Analytic philosophy, 1925-1969: emergence, management and nature.
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Abstract

This paper shows that during the first half of the 1960s The Journal of Philosophy quickly moved from publishing work in diverse philosophical traditions to, essentially, only publishing analytic philosophy. Further, the changes at the journal are shown, with the help of previous work on the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review, to be part of a pattern involving generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. The pattern is one in which journals controlled by analytic philosophers systematically promote a form of critical philosophy and marginalise rival approaches to philosophy. This pattern, it is argued, helps to explain the growing dominance of analytic philosophy during the twentieth century and allows characterising this form of philosophy as, at least during 1925-1969, a sectarian form of critical philosophy.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, history of philosophy, American philosophy, British philosophy.

1. Introduction

The present paper argues that analytic philosophy, at least during the period 1925-1969, was a form of critical philosophy that used institutional control in order to promote itself and marginalise rivals. This institutional control, it will further be argued, partly explains the emergence and eventual dominance of analytic philosophy in Great Britain and the United States of America. More specifically, already documented takeovers of the journals Mind and The Philosophical Review (PR) by analytic philosophers (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a and 2017b) are here shown to be part of a pattern. The pattern is of philosophers with a shared commitment to a form of critical philosophy either (a) founding journals that are dedicated to promoting that form of critical philosophy or (b) using journals with a history of openness to diverse philosophical approaches to promote that form of critical philosophy at the expense of rivals. It is this use of journals which, in turn, plays a role in explaining the emergence and dominance of analytic philosophy.

I provide evidence for the above mentioned pattern by examining the changing contents of philosophy journals and trying to learn about the causes of these changes from the composition of journal editorial boards. In section 2, I outline the classification system I
use in classifying journal papers. Following earlier work of mine with Krist Vaesen (2017a and 2017b), this system divides philosophical approaches in America and Britain into speculative and critical ones, with, e.g., classical pragmatism, absolute idealism and process philosophy being classified as speculative and analytic philosophy being classified as critical. Importantly for what follows, phenomenology and existentialism will be taken to have critical and speculative variants.

Section 3 presents a classification of the contents of The Journal of Philosophy (JoP) during the period 1950-1969. We will see that its contents change in two stages. The first change occurs in 1958, when JoP goes from being a pluralist journal, i.e., one that is open to the various forms of speculative and critical philosophy available in America at the time, to being a journal that, although still open to existentialism and phenomenology, was focused on a form of critical philosophy, namely mid-century analytic philosophy. The 1958 change only impacts the pages of the journal in 1962, for reasons that will become clear. The second change is the exclusion of phenomenology and existentialism from JoP after 1963. As we will see, the two shifts in JoP’s contents are attributable to two changes in its management. The first change in management is the appointment of Robert D. Cumming – whose work was in the history of phenomenology and existentialism – as journal editor. The second change is the appointment of the analytic philosophers Arthur C. Danto, Sydney Morgenbesser and James J. Walsh as journal editors in 1964.

Section 4 situates the occurrences at JoP, and the similar occurrences at Mind and PR, in a broader context. I provide, in less detail than was done for JoP, an overview of the contents of what can be viewed as the ‘generalist’ philosophy journals operating in America and Britain during the 1940s and 1950s, that is, of philosophy journals that then catered to most of the specialisations in subject matter of academic philosophers in these countries.
The journals include, in addition to the three already mentioned journals, *Analysis*, *Philosophical Studies* (PS), *Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (PPR), *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (PAS), *The Philosophical Quarterly* (PQ) and *The Review of Metaphysics* (RM). Relevant journals which were founded in the 1960s are also covered, including *American Philosophical Quarterly* (APQ), *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* (SJP) and *Noûs*. The overview illustrates the founding of analytic philosophy only journals by analytic philosophers (APQ, *Analysis*, Noûs, PS), the use of control of historically pluralist journals in order to marginalise non-analytic philosophy (Mind, PR, JoP and PQ), and the continued existence of (generalist) pluralist journals after 1950 only under the management of non-analytic philosophers (SJP, JoP prior to 1958, PQ prior to 1957, PPR until 1980 and RM). The overview also allows an understanding of the limited journal publication options available to non-analytic philosophers in the late 1940s, the 1950s and the 1960s, and a consideration of how these options contributed to the growth of analytic philosophy. Finally, the overview allows considering other candidate contributors to this growth, including contributors that, like those uncovered here, are primarily independent of argumentation (external contributors) and those that are not independent in this way (internal contributors). With regard to external contributors, I provide evidence for thinking that McCarthyism had a limited role in driving the growth of analytic philosophy. With regard to internal contributors, my discussion suggests that there was no adequate justification for the sectarian attitudes found in analytic philosophy in the decades during which it came to dominance in Britain and America.

In section 5, I discuss what the examination of journal contents, and the way in which analytic philosophy became dominant in Britain and America, might teach us about the nature of analytic philosophy. I consider the form of critical philosophy that analytic
philosophy was, how its attitude to other approaches to philosophy might have been underpinned by a commitment to critical philosophy and whether it was also characterised by dogmatism about philosophical approach, that is, by a level of commitment to its approach that was not justified by available evidence or argumentation. The conclusion, in section 6, summarises my claims about the growth and nature of analytic philosophy, and relates these claims to alternative pictures of analytic philosophy.

2. Classifying British and American philosophy during the period 1925-1969

According to Katzav and Vaesen (2017a, p. 774), the distinction between speculative and critical philosophy is the most fundamental distinction between approaches to philosophy made by authors in *PR* in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. The same is true of authors writing elsewhere in Britain and America during this period (see, e.g., Stedman (1938), Reichenbach (1951), Collins (1951), Dewey (1956) and Lowe (1958)). Speculative philosophy, as understood at the time, tends to focus on the provision of substantial, general claims about the natures of the universe and its human occupants. Moreover, it provides such claims in a way that is epistemically independent of established beliefs, including those of science and common sense. Critical philosophy tends to avoid making claims that are independent in this way and, instead, tends to describe or make explicit/reconstruct the commitments of existing, established beliefs. Speculative philosophies will tend to include a critical philosophy as a component.

The methodologies associated with speculative philosophy include developing views of reality on the basis of a priori principles, dialectical investigation that takes its starting point from common sense and science but that goes beyond both, and observation based
The methodologies associated with critical philosophy are the varieties of analysis, including epistemological, linguistic and logical analysis. In addition, speculative philosophy is thought of as being, unlike analytic philosophy, inherently concerned with drawing practical and normative conclusions.

While Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) only explicitly characterise critical and speculative approaches to philosophy in terms of tendencies to make certain types of claims, these approaches can also be characterised in terms of views about how philosophy should be done. Authors in PR, JoP and elsewhere (see, e.g., de Laguna (1951), Frankena (1951) and the references in the previous paragraph) make it clear that, according to speculative philosophy, philosophy should provide its own distinctive substantive claims. Similarly, according to critical philosophy, philosophy should avoid going beyond established belief.

Speculative philosophical approaches were, during the period under consideration, taken to include absolute idealism, classical – that is, Peircean, Jamesian and Deweyan – pragmatism, process philosophy, Thomism, (some variants of) neo-Kantian philosophy and more. Critical philosophy was taken to include new and critical realism, logical positivism, and early and mid twentieth century analytic philosophy. Mid twentieth century analytic philosophy differs from its analytic predecessor primarily by being broader; by mid twentieth century, analytic philosophy incorporates ordinary language philosophy, the ideas of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein, and ideas from logical positivism and pragmatism.

A complication that matters to what follows concerns the classification of phenomenology and existentialism in America of the 1950s and 1960s. Katzav and Vaesen (2017a, p. 775) follow writers in PR and classify these approaches as speculative. This perspective is supported by James M. Edie’s 1964 survey of what was then recent work in American phenomenology. He characterizes American phenomenology as “aiming to
contribute to a foundational study of man and, in doing so, going ‘beneath’ the "objectivistic" categories introduced from the natural sciences” (1964, p. 116). However, some phenomenologists during the period we are concerned with do think that philosophy should be a purely critical enterprise. Thus, for example, Marvin Farber, the founder of PPR, is critical of the phenomenological movement on the whole and, indeed, thinks (Kim 1989) that what is of value in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy is a critical methodology, namely the method of eidetic analysis and description.

As we will see, some critical work that was neither phenomenological nor existentialist had a real place in JoP in the 1950s but not after about 1963. This work included, for example, work in modern Indian philosophy and will be classified as non-analytic (at least by 1960s standards). My motivation here is the relative absence of the work from the journal after 1963 and the work’s sympathy for what were then, from the journal’s perspective, non-standard forms of analysis or unfashionable, including speculative, authors.


3.1. 1950–1961: pluralism

JoP’s contents during the period 1950-1961 nicely illustrate the above classification of approaches to philosophy into critical and speculative varieties. During these years, work in critical philosophy in JoP includes (work standardly classified as) analytic philosophy, but extends to critical work in phenomenology and existentialism; critical, including analytic, contributions to the journal are also made by speculative philosophers. Speculative philosophy appears regularly in the journal and does so in a variety of forms. These include classical pragmatism, absolute idealism, process philosophy, speculative phenomenology, speculative existentialism, Thomism and eclectic approaches. In terms of diversity, JoP in
this period is similar to PR in the 1940s, though some important differences exist. Most notably, as Katzav and Vaesen note (2017a, p. 781), classical pragmatism is the most prominent form of speculative philosophy in JoP of the 1950s, but is not so in PR of the 1930s and 1940s.

Analytic contributions in JoP include ordinary language philosophy (e.g., Ambrose (1952) and Ebersole (1956)) and logical empiricism (e.g., Nagel (1953) and Feigl (1958)), but also a variety of other analytic approaches, as is seen in the criticism of ordinary language philosophy’s methods and results (e.g., Chisholm (1952) and Danto (1958)). Methodologically, while much analytic philosophy in the journal focuses on analysing language usage, other work involves, among other things, conceptual analysis and reconstruction (e.g., Putnam (1957) and Chisholm (1961)) and epistemological analysis (e.g., Kyburg Jr. (1956) and Wellman (1961)).

Classical pragmatist work in JoP of the 1950s and early 1960s does exhibit the speculative tendency to develop its own perspective about people and the world. For example, Parsons (1961) argues for a Deweyan, speculative methodology for the philosophy of religion and Suits (1961) argues for the viability of aspects of Dewey’s speculative philosophy of nature. Pragmatist papers do, however, often have a critical focus (e.g., Bernstein (1961)). Particularly prominent is Deweyan pragmatism (see the references just provided), but pragmatist papers also draw on Charles S. Peirce (e.g., Murphree (1959)), George H. Mead (e.g., Natanson (1953)) and George Santayana (e.g., Corey (1950)), among others.

Non-pragmatist speculative papers in the journal include papers that are influenced by Alfred N. Whitehead (e.g., Hartshorne (1955) and Bakan (1958)), absolute idealism (e.g., Cotton (1956)), Thomism (e.g., Mourant (1957)) and other less familiar speculative
philosophical approaches (e.g., Krikorian (1955), Pepper (1956) and Doan (1956)). Non-pragmatist speculative papers also include work in phenomenology and existentialism, as we will see.

In addition, the tie between speculative approaches and practical concerns is something that is recognised regularly (e.g., Gray (1952) and Burtt (1960)). Papers with concrete normative implications are also to be found, and these are rarely by analytic philosophers. Particularly notable papers with concrete normative implications include three from 1951 and 1952, one of which is by the pragmatist Sydney Hook, one by the critical realist Arthur O. Lovejoy and one by the process philosopher Victor Lowe. Hook and Lovejoy argue that members of the communist party are, as such, disqualified from being professors in academia, and Lowe criticises the position taken by Hook and Lovejoy (see Capps (2003) for more on the exchange).

Papers that are not in phenomenology or existentialism, but do focus on these approaches, often sympathetically, regularly appear in JoP (e.g., Gray (1952) and Seyppel (1953)). So do papers in existentialism and/or phenomenology (e.g., Wild (1952), Tillich (1956) and Champigny (1957), which includes work by Jean-Paul Sartre). In the early 1960s, some phenomenology in JoP is speculative (see appendix I) while some argues that phenomenology should be a critical enterprise (Farber (1962), Gurwitsch (1961) and Schmitt (1962)).

Some JoP papers engage with the history of Western philosophy and/or with a wide variety of then contemporary approaches to philosophy (e.g., Sommers (1952) and Smith (1958)). In addition, some volumes showcase what was then contemporary European philosophy (e.g., the special edition on Polish philosophy (57(7)) and the edition that contains the already mentioned work by Sartre). However, work in non-Western philosophy
does not appear in JoP; by contrast, Katzav and Vaesen (2017a, p. 777) document such work in pre-1950s PR. Indeed, the vast majority of JoP authors write from America, though some were modern Indian philosophers who were located in India and whose papers were in critical philosophy (e.g., Krishna (1956), Raju (1958) and Devaraja (1959)).

Specialist areas of philosophy which are represented in the journal include the philosophy of science, the philosophy of economics, political philosophy, the philosophy of psychology, the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, metaphilosophy and more.

3.2. 1962–1969: two abrupt changes

JoP’s contents change quickly after 1961. During the period 1950-1960, the non-analytic, non-historical (i.e., non-analytic, critical and speculative) papers in the journal on any given year comprise roughly between 40% and 50% of the journal’s papers1, with almost all of the rest of the papers in the year being analytic papers. Roughly 70% or more of the non-analytic, non-historical papers in any given year were speculative; there were sixteen such papers in 1955 and twenty one in 1956. In 1961, the journal still publishes nineteen papers which can be classified as speculative. There are five further papers which can be classified as non-analytic, critical papers. In total, this amounts to about 40% of the papers in the journal in that year (see Appendix I). In 1962, however, there is one paper which can be classified as speculative and another two which can be classified as critical, non-analytic papers. The non-analytic, non-historical papers in this year are approximately 5% of the

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1 My estimate is based on the percentages of non-analytic, non-historical papers in 1955 (=40%) and 1956 (=50%), years which seem to contain, respectively, relatively low and relatively high numbers of non-analytic, non-historical papers. Note that here, and in what follows, I am referring to full-length papers, including contributions to American Philosophical Association symposia.
papers in the journal (see Appendix I). In 1963, about 20% of the papers are non-analytic, non-historical papers and in 1964, about 10% (see Appendix I). The years 1965-1969 are akin to 1962, with non-analytic, non-historical content at about 5%; 1965, for example, only includes two papers that might be classified as non-analytic (see Appendix I). Analytic papers during this period come to comprise almost all that JoP publishes. One thing that does not change during the late 1950s and, at least, the first half of the 1960s is the nature of analytic philosophy in JoP; it is aptly termed mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy.

Phenomenology and existentialism appears to maintain its presence in JoP until 1963, but basically comes to be excluded from the journal from 1964. During 1964-1967, for example, only two papers in the journal (both of which are critical papers and appear in 1965) might be classified as phenomenological or existentialist in their approach. By contrast, nine papers can be classified as either phenomenological or existentialist during 1961-1963, including five speculative papers (see Appendix I).

The journal also ceases – much as PR did when it became an analytic journal a decade earlier (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a, p. 778) and Mind more or less did after 1926 when it became hostile to speculative thought (Katzav 2017) – to publish papers by philosophers in India; this occurred despite the fact that the JoP papers these philosophers published in the 1950s were critical and, indeed, were neither phenomenological nor existentialist. Plausibly, the work was still not close enough to mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy for 1960s JoP. Thus, for example, Daya Krishna’s 1956 paper is a contribution to linguistic philosophy, but would stand out in post-1961 JoP because it appeals to the cultural context of language in analysing meanings (similar considerations apply to, e.g., Devaraja (1959)).
Not surprisingly, which individuals publish in *JoP* also changes in the early 1960s. In particular, some speculative philosophers whose publishing careers extend well after 1962-1963 and who publish in *JoP* regularly prior to these years, cease to do so in later years. Examples include Gail Kennedy, Max Rieser and John Wild (Appendix I provides references to some of their *JoP* work).

### 3.3. Proximate causes of the changes at *The Journal of Philosophy*

Given the speed of the changes at *JoP*, they must have been driven by editorial policies. A note by Danto marking the death of Cumming in 2004 helps to identify the policies’ authors.

Danto writes:

> [A]ll of us have reason to be grateful to Bob for his service as editor of the Journal, from 1958-1964, for it was he who took the steps necessary to transform it into the important journal of professional philosophy that it became through his measures. Bob inherited an immense backlog of papers that had been accepted in an act of recklessness by one of his predecessors, and he insisted that until all this was published, no further papers could be accepted. When space had at last been made for new contributions, he imposed the highest standards, using prompt publication as an incentive. When the level he deemed suitable was attained, he withdrew, leaving the publication in the hands of younger philosophers. Interestingly, he had no particular interest in the kind of professional analytical paper through which the Journal made its reputation. His philosophical tastes and values were entirely Continental, and his heroes were Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty (2004, p. 607).

If Danto is correct about who controlled the content of *JoP* during the years 1958-1964, then it is plausible to suppose that Cumming was responsible for the standards by which *JoP* papers were judged during these years and thus was responsible for the changes that then occurred in the journal. This fits with *JoP’s* front matter; it tells us that Cumming was editor from 1958 until June 1964 (Vol. 61(13)). The moratorium decided upon by Cumming thus also went along with a decision that – with the exception of speculative existentialist and speculative
phenomenological work – basically excluded accepting speculative papers for publication in *JoP*. Although the moratorium meant that this decision only became visible in 1962, it was presumably made in 1958. The front matter also reveals that the younger philosophers who were on the editorial board from 1964 were Sidney Morgenbesser, Arthur Danto and James J. Walsh. It thus seems that these three were responsible for maintaining the changes initiated by Cumming and for further narrowing down the focus of the journal in 1964, including effectively excluding phenomenology and existentialism from the journal.

Attributing responsibility for *JoP* content from 1964 onwards to Danto and Morgenbesser fits well with their analytic approach to philosophy (see, e.g., Danto (1958 and 1963) and Morgenbesser (1969) respectively). Walsh was primarily a historian of medieval philosophy, but his non-historical work (e.g., Walsh (1963)) reveals a clear analytic orientation. Things are more complex when it comes to Cumming. He too was primarily a historian of philosophy. But, as Danto notes, Cumming’s work was on, and his sympathies were with, phenomenology and existentialism. Why, then, did he help to promote analytic philosophy at the expense of speculative philosophy? Most plausibly, Cumming shared the already noted opposition to speculative philosophy that was prominent among some of those working in phenomenology. Indeed, although the historical nature of Cumming’s late 1950s work makes his approach to philosophy at the time hard to discern, his focus was on the work of Søren A. Kierkegaard and Sartre, and he pits these thinkers against a “disintegrating philosophical tradition” that has Hegel – whose work is central to much Anglo-American speculative philosophy – as its pivotal figure (1955, p. 98). Another possibility is that the young philosophers who officially took over the journal in 1964 already had substantial influence on the journal prior to 1964; this possibility is in tension with
Danto’s letter but fits the fact that analytic philosophy was the primary beneficiary of the 1962 changes in JoP.

Three other philosophers were, according to JoP’s front matter, among its editors in 1958. Since all three were editors prior to 1964, Danto’s letter suggests that they were not involved in driving the changes in JoP’s contents. Indeed, it is independently implausible that they were. George L. Kline, whose role as editor is coextensive with that of Cumming, was a speculative philosopher (see, e.g., Kline (1961)). The remaining two editors were Herbert W. Schneider and John H. Randall Jr. Both had been editors throughout the 1950s and thus are unlikely to have participated in initiating the changes in the journal. Further, Schneider ceases to be recognised as an editor in 1962, precisely when the character of the journal is visibly transformed. Schneider is also a speculative philosopher (see, e.g., Schneider (1949)). Randall Jr. does continue to be named as an editor until the end of 1966; at that point, his editorial position comes to be described as honorary. But he is a speculative philosopher with little respect for analytic philosophy (see, e.g., Randall Jr. (1956)).

Finally, Danto claims that Cumming was responsible for an improvement in the quality of the papers in JoP as well as for making the journal’s reputation. But an improvement in the reputation of JoP in the 1960s would, at most, make sense from the perspective of analytic philosophers; JoP was the most prominent journal still open to non-analytic philosophers in the 1950s and among the three most prominent journals in America and Britain (see section 4). As for the claim that the standard of work in the journal improved in the early 1960s, this is perhaps correct by the mid-twentieth century standards of analytic philosophy. Yet these standards were clearly in dispute between non-analytic
and analytic approaches to philosophy. I consider what justification there might have been for preferring the standards of analytic philosophy below.

4. **The contents of generalist philosophy journals in Britain and America (1925-1969), and the effects of these contents**

There is evidence (Katzav and Vaesen 2017b) that analytic editors by and large exclude non-analytic philosophy from *Mind* from roughly 1925 onwards; a notable exception was made for new and critical realism while it still had force in the 1930s. There is also evidence (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a) that analytic editors basically excluded non-analytic philosophy from *PR* from 1948 onwards. Section 3 allows adding that, plausibly, *JoP* closed its doors to non-analytic philosophy in 1958, even if this only became visible in its pages in 1962. Thus, by the end of the 1950s, the three most prominent philosophy journals in Britain and America were dedicated to analytic philosophy.²

Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) also note that the changes in *PR* probably pushed young academics in the direction of analytic philosophy at a time when there was substantial growth in American philosophy.³ Presumably, the changes in *JoP* and the established sectarian attitudes at *Mind* enhanced this effect. Partly, the effect is likely to have been a direct result of the prestige of the involved journals; what they presented to young philosophers was a world of philosophy which, by and large, identified serious philosophy

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² Support for assuming the mid-twentieth century prominence of *Mind*, *PR* and *JoP* is provided by Katzav and Vaesen (2017a, p. 773) as well as by considering which established, generalist philosophy journals were available at the time. As what follows makes clear, *PPR* was, leaving aside the relatively lightweight *Philosophy*, the only other established, generalist journal in Britain and America of the 1950s which published non-invited, full-length papers. *PPR*, however, was only founded in 1940 and had a base in a niche in American philosophy, namely phenomenology. This suggests that the journal had comparatively limited influence.

³ The membership of the American Philosophical Association rose from 1248 in 1950 to 2725 in 1970 (Soames, 2008). Taking this growth rate to reflect the overall growth rate in the number of American academic philosophers implies that the number of academic philosophers in 1970 was roughly 2.2 the number in 1950.
with analytic philosophy. In addition, however, the end of the Second World War saw a period during which publishing became important to getting and keeping an academic position (Nee and Ingram 1998).

In order to get a more complete picture of the impact of the kind of sectarianism found at *Mind*, *PR* and *JoP*, we need to examine the contents of other generalist journals in Britain and America. I do so first by focusing on the period 1940-1959 and then, more briefly, on the period 1960-1969. In Britain of the 1940s and 1950s, the only established, generalist academic philosophy journals other than *Mind* were *Analysis*, *Philosophy* and *PAS*.\(^4\) *Analysis*, which was founded in 1930, was an analytic philosophy only journal from the outset. *PAS* only published papers annually and thus provided relatively little space. In addition, its papers were invited and were, by the 1950s, dominated by analytic philosophy (see the abstracts compiled by John W. Scott (1960)). *Philosophy* was, during the period under consideration, open to non-analytic philosophy, but it was founded in 1926 by the British Institute of Philosophical Studies – later named the Royal Institute of Philosophy – partly in order to bring philosophy to a wide audience (see the editorial statement in vol. 1(1)). As a result, its articles were relatively popular and short; plausibly, it was not the place to establish an academic reputation.

*PQ* was founded in 1950 by the speculative philosopher Thomas M. Knox and was then open to speculative philosophy (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a) and to analytic philosophy. However, *PQ* was not an established journal in the early 1950s. Moreover, its pluralism about philosophical approach was short-lived. The ordinary language philosopher Anthony D. Woozley (see, e.g., Woozley (1953)) assists Knox in editing the journal in 1956 and

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\(^4\) Here, and in what follows, claims about which generalist journals were available are based on *International Directory of Philosophy and Philosophers* (1965) and *The Directory of American Philosophers* (1972), along with a consideration of journal contents.
becomes the journal’s editor in 1957 (see PQ’s front matter for these years); the journal is basically an analytic only philosophy journal from 1957. Ratio was a British-German journal founded in 1957 under the editorship of Julius Kraft, but it published relatively few papers in its first decade – e.g., it only published fifteen papers during 1957-1959 – and (Hacohen 2000, p. 121) was an anti-Hegelian journal that aimed to promote critical philosophy, in a Kantian sense of ‘critical philosophy’.

In America, PPR of the 1950s was a relatively established venue for publication, albeit one that was not as prestigious as Mind, PR or JoP. Moreover, while PPR was the organ of the International Phenomenological Society and did place particular emphasis on work in phenomenology and existentialism, it published speculative philosophy that was neither phenomenological nor existentialist as well as analytic philosophy; it also catered to a wide range of areas of specialisation within philosophy. It can thus plausibly be viewed as a venue that was generalist.

The only other American venues which might be thought of as generalist were PS and RM. But PS was dedicated to analytic philosophy from its founding in 1950. RM was, by contrast, pluralistic and particularly open to non-analytic, including speculative, philosophy. Yet, RM was established in 1947 and thus was a fledgling journal for some of the period at hand. Building a reputation for a pluralistic journal at a time during which the main players were predominantly analytic would have been hard, though RM’s base at Yale (Castiglione 2005) could have somewhat compensated for this.

In summary, during the period 1949-1959, non-analytic philosophy was allowed substantial space only in two established generalist, American journals, i.e., JoP and PPR –

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5 The Hibbert Journal was British and did provide limited room for philosophy, including speculative philosophy, but it had a much broader focus than philosophy or academic research, and ceased publication in 1956.
and only one of these (JoP) was among the three most prominent journals in America and Britain. This space – not much more than the equivalent of one journal – was supplemented by space in the fledgling RM. The destinations for non-analytic philosophy are further reduced after the 1958 changes in JoP. In Britain, Philosophy and PQ had space for non-analytic philosophy, but PQ was a fledgling journal the pluralism of which only lasted until 1957, and Philosophy was a relatively lightweight journal. On the other hand, analytic philosophy had, throughout the period being considered, virtually all of Mind, PR, Analysis and PS to itself (though note the thinness of the volumes of the last two of these journals) as well as substantial room in JoP, PPR, RM, PQ and Philosophy; in the late 1950s, PQ became an analytic journal and analytic philosophers are likely to have learnt of what was brewing at JoP (see Table 1 for the situation in 1959). Restrictions on journal space thus placed very substantial limits on the visibility, prestige and publication of non-analytic philosophy and helped to push philosophers in the direction of analytic philosophy.

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<th>Journal</th>
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<td>The Journal of Philosophy</td>
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<td>Analysis</td>
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<td>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</td>
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<td>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</td>
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<td>The Review of Metaphysics</td>
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Table 1: Generalist, academic philosophy journals in America and Britain and their openness to publishing analytic and non-analytic papers (1959).

The 1960s did not see a reversal in the sectarianism of the journals that were, by the end of the 1950s, focused on analytic philosophy. To be sure, one generalist, pluralist
journal, namely *SJP*, is founded in 1964, early enough in the 1960s to have an impact on the trajectory of philosophy during this decade. But *SJP* was not only a fledgling journal, it was also open to analytic philosophy and provided very limited space in comparison with what was already available in sectarian journals at the time. A second generalist journal, *APQ*, is founded in 1964, but it only occasionally publishes non-analytic philosophy.

Let me make five more points before concluding this section. First, the sectarian attitudes at *Mind, PR* and *JoP* were part of a pattern. Generalist journals under the control of analytic editors in America and Britain are, during the period under consideration, essentially only open to analytic philosophy. The changing contents of *PQ* fit this pattern, as do the prominent analytic editors, and corresponding contents, of *Analysis* and *PS* (*Analysis* is edited by Margaret MacDonald during 1948-1956, and *PS*’s founding editors are Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars). *APQ*’s founding occurs before its editor, Nicholas Rescher, moves away from analytic philosophy (Rescher 1982, pp. 161-162). *Noûs* too (contrary to its front matter) was dedicated to analytic philosophy from its founding under the editorship of Hector-Neri Castañeda – an analytic philosopher (Rapaport 2005) – in 1967. *RM* and *PPR* remain open to a variety of philosophical approaches, but their editors are not analytic philosophers. *RM* is founded by Weiss, who was a speculative philosopher (Castiglione 2005) and who remains editor there until 1964, when another speculative philosopher, Bernstein, takes over the journal (Hogan 2005). Farber edits *PPR* from its founding in 1940 until his death in 1980, when the journal is taken over by the analytic philosopher Roderick Chisholm (Chisholm 1986); under Chisholm, non-analytic philosophy has a token presence in the journal, often in the form of exegetical work on Husserl or Heidegger.6 *SJP*’s founding

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6 Chisholm writes, “I had told Farber that I would try to make the journal conform to the original plans he had had in founding it. I took this to mean that it would be especially receptive to the kinds of philosophical
editor is William B. Barton Jr., a speculative philosopher (see, e.g., Barton Jr. 1964). And while my focus has been on pre-1970s generalist journals, the case of PPR suggests that, at least to some extent, the pattern described here continued beyond the 1960s (to offer a further potential illustration, The Personalist, which was renamed Pacific Philosophical Quarterly in 1980, appears quickly to have transitioned into an analytic philosophy dominated journal in the early 1970s, after it came to be edited by the analytic philosopher John Hospers (Rasmussen 1988) in 1968. Takeovers of at least some specialist journals also occurred. Don A. Howard shows (2003) that Philosophy of Science becomes a journal for analytic philosophy of science when it is taken over by the logical empiricist Richard Rudner in 1959.

Second, Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) suggest that, in the case of the takeover of PR, speculative philosophers’ pluralism about philosophical approach may partly explain why analytic philosophers were given editorial roles. The broader picture provided above suggests that pluralism may have also had a stage-setting role at other American journals. As we have seen, pluralist journals (in America and Britain) did not, prior to being taken over by analytic philosophers, generally exclude work in analytic philosophy from their pages. Nor did they exclude analytic philosophers from participating in the editorial process. Thus, JoP’s front matter tells us that the analytic philosopher Ernest Nagel served as one of its editors during the period 1939-1956. PR had the analytic philosopher Richard Robinson as an editor in the 1940s while it was still a pluralist journal (Katzav and Vaesen, 2017a, p. 783). Now, the openness of speculative philosophers could in principle help to explain why analytic philosophers got in through the door. And the sectarian attitude of relevant analytic

question that have been emphasized by philosophers in the tradition of Brentano and Husserl and that the journal should be primarily concerned with philosophy and not with other disciplines” (1986, p. 13).
philosophers would then help to explain why, once they had sufficient control, they let nobody else in.

Third, in addition to sectarianism at philosophy journals, sectarianism in teaching at PhD-awarding philosophy departments and in hiring philosophers (independently of their records of publication) is likely to have substantially affected the trajectory of philosophy in Britain and America. It is clear, for example, that a number of prominent American PhD-awarding departments came quickly to be dominated by analytic philosophers during the late 1940s and the 1950s, including, among others, the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a), the philosophy department at UCLA (McCumber 2016) and the philosophy department at Harvard (Soames 2008). This, plausibly, would have reduced the willingness of the departments in question to hire non-analytic philosophers as well as steered PhD students at these schools in the direction of analytic philosophy. Similar effects have been documented at the University of Oxford after the Second World War (Akehurst 2011).

Fourth, Katzav and Vaesen (2017a) observe that the takeover of PR by analytic philosophers in the late 1940s predates the main pressures of the McCarthy era, and thus that it – along with any tension that might have existed between it and practice oriented speculative philosophy – is not a plausible explanation for these changes. The changes at JOP also do not seem to be explained by an appeal to McCarthyism. They begin in 1958, which is already after the height of the McCarthy era, and are implemented and reinforced in the 1960s. Indeed, we have seen that analytic philosophy’s sectarianism continues throughout the 1960s in a wide variety of American venues, as well as that it extended to Britain. This suggests that the changes in America depended on less local factors than McCarthyism (cf. Hollinger (2002)). In addition, speculative American philosophy continued to be prominent
in American philosophy during the McCarthy era. Perhaps this was because speculative philosophy could steer away from practical issues that might have then been viewed with suspicion, perhaps because (recall the case of Hook) it could fit comfortably with McCarthyism and perhaps because (recall Lowe’s criticism of Hook) McCarthyism was limited in its influence.

Finally, my investigation of journal contents, and associated non-journal literature, suggests that there was no case that might justify the sectarianism I have been describing. One does find some direct criticism of speculative philosophy as such during the period 1920-1960 (e.g., Ayer (1934), Carnap (1935, ch. 1), Ryle (1937), Stace (1943), Reichenbach (1951) and Hampshire (1960)). Moreover, speculative philosophers do repeatedly respond to this criticism (e.g., Stedman (1938), Pepper (1942), Emmet (1946), Hahn (1952), Harris (1952) and Blanshard (1966)). However, these responses are not, as far as I can tell, addressed by the criticism of speculative philosophy. There thus does not appear to be even the beginning of an extended exchange between approaches to philosophy that might justify a sectarian form of critical philosophy.

Let me illustrate – and I can here do no more than illustrate – the lack of engagement with defences of speculative philosophy. Speculative philosophy was most often objected to on the ground that it concerns what is beyond any possible empirical evidence and rests on purported synthetic a priori knowledge (see, e.g., Ayer (1934), Carnap (1935, ch. 1), Ryle (1937), Reichenbach (1951, ch. 18) and Hampshire (1960)). As speculative responses make clear, this objection ignores many speculative philosophers’ explicit commitment to fallibilistic forms of empiricism (see, e.g., Whitehead (1929), Stedman (1938), Pepper (1942), Emmet (1946) and Hahn (1952)). Some of speculative philosophy’s critics acknowledged that empirical evidence bears upon it, but denied it any value qua
search for truth. Stace is an example; he held that the claims of speculative philosophy “are probably bad, poor, amateurish science” (1943, p. 124). Reichenbach (1951) argues that speculative philosophy makes use of superficial analogies and that these lead to pseudo-explanations (1951, ch. 2). Proponents of this objection do not appear to engage with their targets. Stace provides no argument for his assertion. Reichenbach, in turn, ignores all twentieth-century speculative philosophy, including book-length speculative work about when analogy can legitimately be used in philosophy (e.g., Pepper (1942), Emmet (1946)) and speculative use of hypothetico-deductive inference alongside analogy and other forms of ampliative reasoning (e.g., Whitehead (1929), Stedman (1938) and Pepper (1942)).

Of course, arguments for specific critical approaches to philosophy as well as the application of such approaches in trying to address long-standing philosophical issues might be thought indirectly to undermine speculative philosophy. For instance, in making his case for logical empiricism, Reichenbach claims that it resolved many traditional philosophical issues, from the problem of induction to the issue of the cognitive status of ethical claims (1951, p. 307). But, as I noted with regard to discussions of ordinary language philosophy in JoP, and as is reflected in the short lives of logical positivism and logical empiricism, specific critical proposals for resolving philosophical issues, as well as which critical approach was the right approach for philosophy, were hotly disputed, even among analytic philosophers. Here too, on the face of things, no sufficiently strong case against speculative philosophy appears to have been made. Indeed, the absence of such a case is independently plausible. Katzav and Vaesen argue (2017b) that we still do not have a good case for mainstream approaches to philosophy and that this is recognised by many inheritors of the analytic tradition.
5. The nature of analytic philosophy (1925-1969)

Section 4 focused primarily on the emergence and management of analytic philosophy in Britain and America during the period 1925-1969. I now focus on the nature of analytic philosophy during this period. Katzav and Vaesen’s documentation (2017a and 2017b) of how *Mind* and *PR* became analytic journals shows the existence of institutionalised opposition to speculative philosophy from as early as 1925; the evidence is that speculative philosophy was a major part of what came to be excluded from these journals when they were taken over by editors identified as analytic philosophers. In sections 3 and 4, we saw that the later takeovers of *JoP* and *PQ* were similar occasions for the exclusion of speculative philosophy. My more preliminary examination of *Analysis*, *PS* and *APQ* suggests that they were similarly disposed; indeed, *Analysis*’ founding policy statement (Vol. 1(1)) is an extremely clear statement of its commitment to critical philosophy. I have found no cases during the period 1925-1969 in which a journal run by analytic philosophers was open to speculative philosophy. This supports the characterisation of analytic philosophy during the period 1925-1969 as a form of philosophy that, at an institutional level, exerted a form of control over its rivals that bypassed discussion. Plausibly, as we have seen, the reason for this sectarian behaviour was a commitment, again at the institutional level, to the view that philosophy should be critical in its approach.

My characterisation of *JoP*’s 1950s and 1960s contents, especially of how phenomenology and existentialism were excluded from the journal, also allows me to say something about the species of critical philosophy that analytic philosophy was. The characterisation suggests that analytic philosophy was at the time a form of critical
philosophy that excluded (at least) making central use of detailed characterisations of experience in addressing philosophical problems. This fits well not only with the absence of sustained phenomenological description from other analytic journals during the years at hand, but also with what Katzav and Vaesen (2017b, p. 3) tell us about *Mind*; what was excluded from its pages in the mid-1920s included philosophical psychology, and philosophical psychology shared with phenomenology and existentialism an emphasis on the detailed characterization of experience as well as the influence of Franz Brentano (van der Schaar 2013). An interesting question, which cannot be addressed here, is to what extent analytic philosophy might, during the period at hand, be further specified by its exclusion of forms of critical philosophy other than those for which the detailed characterisation of experience was central. Another question which cannot be addressed here is whether, as suggested by earlier work on *PR* (Katzav and Vaesen 2017a), analytic philosophy was also characterised by a certain attitude towards normative issues.

The relatively pluralistic contents of *Mind, PR, JoP, PPR* and *PQ* prior to their takeover by analytic philosophers suggests that, at an institutional level, speculative philosophy was not, during the period under consideration and if only in America and Britain, sectarian in the way that analytic philosophy was. Even *PPR* under Farber, who was, recall, a phenomenologist of the critical variety, was a relatively pluralist journal. To be sure, other critical philosophers in America (see, e.g., Randall Jr. (1956) on the logical positivists and recall Cumming) may well have shared the sectarian attitude institutionalised by analytic philosophers, but only analytic philosophers appear to have institutionalised this attitude in a regular and effective way.
There is a straightforward connection between a commitment to critical philosophy and sectarianism about philosophy. If philosophy should be critical, then philosophy should aim to avoid making its own substantive claims about the world and its inhabitants; philosophy should try to avoid straying beyond established opinion. Speculative philosophy, by contrast, is not committed to the view that critical philosophy should be avoided. On the contrary, examining the limits of established opinion would seem to be a natural, or even unavoidable, part of trying to go beyond it. Indeed, Grace de Laguna (1951) argues that twentieth-century speculative philosophy is, to a substantial extent, a reaction to twentieth-century critical philosophy.

Of course, the extent to which a commitment to a specific critical philosophical approach will lead to sectarianism depends on the strength of the commitment and on available opportunities for controlling alternative approaches. A strong degree of commitment, along with appropriate opportunities, are plausibly needed to explain the sectarian practices we have been observing. A tentative or hedged commitment to critical philosophy, it would seem, would allow, or even require, the survival of speculative philosophy.

Further, the conjunction of the high institutional confidence in critical philosophy with the already noted apparent absence of sufficiently strong arguments against speculative philosophy suggests that analytic philosophy can perhaps be further characterised as a form of dogmatism, where dogmatism is here understood to involve a degree of commitment to a position that goes beyond what is justified by evidence or argumentation. Deciding to what extent such a characterisation is justified requires, however, further examination of the case for critical philosophy.
6. Concluding discussion

We have seen that, during the period 1925-1969, control of generalist journals in America and Britain was systematically used to marginalise speculative philosophy and other rivals to a relatively narrow, critical approach to philosophy, one standardly called ‘analytic philosophy’. This suggested a view of the nature of analytic philosophy at the time, one according to which it was, at the institutional level, a sectarian, possibly dogmatic, form of critical philosophy. My case here is thus in tension with views according to which analytic philosophy never involved agreement about fundamental principles (e.g., Preston 2017, p. 4) and in the spirit of views according to which philosophical approach did, in some sense, unify analytic philosophy (e.g., Beaney 2013a).

We have also seen that the role of one candidate external influence on Analytic philosophy’s growth, i.e., McCarthyism, should be downplayed, something that is in tension with the picture of this growth provided by McCumber (2001 and 2016) and Reisch (2005). Nevertheless, the control of generalist philosophy journals in America and Britain, perhaps alongside control of key philosophy departments, plausibly played an important role in explaining the growth of analytic philosophy. Thus, the fundamental shift towards critical philosophy that came with analytic philosophy was substantially externally driven. Indeed, it was, on the face of things, not adequately justified. These conclusions are compatible with their being important internal drivers behind the growth of analytic philosophy, including with this growth being facilitated by an affinity between British and American philosophy and/or by the philosophical merits of analytic philosophy (for such views see, e.g., Kuklick (2006), Soames (2008), Misak (2013) and Beaney (2013b)). Nevertheless, my conclusions do
mean that the growth of analytic philosophy was not, at bottom, a matter of mutual understanding across the Atlantic or good philosophy.

Acknowledgements

I thank the referees and Michael Beaney for their valuable comments on this paper. I dedicate the paper to my friend Paul McGoay, who died in 2015.

References


**Appendix I:**


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<tr>
<th>Year (Vol.)</th>
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<th>Speculative (Phenomenology and existentialism in bold)</th>
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