

knowledge-systems of the early modern period? There is some evidence that the opposite was the case. This period saw the increasing “bhaktification” of Advaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā, as major thinkers in Vārāṇasī such as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Āpadeva sought to demonstrate the compatibility of their respective knowledge-systems with the Vaiṣṇava devotionalism that had become so prevalent in North India. Is it possible that Navya-Naiyāyikas were swimming against the tide in an intellectual culture that was increasingly concerned with theology and liberation through the grace of God? Ganeri notes that Caitanya, the founder of the Gauḍīya sect of Bhedābheda Vaiṣṇava theology, lived in Navadvīpa at the same time as Raghunātha, and is even recorded as sharing the same teacher (p. 43)! Yet Ganeri does not try to explain how two such vastly different intellectual cultures could have thrived side-by-side in a small town in what is now West Bengal. Entertaining these sorts of questions would greatly help clarify whether the changes in the Navya-Nyāya philosophy of Navadvīpa and Vārāṇasī were truly indicative of wider changes in Indian philosophy and society as a whole.

Jonardon Ganeri’s *The Lost Age of Reason* succeeds in rehabilitating the reputations of a number of unfairly maligned Navya-Naiyāyikas, showing that their ideas were indeed new, and are philosophically relevant to this day. As a compact work of intellectual history that attempts to illuminate major trends in the incredibly rich and complex era between 1450 and 1700, it inevitably raises more questions than it is able to answer. Despite my reservations regarding some of its more audacious claims, it is a book that Indologists and students of Indian philosophy should read with great interest and cannot afford to ignore.

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Desire and Motivation in Indian Philosophy. By CHRISTOPHER G. FRAMARIN. Routledge Hindu Studies Series. London: ROUTLEDGE, 2009. Pp. xv + 196. \$170 (cloth); \$44.95 (paper).

According to the widely accepted Humean view of action, if I write this book review in my office, it is because I have a belief-desire pair. I desire an end (that the review be finished) and have a belief about the means to the end (that my office will allow me the solitude to complete it). Simply having the belief about my office is insufficient for action. Desire is required. However, in the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna that he should act without desire (*nissprhaḥ*), having abandoned all desires (*sarvān kāmān*). Many commentators suggest non-literal interpretations of Kṛṣṇa’s words, thinking a literal reading to be incoherent. In *Desire and Motivation in Indian Philosophy*, Christopher G. Framarin argues against this view and offers an account of desireless action.

Framarin exegetes the *Bhagavad Gītā* and related Sanskrit texts, evaluates the interpretations of modern Indologists, and engages with contemporary philosophers working in theory of action. His concise and clear text simultaneously serves as an overview of the topic and a constructive philosophical account. The positive argument he makes in the final chapter for desireless action complements anti-Humean arguments in Western literature but is not identical to any existing view.

A brief introduction neatly outlines the book’s argument: (1) In the *Gītā*, Kṛṣṇa tells Arjuna to act without desire. (2) Scholars interpret this as literally contradictory because desire is necessary for action, and so claim this cannot be Kṛṣṇa’s actual advice. (3) They argue instead that Kṛṣṇa is urging the elimination of some desires—the “Some Desires Interpretation,” henceforth SDI. (4) Scholars also argue that the wider Indian tradition accepts the SDI, and so we ought to understand the *Gītā* in this way. (5) However, Kṛṣṇa’s advice is not so obviously a contradiction, contra (2), and so the SDI must be justified on the basis of the wider Indian tradition. Before accepting the SDI on the basis of other texts, per (4), we must ask two questions: first, on what basis do these texts distinguish between permissible and impermissible desires, and second, are these texts committed to the claim that action entails desire?

Thus while his starting point is the *Gītā*, Framarin also surveys four other texts which are central to the Indian tradition: the *Yogasūtra*, *Manusmṛti*, *Nyāyasūtra*, and *Brahmasiddhi*. He ultimately con-

cludes that the SDI is implausible. Further, he claims that the Indian tradition is not always committed to action entailing desire, and so for these reasons we ought to take the argument for desireless action seriously.

Chapter two investigates how we might distinguish between permissible and impermissible desires, on the SDI. Framarin concludes that there are two closely related conditions: a desire is permissible only if the object of the desire is the most valuable one, and only if the desire “plays a necessary role in motivating the right action” (p. 31). A second way of putting this set of conditions is that if and only if a fully knowledgeable agent would have a desire is it permissible. As support, Framarin explicates Patañjali’s analysis of *rāga* and *dveṣa* (typically translated as “desire” and “aversion”) in the *Yogasūtra*, with Vyāsa’s commentary.

In chapter three Framarin takes up the “*Mokṣa*-Only Interpretation” (Kṛṣṇa advises Arjuna to act only on the desire for *mokṣa*, or liberation). Framarin criticizes all of the arguments for this interpretation as being ad hoc and self-contradictory accounts of permissibility which entail that *mokṣa* itself cannot be permissible.

Chapter four considers whether the desires permitted are “unselfish” ones (the “No Selfish Desires Interpretation”). After disambiguating two ways the term “selfish” could be understood (simply self-interested or excessively self-interested), Framarin suggests that problems remain on either interpretation. One is that simply self-interested desires seem permissible. For example, an enlightened sage would not refuse to treat his own injury just because it belongs to himself. However, if we mean excessively self-interested desires, eliminating excessively self-interested desires will not necessarily eliminate excessively self-interested actions. Framarin argues that, for instance, a child’s desire for more cake than his sibling need not be motivated by the desire to have more cake than his sibling. It might simply be the desire to eat cake.

Having rejected two versions of the SDI (the *Mokṣa*-Only and No Selfish Desires Interpretations), in chapter five Framarin turns to the *Manusmṛti*. He claims that *Manusmṛti* 2.3 should be understood: “belief is the basis of desire,” not “desire is the basis of intention.” Framarin thus argues that the *Manusmṛti* cannot be marshaled as evidence for a broadly Humean view in Indian philosophy. Instead, the *Manusmṛti* only requires that one have a desire for a means. In a case such as performing a ritual sacrifice, one might have a purpose such as fulfilling an injunction (*vidhi*), a belief that the *agnihotra* sacrifice will fulfill the *vidhi*, and a desire to perform a sacrifice which is a means to the *vidhi*, but no desire to fulfill the *vidhi* (p. 87). Acting without desire, then, would be acting simply because an action is to be done—and desiring only the means (pp. 90–91).

In chapter six Framarin takes up the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Brahmasiddhi*, two texts which are typically taken to exclude phenomenologically salient desires. This is the third variation of the Some Desires Interpretation, and Framarin shows that it entails that all desires are impermissible (both for ends and means). After all, it seems characteristic of desires to dispose us to have sensations of joy and disappointment based on the results of our actions. Framarin proposes that these Indian texts actually distinguish between a type of purpose that is equanimous (*icchā* in the *Brahmasiddhi*, *vairāgya* in the *Nyāyasūtra*) and desires that are phenomenologically salient (*rāga* and *dveṣa* in both texts). What these texts say, then, is that a person free from *rāga* and *dveṣa* need not have desires, but only an equanimous purpose.

The last chapter is primarily dedicated to refuting analytic philosopher Michael Smith’s version of Humeanism. If anti-Humean arguments are plausible, then there is no philosophical constraint against taking Kṛṣṇa’s advice literally. Framarin’s anti-Humean alternative is different from contemporary philosophy’s alternatives. On his view, beliefs and purposes (not desires) motivate actions, whereas contemporary anti-Humean models claim that beliefs alone can motivate. Thus Framarin claims that his proposal is not intimately tied to the success of contemporary rebuttals to Humeanism.

Undertaking such a wide-ranging work of comparative and reconstructive philosophy is a difficult task. There is always the danger of neglecting the text’s historical context and shoehorning passages into preconceived philosophical categories. This is essentially Simon Brodbeck’s criticism, who says the *Mahābhārata* and *Bhagavad Gītā* “would be a more convincing locative object of study than ‘Indian philosophy,’” and that Framarin writes as if brahminical commentaries are straightforward expositions of a root text, rather than often creative philosophical efforts in their own right (*Religious*

Studies 46.1 [March 2010]: 135–40). True, one might wish that Framarin more explicitly highlighted the relationship between root text author and commentator. Further, given that there are multiple commentaries on these seminal texts, the reader is left wondering why these particular commentators are the representative voices of the Indian tradition. However, his argumentative burden is to show that the tradition is not unanimous in accepting the Some Desires Interpretation. Brahminical commentaries are part of the philosophical tradition of Sanskrit philosophy, and I take it that part of Framarin’s purpose is to show that there is no univocal “Indian context” necessitating the SDI. In this respect, he has succeeded.

With regard to the analytic philosophers in his readership: while most will appreciate the numbered premises and abundance of schematized arguments (named by acronyms such as SDI, MO1 through MO4, and so on), the repetition is tiresome. In some places, the reader would be better served by Framarin leaving schematization aside and simply expositing the general structure of his argument through narrative.

Finally, the text’s end matter includes three appendices: English translations of *Manusmṛti* 2.1–2.5 with Medhātithi’s *Manubhāṣya* on 2.2–2.5; *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.22 with Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyadarśanabhāṣya*; selections from Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika*, Vācaspatimiśra’s *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā*, Maṇḍanamiśra’s *Brahmasiddhi*; and selections from Śaṅkhaṇḍi’s *Brahmasiddhivyākhyā*. The appendices are not referenced in the text itself, but are valuable evidence that Framarin’s work is both philosophical and exegetical, as well as enjoyable translations of important texts. There are also a bibliography, chapter-by-chapter footnotes, and an index. Future editions of the text would be served well with a more extensive index, in particular with regard to the names of analytic philosophers.

These small criticisms aside, *Desire and Motivation in Indian Philosophy* is both an excellent introduction to the Indian tradition for philosophers trained in the analytic tradition and a fruitful investigation into the tradition’s views on agency and action that Indologists will appreciate.

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Dharma Pātañjala, *a Śaiva Scripture from Ancient Java, Studied in the Light of Related Old Javanese and Sanskrit Texts*. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. 16. By ANDREA ACRI. Pp. xviii + 706. Groningen: EGBERT FORSTEN, 2012. €170.

Since the time of his *tesi de laurea* (2005) and first published article on “the textual basis of Śaivism in ancient Indonesia” (2006), Andrea Acri has worked to build the basis of a solid understanding of the relationship between the Tūtur and Tattva literature of Java and Bali and the texts of the Siddhāntatantra, Śaivāgama, Pāśupata, Yoga, and Sāṅkhyā traditions of South Asia. With the publication of his text, translation, and commentary of the *Dharma Pātañjala* (DhPāt), which he describes as “a Śaiva Scripture from ancient Java,” we have before us a comparative study that more than lives up to the promise of his earlier work. For anyone with an interest in either the history of Śaivism in India or its efflorescence in the ancient Malay-Indonesian archipelago, this publication provides an invaluable resource that provides much insight into the ontology, epistemology, and cosmology of Śaiva doctrine in comparative perspective.

Acri’s work is focused on a work from the little-known Śaiva tradition of Sunda (west Java) that exists in a single manuscript. This work provides us with access to a new and very welcome body of textual evidence for the doctrines and practices of the Śaiva stream in ancient Indonesian religion. We have but to glance at the fifteen pages of Acri’s “Index of Text Passages” (pp. 689–706) to get a sense of the usefulness of this volume for the study of the extensive network of connections with Indian doctrinal sources that enabled the Javano-Balinese school of Śaivism and provided a touchstone for their every textual endeavor.

While I will note below some quibbles with Acri’s translation of the DhPāt (pp. 101–342), this should not be taken to outweigh my positive assessment of the merits of this publication. Acri begins his work with an excellent introduction to the Tūtur and Tattva textual streams and how the DhPāt is