Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Credit

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ABSTRACT: It is generally acknowledged that testifiers can play a central role in the production of knowledge and other valuable epistemic states in others. But does such a role warrant any form of epistemic credit and is an agent more successful *qua* epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I here propose an affirmative answer to both questions. The core of the current paper consists in a sustained defence of this proposal against a series of objections. I further argue that the proposal allows us to recognize an important additional epistemic harm that arises in cases of testimonial injustice beyond those described by Miranda Fricker. Finally, I conclude by distinguishing between four kinds of credit - distinctions that allow us to avoid inappropriately attributing epistemic credit in problematic cases. If the current proposal is correct, our understanding of successful epistemic agents needs to be significantly modified in order to take into account their role in producing epistemically valuable states in others.
Testimony, Epistemic Egoism, and Epistemic Credit

In what follows I examine what makes an agent a successful epistemic agent – or at least, certain aspects of such success. In particular, I consider the epistemic status of testifiers or informants. Such agents often play a crucial, cognitive role in the generation of knowledge through their testimony – it just happens to be that this knowledge is generated in other agents, rather than in the testifier herself. But if the testifier is generating knowledge, why not see this as an epistemic success for her, one for which she warrants epistemic credit akin to that which she would garner for acquiring knowledge for herself? If we were to accept such a proposal, our assessment of epistemic agents might change significantly. Rather than simply considering how much knowledge (or understanding, or other epistemically valuable states) an agent accrues for herself, our evaluation of how successful an agent is (qua epistemic agent) would instead consider how much knowledge she generates more generally, whether it be her own knowledge, or that of others in her community, through her testimony or by other means. I seek to defend this proposal here.

I begin by providing a broad characterization of epistemic credit in section I, before turning to a range of cases of testimony (in section II) where it is commonly agreed that the testifier plays a central role in the knowledge acquisition of the recipient; indeed, in many such cases it seems that the testifier plays the most salient, epistemically relevant role in the knowledge acquisition. In section III I present my main arguments for the claim that testifiers garner epistemic credit for playing a suitable role in the production of knowledge and other epistemically valuable states in others.
I further explore the proposal in section IV by showing how it can help us to identify an additional epistemic harm that occurs in cases of testimonial injustice (as developed in the work of Miranda Fricker and others), while also being supported by Edward Craig’s work on the genealogy of our concept of knowledge. In section V I respond to an objection that the current proposal has problematic, counterintuitive implications, while in section VI I distinguish four kinds of epistemic credit (direct, indirect, auxiliary, and incidental); such distinctions allow us to more fully capture and accommodate varying roles in the production of knowledge and other epistemic goods. I end the paper by briefly turning to the implications of the current proposal for epistemology, and for our assessment of epistemic agents.

I will not take a firm stance regarding which states ought to be treated as basic epistemic goals, or as epistemically valuable more generally. That is, regardless of what states are taken to be epistemically valuable or properly treated as basic epistemic goals – knowledge, understanding, rational beliefs, true beliefs while avoiding false beliefs, or what-have-you - testifiers can play a crucial role in the achievement of these states in other agents. For ease of exposition I will generally focus on examples involving the generation of knowledge, but this is intended only to focus and simplify the discussion.

I. Epistemic Credit: An Initial Characterization

A natural starting point is to provide an initial, working characterization of epistemic credit; I will later distinguish four different kinds of credit in section VI. Epistemic credit in general can be understood as a particular instance of a more general causal-contributory conception of credit whereby an agent receives credit for an outcome to the extent that she plays
a suitable role in the production of the outcome through her abilities or competences. For example, John Greco holds that credit attributions in general involve causal explanations: To say that a person S is creditable for some state of affairs A, is to say that S’s agency is salient in an explanation regarding how or why A came about (Greco 2010: 105-6).

And in an earlier paper, he presents the following account of when an agent deserves intellectual or epistemic credit for believing a true proposition:

S deserves intellectual credit for believing the truth regarding p only if

a. believing the truth regarding p has intellectual value,

b. believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and

c. believing the truth regarding p reveals S’s reliable cognitive character. Alternatively:

S’s reliable cognitive character is an important necessary part of the total set of causal factors that give rise to S’s believing the truth regarding p (Greco 2007: 123).

Wayne Riggs (2009) presents a related account, though with some significant differences. For Riggs, for an agent to receive credit for an outcome is a matter of attributability – which in turn is a matter (in part) of ruling out luck:

As a general rule, attributability is undermined by luck. To the extent that we think that state of affairs X was a matter of luck with regard to S, to that extent we believe that X is not attributable to S as an agent […] Indeed, it is hard to think of an instance in which anyone says that some event or state of affairs is “lucky” without meaning to imply that the outcome was not attributable to the people for whom the event or state of affairs was said to be lucky. […] “Credit,” then, is simply shorthand for saying that some event, state
of affairs, or consequence thereof is attributable to an agent, as an agent (Riggs 2009: 203).

For Greco, then, credit for an outcome is a matter of playing a salient causal role in producing this outcome, while for Riggs credit is a matter of the outcome being attributable to an agent, which involves (among other factors) ruling out luck. Of course for a full understanding of these views, accounts of causal salience and of luck would be required (and Greco and Riggs provide such accounts in their work), but these details are not crucial for current purposes.

As a broad characterization, and following Greco and Riggs, we can understand epistemic credit as a causal-contributory notion where an agent receives epistemic credit for an epistemically valuable state (such as knowledge, or true belief, or understanding) to the extent that she plays a suitable role in producing this outcome through her abilities or competencies. I will say a bit more that will help to clarify what “suitable roles” might amount to in section VI, but for now we can rest with intuitive, commonsense judgments. I should stress that, unlike Riggs and Greco, I am not attempting to provide an account of knowledge in terms of epistemic credit. Rather, I am interested in cases where an agent seems to play a creditable role in the production of knowledge (or other epistemically valuable states) in other individuals, and determining whether this credit should be treated as epistemic, and in turn, whether this production of epistemically valuable states in others should be understood as an epistemic success and achievement for the agent herself.

II. Testimony and the Credit of Testifiers

Jennifer Lackey presents the following case of testimonial knowledge:

Case 4 Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain
directions to the Sears Tower. He looks around, approaches the first adult passerby that he sees, and asks how to get to his desired destination. The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower by telling him that it is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief. (Lackey 2007: 352)

Lackey holds that Morris acquires knowledge in this case, but that the truth of his belief is only minimally due to his own faculties:

Indeed, what explains why Morris got things right has nearly nothing of epistemic interest to do with him and nearly everything of epistemic interest to do with the passer-by. In particular, it is the passer-by’s experience with and knowledge of the city of Chicago that explains why Morris ended up with a true belief rather than a false belief. (Ibid.: 352)

She thus takes the Chicago visitor case to constitute a potential counterexample to knowledge as credit theories because credit for Morris’ true belief seems to lie primarily with the testifying passer-by. Defenders of such views have responded to Lackey, arguing that even if the testifier garners much or even most of the credit, the recipient of testimony still accrues sufficient credit for the truth of her belief for it to constitute knowledge. John Greco considers an analogous case:

Playing in a soccer game, Ted receives a brilliant, almost impossible pass, and then scores an easy goal as a result. In the case we are imagining, it is the athletic abilities of the passer that stand out. The pass was brilliant, its reception easy. Nevertheless, Ted deserves credit for the goal. Whatever help Ted got, he is the one who put the ball in the net. Now that is not to say that the passer does not deserve credit for the goal, or even
that he does not deserve more credit than Ted. It is to say, however, that Ted was involved in the right sort of way so as to get credit. (Greco 2007: 64-5, emphasis added)

Similarly, Wayne Riggs writes:

Why do we suppose that someone has to get all the credit? Why not just say that both the parties involved [testifier and recipient] get some credit for the recipient’s true belief? It is vanishingly rare for any human being to accomplish anything completely on the basis of his own powers and abilities alone. And yet, even in many of those cases, we unhesitatingly attribute such accomplishments to people. (Riggs 2009: 215)

Both Greco and Riggs agree that in Lackey’s testimony case (and similar ones), at least partial, and potentially even most of the credit for the true belief of the agent belongs to the testifier. This is credit for the production of knowledge - it just happens that the testifier receives credit for creating knowledge in another person, rather than herself.

So what should we make of such cases? All of the authors discussed here would hold that the testifier in Lackey’s case deserves at least partial credit for the belief of the recipient. And even those who do not embrace knowledge as credit theories (like Lackey) recognize that the testifiers in such cases are playing a key role in the creation of knowledge in the recipients. But what kind of credit is it that testifiers garner? I would hold that the credit accruing to them is appropriately treated as epistemic, and in the next section I defend this claim.

III. Epistemic Credit for Epistemically Valuable States in Others

To begin, notice that the cognitive faculties, skills, and actions of the testifier clearly play an essential role in the formation of the knowledge or other epistemically valuable states that ultimately result in the recipient. Furthermore, the skills, faculties, and actions involved will
overlap significantly with those that are also involved in forming one’s own beliefs. Consider first a case of demanding, involved testimony where such overlap in skills and faculties is quite clear; for example, imagine someone writing an introductory philosophy textbook. To do so in such a way that her readers will gain knowledge will require clarity of thought, an ability to formulate and assess arguments, find helpful analogies, and so on. She will need to have an awareness of her audience, recognize when definitions are required, and find clear ways of expressing often difficult concepts and ideas. Notice that many of these same skills, faculties, and activities would be involved in her own thinking when forming her own beliefs about difficult issues, and that there is a great deal of intellectual work being done. This is even clearer if we imagine our author writing a new scholarly article instead of a textbook – here her epistemic, intellectual skills would clearly be at play, and there may well not be a firm divide between her forming her own beliefs and her efforts to clearly communicate and justify these beliefs. The very process of trying to articulate her ideas for others can serve to articulate her ideas to herself.

Of course not all testimony is so involved or demanding, and it is often performed with little conscious reflection, as when a stranger asks one for the time. But even here, reading one’s watch, quickly figuring out the time, and using clear language to convey this information to the stranger all involve significant cognitive processing, even if easily done. Notice that we would typically attribute knowledge (and corresponding epistemic credit) to an individual who instead simply read her own watch, and easily arrived at the time for herself. That is, the cognitive processing involved in straightforward, non-demanding cases of testimony seems akin in relevant respects to that found in a wide-range of non-demanding cases where we would grant knowledge (and epistemic credit) to an agent.¹
In all of these cases, then, the testifier accomplishes something that is epistemically significant – the creation of knowledge in others - through her cognitive faculties, such that she is thereby acting as a good epistemic agent. And it is through various of her cognitive abilities that she is able to do so. Compare the following from Sanford Goldberg:

proffered testimony should be seen as the output of a cognitive process that is assessable along the dimension of reliability.

The initial case for this is straightforward. First, testimony should be seen as the output of a cognitive process. This point should be obvious. [...] Second, the cognitive process in question is assessable along the dimension of reliability. In order to be so assessable, a cognitive process must be such as to produce outputs that are truth-value-bearing. [...] But testimony fits the bill here, since pieces of testimony are truth-value-bearing (Goldberg 2010: 23).²

Testifiers can be reliable or adept in producing true statements or testimonies – ones from which, ceteris paribus, recipients will gain knowledge or other epistemically valuable states. Note that this is compatible with the recipient still playing a creditable role in the formation of her own belief such that it constitutes knowledge (if one accepts a knowledge as credit theory) – both testifier and recipient can play relevant roles in producing the recipient’s belief. Following work by Adam Green, we can hold that both the testifier and the recipient accrue credit for good-making in the case of the belief (both contribute suitably to the generation of the belief), while the recipient also accrues credit for good possession – the new belief belongs to the recipient. It is the recipient who needs to incorporate this new belief into her broader body of beliefs, weigh how strongly to believe the new claim, perhaps revise or modify other beliefs, and so on (see Green 2017: ch. 5).
Of course one might object that even if many of the same cognitive faculties and skills that are used in providing testimony are also used in forming beliefs, that this is not enough to hold that their usage in testifying is properly treated as epistemic. Compare – Fergus might use the very same ability to jump while playing basketball, football, and in various track and field events. The same ability is being used across a wide range of quite different practices, but Fergus jumping to block a shot in basketball is neither relevant nor appropriately evaluated according to the standards of the long jump in athletics – even if the same underlying ability is at play. Might something similar be true of cognitive abilities in the case of testimony – that such usage is not properly treated as epistemic (or part of an epistemic practice), even if these same abilities can also, in different contexts, be used in forming beliefs, where their use is properly treated as epistemic?

In response, note that paradigmatic instances of testimony are clearly aimed at generating epistemically valuable states in their recipients; it is not merely a happy side-effect of testimony that recipients typically gain knowledge. Elizabeth Fricker writes that:

> It is evident that the epistemic force a telling has – namely, in favourable circumstances one can with epistemic propriety take the speaker’s word for what she tells one, and thereby come to know it – depends on the fact that telling is an act with the performative significance already described: the teller guarantees the truth of what she tells to her audience; and the correlative fact that it is governed by a socially maintained norm: One should not tell someone that P unless one is oneself epistemically well enough placed properly to guarantee her the truth of P. (Fricker 2015: 75)

While some would disagree with the details of Fricker’s claims here, the broad picture she paints would be embraced by most who discuss norms of assertion. Assertion or testimony is, in its
paradigmatic instances, aimed at providing the recipient with epistemic goods; the underlying point of the practice is epistemic. To return to the objection – our use of our cognitive faculties in forming beliefs and in testifying are both aimed at generating epistemically valuable states, and properly seen as part of a broad epistemic practice. It simply happens that in the former case we aim at producing epistemically valuable states for ourselves, while in the case of testimony we aim at producing such states in others. As such, there is good reason to hold that in testifying, an agent is performing an action that is appropriately evaluated from an epistemic point of view. An agent’s success in testifying is relevant to our assessment of her qua epistemic agent.

Humans are not merely capable of exchanging information with each other; it is one of the most powerful and widespread epistemic practices upon which we rely. Elizabeth Fricker notes that

[T]estimony, for each of us in our modern social and epistemic predicament in which division of epistemic labour along with other sorts is the rule, is an essential source of empirical grounding for her beliefs about the world she finds herself in, and her own place in it. (Fricker 2006: 228)

And in a similar vein, Ernest Sosa suggests that

We are ourselves among our main sources of information. […] Without implicit trust in the testimony of our neighbours or our own memories, we would be greatly reduced epistemically, well below the level of an isolated Robinson Crusoe reliant on his memory at every turn. Indeed it is hard to see how any human could live once so radically reduced epistemically. (Sosa 2015: 186-7)

Given the central role of testimony in the epistemic lives of humans, it would seem problematic to exclude effective testimony from the list of an agent’s epistemic successes. She is generating
knowledge both within her community, and within the world as a whole. In the absence of strong reasons to do so, ignoring our contributions to multiple bodies of knowledge via testimony seems unduly restrictive. Indeed, the burden of proof would seem to lie with those who would so restrict the epistemic point of view as to exclude such contributions.\textsuperscript{4} The testifier’s success is fundamentally epistemic: there is more knowledge in the world and the agent’s community precisely as a result of her successful testimony; and her testimony itself is (in the ordinary case) aimed at achieving such epistemic results.

The above is compatible with recognizing that the levels of epistemic credit likely to accrue to testifiers and recipients can vary significantly. For example, John Greco has suggested that we ought to distinguish between cases where a recipient of testimony is serving a gatekeeping role for information entering her community, and cases where a recipient is working within a community where trust is established (Greco 2015: 282-5). In the former cases the recipient will typically need to engage in greater reflection upon and assessment of any proffered testimony – as when the broader scientific community needs to assess the claims of a fellow scientist concerning a new finding. They need to ensure that the claims are well-justified before allowing these claims to be shared across their epistemic community more broadly. In such cases the recipients of testimony will typically accrue greater epistemic credit for their new belief than the testifier. On the other hand, within the confines of an epistemic community, once information has been allowed in, we will want to encourage the easy dissemination or distribution of such information. Recipients can typically be more trusting in such circumstances, while testifiers will tend to accrue greater epistemic credit as they engage in the work of making the information accessible.
IV. Further Support and Implications: Epistemic Injustice and the Genealogy of Knowledge

In this section I have two related goals. First, I wish to explore an interesting – and I believe plausible – consequence of the current proposal. In brief: if testifiers can gain epistemic credit for the knowledge they create in their recipients, then we can posit an additional, clearly epistemic harm in cases of testimonial injustice (as developed in Miranda Fricker’s influential work; see especially Fricker 2007). My second goal is to present an additional, supplementary line of support for the current proposal, drawing on Edward Craig’s discussion of our concept of knowledge, and how such a concept would have evolved in a state of nature (Craig 1991). Craig’s account places being a good, reliable informant or testifier at the foundations of our concept of a knower – and Fricker draws upon Craig’s account in identifying the harms of testimonial injustice. Overall, then, my goal in this section is to show how the current proposal provides something of a unifying link that both gains support from Craig’s important work while also providing a helpful supplement to Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice.

Broadly, Craig argues that we are highly interested in being able to identify good informants in order to acquire information that will allow us to act effectively, and that our attributions of knowledge (and, indeed, our concept of knowledge) have emerged out of efforts to mark off those who are good informants. Very roughly, if we say someone knows something, this is an indicator that this person is a good informant, and that other agents can – for most purposes – rely on this person’s testimony. At least, this is how the concept of knowledge could have come into being, even if it now departs somewhat from these origins. Notice how crucial to Craig’s proposal is the whole apparatus of our status as informers or testifiers; epistemology emerges out of practices of testifying and identifying good informants. If so, our role as testifiers
would seem central to epistemology, and to our role as epistemic agents. Epistemology and epistemic evaluations are driven by our ability to communicate, to take advantage of (and learn from) the information possessed by others – our role as informant on such a view is conceptually prior to being a knower.

Miranda Fricker draws upon Craig’s proposal at several points in her *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing*. She makes the following observation while characterizing testimonial injustice (broadly, cases where a testifier experiences an unwarranted credibility deficit due to prejudice on the part of a hearer):

> [G]iven Craig’s account, what the recipient of a prejudicial credibility deficit is excluded from is the single practice that dramatizes the origin of what it is to be a knower at all. Testimonial injustice denies one access to what originally furnishes status as a knower. No wonder, then, that relatively inconsequential testimonial injustices can carry a symbolic weight to the effect that the speaker is less than a full epistemic subject: the injustice sends the message that they are not fit for participation in the practice that originally generates the very idea of a knower. (Fricker 2007: 145).

Fricker picks out several other harms that arise in cases of testimonial injustice. First, the potential recipients of the testimony – those who fail to listen or appropriately weigh the testimony due to prejudice – will face an epistemic harm (to themselves, as it were) insofar as they lose out on potential knowledge, and their failure to listen appropriately also blocks the spread of knowledge more generally in their communities (Fricker 2007: 43-4).

A second potential epistemic harm is that victims of such injustice may lose confidence in the justification for their beliefs – or even in their intellectual abilities, particularly if they experience such injustices repeatedly. As a result, they may lose knowledge (due to loss of
confidence in their beliefs, or their justification for their beliefs), or be hindered in educational and other intellectual projects (Fricker 2007: 47-8).

A third range of harms is practical – recipients of epistemic injustice may be found guilty rather than innocent in court because their testimony is inappropriately ignored or downplayed, their careers may suffer as their ideas are ignored, and so on (Fricker 2007: 46-7).

Finally, Fricker sees the primary harm of testimonial injustice as an ethical harm whereby those who suffer such injustice are wronged in their capacity as a knower – it “involves insult to someone in respect of a capacity essential to human value […] When someone suffers a testimonial injustice, they are degraded qua knower, and they are symbolically degraded qua human” (Fricker 2007: 44). She notes that in rejecting a testifier’s epistemic trustworthiness, one might be rejecting either her competence or her sincerity – or both. And even if some forms of prejudice might in principle focus exclusively on one or the other, “the experience of testimonial injustice remains unified enough to warrant a unified ethical characterization in terms of being wronged qua giver of knowledge” (Fricker 2007: 45). Essentially, those who face testimonial injustice are degraded, insulted, or demeaned, precisely with respect to their role as knowers – an ethical harm or injustice, but one grounded in a lack of respect for the epistemic or intellectual standing of the testifier.

But notice how the current proposal - that epistemic agents warrant epistemic credit for the knowledge they help to produce in others via testimony - may help to further capture the sense that victims of testimonial injustice face a distinctively epistemic injustice. If one’s status and success as an epistemic agent depends upon one’s contributions to multiple bodies of knowledge, then testimonial injustice is clearly a deeply epistemic injustice. Fricker focuses on the insult or demeaning aspect of testimonial injustice as the primary harm – one is dehumanized
and undermined as a knower. But on the current view, one is not simply insulted or demeaned (not that I wish to downplay these harms): rather, by refusing to properly accept the testimony of those with certain identities, the perpetrators of testimonial injustice thwart those who suffer the injustice in their efforts to produce knowledge in others. They are preventing potential testifiers from achieving epistemic successes for which they would otherwise receive epistemic credit. One might compare a case where a moral agent wishes to help others, to reduce suffering, and so on, but where out of prejudice certain individuals refuse her assistance. These individuals miss out on the goods the moral agent could have provided – but the moral agent is not merely insulted or demeaned. She also misses out on being able to improve the world, to create happiness or reduce suffering in others – she misses out on moral achievements for which she would have warranted moral credit.

Beyond bringing out an important additional clearly epistemic harm that would arise in cases of testimonial injustice (thereby supplementing Fricker’s important work), notice how well the current proposal meshes with Craig’s picture of our concept of knowledge and its roots in marking off those who are reliable informants. As Stephen Grimm notes,

If Craig is right, then as modern-day knowledge evaluators when we judge that a belief amounts to knowledge we are judging that the belief is reliable enough not only given our first-person interests and concerns, but given the interests and concerns of third parties who might come to depend upon the belief as well. (Grimm 2015: 131)\(^6\)

On Craig’s view, our current concept of knowledge and our use of it are still driven, at least in part, by concerns with identifying reliable informants; being a good potential informant is interwoven into our current concept of a knower. And on the current proposal epistemic agents receive epistemic credit for their contributions to various bodies of knowledge, not just their own
– the role of informant or testifier is explicitly built into the role of epistemic agent. In turn, this allows us to identify an additional epistemic harm that arises in cases of testimonial injustice.

V Objection: The Proposal Has Counterintuitive Implications

While many might find the identification of an additional epistemic harm in cases of testimonial injustice to be an attractive feature of the current proposal, other of its apparent implications may seem more problematic. For example, on the current proposal it may appear that tour guides and newscasters are epistemic exemplars insofar as they help to create knowledge in hundreds or possibly even millions of other people every day (thereby warranting some degree of epistemic credit for each of potentially millions of beliefs). Indeed, they might appear to be better epistemic agents than a brilliant scientist working in relative obscurity; this might be so even if the newscasters or tour guides are a bit dim themselves. As a result, one might worry that the current proposal leads to highly implausible assessments of epistemic agents and of who qualifies as an epistemic exemplar. In turn, this might provide reason to reject the proposal.

As an initial point, note that I need only hold that the tour guide and the newscaster are more successful epistemic agents than the scientist, not that they are better epistemic agents as such. Compare a saintly individual locked in a prison, and a more ordinary agent with ample freedom. The latter could well do far more of moral value, and as such be more successful as a moral agent, even if the imprisoned saint is a better moral agent. There can be a gap between an agent’s abilities and skills in a field, and the level of success that she achieves in it, often due to external circumstances.
Still, what should be made of the claim that newscasters and tour guides are highly successful epistemic agents insofar as they play a significant role in producing knowledge in thousands, potentially millions of others? I believe that we should embrace this result, and that properly understood it should not seem terribly implausible. That is, rather than showing a flaw in the current proposal, it instead indicates that one may need to rethink one’s notions of epistemic success, and what epistemic agents should be striving for. Still, the claim needs to be understood in light of three qualifications:

*The Testifier’s Role / Salience:* First, for many guides and newscasters, their share of the credit in forming the beliefs of others is likely to be minimal. The newscaster reads lines off of a teleprompter; the tour guide has likely memorized a speech and set of responses to common questions. If there is testimonial credit here, much of it seems to accrue to those who carefully write the clear sentences of the newscaster, or the presentations that interest and inform the tourists. One suspects that in many cases the newscaster himself is rather interchangeable. There is no need to hold that much credit is likely to accrue to any newscaster or tour guide who simply gives voice to the careful words of others; on the other hand, those who write these words likely do deserve a great deal of credit.

Even so, notice: if a recipient of testimony requires only a minimal involvement of her own faculties and abilities in order to have a testimonial belief (and its truth) attributed to her, then presumably a similar level of credit will accrue to newscasters and tour guides, given their input into their testimonial performances. If so, one arrives back at the position that newscasters are highly successful epistemic agents. There is much more knowledge in the world because of their testimony to so many others, even if their credit in producing such knowledge is only partial.
The Value of the Knowledge Imparted: Second, one must also consider the value of the knowledge imparted to those who receive the testimony; creating more valuable knowledge will typically constitute a greater epistemic success. Tourists will often forget most of what they have heard soon after their visit, perhaps keeping a couple of interesting items of trivia in mind. Presumably the truths of the scientist, even if shared with a smaller set of individuals, could be of greater value. The case of the newscaster might be different – some of the knowledge would be trivial (think of all the celebrity gossip that is presented as news), while in other cases significant knowledge could be at stake. The point here is that one needs to keep in mind not just the sheer amount of knowledge an agent contributes to producing; the value of various items of knowledge can vary. Broadly, one can treat an agent’s level of success as a function of the degree of credit she warrants in producing an item of knowledge, and the significance of this knowledge for the given knower. To play a crucial, creditable role in the production of highly significant knowledge constitutes a major epistemic success.

One might still worry. Suppose there is a newscaster with an audience of millions, one who merely reads the words on a teleprompter, but in the case of an important political crisis that could have significant practical impacts upon millions of lives. Even if his share of the credit in producing knowledge in his audience is small in each individual case, overall he earns epistemic credit for producing many instances of very valuable knowledge, and seems an incredible epistemic success. He is playing a creditable role in the formation of millions of instances of knowledge day after day; surely this adds up. And the newscaster is thus an extraordinarily successful epistemic agent – even if quite ordinary as an individual.

Embracing Circumstantial Luck: This leads to a third point. The current case is an instance of epistemic luck akin to the circumstantial moral luck discussed by Thomas Nagel
(1979). Compare: a woman dives into a river and successfully saves a drowning child. She is praised and treated as a hero. Of course, had you been in the same position, as a good person – and a good swimmer – you would also have rescued the child. But we do not praise you or treat you as a hero. The first person was simply in the right place at the right time, and so arrived at a moral success that she would not have had otherwise. More broadly, there are many cases where a person is simply competent, but by being in the right place at the right time, can go on to have extraordinary success. And this may be true of the newscaster. True, almost anyone could read the words from the teleprompter. But he is the lucky one who is actually there, and who actually plays the creditable role in the production of the knowledge of others. Had someone else been there, she would have been the epistemic hero generating knowledge in millions of others. Such is circumstantial luck.

We can see those who are teachers, newscasters, and so on, as individuals who have chosen professions where they will tend to have a great deal of epistemic success in helping to generate knowledge in their communities and in other individuals. We might see them as akin to individuals who choose to be doctors, nurses, or aid workers in various capacities – these are individuals who have chosen professions where they will tend to generate a great deal of moral good.

VI Direct, Indirect, Auxiliary, and Incidental Credit

LJ wakes up Elsie every morning just before sunrise – he does this through various competences (in acquiring knowledge of when the next sunrise will occur, in knowing how to successfully wake Elsie up, etc.). And as a result Elsie comes to form beliefs about the sunrise each morning due to LJ’s waking her up. She may also form beliefs about the smell of coffee,
and so on. She forms all of these beliefs because of LJ’s deliberately waking her up – if he did not do so, she would continue to sleep and would never form these beliefs. As such, it may seem that LJ garners epistemic credit for Elsie’s beliefs on the current proposal – after all, it is his competent performance that leads to her to form these beliefs. But surely he should not receive *epistemic* credit – all that he does is wake her up.

Consider: if LJ were to deserve epistemic credit here, then it seems that you should receive epistemic credit for my perceptual beliefs if you drive me to a friend’s place – both the perceptual beliefs I form during the drive, as well as those I form while visiting our friend. After all, without your competent driving performance I would not have been in a position to form any of these beliefs. One thus might worry that the current proposal is too loose, allowing far too many instances where agents garner unwarranted epistemic credit.

Here I would distinguish between four kinds of creditable role and credit in producing a belief in an agent:

**Direct**: one garners direct epistemic credit in the formation of a belief to the extent that one (i) intentionally attempts to generate knowledge or some other epistemically valuable state in an agent, and (ii) plays a suitably important or salient role through ability in (iii) the formation of a belief, (iv) its specific content and (v) its truth; that is, there is a creditable role in the success (truth) and content of the resulting belief, not merely in the existence or formation of the belief.

**Indirect**: one garners indirect epistemic credit in the formation of a belief to the extent that one (i) intentionally attempts to help to generate knowledge or other some epistemically valuable state in an agent, (ii) plays a suitably important or salient role
through ability in the production of the belief as such, (iii) and its truth, without playing a
creditable role in its specific content.

**Auxiliary**: one garners auxiliary epistemic credit in the formation of a belief to the extent
that one (i) intentionally attempts to help to generate knowledge or some other
epistemically valuable state *as such* in an agent, but (ii) in a supporting role where one
does not directly influence the aided agent’s belief formation process through one’s
abilities.

**Incidental**: one garners incidental (non-epistemic) credit in the formation of a belief to
the extent that one *unintentionally* plays a suitably important or salient role in the
production of the belief or in its truth.

‘Intentional’ and ‘unintentional’ in the above definitions refer to an intention to generate or help
to generate knowledge in another agent. Thus if I intend to lie to you, but accidentally tell you
the truth, and you thereby gain a true belief, I would garner only incidental credit – I
intentionally intend to generate a belief in you, but I do not intend it to be true. Such incidental
credit is not a form of epistemic credit – it is merely a matter of playing a causal role; indeed, the
term ‘credit’ here is used rather loosely. Further examples of merely incidental, non-epistemic
credit would include cases where, by your behaviour, I come to believe that you are scared
(though you did not intend to convey this information), or where you accidently bump into me,
causing me to form various beliefs about being bumped, and so on.

On the other hand, in paradigmatic cases of testimony, the informant garners direct
epistemic credit. In such cases the informant intends to inform the other agent; there is particular
content that informant is attempting to convey, and the informant uses relevant skills and
abilities to convey the content. If Henri appropriately testifies to Belle that there is wine in the
cellar, he plays a key or suitably salient role in the generation of her belief that there is wine in the cellar. Furthermore, he does this intentionally – he intends to inform her, he provides her with a specific content (that there is wine in the cellar), and her resultant belief is not merely true by chance – his own good epistemic position, cognitive processing, and effective testimony allow her to gain knowledge (ceteris paribus – assuming she does not possess additional defeaters for this belief that Henri lacks, there are not Gettier-like conditions, etc.).

Notice that the account of direct credit also allows for cases like the following: suppose Henri testifies to Belle as above, but that Belle is distracted and forms no belief, while René is secretly listening and does form the belief that there is wine in the cellar. Henri would still receive direct epistemic credit for René’s knowledge because while he did not intend to testify to René (or generate knowledge in him), he did intend to generate knowledge in another individual through his testimony (Belle), and the other conditions for warranting direct epistemic credit are satisfied. In effect – Henri still provided effective testimony that played a suitably important role in the generation of knowledge in René – even if he had been intending to testify to someone else.

Direct credit is a matter of degree across three different dimensions. First, it is a matter of degree insofar as an agent can have varying degrees of intention to inform. For example, you might tell me that the kitchen is filthy partly to inform me, but primarily to scold me for not having cleaned it earlier. Or you might simply intend to inform me. Furthermore, one’s testimony (drawing upon one’s relevant cognitive skills and abilities) can play a more or less salient or important role in the production of the recipient’s belief; in some cases a pass is brilliant (as it were), and the catch is easy, while in others the pass is poor, but a skilled catch compensates… Finally, the content of the recipient’s belief might be more or less that which the
informant intends. For example, imagine Henri testifies to Belle that her suitcase weighs precisely 18.95kg, but Belle is not so interested in such details (and a little sceptical of this apparent precision), and thus forms the belief that her suitcase weighs around 19kg. Henri presumably deserves some degree of direct, epistemic credit here, though perhaps less than if Belle had formed a belief with the precise content that he is attempting to convey.\(^7\)

An agent garners indirect epistemic credit in cases where she intends to help an individual to gain knowledge, plays a salient or suitably important role in the truth of the resulting belief, but where she does not provide any explicit content for the individual’s belief. Suppose you hand me a pair of binoculars after carefully cleaning the lenses so that I can get a closer look at some figure off in the distance. You are attempting to help me to gain knowledge by doing so, and the binoculars might be crucial to my coming to know who or what that figure is (after all, I could not make it out clearly without the binoculars); the truth or accuracy of my belief depends on the binoculars and their clean lenses. But you yourself are not providing me with any particular content, unlike cases of testimony. The content of my belief is down to me, my faculty of vision, and my ability to focus the binoculars. Further examples of agents garnering indirect epistemic credit might include a lab assistant who carefully maintains and calibrates a delicate instrument in order to ensure that it provides accurate results, or an assistant who helps a researcher to use a difficult or awkward piece of measuring equipment in the field. Such agents help others to gain knowledge and help to shape the belief-forming processes involved (though without providing the recipient with particular content for her belief).

Note that there can be cases where most of the epistemic credit at stake is indirect epistemic credit that accrues to an agent assisting a person who ultimately forms the relevant belief. For example, suppose that in the case of the lab assistant mentioned above that the
successful calibration of a finely-tuned and sensitive instrument is what plays the crucial role in
the accuracy and truth of a researcher’s beliefs when she later performs experiments using the
instrument. That is, suppose that once calibrated, the instrument is very simple to use and
requires very little ability or reflection. In such cases, we can hold that most of the epistemic
credit at stake accrues to the lab assistant. Once calibrated, the researcher might simply need to
read measurements from a display on the machine; but without the assistant’s careful work, the
machine would have given inaccurate results.

More generally, the extent of the indirect epistemic credit an agent warrants for a given
belief will depend on such things as the extent to which the truth of the resultant belief is due to
the agent’s efforts, and the extent to which significant abilities or skills are required on her part.
Compare two agents – our lab assistant whose extensive skill and careful work on calibrating an
instrument is crucial to the accurate (true) outcomes of a researcher’s experiments, and another
who merely cleans test tubes using a simple, easily-operated autoclave that most anyone could
use. Plausibly the former lab assistant warrants much greater indirect epistemic credit for the
truth of a researcher’s beliefs than the individual who merely exhibits bare competence in
cleaning test tubes, both as more significant skills and abilities are involved, and also to the
extent that it is the careful calibration of the instrument that plays the key role in the accuracy or
truth of an experiment’s results (and the resulting beliefs).

Auxiliary epistemetic credit accrues when an agent attempts to help individuals to gain
epistemic goods, qua epistemic goods, but where the agent does not influence the recipient’s
belief-forming processes directly through her abilities (unlike direct or indirect credit). Suppose
we have a wealthy benefactor who buys new textbooks for all of the students and teachers in an
impoverished school district, precisely because she wants to help the students to gain a wide
range of valuable knowledge and understanding. Her actions could then play a key role in the acquisition of many true beliefs and much knowledge in the district. But she herself is not teaching the students, nor is she setting-up equipment that they use; she is not directly influencing their belief-forming processes when they occur. That said, she seems to be doing something very valuable from an epistemic point of view, in terms of helping to generate valuable knowledge in her community.  

Of course the benefactor need not exhibit any particular epistemic aptitudes herself in providing the textbooks. So why hold that there is a form of epistemic credit – auxiliary epistemic credit – that accrues in such cases? An agent who tries to help others generate or acquire knowledge demonstrates a respect for epistemic goods, and for the others _qua_ epistemic agents. One can contribute to the epistemic efforts of others and of one’s community in a variety of ways beyond simply testifying or otherwise directly attempting to generate beliefs in these others. One can fund, appreciate, promote, and so on.

Such contributions may reflect an apt epistemic humility and other virtues. An agent might recognize that he lacks the epistemic virtues or training to successfully pursue a certain project, while being dedicated to helping others who are so capable. Compare Christine Swanton’s observations regarding moral virtues:

[The virtues] recognize that we are not only agents who are active in changing the world by promoting good (often at the expense of causing harm), but also agents who love and respect (often at the expense of maximizing good). Finally, they accept that we are not only active beings hell-bent on change, but are also passive in a sense: in our openness to, receptivity to, and appreciation of value and things.
By supporting research, working to improve schools and public education, and so on, agents can demonstrate an appropriate respect for knowledge and other epistemic goods as such; there a variety of modes of responsiveness to epistemic goods, all of which can reflect well upon the agent’s epistemic character. One may not be a climate scientist, but one can act appropriately as an epistemic agent by helping to put them in a position where they can learn more and succeed – even if one is not shaping their belief-formation processes directly oneself. One can submit comments to funding agencies, make donations to relevant science advocacy organizations, vote for politicians who will support adequate public funding for research, and so on.¹⁰

It should be stressed that individuals who exhibit their respect for epistemic goods and agents in these ways accrue only an auxiliary form of epistemic credit – such activities do not generate knowledge directly, nor do they necessarily require highly developed epistemic skills or faculties on the part of the agent. But that said, such agents demonstrate, promote, and respect their epistemic values through these auxiliary actions; the credit is appropriately treated as epistemic.

Returning to the original case of LJ and Elsie, it seems likely that LJ would accrue only incidental, non-epistemic credit for Elsie’s knowledge about the sunrise, the coffee, and so on. Still, the details of the case will matter. First, suppose LJ wakes Elsie up at least in part so that she can form various beliefs about the world, though he does not care about the particular content of the beliefs, and does nothing to modify Elsie’s belief-performing processes (beyond waking her up); here he would accrue some minimal auxiliary epistemic credit to the extent that he wants Elsie to gain knowledge, and by waking her up he provides her an opportunity to do so.

Next, imagine that LJ wakes Elsie up (in part) to help her to gain knowledge of the world, and that he tries to direct her to specific content – “Look outside – can you see the cardinal on
the hedge? And look at how the sun is glistening off of the icicles on next door!”. Here LJ would accrue direct epistemic credit for Elsie’s beliefs, to the extent that he guides her attention and leads her to gain specific items of knowledge (about the cardinal, about the sunlight glistening, etc.). If LJ were instead to simply say to Elsie “You should take a look outside” after opening the curtains to the room so that she can see, he would accrue some minimal indirect epistemic credit for her beliefs about the scene outside of the window. He does not direct her attention to specific contents – but by opening the curtains and encouraging her to look outside, he is influencing her belief-forming processes. By providing light, and a view outside, he does help – at least to some extent - to ensure Elsie’s visual beliefs are accurate. Still, there is little skill or ability involved in this influence (on the part of LJ) and his role does little to ensure the truth of Elsie’s beliefs; as such the indirect credit would be quite minimal.

Finally, suppose LJ is simply waking Elsie up to get ready for work (as seems the most likely scenario) – he has no concern for her epistemic life or belief formation in so doing. This would be an instance of incidental, non-epistemic credit. He happens to wake her up, leading her to form beliefs, but not in any way that reflects any sort of epistemic success or virtue on his part. Similarly, you would presumably deserve only incidental credit for the perceptual beliefs that I form while you drive me to our friend’s home, unless (for example), you decided to take us on a particular route precisely to allow us to see and form beliefs about various landmarks along the way.11

VII Implications and Conclusions

If the current proposal is correct, the assessment of epistemic agents and epistemic success should change significantly. One needs to take into account an agent’s overall impacts in
terms of producing knowledge and other valuable epistemic states, not simply her own stock of such. An agent can create a great deal of non-trivial knowledge in the world through effective conversation, teaching, writing, and so on, and thereby improve the world significantly from an epistemic point of view, even if her own stock of knowledge is quite ordinary. Indeed, agents will typically be able to achieve greater epistemic success by providing knowledge to large numbers of agents via testimony than by merely acquiring knowledge for themselves.

Beyond this, they can act in ways that support the pursuit of knowledge in their communities more indirectly – by acting as assistants, by supporting or paying for educational resources, and so on. Such support activities can reflect a range of epistemic virtues and a suitable concern with epistemic goods. Developing a powerful, effective epistemic community often depends on such auxiliary epistemic support. Good epistemic agents, then, would typically aim both at developing their own large body of knowledge, but also at informing others and improving the overall epistemic state of their community.

As epistemologists, we need to think further about different roles that epistemic agents might play - different ways of being good epistemic agents and manifesting epistemic virtues. For example, we can recognize the importance of those who can communicate difficult or complex material to a wide audience. We might see successful researchers as particularly successful epistemic agents insofar as they bring new truths into their communities that can then be shared across thousands or millions of others. And we could further appreciate the role of librarians and others who play key, but often indirect roles in the knowledge-acquisition and research of others.

Relatedly, we might consider the ways in which agents might contribute to the knowledge of others outside of testifying. For example, consider a Socratic questioner who,
through careful questioning, leads another agent to arrive at knowledge that p. The questioner does not testify that p, but instead guides the other agent to the truth on the issue by focused, well-crafted questions. The questioner plays an essential, creditable role in the agent’s knowledge that p, but what *epistemic* status or credit accrues to her, if any?

Again, a great deal will depend on the details of the case. For example, we might imagine a questioner who asks a college student a series of thoughtful questions about what the student would like to pursue as a career. The student may come to a great deal of knowledge about her own preferences, etc., that she did not previously possess. Still, if the questioner was not aiming to direct the student to particular truths or answers, then it seems he warrants indirect epistemic credit. On the other hand, consider the case of Socrates in the *Meno*, where – through careful questioning – he leads a slave boy to see that one can take a square and create a second square with double the area of the original square by using the original square’s diagonal as the length of the second square’s sides. Here the questioning is aimed at particular truths, and Socrates’ questions would seem to play an essential role in the boy’s knowledge – this would be an instance of direct epistemic credit. Finally, if you ask me for the time, and this by chance happens to lead my mind to wander, such that I discover multiple new truths about the nature of time itself, it seems you would warrant only a rather low level of incidental, non-epistemic credit.

More broadly, to the extent that good epistemic agents are ones who, *ceteris paribus*, tend to achieve a great deal of epistemic success, our conception of the good epistemic agent must also change. Abilities and skills in effective testifying, questioning, and teaching, and a desire to engage in a range of epistemic support activities would all contribute to (and manifest) an agent’s good epistemic character insofar as they enable her to help to produce knowledge and
other epistemic goods in others. And to the extent that agents lack such traits and interests, a wide range of potential epistemic achievements are denied to them. The rejection of a narrow epistemic egoism opens doors to richer, more complete assessments of our epistemic goals, successes, and characters.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{enumerate}
\item There are, of course, cases where an agent’s belief-forming processes are poor and lead to epistemically unjustified beliefs; similarly there are instances of poorly-developed, unreliable testifying – agents would presumably warrant little or no epistemic credit in such cases. In this paper I will focus on successful cases, where epistemic credit is due, to further understand the credit that accrues to reliable, effective testifiers. My thanks to an anonymous referee for noting that the more problematic cases, while not our focus here, should also be acknowledged.
\item Goldberg (2010) argues – plausibly, in my view – that in assessing whether an agent’s testimonial belief amounts to knowledge or is justified on a process reliabilist view, that the relevant processes should include the cognitive processes of the testifier (not just those of the hearer or recipient). Notice that I do not need to take such a strong stance here – rather, I am claiming only that a testifier who provides testimony such that her recipient gains knowledge (or some other epistemically valuable state) as a result warrants epistemic credit for her role in producing this knowledge.
\item I do not mean to strictly equate testimony and assertion here; I merely note that testimony typically involves assertion, and in turn that the norms governing assertion are typically taken to be epistemic in nature (even while there is significant disagreement concerning the exact nature of these norms).
\item See Kawall (2003) for arguments against such a narrow, self-regarding construal of the epistemic point of view.
\end{enumerate}
Craig’s genealogy of knowledge is controversial and has been subject to sustained criticism (see, for example, Kelp 2011 and Fricker 2015). Still, it has been highly influential, and has many adherents (or adherents to slightly modified versions of his view).

Sosa also draws attention to the importance of having suitably apt beliefs that can be properly stored to share with others, and with oneself in the future. See Sosa 2015: ch. 8.

To the extent that Belle forms a belief with a slightly different content from what Henri specifically testified, she has evaluated his testimony and made greater use of her own cognitive capacities to arrive at the slightly different content. As such, she is playing a greater role in the creation of this belief than if she simply embraced the exact content suggested by Henri.

Boaz Miller (2015) argues that in some cases the justification of an agent’s beliefs depends on evidence that the agent herself does not possess; rather, it is possessed by other members of her epistemic community. Here I will remain neutral on Miller’s proposal, while noting that his approach would be compatible with the claims of the current paper. We could treat such cases as involving auxiliary credit, where one agent broadly shares her knowledge and evidence with her community, such that it is available to the community as a whole, but without directly influencing a given individual’s process of belief formation. The former agent accrues auxiliary credit insofar as the latter individual’s belief relies on her (and her evidence) for its justification.


More passive forms of virtuous response to epistemic goods are also possible, as Swanton suggests. Thus we might admire epistemic exemplars, or appreciate and respect the insight demonstrated by an author in a creative new paper, and so on.

In chapter 5 of his fascinating *The Social Contexts of Intellectual Virtue*, Green distinguishes three kinds of credit: credit for good making, credit for good possession, and credit for
participating (in the achievement of some good). A full comparison of the current distinctions with those drawn by Green is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, we can make a few observations here. My proposed distinction between direct and indirect credit allows us, within Green’s category of credit for good-making, to differentiate between the contribution of a testifier, and the contribution of a lab tech who ensures that instruments are working correctly.

The proposed category of auxiliary credit would correspond broadly to Green’s ‘credit for participation’ but not entirely. For example, Green suggests that the recipient of testimony in a case where she has to do barely any work at all (where the testifier makes it extremely easy for her to gain knowledge with a minimal contribution) would warrant credit for participation in the formation of her belief (Green 2017: 101). Under the distinctions proposed here, the recipient would not accrue auxiliary credit to the extent that it is her own belief-forming processes that are at stake. This would simply be an instance of direct credit for her own belief.

12 See Plato, *Meno*, 82b-86a. I would like to thank Wayne Riggs for helpful comments on this issue.

13 Early versions of this paper were presented at the Bled Philosophy Conference on Epistemic Virtue and Value, the Pacific Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association, and at the University of Edinburgh; I would like to thank these audiences for their kind feedback. I would also like to thank Anne Baril, Allan Hazlett, Jennifer Lackey, Chippendale Mupp, Baron Reed, Wayne Riggs, Sarah Wright, and the anonymous referees for this journal for their especially helpful and in-depth comments and suggestions.

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