Statelessness, Refugees, and Hospitality: Reading Arendt and Kant in the Twenty-First Century

Siobhan Kattago

The plight of today's refugees juxtaposes indifference, or even outright hostility, to hospitality as fundamentalism and terrorist attacks on European soil feed a growing culture of fear. The closing of borders has been accompanied by vociferous debate about who has the right to belong inside city walls. Images of refugee camps, families, train stations, and long lines of people fleeing war recall scenes of Europeans who were forced to leave their homes during the twentieth century.[1] Only this time the issue is forced expulsion and flight not from war within the continent but of non-Europeans seeking asylum in Europe. The age-old question remains: "Am I my brother's keeper?" Do I bear responsibility to help those fleeing war and violence when they appear at my doorstep? Are those people my brothers and sisters? Or, if they are not part of my tribe, may I simply close the door? While these questions have been

Research for this article was supported by the Estonian Ministry of Education and Research (IUT 20-5, Disagreements: Philosophical Analysis) and by the European Regional Development Fund (Centre of Excellence in Estonian Studies). An early draft was presented at the conference "Europe in Challenging Times" at the University of Barcelona, May 31–June 1, 2016. In addition to the helpful suggestions of the anonymous reviewer at *New German Critique*, I am grateful for the critical comments of Christopher Adair-Toteff, Andreas Huyssen, Emma Juslin, Tiina Kirss, Francisco Martinez, Eva Piirimäe, Johanna Söderholm, and Michael Weinman.

1. See Zahra, "Return of No-Man's Land."

New German Critique 136, Vol. 46, No. 1, February 2019
DOI 10.1215/0094033X-7214653

asked since the book of Genesis, responses to how kinship is defined and its moral contours are very different. Today questions of fraternity and solidarity have moved from the language of religion to that of law and politics. The contemporary response to the plight of refugees fleeing war in Syria is that international human rights and asylum treaties are already in place, stating that individuals have the right to be granted human dignity and refuge if they meet the necessary conditions. However, despite the universal claims of these treaties, some people reside outside the law, having the right neither to dignity nor to refuge because their religious beliefs and cultural way of life pose a threat to the state.

Terrorist attacks since 9/11, the war on terror, and a rising tide of populism have created a different geopolitical environment from the immediate postwar era when new declarations of human rights and the rights of refugees were drafted. If anything, hostile responses to the current refugee crisis underscore Carl Schmitt's argument that the most basic concept of the political is the relationship between friend and enemy: "The political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping."[2] The enemy poses a primal and existential threat to the existence of the state and the life of a people. A definition of politics viewed through the antagonistic prism of friend or enemy is increasingly accompanied by placing certain individuals outside the law due to the threat of terrorism. Since 9/11 the United States has become, as Michael Ignatieff ruefully notes, more of a "bemused bystander" to the fate of refugees, like those from Syria.[3] Moreover, the US government openly disregarded rights of asylum guaranteed in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with its controversial policy of separating children from their parents at the US-Mexico border in the spring of 2018. In the twenty-first century national reactions to refugees are dangerously overriding a concerted international response to share responsibility for their relocation and integration. As a report for Amnesty International stated in 2015:

> The global refugee crisis may be fuelled by conflict and persecution but it is compounded by the neglect of the international community in the face of this human suffering. In the aftermath of World War II, the international community came together to create the United Nations Refugee Convention to protect people from being returned to countries where they risked persecution

2. Schmitt, *Concept of the Political*, 29.
3. See Ignatieff, "Refugees and the New War."

> and human rights abuses. The Refugee Convention has been an important mechanism, providing a framework for the protection of tens of millions of people. The Refugee Convention also established the principle of responsibility and burden-sharing—the idea that the international community must work together to address refugee crises so that no one country, or a small number of countries, has to cope by themselves. This fundamental principle is now being ignored, with devastating consequences: *the international refugee protection system is broken* [my emphasis].[4]

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Refugee Convention (1951) were signed in the aftermath of two world wars, genocide, and the profound recognition that individual states had failed to help refugees. When faced with waves of people seeking asylum during World War II, political elites were paralyzed by national interest, fear of political extremism, anti-Semitism, and the economy; likewise, today's political elites are paralyzed by national interest, fear of terrorism, Islamophobia, and the economy. Despite the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Refugee Convention, the refugee crisis demonstrates that many of the problems that Hannah Arendt identified during the first half of the twentieth century are still with us. Indeed, national concerns are preempting an effective response to the refugee crisis despite the legal obligations of international treaties. As Zygmunt Bauman argues, national interest and legal exceptions increasingly place refugees and migrants at the borders of the law, as rights to asylum are subordinated to issues of security.[5]

What does hospitality mean in an international world order structured by sovereign states, operating within a framework of international treaties in the midst not of peace but of a debilitating war on terror? As the war in Syria and the destruction of the Calais camp in France in 2016 bitterly demonstrate, declarations of human rights and asylum devolve into empty promises without a common sense of solidarity and an implicit understanding that we share responsibility for the world and one another. This article argues that Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" and Arendt's postwar reflections on the stateless as modern pariahs continue to frame current debates on hospitality, human rights, and responsibility. Moreover, the postwar question of how to translate individual hospitality toward the guest into national and international policy remains unanswered. Without a recognition of our common humanity and shared world, sovereign states will continue to find excep-

4. Amnesty International, "Global Refugee Crisis."
5. Bauman, "Refugee Crisis Is Humanity's Crisis."

tions to the legal status of refugees and migrants, thus enabling their exclusion as pariahs from political life and the very laws that should protect them.

Modern Pariahs and Statelessness

Although the political situation today differs from the immediate postwar years, there are haunting parallels in the precarity of refugees then and now. Indeed, what Arendt wrote in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* seems to ring even more true today: "We become aware of the existence of a right to have rights (and that means to live in a framework where one is judged by one's actions and opinions) and a right to belong to some kind of organized community, only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain these rights because of the new global political situation."[6] The refugee crisis, terrorism, and continued wars in the Middle East are precisely such a "new global political situation" in which the right to asylum clashes with the sovereign power of exclusion. As Jeremy Adelman writes: "Arendt's voice is one we can turn to as we grapple with the spread of statelessness in our day. Camps and pariahs are still with us."[7] Her reflections and life experience illuminate many aspects of the current refugee crisis.[8] While *The Origins of Totalitarianism* established Arendt as a major thinker on state domination, the problem of evil, and moral responsibility, much of her writing was inspired by her own experience as a Jew in Germany and a refugee in Europe and the United States.[9] Born in Hannover in 1906, Arendt grew up in Königsberg, studied philosophy at the University of Marburg with Martin Heidegger, and wrote her dissertation under Karl Jaspers in Heidelberg. In 1933 she began working for a Jewish organization recording Nazi racism. After a few months she was arrested, was freed, and left for Paris. There she worked from 1933 to 1939 for organizations (Agriculture et Artisanat and Youth Aliyah) helping young Jewish people emigrate to Palestine. In 1940, with the Vichy occupation, she was sent as an "enemy alien" and an "undesirable" to an internment camp in Gurs, where she escaped and was reunited with her husband, Heinrich Blücher. In May 1941 she obtained an emergency visa to the United States and left for New York via Lisbon. After eighteen years of statelessness (1933–51), Arendt became a naturalized American citizen in 1951.

6. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 296–97.

7. Adelman, "Pariah."

8. For recent writings on the relevance of Arendt's postwar reflections on refugees, see Meyer, "Es bedeudet den Zusammenbruch unserer privaten Welt."

9. For helpful discussion of Arendt's statelessness and Jewish writings, see Benhabib, *Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*; Bernstein, *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question*; Butler, "I Merely Belong to Them"; Feldman, "Introduction"; and Young-Bruehl, *Hannah Arendt*.

While Arendt was stateless, she experienced the largest uprooting and movement of people in Europe. She also lived through international responses to the plight of refugees, most notably the Evian Conference. Similar to the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants convened by President Barack Obama in September 2016, calling for a global answer to statelessness, the Evian Conference was a response to refugees seeking refuge after the Nazi annexation of Austria. In June 1938 President Franklin Roosevelt organized the Evian Conference in France to address the problem of German and Austrian Jews seeking to emigrate. Delegates were sent from thirty-two countries and thirty-nine organizations, with two hundred journalists reporting. While hospitality was on the agenda, the general mood was of national interest and isolationism. Countries were reluctant to raise immigration quotas, mindful of economic difficulties after World War I and the Depression. The conference ended with the creation of an intergovernmental committee on refugees to help safe haven countries. By and large, the Evian Conference represented the failure of sovereign nation-states to respond to Jewish refugees.[10] It was not until 1951 that the UN Refugee Commission was founded, along with the Refugee Convention, as a response to the millions of displaced persons in Europe after World War II. Although the Refugee Convention was initially drafted for Europeans, its mandate expanded globally in 1967. Similar to the UN Declaration on Human Rights, it declares "Never again" to the humanitarian failures of the twentieth century.

In 1943, two years after arriving in New York, Arendt reflected on the condition of refugees and statelessness in an article for the *Menorah Journal* titled "We Refugees." "In the first place," she wrote, "we don't like to be called refugees. We ourselves call each other 'newcomers' or 'immigrants.'"[11] There is enormous pathos in Arendt's writing as she reflects on the experience of many people in her generation: "A refugee used to be a person driven to seek refuge because of some act committed or some political opinion held. . . . Now 'refugees' are those who have been so unfortunate as to arrive in a new country without means and have to be helped by refugee committees."[12] The very title of the article, "We Refugees," emphasizes a shared experience, a "we" rather than an individual. Although one may be categorized as a refugee, Arendt emphasizes the common desire to be regarded as an immigrant or a newcomer—as someone who chooses to belong, rather than as an outlaw or

10. See Kalb, "Refugee Crisis"; and Rothman, "How Europe."
11. Arendt, "We Refugees," 264.
12. Arendt, "We Refugees," 264.

homeless person fleeing persecution. Thus Arendt reflects on a theme that dominates much of her work—loss of a familiar world and the fierce desire to belong to a political community: "We lost our home, which means the familiarity of daily life. We lost our occupation, which means the confidence that we are of some use in this world. We lost our language, which means the naturalness of reactions, the simplicity of gestures, the unaffected expression of feelings."[13] From being people who belong somewhere, refugees experience the complete loss of their world. Thrown out of their countries, they seem to be nobodies who belong nowhere and who are at the mercy of charity and refugee organizations. Moreover, she reflects on the suicide of Jewish friends and acquaintances (among them Walter Benjamin and Stefan Zweig) as they failed to find a new place of refuge. In particular, Arendt calls attention to those Jews who identified themselves as Germans and Europeans, not only as Jews: "We are the first nonreligious Jews persecuted—and we are the first ones who, not only in extremis, answer with suicide. . . . Yet our suicides are not mad rebels who hurl defiance at life and the world, who try to kill in themselves the whole universe. Theirs is a quiet and modest way of vanishing; they seem to apologize for the violent solution they found for their personal problems."[14] Widely regarded as pariahs, severed from their homelands, refugees have, Arendt argued, a confusing legal status that disrupts political conventions of citizenship and national identity. The refugee is a liminal figure who does not fit into the sovereign structure of citizenship and rights. "Man is a social animal and life is not easy for him when social ties are cut off."[15] Rather than highlight their passive victimhood, Arendt admired those individuals who were conscious of being pariahs and actively participated in worldly affairs.

Spurred by her work with Zionist organizations helping Jewish children emigrate to Palestine and her experiences as a displaced person in France and a refugee in the United States, Arendt returned often to the Jewish question and to the matter of citizenship and rights. With the rise of National Socialism, Jews lost their citizenship and slipped into the category of displacement, even that of an outlaw. "History has forced the status of outlaws upon both, upon pariahs and parvenus alike."[16] She underscored that those seeking refuge did not choose to leave the comforts of their home lightly. Inspired by Bernard Lazare, Arendt described different ways that Jews have been an integral part of

13. Arendt, "We Refugees," 264.
14. Arendt, "We Refugees," 268.
15. Arendt, "We Refugees," 271.
16. Arendt, "We Refugees," 274.

European society. If a parvenu tried to assimilate into European culture, the pariah was more of a social outcast. He or she was never quite accepted and remained on the margins of European society. The "conscious pariah," on the other hand, is aware of his or her outside status and consciously rebels. The parvenu attempts to integrate into the gentile world but cannot escape his or her Jewishness. For Arendt, the conscious pariah is part of what she called a "hidden tradition" that includes Lazare, Heinrich Heine, Rahel Varnhagen, Franz Kafka, and Walter Benjamin.[17] As long as European Jews were regarded as social pariahs, they could still assimilate as parvenus. However, once they lost their citizenship and were denied political rights, Jews as pariahs and parvenus were expelled from their political communities. "The pariah Jew and the parvenu Jew are in the same boat, rowing desperately in the same angry sea. Both are branded with the same mark; both alike are outlaws."[18] The same sentiment might be applied to today's refugees, who are "rowing desperately" away from war, only to be treated as "outlaws" or "pariahs" at the borders of Europe.

Arendt argued that political communities are public spaces that guarantee civil and political rights. When people are forced to leave their political community, those rights are lost. As Adelman suggests: "It would take a stateless woman to remind the public that these rights are not natural. It took an alien to say it: these rights can be taken away."[19] While the Jewish question is deeply entwined in Arendt's reflections on statelessness in the twentieth century, today's refugee is often a Muslim and a non-European. However, what makes Arendt's writing so pertinent to today's refugee crisis is that statelessness is a modern phenomenon linked to masses of people fleeing war and violence. Moreover, refugees are often regarded as pariahs, who have lost their political communities. As stateless people, they risk entirely losing their rights when they stand before the sovereign nation-state. Since rights are derived from the very citizenship that the stateless have lost, refugees are thrown back onto their basic humanity or bare life. They become suppliants at the mercy of strangers and sovereign states, who have the power to offer or deny them refuge.

Arendt highlights the fragility of the modern nation-state in dealing with extreme political movements resulting in statelessness. Indeed, she develops her reflections on refugees in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* by arguing that statelessness was one of the hallmarks of the twentieth century. Like Edward Said, she distinguishes the exile from the refugee. Exiles are those banished

17. For reflection on the conscious pariah, see Feldman, "Introduction"; and Heuer, "Europe and Its Refugees."

18. Arendt, "Jew as Pariah," 296.

19. Adelman, "Pariah."

from their homeland, while refugees, as Said argues, are "a creation of the twentieth-century state."[20] If the exile cannot return home, the refugee is associated with masses and "large herds of innocent and bewildered people requiring international assistance."[21] The exile and the refugee are products of the failure of the international system to deal with those who are not citizens. Whether referred to as "stateless" by Arendt, "homo sacer" by Giorgio Agamben, or "precarious" by Judith Butler, the refugee suffers a plight linked to problems within modern political and legal structures.[22] "If one regards European history as the development of the European nation-state, or as the development of European peoples into nation-states, then these people, the stateless, are the most important product of recent history."[23]

World War I dramatically redrew national borders in Europe. With the collapse of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires, newly independent states created minority treaties to protect minorities living on their soil. In doing so, these states created, Arendt noted, a new class of people, "the stateless," or, as Michael Marrus later described them, "the unwanted."[24] Although the minority treaties were meant to protect the legal rights of minorities, they also set a dangerous precedent for the racist policies of the twentieth century: mass denationalization, deportation, and expulsion. As Arendt puts it,

> The Minority Treaties said in plain language what until then had only been implied in the working system of nation-states, namely, that only nationals could be citizens, only people of the same national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, that persons of different nationality needed some law of exception until or unless they were completely assimilated and divorced from their origin.[25]

At the end of the day, the problem lay with the sovereignty of the state to decide whether to admit a refugee. Likewise, with respect to minorities in newly independent nation-states, their fate was also linked with state power. Arguments based on humanity failed when confronted with state sovereignty. As Arendt wrote, "All politics dealing with minorities, and not just with Jews, have foundered on the existent and abiding fact of state sovereignty."[26]

20. Said, "Reflections on Exile," 144.
21. Said, "Reflections on Exile," 144.
22. See Agamben, *Homo Sacer*; and Butler, *Precarious Life*.
23. Arendt, "Minority Question," 128.
24. See Marrus, *Unwanted*.
25. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 275.
26. Arendt, "Minority Question," 127.

The end of World War II brought about what is sometimes called the "postwar scramble," the largest population movement in European history. As Tony Judt wrote in *Postwar*: "At the conclusion of the First World War it was borders that were invented and adjusted, while people were on the whole left in place. After 1945 what happened was rather the opposite: with one major exception boundaries stayed broadly intact and people were moved instead."[27] From people fleeing the Spanish Civil War to those displaced and expelled from National Socialism and communism, the European continent was home to large transfers of the population before, during, and after World War II. The postwar administration of "displaced persons"—itself a term signifying those who no longer have a home or place in the world—was at first managed by the Allied forces in occupied Germany, and subsequently by the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

State Sovereignty, Citizenship, and Rights

One of the most enduring contributions to the discussion of state sovereignty is Arendt's chapter "The Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man" in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Here she addresses the contradiction within the nation and the state. If the nation is a community of people aware of their common cultural background, lineage, language, and shared traditions, the state is a legal and political structure bound to guarantee rights for the inhabitants of a specific territory. As Arendt writes, "The secret conflict between state and nation came to light at the very birth of the modern nation-state, when the French Revolution combined the declaration of the Rights of Man with the demand for national sovereignty."[28] Rather than appeal to status by birth or the divine right of kings, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen set forth an idea of human dignity that is evident to reason, boldly linking civil rights with citizenship and humanity. "The Declaration . . . was a turning point in history. It meant nothing more nor less than that from then on Man, and not God's command or the customs of history, should be the source of Law."[29] The problem with linking the rights of man with those of citizenship is that stateless persons are excluded as rootless nomads, barbarians, strangers, foreigners, and outlaws. The tension is between the state as the legal guarantor of its citizens' rights and the idea of the nation as a political community closed to noncitizens. As Arendt points out, the loss of citizenship entails the loss of

27. Judt, *Postwar*, 27.
28. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 230.
29. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 290.

human rights: "The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships—except that they were still human."[30] The same sentiment could be applied to Europe today, as the European Union defends human rights but is at a loss when confronted by people who are merely human—who may or may not have passports, who are fleeing war or poverty. Instead, the Refugee Convention is invoked to distinguish an economic migrant from an asylum seeker. When reflecting on the war and postwar refugee crisis that she herself was part of, Arendt raised an important question that is relevant for us today: how to provide equality before the law for stateless persons, if rights as such are derived from citizenship in the nation-state.[31] As she wrote in 1951, the situation of refugees highlights "the many perplexities inherent in the concept of human rights."[32] A stateless person is, in effect, without rights and lives in a precarious position of uncertain limbo. Moreover, he or she is entirely dependent on the kindness of strangers and at the mercy of the sudden closing of borders by the sovereign.

The stateless face a double loss. First, they lose their homes—"and this meant the loss of their entire social texture into which they were born and in which they established for themselves a distinct place in the world."[33] Second, they lose governmental protection as citizens of a particular community. As Arendt noted, "The calamity of the rightless is not that they are deprived of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or of equality before the law and freedom of opinion—formulas which were designed to solve problems *within* given communities—but that they no longer belong to any community whatsoever."[34] The expelled and deported, along with those forced to flee due to war and violence, lost their physical homes and political community. As Arendt outlined, no law exists for them. At this point we might ask, What about the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Refugee Convention, and the European Convention on Human Rights? Is not the situation far more

30. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 299.

31. In the growing literature on Arendt and rights, see Benhabib, "Critique of Humanitarian Reason"; Benhabib, *Rights of Others*; Parekh, *Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity*; Birmingham, *Hannah Arendt and Human Rights*; Gündoğdu, *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights*; Hayden, "From Exclusion to Containment"; Huyssen, "International Human Rights"; Isaac, "Hannah Arendt on Human Rights"; Menke, "'Aporias of Human Rights'"; Rancière, "Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?"; and DeGooyer et al., *Right to Have Rights*.

32. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 295.

33. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 293.

34. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 295.

advanced in the twenty-first century than in the postwar years, when Arendt was writing? Yes and no. Without a common sense of responsibility for others, international laws drafted in the aftermath of World War II are insufficient to deal with the effects of new wars in the Middle East and a long-term war on terrorism. Instead, the very laws that are supposed to protect the stateless are rendered hollow in the face of national indifference and a tendency toward a politics of nonintervention.

Ayten Gündoğdu augments Arendt's concept of rightlessness as a situation at the "borders of personhood": "One of the most crucial transformations since the time Arendt wrote her analysis of statelessness has been the shift from citizenship to legal personhood as the basis of an entitlement to rights."[35] While this offers room for the stateless to be considered rights-bearing persons, the gap between individual and citizen has not been overcome for migrants, who are often "without effective guarantees against the violent practices of border control." For Gündoğdu, like Arendt, personhood is an "artificial mask provided by law."[36] From Roman times, persona or personhood was a mask worn by actors. Taking her cue from Arendt's reflections on persona in the public realm, Gündoğdu argues for a more robust sense of personhood for migrants and the stateless. Without a concrete legal status, they are deprived of personhood, voice, and agency.[37] Likewise, without a persona, they are superfluous, precarious, and vulnerable to continued exclusion.

Statelessness and the Paradox of Human Rights

Statelessness then and now demonstrates a paradox within liberal political philosophy. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen as coeval has been internalized into modern political and legal thought. The stateless can only appeal to universal reason—and to the conscience of the international community. Arendt is most critical when she portrays the postwar plight of minorities in Europe: "The very phrase 'human rights' became for all concerned—victims, persecutors, and onlookers alike—the evidence of hopeless idealism or fumbling feeble-minded hypocrisy."[38] Yet she is not arguing against human rights but pointing to their ambiguity and ultimate frailty. "The crisis at hand," Omri Boehm declares, "confronts us with a predicament of modern political thought—modern liberalism even. It is a problem that we

35. Gündoğdu, *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights*, 92.

36. Gündoğdu, *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights*, 92.

37. For a further discussion of the shift from legal to political personhood, see Weinman, "Arendt and the Legitimate Expectation."

38. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 269.

have successfully repressed but that now returns with a vengeance, namely the inadequacy of the lingo of human rights."[39] Boehm, like Arendt, recognizes how human rights assume membership in a political community and citizenship. Furthermore, he detects confusion in the normative foundation of human rights. If anything, Arendt is looking for a way to avoid the abstract appeal to humanity or bare life.

What she perceived in 1951 is particularly relevant today in light of one of her earlier articles, "The Rights of Man: What Are They?" (1949). The German version, "Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht," emphasizes a single human right, while the English translation questions what those rights might be. In reflecting on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Arendt objected to its "lack of reality." Moreover, the declaration tried to proclaim an "ought" without a corresponding "can."[40] It argued for an idea of human rights parallel to membership in a national community. For Arendt, this signaled a return to natural law as prepolitical. Moreover, the discussion of how to ground human rights reaches an aporia or perplexity within the very idea of human rights. Only a member of a political community has rights. A stateless person or refugee, however, has lost his or her community and become a pariah and an outcast. The idea of the individual as a human being with civil, political, and social rights is legally and historically entrenched in national citizenship. Hence Arendt asks how human rights might be grounded on bare humanity when rights as such are rooted in national citizenship.

From Aristotle onward, we are understood to be political beings (*zoon politikon*), who, by nature, belong to a community. Political identity is rooted not in the cosmos or the world but in citizenship in a specific community—the polis. Arendt, like Aristotle, has a strong reading of man as a political being because the ability to act and speak in the polis is precisely what makes us human. What the refugee crisis in World War II demonstrated was the superfluousness of certain people—as displaced, seeking asylum, expelled, deported, and homeless. "Man, it turns out, can lose all so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality as man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity."[41] Human rights are understood to be inalienable, self-evident, and natural because they appeal to the inherent dignity of man. However, Arendt calls our attention (then and now) to the fragility of this claim. An individual, by nature, is not only a political being; he or she is a

39. Boehm, "Can Refugees Have Human Rights?"
40. Arendt, "'Rights of Man': What Are They?," 37.
41. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 297.

person, who has the right to have rights. For Arendt, human rights have the unfortunate tendency to become empty abstractions, or what Jeremy Bentham would call "nonsense on stilts." One might proclaim the equality of all human beings to be treated with dignity and respect, but political reality demonstrates the harsh necessity of citizenship.

Citing Edmund Burke's "rights of an Englishman," Arendt grants the necessity of belonging to a concrete political community. Otherwise, people fall back on their bare humanity. For Burke, and by extension Arendt herself, the rights of an Englishman are an "entailed inheritance" offering a stronger guarantee of legal protection than an appeal to abstract humanity. As Arendt and later Agamben conclude, the history of totalitarian regimes, with their systematic policies of denationalization, expulsion, and deportation, reduced individuals to their bare humanity. "The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being human."[42] Instead, human beings became stateless people without the right to have any rights. The survivors of concentration and internment camps demonstrated that "abstract nakedness of being nothing but human was their greatest danger."[43]

Certainly, there were dramatic changes after World War II with the precedent of crimes against humanity at the Nuremberg trials (1945–46), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), and the Refugee Convention.[44] In particular, the Refugee Convention defined a refugee as a person with a "well-founded fear of being persecuted." Yet Arendt's insight that statelessness affects how refugees are regarded by national governments and international agencies illuminates the current refugee crisis: "Only with a completely organized humanity could the loss of home and political status become identical with expulsion from humanity altogether."[45] Moreover, although Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees "the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution," how a refugee is defined—as asylum seeker, migrant, foreigner, stranger, potential terrorist, pariah, or enemy—is far from clear and is subject to national politics. The sheer scale of the refugee crisis tests the validity of international charters. As Ignatieff wrote, "The Refugee Convention of 1951 has been overwhelmed by the reality of 2015."[46]

42. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 299.

43. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 300.

44. While the Refugee Convention of 1951 focused on European refugees in the aftermath of World War II, the Protocol of 1967 extended its scope beyond Europe.

45. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 297.

46. Ignatieff, "Refugees and the New War."

As we are witnessing today, statelessness is endemic to the modern international order. Indeed, as Arendt argues, it is synonymous with the refugee question.[47] What she perceived then was the failure of international agencies and individual nation-states to address the existential and political limbo of statelessness. "The trinity of state-people-territory" means that the stateless are de facto rightless.[48] Without a home and citizenship, the refugee loses the right to have any rights whatsoever—and becomes a liminal or marginal figure. As Arendt remarks, "It seems that a man who is nothing but a man has lost the very qualities which make it possible for other people to treat him as a fellowman."[49] Then and now the bureaucratic administration of the stateless goes beyond sovereign states to include humanitarian organizations, charities, volunteers, smugglers, and the police.

As Butler argues, statelessness for Arendt was not limited to the Jewish question; rather, "statelessness [was] the recurrent political disaster of the 20th century."[50] Indeed, Butler underscores Arendt's criticism of the creation of stateless people by quoting at length from *The Origins of Totalitarianism*:

> After the war it turned out that the Jewish question, which was considered the only insoluble one, was indeed solved—namely, by means of a colonised and then conquered territory—but this solved neither the problem of the minorities nor the stateless. On the contrary, like virtually all other events of the 20th century, the solution of the Jewish question merely produced a new category of refugees, the Arabs, thereby increasing the number of stateless and rightless by another 700,000 to 800,000 people. And what happened in Palestine within the smallest territory and in terms of hundreds of thousands was then repeated in India on a large scale involving many millions of people.[51]

Resolving the Jewish question with the creation of the state of Israel meant that Arabs living in Palestine became a new group of stateless people driven from their homeland. For Arendt, the minority treaties in Europe and historical experiences in Palestine, Israel, and India demonstrated the exclusion of those who were rendered stateless by the formation of new nation-states. As she writes, "the new category of refugees" is a distinct by-product of twentieth-century statehood. Although Arendt was critical of human rights as empty

47. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 279.
48. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 358.
49. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 300.
50. Butler, "I Merely Belong to Them."
51. Butler is quoting Arendt in "I Merely Belong to Them."

abstractions, she did not oppose them as such but instead called attention to the fact that rights are grounded in national citizenship. As she states in the preface to the first edition of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, a rethinking of "a right to have rights" is linked with "the founding of a new political principle, in a new law on earth."[52]

Rethinking Kantian Hospitality and Human Dignity after World War II

At this point we might ask whether making genocide a crime against humanity could be such "a new law on earth" binding individuals together in a common world or common moral community? After all, "it is the right of every human being to have membership in a political community."[53] The legal recognition of "crimes against humanity" was an international response to twentieth-century totalitarianism, war, and other forms of violence. Similar to the UN Declaration of Human Rights, laws banning crimes against humanity recall the historical conditions in which they were written. Such crimes transcend national law and can be seen as correlates to human rights. "This human right, like all other rights, can exist only through mutual agreement and guarantee. Transcending the rights of the citizen—being the right of men to citizenship—this right is the only one that can and can only be guaranteed by the comity of nations."[54] Hence Arendt's solution to the perplexity of human rights is an appeal not to God, nature, history, or reason but to the intrinsic right of individuals to belong to a political community. "We only have rights because we inhabit the world together with other people" (Rechte haben wir nur, weil wir die Erde zusammen mit anderen Menschen bewohnen).[55] It is here that Arendt places the world at the very center of her philosophical reflections. The relationship is of the individual not to the nation but to the world at large. As Christoph Menke argues, crimes against humanity, for Arendt, transcend national law precisely because they are rooted in the very world that is common to everyone. The right to have rights is shared by different people who value plurality and the human capacity to begin anew. It is precisely at this point that one might draw parallels with Kant's universal law of hospitality that is grounded in the earth as a globe shared by all.

As states struggle to respond to the refugee crisis, the question arises as to whether hospitality is a universal right, a moral duty, an act of compassion, or one of charity and philanthropy. While written in a different century and a dif-

52. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, ix.
53. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man': What Are They?," 34.
54. Arendt, "'The Rights of Man': What Are They?," 37.
55. Arendt, "Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht," 766.

ferent Europe, Kant's eighteenth-century reflections on the universal right of hospitality in "A Perpetual Peace" still have much for us to glean:[56]

> **The law of world citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality.**
>
> Here, as in the preceding articles, it is not a question of philanthropy but of right. Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one may not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one may demand. . . . It is only a right to temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. They have it by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they cannot infinitely disperse and hence must fully tolerate the presence of each other.[57]

Kant's conditions of universal hospitality are carefully defined and limited. He is arguing not for brotherly love but for a specific type of hospitality—that of the host toward the guest. First, hospitality is a right and not an act of philanthropy or charity. Because the guest is a human being, the host is morally obligated to treat him or her hospitably. Achille Mbembe underlines how Kant described a qualified and "limited hospitality" because the stranger is not, and will not become, a member of the host's home and family.[58] Second, hospitality is a negative right. The guest has the right "*not* to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another"—so long as he or she does not threaten the host. How one determines whether the guest is hospitable or hostile remains unclear. Third, and perhaps most important, hospitality is a limited and tempo-

56. For responses by contemporary philosophers to Kant's "Perpetual Peace," see *Die Zeit*, "Was bleibt von Immanuel Kant?"

57. Kant, "Perpetual Peace," 284: "Das Weltbürgerrecht soll auf Bedingungen der allgemeinen Hospitalität eingeschränkt seyn. // Es ist hier, wie in den vorigen Artikeln, nicht von Philanthropie, sondern vom Recht die Rede, und da bedeutet Hospitalität (Wirtbarkeit) das Recht eines Fremdlings, seiner Ankunft auf dem Boden eines andern wegen, von diesem nicht feindselig behandelt zu werden. Dieser kann ihn abweisen, wenn es ohne seinen Untergang geschehen kann; so lange er aber auf seinem Platz sich friedlich verhält, ihm nicht feindlich begegnen. Es ist kein Gastrecht, worauf dieser Anspruch machen kann (wozu ein besonderer wohlthätiger Vertrag erfordert werden würde, ihn auf eine gewisse Zeit zum Hausgenossen zu machen), sondern ein Besuchsrecht, welches allen Menschen zusteht, sich zur Gesellschaft anzubieten, vermöge des Rechts des gemeinschaftlichen Besitzes der Oberfläche der Erde, auf der, als Kugelfläche, sie sich nicht ins Unendliche zerstreuen können, sondern endlich sich doch neben einander dulden zu müssen, ursprünglich aber niemand an einem Orte der Erde zu seyn, mehr Recht hat, als der Andere."

58. Mbembe, "In Conversation with Achille Mbembe."

ral right. Both host and guest have specific roles to play—the host should be polite; however, the guest only has the right to "temporary sojourn," not permanent residency. A host-guest relationship is, by definition, temporary. At some point, the guest should leave.

For Kant, the right to hospitality is a basic right to visit; it does not make the claim that the guest has the right to remain. A guest has the temporary right of sojourn (*Besuchsrecht*) but not the right to be a permanent visitor (*Gastrecht*). Likewise, as a visiting guest, he or she is not a member of the host's home but remains at the borders, in a liminal status. The guest is not a member of the political community that the host belongs to. As Robin May Schott points out, Kant's universal hospitality is limited to protecting the rights of the foreigner in extreme situations.[59] Since asylum often leads to settlement or immigration, the guest will most likely stay in the country of refuge. Kant's clear boundaries between host and guest are blurred when confronted with modern issues of national integration and assimilation. Likewise, because refugees are guests inside the home, their liminal existence challenges Kantian distinctions between host and temporary guest. Kant's conception of hospitality is limited to the relationship between host, guest, and surface of the earth. Today there are different types of guests, such as the exile, refugee, immigrant, guest worker, foreign student, and tourist. However, what does not change is the relationship between host, guest, and the world.

Because the earth is a planet that we share, we have no choice but to tolerate one another. Kant asks us not to embrace the guest but to tolerate him or her. The host and the guest have "the right to associate [*sich zur Gesellschaft anzubieten*]" and to temporary sojourn because of our "common possession of the surface of the earth." It is the world, not the nation or the city, that binds us together. As Kant is at pains to articulate, we are obligated not to love one another but to accept the presence of one another. Bauman interprets "the right to associate" to include the right "to communicate, to enter into friendly interaction, and eventually to try to establish mutually beneficial bonds of friendship, presumed to be spiritually enriching."[60] Not only is the idea of hospitality universal to everyone and temporary, it can be understood only within Kant's larger framework of perpetual peace, a republican constitution, and a cosmopolitan right to and respect for human dignity. In this sense, the creation and expansion of the European Union are a kind of Kantian project for peace among member states, with respect for human dignity enshrined in Article 2 of

59. Schott, "Kant and Arendt on Hospitality."
60. Bauman, *Strangers at Our Door*, 74.

the Treaty on European Union. Seyla Benhabib argues that Kant's universal hospitality is not linked to our unsocial sociability, kindness, or compassion but is a cosmopolitan right.[61] Indeed, Kant's claim that one cannot refuse the stranger has been incorporated into the Refugee Convention forbidding the return of refugees and asylum seekers if their lives are endangered.[62] As Kant writes, "One may refuse to receive him when this can be done without causing his destruction [*Untergang*]." It is precisely this issue of potential harm or destruction that underwrites the principle of non-refoulement enshrined in the Refugee Convention. The 2015 political agreement between the European Union and Turkey attempts to legally circumvent such refoulement by returning refugees to Turkey as a "safe" third country.

Schott argues that Kant's notion of hospitality was very much in the background of Arendt's reflections on statelessness in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*: "Although in this chapter Arendt does not discuss Kant's notion of hospitality, she does provide the historical background that illustrate[s] the *inhospitality* of the twentieth century, which threatens the right to have rights that should be guaranteed by humanity."[63] In fact, many of Arendt's reflections on statelessness detail the systematic dehumanization of the stateless so that they are rendered outside the relationship of host and guest. When Arendt reflects on hospitality as a right, she is drawing attention to the origins of hospitality in a shared world and language.

In *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* Arendt links hospitality, sociability, and speech with common membership in the world.[64] When Kant wrote about the universal right of hospitality, he referred neither to compassion nor to solidarity. Because hospitality is a universal right, it is not dependent on the pity or charity of strangers. Rather, it is guaranteed by the world that we inhabit together. As Arendt argued, the surface of the earth (*Kugelfläche*) is linked with Kant's idea of enlarged mentality and *sensus communis*. An enlarged mentality, "eine erweiterte Denkungsart," means the "anticipated communication" with others.[65] The right to hospitality would not make sense without the tacit understanding that the world is shared. It also assumes the condition of plurality; otherwise we would not think of inviting a guest into our home. Arendt reflects on the three maxims of the *sensus communis* in Kant's work: to think for oneself, to put oneself in thought in the place of

61. Benhabib, *Rights of Others*, 26.
62. Benhabib, *Rights of Others*, 35.
63. Schott, "Kant and Arendt on Hospitality," 187.
64. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 75.
65. Arendt, "Crisis in Culture," 220.

others, and to be in agreement with oneself.[66] Although one judges as a member of a particular community, one is also a member of a world community linked by our shared humanity or, as Arendt writes, by "the sheer fact of being human." It is precisely this shared world or "cosmopolitan existence" that Kant presupposes in the universal right to hospitality.[67] A sense of community entails responsibility for one another and the world. Moreover, unlike a private sense, the *sensus communis* is shared with others. For Arendt, the law of universal hospitality directly follows from our ability to communicate with one another and our sociability. Hence the right to temporary sojourn and the right to associate are rights guaranteed by the world. "One judges always as a member of a community, guided by one's community sense, one's sensus communis. But in the last analysis, one is a member of a world community by the sheer fact of being human; this is one's 'cosmopolitan existence.'"[68]

If Kant's "Perpetual Peace" grounds universal hospitality in common possession of the world, *The Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* defends the right of individuals to be treated with dignity for their own sakes. Each person possesses moral worth and should be treated with respect. "So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."[69] While agreeing with Kant, Arendt is wary of idealizing "humanity" because human beings deprived of a political community are the most vulnerable:

> On the other hand, humanity, which for the eighteenth century, in Kantian terminology, was no more than a regulative idea, has today become an inescapable fact. This new situation, in which "humanity" has in effect assumed the role formerly ascribed to nature or history, would mean in this context that the right to have rights, or the right of every individual to belong to humanity, should be guaranteed by humanity itself. It is by no means certain whether this is possible.[70]

Translating the Right to Universal Hospitality into Adherence to International Treaties after 9/11

The problem emerges when the Kantian model of hospitality is moved from the individual realm of the host, guest, and home to that of sovereign nation-states and refugees caught in a polarized war on terror. Especially since many refu-

66. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 71.
67. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 75.
68. Arendt, *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 75.
69. Kant, *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 36.
70. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 298.

gees are fleeing terrorists, governments and international agencies face the daunting challenge of being hospitable to refugees seeking asylum while preventing terrorism at home. The tradition of hospitality is admittedly far older than Kant. In ancient Greece asylum was granted to any person who took refuge in a temple or sacred place and asked the gods for protection. As exemplified in *The Suppliants*, *Oedipus at Colonus*, and *The Libation Bearers*, asylum is an important theme in Greek tragedy. The tradition continues today as religious places of worship and embassies provide refuge for those who seek it. One may ask for refuge without knowing whether the other side will grant it. As Benhabib sums up, "While the right to seek asylum is recognized as a human right, the *obligation to grant asylum* continues to be jealously guarded by states as a sovereign privilege."[71]

Mitzvahs, the Good Samaritan, and love of neighbor are central tenets of Judaism and Christianity. However, the idea of a *Willkommenskultur*, or a culture of welcoming strangers, is linked to different ways in which the historical experiences of xenophobia, scapegoating, expulsion, deportation, and genocide have been interpreted in different countries. Although appealing to a universal sense of decency and respect for human life, the culture of welcoming refugees is framed within conflicting memories of twentieth-century violence and genocide. Responses toward refugees entering Europe vary considerably, from those who argue for hospitality and the moral responsibility to share the burden of refugees to those who build walls against non-Europeans. Although previous generations of Eastern Europeans during the Cold War were granted asylum in Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Israel—Viktor Orbán's razor fence between Hungary and Serbia symbolizes inhospitality toward non-European refugees. Likewise, the fortified wall at the US-Mexican border and the policy of separating children from migrant parents are blatant rejections of human rights and the Refugee Convention in the name of national security.

The closing of the Calais camp in northern France in November 2016 exemplified a fundamental breakdown of the international framework of the Refugee Convention. The inhabitants of that camp, whose goal was entry into the United Kingdom, were rendered rightless by the decision of the French government to destroy "the jungle." Those who lived there, most notably children, were caught between the national sovereignty of France and the United Kingdom. The destruction of the camp meant that Calais was a state of exception to the Refugee Convention. Moreover, the moral and legal responsibility to

71. Benhabib, *Rights of Others*, 69.

help those seeking refuge was averted in the face of national interest. Asylum seekers were abandoned to charity organizations, while the bulldozing of the camp asserted the primacy of the state over binding international treaties. Inhabitants of the camp were effectively reduced to pariahs, enemies, criminals, and "the unwanted." Since their status was legally undetermined, they were pushed outside international definitions of "refugee," whether adult or child, economic migrant or stateless. The destruction of the Calais camp reverted to a police operation as France asserted its sovereignty. The children in the camp, who tried to reunite with their families in the United Kingdom, were consigned to bureaucratic obscurity and a precarious future.

Twentieth-century philosophers such as Emmanuel Levinas ground responsibility toward others in the human face formed in the very likeness of God. His plea for the primacy of the other has a particular resonance after the Holocaust.[72] Likewise, the arguments of Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas, rethinking Kantian hospitality, are framed within a European culture of remembrance.[73] While Levinas's responsibility originates in the other person, for Kant and by extension Arendt, responsibility for and to the other person is grounded in the common world that we share. The relationship is thus not only between the host and the guest but between host, guest, and the world. If the point of reference is first and foremost the nation and not the world, the rights of hospitality break down and refugees are abandoned to the goodwill of private charity or to the bureaucratic netherworld of displaced-person camps, police, and border controls. For Arendt, it is belonging to the world that is the fundamental right from which our unique plurality and personhood stem. Those who are excluded from the world are rendered pariahs, outcasts, and enemies. In his trenchant reflections on Arendt and statelessness, Adelman writes about the modern predicament of refugees: "The real plight of the pariah is not just to be driven from home. That has been the misfortune of our world for a long time. God did it to Adam. Rulers have made outlaws from time immemorial. No, what singled out the modern age was that no one would take in the pariah."[74]

As international organizations, governments, and the European Union struggle to answer the biblical questions of whether refugees are our brothers and sisters, and whether we bear any responsibility toward them, nations are retreating into tribal fortresses. If the political climate of the immediate post-

72. Levinas, *Totality and Infinity.*

73. See Derrida, *Of Hospitality*; and Habermas, "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace."

74. Adelman, "Pariah."

war years recognized the failure of nation-states to respond to statelessness after World War II, populism and national sovereignty are superseding the postwar liberal order of international organizations and human rights. Moreover, since 9/11 there has been a tendency to conflate refugees and terrorists. Heated debates surrounding the plight of today's refugees are occurring not in a vacuum but against the historical background of failures to help the stateless in the twentieth century. Then and now national responses vacillate between compassion and moral indifference, hospitality and hostility. When reflecting on compassion, Arendt was deeply skeptical of turning it into a political virtue. In directing a feeling toward an individual into the political realm, one risks turning compassion into pity. In doing so, there is a risk of hierarchy, of viewing refugees as less human. "Pity may be the perversion of compassion, but its alternative is solidarity."[75] Unlike pity, solidarity recognizes the humanity of others and emphasizes what we have in common. Today's refugee crisis addresses the moral contours of the self: Should one be hospitable, and if so, for how long? How can hospitality toward those fleeing war coexist with fear of terrorism?

So we are back to Arendt's reflections on refugees during and immediately after the war about how to guarantee the right to have rights. After all, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and *should* act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood [my emphasis]." Arendt's doubt that human rights alone would suffice to address the refugee problem is echoed by Ignatieff when he writes that consciousness of human rights is a legacy of the Holocaust. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights promotes not the sacredness of man but the knowledge of the cruelty that human beings are capable of. "The Holocaust laid bare what the world looked like when pure tyranny was given free rein to exploit natural human cruelty. Without the Holocaust, then, no Declaration. Because of the Holocaust, no unconditional faith in the Declaration either. The Holocaust demonstrates both the prudential necessity of human rights and their ultimate fragility."[76] Likewise, the Refugee Convention, as a response to expulsions and denationalization in the twentieth century, is a bitter reminder of the failures of nation-states. The European project is founded on the remembrance of catastrophic violence during two world wars. Moreover, the European Union emphasizes the rights and duties of citizenship, as well as political and moral

75. Arendt, *On Revolution*.
76. Ignatieff, *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*, 81.

solidarity as reflected in its commitment to human rights and the Refugee Convention. Today's refugee crisis challenges the self-understanding of the European Union as a political and moral community.

Viewing today's refugees as pariahs all too quickly engages a conception of politics as friend versus foe that reduces both to enemies. The Kantian argument for the universal right to hospitality appeals not only to reason but also to conscience, a sense of common humanity, and a capacity for solidarity as members of a shared world. Unfortunately, Arendt's life experience demonstrated that such an appeal is unreliable and fragile. The right of refugees to be treated with hospitality clashes with their vulnerable and precarious statelessness. Detention and displaced-person camps, the stateless and pariahs, are very much part of the twenty-first century; they have not gone away. Key to Arendt's argument is "a right to belong to some kind of organized community."[77] Deprived of their political community, refugees are most endangered when placed outside the law. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Refugee Convention are internationally binding treaties, they are subject to political interpretation, avoidance, and manipulation by sovereign states. Falling outside human rights law and the rights of refugees leads to the uncertainty of the unwanted pariah.

Siobhan Kattago teaches in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tartu, Estonia.

77. Arendt, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, 376.

References

Adelman, Jeremy. "Pariah: Can Hannah Arendt Help Us Rethink Our Global Refugee Crisis?" *Wilson Quarterly*, Spring 2016. wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/looking-back-moving-forward/pariahcan-hannah-arendt-help-us-rethink our-global-refugee-crisis.

Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Amnesty International. "The Global Refugee Crisis: A Conspiracy of Neglect." June 15, 2015. www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol40/1796/2015/en.

Arendt, Hannah. "The Crisis in Culture." In *Between Past and Future*, 197–226. New York: Penguin, 1968.

Arendt, Hannah. "Es gibt nur ein einziges Menschenrecht." *Die Wandlung* 4 (1949): 754–70. www.hannaharendt.net/index.php/han/article/view/154/273.

Arendt, Hannah. "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition." In *The Jewish Writings*, edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, 275–97. New York: Schocken, 2007.

Arendt, Hannah. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, edited by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Arendt, Hannah. "The Minority Question." In *The Jewish Writings*, edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, 125–33. New York: Schocken, 2007.

Arendt, Hannah. *On Revolution*. New York: Penguin, 1963.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973.

Arendt, Hannah. "'The Rights of Man': What Are They?" *Modern Review* 3, no. 1 (1949): 24–36.

Arendt, Hannah. "We Refugees." In *The Jewish Writings*, edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, 264–74. New York: Schocken, 2007.

Bauman, Zygmunt. "The Refugee Crisis Is Humanity's Crisis." *New York Times*, May 2, 2016. www.nytimes.com/2016/05/02/opinion/the-refugee-crisis-is-humanitys-crisis.html?smid=fb-share&_r=0.

Bauman, Zygmunt. *Strangers at Our Door*. Cambridge: Polity, 2016.

Benhabib, Seyla. "Critique of Humanitarian Reason." *Reset DOC*, July 10, 2014. www.eurozine.com/articles/2014-07-18-benhabib-en.html.

Benhabib, Seyla. *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.

Benhabib, Seyla. *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Bernstein, Richard. *Hannah Arendt and the Jewish Question*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.

Birmingham, Peg. *Hannah Arendt and Human Rights: The Predicament of Common Responsibility*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Boehm, Omri. "Can Refugees Have Human Rights?" *The Stone* (blog), October 19, 2015. opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/10/19/could-refugees-have-human-rights.

Butler, Judith. "I Merely Belong to Them." *London Review of Books*, May 10, 2007, 26–28. www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n09/judith-butler/i-merely-belong-to-them.

Butler, Judith. *Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence*. London: Verso, 2004.

DeGooyer, Stephanie, Alastair Hunt, Lida Maxwell, and Samuel Moyn. *The Right to Have Rights*. London: Verso, 2017.

Derrida, Jacques. *Of Hospitality*, translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001.

Die Zeit. "Was bleibt von Immanuel Kant?" December 20, 2015. www.zeit.de/2015/49/philosophie-immanuel-kant-vermaechtnis-philosophen.

Feldman, Ron H. "Introduction: The Jew as Pariah; The Case of Hannah Arendt (1906–1975)." In *The Jewish Writings*, edited by Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman, xli–lxxvi. New York: Schocken, 2007.

Gündoğdu, Ayten. *Rightlessness in an Age of Rights: Hannah Arendt and the Contemporary Struggles of Migrants*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Habermas, Jürgen. "Kant's Idea of Perpetual Peace: At Two Hundred Years' Historical Remove." In *The Inclusion of the Other*, edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greiff, 165–201. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

Hayden, Patrick. "From Exclusion to Containment: Arendt, Sovereign Power, and Statelessness." *Societies without Borders*, no. 3 (2008): 248–69.

Heuer, Wolfgang. "Europe and Its Refugees: Arendt on the Politicization of Minorities." *Social Research* 74, no. 4 (2007): 1159–72.

Huyssen, Andreas. "International Human Rights and the Politics of Memory: Limits and Challenges. *Criticism* 53, no. 4 (2011): 607–24.

Ignatieff, Michael. *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Ignatieff, Michael. "The Refugees and the New War." *New York Review of Books*, December 17, 2015. www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-and-new-war.

Isaac, Jeffrey. "Hannah Arendt on Human Rights and the Limits of Exposure, or Why Noam Chomsky Is Wrong about the Meaning of Kosovo." *Social Research* 69, no. 2 (2002): 505–38.

Judt, Tony. *Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945*. London: Penguin, 2005.

Kalb, Marvin. "Refugee Crisis and the Sad Legacy of the 1938 Evian Conference." Brookings Institute, September 23, 2015. www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/09/23-refugee-crisis-evian-conference-kalb.

Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by James W. Ellington. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981.

Kant, Immanuel. "A Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch." In *Philosophical Writings*, edited by Ernst Behler, translated by Lewis White Beck, 270–311. New York: Continuum, 1991.

Levinas, Emmanuel. *Totality and Infinity*, translated by Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1969.

Marrus, Michael. *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002.

Mbembe, Achille. "In Conversation with Achille Mbembe." In The Perpetual Peace Project, n.d. perpetualpeaceproject.org/initiatives/film-mbembe.php (accessed April 29, 2016).

Menke, Christoph. "The 'Aporias of Human Rights' and the 'One Human Right': Regarding the Coherence of Hannah Arendt's Argument." *Social Research* 74, no. 3 (2007): 739–62.

Meyer, Thomas. "Es bedeudet den Zusammenbruch unserer privaten Welt." *Die Zeit*, December 20, 2015. www.deutschlandfunk.de/hannah-arendt-ueber-fluechtlinge-es-bedeutet-den.1184.de.html?dram:article_id=337310.

Parekh, Serena. *Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Rancière, Jacques. "Who Is the Subject of the Rights of Man?" *South Atlantic Quarterly* 103, nos. 2–3 (2004): 297–310.

Rothman, Lily. "How Europe First Confronted Its Last Major Refugee Crisis." *Time*, September 10, 2015. time.com/4030159/evian-conference.

Said, Edward. "Reflections on Exile." In *Altogether Elsewhere: Writers on Exile*, edited by Marc Robinson, 137–49. London: Faber and Faber, 1994.

Schmitt, Carl. *The Concept of the Political*, translated by George Schwab. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Schott, Robin May. "Kant and Arendt on Hospitality." *Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik* 17 (2009): 183–94. www.jstor.org/stable/43593976.

Weinman, Michael D. "Arendt and the Legitimate Expectation for Hospitality and Membership Today." *Moral Philosophy and Politics* 4, no. 2 (2017): 1–23.

Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth. *Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982.

Zahra, Tara. "The Return of No-Man's Land: Europe's Asylum Crisis and Historical Memory." *Foreign Affairs*, September 22, 2015. www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2015-09-22/return-no-man-s-land.