



The Resurrection of the Same Body and the Ontological Status of Organisms:

10

What Locke Should Have (and Could Have) Told Stillingfleet¹

DAN KAUFMAN

Vere Chappell has pointed out that it is not clear whether Locke has a well-developed ontology or even whether he is entitled to have one.² Nevertheless, it is clear that Locke believes that there are organisms, and it is clear that he thinks that there are substances. But does he believe that organisms are substances? There are certainly parts of the *Essay* in which Locke seems unequivocally to state that organisms are substances. For instance, in II.xxiii.3 Locke uses men and horses as examples of substances. In Locke's most explicit account of abstraction, given in 3.3.7-9, *organism* [*vivens*] is treated as a sub-species of *body* and *body* as a sub-species of *substance*; so, by transitivity, *organism* is a kind of *substance*. Finally, in his discussion of essences in 3.6, Locke uses all of the following organisms as examples of substances: horses, mules, men, sheep, goats, plants, drills, changelings, asses, bulls, cats, and rats. This textual evidence would seem to settle the matter about the ontological status of organisms. However, there are other parts of the *Essay* in which the ontological status of organisms is less clear, to say the least. In fact, there are texts in which Locke seems to state (or at least to be committed to the view) that organisms are not substances. I believe

1 This paper was initially part of a much longer paper which has since splintered into separate papers. The discussion of the resurrection was included in versions presented at Auburn University, the University of Utah, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and the South Central Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy at Texas Tech University. A penultimate draft of this paper was presented at the Pacific Northwest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy at the University of Washington. I thank those audiences for helpful comments as well as Vere Chappell, Paul Hoffman, Derek Kern, Lex Newman, Gary Matthews, Eileen O'Neill, David Owen, Bob Pasnau, Tad Schmaltz, Lisa Shapiro, and Erik Wielenberg for comments and discussion of the issues in this paper. Finally, I wish to give special thanks to Vere Chappell, whose own work on Locke has inspired mine, and whose friendship and encouragement have inspired *all* of my work. I dedicate this paper to him with gratitude and affection.

2 Chappell 1990, 19.

that this ambivalence ultimately presents the reader of Locke with an intractable interpretive problem.

In this paper, I wish to discuss what light is shed on Locke's view of the ontological status of organisms by his 1699 exchange with Edward Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worcester, concerning the resurrection. I attempt to show that Locke's views in this exchange, rather than making the status of organisms more perspicuous, actually makes Locke's view of organisms even more confusing. More precisely, the exchange with Stillingfleet seems to entail that Locke did not hold that organisms are substances. And given what he says elsewhere, this seems to entail that Locke's thinking about the status of organisms is inconsistent.

In the first part of the paper, I present two *prima facie* reasons why one might think that Locke did not hold that organisms are substances. One is the so-called "Reid-Shoemaker Problem," and the other stems from, what I will call, "the Kinds Problem." In the second part, I address this issue in light of Locke's exchange with Stillingfleet. I first present Stillingfleet's position concerning the resurrection. It is important to know exactly what Stillingfleet's position is because Locke's arguments against the resurrection of the same body are explicitly aimed at refuting *Stillingfleet's* position on this issue. In the third part, I present what Locke *in fact* said to Stillingfleet, and how this affects an interpretation of Locke on the ontological status of organisms. Finally, in the last part of the paper I entertain different suggestions as to what Locke not only *should* have said to Stillingfleet but also what he *could* have said to Stillingfleet, *if* Locke believes that organisms are substances.

Before I begin, it is methodologically important to point out what I mean when I say that there are things that Locke "should and could have said." I don't mean to engage in mere speculation about what a "Lockean" philosopher or what a contemporary philosopher would say if she were to lend Locke a hand. When I say that Locke "should have said" certain things, I mean simply that *if* Locke held his theory about the persistence of organisms *and* that organisms are substances, then there are things such that by saying them, he would have cleared up the matter for both Stillingfleet and others reading Locke. When I say that Locke "could have said" the things he should have said, I mean simply that Locke had the background principles, principles he *already* accepted, which would have allowed him to tell Stillingfleet the things that he *should* have said if he held that organisms are substances.³ The fact that Locke does not say these things (and in fact seems to tie his own hands with respect to at least one of these things) indicates a deep tension in Locke's thinking about organisms.

3 In other words, I am doing (I hope) what Robert Sleigh has called "exegetical history of philosophy" as opposed to "philosophical history of philosophy." See Sleigh 1990, 2-6.

I • TWO CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST THE
SUBSTANCEHOOD OF LOCKEAN ORGANISMS

If we were only familiar with 2.23.3 and Book 3 of the *Essay*, we might think that it is crazy even to entertain the idea that organisms are not substances for Locke. However, it is II.xxvii (“Of Identity and Diversity”) to which we must look in order to see why scholars have argued that organisms may not be substances for Locke.⁴ And in II.xxvii, we find at least two reasons for denying the substancehood of Lockean organisms.

1a • *First Consideration*

Thomas Reid and Sydney Shoemaker, among others, contend that, in II.xxvii.7, Locke gives explicit evidence that *persons* are not substances. Given that the textual evidence for this view applies equally to the status of *men* (a kind of organism), we can assume that if the text shows that Lockean persons are not substances, then neither will Lockean organisms be substances. The text in question is the following well-known passage:

’Tis not therefore Unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of *Identity*, or will determine it in every Case: But to conceive and judge of it aright, we must consider what *Idea* the Word it is applied to stands for: It being one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third the same *Person*, if *Person*, *Man*, and *Substance*, are three Names standing for three different *Ideas*; for such as it the *Idea* belonging to that Name, such must be the *Identity*. (II.xxvii.7)

This passage is a prime example of Locke’s view that in order to give correct persistence conditions for an individual, we must consider that individual as belonging to a certain kind, and the kinds in question will be (general abstract) ideas, i.e., nominal essences. And clearly Locke holds that the kind *substance* is a different kind from *man*.⁵

4 It is well known that II.xxvii was not in the first edition of the *Essay* (published in December 1689), nor did issues of identity receive attention in any of the drafts of the *Essay* Locke had been working on starting in 1671, although there is a brief mention of personal identity in II.i, especially II.i.11–12. Locke only added II.xxvii to the second edition of 1694 at the suggestion of William Molyneux. So, perhaps one could make the case that because Locke had already worked out his theory of substances well before he had written II.xxvii, we should not give interpretive priority to II.xxvii when deciding whether Locke held that organisms are substances. But then we are left with all sorts of entirely speculative interpretive issues such as why Locke didn’t revise certain parts of the *Essay*. Perhaps he was unaware of the problem. Perhaps not. In any case, as we’ll see, the revisions Locke *did* make are perfectly in line with what he says to Stillingfleet.

5 It should be noted that the fact that Locke claims that the kind *substance* is a different kind from the kind *man* obviously does not entail that men are not substances. The kind *cat* is a different kind from the kind *animal*, but clearly that fact does not entail that an individual cat is not an

William Alston and Jonathan Bennett state that “in thus denying that the identity of a person is determined by ‘unity of substance,’ Locke denies that a person is a substance.” (1988, 25) Because *man* is also contrasted with *substance* in this passage, every reason this text gives us for denying that persons are substances are also reasons for denying that organisms are substances.

Of course, in order to interpret this passage as supporting a denial of substancehood to organisms, one must be able to get from:

(a) Identity of substance is neither necessary nor sufficient for identity of organism.

to

(b) Organisms are not substances.⁶

Perhaps what we would need is something like this: If *x* is a substance, then *x* persists by virtue of remaining the same sort of substance.⁷ I think that there are good reasons to attribute this conditional to Locke, but irrespective of this, this text seems to be at least *prima facie* evidence for denying Lockean organisms the status of substance.

1b • *Second Consideration*

Another case against the substancehood of Lockean organisms arises from Locke’s principles of individuation, his theory of the persistence conditions for individuals of certain sorts, and his view about the kinds of substances there are.

Locke held four principles of individuation:

- L1: It is impossible for two things of the same kind to be in the same place at the same time.
- L2: One thing cannot have two beginnings (i.e., one thing cannot *first* begin at two different places or two different times)

animal. So, the fact that it is a different thing to be a substance than to be a man (or person) does not entail that a man is not a substance. Locke, if he holds that men are substances and that *substance* is a different kind from *man*, could still hold that *man* is a species of the genus *substance*.

6 I am not convinced that we can uncontroversially make the move from (a) to (b) because it strikes me that in the relevant passage Locke is not using the term “substance” to refer to individual substances. Rather I believe that Locke is using it in a different sense. So, when Locke states that sameness of man doesn’t involve sameness of substance, he is simply stating that the former doesn’t involve sameness of the *stuff* that constitutes the man. That is, in (a), Locke is stating that persistence of organisms does not require the persistence of the same substance (i.e., stuff that constitutes the organism at a time), but nevertheless the organism can be a substance, (i.e., the same individual falling under a substance-sortal). That is, Locke seems to be equivocating about the use of “substance.”

7 Alston and Bennett suggest this. 1988, 25.

- L₃: Two things of the same kind cannot have one beginning (i.e., two things of the same kind cannot *first* begin in the same place at the same time)
- L₄: One thing cannot be in two different places at the same time.

Locke also held that there are different persistence conditions for different kinds of things. In fact, the passage from II.xxvii.7 (quoted above) explicitly states that persistence conditions will vary depending on the kind of thing we're concerned with. For instance, Locke is, what we would now call, a *mereological essentialist* about masses, i.e., a mass persists iff it consists of all and only the same atoms (though the arrangement of the atoms is irrelevant). On the other hand, Locke does not think that organisms require all and only the same atoms in order to persist. Rather, he thinks that it is necessary (and very close to sufficient, as we'll see later) that it partake of the same "Life" at successive times.

From the principles of individuation and the different persistence conditions for masses and organisms, we get a quick and tidy argument that organisms are not substances for Locke:⁸ A mass, according to Locke, cannot survive any subtraction or addition or replacement of parts. Take a mass, M_1 , at t_1 and an oak tree O_1 , which M_1 constitutes at t_1 .⁹ O_1 does not have the same persistence conditions as M_1 : O_1 can survive even if one or more of its "successively fleeting particles" is lost or a new particle is added. So, say that at t_2 , M_1 ceases to exist because it either loses or gains an atom. Thus, at t_2 , M_2 ($M_1 \neq M_2$) constitutes O_1 . But according to Locke's L₂, one thing cannot have two beginnings. But M_2 begins to exist at t_2 ; O_1 does not begin to exist at t_2 but rather at some earlier time. Therefore, $M_2 \neq O_1$.¹⁰ But clearly the mass and the organism are in the

8 Versions of the following argument are given by Chappell 1989, 1990, and William Uzgalis 1990. In fact, Chappell states that the following argument is "as neat and conclusive as any that is found in the *Essay*, or rather as any that can be drawn out of Locke's words there." (1990, 22) It should be noted, however, that Chappell and Uzgalis draw very different positive conclusions about what the relationship between masses and organisms is. Chappell thinks that organisms *are* substances – i.e., compounded substances, diachronically compounded out of their successive masses, and synchronically compounded of the atoms that compose the mass that constitutes that organism at a time. Uzgalis thinks that organisms are "mixed modes" that depend on the substances (in this case, the successive masses of matter) that constitute them.

9 Although I believe that constitution is an asymmetric and irreflexive relation, I don't wish to beg any questions here. So, for the time being, let us assume that composition is a relation that can hold between x and y even if $x=y$.

10 Although Chappell doesn't notice it (or at least does not mention it), there is another similar Lockean argument for the conclusion that a mass at t and an organism it constitutes at t are not identical. Most commentators recognize that it is possible for an organism to be constituted of different masses at different times. What goes unmentioned is the fact that it is also possible, and consistent with Locke's corpuscularianism, for the same mass to constitute a different organism at different times or no organism at all. Locke holds that M_1 at t_1 is the same mass as M_2 at t_2 iff M_1 and M_2 consist of all and only the same atoms, but that the arrangement or organization of atoms in a mass is irrelevant to the identity of the mass over time. Thus, if we were able to rearrange a mass, while retaining all and only the same atoms, we could have the same mass without

same place at the same time. Therefore, by L_1 , the mass and the organism must be of different kinds.

Let us call any interpretation that maintains, as Chappell's does, that Locke holds that a mass and an organism (or an artifact) are non-identical things of different kinds occupying the same place at the same time, the "Coincidence Interpretation" of Locke.¹¹ I agree with Chappell that the Coincidence Interpretation is the correct interpretation of Locke's view of material things. However, I don't think that the Coincidence Interpretation is free of problems; in fact, it has more problems than can be discussed in this paper.¹² Let us concentrate on just one problem, a problem that will lead nicely into the discussion of the resurrection.

In II.xxvii.2, Locke says that there are only three kinds of substances: God, finite intelligences, and bodies (where bodies are either atoms or collections ("masses") of atoms). Let us call this the "Three Kinds Thesis." Locke seems to indicate that his principles of individuation (in particular, L_1 and L_3), when concerned with the individuation of substances, can have application to only the kinds of substances mentioned in the Three Kinds Thesis. So, according to Locke's L_1 , because a finite intelligence and a body are *of different kinds*, it is possible for them to be in the same place at the same time. But if *per impossibile*, there were two Gods, they could not be in the same place at the same time; nor could two finite intelligence be in the same place at the same time; and, most importantly for our present purposes, two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time.

If the Three Kinds Thesis, is the whole story about the kinds relevant to application of the principles of individuation, problems arise.¹³ Clearly, masses and organisms are neither God nor finite intelligences. Thus, if they are substances

having the same organism or an organism at all. Just jumble up the atoms, and so long as there are the same atoms, there is the same mass; but a different arrangement of atoms might result in something else. That is, it is possible that an organism come into existence at a time later than its "constituting" mass. In which case, by L_2 , the mass and what it constitutes would not be identical.

- 11 There are different versions of the Coincidence Interpretation. More precisely, there are different answers to the obvious question: Given that the mass and the organism are not identical and are in the same place at the same time, then in conformity with L_1 , what are the kinds exemplified by the mass and organism that would allow for their coincidence? Chappell thinks that the mass and organism are different kinds of compounded substances. See Chappell 1989, 1990. Martha Brandt Bolton thinks that the difference is between compounded vs. simple substance: the mass is a simple substance, and the organism is a compounded substance. See Bolton 1994. William Uzgalis thinks that the difference is between substance and mixed mode: The mass is a substance and the organism is a mixed mode. See Uzgalis 1990.
- 12 In "Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds," I discuss another problem for the Coincidence Interpretation, namely that it is incompatible with Locke's theory of real and nominal essences.
- 13 Actually, there is going to be a problem in any case, even if we allow for a more fine-grained account of the kinds of substances, because *mere* difference in kind is not going to allow for the possibility of coincidence. After all, for Locke *dog* and *cat* are different kinds, but Locke certainly does not want to allow the possibility of dog/cat coincidence. A major task for scholars is going to be spelling out which kinds are relevant to the application of L_1 and L_3 .

at all, they must be bodies. But Locke indicates that it is only *masses* (and atoms) that have legitimate claim to the title of “body.” This is clear from the following passage, in which Locke gives his most explicit application of Lr:

For though these three sorts of Substances, as we term them, do not exclude one another out of the same place; yet we cannot conceive but that they must necessarily each of them exclude any of the same kind out of the same place... For example could two Bodies be in the same place at the same time; then those two parcels of Matter must be one and the same. (II.xxvii.2)

The context in which this passage occurs makes clear that the bodies, the “parcels of Matter,” are masses of matter having the persistence conditions of masses.¹⁴ So, if the mass is a body, *and* the Three Kinds Thesis is held by Locke, then the organism cannot be a body; otherwise the mass and the organism would be distinct things in the same place at the same time *and* be of the same kind, and this would violate Lr.¹⁵ But if organisms are not bodies (or God or finite intelligences), then, according to the Three Kinds Thesis, organisms are not substances.¹⁶ Why should this bother us? This should bother us because, as we have already seen, Locke constantly refers to paradigm *organisms* (e.g., horses, oak trees, men, etc.) as paradigm *substances*.¹⁷

There are several interpretations that avoid this problem but which have problems of their own.¹⁸ I do not have the space to address these interpretations in

14 This is one of the reasons why I cannot accept the interpretation of Alston and Bennett. They argue that in II.xxvii Locke uses the term “substance” in a much more restricted sense than he does in the rest of the *Essay*. In II.xxvii, they argue, Locke uses “substance” to refer to the most basic or fundamental elements in his ontology. In the corporeal realm, then, Locke thinks (at least in II.xxvii) that atoms are the only substances. But the passage I have just quoted and the context in which it occurs makes clear that Locke held that masses of atoms are substances within the confines of II.xxvii.

15 Alston and Bennett believe that in the few cases in which Locke refers to organisms as “bodies” (i.e., *living* bodies) “these uses of ‘body’ are imperfect, but mildly and understandably so.” 1988, 28.

16 Uzgalis and (to some extent) Alston and Bennett are willing to accept this conclusion. Uzgalis thinks that, according to Locke, masses are substances but organisms are “mixed modes,” and those are sufficiently different in kind to allow for the spatial coincidence of masses and organisms. Alston and Bennett, on the other hand, believe that more often than not Locke thinks that organisms are substances, but in II.xxvii, Locke uses a restricted notion of substance, which excludes organisms.

17 See Alston and Bennett 1988, 26. Anecdotal empirical evidence (i.e., discussions with other scholars) suggests to me that many scholars do not find Locke’s apparent denial of the Substancehood of organisms to be problematic; rather they find Locke’s occasional use of organisms as examples of substances to be the problem. It should be clear that what I find problematic is his *ambivalence* about the Substancehood of organisms.

18 In addition to the various versions of the Coincidence Interpretation, which deny the Three Kinds Thesis (e.g., Chappell, Bolton), and which accept the Three Kinds Thesis (e.g., Uzgalis), Christopher Conn 2003 has argued that Locke is a four-dimensionalist. Hence the relation between an organism and its constituting mass is the relation between a whole and one of its proper temporal parts. Too many people to mention have argued that Locke believed in the

the present paper.¹⁹ So, let us now turn to the issue of the resurrection and what it tells us about Locke's views about the status of organisms.

Although in some places it is clear that Locke held that organisms are a kind of body it isn't clear that Locke consistently held this (or that he *could* consistently hold this).²⁰ In fact, in his exchange with Stillingfleet, Locke is given ample opportunity to clarify his position on the ontological status of organisms and to give his readers reasons to think that organisms are bodies of a certain kind and hence substances. Unfortunately, as we will see, Locke not only does not clarify things in any way which supports the Substancehood of organisms, but in fact, without exception, his 1699 exchange with Stillingfleet indicates that Locke was not taking organisms to be bodies and hence (if the Coincidence Interpretation and the Three Kinds Thesis are correct), he does not think that organisms are substances. It is to the discussion of the resurrection that we now turn.

2 • THE RESURRECTION OF THE SAME BODY

In the seventeenth century, there was much debate concerning the resurrection of the body, especially among British philosophers and theologians.²¹ Without discussion of all of the points of disagreement between the parties to this issue, it should be pointed out that, to my knowledge, (almost) all parties agreed on certain things. First, the parties agree that the resurrection is an article of the Christian faith.²² Second, they agreed that the resurrection is not a "natural" occurrence but a supernatural one requiring God's immediate power to bring it about.²³ Third, they agreed that an account of the identity of the resurrected person or

thesis of "relative identity" in which it is possible for x to be the same F as y but not the same G as y even if both x and y are F s and G s. If this interpretation is correct, then we need not answer the question about which kinds are exemplified by the mass and the organism which allows for their coincidence. On the relative identity interpretation, we are dealing with *one* thing that is both a mass and an organism. For the best defense of this view, see Matthew Stuart, in preparation.

19 In "Locke on Individuation and the Corpuscular Basis of Kinds", I spend some time addressing the interpretations of Chappell, Bolton, Uzgalis, and Alston and Bennett.

20 Locke refers to organisms as "living bodies" in II.xxvii.3, 4, 8, for example.

21 See Thiel, 1998.

22 When Stillingfleet accuses Locke of forming his view of the resurrection because of his view on personal identity, Locke replies as follows: "the reason of believing any article of the Christian faith (such as your lordship is here speaking of) to me and upon my ground, is its being a part of divine revelation. Upon this ground I believed it, before I either write that chapter of identity and diversity, and before I ever thought of those propositions which your lordship quotes out of that chapter, and upon the same ground I believe it still." (*Works* III, 303) What Locke *does* hold is that his account of the resurrection is accommodated more easily by his theory of personal identity.

23 See, for instance, Arthur Bury 1690, 69, and Robert Boyle 1675, 2-3. Hence there was needed some re-interpretation of Paul's famous "seed metaphor" for the resurrection. In fact, St. Thomas and Giles of Rome explicitly take issue with Paul's "seed metaphor" for the resurrection precisely because it likens the resurrection to a perfectly natural occurrence. See Bynum 1995, Ch. 6, for discussion of the decline of the "seed metaphor" in the thirteenth century.

body should not be *ad hoc*; rather the case of the resurrection should be able to be accommodated by a perfectly general account of diachronic identity. This is certainly the case with both Locke and Stillingfleet; but it is also the view of one of Locke's harshest critics, Thomas Beconsall:

And now since it is concluded, the Resurrection we are to make will be a Resurrection of the same Body, it remains that we *Enquire into the Nature of its Identity, or wherein this Sameness consists*. And that we take just Measures of the Identity of the rising Body, I think it will be necessary to offer something concerning the Nature of *Humane Identity*, or which is all one, the *Identity of a humane Person*, because the Identity of the *rising Man*, will certainly be formed upon the same Rules and Principles with that of the *living Man*. (Beconsall 1697, 14-15)

That is, our theory about the persistence of human beings should be general enough to explain typical or "everyday" persistence as well as puzzle cases such as the identity of premortem and resurrected human beings. Fourth, the parties agree that Scripture is the ultimate authority for an account of the resurrection. This is certainly the case with Locke and Stillingfleet. Stillingfleet insists that his account of the resurrection is not to be given with a view to the doctrines of any particular branch of Christianity, but says that he "shall confine my self to the Scripture as the Foundation and Rule of our Faith" (1698, 34) when giving his account of the resurrection. And Locke acknowledges this: "I know your lordship pretends not to erect your particular interpretations of scripture into articles of faith." (*Works* III, 305) And Locke, in his *Resurrectio et quae sequuntur* as well as his 1699 reply to Stillingfleet confines himself to what is explicitly stated by Scripture. Of course, the passages in Scripture that were of concern to philosophers and theologians (e.g., I Corinthians 15 and Job) were in need of philosophical interpretation when it comes to the details of the resurrection: Even if scripture states that the resurrection requires the same body, it is a philosophical matter as to what constitutes the same body; and on this issue there was much disagreement among those who believed in the resurrection of the same body.²⁴ Fifth, Christ's resurrection is not only *proof* of the resurrection but also a *model* of the resurrection of the body. That is, with respect to the latter, Christ's resurrection with the same body was taken to be indicative of the manner in which people would be resurrected in the general resurrection. While Locke seems to think that Christ's resurrection, as well as the resurrection of the saints, serves as proof of the resurrection, he denies that Christ's resurrection serves as a model for the general resurrection.²⁵

24 For a very helpful (albeit brief) discussion of this issue, see Thiel 1998. Arthur Bury explicitly makes this point: "a resurrection from the dead is the proper Matter of the Christian Faith...but concerning the Manner thereof, it doth not so plainly appear what we are to believe." (1690, 69).

25 "For it may be a good consequence, Christ is risen, and therefore there shall be a resurrection of the dead; and yet this may not be a good consequence, Christ was raised with the same body he had at his death, therefore all men shall be raised with the same body they had at their death,

What is obvious from even a cursory reading of II.xxvii of the *Essay* is that Locke thinks that sameness of body is not relevant to (i.e., neither necessary nor sufficient for) personal identity; and hence is not relevant to the doctrine of the general resurrection, a doctrine held by Roman Catholics as well as most Anglicans. Locke takes it as an article of the Christian faith that there will be a general resurrection, *and* that I will be resurrected with *a* body, *and* that that body will be *my* body, but the body I have after the resurrection need not be the *same* body as my premortem body.²⁶ What *is* relevant to the resurrection is that the resurrected thing be the same *person* as the premortem person. Given that an account of the resurrection should be covered by a general theory of diachronic identity, and given Locke's psychological criterion of personal identity, in which sameness of body (or soul) is irrelevant, "we may be able without difficulty to conceive, the same Person at the Resurrection, though in a Body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here." (II.xxvii.15) By making sameness of body or soul irrelevant to personal identity and hence the resurrection, Locke avoids the problems that bothered philosophers and theologians about the resurrected body, e.g., will we have the bodies we had when we died? Will we have all the same hairs, fingernails, and toenails we had when we were alive? Etc. But clearly, given the severe reaction against Locke's theory and its ramifications for the resurrection of the same body, Locke's view was rather radical and opposed to standard Christian thinking, both protestant and catholic.

Stillingfleet, on the other hand, holds that the words of St. Paul indicate a requirement of bodily identity in the case of the general resurrection.²⁷ In believing this, Stillingfleet was most certainly not alone; in fact, we would be justified in calling the view that requires sameness of body for the resurrection the "standard view."²⁸

contrary to what your lordship says concerning a fat man dying of consumption. But the case I think far different betwixt our Saviour, and those to be raised at the last day." (*Works* III, 313) See also *Works* III, 304-305, 313, 315. Locke thinks that Christ's resurrection is a special case, in which the same (or roughly the same) body was necessary for purely practical purposes. Locke thinks that Christ's resurrected body must sufficiently resemble his premortem body for the purposes of recognizability, i.e., so people who saw him would recognize him and recognize that he had come back from the dead.

26 See *Works* III, 314, 324.

27 See also John 5.28,29.

28 This is especially true if we consider the Catholic Church's stand on the resurrection of the body. The resurrection of the same body was declared by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215, the condemnation of 1277 condemned propositions denying the resurrection of the same body, and in 1274, the Second Council of Lyon declared the resurrection of the same body. See Bynum 1995, 229-231. According to Bynum, "no mainstream theologian of the late Middle Ages denied the doctrine of bodily resurrection." (1995, 276).

In the seventeenth century, John Pearson, Thomas Beconsall, Humphrey Hody, Kenelm Digby, Thomas Browne, Alexander Ross, and Robert Boyle defended the view, though each differs in what they take to be the conditions under which a body counts as the same body. See Pearson 1659, Beconsall 1697, Hody 1694, Digby 1643, 1644, Browne 1977, originally 1643, Ross 1645, Boyle 1675. There are detractors other than Locke. For instance, Arthur Bury (1690) holds that

What is especially interesting about the dispute between Locke and Stillingfleet about the resurrection is the fact that Stillingfleet grants much of what Locke would seem to want to hold. Stillingfleet begins by explicitly stating what he is *not* going to mean by “same body”: “I do not say the same individual Particles of Matter which were united at the Point of Death”;²⁹ and second: “I do not say, the same Particles which the Sinner had at the very time of commission of his Sins.”³⁰ So, Stillingfleet does not hold that the premortem and the resurrected bodies are identical in the mereological-essentialist sense of having exactly the same material atoms at death or at the time of their sins. If *that* were Stillingfleet’s view, then identity of premortem and resurrected body would perhaps be implausible on its face. Stillingfleet would then encounter undesirable consequences, and in fact mentions the problem that if the resurrected body required the atoms present at death, then a man who died of consumption would be resurrected to a completely emaciated body. Locke agrees with Stillingfleet on this point: as Locke points out, what would a dead embryo’s body be like when resurrected if identity of body required all and only the same atoms at the time of death? Must the embryo “remain a man not an inch long to eternity; because there are not particles of matter, formerly united to his soul, to make him bigger.” (*Works* III, 311)

Would the resurrected body consist of the atoms the body had when it performed the sins and laudatory actions for which it will be punished or rewarded? Stillingfleet denies this as well because then someone who sinned constantly and for a long time would be resurrected with an inappropriately gigantic body.

Also, as most seventeenth-century philosophers knew, cannibalism, both “direct” and “indirect” posed problems for bodily resurrection. In fact, cannibalism was a standard test case for adequacy of accounts of the resurrection of the body. The *direct cannibalism* case is one in which another human being eats, say, part of my body. When my particles “nourish” the cannibal, many of my particles become parts of the cannibals’ body.³¹ The *indirect cannibalism* case is one in

the same body is not required for the resurrection. However, Bury, unlike Locke, holds that the same soul is required.

29 Locke objects that Stillingfleet’s appeal to John 5:28 (“All that are in the Graves shall hear his voice; and shall come forth.”) commits him to saying that the resurrected body must be the “particles but such as were united at the point of death: because you mean no other substance, but what comes out of the grave; and no substance, no particles come out, you say, but what were in the grave.” (*Works* III, 306-307)

30 Stillingfleet 1698, 34-35.

31 Early discussions of the resurrection found cannibalism to be a very difficult issue to account for. Augustine, for instance, who held that cannibalism is a horrible depravity, held that cannibalism was the hardest problem for an account of the resurrection. See *De civitate Dei* 22.20-23. See also Bynum 1995, 263.

In his very interesting account of the resurrection and how to deal with the cannibalism case, *The Resurrection of the Same Body Asserted*, Humphrey Hody argues that so few of the particles that are eaten nourish the cannibal that only a negligible amount of the cannibalized body becomes parts of the cannibal’s body. Hody cites the “infallible *Statick Experiments*” of Sanctorius as establishing that only 2% of what a person (or cow) eats nourishes them and becomes part of their body. (In *Some Physico-Theological Considerations about the Possibility of the Resurrection*

which one of several things can happen. For instance, I die and am buried. When my body decomposes, my atoms “nourish” the grass, which is then eaten by a cow. My atoms nourish the cow, and become parts of the cow. When the cow is slaughtered and eaten by a human being, my atoms become parts of that human being. Humphrey Hody describes the prevalence of indirect cannibalism:

You may add that we are all in some sense *Canibals* and *Man-eaters*, we *devour* one another, we eat our dead Neighbours, our Brothers, our Fathers, the succeeding Generation *swallows down* the former, though we *prey* not upon ‘em, in the same manner, as some other *Canibals* do, yet, by a subtle *Cookery* of Nature, we eat ‘em at *second Hand*. This is true in some Measure: From the Bodies of the Dead springs up *Grass*, this when eaten by the Ox, is turn’d into *Flesh*; this we eat, and the *Flesh* of the *Ox* becomes *ours*. (Hody 1694, 184)

If the identity of premortem and resurrected body requires all of the same atoms, then how can the direct/indirect cannibal and I both be resurrected with the same bodies we had? Clearly, if sameness of body required all and only the same atoms, then cannibalism, both direct and indirect, would have unpalatable consequences for the resurrection of the same body. But remember: Stillingfleet’s view does *not* entail these consequences. We should not find this surprising. Stillingfleet was most certainly aware of the problem for the resurrection of the body posed by cannibalism. As I have previously mentioned, it was a standard “test case” for bodily identity and the resurrection in the seventeenth century and earlier. Moreover, Hody’s 1694 work, *The Resurrection of the (same) Body Asserted*, includes many pages addressing just this issue; and this work was dedicated with extreme devotion and reverence to Stillingfleet. Even if (as is very unlikely) Stillingfleet were unaware of the problem of cannibalism from other sources, it is rather unlikely that Stillingfleet was unaware of Hody’s work and its contents.

What we have seen so far is that Stillingfleet, at least in his negative characterization of the same body, does not hold a *prima facie* ridiculous view of the identity of premortem and resurrected bodies. Stillingfleet has already told us that he doesn’t think that sameness of premortem and postmortem bodies requires the

(1675, 198), Boyle also appeals to Sanctorius’ experiments to support much the same point.) So, in the “indirect cannibalism” cases, no more than 2% of the cow’s body is composed of a deceased person’s body (assuming, of course, that the cow doesn’t make a habit of eating dead people); and so, when a person eats the cow, presumably less than (but certainly no more than) 2% dead person particles become parts of the indirect cannibal’s body. Moreover, Hody thinks that the most “substantial” parts of the human body – the bones, skin, nerves, tendons, and ligaments – are not nourishing; and these “substantial” parts of the body are the “*integrant and necessary* Parts of the Body.” That is, these parts are both necessary and sufficient for a resurrection of the *same* body. So, cannibals, both direct and indirect, do not integrate the parts of the cannibalized that would threaten the resurrection of the cannibalized’s body. See Hody 1694, 184–192. A similar account is given by Athenagoras in *De resurrectione*. See Bynum 1995, 32–33.

same particles of matter. On the contrary, he seems to hold a very Lockean account of *living* bodies. In his positive explanation of what he means by “same body” in the resurrection Stillingfleet tells us the following: “it must be the same Material Substance which was vitally united to the Soul here.” (1698, 35) Admittedly, this is pretty vague, but we can try to make some sense of it. Stillingfleet tells us what is a *sufficient* condition for the identity of the premortem and postmortem bodies:

And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the *Resurrection* is consistent with its *Identity*, if its *Organization* and *Life* be the same; and this is a *Real Identity* of the Body which depends not upon *Consciousness*. From whence it follows, that to make the same Body, no more is required but restoring Life to the *Organized Parts* of it. (1698, 42)

That is, Stillingfleet holds that if *x* has the same organization and partakes of the same life as *y*, then *x* and *y* are the same body (or at least the kind of body that would be relevant to the resurrection). So, Stillingfleet looks like he means by “body” in this context what Locke seems to mean by “organism.”

Stillingfleet even uses the Lockean example of a plant as a representative living body, and he explains that “the variation of great parcels of matter in plants alters not the identity; and that the organization of the parts in one coherent body, partaking of one common life, makes the identity of a plant.” (1698, 42) Even Locke holds that a plant persists as the same plant just in case the same Life is communicated to successive, fitly-disposed masses of matter. In fact, in II.xxvii.4, Locke seems exhaustively to characterize organisms synchronically as *organizations* of parts at times that “partake” of the same continued Life, and diachronically as successive such organizations linked by a common Life. He speaks of organisms as “such an Organization of those parts,” the “continued Organization,” “this Organization being at any one instant in any one Collection of Matter,” and “that continued Organization, which is fit to convey that Common Life to all the Parts so united.” And in II.xxvii.8 Locke states: “An Animal is a living organized Body; and consequently, the same Animal, as we have observed, is the same continued Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organiz’d living Body.”

Stillingfleet clearly does not think that the bodies involved in the resurrection are simply masses of matter, and frankly offers what I take to be a very Lockean account of the nature and persistence conditions of organisms. It seems then that Stillingfleet’s account of the identity of resurrected bodies concerns the resurrection of the same organism (i.e., man). That is, Stillingfleet’s “sense of the same body” concerns organisms. And given that Locke wishes to address “the resurrection of the same body, *in your lordship’s sense* of the same body” (*Works* III, 303, emphasis mine), it is the identity of organisms that should concern Locke.³²

32 Locke’s claim that he is going to address the “same body” in *Stillingfleet’s sense* is reiterated several times. For example, *Works*, III, 305 (4 times), 306, 307. But Locke then seems not to get

It would seem then that Locke could very easily and consistently agree with Stillingfleet. After all, Locke states the following about the persistence of men: “This also shews wherein the Identity of the same *Man* consists; *viz.* in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body.” (II.xxvii.6) However, Locke agrees neither with Stillingfleet’s account of the resurrection, nor with the latter’s account of the diachronic identity of bodies.

WHAT LOCKE SAID

Much of Locke’s reply to Stillingfleet concerns the claim that the resurrection of the same body is an article of the Christian faith and the scriptural basis of the belief in the resurrection of the same body. With respect to whether it is an article of faith for Christians, Locke says the following to Stillingfleet:

The resurrection of the dead, I acknowledge to be an article of the christian faith: but that the resurrection of the same body, in your lordship’s sense of the same body, is an article of the christian faith, is what, I confess, I do not yet know. (*Works* III, 303)

And with respect to the scriptural basis of the resurrection of the body, Locke states:

I do not remember any place, where the resurrection of the same body is so much as mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable in the case, I do not remember in any place of the New Testament (where the general resurrection at the last day is spoken of) any such expression as the resurrection of the body, much less of the same body. (*Works* III, 304)

Locke consistently maintains that while scripture does tell us that there will be a resurrection, scripture does not say that the resurrection will involve sameness of body. And as Locke says in *Resurrectio et quae sequuntur* (a work written most likely ca. 1699, around the time of Locke’s dispute with Stillingfleet about the resurrection), when writing about the resurrection of dead:

But of the changes of their bodys of their being made spiritual or of their putting on incorruption or immortality I do not remember anything said.

Stillingfleet’s sense of same body right: Stillingfleet holds that the same body is the same organism, but Locke says “as I understand it, the same individual particles of matter, which were, some time during his life here, vitally united to the soul.” (305) This does not seem to be Stillingfleet’s sense of “same body.”

They shall be raised that is said over & over, But how they are raised or with what bodys they shall come the Scripture as far as I have observed is perfectly silent. (2002, 237)

With respect to St. Paul's words in 1 Corinthians 6.14, Locke says "yet when he [i.e., Paul] speaks of the resurrection, he says, you, not your bodies." (*Works* III, 304) This is one of the points repeatedly made by Locke in his 1699 exchange with Stillingfleet: Scripture talks about the resurrection of the dead, but does not say that the body will be resurrected, let alone *the same* body.

Moreover, Locke claims that he is not *denying* the resurrection of the same body (See *Works* III, 323). What he says is that his view is not inconsistent with the resurrection of the same body—though I am not sure Locke is right about this—but that, in his view, the resurrection of the same body is not *necessary* and hence is not an article of the Christian faith. Locke states that just because his view of the resurrection makes it *unnecessary* for the same body to be resurrected, it doesn't follow that it is impossible "that God may, if he pleases, give to every one a body consisting only of such particles as were before vitally united to his soul." (*Works* III, 332) But in this case, Locke is merely conceding that it is possible for God to reunite the soul with the *mass* that previously constituted a human body. He is not conceding (for a reason I will discuss later) that the same *organism* may be reunited and resurrected.

On Locke's view, it is *personal identity* that is important for resurrection. This of course should be expected: We already knew that Locke thinks that sameness of body *in this life* is neither necessary nor sufficient for sameness of person; *a fortiori*, he argues, it is irrelevant to the resurrection of the same person. He states:

The body he had, and did things in at five or fifteen, was no doubt his body, as much as that which he did things in at fifty was his body, though his body were not the very same body at those different ages: and so will the body, which he shall have after the resurrection, be his body, though it be not the very same with that which he had at five, fifteen, or fifty. He that at threescore is broke on the wheel, for a murder he committed at twenty, is punished for what he did in his body; though the body he has, i.e., his body at threescore, be not the same, i.e., made up of the same individual particles of matter, that that body was, which he had forty years later. (*Works* III, 308)

We should notice something else important in this passage: Here, as in *every other passage in the 1699 letter dealing with sameness of body*, Locke equates *body* with *mass of matter* and *material substance*, and as such bodies and material substances are to be treated as having the persistence conditions of masses, i.e., mereological essentialism is true of them. This is further supported when Locke states:

The well known tree in Epping forest called the king's oak, which from not weighing an Ounce at first, grew to have many tuns of timber in it, was all along the same oak, the very same plant; but nobody, I think, will say it was

the same body when it weighed a tun, as it was when it weighed but an ounce; unless he has a mind to signalize himself by saying that that is the same body, which has a thousand particles of different matter in it, for one particle that is the same. (*Works* III, 321)

Nobody, upon removal or change of some of the particles that at any time make it up, is the same material substance or the same body. (*Works* III, 308-9)
There can be no question that, in this context, Locke is treating material substances and bodies as masses of matter.

In response to Stillingfleet's paraphrase of his example of the same plant persisting through change of matter, Locke responds by citing something crucial to his theory of individuation, namely that an individual has the persistence conditions it does only if it has been sorted into a kind or species; and the kind or species will be a nominal essence or general abstract idea. We find this condition explicitly stated in II.xxvii.7 and other places. Locke appeals to this condition when responding to the plant example:

But this deduction, wherein from those words of mine, that speak only of the identity of a plant, your lordship infers that there is no more required to make the same body, than to make the same plant, being too subtile for me, I leave to my reader to find out. (*Works* III, 322)

And then applying this to the case of *man* and *body*, Locke states:

Your lordship goes on and says, that I grant likewise, "that the identity of the same man consists in a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession, vitally united to the same organized body." Answ. I speak in these words of the identity of the same man; and your lordship thence roundly concludes, "so that there is no difficulty of the sameness of the body." But your lordship knows, that I do not take these two sounds, man and body, to stand for the same thing; nor the identity of the man to be the same with the identity of the body. (*Works* III, 323)

This, of course, is to be expected. The nominal essence *man* is not the same as the nominal essence *body*, and as such the conditions in which something is the same man will be different from those in which something is the same body. However, notice that this is no barrier to Locke saying—what might seem to be obvious—that, although *man* is not *body*, *man* is a *kind of body*, a *living body*, "an Animal of such a certain form." (II.xxvii.8) If Locke holds that organisms are bodies (and hence substances), this passage seems like a good place to mention it. Both his silence and his distracting us from a fairly straightforward answer to Stillingfleet are very telling. But even in this context Locke reiterates his view that organisms are *not* bodies because mereological essentialism is true of the latter but not of the former:

[T]he question is not about the identity of a plant, but about the identity of a body; it being a very different thing to be the same plant, and to be the same body: for that which makes the same plant, does not make the same body; the one being the partaking in the same continued vegetable life, *the other the consisting of the same numerical particles of matter.* (*Works* III, 322, emphasis mine)

One might object that the treatment of bodies and masses of matter in the exchange with Stillingfleet is an anomaly, and that we should give interpretive priority to what Locke says about them in the *Essay*. To this I would like to respond by calling attention to something very important: Around the time of this letter to Stillingfleet, Locke revised II.xxvii of the *Essay*, for the fourth edition of 1700, to include more explicit identifications of *body* and *mass*. This is quite explicit in several texts. For instance, take the following passage from II.xxvii.3; I have inserted the revisions from the fourth edition in brackets:

And whilst they exist united together, the Mass, consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, [or the same Body], let the parts be never so differently jumbled: But if one of these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass, [or the same Body]. (II.xxvii.3)

Now we can only speculate about why Locke made what, to a superficial reader, may seem like minor revisions here. But one plausible explanation is that he wanted to make it more explicit that he understood the terms “body” and “mass of matter” as equivalent. If this is the case—and it certainly seems to be the case in the Stillingfleet exchange—then only things having the persistence conditions for masses of matter are bodies. However, Locke clearly thinks that organisms do not have the persistence conditions for masses of matter. As such, it seems that organisms are not bodies and hence are not substances.

Why would Locke insist on treating human bodies in the Stillingfleet correspondence as masses? Why couldn't he have done the obvious and have said that whereas the same *mass* doesn't persist before and after the resurrection, the same *organism* or *living body* does and that the *living body* is a different kind from mere body? After all, *this* is all Stillingfleet is pressing; so, this answer would have brought perhaps some satisfaction to Stillingfleet. The fact that he never even remotely entertains this suggestion says volumes about Locke's thinking on the subject: Bodies, just as we saw in II.xxvii of the *Essay*, are masses of matter and only masses of matter.³³ The ontological status of organisms remains puzzling.

33 Atoms are also bodies for Locke, though they are not masses.

WHAT LOCKE SHOULD HAVE AND COULD HAVE SAID

If Locke held that organisms are a sub-kind of body and hence are substances, then there are several things he easily could have told Stillingfleet. Chappell has pointed out (1990) that Locke held, in addition to his principles of individuation, that there are two necessary conditions for the diachronic identity of an organism: I will call them the “Continuity Condition” and the “Gradual Shift Condition”. I suggest that, if Locke in fact held both of these conditions, then he had fairly obvious ways to maintain both that identity of organism is irrelevant to the resurrection *and* that organisms are a kind of body and hence a kind of substance.

Suggestion 1: Appeal to the Continuity Condition

Locke holds that the persistence of a material object x between t_1 and t_5 entails that x exists *continuously* between t_1 and t_5 .³⁴ That is, if x at t_1 is the same organism as y at t_5 , then there is no time between t_1 and t_5 at which that organism fails to exist. This is the Continuity Condition. So, why didn't Locke say the following to Stillingfleet: Organisms *are* a kind of body, but the premortem body and the resurrection body are not the same organism (living body) in virtue of the lack of continuity? Locke holds that the same Life is necessary for the same organism over time, and the Life of an organism is clearly not continuous between the premortem and resurrection body. And *that* is why Locke does not entertain the notion that the premortem and resurrection bodies are the same organism or living body. Perhaps this would have provided some satisfaction to Stillingfleet; after all, Stillingfleet himself holds that the same life is a necessary condition for the persistence of organisms. The ball would then be in Stillingfleet's court to provide an account of how life can be “restored.”

In the exchange with Stillingfleet, Locke is silent about the interrupted existence of premortem and resurrected body. This may indicate that this suggestion was not considered by Locke. (As we'll see shortly, there are other reasons why we should think that Locke did not consider appealing to the Continuity Condition.) Locke's silence about lack of continuity is especially interesting and revealing because Locke definitely leaves open the possibility that persons, unlike organisms, can have a “gappy” or interrupted existence. In other words, the Continuity Condition does not apply to persons.³⁵ The possible, and in many cases *actual*, gappiness of personal identity, I believe, is one of the lessons of the famous, though poorly-named, Dayman-Nightman case in II.xxvii.23, the case of Castor and Pollux in 2.I.I2, and the Socrates-waking and Socrates-sleeping case in II.xxvii.19. Thus, Locke holds

34 At least this is the case with organisms. I think that it is consistent with everything Locke says about masses that they can go out of existence and come back into existence, and this is certainly the case with persons.

35 See Conn 2003, II4 n.10.

- (1) *Personal* identity is what is required for resurrection.
- (2) *Personal* identity can be gappy/interrupted.³⁶
- (3) *Organism* identity cannot be gappy/interrupted.

The gappiness of premortem and resurrection bodies would seem to be obvious to Locke. At the very least, death “interrupts” the Life constitutive of the same organism. Locke could have said: “Listen Stillingfleet, I hold (1), (2), and (3); so you should understand why I don’t think that sameness of organism (man) is required for the resurrection. Organisms like human beings cannot survive interruptions, but persons can. My account of the resurrection can hold that a premortem person can be resurrected despite interruptions in her existence. But due to the biological death of the living human body and the fact that organisms cannot survive interruptions, you should totally understand why I can’t hold that the same organism can be resurrected. Moreover, Stillingfleet, you say that “no more is required [to resurrect the *same* body] but restoring Life to the *Organized Parts* of it.” (1698, 42) But, on my view, Life is not something that can be *restored*. Lives begin and end, but lives are not the type of things that can end and then begin again.”

Before we address the issue of *why* Locke did not say this to Stillingfleet, we should address the issue of whether Locke in fact holds that organisms cannot have a gappy persistence. If organisms can have a gappy persistence, then the suggestion made above would not be available to Locke. There are at least two reasons why one might dispute the gappiness of personal identity and the continuity of organisms for Locke. First, Locke makes a fairly-strong analogy between the consciousness constitutive of personal identity and the Life constitutive of organism identity:

Different Substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one Person; as well as different Bodies, by the same Life are united into one Animal, whose *Identity* is preserved, in that change of Substances, by the unity of one continued Life. (II.xxvii.10)

As Ed McCann puts it: “consciousness is the life of persons” (indicating that consciousness and life play the same role in accounting for the persistence of persons and organisms, respectively).³⁷ If consciousness can link together a temporally-gappy person, and the Life of an organism is strongly analogous to the consciousness of a person, then perhaps there can be temporally-gappy organisms. Perhaps Locke does not hold a continuity condition for organisms after all.

36 See Ayers 1991, vol. 2, 265: “Unlike life...consciousness is for ever being interrupted.” Even ignoring the person-switching cases mentioned above, Ayers thinks that consciousness (and hence persons) are interrupted in deep sleep and in cases of memory loss.

37 McCann 1987, 68. See also Conn 2003, ch. 4.

Second, although it is more often than not taken for granted that Locke held the Continuity Condition for the persistence of material things,³⁸ it has been pointed out by several scholars³⁹ that Locke's own principles of individuation (L₁-L₄) do not entail the Continuity Condition. Whereas Chappell takes L₂ to mean that it is not possible that one thing can begin to exist at two different *times*, these scholars deny this reading of Locke's L₂. Joshua Hoffman, for instance, claims that if "beginning" in L₂ is understood in a purely temporal sense, then Locke would be "guilty of an obvious non-sequitur."⁴⁰ When we look at the context in which Locke states L₁-L₄, he states:

...from whence it follows that one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence [i.e., L₂], nor two things one beginning [i.e., L₃], it being impossible for two things of the same kind, to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same place [i.e., L₁]; or one and the same thing in different places [i.e., L₄]. (II.xxvii.1)

It is clear from this passage that Locke thinks that L₁ entails L₃ and that L₄ entails L₂. But if L₂ is understood in a purely temporal sense, then L₂ would *not* be entailed (as Locke thinks it is) by L₄. So, if Locke is right and L₂ is entailed by L₄, then L₂ must, as Hoffman *et al.* believe, mean that one thing cannot come into existence in two different *places*. So, Locke's own principles of individuation don't seem to entail the Continuity Condition.

However, Hoffman admits—what should be uncontroversial—that there is a temporal aspect to L₂. Hoffman thinks that "beginnings" must be understood as "first beginnings." This, of course, is a very natural way to understand beginnings. I think that L₂ should be understood as involving both a spatial and a temporal aspect: As Conn succinctly puts it: "there is a single time and place at which each object first began to exist."⁴¹

I agree with Hoffman *et al.* that the Continuity Condition is not entailed by L₂. Just because each object *first* begins to exist at a single time and place, this *by itself* does not entail that there cannot be temporal gaps in the existence of a thing. Nevertheless, Locke definitely believes that what constitutes the persistence conditions for organisms is Life and without exception refers to the relevant Life as "continued." In II.xxvii.4 alone, Locke claims that the Life in question must be "continuous" (or terms synonymous with "continuous") at least seven times. Moreover, in the passage from II.xxvii.10, in which Locke makes the analogy between consciousness and Life, he refers to the Life in question as "one, continued Life." As with analogous things in general, consciousness and

38 See, for instance, Chappell 1989, 1990, McCann 1987, David Wiggins 1980, Peter Simons 1987.

39 For instance, Joshua Hoffman 1980, Christopher Conn 2003, Martha Brandt Bolton 1994, Matthew Stuart in preparation.

40 Hoffman 1980, 106.

41 Conn 2003, 70.

Life are dissimilar in certain ways; and one glaring dissimilarity is the fact that consciousness, unlike Life, can be gappy.⁴² The organism whose Lives it is, must be continuous, i.e., not gappy.

So, Locke *could* hold that the resurrection of the same body (in Stillingfleet's sense) is impossible because of the Continuity Condition for organisms. In fact, one really good reason to hold that Locke held that continuity is a necessary condition for organisms but not for persons is precisely because of the resurrection: Persons can survive gaps but organisms cannot. If this is the case, then clearly the same organism cannot be resurrected, though the same person can. Therefore, it seems that Locke could have appealed to the Continuity Condition to explain why it is hopeless to require the same body in the resurrection. Why doesn't Locke say this or something like this to Stillingfleet? Is this something inexplicable, about which we are reduced to mere speculation? No: Locke's own examples illustrate that he cannot help himself to this type of explanation, that Locke has tied his own hands here. The example of the man at fifteen and fifty and the case of the king's oak are cases in which the organisms are continuous, yet Locke says they do not have the same body at those different times. Why? Clearly it is not because of a lack of continuity. Rather Locke's explanation for the non-identity of the bodies in question is that they do not have all and only the same material parts. Once again we are confronted by the fact that, in the exchange with Stillingfleet, Locke thinks that bodies are masses and only masses (or atoms, of course). Appeal to the Continuity Condition is not going to help Locke here. Locke's own examples seem to eliminate appeal to the Continuity Condition here.

Suggestion 2: Appeal to the Gradual Shift Condition

Locke very briefly and only once states that, while an organism can persist through changes of matter, the identity of an organism requires that the material parts be "not shifted all at once." (II.xxvii.8)⁴³ That is, there must be sufficiently *gradual* parts replacement, addition or subtraction. Just how gradual the shift must be is unclear. In the case of the "lopp'd Oak" (II.xxvii.3), the shift is gradual enough, and we can imagine situations in which the shift would not be gradual enough to preserve identity. We need not worry too much about drawing sharp boundaries between cases of gradual shifts and non-gradual shifts. All that Locke would need is to claim that in the case of the premortem and resurrection body the shift might not be gradual enough to preserve identity of the organism. Locke then could have said that he does not consider the possibility of the identity of premortem and resurrected bodies because the bodies in question could not satisfy the Gradual Shift Condition. And even if there were some bodies that would satisfy this condition (say, people who died the hour before

⁴² See Ayers 1991, vol. 2, 265.

⁴³ Cf. Chappell 1990, 25.

the resurrection), there would certainly be cases where the Gradual Shift Condition was not satisfied. Given the situation in which only some, but not all, bodies would satisfy this condition, Locke clearly could say that we cannot require the same body in the case of the general resurrection because then only the bodies satisfying the condition could be resurrected.

Notice how easily Locke could have said this. However, he does not help himself to this easy way out. Why? Perhaps Locke did not appeal to the Gradual Shift Condition for the following reason: Presumably, there is something about biological functions constitutive of Life which requires gradual replacement of parts. Perhaps it is a (contingent) fact about Life that it could not be communicated over time if the replacement of parts were not sufficiently gradual. So, maybe Locke did not consider an appeal to the Gradual Shift Condition precisely because the Life in question ends anyway. The very reason for requiring the Gradual Shift Condition (i.e., sustaining of Life) is completely eliminated by death. Maybe *that* is why Locke did not consider appealing to the Gradual Shift Condition. This, of course, is speculation, but it may explain why Locke did not consider this suggestion even though it was available to him and would have allowed Locke to answer Stillingfleet without making bodies merely masses.

CONCLUSION

What is the lesson to be drawn from all of this? I think it is that Locke's thinking about the ontological status of organisms is completely muddled.⁴⁴ As I have already mentioned, there are certainly places in Locke in which he unequivocally states that organisms are substances. In fact, I am not disputing the fact that Locke probably thought that organisms *are* substances. However, what I have tried to show is that there are more than just *prima facie* reasons for denying Locke's organisms the status of Substancehood: Even when Stillingfleet dangles opportunity after opportunity to affirm the Substancehood of organisms in front of him, Locke doesn't take the bait. This is unfortunate because it leaves us in an uncomfortable interpretive situation, one from which I doubt we will easily escape.

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⁴⁴ If the Coincidence Interpretation is correct, and I think there is every reason to think that it is.

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