronizing brushes on his suit as if removing dandruff, then self-satisfaction at the achieved result: “He is perfect”. Trump’s gesture during Macron’s state visit turned into another ‘funny moment’ for US foreign policy in 2018. The event attracted a variety of analytical interpretations which included a disapproving diagnosis of ‘dandruff diplomacy’ (Mahdawi 2018) or many compliments to Macron for his political poise and pragmatism, that could be useful in building future alliances. The rest of the world witnessed two states entering a special kind of relationship. Politics is a very complicated endeavor permeated with loose definitions of rationality (or ‘rationalities’) and reality (or ‘realities’). However, it also used to imply (at least, within liberal democracy) an external set of standards or rules to which political practice could be referred to in judicial and ethical terms. Growing popular discontent has indicated certain strains on the universal rational framework – the state, as the consolidated center of power, has been brought into question. In other words, the Westphalian state transformed by the Enlightenment persists as an unaccomplished idea in the current context. The focus of the problem is about defining a possible developmental path for the state: e.g., the pursuit of a self-centered and ‘purified’ concept of state or the pursuit of more sustainable involvement with civil society and international institutions.

The idea of progress or historical development has been entrenched within the Hegelian framework since the nineteenth century. Fukuyama (1992) blended the propagation of liberal democracy with the concept of homogenous state and universal scientific method, that was redeemed by the “end of history”. According to Fukuyama’s previous expectations, Trump’s egocistic urges and ‘arrogant display’ were supposed to be channeled into entrepreneurial activity, thus proving the resilience of the capitalist system by providing alternative outlets rather than political activity (Fukuyama 1992: 295). Now, there are impeachment proceedings regarding the former real estate developer’s right to pursue his political outlets that is a real trial for liberal democracy. It is not merely a political problem that points to the existing discrepancies between society and the state. In order to understand that, it would be better to refocus attention on the concept of the state as it does not represent social realities directly. Likewise, the possession of “Head & Shoulders” shampoo – a necessary item next to Ferrari in Trump’s recommended list for billionaires (2005) – will not automatically make everyone a billionaire.

The Dialectics of the Homogenous State and Civil Society

In the last thirty years, Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ has been readapted several times when a triumphantist idea, full of prophetic inclinations, tries to cope with the contingencies of the present moment. Nevertheless, the ‘end of history’ is a multi-layered concept referring to Hegel and his later interpreters. As many ideas with ideological flavor and absorbed philosophical content, it relies on ambiguity thus protecting itself from criticism and providing some flexibility for readjustment in case of conflicting evidence. The evolutionary pattern of liberal democracy, invoked through the ‘end of history’, has been supplemented with the notion of the homogenous state as a consolidated center of power freed “from internal contradictions: from class strife, and so on”
(Kojeve 1980: 90). Fukuyama's assumptions, and controversial projection of historical development, may serve as a proper point of departure for deconstructing a certain line of thought aimed at the justification of the absolute state (mostly, of the Westphalian - Hegelian kind) and its priority over civil society. In the latter view, the homogeneity of the state does not presuppose any alternative sources of authority. The more consolidation and formalisms, and the less the contradictions and informal interactions, the better for liberal democracy. It is not coincidental that such justification has employed universalist aspirations and formal procedures of scientific methodology in the pursuit of final legitimacy. The triumphalist statement about the 'end of history' and the idea of a homogenous state have been meshed with liberal democracy into such a contradictory edifice that possible links can be established only through a generic setting, which may give enough space for undemocratic explanatory practices as well. In other words, an allusion to the scientific method and its possible application within social realm does not automatically embed the standards of objectivity and rationality into preferred ideological attitudes.

The homogenous state and liberal democracy as “the final form of human government” (Fukuyama 1989) entails the proclaimed elimination of social contradictions. This suggests an uneasy vagueness regarding civil society as the main source of 'un-homogeneity'. The problem with civil society becomes convoluted due to the persistent differences in interpretations of Hegel's philosophy. From a Hegelian teleological perspective, civil society occurs somewhere in the transition from family to the state. If dialectics are applied, the family could be ascribed to thesis and civil society to anti-thesis thus producing synthesis as state. But the dialectical method does not necessary end with pre-defined clarity as the philosophy of Hegel does. The dynamic shift amid the triad of family, civil society, and state could be viewed either in complementary or antagonistic terms. Stace (1955) had defined the state as the unity of family and civil society but warned of possible misconceptions about 'homogenous unity' with annihilated differences. “As always in Hegel, the differences are retained within the unity, which is, for that reason, a concrete unity” (Stace 1955: 278). On the contrary, Kojeve (1980: 9) preferred ‘synthesis’ as a 'dialectical overcoming' or sublimated reconciliation with an indispensably final term, designating the end of process (and history). Following his line of thought, only the citizen of a universal and homogenous state is the final synthesis of master and slave. Kaufmann (1966: 173) has summarized the existing discrepancies within the Hegelian framework, "there is a legend abroad that the student of Hegel must choose in the end between the system and the dialectic, and it is widely supposed that the right wing Hegelians chose the system while the left wing, or the "young" Hegelians, including Marx, chose the dialectic". Stace had defined dialectics in terms of logical deduction but did not discover any "genuine deduction of the state" (1955: 422) – though, this was not an obstacle to pursuing a systemic approach to Hegel's philosophy. For Kojeve (1980: 259), "Hegelian Dialectic is not a method of research or of philosophical exposition, but the adequate description of the structure of Being, and of realization and appearance of Being as well”. According to this interpretation, as far as Being is not the origin (or becoming) but the result, or final synthesis of Knowledge and the Real, full autonomy of the individual can be realized only in the homogenous state at the end of history. This arrangement displaces civil society to a sublimated and not autonomous part of the state.

The Limits of the State and Hierarchical Setting

Kaufmann has dismissed 'left-wing' and 'right-wing' interpretations of Hegelian philosophy by denying its predictive capacity, "in other words, Hegel's dialectic is at most a method of exposition; it is not a method of discovery” (1966: 175). Fukuyama's (1989, 1992) endeavor is a continuation of the efforts since the 19th century to apply an evolutionary framework for social and political
processes. It is an attempt to overcome ideological differences (exemplified through the cases of right-wing authoritarianism and left-wing totalitarianism) by introducing liberal democracy as the only (the final) “ideology of potentially universal validity” (Fukuyama 1992: 42). For the last 30 years, since the first publication of “The End of History?” (1989), accumulated criticism still has focused on Fukuyama’s predictive exposition, and less attention has been paid to the attributed role of intellectuals and civil society in his texts on the turbulent shifts within democracies. As pointed out by Wallerstein (1996), the social sciences are too much preoccupied with the state as a conceptual container, both implicitly and explicitly. Regarding civil society, Fukuyama has displayed a whole range of intellectual fluctuations that represent the perplexity in the scholarship at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st centuries, despite many public allegiances to the consistency of thought. In summary, civil society does not unequivocally fit any of the universal patterns of development prescribed by the scientific and political establishment. This means it does not simply posit ‘just another’ methodological or political challenge which waits for ‘successive’ rationalizations. As a source of contestation, it implies the fundamental principle of democracy.

Back in 1992, Fukuyama recognized the limits of the rational liberal state accordingly assuming an undistinguishable line between culture and politics, or to put it another way, between peoples and states. “Successful political modernization thus requires the preservation of something pre-modern within its framework of rights and constitutional arrangements, the survival of peoples and the incomplete victory of states” (Fukuyama 1992: 222). The ‘incomplete victory of states’ could be an indispensable prerequisite for civil society, or respective definition of democracy as well. However, the role of the state and its relation to civil society has not been properly elaborated by Fukuyama with respect to democracy. A state can potentially perform either as a facilitator or inhibitor to liberal democracy, thus the concept of homogeneity does not necessary clarify this ambiguity. According to Kojève (1980) and Fukuyama (1989, 1992), the idea of a homogenous state indicates a certain developmental phase when contradictions are annihilated, knowledge perfectly corresponds to reality, and absolute freedom is achieved. In other words, the state as a conceptual container enhances and finalizes the development of society. The idealistic evolutionary pattern may be quite instrumental but the construction of ‘political realities’ very often tend to replace reality itself with wishful modelling. Its ideological counterpart transposes the “completeness” of the state’s victory from the ideal realm into political programs or analytical frameworks of the present. Respectively, the proponents of philosophically rational ideas still prefer absolute reason in the role of enabling agent or guarantor of change. This has been pursued since the times of Plato (Mumford 1928, Hertzler 1965), so Fukuyama is not unique in this sense. What is important to emphasize is his perception of liberal democracy and homogeneity, as annihilated contradictions and this is inconclusive regarding civil society. In methodical terms, it becomes an unsettled issue itself with equally possible negative implications for liberal political improvements.

The networks of civil society does not concur with the top-down hierarchical settings sustained by state institutions. In this sense, civil society occupies that space where the presence of state is insufficient for many reasons, ranging from constitutional restrictions to the influences of informal groups. It seriously distorts the aspired homogeneity of the state and the result of this can be interpreted differently depending on ideological or philosophical premises. The autonomous capacity of civil society to exert or to transmit informal influence does not fit the notion of the rational state and formal institutions. But the reliance on hierarchical structures, invoked by rational and natural necessities, for the sake of social order or directed change (Fukuyama 2000) is not supported by plausible justification (Kasputis 2019). Homo Hierarchicus, as the model citizen of
the homogenous state, began its ‘crusade’ at “The End of History?” (1989) though it was apparently introduced during “The Great Disruption” (2000). The supremacy of Homo Hierarchicus has been challenged many times by civil society equally contributing to the demise of Homo Economicus, i.e., exposing the ideological dimension disguised as scientific neutrality. The attempted prescription of a hierarchical framework to society mainly presumes the major indicator for good democratic governance is efficiency. However, the notion of efficiency rather pertains to idealization thus diluting the content of democracy with its universalist aspiration. That tends to purify (or monopolize) the meaning of liberal democracy by repelling (if not constraining) civil society as a possible obstacle to rational efficiency (mastery). Within this line of thought, liberal democracy has been re-evaluated in terms of checks-and-balances by attributing civil society to “vetocracy,” the antithesis of good governance (Fukuyama 2014). This kind of projection may serve as an indication of ‘rational’ misrepresentations and a warning signal for intellectuals regarding the application of scientific method.

Phony Intellectualism

Ideas move people to transcend current situations although they may lead to closed rational systems of thought which can be identified as phony intellectualism that is permeated with fake dynamics and includes distorted representations of the past and inadequate synthesis (Mannheim 1954). But conservative mentality is no less innovative than progressive mentality, because orthodoxy can exert practical control in an efficiently “rationalizing” way. So, a truly intellectual effort should maintain an adequate level of criticism to social determinism and imposed finitude thereby securing public space as a creative provider of alternative ideas. “A demand for an absolute, permanent synthesis would, as far as we are concerned, mean a relapse into the static world view of intellectualism” (Mannheim 1954: 135). The lack of self-reflection ends up in a closed loop, because “under certain circumstances, nothing contains more irrational drive than a fully self-contained, intellectualistic world-view” (Mannheim 1954: 197). The risk of ‘intellectualism’ could be identified with that of ‘scientism’ (Popper 2008) or ‘systems thinking’ (Holland 2015a) as well. Premise dependent thinking (Holland 2015a) evolved conjointly with industrialization and Hegelianism in the 19th century. Universalist philosophy placed universal concepts as antecedent to the existing particularities. The idealist philosophy of Plato referred to ideas outside of time and space, that made it impossible to specify the realm except in terms of poetry and myth. To overcome this, Hegel and his followers redefined time with a new speculative interpretation that exercised a long-term influence on modern political and social thought. According to Kojève (1980: 134), proper human time is historical as “in the Time of which Hegel speaks, on the other hand, the movement is engendered in the Future and goes toward the Present by way of the Past: Future Ṣ Past Ṣ Present ( Ṣ Future)”. Following Stace (1955: 20-21), with reference to Aristotelian logics the time-priority was replaced by the logical-priority, therefore, “the premises have logical priority over the conclusion… the end of a thing is prior to the thing; or in general the end of the world-process is prior to the world”. That presupposes a teleological process containing the idea – both as craved result and initial premise – within Hegelian framework. It makes the similarity between logics and ideology more than just orthographical. Now, Fukuyama has attempted to combine liberal democracy and the homogenous state by projecting a temporal point of convergence – ‘the end of history’. In his pretentious Hegelian account, the idea of the homogenous state has oscillated from a claimed projection to an alleged rational premise. Therefore, the present rests in the intermediary phases that need to be rearticulated in order to prove the relevance of the argument. It means that the universal features of the homogenous state can be delivered only after reducing the manifold currently existing states to the ideal type of state.
governance. After such a theoretical operation civil society simply disappears as an imperfection beyond the constructed model of “scientific democracy”.

The scientific explanation includes a set of established causal links confirmed by their predictive capacity. The applications of scientific methods still contain the implicit assumption of universality adopted from the natural sciences which includes the ‘omniscient’ detached observer and ‘omnipresent’ foreseeable regularities. Fukuyama’s Universal History referred to universal scientific method being applied both in the natural and social realms. “And once discovered, the progressive and continuous unfolding of modern natural science has provided a directional Mechanism for explaining many aspects of subsequent historical development” (Fukuyama 1992: 73). Nevertheless, social inquiry has been constantly juxtaposed with the “value-free” approach thus involving the issues of bias, geographically localized exceptions, and so on (Redman 1993, Addleson 1995, Wallerstein 2001). Even physics has been engaged in epistemological dialogue with interpretative or contextual discourse on causality and its possible implications for the social sciences (Weinert 2005, Flik 2019). Scientific knowledge has a limited (not absolute) correspondence with reality, which means that some of the epistemic void must be taken into consideration. It opens certain space for interpretation that encloses premise-based modelling only for specified functionalities which possess neither universal validity nor universal predictability. Regarding social reality, such an epistemic void may be prone to ideological determination in terms of establishing new certainties. The predictive capacity of the social sciences (what still persists within the close range of probability or speculative thought) and universal validity (what is just another unfulfilled dream of Theory-of-Everything (Barrow 2007)) being incorporated into an evolutionary Hegelian framework with ideological content gives a captivating sense of “final revelation”. This is an ideological swamp for many intellectuals, who claim expertise in social development, and for their audience, that craves a “solid” societal foundation. The insufficient predictive capacity and distorted understanding of universal validity corrupts the possible applications of the scientific method due to biased representations. In this regard, the reliance on ‘value-free’ legitimation does not necessary explain the functioning of liberal democracy and public space. On the contrary, it puts in jeopardy the basic principles of democracy and social development. Fukuyama’s case displays the limits of scientific scope and the importance of social responsibility that the mechanistic approach tends to dismiss. The previously cited mechanism of directional development can gain logical autonomy from every set of values related to ideology, religion, ethics, etc. This is a reversible feature of universal setting – autonomy and arbitrariness are two sides of the same coin.

The “Containment” of Evolution

Fukuyama’s (1989, 1992) conceptualization of the ‘end of history’ has been frequently criticized for its triumphalist propensity to strongly adhere to capitalism as a major pillar of liberal democracy. He is ardent admirer of Weber (1958), though with some quasi-religious favor for ‘protestant capitalistic ethic’. Despite that, Europe has remained outside this triumphalism as an alternative model that denies the universal validity of the ‘end of history’. And there are some good reasons for that: 1) the European Union, as a unique form of intergovernmental and federal governance, contradicts the idea of the homogeneous state as the consolidated center of power with the exclusive right to protect liberal democracy; 2) the historical legacy of Catholicism and ongoing secularization deconstructs the Weberian framework (Tawney 1954), especially its American rendition. In response to unforeseen developments over the last 20-30 years, Fukuyama re-enunciated the ‘end of history’ (2002, 2012) thus trying to adjust it. But the whole story regarding the ‘end of history’ has another underlying thread which is more consistent and alarming than the
continuously shifting descriptive ideological exposition. This thread targets the issue of civil society and its relations to the state and liberal democracy in general. Fukuyama’s ‘hierarchical’ turn could provide helpful insight on the repercussions of scientific method and democracy being identified with the mechanism of directional development. The ‘end of history’ overshadowed and obscured the role of civil society by expressing a preference for the state in a truly Hegelian way. It is a side effect of ideological foundationalism that claims to follow rational premises though without any reasonable justification. Fukuyama’s focus on the homogeneous state implied the reduction of social processes to a finite set of parameters within specified borders. In addition to this, the delivered concept of historic evolution was granted the implicit quality of self-regulation, or self-correction (to be precise). Now, the actual dispute regarding current challenges to democracy (including Trump’s ascent) must address the adequacy of such an approach to provide any relevant analysis or policy advice.

Darwin’s theory of evolution was expected to prevail over metaphysical speculations or the ideas of divine providence. It marked the rise of scientific thought which entered the social realm along with industrialization in the 19th century. The idea of social and biological evolution as universal concepts had been endorsed at that point as well (Grinin et al 2011). Epistemologically, it may be relevant and important to take a detached and general but modestly precautionary view to refrain from intellectual escapism. The issue at stake is human agency, or representative democracy. Bury (1920), after summarizing the history of the idea of progress, noted that Darwin’s theory did not introduce immunity against pessimistic or optimistic interpretations. At the beginning of the following century, Dennett (2004: 93) confirmed that “we live in a world that is subjectively open”. He warned of absolutism as an ‘occupational hazard’ (Dennett 2004: 101) and accepted the evolutionary compatibility of determinism and non-causality. Rosenberg (2005), in a similar attempt, suggested to introduce biological naturalism into the social sciences thus uniting the necessity of law with descriptive/interpretative inquiry. Their foundational premises are evident: 1) “the Darwinian algorithms of evolution are substrate-neutral” (Dennett 2004: 188), and 2) “…the mechanism of natural selection is the only game in town when it comes to the production of adaptive traits, behaviors, institutions, and so on” (Rosenberg 2005: 7). There is enough room to start a critical discussion regarding the alleged algorithms of evolution, especially after Rosenberg’s turn to continental philosophy which almost intuitively goes back to Cartesian metaphysics (though, this time in biological terms, not mechanical ones). This indicates the intensity of the issue and the variety of approaches within the scientific community.

Fukuyama’s reaction to social complexity and social development is exposed by the elimination of civil society from his model of democratic governance, an uneasy intellectual shift that occurred “progressively” over time since “The End of History?” (1989). When Fukuyama opted for the evolution of consciousness in the ideal realm (or Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel), the state and its material boundaries became a metaphysical container ensuring this development. To rephrase Dennett, Fukuyama’s concept of directional historical development includes a world that is objectively closed. Of course, this kind of objectivity is ideologically imposed by anonymous state apparatus. Besides adding fuel to the ‘deep state’ conspiracy, such an approach compromises the scientific method and social sciences in general. Rational modelling is not comfortable with the ethical dimension that necessitates constraining the political machinery based on the premise of ‘perfect information’. Likewise, the presence of civil society prevents the monopoly of the state in the “production” of ideas and decision making. Therefore, social ethics, civil society, and the moral responsibility of intellectuals are crucial elements of democracy. The homogenous state – or state without contradictions – is a fringe concept, where scientific method alone is not enough to define or justify the direction of development in terms of governance.
Since the beginning of philosophical traditions there has been a debate between the exponents of ontology and the philosophy of change. After Hegel many started to adhere to the belief that such a debate was no longer relevant. Universal History and the development of consciousness (or Spirit) were supposed to converge into absolute Knowledge (or Wisdom) at the end of history which also would be the end of contradictions. Fukuyama’s personal intellectual shifts reveal a slippery Hegelian path to an undemocratic future. “The end of history is not an exemplary or a perfectionist value; it is an arbitrary and terroristic principle” (Camus 1991: 224). Camus (1991) implied that dialectical synthesis does not necessarily produce anything better than the original; rather it can be pressed into the service of social mystification. Fukuyama’s theoretical assertion regarding the state, as consolidated power, has reproached civil society as an indicator that the state was not functioning properly. In this way, the idealization of the state began long before the final phase of the end of history that can be explained by an arbitrary ideological choice. The explanation can be following: the triumphalism of 1989 is gone, the end of history has been revisited and postponed, but the belief in the state’s special historical mission has become even stronger. As the result, liberal democracy may easily be turned into an appendage of the state at the mercy of political realities’ “constructors”.

In Search of Efficient Governance

Fukuyama’s book “The End of History and the Last Man” (1992) can still potentially feed intellectual debates. It affirms that universal liberal democracy tends to be the complete correspondence between peoples and states. This definition is a slight reinterpretation of Fukuyama’s statement explaining the reason why democracies sometimes stop progressing. “The reason why liberal democracy has not become universal, or remained stable once it has achieved power, lies ultimately in the incomplete correspondence between peoples and states” (Fukuyama 1992: 212). The notion of complete correspondence includes that quality of perfection which barely survives any scrutiny. It is impossible to have a common denominator even for the Kingdom of Heaven due to the variety of religious or ideological misgivings. The state and the idea of complete correspondence do not fit into unilateral exclusive standards; there always exist competing world-views regarding the best possible forms of governance. For example, as an alternative hypothesis, the complete correspondence between peoples renders the perfect state irrelevant. The issue at stake is the ideological bias hypostasizing (taking for real) the perfections. Civil society, as such, does not accord with the allegedly complete correspondence between the state and peoples in the writings of Fukuyama. From the overall perspective of his 1989–2020 texts, civil society has been converted rather into an obstacle than essential part of functional democracy. Fukuyama accepted the ‘incomplete victory’ of the state and the relevance of ‘irrational attachment to values’ in “The End of History” of 1989-1992. But it was obvious that the state had gained a total monopoly over the political realm in his approach. The conceptualization of the mechanism of directional historical development was launched in favor of the state as the consolidated center of power. Although this involved some methodical trickery – “the success and the stability of liberal democracy therefore never depends simply on the mechanical application of a certain set of universal principles and laws, but requires a degree of conformity between peoples and states” (Fukuyama 1992: 213). Projected this way, the ideal political machinery should be smoothly operated in accordance with the ‘complete correspondence’ and a high ‘degree of conformity’. This is the same theoretical move to reduce social reality to a mechanical system thus eliminating civil society from the picture. It suggests a sub-political, passive role for civil society, which otherwise obstructs this imagined perfect machinery as a frictional force. The slogan ‘state for peoples’ and ‘complete correspondence’ could turn into subjugation. That is why Fukuyama’s treatment of civil society must be reconsidered, especially in the context of intellectual accountability.
Normativity is usually eliminated when it comes to the empirical measurement of efficiency in “purely scientific” terms. Such a methodical procedure was applied out of respect to the universal scientific framework. Fukuyama (2013) has also taken this direction in the effort to reconceptualize the state and the efficient governance that ends with assumed neutrality or detachment. “As a starting point, I am going to define governance as a government’s ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether that government is democratic or not” (ibid: 3). Some readers may find this an unexpected theoretical deviation from the studies of transition or comparative politics. However, it is the same Hegelian thread which can be traced back to “The End of History”. Fukuyama has reasonable doubts about the studies of transition, which too much emphasize a process of change and disregard institutional structures that persist in different regimes or successive periods. And the state is the most important institution accumulating power throughout historical changes and embodying a permanence which captivated Fukuyama (after Hegel). So, in order to distinguish (or purify) this permanence, civil society needs to be “put off” as other institutions of democratic accountability. Fukuyama (2013) emphasized that he is rather interested in “infrastructural” than “despot” power. A governance without democratic accountability supposedly enables theoretical modelling of the “infrastructural” state which sets a universal scientific standard for measuring the efficiency of governance in many different states. This kind of theorizing has misperceived the scientific method and its possible application but, as they say, the devil is in the details. The “infrastructural” model of the state relies on the necessity of professional and autonomous bureaucracy. Social scientists are frequently tempted to “forget” the instrumental purpose of the models and thus misapply them as substitutes for social reality. Fukuyama identified civil society organizations with interest groups in his paper “America in Decay: The Sources of Political Dysfunction” (2014). Again, the analysis allegedly pursues scientific objectivity but the motive to debunk civil society is quite arbitrary – the impossibility to distinguish a „good“ civil society organization from a „bad“ interest group (Fukuyama 2014: 18). Policy advice, which follows this conclusion, refers to professional governmental bureaucracy and public administrative expertise as the best mediators for conflict resolution. The widespread influence of interest groups and lobbyists is a severe problem for every democratic state. But there must be a reasonable precaution against remedies easily turned into poison. While Fukuyama (2014: 19) has attributed civil society to ‘vetoocracy’, which tends to undermine a political system, Jensen remarks on “the perverse logic of meritocracy” (2015: 59). The authority of the ‘best and brightest’ can imprison a society in the vicious circle of repeatedly sustained dysfunctionality, when problem solving is monopolized by those who caused it. “If Weber was wrong in equating the rise of capitalism with a Protestant Ethic, he was right in warning that bureaucracy could defeat democracy” (Holland 2015b: 203).

Fake Neutrality and Autonomous Bureaucracy

After WWI, Wolfe published the book “Conservatism, Radicalism, and the Scientific Method” (1923) directed at the new ‘scientific’ ways to eliminate the causes of devastating conflicts. It was suggested to involve the scientific method to replace political attitudes on the whole spectrum from left to right. According to Wolfe, a scientific attitude could be the perfect factor for de-emotionalizing and de-personalizing conflicts thus achieving social efficiency and justice (1923: 221). In addition to that, the mechanistic conception of the universe was expected to leave no space for metaphysical and other kinds of superstitions. “We can look nowhere else than to science to dispel the mystical, metaphysical, nationalistic, class and narrow, hyper-egotistical illusions that still stand in the way of our sensing a rational direction in which collectively to guide human evolution” (Wolfe 1923: 306). Then WWII followed and the reputation of ‘preaching reason’ was deeply shaken, “history is not made with scientific scruples; we are even condemned to not mak-
ing history from the moment when we claim to act with scientific objectivity” (Camus 1991: 221). Although, Wolfe (1923) was confident in converting the popular mind into a scientific one through the education and rationalizing discipline, his text contained insights still relevant today. Regardless of the naïve intellectualistic projection, Wolfe’s sociological analysis pointed out the existing interconnections between scientific method and political attitudes. Every political attitude is a social behavior-pattern that can drift among separate layers of society and vice versa (today’s conservative as yesterday’s radical). Also, it is a tricky side of scientific universality that the scholar throughout his/her career must also embrace radical courage, conservative cautiousness, or liberal modesty. Wolfe (1923) attempted to endorse an autonomous and pragmatic scientific mentality with a pledged social responsibility. But there is a long way to go. WWII proved that the machinery of cause and effect, and future projections do not always lead to the Garden of Eden. According to Camus, a confident draft of future can justify a slavery – “the future is the only kind of property that the masters willingly concede to the slaves” (1991: 194).

Fukuyama “celebrated” the scientific method in naturalist terms, but he disregards scholars and their intellectual responsibility. The concept of a mechanism of directional historical development requires only technical supervisors to fix any malfunctioning. Fukuyama’s alleged neutrality renders a methodical distancing from left and right political spectrum, populism, and elitism. But his concept of that developmental mechanism resembles the previously mentioned endeavor of the interwar period to rely on the scientific method to rebuild a society after WWI and to prevent further calamities. Sadly, later it had to “embrace” the reality of looming fascism. Historical analogies are always risky to employ due to their speculative nature. However, it is important to keep in mind that omniscience is not immune to the blind spots which cover unexpected looming threats. Even more, the scientific method itself has a “design issue” which includes unprotected backdoors for ‘vested interests’. Fukuyama’s notion of the homogenous state without internal contradictions evolved into the “infrastructural” state with complete correspondence or conformity to the peoples. This theoretical move is conceptually contained within the idea of the historically functional mechanism. The “infrastructural” state and its autonomous bureaucracy consolidates executive power to secure the developmental path from the possible obstructive acts of civil society as well. This theoretical model of the state as a consolidated system is mobilized and “corrected” after harmful external impacts. Civil society is rather preferred not to interfere with the system of governance which relies on efficient bureaucracy and hopefully respected elites.

Recently, Fukuyama utilized his model on two occasions – Trump’s election and the Covid-19 pandemics. Trump’s character has become a good indicator for the validity of this model after taking into historical account Fukuyama’s line of thought. Back in 1992, Trump as entrepreneur was expected to channel his ambitions through the possibilities delivered by liberal democracy and its triumphalist counterpart in the realm of consciousness. Now, Fukuyama (2016) believes that Trump as president will shake the system and will accelerate the mobilization of elites to pursue highly needed reforms. This picture depicts the president as an outsider, who gives a wake-up call through his negative impact. It does not consider Trump as an insider who channels liberal democracy according to his ambitions. Likewise, Fukuyama (2020) emphasized that Covid-19 will discard the dichotomy of democracy and autocracy in the efficiency of crisis response, which will be determined not by the type of regime but by the state’s capacity. The delegation of power to the executive branch is the best response to crisis – “in a democracy no less than in a dictatorship, citizens have to believe that the executive knows what it is doing” (Fukuyama 2020). Fukuyama disregards the input of civil society organizations in fighting coronavirus pandemics and helping those most in need. Though, growing evidence suggests that governmental institutions received a substantial support from civil society in many ways. Fukuyama’s criticism of the
Trump administration's misdoings basically concerns only the efficiency and competence of the state. He does not acknowledge the looming threat of a 'new normalcy' when democracies after crisis may turn into autocracies. The US is no less susceptible to this scenario than Hungary, but only consolidated societies will make a true difference contrary to the consolidated power of bureaucracy.

Concluding Remarks

"In the post-historical period there will be neither art nor philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history" (Fukuyama 1989: 17-18). Possibly, this is not the last announcement of the end of philosophy; it has happened in the past, and still more announcements are forthcoming. Fukuyama's (1989) 'end of history' entails merely the solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the satisfaction of consumer demands as the basic concerns in the post-historical society. Castoriadis has a definitive reply to this, "philosophy is a central element of the Greco-Western project of individual and social autonomy; the end of philosophy would mean no more and no less than the end of freedom" (1991: 13-14). Social and individual autonomy is an essential prerequisite for the public space which appears as a platform for intellectual and critical exchange. Civil society has an active role in sustaining public space, they are rather mutually dependent in terms of survival. Castoriadis (1991) has pointed out that democracy can be threatened not just by totalitarian or authoritarian regimes; the biggest danger comes from every rational machinery of the state which precludes fundamental inquiry related to existing institutions. Autonomous civil society provides enormous contributions to democracy as a self-reflective regime.

Even more, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal revealed, the social sciences and democracy may be closer to an end than the 'end of history' itself. During the electoral campaign, Trump's supporters employed a potentially disastrous micro-targeting technique, the effects of which damaged the democratic fundamentals, like "the foundational idea of a democracy is that it provides a public market place of ideas, however imperfect, where competing positions are discussed and decided upon" (Wiesner et al 2019:14). To make it simple, what micro-targeting needs is a huge amount of private data, a powerful supercomputer, and some nuclear physicists to operate it. Of course, nuclear physicists have nothing to do with social inquiry, but they are better financed to afford a supercomputer and are equally good in algorithms. Micro-targeting targets segments of society in disconnected groups and feeds them personalized information that exploits their vulnerabilities. Only basic criteria for segmentation are needed, technology and social media do the rest. This is a perfect example of modelling and manipulating social realities according to a desired political design. As never before, there should be a strong 'normative imperative' to protect public space as the foundational idea of democracy (Wiesner et al 2019), which implies the ethical responsibility of scholars as well.

"There are crimes of passion and crimes of logic" (Camus 1991: 3). The state, civil society, and the scientific method can be equally abused by the crimes of logic. Though, none of them are immune to the crimes of passion in terms of abuse as well. According to Dewey (2013 [1938]), logic is a social discipline which means socially conditioned. But logic is also autonomous, "it does not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry" (Dewey 2013: 38). The concept of directional historical development is based on the logical necessity of proceeding from one phase to another. It implies a mechanism of change that refers to an initial set of premises. This explains how rational machinery is set loose in an independent existence. Of course, this independence is controversial as far as many approaches are considered. The scientific method presupposes a detached worldview, in mainstream terms, but it is susceptible to hidden bias. Certainly, the al-
leged objectivity sometimes is nothing else but an instrumental way to impose governed inevitability. This way, even the idea of progress is institutionalized, it has been appropriated by the state as a function of the system. “Thus, progress here implied the rationalization of society through the legal/bureaucratic state and the incorporation of intellectuals in the process” (Eyerman 1990: 99). Civil society has extended a range of opportunities for intellectuals, so they are not determined anymore by the occupational hazard as state's employees or institutional knowledge producers. This should ensure that the ‘new normalcy’ after pandemics will not end as the new permanent form of governance – the state in quarantine.

References


