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The de Lagunas’ *Dogmatism and Evolution*

Overcoming Modern Philosophy and Making Post-Quinean Analytic Philosophy

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9.1. Introduction

Grace and Theodore de Laguna’s joint 1910 monograph *Dogmatism and Evolution: Studies in Modern Philosophy* (*DE*) has been forgotten. I show, however, that it develops an important theory of judgment or, in contemporary terminology, epistemology. The theory rejects, and in doing so addresses challenges to, what the de Lagunas call “the dogmatism of rationalism and empiricism.” Roughly, this dogmatism includes the dogmas that complex ideas are analyzable into simple ideas, that the relations simple ideas stand in are external, and that knowledge ultimately rests on judgments that are evaluated against experience individually, in single acts of infallible intuition. In rejecting the dogmas, *DE* rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction and the existence of infallible judgments, and proposes that judgments confront experience holistically, as parts of systems of judgments. *DE* also addresses challenges to other similarly holistic responses to dogmatism, including to Hegelian and pragmatist theories of judgment.

I show, further, that *DE* provides an important perspective on the history of modern philosophy. According to *DE*, this history involved the realization of the inadequacy of the dogmas of rationalism and empiricism, as well as of the analytic-synthetic distinction. George W. Hegel’s and pragmatism’s theories of judgment were responses to this realization, just as *DE* was. While *DE* explains how Hegel’s system...
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constitutes a response to dogmatism, \textit{DE} is neither really explicit about how it or pragmatism constitute such responses, nor considers how later Hegelians, such as the de Lagunas’ supervisor James E. Creighton, go beyond Hegel on this matter. Nevertheless, we will see that \textit{DE}'s perspective can be straightforwardly extended to answer these questions.\footnote{According to \textit{DE}'s introduction (DE, p. iv), the explanation for some of this lack of explicitness is that one of the authors—we are not told which one—had to withdraw from writing part III of the book, with the result that this part engaged less than adequately with parts I and II. Parts I and II present the de Lagunas’ treatment of the dogmas and of Hegel, while their own position is mostly presented through criticism of pragmatism, in part III.}

Finally, I argue that \textit{DE} matters because its historical perspective can be extended to illuminate the development of mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Willard V. Quine’s 1951 paper, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (\textit{TD}), rejects what he called “two dogmas of empiricism” and proposes a holistic epistemology. This rejection and positive proposal are usually supposed to lie behind \textit{TD}'s revolutionary impact. But Quine’s dogmas were part of what the de Lagunas, as well as the Hegelian Creighton, had targeted when rejecting dogmatism. And Quine’s holism was close to the much earlier holism of Creighton, a position the de Lagunas also rejected. When viewed from the perspective of \textit{DE}, \textit{TD}'s real revolution lay in its relation to critical philosophy. Critical philosophy, roughly, aims to unpack, or examine the commitments of, established opinion. Speculative philosophy, of which \textit{DE} is an instance, includes critical philosophy as a part, but also aims to go beyond science and common sense in teaching us about the world. What \textit{TD} did was to contribute to narrowing down epistemology and metaphysics to critical epistemology and critical metaphysics.\footnote{Critical philosophy, as understood here, is not the Frankfurt School’s critical theory.} \textit{TD} also participated in the marginalization of philosophers who, like the de Lagunas, were speculative philosophers. Grace de Laguna surely recognized much of this as she stood opposite Quine during his first presentation of \textit{TD} in 1950.

In section 9.2, I outline some key features of the de Lagunas’ theory of judgment. In section 9.3, I present what \textit{DE} tells us about how this theory of judgment goes beyond empiricism, rationalism, and Hegel’s theory of judgment. In section 9.4, I present \textit{DE}'s critical discussion
of the pragmatist theories of judgment of William James and John Dewey; I also explain the roles of pragmatism and of Creighton’s Hegelian theory of judgment in overcoming the dogmas of rationalism and empiricism. Section 9.5 illuminates mid-twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Section 9.6 is the conclusion.  

9.2. Some Key Features of the de Lagunas’ Theory of Judgment

9.2.1. Holism and Fallibilism

According to the de Lagunas, ideas come in a variety of kinds. An image, for example, is an idea that represents specific circumstances, say, a specific chair from a specific perspective. A concept is an idea that is able to represent a single object in multiple circumstances and thus that can represent objects as such (DE, 165–166). The theory of judgment aims to describe the various kinds of ideas and to explain how those ideas that are characteristic of animals and early childhood, including images, evolve into those that come to be characteristic of humans as they mature, that is, into concepts, including the particularly sophisticated concepts characteristic of science, culture, and common sense (DE, 148–149, 165–166). The theory of judgment also includes a description of the evolving standards for the application of concepts in specific circumstances, that is, of the evolving standards for judgment. I here present some key aspects of the de Lagunas’ view of concepts and the evolution of concepts, mostly leaving aside explanations for this evolution and leaving aside what the de Lagunas say about other kinds of ideas.

An important key to the de Lagunas’ theory of judgment is their meaning holism regarding concepts, that is, their view that the meaning of a concept is partly fixed by its logical (deductive) relations to other concepts. As the de Lagunas put it,

3 DE includes (p. 160) a potentially racist statement, though not one that explicitly identifies a particular race or that seems to express racial superiority or animosity.
the reference of a concept to a mode of conduct is never direct. The concept never directly bridges the gap between stimulus and response. On the contrary, thought is a long-circuiting of the connection, and its whole character depends upon its indirectness, its involution, if we may use the term. Though concepts, apart from the conduct which they prompt, mean nothing, yet their meaning is never analyzable except into other concepts, indirect like the first in their reference to conduct. *(DE, 206)*

When the de Lagunas say that a concept determines action indirectly, they mean that it determines action only as a function of relevant conditions. They add that the relevant conditions amount to what they call the "total situation," where a total situation includes relevant internal states of the organism, including judgments and interests, and external conditions *(DE, 167)*. How one's concept of, say, one's coat guides one's behavior depends on external circumstances such as the weather, as well as on one's relevant judgments about the coat, the weather, and other matters, and on one's relevant goals.

Explicit in the preceding quote is the view that a concept's meaning has two components. It encompasses, in addition to the concept's logical relations to other concepts, the concept's role in guiding behavior, including not only overt behavior but also thought. The de Lagunas call the component relating to concepts' logical relations "content" and the component relating to behavior "import" *(DE, 126, 139, 162–171, 190–194)*. In providing examples of the meanings of concepts, they tell us that the content of "toy" in the mouth of a three-year-old might be partly captured by "is bought by papa in a certain store" and the import of "toy" might partly be captured by its role in picking out toys *(DE, 190)*. More interestingly, the de Lagunas write that "[o]n the side of content, evolution means a process of change distinguished by certain definite characteristics; on the side of import, it means no less than a whole new principle of classification, almost one might claim, of scientific procedure" *(DE, 199)*.

The de Lagunas' view that the content of a concept correlates stimuli, behavioral responses, and goals indirectly via the concept's logical relations to other concepts goes along with the view that a concept's import
is also not simply a matter of correlating stimulus and response. As the de Lagunas put it,

[a] concept is never univocal in its reference to a mode of conduct; that is to say, its meaning is never limited to the correlation of a certain type of stimulus with a certain response. On the contrary, its import invariably embraces a variety of actions. (DE, 205)

Meaning holism regarding concepts implies, according to the de Lagunas, a variant of confirmation holism, that is, of the view that our concepts and judgments are tested by experience as systems rather than individually. Confirmation holism and the lack of univocity of concepts’ relations to conduct imply, in turn, a variant of fallibilism, that is, of the view that all concepts and judgments are tentative. In light of meaning holism, the de Lagunas tell us that

[e] very concept involves an indefinite number of problems; and these cannot be stated except in terms which themselves in turn involve indefinite series of problems. Nowhere is there an absolute given, a self-sufficient first premise. From this, as well as from the indirect and equivocal nature of the reference of thought to conduct, it follows that the confirmation or invalidation of a concept by the result of the conduct which it serves to guide can itself be no more than tentative. (DE, 206)

Because concepts are applied in logically interrelated clusters, any challenge to a judgment is, as a matter of logic, a challenge to the cluster to which it belongs. Similarly, because a concept has implications for conduct in a variety of circumstances, the success of a concept’s application in any particular circumstance is, as it were, hostage to its application in other circumstances. An earlier judgment might, for example, have to be revised because of a later one. As a result, judgments are never evaluated in isolation. And since judgments are not evaluated in isolation, they are generally fallible. Fallibility is supposed to extend to mathematics and logic. The de Lagunas ask whether the concepts of number and the concepts of implication and inclusion it presupposes are final, and respond:
[t]his we see no sufficient reason to believe. On the contrary, the utterly unexpected development which the concept of number has recently undergone through researches in the theory of infinite numbers is an index of the possibilities which may yet be in store. Nothing could ever have seemed more necessary than that if $2X = X$, $X = 0$; and yet we know today that there is a distinct class of other roots. (*DE*, 159–160)

Elsewhere in *DE*, the de Lagunas claim something stronger than just the fallibility of all concepts and judgments. They claim that all concepts, including those of mathematics and logic, are ultimately evaluable in light of their success in guiding behavior and thus not solely on the basis of their content (*DE*, 137–139, 149, 198). Indeed, all concepts are ultimately evaluable in light of their role in guiding overt behavior:

[we must not, of course, fail to recognize that mental behavior can never become more than relatively independent of overt conduct. Its roots are in practical and social life, and the very condition of its health lies in an ever renewed contact with, and adaptation to, the changing phases of such life. (*DE*, 198)

The evaluableity of concepts in light of behavior meshes with the de Lagunas’ view that all concepts have import, but also with what they say about truth. They take the truth of judgments in general, including those of logic and mathematics, to be partly a function of success in guiding behavior (*DE*, 148–149). Judgments are, strictly speaking, never analytic in the sense of being true solely by virtue of meaning but are synthetic in the sense of being true partly in virtue of their success in guiding behavior.*

4 The de Lagunas do not explicitly say that their claim that the truth of judgments depends on success in guiding behavior means that all judgments are synthetic. They would, however, have recognized this way of putting their position. Creighton, we will see, puts his related position in this way. More directly, as we will also see, the de Lagunas are explicit that they think that the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic depends on meaning atomism, a dogma they reject.
9.2.2. Tempering Meaning Holism and Tempering the Implications of Meaning Holism

The de Lagunas are careful to temper their meaning holism, their confirmation holism, and the denial of the existence of truths that are true by virtue of meaning. With regard to meaning holism, their view is that our conceptual system is to some extent granular; some concepts are relatively closely interrelated when compared with others. Thus, while the content of a concept might be fixed by its logical place in our entire system of concepts, its content is largely fixed within a much more local cluster (DE, 200). Further, in the sciences, the process of integration and fixation of concepts has been carried farthest. Because the special science is so remote in its reference to common life and so entirely controlled in its progress by its own special end, it becomes a system relatively independent of the great body of cognitive experience. (DE, 200)

Meaning holism is, for the de Lagunas, blunted in a further way. The development of each one of our relatively tightly knit clusters of concepts also includes the creation of new, relatively autonomous concepts. For the new concepts that are introduced into our system of concepts often bear few logical relations, and many contingent relations, to existing concepts (DE, 110–111, 161).

Similarly, the de Lagunas blunt confirmation holism. They recognize that the failure of the system of concepts in generating satisfactory behavior can, as far as logic is concerned, be due to any of the involved concepts, and thus can be due to commitments across different special sciences, or even across science and common sense. Nevertheless, they also see that the blame for such failure tends to be sought in a relatively circumscribed part of the system (DE, 152–153). The reason for a failed expectation regarding the time of the arrival of a bus is not, for example, sought in the assumptions of logic or physics. This is, on the de Lagunas’ view, partly due to the purpose relativity of judgment. In order to reason, the de Lagunas argue, we inevitably make a variety of

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5 The de Lagunas classify physics as a special science.
assumptions, but which assumptions we make depends on the purpose of our reasoning and different purposes govern different instances of reasoning. As a result, standards of correctness for judgments vary with interests (DE, 153–155). Thus, for example, while a figure may, in some circumstances, count as a circle if our finest measurements show no deviation from the mathematical ideal of a circle, the degree of accuracy ordinarily required of a circle is no more than that it look circular to the unaided eye (DE, 150–151). Similarly, when economists assumed that people seek to gratify desires by the least exertion, all that was required was that the assumption hold other things being equal (DE, 159). But in mechanics, by contrast,

there is no “other things being equal.” The antecedent of each formula purports, at least, to set forth the precise conditions under which the consequent must follow. (DE, 159)

Now, since judgment is relative to purpose and purpose varies across domains of thinking, we evaluate claims in a given domain relatively independently of claims in other domains (DE, 152–153).

Importantly, while the purpose relativity of judgment blunts confirmation holism, evolution blunts purpose relativity. According to the de Lagunas, the development of relatively tightly knit systems of concepts and their associated standards of judgment brings with it, in some domains and especially in the mathematical sciences, an evaluation of judgments in increasingly large conceptual systems. And where judgment is increasingly systematic in this way, the application of concepts will become more conditional or indirect, that is, the appropriateness of the application of a given concept will depend on the applicability of larger clusters of related concepts (DE, 197–198). Further, judgment which is characterized by increasing systematicity and indirectness is also characterized by

increasing definiteness and increasing universality, that is to say, by the greater and greater delicacy with which it is contradicted or confirmed by experience, and by its gradual transcendence of the limits of the particular interests and the particular occasion which have called it forth. (DE, 149–150)
A particularly high degree of indirectness and universality is found in mechanics and geometry:

considerable alterations can be made in either and sufficiently compensated by corresponding alterations in the other. A non-Euclidean geometry, coupled with its appropriate non-Newtonian mechanics, can describe our world as exactly as the Euclidean can do. In short, geometry is recognizedly a branch of applied mathematics. (DE, 159)

Variation in definiteness of judgments is illustrated by the de Lagunas’ already noted suggestion that the conditions in which mechanics’ general judgments are supposed to hold are precisely specified, while those of economics are only supposed to hold other things being equal.

This brings us to blunting the rejection of the idea of truth by virtue of meaning. The de Lagunas think of the indirectness of concepts as the key evolutionary advantage of concepts. It is the conditionality of the applicability of concepts that makes uncovering the correct response to a novel situation something other than chance; the more conditional or indirect the concepts, the greater the ability to respond to diverse situations in different ways and thus to select an appropriate response (DE, 168–169). But the indirectness of concepts, they point out, means that thought has a structure of its own:

with respect to thought and conduct it must be said that the very indirectness and equivocality of the reference of the former to the latter gives thought a character of its own, which is as independent of aught beyond as can well be imagined. (DE, 207)

The de Lagunas thus tie what they take to be the evolutionary advantage of concepts to the existence of conceptual structures that can be evaluated, by and large, independently of their impact on conduct and thus to something that comes close to analyticity, in the sense of truth by virtue of meaning.6

6 The de Lagunas call formulae such as “7 + 5 = 12” analytic because they take them to be reducible to “statements of absolute identity” (DE, 159). Being reducible to an identity statement is accordingly an example of the kind of test of truth that, in their view, is close to being independent of experience.
9.3. Dogmatism and Hegel’s Philosophy: A Nineteenth-Century Problem Situation

We can now consider the dogmas of rationalism and empiricism, and the story of the attempts to overcome them, first by Hegel and later by his followers, by the pragmatists and by the de Lagunas. This section focuses on rationalism and empiricism, and on Hegel’s own position.

DE’s discussion of rationalism and empiricism focuses primarily on three dogmas, as well as covers a corollary of these dogmas. The first dogma, call it “meaning atomism,” is that ideas are either complex or simple, and that complex ideas can be analyzed into absolutely simple, and hence unanalyzable, ones. Empiricists held that psychological analysis, or dissection, of ideas of particulars would yield simple ideas. Rationalists, by contrast, thought that logical analysis, that is, an examination of the logical presuppositions of complex ideas, would yield simple ideas. The empiricist’s simples were ingredients in ideas of particular objects, that is, sensations. The rationalist’s simples were general ideas (DE, 30–33). The second dogma, call it “External Relations,” is that the relations between simple ideas are independent of, i.e., not essential to, their natures or meanings (DE, 36). The third dogma, call it “Intuition,” is that all knowledge ultimately rests on infallible intuitions of simple ideas. For rationalists, infallible intuition is provided by judgments affirming simple, general ideas. For empiricists, it is provided by judgments affirming simple sensations (DE, 25–33). According to the de Lagunas, the dogmas are closely related since, roughly, simple, logically independent concepts are required if infallible knowledge is to be possible (DE, 32–33). Indeed, we have seen that their own fallibilism is driven by the view that concepts have their meanings fixed, in part, by their logical interrelations.

The three dogmas bring with them, according to the de Lagunas, a number of corollaries. Of particular importance to what follows is a corollary that follows from meaning atomism’s assumption that analysis yields simple ideas. The de Lagunas claim that “the very division of propositions into analytic and synthetic rests on this assumption,” and do so, in part, on the ground that “no proposition could be determined as synthetic, unless a complete definition of its terms had
exhibited their ultimate disparateness” (*DE*, 73). The idea here is that, unless we exhaustively analyze a proposition’s concepts, we cannot determine what their mutual relations of implication are and thus determine whether the proposition is synthetic. So, meaning atomism provides the necessary basis for distinguishing between analytic and synthetic propositions.

One of the de Lagunas’ key objections to dogmatism is that it takes the form of judgment to be fixed. Their view is that, in light of Charles R. Darwin’s work on evolution, theories of judgment need to recognize, and empirically investigate, the past and future evolution of the form of judgment (*DE*, 19–20, 117–124). A second key objection to dogmatism—the final one to be summarized here—concerns relations between ideas. On the one hand, ideas without any interrelations are meaningless. On the other hand, it seems that dogmatists can admit no ideas of relations between ideas. Ideas of relations between ideas are complex and thus must, according to meaning atomism, be analyzable into constituent simple ideas. But no such analysis is possible, given External Relations. External Relations tells us that the meanings of simple ideas are independent of such ideas’ interrelations, so that simple ideas imply nothing about their interrelations. Rationalists are, to be sure, willing to argue that inclusion is not a real relation and thus can still maintain that some ideas include others. But simple ideas can include no others, and thus remain unrelated to other ideas (*DE*, 36–42). Empiricists invariably admit some relations between simple ideas, despite their commitment to meaning atomism and External Relations (*DE*, 48–51).

After criticizing rationalism and empiricism, *DE* argues that Kant’s, and his neo-Kantian followers’, commitment to the analytic-synthetic distinction implies a commitment to simple ideas and thus to theories of judgment that fail in the way dogmatist ones do (*DE*, 73–80). A certain reading of Hegel is then identified as the main challenger to dogmatism.7 On this reading, Hegel adopts the assumption, call it “Internal Relations,” that a thing is wholly constituted by its relations to other things (*DE*, 88–91). It follows that ideas, which Hegel

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7 The de Lagunas recognize (*DE*, 148) other interpretations of Hegel, but are here interested in a standard interpretation.
supposedly identifies with concepts, are wholly constituted by their rela-
tions to their objects and to other ideas (DE, 92). Thus, contrary to Ex-
ternal Relations, no idea has a non-relational nature. And, contrary to
meaning atomism, ideas are generally analyzable in relational terms,
so that no idea is analyzable into unanalyzable ideas. Given that the
relations of an idea to its object will partly determine the idea’s nature
and, accordingly, partly determine whether the idea will be true or not,
it seems the de Lagunas also imply that, for Hegel, the truth of an idea
is never entirely independent of how the world is and thus true just
by virtue of meaning. From their perspective, Hegel must reject the
analytic-synthetic distinction.

Intuition too must be given up with the adoption of Internal
Relations. Here, the de Lagunas attribute to Hegel a variant of their
own already mentioned argument for fallibilism; no finite, immediate
intuition could, given that the natures of ideas are relational and thus
that their application is always indirect, serve as a sufficient basis
for judgment. Partly as a result, Hegel needs to find another basis for
judgment. His solution is to adopt an evolutionary form of confirma-
tion holism according to which each judgment is evaluated in light of
its consistency with the entire system of thought (DE, 92–93, 99).

Hegel conceived of actuality as a system of internally related phe-
nomena that is driven to change by internal contradictions. The
contradictions existing at any stage of the system’s evolution are re-
solved in the stage they give rise to. Further, the phenomena at any
stage are subsumed in the subsequent stage, and their true nature is
fixed by their relations in the subsequent stage; the earlier stage is re-
vealed as appearance (DE, 95–100). Such evolution occurs in parts of
actuality too. For example, the system of fundamental concepts we use
to interpret reality evolves, according to Hegel, due to internal log-
ical contradictions. The true meaning of a concept in this system at
any time is fixed by a subset of its relations, specifically by its logical
relations to other fundamental concepts in the next, more consistent
stage of the system (DE, 100–102). In general, the fully true meaning
of an idea is fixed by its logical relations to ideas in the fully consistent
system of ideas (DE, 99).

A key problem the de Lagunas identify for Hegel’s position is that
it does not subject the law of contradiction to evolution and indeed,
like rationalism, assumes this law is an infallible criterion of truth (DE, 105–106). Further, Hegel does not give empirically ascertained, contingent fact a role in explaining the evolution of concepts (DE, 117–119). Finally, Hegel’s commitment to the idea that contradiction alone drives evolution comes with his recognition that actual history is only partially interpretable as being driven by this principle. Hegel must thus also suppose that history has entirely inexplicable, contingent elements (DE, 109). But the content of thought need imply nothing about any inexplicable, contingent historical elements. So Hegel seems to be committed to the view that thought is externally related to history, a commitment that is incompatible with his commitment to Internal Relations (DE, 110–111).

Thus, according to the de Lagunas, the nineteenth-century theory of judgment was in trouble. Dogmatist views of judgment, according to which judgment is ultimately based on intuition, were in trouble given their association with meaning atomism and External Relations. Such views of judgment were also in trouble because they were not evolutionary. At the same time, the leading evolutionary alternative to dogmatism, namely Hegel’s philosophy, was also untenable. Its evolutionary epistemology did not extend to logic itself and thus was dogmatic, in the end. Further, its commitment to Internal Relations and to a corresponding, extreme form of holism led to inconsistency. The de Lagunas’ own theory of judgment, however, avoids the troubles of dogmatism and of Hegel’s evolutionism. The confirmation holism the de Lagunas adopt is not inconsistent in the way that Hegel’s is. They treat logic as a fallible product of evolution, one that is ultimately also judged and explained by its role in guiding behavior. Similarly, they reject extreme forms of meaning holism, along with Internal Relations. They do this by taking concepts’ meanings to depend on import in addition to logical relations, and by supposing the continued creation of new concepts that are largely related to existing concepts in contingent, and thus external, ways. Meaning holism is also limited because concepts cluster and judgment is contextual. At the same time, the de Lagunas reject meaning atomism, External Relations, and the problematic, non-holistic epistemology associated with these positions. Meaning atomism and External relations are rejected because, according to the de Lagunas, there are no simple, unanalyzable concepts.
All concepts have content and import as constituents, and are analyzable in terms of their logical relations and behavioral role.

9.4. Dogmatism, Pragmatism, and Hegelianism

9.4.1. The Pragmatist Response to Dogmatism and to Hegel

Let us see why the de Lagunas also think of pragmatism's theory of judgment—which for them is the theory of judgment found in the work of James and Dewey (DE, iii)—as a response to the failures of dogmatism and of Hegel's system, and also how the de Lagunas' position relates to pragmatism.

Pragmatism, as the de Lagunas understand it, assumes that ideas are practical. More explicitly, it assumes that the meaning of an idea is just its role in guiding overt behavior and that this role is just that of specifying what we are to do given our goals and the type of context we find ourselves in (DE, 126–127). In addition, the pragmatist holds that ideas are judged in terms of consistency with each other, and usefulness in guiding, overt behavior. When the interpretation of a new experience contradicts a body of ideas, the tendency is to reject the interpretation; and when an idea persistently fails, then not only it but also, in accordance with confirmation holism, ideas that harmonize with it are put in doubt (DE, 129). Here the de Lagunas note an anomaly in pragmatism, namely that it does not properly extend its view of meaning to the ideas of logic and mathematics. It states that, in these fields, an idea's meaning is also given by its role in guiding behavior. But, according to the de Lagunas, this claim is not substantiated. Pragmatism admits that judgments about ideas in logic and mathematics are to be made on purely a priori, intuitive grounds and thus entirely independently of the ideas' roles in guiding behavior (DE, 149).

Pragmatists follow Hegel in rejecting Intuition for the view that ideas are evaluated in an evolutionary and holistic way. True, pragmatists do not subject logic and mathematics to this evolutionary treatment, but they disagree with Hegel in supposing that experience and logic, rather than just logic, drives changes in our ideas. So pragmatists can
suppose that logic too is subject to evolution; logic too can be properly conceived of as an instrument to be judged by its efficacy in guiding behavior in relation to experience. This, claim the de Lagunas, allows pragmatists to avoid reverting to dogmatism about logic and mathematics even if they have not chosen to do so (DE, 118, 202–204).

How the de Lagunas understand pragmatism’s stance on the remaining dogmas requires some extrapolation from what DE explicitly states. Since pragmatism supposedly tells us that ideas can be analyzed in terms of their role in guiding overt behavior, extrapolation tells us that pragmatism is incompatible with the view that there are unanalyzable, simple ideas, and thus incompatible with External Relations and meaning atomism. Pragmatism also, since the analysis of meaning in terms of behavior is supposed to be a complete analysis, denies that ideas can partly be analyzed by specifying their logical relations to other ideas, contrary to Internal Relations. The analytic-synthetic distinction will have to be rejected if pragmatists are taken at their word and are supposed to think that all ideas are to be analyzed in terms of their roles in guiding behavior. With the rejection of Intuition, meaning atomism and External Relations, the pragmatist has avoided dogmatism and its challenges. With the rejection of Internal Relations, some of the challenges to Hegel’s system are also avoided.

9.4.2. Objections to Pragmatism

As we have seen, the de Lagunas recognize that concepts do not directly link stimuli and response, even when goals are fixed. A concept only specifies behavior indirectly, as a function of circumstances broadly conceived, including which other concepts are in the agent’s conceptual system. It is for this reason, recall, that they think that concepts have content. But then, contrary to the pragmatist theory of meaning, meaning cannot be explicaded solely in terms of overt behavior; meaning cannot even be explicaded in terms of import. This is the first of the de Lagunas’ main criticisms of pragmatism (DE, 126–128).

A second main criticism of pragmatism (DE, 148–150) is that pragmatism fails to account for the fact that, in some domains, the evolution of concepts, and hence of judgment, is in the direction of
increasing indirectness and decreasing context dependence. This objection can be read as the objection that pragmatists have failed to provide detail about the evolution of judgment, an objection to which Pragmatists could respond by filling in their position with relevant details. But the de Lagunas have a deeper objection here. Their claim is that the view that ideas are practical has little truth to it. The de Lagunas admit that there is truth in the claim that concepts are practical. Concepts’ meanings do depend on their role in governing behavior, and the implications of a concept for behavior are context dependent. But concepts are indirect, and context dependent, to varying degrees, with some kinds of concepts, such as those of logic and mathematics, being highly indirect and context independent. As a result, it is more accurate to say that there are a variety of kinds of concepts, with varying degrees of practicality, and that many concepts are hardly practical at all.

The de Lagunas’ above criticisms of pragmatism can be thought of as suggesting that it is an overreaction to the failures of dogmatism and of Hegel’s system. The pragmatists avoid having to choose between dogmatism’s External Relations and the Hegelian Internal Relations, but they do so by identifying meaning with a species of import and thus by ignoring the ineliminable role that content has in explaining human behavior. This blind spot, in turn, means that pragmatism fails to note the varying kinds of concepts, and corresponding kinds of judgment, that result from evolution and, accordingly, fails to see that there is little truth to the dictum that ideas are practical.

9.4.3. Creighton’s Hegelian Response to Dogmatism

The de Lagunas and the pragmatists were not alone in responding to the challenges to dogmatism and to Hegel’s system. Of particular interest here, partly because it makes more explicit the de Lagunas’ Hegelian heritage and partly because it will later help illuminate Quine’s *TD*, is Creighton’s Hegelian response.

Creighton’s theory of judgment is close to Hegel’s theory, as presented by the de Lagunas. Most importantly, Creighton endorses
a version of meaning holism that identifies meaning with content. For him, a concept’s meaning is constituted by a system of judgments and thus by whatever other concepts are involved in those judgments (1898, 268–270). Further, Creighton’s meaning holism comes with confirmation holism and the rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In judgment, on his view, experience is brought “into relation with the facts which we already know, and is tested by them” (1898, 286). And because a judgment always involves bringing it into a relation with the rest of knowledge, judgment always adds to our knowledge, that is, is synthetic to some degree or another (1898, 280–282). Creighton states that “it was at one time supposed that analytic and synthetic judgments were entirely different in kind from each other,” but adds that “this view is of course fundamentally different from the account of judgment which we have just given” (1898, 282–283).

Creighton was, however, aware of the kinds of challenges to Hegel put forward by the de Lagunas and responds to these. For example, he holds that the most general assumptions of all rational experience are justified only by their results and, accordingly, are criticized in light of experience. Such criticism results in a reinterpretation of our basic categories and forms of reasoning so that, contra Hegel, logic itself is not exempt from evolution (1913, 138).

Nevertheless, Creighton’s position was, it is plausible to think, viewed as inadequate by the de Lagunas. For Creighton’s insistence that judgment is evaluated in light of our entire system of judgments goes against the de Lagunas’ contention that judgment is often properly local. Creighton does have a response to this contention, one he states in rebutting the pragmatist claim that judgment is always local. His response is that the local evaluation of judgment is merely a matter of expedience and thus a subject for psychology (1906, 489). For him, “the real locus of the logical problem . . . cannot be adequately defined except in the light of the object and end of experience as a whole” (1906, 489). The de Lagunas, however, would have responded that Creighton here fails adequately to take on board the evolving nature of judgment. Many kinds of judgment are still at a stage of evolution where their meaning is fixed in a relatively local way and so their evaluation should, as a matter of logic, be relatively local.
9.5. Dogmatism, Evolution, and Analytic Philosophy

9.5.1. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Its Hegelian Context

What remains is to examine the place of Quine’s TD in history. I will, in this section, look at TD in relation to dogmatism and Hegelianism. I will then, in the next section, use the distinction between speculative and critical philosophy to examine TD in the context of analytic philosophy.

TD is well known for its critique of what Quine took to be two dogmas of empiricism, as well as for its sketch of a holistic epistemology. The first of Quine’s “dogmas” is reductionism, that is, the view “that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or information” (1951, 38). The second dogma is “that there is a cleavage between the analytic and the synthetic” (1951, 38). These dogmas are included among the dogmas which are, much earlier, targeted by Creighton and the de Lagunas. Their criticism of Intuition includes criticism of the view that judgments are assessed individually. And they reject the existence of a sharp division between the analytic and the synthetic.

Quine replaces his dogmas with confirmation holism, which he describes as the view “that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body” (1951, 38) and with the view that all statements depend on language and experience, and thus that all statements are, to some extent, synthetic (1951, 39). Quine also supposes that all statements are revisable in light of experience (1951, 40). These three positive theses were, as we have seen, defended by Creighton and the de Lagunas. Indeed, Quine’s confirmation holism is close to Creighton’s and is, like Creighton’s, subject to the de Lagunas’ worry that it does not adequately recognize the local evaluation of judgments. Quine himself later had similar worries about TD’s holism (1991). The de Lagunas’ sophisticated analysis of the varying degrees of indirectness of the contact of concepts with experience is absent from TD; it recognizes, but provides no insight into, the relatively non-empirical nature of some beliefs (1951, 40–41).
TD's position is thus a late, not very original, reversion to a Hegelian theory of judgment. This reversion is unlikely to be purely accidental. It is plausible that TD is, in part, a criticism of Clarence I. Lewis's pragmatist defence of the analytic-synthetic distinction (Morris 2018). Further, Quine's career starts in 1930s America and the de Lagunas' work was well known then (Katzav 2019), as was Creighton's (Auxier 2005) and, of course, that of the pragmatists.

9.5.2. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” in Its Analytic Context

Speculative philosophy tends to encourage making claims that criticize, and go beyond, what is found in, or required by, established opinion, including science and common sense. In doing this, speculative philosophy aims to teach us about ourselves and our world. Importantly, the task of criticizing established opinion includes, as a proper part, engaging in critical philosophy. Examples of speculative philosophies are Hegelianism, the pragmatism of James and Dewey, and process philosophy. Critical philosophy, which includes analytic philosophy from the period 1940–1960, is epistemically conservative, that is, tends to discourage going beyond, or criticizing, some substantial portion of established opinion. Critical philosophy aims to elucidate, analyze, or determine the commitments of part, or all, of established opinion. Doing this may simply uncover aspects of existing, established opinion and its commitments, but may also involve reconstructing it and its commitments, while minimizing changes to them (Katzav 2018; Katzav and Væsen 2017).

Creighton’s vision for the theory of judgment exemplifies the speculative tendency. The theory of judgment, on his view, should offer an alternative interpretation of reality to the one offered by the special sciences. Developing this alternative requires critically evaluating the assumptions of the special sciences:

in no case are the conclusions derived by employing the methods and assumptions which a special science finds adequate for its purpose to be accepted without modification or interpretation, as a direct description of the nature of reality. (Creighton 1919, 401)
Common sense, on Creighton's vision, seems to be touched on by philosophy only insofar as common sense finds its way into the special sciences (1919, 404–407).

(Grace) de Laguna's paper, "Speculative Philosophy" similarly takes "a critical examination of traditional belief and accepted common sense" (1951, 4) to be essential to speculative thought, and states that such thought goes beyond science in seeking to understand reality (1951, 16). DE itself is a speculative treatise. It is informed by Darwin's theory of evolution and by psychology, but ultimately aims independently to provide an evidential basis for a new evolutionary theory of judgment. DE does not exclusively or primarily bring out what is implicit in, follows from, or is required by, established opinion.

Quine's TD, by contrast, promotes a critical approach to philosophy. The positive picture of knowledge it offers, that is, its holism and opposition to the analytic-synthetic distinction, concerns the logical relations between judgments and evidence. No mention is made of the possibility of an evolutionary theory of judgment, never mind of the scientifically informed kind strived for by speculative philosophers such as the de Lagunas. If only by omission, TD thus gives "epistemology" something like the content of "logical analysis of confirmation," and contributes to transforming the import of "epistemology" by making epistemology's procedures more epistemically conservative and less empirical.8 TD, to be sure, presents its case against the analytic-synthetic distinction as a "blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative metaphysics and natural science" (1951, 20). With the blurring of the distinction, all metaphysics supposedly becomes empirical. But TD tells us that metaphysics determines our ontological commitments by logically regimenting established scientific theories, and possibly also common sense, and seeing what the resulting regimentation quantifies over (1951, 43). So, Quine identifies the content and import of "speculative metaphysics" with that of something like "logical analysis of the ontology of established opinion." Further, the content of "logical analysis" is modified merely by the claim that, in unspecified circumstances, its

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8 Whether Quine's subsequent support for naturalized epistemology reverses these effects is not a question I address here.
procedure might be affected by empirical considerations; the import of "logical analysis" is not modified in any real way. Quine is, accordingly, primarily promoting a narrowing down of the content and import of "speculative metaphysics," one that excludes speculative philosophy and thus that makes philosophy a more epistemically conservative discipline. Further, while Quine's promotion of critical epistemology is done by omission, his promotion of critical metaphysics involves misrepresentation. At no point does TD make a case for critical philosophy; on this matter, TD is dogmatic.

Prior to publication, TD was presented at the 1950 American Philosophical Association Eastern Division meeting as part of a symposium about what were then the main trends in critical and speculative philosophy (Katzav and Vaesen 2017). Max Black, one of the Philosophical Review's (PR's) editors and the symposium organizer, wanted Quine to cover trends in critical philosophy and de Laguna to do the same for speculative philosophy (de Laguna 1950). Her paper was her already mentioned "Speculative Philosophy" and his was TD. The papers appeared in PR in 1951. Interestingly, she wrote Quine prior to the symposium, suggesting that they coordinate paper contents and extensively sharing her thoughts about her paper (de Laguna 1950). Quine's response is basically the abstract of his paper; he states his goal of rejecting the idea that statements can be tested individually and of rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction (Quine 1950).

Black, and PR's other analytic editors, had recently decided to exclude speculative philosophy from their journal, thus bringing to an end the openness to diverse philosophical approaches fostered by its earlier editors, including Creighton (Katzav and Vaesen 2017). And this marginalization, along with similar cases of marginalization at other prominent journals and institutions, including the journals Mind and The Journal of Philosophy and America's National Science Foundation, is plausibly part of what explains the eventual dominance of analytic philosophy in America and the amnesia about the work of philosophers such as Creighton and the de Lagunas (Katzav 2018; Katzav and Vaesen 2017; Vaesen and Katzav 2019). "Speculative Philosophy" thus can be thought of as representing the end of the tradition of speculative philosophy in PR. Indeed, her paper dutifully covers much of the canon of that tradition, including Dewey, Alfred
N. Whitehead, and Martin Heidegger. TD, on the other hand, was a dogmatic contributor to the marginalization of speculative philosophy. Further, TD was a key factor in determining the post-1950 trajectory of metaphysics (Glock 2008, ch. 2) and thus, not implausibly, in strengthening epistemically conservative, anti-speculative, relatively non-empirical metaphysics. Similarly, TD’s epistemology was influential (Elgin 2011), thus not implausibly playing a role in strengthening corresponding epistemology. That TD had the impact it had despite its unoriginal key claims is partly explained by the marginalization of speculative philosophy, including Quine’s failure to acknowledge, never mind engage with, the work of speculative philosophers.

9.6. Conclusion

DE presents an intriguing picture of modern philosophy as the attempted overcoming of the dogmas of empiricism and rationalism, an attempt that includes Hegel’s untenable, extreme form of holism. Filling in some of the details in the de Lagunas’ story leads to thinking of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century pragmatism and Hegelianism as still confronting the old dogmas, but also trying to avoid Hegel’s extremism and, at the same time, to learn from Darwin. The de Lagunas themselves then appear to provide a moderate form of holism, one that avoids dogmatism and also takes on board the implications of the evolutionary nature of judgment. Further extending the de Lagunas’ stories to the 1950s illuminates Quine’s holism as a relatively unoriginal Hegelian form of holism, but as dogmatically tending to strengthen the epistemically conservative, anti-speculative tendencies in epistemology and metaphysics.

Bibliography


