Hiromatsu Wataru’s philosophical thought revolves around an analysis of what he calls the “fourfold structure.” According to Hiromatsu, all phenomena in the world are structured in such a fourfold manner that “a given presents itself as something to someone as Someone,” and these four moments of the phenomenon are not independent elements, but exist only as terms of the functional relationship. This paper surveys and critically examines this theory of the fourfold structure, and shows, in particular, how this theory, while largely presented as synchronic structural analysis, contains some conceptual motifs going beyond the synchronic framework. Specifically, with a focus on the process in which there arises a meaning common to different phenomenal givens and to different knowers, my analysis suggests the way in which phenomena are dynamically structured and thereby displaced in meaning as well as in the knowers’ role relationship.

**KEYWORDS:** Hiromatsu Wataru—phenomenon—meaning—intersubjectivity—fourfold structure—reification—synchronic structure—structuring movement—displacement—general signifier—general signified
Hiromatsu Wataru 廣松 渉 (1933–1994) describes the basic motif of his philosophy as a systematic critique of the “modern worldview” (近代的世界観), which he characterizes as ontologically “substantialist” and epistemologically bound by the “subject/object schema.”¹ Inspired by the thought of Karl Marx and Marxism as well as by the philosophical implications of twentieth-century physical science,² he strives to replace the modern worldview with a new philosophical orientation marked by “the primacy of relation” and what he calls the intersubjective “fourfold structure” (四肢構造).³

In this article, I will survey and critically examine Hiromatsu’s general philosophical theory of the fourfold structure.⁴ As Hiromatsu notes, this theory is largely developed as a “synchronic” structural analysis of the phenomenal world.⁵ A closer reading will show, however, that his texts contain some lines of thought that differ from, and stand in latent tension with, his overall synchronic approach. In the first section, I outline his theory of the fourfold structure in its primarily synchronic framework. I then set out to analyze this theory and show how his synchronic framework may be sur-

¹. HWC 1: 13, 15: xvii.
². Hiromatsu’s systematic philosophy goes hand in hand with his novel interpretation of Marx’s thought. In the present study, however, except for referring to part of his reading of Marx in the second section, I will not enter into this area of his scholarship. For a discussion of Hiromatsu’s analysis of Marx’s theory of the commodity, see KATSUMORI 2016B. For a study of his approach to modern physical science (specifically, Ernst Mach’s thought and Einstein’s relativity theory), see KATSUMORI 2016A.
³. HWC 15: xiii, xviii.
⁴. Major prior inquiries into Hiromatsu’s theory of the fourfold structure include chapter 3 of KOBAYASHI 1987 and part 2 of KUMANO 2004. In the present study, however, I do not enter into these or other authors’ readings of his philosophy.
⁵. HWC 1: 29.
passed by some of his dynamic conceptual motifs. More specifically, in the second section, I investigate the structuring of the known side of phenomena, and, in the third, the fourfold structuring of phenomena, with a focus on what may be called the dynamic displacement of meanings and cognitive roles.

**An overview of the theory of the fourfold structure**

Hiromatsu’s overall philosophical project revolves around the theory of the fourfold structure, which he developed in his 1972 book *The Intersubjective Being-Structure of the World* and several subsequent works, most systematically in *Being and Meaning*, vol. 1 (1982) and vol. 2 (1993). This theory begins with a structural analysis of phenomena “as they unfold cognitively.” For Hiromatsu, the cognitive aspect of the world, or the world “in a provisional abstraction from such moments as practical significance or value significance,” has no priority over the practical, but is rather just a “structural moment or perspectival cross section” of the latter. Yet, in order to confront effectively the modern philosophical tradition, which has primarily been concerned with the cognitive dimension, he finds it convenient to start with this dimension. His philosophy thus sets out to analyze the cognitive aspect of the phenomenal world—“the world as it appears to pre-reflective consciousness.” In the present study, I largely restrict myself to this part of his work engaging with the cognitive dimension.

Hiromatsu rejects the modern subject/object schema, which underlies the realist copy theory as well as various kinds of idealism, and—up to a point following Ernst Mach’s phenomenalism—conceives phenomena as neither simply subjective nor purely objective, but prior to the very divi-

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6. A large part of this section has been adapted from a section of Katsumori 2016a, 168–75.
7. HWC 15: xvii.
9. The first and the second volumes of *Being and Meaning* are devoted to an analysis of the cognitive and the practical dimensions, respectively.
10. HWC 1: 30.
sion of subject and object. However, he breaks with Machian phenomenality insofar as it fails to grasp the “meaningful moment” of phenomena. Rather, in a manner reminiscent of phenomenology, he emphasizes that all phenomena “bear meaning,” or, in other words, that they appear as something. As he explains it:

The phenomenon always already appears in itself as something more than a mere “sensuous” (感性的) given. The sound that is just heard appears intuitively as a car horn; what is seen outside the window appears as a pine tree. When I see a thing that lies on the desk, I am aware of it directly as a “pencil.”

This applies not only to perceptions, but to all kinds of phenomena, including representations as well as linguistically mediated judgments. All these phenomena appear as something more or something other than “the phenomenal given” (現相的所与). Put differently, the phenomenon is such that, “in showing itself..., it always already shows something else.” Hiromatsu designates this something more or something else as “the meaningful cognized” (意味的所識) or simply the “meaning.” Any phenomenon thus consists of these two factors, given and meaning, linked to each other in such a way that the former appears as the latter. If we denote the phenomenal given by p and the meaningful cognized by [p], the phenomenon is structured in the form of “p as [p].”

11. HWC 3: 546. See Katsumori 2016a, 158.
12. HWC 1: 33.
13. In what follows in the text, while treating not only nonverbal perceptions and representations but also linguistic signs, I will not directly enter into Hiromatsu’s thematic discussion of language, specifically his analysis of judgment (see HWC 1: 47ff., 15: 28ff.).
15. HWC 1: 34.
16. HWC 15: 39, 1: 35. In his early works, Hiromatsu used the term 意味的所知 (the meaningful known) instead of 意味的所識, thus giving rise to a double meaning of 所知: as against the knower (能知) and as against the given (所与). To remove this ambiguity, he introduced in Being and Meaning, vol. 1, the neologism 所識 (the cognized), while reserving 所知 for what comprises both given and cognized (or meaning) (see HWC 15: xxvii). The words 所知 and 所識 are hardly distinguishable, however, in terms of the intrinsic meanings of the component characters.
17. This expression is based on a notation that Hiromatsu introduced in his graduation thesis (HWC 16) and later used in his analysis of Marx’s theory of the commodity. More specifically, he employs the expression “a as [a]” for the relation between what Marx calls use-value and value.
This twofold or dual character of the phenomenon, Hiromatsu continues, is “manifest most typically in the case of signs,” such as a series of sounds or ink stains appearing as a meaningful word. Yet this twofoldness is not unique to what are commonly called signs, but, conversely, all phenomena are, in a sense, “of a signitive (symbolic) character.” It is precisely by virtue of this general character of phenomena that signs in the narrow sense can function as signs. From this point of view, borrowing terms of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics, Hiromatsu renames the phenomenal given the “signifier” and the meaningful cognized the “signified.”

While emphasizing the duality of phenomena, Hiromatsu in no way maintains a dualism of mutually independent terms. On the contrary, he seeks to de-substantialize the two moments of phenomena by what may, in a sense, be characterized as an extension of the Saussurean views of signs to all phenomena. First, he argues that not only are all phenomena meaningful, but also any meaning (or signified) exists only to the extent that it is tied to, or, as it were, is “incarnated” in a phenomenal given (or signifier). In other words, far from being self-contained, both the given and the meaning can be what they are only in their interrelation. Second, Hiromatsu points to the differential character of meaning: It is not that the meaning A is distinguished from non-A because of A’s independent self-identity, but that “A is taken... as self-identical insofar as it is distinguished from non-A.” In this way, with regard both to the relation between given and meaning and to the relation between different meanings, he offers a radically “relationist” account, rejecting the reifying notion of meaning as self-contained.

Hiromatsu goes on to determine more closely the character of the meaningful cognized. Meaning is, he maintains, neither a “real object” referred
to, nor a “mental image” associated with the phenomenal given. For what are called real objects as well as mental images are themselves phenomena, already consisting of the two moments of given and meaning. Rather, meaning is, if considered as such, marked by its “ideal” character. Suppose a series of phenomena such as this pine, that cedar, and so on, equally appear as one and the same meaning “tree.” Here, as we can see, unlike the pine or cedar located at a particular place, the meaning “tree” “exists anywhere”; in contrast to the individual trees, which grow, change, and finally die, the latter remains unchanged; and the meaning “tree” is “a universal that is not any of the individual phenomena, but can be any of them.” In this way, while givens are “individual, local, and variable” and may thus be called “real,” the meaning exhibits a “universal, trans-spatial, and invariable,” in short, “ideal,” character.23 It should be noted, however, that this ideality of meaning holds only insofar as one attempts in thought to “isolate” the meaning from the whole phenomenon and to “treat it as if it were an independent term.” In other words, as Hiromatsu admits, his characterization of meaning as ideal contains a kind of “reification,”24 and this critical and self-critical insight marks his decisive break with Husserlian phenomenology. In an effort to avoid this reification, Hiromatsu reformulates meaning as “functional,” in the sense of the mathematical function into which specific values—corresponding to phenomenal givens—are each time inserted.25 He holds this analogy to be appropriate insofar as the function is not considered in separation from the specific values it takes.

This motif of criticizing reification further leads Hiromatsu into a certain relativization of the given/meaning distinction itself. He points to the possibility of the “manifold process” or “multi-layered structure” in which “the given-cognized formation at one level… stands in the position of a given in relation to a higher-level meaningful cognized.”26 Conversely speaking, the

23. HWC 15: 21; cf. 78f.
25. HWC 15: 22f., cf. 74f. It seems to me that, without compromising what Hiromatsu means here, meaning could well be likened to the mathematical variable rather than to the function. The analogy to the function is employed, however, in order to emphasize the relational character of meaning (private communication with Hiromatsu).
26. HWC 1: 45, 15: 7. The term “multi-layered structure” is cited from HIROMATSU 1988, which is not included in his Collected Works.
phenomenal given at any level can be a twofold formation at a lower level. In the series of such different levels, he continues, “there is no fixed, unique lowest-level given.”27 For, as soon as one is aware of the phenomenal given as such, this can no longer be a pure given, but is already known as something. This being the case, “sensuous elements” in Mach’s philosophy as well as what positivists call “sense data” cannot be ultimate givens, but already assume the duality of given and meaning.

Thus far, while desubstantializing and relativizing the twofold structure of phenomena, Hiromatsu has restricted himself to their “known” side in a provisional abstraction from the subjective or “knowing” side. As he points out, however, a phenomenon is every time a phenomenon “for someone,”28 and this someone—the “knower” (能知)—is, also like “the known” (所知), twofold in character. When, for instance, a child sees a cow, saying, “that’s a doggie,” it is indeed to the child, and not to me, that the phenomenon appears as a “doggie.” Nevertheless, Hiromatsu continues:

...without in a sense taking the cow as a doggie, I could not even know that the child has “mistaken” it for a dog. I can recognize the child’s mistake only insofar as I myself also in a sense take the cow as a doggie.29

Here we see the “self-dividing unity” of “oneself as oneself” and “oneself as (playing the role of) another.” While this is most manifestly seen in linguistic communication, the duality of “someone as someone (else)” can be recognized generally in phenomenal consciousness. The latter someone, “initially a concrete individual,” tends, through human intercourse, to be depersonalized into “the one” (ヒト),30 so that the knower takes on the form of “someone as the one.” Insofar as the known is attributed to this someone as the one, Hiromatsu designates the someone as the “knowing someone” (能知的誰某) and the one as the “cognizing Someone” (能識的或者), for-

27. HWC 15: 8.
28. HWC 1: 38/973. The second page number refers to the English translation (Hiromatsu 2011).
29. HWC 1: 39/974 (translation modified).
30. HWC 15: 133f. In Hiromatsu’s account, what he means by “the one” more or less overlaps with Martin Heidegger’s concept of “das Man” (HWC 1: 44/977). As the English translator Viren Murthy comments, however, the one is “free of some of the pejorative connotations” of das Man (Hiromatsu 2011, 973).
mulating the duality of the knower: P as \([P]\). He characterizes the cogniz­
ing Someone in a manner similar to the meaningful cognized seen above: While the knowing someone may be called “individual, variable, and local,” that is, “real,” the cognizing Someone, if considered as such, exhibits a “uni­
universal, invariable, and trans-spatial,” in short, “ideal” character. Thus structured in parallel with the known, the knower “exists as a cognizing Someone who is more than a knowing someone.”

It might appear to the reader that Hiromatsu is simply calling the sub­
ject and the object by other names—knower and known, respectively—and dividing each of them into two factors. Yet, as he emphasizes, unlike the traditional notions of subject and object, knower and known are not “ontically separate,” but are, as is illustrated by “the expansion and contraction of the bodily self,” just the two non-fixed aspects of a “state of union.” This internal link between knower and known is further specified as follows. First, the phenomenal given and the knowing someone are necessarily connected in such a way that the former is “each time perspectively given” to the latter. Second, and more importantly, the formation of a meaning is correlative with the process through which different knowers make themselves intersubjectively isomorphic to become a cognizing Someone. Not only the meanings of linguistic signs, but also the perceptual articulations of phenomena are already conditioned by the “intersubjective cultural setting”—as is illustrated by the fact that the dog’s bark, which native Japanese speakers hear as *wanwan*, sounds like “bow-wow” to native English speakers. In this way, “intersubjectivity” (間主観性 or 共同主観性) serves as the

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31. HWC 15: 148. Just as in the case of 所知 and 所識, one can hardly distinguish between the intrinsic meanings of 能知的 (knowing) and 能識的 (cognizing)—Hiromatsu’s neologisms—or between 誰某 (someone) and 或者 (Someone). The philosophically relevant distinctions rest entirely on his original usage of the terms.

32. HWC 15: 135.

33. HWC 15: 132.

34. HWC 15: 92, 98, 96. As examples of the expansion of the bodily self, Hiromatsu cites “the blind person’s cane and the medical doctor’s stethoscope” as well as the “observational instrument” in physics, which is given special importance in the context of quantum theory. On the other hand, he takes a “paralyzed arm or leg” as an example of the contraction of the bodily self (HWC 15: 91–3).

35. HWC 15: 185.

essential link between meaning and Someone.\textsuperscript{37} Intersubjectivity lies in the fact that “while I and others have as given different perspectival phenomena,” we can share one and the same meaning.\textsuperscript{38}

As is suggested by our consideration so far, the twofold structures of both knower and known are combined to form what Hiromatsu calls the fourfold structure (四肢構造) of the phenomenon: “a given presents itself as something to someone as Someone,” or, in fully technical terms, “a phenomenal given is valid as a meaningful cognized to a knowing someone as a cognizing Someone” (p as [p] for P as [P]).\textsuperscript{39} For instance, something outside the window appears as a pine tree to me as a “one” (general knower); and the sound “tree” bears the meaning of tree for someone as an English speaker. As Hiromatsu repeatedly stresses, the above four moments of the phenomenon are not self-contained elements that subsequently enter into relation to one another, but themselves “subsist only as terms of the [fourfold] functional relationship.”\textsuperscript{40} Furthermore, a fourfold-structured phenomenon itself is “not closed in on itself as a four-term relation,” but exists only in relation to other phenomena, that is, to other fourfold formations.\textsuperscript{41} Insofar as the phenomenon is thus relationally structured, Hiromatsu names it the \textit{koto} (事)—a Japanese term that defies simple translation, but may roughly be rendered as “state of affairs” or \textit{Sachverhalt}.\textsuperscript{42} Hiromatsu counterposes this \textit{koto} to the \textit{mono} (物), namely, the thing (Ding, res) that is taken as substantial and self-contained.

In terms of this contrast between \textit{koto} and \textit{mono}, Hiromatsu defines the term “reification” (物象化), broadening Karl Marx’s concept of reification (Versachlichung)—the reification of the social relation between humans—into a concept that covers the whole phenomenal world. By reification he means mistaking a \textit{koto} for a \textit{mono}, that is, a misconception of the fourfold

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Hiromatsu uses the two Japanese terms 間主観性 and 共同主観性 as translations of “intersubjectivity” with their nuances somewhat different from each other, but without an explicit conceptual distinction between them. I will discuss issues concerning these terms toward the end of the third section.
  \item \textsuperscript{38} \textit{HWC} 15: 189.
  \item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{HWC} 15: 198.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{HWC} 1: 45.
  \item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{HWC} 13: 260.
  \item \textsuperscript{42} \textit{HWC} 15: 199.
\end{itemize}
structural relation such that one or more terms of the relation are taken as independent of other terms or of the whole relationship. More strictly, in terms of the quasi-Hegelian we/it perspectival difference, reification is defined as the circumstance that “a koto, which is determined relationally from the point of view of scholarly reflection (für uns), appears as a mono to the immediate consciousness involved (für es).” While the hypostatization of meaning represents the most typical mode of reification, Hiromatsu is no less critical of the Machian or other modes of reification of the phenomenal given, or of the reification of the known or the knower as a whole. A continual uncovering and overcoming of reification in this manner constitutes the leading motif of his philosophical enterprise.

It should be noted, however, that this idea of reification in its relation to the fourfold structure is formulated within the framework of static or synchronic structural analysis. Yet, as we will see below, Hiromatsu’s philosophy does not entirely confine itself to, but at least partly goes beyond, the synchronic frame of analysis, and, moreover, his formulation of synchronic structure itself depends in part on motifs exceeding the synchronic dimension. This being the case, there may also arise circumstances in which the concept of reification as defined above synchronically can no longer be maintained as it is. In the next section, I will pursue such more or less latent lines of thought of Hiromatsu, with a focus on the way in which phenomena are dynamically structured and thereby displaced in meaning.

43. According to Hiromatsu, not only individualism or atomism, which “substantializes terms of a relation,” but also holism, which “substantializes the totality of a relation,” is a “reifying misconception” (HWC 16: 282). The primary target of his critique, however, is the individualist and elementalist type of reification, because this type is characteristic of the modern worldview (see HWC 10: 496).

44. HWC 13: 245. As Hiromatsu notes, the “we” in his—as well as Marx’s—sense differs from the Hegelian we (wir) in that it does not stand in the position of absolute knowledge, but is relative to the specific stage of the dialogical-dialectical processes in which it is formed (HWC 4: 425; cf. 2: 357).
Displacement and reification in the structuring of the known

In his 1979 book *Things, States of Affairs, Words* 『もの・こと・ことば』, when discussing the fourfold structure of linguistic phenomena, Hiromatsu adds the following note to the text:

While in this work I have studied [linguistic phenomena] provisionally as they are *reified* in the mode of the *langue*, it is necessary to note in a more rigorous discussion that the linguistic formation is “produced” (reproduced) each time it is spoken and understood in hearing, and that this is also the case with “meaning.” In reality, the identity and invariability of meaning hold, as it were, only on a meta-level, that is, only insofar as the intentional moment that each time occurs “productively” is identified reflectively from our point of view (*für uns*).45

Does reification here also mean the hypostatization of the meaning or any other term of the fourfold structure? It can hardly be so, because Hiromatsu’s main text to which the above note refers is devoted entirely to a critique of reification in this sense. Rather, it seems that the term “reified” in the above quotation is concerned with the structure in which an identical meaning is maintained over a series of phenomena, that is, with the synchronic given/meaning structure itself. Correlatively, the critique of this reification is being made from a point of view that surpasses the synchronic framework.

The possibility of such a shift in the meaning of reification will be still more difficult to ignore if we look—here briefly—at Hiromatsu’s analysis of the practical world. First, Hiromatsu characterizes as “reified” the circumstance that the rules and norms of action appear as rigid and self-identical “despite their plasticity.”46 Second, maintaining generally that human action is carried out “as something more than a mere bodily behavior,” namely, as

45. *HWC* 1: 445 (first emphasis mine). Elsewhere, in discussing the practical dimension, Hiromatsu makes a parallel remark: The “norms and rules” of action are “produced and reproduced each time the subjects involved act in a specific manner” (*HWC* 16: 416).

46. *HWC* 16: 450. As regards historical laws, Hiromatsu maintains that “it is through a reification of the activity of individuals that historical-social lawfulness holds” (*HWC* 10: 175f.). In his analysis of the cognitive world, however, he characterizes as reifying, not so much law or lawfulness itself, but rather the notion that laws “govern” individual facts (*HWC* 15: 485). This seems to illustrate the fact that Hiromatsu’s dynamic conceptions come to the fore more visibly in the practical than in the cognitive dimension.
an interhuman “role-playing,” he points out that roles (役割) tend to be “reified” into fixed “Roles” (役柄) such as statuses and positions. In this “institutional reification of the connection of role actions,” he continues, individual actors become “impersonal and anonymous.” These points seem to raise questions for the cognitive dimension as well, insofar as we are to avoid inconsistency between the cognitive and the practical: If a self-identical meaning and, correlative, a depersonalized “one” or cognizing Someone are established, is not this circumstance already reified? If this is so, is not the fourfold structure itself, as understood in the synchronic framework, already a product of reification?

Before directly examining these questions, I wish to qualify the parallels that I earlier drew between Hiromatsu’s and Saussure’s relationist views. First, Hiromatsu’s concept of the signifier is not, as the Saussurean signifier (signifiant), a formal factor within the already structured langue, but the “material moment” each time phenomenally given. This conception of the signifier makes it possible to inquire into processes prior to the establishment of a langue-like structure. As a concrete inquiry along this line, Hiromatsu enters into the process in which perceptual phenomena are progressively articulated. In his account, this process consists of the following series of stages: (a) Something is congealed from the “nothing-ground” (無-地) to become a “figure”; (b) the figure and the ground are differentiated so that the former appears as self-identical; and (c) two such figures become distinct from each other in the mode of “this and that.” While, in the first stage (a), there is already a potential duality in which something appears as a figure, it is not until stage (b) that this figure is grasped as a meaning through the mediation of the reflexive relation to the ground.

Conversely speaking, Hiromatsu’s theory includes within its scope the cir-

47. HWC 1: 113, 16: 99, 5: 139. In his later work, Hiromatsu introduced a distinction between役割 and役柄, both of which are commonly translated as “role.” While by役割 he means “role” in general, he reserves役柄 for the role that is already fixed as status or position. In this study, I render役割 and役柄 as “role” and “Role,” respectively.
48. HWC 5: 220, 228.
49. HWC 15: 168.
50. HWC 15: 151ff.
51. HWC 1: 347f.
cumstance that “something other than the given” is not yet established as the self-identical meaningful cognized.

These points suggest that Hiromatsu’s philosophy, while primarily a synchronic structural analysis, diverges from Saussure’s position (at least in his Course in General Linguistics) and structuralism, and opens itself to the dimension of “structural change”—in a broad sense of the term covering “the formation, maintenance, and transformation of structure.” Notwithstanding Hiromatsu’s remark that “my developmental arguments are largely an auxiliary means for a theory of being-structure,” the developmental, or better, the dynamic dimension seems to be an indispensable moment of his thought. This dynamic dimension is concerned not so much with the merely diachronic transition of already structured systems, but rather with the very process through which phenomena are structured. It is no doubt in terms of this structuring movement—in the sense including both de- and re-structuring—that we can adequately understand what Hiromatsu calls reification “in the mode of the langue” or “institutional reification.” In what follows, I will accordingly explore this dimension of structuring with a provisional restriction to the known side of phenomena.

Some important clues for understanding Hiromatsu’s dynamic conceptions may be found in some apparently minor details of his texts. First, there seems to be an ambiguity when he characterizes meaning as either “something more” or “something other” than the phenomenal given. Yet, well aware of this apparent ambiguity, Hiromatsu seeks to remove it by noting that, strictly speaking, a meaning can be said to be “something more” not relatively to the phenomenal given itself, but only to another, lower-level meaning in a multi-layered structure. In relation to the phenomenal given on the same level, he continues, the meaning may only be called something

52. Here I leave on one side the question of whether and to what extent Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics, posthumously compiled and published, represents his original thought. For a thematic study of this and related questions about Saussure’s thought, see Maruyama 1981.

53. HWC 14: 199.

54. HWC 15: 36.

55. Hiromatsu remarks, for example, that the fourfold structure “consists solely in the process relationship” (HWC 1: 43f., my emphasis) among the moments of phenomena, notably between meaning and cognizing Someone in their correlative formation.
else. In this sense, it is not more-or-lessness, but “otherness” that is basic to the relation between given and meaning.\(^{56}\)

Second, however, there remains another ambiguity, not mentioned as such by Hiromatsu himself, in his formulation of the duality of phenomena. On the one hand, as we have seen, Hiromatsu claims that a phenomenon appears as something “more than a mere ‘sensuous’ given,” or more precisely, something other than the phenomenal given. This type of formulation readily leads to the synchronic structure in which the phenomenon comprises the two moments of given and meaning. On the other hand, he also maintains that the phenomenon is such that, “in showing itself..., it always already shows something else.”\(^{57}\) This mode of expression implies that \(p\) appears as \textit{something other than \(p\) itself}, or, in other words, that the phenomenon contains in itself a movement of becoming other than itself or a displacement of itself. It is no doubt this latter formulation that is relevant to the dynamic dimension, which is rendered invisible in the first formulation.

To make a third point, I wish to start by specifying what Hiromatsu means by the phrase “in itself” (即自的 \textit{an sich}) as in the statement that “a phenomenon... appears in itself as something more than a mere ‘sensuous’ given.” By this qualification “in itself,” he means that the knower is not always actually—but in many cases only potentially—conscious of the twofoldness of phenomena. According to Hiromatsu, “in the \textit{immediate} consciousness of the subject involved,” the phenomenon is commonly a full unity of given and meaning. In \textit{reflective} consciousness, however, it is readily “bifurcated” into the two moments.\(^{58}\) This indicates that, despite his preliminary characterization of the phenomenal world as “the world as it appears to pre-reflective consciousness,”\(^{59}\) one cannot maintain the twofold structure without including reflection on phenomena in the phenomenal world itself.

\(^{56}\) \textit{HWC} 1: 349.

\(^{57}\) Hiromatsu also says that consciousness “does not receive the given as such, but is aware of it as something other or something more than the given” (\textit{HWC} 1: 34).

\(^{58}\) \textit{HWC} 1: 348.

\(^{59}\) Hiromatsu acknowledges the “fictional” character of such a pre-reflective world, noting that it is “nothing more than our basic prejudgment” relative to our historical and social conditions (\textit{HWC} 1: 31, 15: 32).
What is more important, however, is Hiromatsu’s argument directly following the above: As soon as one is thus aware of the phenomenal given in distinction to the meaning, this given is no longer a given as such, but is itself dualized into a given and a meaning.

For instance, when one is aware of a “comma” [in a written text] and then tries to make explicit “the given” of which one has just been aware as a comma, one is now aware of that moment as, say, a black spot. That is, one is aware of the given anew in a twofold structure, as a cognized “black spot,” which differs from the initially cognized “comma.”

This passage from Hiromatsu’s Things, States of Affairs, Words is meant to prove the non-presence of the phenomenal given “purified” from meaning, which is an important point of his synchronic analysis as seen earlier. In my view, however, what is more relevant here lies in the course of the argument itself: Reflective consciousness not only makes explicit the twofoldness of the phenomenon (p as [p]), but also produces a new twofold formation (p′ as [p′]), that is, dualizes the phenomenon differently than earlier. Reflection on a phenomenon, itself involved in the phenomenal world, cannot simply be to view the phenomenon just as it is, but necessarily redetermines it in meaning. That is to say, a phenomenon, as soon as it is reflected upon, undergoes a displacement in meaning.

While this point has been made about reflection on the phenomenal given, the same point will basically apply to reflection on the meaning or the given/meaning as a whole. A series of such reflections leads to what Hiromatsu calls the “manifold process,” mentioned earlier, which may be expressed as “p as [p] as [[p]]....” Here the as-connection “...as [[p]],” for example, may provisionally be called an addition to the preceding as-connection “p as [p].” Yet, despite the architectonic image easily evoked by Hiromatsu’s expressions such as “multilayered structure” or “piling-up,” the

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60. hwc 1: 348. In this quotation, I have translated 所知 as the cognized, not as the known, because by 所知 Hiromatsu here means what he would call 所識 in his later work.

61. In Being and Meaning, Hiromatsu makes a similar point using the example of Rubin’s figure. In his account, one may at first say that the black-and-white figure is seen either as a vase or as two facing profiles (hwc 15: §). As soon as this black-and-white figure is perceived as such, however, it becomes “yet another meaningful cognized beside the two profiles and vase” (hwc 15: 7).

62. HWC 1: 349.
addition of a new dual connection, which is a reflection on the preceding dual formation, cannot leave the latter purely intact. Insofar as any reflection on phenomena is itself involved in the connection of phenomena, and the meaning of any phenomenon is determined in relation to other phenomena, it follows that the manifold process is also a process of displacement in meaning.

So far we have traced some of Hiromatsu’s lines of thought that tend to surpass his synchronic framework, which suggest that phenomena, including reflections on phenomena, contain in themselves a movement of displacement or self-displacement in meaning.63 Taking now one step further than his own accounts, let us examine whether and, if so, how such a displacement occurs in the process through which there arises a meaning common to different phenomenal givens. While meaning is a constitutive moment of a single phenomenon, its existence rather lies in the possibility64 that it is reproduced as one and the same meaning over a (potentially indefinite) number of phenomena. This identical meaning, in Hiromatsu’s view, does not exist independently of the phenomena, nor can it be derived from them through “inductive abstraction.” Rather it derives from a “direct equating” of the phenomena with each other in terms of meaning.65 This equating may be illustrated by such cases as recognizing the person just seen as an old friend, or regarding this pine and that cedar as similar things. Although the identical meaning (“tree” in the latter example), once established, seems to precede individual phenomena, let us start from the situation in which it does not yet exist, and examine how it emerges through the equating of phenomena.

Hiromatsu thematizes this kind of equating not so much in his major epistemological-ontological works as in his writings on Marx’s thought,

63. In his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu briefly speaks of “displacement” (ズレ) as it occurs in the imitation of actions (HWC 16: 444).

64. The word “possibility” is needed here to reflect Hiromatsu’s view that meaning, while it must be reproducible, need not be actually reproduced over different phenomena (see HWC 4: 78). Incidentally, we can see a parallel between this idea and Jacques Derrida’s notion of “iterability” (Derrida 1972a, 375/315).

65. HWC 15: 158. This applies to phenomena in the third stage of the process of articulation as seen earlier, that is, a pair of phenomena that become distinct from each other in the mode of “this and that.”
specifically in his 1974 book The Philosophy of Capital 『資本論の哲学』. In it he analyzes Marx’s theory of the commodity with a focus on the equating (Gleichsetzung) of different commodities in their exchange. Although Marx’s discussion of “the two factors of commodities” and “the duality of labor,” which correspond to the Hiromatsuan dualities of phenomena in the known and the knowing sides, respectively, already prefigures the outline of the fourfold structure, Hiromatsu’s reading centers on Marx’s subsequent analysis of the value-form, an analysis of the very process through which such a structure is formed.\(^{66}\) Given the structural parallelism in Hiromatsu’s philosophy between the cognitive and the practical dimensions, the problematic of the equating of commodities in value may reasonably be carried over into the equating of phenomena in cognitive meaning.

Let us first consider two phenomena \(p_1\) and \(p_2\), say, this pine and that cedar, and suppose that \(p_1\) is equated with \(p_2\) in meaning. Although this equating does not, as with that of commodities, have a quantitative character, I express it likewise by the equation \(p_1 = p_2\). Following Marx, by this equation I mean the unidirectional relation in which \(p_1\) is worth \(p_2\), and not the other way around. By analogy with Marx’s terminology, we can say that \(p_1\) is determined in meaning relatively to \(p_2\) and thus stands in the “relative form of meaning,” whereas \(p_2\) serves as the measure or “meaning mirror” of this determination (similar to what Marx calls the “value mirror”) and is thus in the “equivalent form.”\(^{67}\) In this equating, \(p_1\) assumes duality \((p_1 \text{ as } [p_1])\) through the mediation of its reflexive relation to \(p_2\). While, like any other phenomenon, \(p_1\) is, prior to the above specific equating, already a dual formation of given/meaning, it is newly dualized through this equating, taking on a meaning other than the previous one (“pine”).\(^{68}\) That is, the

\(^{66}\) See MEGA II-6: 80ff./138ff. It should be noted, however, that Hiromatsu considers the simple form of value to be already a “constitutive moment” of the total or expanded form of value (HWC 12: 399), and does not treat the transition from the former to the latter—and further to the general form of value—as a dynamic process of structuring. I have elsewhere critically examined this aspect of Hiromatsu’s reading of Marx (KATSUMORI 2016b). My analysis here, starting from the equating of two phenomena, will treat the subsequent process as a literally dynamic development.

\(^{67}\) See Marx’s argument in MEGA II-6: 81/139f., 85/144.

\(^{68}\) As we can see, this process constitutes part of a manifold process as discussed earlier. The previous meaning “pine” was also formed through equating of phenomena, and, in this sense, the series of equating processes has no unambiguous origin. It is also worth noting that when
meaning of \( p_1 \) is determined in terms of \( p_2 \), as something equal in meaning to \( p_1 \). This state of affairs, a dualization through equating, may be expressed as:

\[
p_1 \text{ as } [p_1 (=p_2)].
\]

Next, let us suppose that a third phenomenon \( p_3 \), say, that oak, appears and is also equated with \( p_1 \) (\( p_1 = p_3 \)). Then \( p_1 \) is again, but differently, dualized, where both \( p_2 \) and \( p_3 \) serve as \( p_1 \)'s equivalents:

\[
p_1 \text{ as } [p_1 (=p_2, p_3)].
\]

The transition from (1) to (2) indicates that the equating of \( p_2, p_3 \), and in general, \( p_n \), with \( p_1 \) each time newly dualizes \( p_1 \) and redetermines it in meaning. This applies not only to \( p_1 \), but mutatis mutandis also to \( p_2, p_3 \), and other phenomena. It thus follows that each newly added equation “\( = p_n \)” rearticulates all the phenomena with which it is equated, thereby incessantly rearticulating the phenomenal world. In other words, the equating of different phenomena, constitutive of an identical meaning, cannot be a pure reproduction of the same meaning, but contains a movement that each time displaces the phenomena in meaning.

To be sure, it has been pointed out by many that the repetitive reproduction of meaning brings about its displacement or fluctuation. What is important here, however, is that the displacement of meaning, or the displacement of phenomena in meaning, is not simply due to a change in the context external to the phenomena, but that, as analyzed above, it arises structurally and unavoidably from the very constitution of the same meaning.

To be noted is that this displacement of meaning is not gener-

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\( p_1 \) is equated with \( p_1 \), \( p_1 \) may perceptually have disappeared and be reproduced in memory. In this case, \( p_1 \) is equated not directly with the “original” \( p_1 \), but with a reproductive remembrance thereof.

69. As mentioned in the first section, Hiromatsu holds that any identification of a meaning, say \([p]\), is already mediated by its difference from other meanings, \([q], [r], \ldots\). For the sake of simplicity, however, this reflexive determination is not explicitly dealt with here.

70. As we can see, this point is again reminiscent of Derrida’s conception of “iterability.” According to Derrida, while the possibility of repetition or iteration is constitutive of the ideal identity of meaning, this iteration “always alters... that which it seems to reproduce” (DERRIDA 1990, 82/40). In my view, however, Derrida does not fully explicate why or how this “alteration” occurs, and thus his arguments may be supplemented by an inquiry comparable to the analysis attempted here with respect to Hiromatsu’s philosophy.

71. This is related to Hiromatsu’s (rather unelaborated) point that “in the mechanism
ally noticed by the consciousness directly engaged in the acts of equating. It can first be recognized as such by a reflective consciousness that directs attention to such a transition as that from (1) to (2). Since, however, as we saw above, reflection on phenomena and their meanings generally displaces what is reflected upon, reflection on a displacement of meaning gives rise to yet another displacement. From this it follows that the displacement of meaning cannot be unambiguously determined. This is analogous to the circumstance in quantum theory, as it is analyzed by Niels Bohr, that the interaction between objects and measuring instruments “cannot be controlled,” because any attempt to determine such an interaction in its turn introduces “new possibilities of interaction.” We can thus borrow Bohr’s terminology to characterize the displacement of meaning as in principle “uncontrollable.”

Under certain prevalent, if not ubiquitous, circumstances, however, this uncontrollable displacement seems on the surface to disappear. Suppose that, from the series of phenomena, one picks out a specific phenomenon \( p^* \), and gives priority to the equations having \( p^* \) on the right side, namely \( p_1 = p^* \), \( p_2 = p^* \), ..., and thus to the as-connections having \( p^* \) as the sole equivalent (or meaning mirror), “\( p_1 \) as \([p_1 (=p^*)]\),” “\( p_2 \) as \([p_2 (=p^*)]\),” and so on. In this case, \( p^* \) comes to serve as a sign in the narrow sense (e.g. the word “tree”) that exclusively represents all the other phenomena in question, thus structurally stabilizing the connection of phenomena. Here \( p^* \) may be designated as the general signifier, and the meaning common to all the phenomena as the general signified. Denoting this general signified by \([p^*]\), we can express the structure thus stabilized as:

of reproductive maintenance of structures lies also the possibility of structural change” (Maruyama and Hiromatsu 1993, 204).

72. Bohr 1987, 2: 40f. According to Bohr, this uncontrollability of interaction leads to the relation of “complementarity” between “the space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality” (Bohr 1987, 1: 54f.). Further, he extends this view beyond physics to the cognitive process in general, pointing to the complementarity of “the analysis of a concept and its immediate application” (Bohr 1987, 1: 20). This enlarged conception of complementarity seems to be essentially linked to the thematic developed here in the text. For a philosophical-historical analysis of Bohr’s complementarity, see Katsumori 2011.

73. In his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu speaks of the “structural stabilization” of the relation of cooperative actions between different persons (HWC 5: 248).

74. These terms—general signifier and signified—appear, under the reified condition in the sense to be defined below, as what Derrida calls “transcendental signifier” and “transcendental
Again with reference to Marx’s analysis of the value-form, this structure is analogous to the general form of value or the money form, where \( p^* \) corresponds to the “general equivalent” or money, and \([p^*]\) to the value of commodities as commensurated by the general equivalent.\(^{75}\) Since, from the Hiromatsuan point of view, sign \( p^* \) is in principle nothing more than one phenomenon among others, its introduction does not alter the basic fact that the equating of phenomena displaces them in meaning. Moreover, privileging the relations with \( p^* \) as the equivalent is itself a further displacement of the connection of phenomena. Nevertheless, these displacements tend to be concealed as a result of the above structural stabilization. For, under formula (3), it seems as if the meanings of phenomena \( p_1, p_2, \ldots \) were determined in terms of \( p^* \) alone, thus fixed once and for all, without being incessantly redetermined. This leads to the notion that the series of phenomena shares the purely self-identical and directly present meaning \([p^*]\). Furthermore, once the structure (3) is set up for phenomena \( p_1, p_2, \ldots, p_n \), a further equating of \( p_{n+1} \) with these phenomena seems to be confined to the same structure despite the fact that this equating again displaces the phenomena in meaning.\(^{76}\) For example, although calling something a tree (instead of a grass or anything else) each time redetermines “tree” in meaning, it seems as if the meaning of “tree” were fixed in advance. Thus the displacing movement of phenomena apparently gives way to the synchronic structure of given/meaning. In my view, it is precisely this kind of concealment of the dynamic dimension that Hiromatsu means by reification “in the mode of the langue” or “institutional reification.” This reification no longer primarily refers to a substantializing misconception of what is in synchronic relationship. The concept of reification may rather be redefined as the apparent reduction of displacing movement to a synchronic structure.

From this perspective, let us reexamine Hiromatsu’s analogy of meaning or the meaningful cognized with the mathematical function. Hiromatsu

\[ p_1, p_2, \ldots \text{ as } [p^*]. \] (3)

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76. As Hiromatsu notes, although the linguistically expressed meaning is “in an incessant process of formation and change,” it tends to become apparently fixed and ready-made (HWC 15: 179).
indeed stresses that, in this analogy, what really exists is solely the function $f(x, y, z, \ldots)$ with specific values inserted into its variables $x, y, z, \ldots$, and not the function itself as it is independent of inserted values. Yet our consideration above indicates a further point he does not make explicit. That is, the equating of different phenomena corresponds to the substitution of specific values, not into an already existing function, but rather for other specific values.\(^7\) It is a series of such substitutions that first generates a “function,” while at the same time altering and displacing it. In contrast, the mathematical function, while not independent of the whole set of insertable values, is in general considered as remaining purely the same regardless of the specific values inserted each time, insofar as these values are within the range for which the function is defined in advance. To this extent, contrary to Hiromatsu’s remarks, “functional identity” can by no means be contrasted with “rigid self-identity.”\(^7\) Put differently, the validity ($Gültigkeit$) of a function implies its indifference ($Gleichgültigkeit$) to specific values. In fact, in his analysis of the practical world, Hiromatsu himself introduces the concept of the function to characterize the circumstance that the personality of individuals becomes “irrelevant (gleichgültig)” to their relation of roles.\(^7\) This enables us to see how meaning differs in character from the mathematical function as it is commonly understood. It is by virtue of this difference that the “structural form” of phenomena, a specific kind of meaning, is subject to change.\(^8\) This being the case, the analogy of meaning to the mathematical function, insofar as the latter is understood in the above manner, proves to be already reifying—reifying in the sense redefined above. In other words, reification, as it is dynamically reconceived, refers precisely to the circumstance that different phenomena $p_1, p_2, \ldots$ seems to be functionally subsumed under a general signified [$p^*$]. In fact, this reification seems to be most

77. This is related to Hiromatsu’s point in his analysis of the cognitive world that learning rules as objective knowledge is preceded by “imitation” of actions (HWC 16: 442; cf. 430).
78. HWC 15: 26.
79. HWC 1: 118.
80. HWC 14: 220. Hiromatsu remarks that meaning, while remaining self-identical “within certain limits,” “can be experienced as something else… if it changes beyond [these] limits” (HWC 1: 350). It should be noted, however, that these limits are not, as in the case of the mathematical function, determined in advance.
strongly prompted in physical-scientific knowledge, which seeks to determine phenomena by subsuming them under mathematical functions.

In the present section, I have striven to extend some of Hiromatsu’s conceptual motifs to show how his theory of the fourfold structure tends to move beyond itself. Focusing particularly on the displacement of phenomena in meaning and the reifying mechanism of its concealment, my analysis has also suggested that the functional relation, which, in his account, essentially characterizes “phenomena as they really are,”81 is itself reified in character. The scope of this section, however, has still been limited to the known side of phenomena. Given the structural link between knower and known, we must explicitly take into account the knowing side, and thus the intersubjective dimension, of phenomena. In the next section, I will accordingly examine the fourfold structuring of phenomena in the mutual understanding of knowers.

DISPLACEMENT AND REIFICATION
IN THE FOURFOLD-STRUCTURING OF PHENOMENA

Hiromatsu more or less implicitly supposes circumstances in which a meaning common to various phenomena, or a general signified, is not established, nor a cognizing Someone correlative with such a meaning. In fact, with regard to the knowing side of phenomena—as we have seen in the example of noticing the child’s “mistake” of calling a cow a doggie—he starts from the twofoldness of “someone as someone (else)” where not only the former someone, but also the latter is a “concrete individual.”82 Furthermore, as suggested by his remarks that the duality of knowing someone and cognizing Someone holds “except for the latent ‘knowing subject’ in the developmentally initial phase,” and that some kinds of mental illness may be characterized as a “disintegration” of the cognizing Someone, Hiromatsu seems to hold that there are phases or cases in which the cognizing Someone

81. HWC 15: 18.
82. Here it is not essential, however, to take the individual as the starting point, considering that, in Hiromatsu’s view, the personal individual is not a primary being, but derives from the division of pre-personal phenomena into self and other (HWC 15: 112).
is either not yet established or has already collapsed. He does not, however, fully analyze the formation or dissolution of the cognizing Someone, that is, the structuring process of the knower, or the process of intersubjective fourfold structuring, as distinct from the synchronic structure. In this section, starting from, but going one step beyond, Hiromatsu’s ideas, I will accordingly investigate the dimension of fourfold structuring and thereby amplify my previous discussion of displacement and reification.

In what follows, for the sake of simplicity, I provisionally limit myself to the relation between two knowers and focus on their mutual understanding through linguistic communication. Suppose an English and a Japanese speaker, P1 and P2, both of whom initially have no knowledge of each other’s language, utter words p1 and p2—say “tree” and “ki”—respectively, and let us consider the process through which they come to grasp these words as having the same meaning. If, to begin with, P1 thinks that P2’s word “ki” means “tree,” he equates in meaning his own word p1 with the word he has just heard, p2, or, to put it differently, grasps p2 as equal in meaning to p1 (p2 = p1). That is to say, P1 dualizes p2 into

\[ p_2 \text{ as } [p_2 (= p_1)]. \]  (4)

In a conjugate manner, the Japanese speaker P2 thinks that P1’s word “tree” means “ki,” that is, equates p2 with p1 (p1 = p2) and thereby dualizes p1 into

\[ p_1 \text{ as } [p_1 (= p_2)]. \]  (5)

It is important to note that, for the same reason as given in the previous section, these dualizations of phenomena are re-dualizations such that each of the phenomena in question are already displaced in meaning. Even though p2 was, for P1, initially nothing more than a sound lacking a specific linguistic meaning, it was already a phenomenon laden with meaning in the Hiromatsuan broad sense of the term. This p2 or “ki” is, through the equat-


84. Hiromatsu is critical of the approach that treats language games or speech acts as “the general model of social action” (HWC 16: 341), and I also do not intend to make the following example in the text a paradigm of the intersubjective structuring of phenomena.

85. If, in this example, a tree or ki is perceptually given as in the earlier case of “cow/dog,” it may be necessary to enter into the relation between such perceptual phenomena and the linguistic signs “tree” and “ki” (which are themselves phenomena). To avoid intricacies, however, here we abstract from such reference to perceptual phenomena.
ing relation \( p_2 = p_1 \), redetermined in meaning as something equal to “tree.” Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to \( p_1 \).

The relation \( p_2 = p_1 \) and its converse \( p_1 = p_2 \) are different equating relations, and therefore the as-connections (4) and (5), which involve these relations, also differ from each other. That is, in (4), \( p_2 \) is determined in meaning—with \( p_1 \) as equivalent (or meaning mirror)—from \( P_1 \)'s standpoint, while (5) represents a reverse determination of meaning from \( P_2 \)'s standpoint. Insofar as the two knowers’ points of view cannot be arbitrarily interchanged, (4) and (5) constitute two distinct connections of phenomena that are formally symmetrical and yet mutually exclusive. This being the case, at the present stage, we do not yet have the structure in which \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) jointly, as cognizing Someone, grasp \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) as the same meaningful cognized or, in other words, as a general signified—general in the still limited sense of being common to the two knowers and to the two known phenomena.

The formation of this kind of structure, that is, the fourfold structural stabilization of the connection of phenomena, is commonly mediated by the introduction of a general signifier as a correlative of the general signified, and takes on various forms depending on the way the general signifier is introduced. Here I will consider the following three types of cases:

(a) Either \( p_1 \) or \( p_2 \) is privileged over the other and becomes the general signifier;

(b) A third phenomenon is introduced and privileged over \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) thereby serving as the general signifier;

(c) A relation of transformation between \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) is set up in a manner differently from (a) and (b), and the signifying side of this relation itself serves as the general signifier.

Let us start by examining case (a), which seems to conform the most to substantialist ontology.

(a) In the above example, this corresponds to the case in which one of the two knowers, say \( P_1 \), privileges his own language and imposes it on the other, \( P_2 \), who comes to submit to this one-sided move by \( P_1 \). In this case, \( P_2 \) accepts \( P_1 \)'s point of view, and—if we apply Hiromatsu’s term “role” (役割) to the cognitive dimension as well—takes his knowing role as her own, coming to think herself that her word “ki” means “tree.” Here the equating relation \( p_1 = p_2 \), which was initially set up by \( P_2 \), becomes repressed or
excluded. In other words, phenomenon \( p_2 \), which served as \( p_1 \)'s equivalent as well, turns into a term merely determined in meaning, while the relation \( p_1 = p_2 \) are privileged over \( p_1 = p_1 \) and thus relation (4) over (5). Through this process, \( p_1 \), or the word “tree,” becomes the general signifier that unilaterally represents \( p_2 \), and a meaning common to both phenomena, a general signified \([p_1]\), is established. In this way, the set of relations (4) and (5) reduce to the single relation

\[ p_1, p_2 \text{ as } [p_1]. \]  

(b) We can also think of another case, however, the case in which two knowers make themselves equal in their relation of roles when coming to mutual understanding. Suppose that a third word \( p^* \), say, the Esperantist “arbro,” is introduced. In this case, the two knowers take the point of view of a “virtual” knower using this \( p^* \), set up the equating relations \( p_1 = p^* \) and \( p_2 = p^* \) with \( p^* \) serving as the equivalent, and thus dualize \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) into “\( p_1 \) as \([p_1 (= p^*)]\)” and “\( p_2 \) as \([p_1 (= p^*)]\),” respectively. Here, if these as-connections are privileged not only over the possible relations “\( p^* \) as \([p^* (= p_1)]\)” and “\( p^* \) as \([p^* (= p_2)]\),” but also over (4) and (5), the series of the connections of meaning will reduce to the relation

\[ p_1, p_2 \text{ as } [p^*], \]  

where the third term \( p^* \) serves as the general signifier. In this way, the conflictual relationship between (4) and (5) is dissolved, and \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \) become horizontally translatable (or transformable) into each other. Correlatively, the two knowers jointly play the third knowing role, the role of the utterer of \( p^* \), as the cognizing Role, and thereby attain a consensus (\( p_1, p_2 \) as \([p^*]\) for \( P_1, P_2 \) as \([P^*]\)).

(c) Further, there may also be the case in which the two knowers do not
introduce the third in such a “substantialist” manner as above and yet attain an equal mutual understanding. In the example of “tree” and “ki,” this is the process through which a stable relation of translation between the two terms is formed without being mediated by a privileged linguistic sign. This kind of case is, however, treated by Hiromatsu specifically in his epistemological analysis of the theory of relativity in such works as *Outpost to a Koto-based Worldview* 『事的世界観への前哨』 (1975) and *The Philosophy of Relativity Theory* 『相対性理論の哲学』 (1981), and let us take this as an example here.\(^86\) According to Hiromatsu, in Albert Einstein’s relativity theory, observers start by recognizing that their results of space-time measurement are relative to their coordinate systems (for example, the contraction of bodies moving relatively to the system), and, through “intersubjective communication and mutual understanding,” each come to grasp the “phenomenon-for-the-self” and the “phenomenon-for-the-other” synthetically in one and the same intersubjective meaning.\(^87\) I designate the results of measurement obtained by observers \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) or their linguistic representations (for instance, the length of a rod being \(l_1\) and \(l_2\)) as \(p_1\) and \(p_2\), respectively. Here, too, the starting point of \(P_1\) and \(P_2\)’s mutual understanding is their setting up relations (4) and (5), respectively, but, as it turns out, the subsequent process will differ from cases (a) and (b).

The characteristic feature of this process will become clearer if it is compared with the case of pre-relativistic electrodynamics (as represented by Hendrik Antoon Lorentz’ theory), which precisely corresponds to case (b). In pre-relativistic electrodynamics, the results of measurement in a particular coordinate system such as the absolutely resting system or ether system are privileged, and the connection of phenomena is structured in such a way that those privileged results of measurement serve as the general signifier \(p^*\). By contrast, in relativity theory, which rejects the assumption of

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\(^86\) I have elsewhere surveyed and critically examined Hiromatsu’s analysis of relativity theory with a focus on the same issue of intersubjective cognitive structure as discussed here (Katsumori 2016a, esp. 163–8, 181–5).

\(^87\) *HWC* 3: 284, 288. To be sure, in the same way as in the case of cow/doggie, for a stricter discussion we would need to distinguish between observational phenomena and their linguistic representations and enter into the relation between them. Here, however, for the sake of convenience, I will—as Hiromatsu himself often does—provisionally abstract from this aspect of the state of affairs.
such a privileged system, neither $p_1$ nor $p_2$, nor any other particular result of measurement, can serve as the general signifier. Rather, the observers adopt the procedure of deriving a general signifier/signified from the very relation between phenomena $p_1$ and $p_2$ in conjunction with their own observational standpoints (corresponding to the states of motion of the systems). The two observers each start by setting themselves (imaginatively) in each other’s standpoint, that is, playing the other’s role as the knower, so that relation (4) holds also for $P_2$, and (5) for $P_1$. Then they reflectively objectify their observational standpoints and the results of measurement, or, in other words, shift part of their knowing roles as observers to the known side. Thus, in place of the initial phenomena $p_1$ and $p_2$, the phenomena for the respective observing knowers, “$p_1$ for $P_1$” and “$p_2$ for $P_2$” (which I denote by $p_1'$ and $p_2'$, respectively), become the known sides of new phenomena. The knowing sides of these new phenomena are constituted by a single theoretical knower, no longer bound by particular observational standpoints. $P_1$ and $P_2$, both playing the role of this theoretical knower as cognizing Role $[\bar{P}]$, make the transformation relation between $p_1'$ and $p_2'$ itself a general signified $[\bar{p}]$. They thus set up the relation

$$p_1', p_2' \text{ as } [\bar{p}] \quad (8)$$

as the form of their mutual understanding ($p_1', p_2' \text{ as } [\bar{p}]$ for $P_1, P_2 \text{ as } [\bar{P}]$). This may be called a relationist structural stabilization of the connection of phenomena, where there is no self-contained term that exclusively represents the meanings of phenomena. This is not to say, however, that no general signifier appears. Rather, the transformation relation between $p_1'$ and $p_2'$ is a dual formation of signifier-signified (given-meaning), whose signifying side, namely, the mathematical equations of the coordinate transformation (the Lorentz transformation in the case of special relativity), serve as the general signifier $[\bar{p}]$. That is, here again it is not the case that the general signified $[\bar{p}]$ is purely ideally shared, but that the general signifier-signified—which is a phenomenon standing beside $p_1$ and $p_2$—is introduced and given a pivotal role in the structural stabilization of phenomena.

In all the above three cases, we can see how the phenomena undergo not only displacements in meaning, but also displacements in the knowers’ role

88. See hwc 3: 400.
relationship. To begin with, just as there occurred displacements of meaning in (4) and (5), where $p_1$ and $p_2$ were equated and each dualized, there occur similar displacements in case (b), when $p^*$ is equated and thereby $p_1$ and $p_2$ are newly dualized. Moreover, the privileging of a specific as-connection in cases (a) and (b) is itself a displacement in meaning. On the other hand, a knower's playing the standpoint of another knower constitutes a displacement in their role relationship. Specifically, when $P_2$ plays $P_1$’s standpoint in cases (a) and (c), $P_1$’s knowing role becomes a role that $P_2$ also plays as a knowing subject. Further, in case (c), when the two knowers reflectively objectify their own observational standpoints, there occurs not only, in the same way as in the previous section, a displacement in meaning due to reflection, but also a displacement in the knower-known relation in such a way that part of the knowing role shifts to the known side. Finally, in all these cases, the formation of a stable structure is the establishment of new connections of meanings as expressed by (6), (7), and (8), where (the known sides of) the phenomena are displaced in meaning in such a way as to be represented by a general signifier, and also the two knowers are displaced in their knowing role so that they jointly play a cognizing Role.

These displacements in meaning and knowing role seem to be inevitable insofar as we dynamically extend Hiromatsu’s relationist conception of both the knowing and the known sides of phenomena. Furthermore, a stable structure, even though once set up, cannot be maintained without being incessantly applied to new phenomena, and such an application each time newly displaces the connection of phenomena. This incessant displacement is, to be sure, not unrelated to what Hiromatsu calls the “incessant correction” of meaning. As he puts it:

...needless to say, this intersubjective unity and identity of the meaningful cognized do not strictly hold from a transcendent point of view, but is a belief held each time by the consciousness involved. This belief can be subject reflectively to incessant correction. (However, in such reflective correction, an intersubjectively identical and unitary meaningful cognized is posited each time, and the structure of the intersubjective identity and unity of the meaningful cognized does not break down, but “persists.”)

89. HWC 15: 195.
Yet the movement of displacement as discussed so far, while it may contain as particular cases the knower’s reflectively guided corrections, is in principle uncontrollable (for the reason given in the previous section) so that, even when reflected upon, displacement each time exceeds that reflection. This being the case, Hiromatsu’s remark above may be reversed as follows: The intersubjective identity of meaning is always accompanied and affected by incessant displacement in meaning. The displacement of phenomena is not simply caused by factors external to the structure of intersubjective identity, but is structurally involved in the very positing of intersubjective identity itself.

However, this displacement tends to be concealed by the stabilization of structure as expressed by (6), (7), or (8), and, as may be suggested from our findings in the previous section, this tendency advances if such stable structures are formed not only between two knowers or two known phenomena, but among indefinitely many phenomena. That is, under these circumstances, the connection of phenomena in meaning as well as the knowers’ role relation seems to be fixed so that not only are the phenomena apparently subsumed under a general signified, but also the knowers are apparently subsumed under a general cognizing Role. In other words, it now seems as if individual knowers did not substitute for each other in their roles in a “self-ridding (自的) way,”90 but rather were simply inserted into a cognizing Role that maintains its functional self-identity. Precisely this state of affairs may be called reification in the dimension of fourfold structuring. This reification appears paradoxically to be more unavoidable in case (c), where the general signifier and signified are formed relationally, than in cases (a) and (b), where \( p_1 \) and \( p^* \), respectively, serve as a general signifier. For in relation (8) in case (c), although the general signifier is the signifying side of a phenomenon that in principle stands side by side with phenomena \( p_1 \) and \( p_2 \), it nevertheless appears as a transformation rule standing above the two phenomena, as if it transcended the connection of phenomena in general. In this way, the signifying side of the transformation relation becomes seemingly transparent, and this leans toward the notion that only the meaning of the transformation relation, namely the general signified, is intersubjectively shared. This notion becomes all the more irresistible in the case where the

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90. HWC 1: 169.
transformation relation is a mathematical function such as the coordinate transformation in the above example, which is marked by the apparent fixity and unambiguity of the connection between the transformation equations and their meaning. This suggests that modern physics, which Hiromatsu values positively for its tendency to overcome substantialism and the subject/object schema, may be subject to a critique of reification in the dynamic dimension.

This renewed conception of reification may be further elucidated with reference to Hiromatsu’s central concept of intersubjectivity. To translate the Western philosophical term “intersubjectivity” or Intersubjektivität, Hiromatsu uses the two Japanese words kanshukansei (間主観性) and kyōdōshukansei (共同主観性) with their nuances somewhat different from each other. That is, the term kanshukansei (or at times kanshutaisei間主体性), which consists of kan (between) and shukansei (subjectivity), thus reproducing literally the original sense of “inter,” is mainly used where knowers are personally polarized in the mode of self and other. On the other hand, kyōdōshukansei (or kyōdōshutaisei 共同主体性), with kyōdō meaning “common” or “joint,” is often used where knowers, having already attained “mutual recognition,” exist together in the mode of “we,” so that the term could in some cases better be rendered as “cosubjectivity.” Yet Hiromatsu also holds that kanshukansei simultaneously means kyōdōshukansei, and does not treat the two words as technically distinct terms. However, our consideration so far suggests that the difference between the two terms is relevant to the dynamic conception of reification as proposed above. Here I accordingly introduce the following tentative terminological distinction: I reserve the English term “intersubjectivity” for the cases where knowers are polarized as self and other, while using the term “cosubjectivity” for the cases where they exist jointly as “we.” With this terminological setting, we can

91. As I have suggested elsewhere, this reifying mechanism seems to underlie the following conceptual difference between Einstein’s two theories of relativity: The dimension of intersubjective structuring, which is still visible in special relativity, tends to be concealed in general relativity with the adoption of the tensor formalism, which incorporates in itself the intersubjective validity of knowledge among coordinate systems. See KATSUMORI 1992, 578, 590; 2016A, 183ff.

92. See KATSUMORI 2016A, 185ff.

93. See hwc 15: 130.
now characterize the above reification as the circumstance that *the intersubjective movement of mutual substitution of knowing roles apparently reduces to the cosubjective structure of their subsumption under a Role*. Put differently, reification as reconceived here pertains to the circumstance that knowers, deprived of mutual otherness, seem to constitute a cosubjective “we,” and that a purely identical meaning presents itself to this “we.”

In some cases, this “we” may be scholarly cognizers, that is, (the ideal moment of) subjects of scholarly reflection. Since the previous section, we have seen how reflection on a phenomenon, itself involved in the connection of phenomena, brings about a displacement of the phenomenon in meaning, and this should apply to scholarly reflection as well. To be sure, Hiromatsu maintains that the scholarly “we” is not a self-contained joint subject, but just the cognitive moment whose Role individual knowers play in scholarly reflection. However, this is not the whole state of affairs with which we are concerned here. Rather, each time scholarly reflection on phenomena is carried out, the phenomena are redetermined as thus reflected upon and are displaced in meaning in correlation with the knowing role of the reflection. Specifically, Hiromatsu’s (or my) analysis of communication between knowers, in imaginatively playing the roles of the knowers, involves itself in the communicative process and thus brings about a displacement of meanings and roles. In the reifying perspective, however, precisely this state of affairs is concealed from the scholarly reflective knower. That is to say—as Hiromatsu’s texts may at times give rise to this impression—the scholarly subject apparently “looks on in a purely detached manner” at fourfold-structured phenomena as they really are.

In this paper, I have surveyed and analyzed Hiromatsu’s theory of the fourfold structure and thereby sought to extend it fully to the dynamic dimension. This extension is not simply an enlargement of the domain, but a qualitative change that contains kinds of inversion. First of all, we have seen how the equating of phenomena and the knowers’ mutual understanding, which make possible the identity of meanings and roles, paradoxically displace these meanings and roles. We have also seen how this movement of

95. *HWC 15*: 32; *cf. 1*: 31.
displacement tends to reduce apparently to a synchronic structure, which I have characterized as reification in the dynamic dimension. It has thus turned out that dynamic inquiry is not limited to an “auxiliary means” of synchronic structural analysis, but may be developed as a deconstructive critique of a reification that tends to make the latter apparently self-contained. This enables us to see how Hiromatsu’s concept of reification and related basic concepts have themselves undergone a series of displacements in meaning. Here we cannot simply answer the alternative question of whether the present study constitutes a criticism of Hiromatsu’s philosophy or a positive reinterpretation thereof. What has been shown is, rather, how his philosophy—through a movement that at once sustains and disrupts it—opens itself to the possibility of a radical reconfiguration.

* This paper is based on Chapter 1 of my Japanese-language book 『現代日本哲学への問い：「われわれ」とそのかなた』 [Questioning contemporary Japanese philosophy: The “we” and beyond] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2009), 1–43.

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Abbreviations


MEGA Karl Marx/Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe. Berlin: Diez Verlag; Amsterdam: Akademie Verlag.

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DERRIDA, Jacques

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96. Hiromatsu himself at times characterizes his critique of reification as “deconstruction” (Maruyama and Hiromatsu 1993, 82). It is also noteworthy that, at a symposium held on the occasion of Derrida’s visit to Japan in 1983, Hiromatsu outlined his philosophical views with reference to Derrida’s thought, noting that the “unity of identity and difference” in the as-connection of given and meaning “corresponds precisely to Derridean différence” (Hiromatsu 1983, 10). Given the lack of his thematic account of Derrida’s work, however, the relation between the thought of the two philosophers is yet to be examined.


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