Abstract: We explore new connections between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning to offer a novel perspective on skilled behavior and its relationship to practical knowledge. We argue that practical knowledge is “easy” in the sense that, by manifesting one’s skills, one has a priori propositional justification for certain beliefs about what one is doing as one does it. This proposal has wider consequences for debates about intentional action and knowledge: first, because agents sometimes act intentionally in epistemically hazardous environments, these justified beliefs do not always rise to the level of (practical) knowledge. Second, practical knowledge is more intimately related to basic knowledge than has been appreciated. Third, an attractive “middle way” opens between the Anscombian tradition of defending a necessary connection between intentional action and practical knowledge and the more recent tradition of explaining away substantive epistemic conditions on intentional action.

In central or well-ordered cases of intentional action, an agent knows what she’s doing as she does it; her intentional actions manifest “practical knowledge.” Some authors, notably Pavese & Beddor (2022) and Pavese (2022), have recently defended the broadly Anscombian (1963) thesis that intentional actions are necessarily accompanied by practical knowledge; manifesting such knowledge is an essential part of actional control, the control

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that distinguishes intentional actions from unintentional ones and mere (non-actional) behavior.

In this essay, we draw new connections between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning to offer a novel perspective on skilled behavior and its relationship to practical knowledge. In particular, we argue that practical knowledge is “easy” in the sense that, by manifesting one’s skills, one has *a priori* propositional justification for certain beliefs about what one is doing as one does it. One important point of contrast between our “skill-first” theory of actional control and other, “practical knowledge-first” theories is that, because agents sometimes act intentionally in epistemically hazardous environments, (skill-)justified beliefs do not necessarily rise to the level of practical knowledge. This view charts a middle way through the Anscombian tradition of defending a necessary connection between intentional action and practical knowledge, on the one hand, and the more recent tradition of explaining away any substantive epistemic condition on intentional action, on the other.\(^2\)

Our criticism, as our appeal to “easy knowledge” might suggest, relies on motivating parallels between the knowledge requirement for intentional action, on the one hand, and the so-called “easy knowledge” problem, on the other.\(^3\) If we are correct, debates surrounding the connection between intentional action, knowledge, and actional

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\(^2\) Paul 2009; Piñeros-Glasscock 2019.

control are more intimately related to traditional epistemological questions about basic knowledge than has so far been appreciated. It is our hope that by exploring these novel questions about the epistemology of skill, our collective grasp of the relationship between knowledge and action will be enriched.

1. The Epistemology of Mental Rehearsal

It is common for elite athletes to mentally rehearse their competitions, visualizing, sensing, or otherwise simulating their performance before they compete. Sometimes this is a process of addressing contingencies; Michael Phelps, one of the greatest competitive swimmers of all time, is reported to have imagined himself swimming with broken goggles and torn trunks, internalizing and automating how he would respond to those conditions in the pool. Other times, it is a process of diminishing performance anxiety by simulating accomplishing a desired end. A gymnast might mentally rehearse her bars event, focusing on how to stick a tricky dismount; a kicker might spend hours visualizing his field goals before the playoffs: where to place the tee, how many steps back to take when lining up, how quickly to call for the ball to snap, and the precise force and angle with which to hit it, depending on field position and wind conditions, and so on. When

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4 Mental Rehearsal, as we use the term, is a form of Mental Imagery Practice. For discussion, see Epstein 1980; Decety 1999; Cumming & Hall 2002; Munzert et al. 2009; and Di Renzo et al. 2016.
all goes well, the kicker’s mental rehearsal can provide them with knowledge of how to accommodate various conditions on the field so as to bring about his desired end.\textsuperscript{5}

Sports are an obvious place to look for examples of mental rehearsal, but that should not give readers the impression that this phenomenon is somehow tied uniquely to competitive pursuits. The night before a long trip, one might imaginatively simulate possible routes to the airport, paying special attention to how to respond to road-closures and traffic. Let’s focus on this everyday example.

\textbf{T\textsc{r}a\textsc{f}f\textsc{i}c:} Tom has to wake up early to catch a flight from Los Angeles to New York. Traffic in Los Angeles is stressfully unpredictable and predictably stressful, and Tom, sensitive to this fact, has heightened anxiety before the trip. To make it to LAX from Tom’s West Hollywood bungalow, he would typically take La Cienega, but recent construction has rendered that typical route unreliable, and Tom knows this. To ease his anxiety, and to better prepare for the journey ahead, Tom mentally rehearses the trip as

\begin{itemize}
  \item While the above sports examples are meant to illustrate how mental rehearsal/imaginative simulation can furnish one with the relevant propositional knowledge of means, it’s worth registering that – perhaps more controversially – some sports psychologist take knowledge of the relevant means (at least in some domains of athletic performance) to be inextricably dependent upon mental rehearsal. This kind of stronger position is found in the sports psychology of putting in golf (e.g., Rotella 2001); according to Rotella, for example, imaginative simulation of the line of the putt is necessary for knowing the correct line of the putt (where to aim and with what speed), and an inclination to undertake such imaginative rehearsal is common to most elite putters.
\end{itemize}
follows: “If La Cienega is jammed from construction, I can take the 10 to the
405 and only lose a few minutes.”

It is, of course, inessential that Tom engage in inner monologue; he might simply
imaginatively work through the sensations of navigating city traffic. One plausible
upshot of Tom’s mental rehearsal in TRAFFIC is that he comes to know (or is at least in a
position to know) that he can make it to the airport on time by employing one of two
means: the first is to take La Cienega, and the second is to take a detour down the 10 and
405. The next morning, when construction renders the first route too slow, he takes the
second, and he makes it to the airport on time. This is obviously something Tom does
intentionally, and in so doing manifests both knowledge of how to get from West
Hollywood to LAX, and knowledge that the means he employs (taking the detour) are
very likely sufficient to bring about his desired end, a timely airport arrival.

In Tom’s case, to make things especially clear, the following three claims are true:

T1. Tom makes it to the airport on time intentionally,

T2. Tom knows how to get from West Hollywood to LAX, and

T3. Tom knows that in order to get to West Hollywood from LAX, one either takes La Cienega,

or one takes a detour down the 10 and 405.
Cases like TRAFFIC suggest that, in virtue of knowing how to φ, by mentally rehearsing φ-ing one can acquire knowledge that, for some means ψ, it is sufficiently likely for one to succeed at φ-ing by ψ-ing. In particular, in virtue of Tom knowing how to navigate Los Angeles, and in particular, in virtue of Tom knowing how to get from West Hollywood to LAX, he can – to a first approximation – come to know via engaging in mental rehearsal a proposition concerning the means by which one gets to LAX in various counterfactual circumstances. In this way of viewing Tom’s case, T2 is explanatorily prior to T3, since T2 is what puts Tom in a position to know that in order to get to West Hollywood from LAX, one either takes La Cienega, or one takes a detour down the 10 and 405, the proposition featuring in T3.

Why think that what Tom gains through mentally rehearsing his know-how is in the market for know-that? Well, he gains a non-accidentally true belief, which is the mark of knowledge. The truth of the belief is stipulated; its non-accidentality is, of course, the interesting and distinctive part of the story. Tom’s belief that the means he employs (taking the detour) are very likely to bring about his timely airport arrival inherits its non-accidentality from the know-how underwriting it.

To expand on this last claim a bit, consider that, insofar as Tom’s know-how regarding navigating Los Angeles, and in particular getting from West Hollywood to LAX, exhibits a certain kind of counterfactual success. He would succeed in arriving at LAX (on time) across a range of counterfactual scenarios in which he tried or intended to
do so—scenarios in which the weather is a bit worse, in which the flights’ departure time is a bit earlier or later, in which he is fighting a cold, in which the make and model of his car varies, in which he decides to make morning tea rather than coffee, and so on. Part of what makes it the case that Tom possesses this know-how is that, when he tries or intends to navigate to LAX, the means he employs reliably ensure his (likely) on-time arrival across these variations in circumstance. His attempts are, so to speak, safely connected to his success. And given that Tom’s know-how is grounded in this safe connection to success, Tom’s mentally rehearsing his know-how affords the beliefs he acquires during mental rehearsal a safe connection to the truth about how he would likely succeed. The know-that that results from mental rehearsal merely propositionally encodes the skill rehearsed. One might say that the justificatory heavy-lifting is done by

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6 Compare here with the discussion of Phelps above.
7 Hawley 2003; Jaster 2020.
8 There is a structural worry here: know-how is widely (albeit, not unanimously) thought to be less resilient against epistemic luck than propositional knowledge is. This is a point that has been made variously by Cath (2011), Poston (2009), Carter and Pritchard (2015) and others. First, we want to emphasize that it’s mistaken to infer from the kind of inheritance claim being made above that know-how and know-that must be equally epistemic luck resistant. Resistance to being undermined by epistemic luck (in the debate registered above) is thought to matter for exercises of know-how and states of know-that; one can – as per Cath (2011) – exercise know-how in screwing in a lightbulb even if one’s belief about a way to screw in the lightbulb is Gettiered. But, even if that’s right, it might be that one’s reliable ability to screw in lightbulbs (in the very case that the corresponding target belief is Gettiered) is extremely high, as high for all that’s been said, as the level of reliability that one’s, e.g., perceptual or memorial capacities would need to be to furnish one with propositional knowledge. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the core position advanced here is best interpreted (as we will go on to develop it in later sections) as a view about prima facie propositional justification. The view we embrace not a kind of ‘closure’ thesis to the effect that if you know how to \( \varphi \) and mentally rehearse that know-how, then you know that (for some relevant skill-encoding proposition); the prima facie justification furnished to one by mentally rehearsing their know-how puts one in a position to know. When all goes well (as in the case of Tom) one then gains knowledge; in other cases, one’s prima facie justification may not secure ultima facie justification, and one thereby falls sort of knowing,
the skill being mentally rehearsed; the justification for Tom’s know-that is “easy” precisely in that it is parasitic on the know-how it encodes, as opposed to, e.g., being inferred from any other of his justified beliefs or knowledge.

Thus far, we have argued only that Tom’s actually mentally rehearsing his knowledge of how to navigate LA traffic yields knowledge that in order to get to West Hollywood from LAX, one either takes La Cienega, or one takes a detour down the 10 and 405. But suppose Tom never bothered to rehearse, as many of us might refrain from doing, especially when the stakes are low. He would, presumably, nevertheless be in a position to know that proposition concerning the means likely to bring about his desired end; after all, he could come to know it by mentally rehearsing the relevant skill.

In sum, mental rehearsal enables practitioners to rehearse a skill, or simulate a movement, without actually executing it much as, e.g., imagination allows us to simulate possibilities without actualising those possibilities⁹ In rehearsing, whether it concerns navigating traffic on the way to the airport or kicking the game-winning field goal in the playoffs, one comes to know (weaker: puts oneself in a position to know) a proposition that encodes some aspect of the skill being rehearsed, a proposition that specifies the means by which one will achieve a desired end (arriving at the airport on time, kicking the game-winning field goal, and so on).

⁹ Indeed, this general idea – i.e., that mental simulation is closely connected to counterfactual knowledge – is central to a prominent strand of thinking in modal epistemology about philosophical knowledge as sourced in epistemically efficacious thought experiments. See, e.g., Williamson (2007, Chs. 5-7).
Let us briefly remark on one potential objection. In particular, one might think that it’s not obvious that mentally rehearsing one’s knowing how φ, in the absence of knowing that one knows how to φ, suffices to put one in a position to know the relevant skill-encoding propositions. To see the problem, suppose that an underconfident locksmith has a mismeasure of her own abilities to pick a warded lock. Though she in fact knows how to do so perfectly well, her irrational underconfidence leads her to doubt that she has the relevant know-how when facing a particular warded lock she is called upon to pick.\(^\text{10}\) Suppose that, despite this underconfidence, she undergoes the relevant mental rehearsal before, to her surprise, picking the lock successfully. The view under consideration implicates, counterintuitively, that our underconfident locksmith is in a position to know the relevant skill encoding propositions, and simply in virtue of the know-how she (unbeknownst to her) possesses; a more plausible view – as this line of thought goes – will be more restrictive: the locksmith is put in a position to know skill encoding propositions not simply in virtue of possessing the relevant know-how, but rather in virtue of knowing that she possesses the relevant know-how – something our unconfident locksmith lacks, though which she could gain through additional confirmation of her skill.

What this objection brings out is that possessing a skill does not suffice, all on its own, to put a skilled agent in a position to know a corresponding skill-encoding

\(^{10}\) Her underconfidence might function as a “psychological defeater” \textit{a la} Lackey (1999, 2014).
proposition. Instead, possessing a skill suffices, all on its own, to *prima facie* propositionally justify a skilled agent in believing a corresponding skill-encoding proposition.\(^{11}\) In unfavorable epistemic conditions, perhaps those involving considerations of underconfidence, defeat, or other knowledge-undermining features, this *prima facie* propositional justification may not yield *ultima facie* justified beliefs. The underconfident locksmith possesses—and can avail herself of—this *prima facie* justification even if, were she to believe the corresponding skill-encoding proposition, she would fail to know it. But since TRAFFIC is not a case of mental rehearsal performed in inhospitable epistemic conditions, T1-T3 still hold.

In the next section we show how our picture of the epistemology of mental rehearsal is part of a much more general perspective on the epistemology of skills and the propositions encoding them.

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\(^{11}\) An anonymous reviewer for this journal invites us to clarify how this idea applies to, e.g., young children and animals. Such agents plausibly manifest skills and know-how but less obviously have the capacity to believe corresponding skill-encoding propositions or, perhaps further, to be *prima facie* propositionally justified in believing (or to know) such propositions.

There is, however, reason for optimism that animals and children are in a position to possess propositional knowledge of the sort implicated by skilled and intentional behavior, even (i) absent the capacity to verbally articulate that knowledge (Fodor 1968, 71; Stanley 2011, 157–163; Stanley and Krakauer 2013, 6); and (ii) even insofar as they’d have knowledge of means, absent the concept of probability or the capacity to conceptualize means as such (Pavese and Beddor (2022, 615). This is so even if such agents lack the capacities for what might be thought of as *paradigmatic, explicit* belief (Brownstein and Michaelson 2016, 2826).

We follow these authors in thinking that non-human animals and young children are not precluded from having knowledge of skill-encoding propositions. Even views stronger than ours are developed so as to be sensitive to (or at least compatible with) the actionality of, e.g., Fido catching the rabbit.
2. Suppositional Reasoning and Easy Knowledge

The last section explored what might be considered “practical skills,” concerning how to kick a field goal, how to navigate traffic, and so on. But a parallel point can be made about cognitive skills, which we explore here.

One issue that animated epistemologists in the 1990s and 2000s was how to explain the possibility of basic knowledge.

Basic Knowledge: S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S’s knowing P is reliable.\textsuperscript{12}

What made the issue particularly urgent was that many popular epistemological views—including versions of reliabilism, virtue epistemology,\textsuperscript{13} and evidentialist foundationalism—countenanced basic knowledge, but to countenance basic knowledge was, ostensibly, to license problematic justificatory bootstrapping.\textsuperscript{14}

To see the problem, start with a case due to Vogel (2000):

\textsuperscript{12} This is the presentation due to Cohen (2005, p.417). See also Weisberg (2012) and Kallestrup (2012).
\textsuperscript{13} See here, in particular, Sosa’s attempt to respond to the problem of basic knowledge, by identifying species of ‘virtuous circularity’ in his 2009 Reflective Knowledge.
\textsuperscript{14} This problem was originally due to Fumerton 1995 and picked up again by Vogel 2000, but see also Cohen 2002, 2005, 2010; Markie 2005; Titelbaum 2010; and Weisberg 2010, 2012.
“[Roxanne] believes implicitly what her gas gauge says, without knowing that the gauge is reliable. But she undertakes the following, admittedly curious, procedure. She looks at the gauge often. Not only does she form a belief about how much gas is in the tank, but she also takes note of the state of the gauge itself. So, for example, when the gauge reads ‘F’, she believes that, on this occasion, the tank is full. She also believes that, on this occasion, the gauge reads ‘F’. Moreover, Roxanne combines these beliefs; she believes:

\[G\] On this occasion, the gauge reads ‘F’ and \( F \).

...Now, it is a completely straightforward logical consequence of \[G\] that:

\[A\] On this occasion, the gauge is reading accurately.

Assume that Roxanne deduces \[A\] from \[G\]. Deduction is certainly a reliable process, so there is no loss of reliability at this step. Consequently, it seems that Roxanne must be credited with knowing \[A\].” (613)

By repeating applications of this procedure of checking the gauge, Roxanne could infer that the gas gauge is generally reliable. Vogel thinks that Roxanne’s belief in \( A \), along with the inference about the gauge’s general reliability, are illegitimately “bootstrapped” from
her merely reading the gas gauge.\textsuperscript{15} We could even imagine Roxanne continuing this process over and over again to become confident in the “super-reliability” of her gas gauge.\textsuperscript{16} (Arbitrarily secure) knowledge of the reliability of one’s gas gauge is surely not so easy as merely checking the gauge, no matter how many opportunities one has to check. Many thought, more generally, one cannot bootstrap one’s way into knowledge that one’s belief-formation methods are reliable merely by employing those very methods.\textsuperscript{17}

There are, of course, many different proposed solutions to the problem of easy knowledge, and we cannot hope to do them all justice here.

Instead, we hope to explore one throughline in the literature surrounding the easy knowledge problem, namely that of the epistemology of suppositional reasoning, and show its intimate connection to mental rehearsal. Consider, to that end, the following example:

\textsuperscript{15} Vogel’s aim was to raise a problem for Goldman-style reliabilism, but Cohen (2002, 2005) showed that the problem was much more general to any view that admits of basic knowledge, including, for instance, foundationalist evidentialism. And this not only rendered knowledge of the reliability of one’s faculties or methods too easily attained, but licensed a certain objectionably cavalier anti-skepticism. For suppose that I open my eyes and see what looks like a red table, from which, according to theories that admit of basic knowledge, I am in a position to know that the table is red. Moreover, suppose that I know (\textit{a priori}) that if the table is red, it is not white but illuminated by red lights. By an application of \textit{modus ponens}, I am in a position to know that the table is not white but illuminated by red lights. Similar reasoning puts me in a position to know that I am not a brain in a vat being radically deceived about the color of the room’s furniture. But anti-skepticism is surely not so easily attained. The “closure problem” is sometimes given a separate treatment (see Cohen 2000, 2002; Markie 2005), but those details are not important for our presentation here.

\textsuperscript{16} Weisberg 2010.

\textsuperscript{17} For helpful overview, see Weisberg 2010; Titelbaum 2010
**Supposition:** In a reflective moment and blindfolded, Stew anticipates various experiences $E_1, E_2, E_3 \ldots$ he might undergo upon removing his blindfold. Perhaps the wall will appear red to him, or blue, or ... He also considers various hypotheses $H_1, H_2, H_3 \ldots$ about the color of the wall, that it is red, that it is blue, or ... As he imagines these various experiences and hypotheses, he considers which hypothesis would be most reasonable to believe given various experiences, perhaps by reasoning thusly:

“Supposing that the wall looks red, that the wall is red best explains why this is so. Supposing that the wall looks blue, that the wall is blue best explains why this is so...” Stew discharges his assumptions and, making an inference to the best explanation, comes to believe various contingent material conditionals of the form if $E$, then $H$; for instance, if the wall looks red, the wall is red. Blindfold removed, Stew has a (veridical) experience as of a red wall and comes to know the wall is red.\(^{18}\)

According to Hawthorne (2002) and Cohen (2002, 2010, 2016), the upshot of Stew’s suppositional reasoning is that he gains contingent *a priori* knowledge of various material conditionals of the form if $E$, then $H$, in this case various material conditionals concerning the relationship between how things look and their color. Cohen (2010), building off

\(^{18}\) We borrow this general idea from a similar case, “The Explainer,” which appears in Hawthorne 2002.
Pollock (1995), suggests that the epistemology of suppositional reasoning resembles that of conditional proof, in which I assume $p$ to derive $q$ and can then discharge my assumption and infer if $p$, then $q$. In supposition, of course, Stew is not relying on any natural deduction system with derivation rules such as a rule of conditional proof. Instead, he is relying on what might be called the “perception rule,” an informal, defeasible rule of inference according to which:

$$S \text{ looks } C$$

Therefore, $S$ is $C$.

As we invoke it here, the perception rule is highly schematic; it captures quasi-inferential mental transitions from something’s looking a certain way to its being a certain way, and one’s competence with the perception rule is a competence in making the relevant mental transitions.

With that said, note that there is nothing special, at least according to Cohen-cum-Pollock, about the perception rule in respect of its potential to confer justification to competent agents; it is a feature of defeasible inference rules more generally (even more “formal” rules like statistical syllogism) that when applied in suppositional reasoning afford a defeasible a priori justification for believing the corresponding contingent material conditionals encoding particular instantiations of the rule.
How, exactly, can suppositional reasoning play this justificatory role? According to Cohen:

“In the case of the suppositional reasoning, I can arrive at the relevant conditional via trivial reasoning *simply in virtue of my competence in using the rule*. It is important to see that the conditional is not a premise in the reasoning. If we view the conditionals corresponding to inference rules as premises in our reasoning, then as Lewis Carroll observed, we are committed to a vicious regress of premises. But crucially, the bootstrapping reasoning is not independent of my justification for believing the conditional. I can engage in the bootstrapping reason only if I can competently use the inference rule. *And if I am so competent, I am (propositionally) justified in believing the conditional.* So I cannot do the bootstrapping reasoning unless I am already justified in believing the conditional. Moreover, the bootstrapping reasoning cannot increase my degree of justification for the reliability of my color vision beyond the initial *a priori* degree of justification afforded by the suppositional reasoning. The only source of justification in the suppositional reasoning comes from the application of the perceptual inference rule.” (2010, p.154-155, our italics.)
It is an agent’s competence with the perception rule that affords that agent a priori justification for believing a proposition that encodes an instance of the rule itself. In supposition, Stew’s justified belief that if the wall looks red, the wall is red encodes an instance of the rule according to which something’s looking thus-and-so is defeasible reason to conclude that it is thus-and-so, a rule with which, by stipulation, he is competent. Moreover, nothing in this explanation requires that Stew actually engage in the relevant suppositional reasoning in order to be justified in believing that the wall is red (on the basis of its looking red). Instead, when an agent like Stew manifests his competence with the perception rule in suppositional reasoning, he can avail himself of the a priori propositional justification he already has in virtue of that very competence; in other words, Stew’s competence with the perception rule puts him in a position to know various conditionals encoding it.19

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19 Granted, facts about an agent’s conceptual repertoire may constrain the propositional justification available to her via her competence with the perception rule. An agent lacking the concept cerulean but otherwise competent with the perception rule, for instance, may not have propositional justification for believing the conditional if S looks cerulean, S is cerulean precisely because, given her limitations, nothing can look cerulean to her, nor could she believe or suppose that something looks cerulean, at least not until she acquires cerulean.

How does this square with Cohen’s claim—one which we take on board—that an agent’s competence with the perception rule affords her a priori propositional justification for conditionals encoding that rule? We take it that the most plausible answer here is a straightforward one: the perception rule gives one justification only for instances where one possesses the relevant concepts. If one lacks concepts required to grasp the relevant instance of the perception rule, one isn’t in a position to apply the rule to the instance. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for inviting us to clarify this point.
There are two things to note about this rational competence-based view of bootstrapping. The first is that, by engaging in Cohen-cum-Pollock bootstrapping reasoning, one cannot gain justification one did not already have; this avoids the problematic form of bootstrapping discussed by Vogel (2000) and Weisberg (2010), which are predicated on agents gaining knowledge of the reliability (or super-reliability) of their belief-formation processes by deploying those very processes. On the rational competence-based view, any justification one has for believing the conditional encoding an instance of the relevant inference rule was already present in virtue of being competent with that very rule.\(^{20}\) In other words, agents competent with the perception rule have a priori propositional justification for believing that perception is reliable, of which agents can avail themselves by engaging in a bit of suppositional reasoning.\(^{21}\)

The second thing to note is the striking parallel between the conditions of intentional action and the conditions of rational or justified belief deploying the perception rule. Recall the TRAFFIC case from §2, in which:

T1. *Tom makes it to the airport on time intentionally*,

T2. *Tom knows how to get from West Hollywood to LAX*, and


\(^{21}\) If Hawthorne 2002 is correct, then if it is true that S can rationally believe P on the basis of E, S has a priori propositional justification for the contingent proposition if E, then P. See especially his pp.250-252.
T3. *Tom knows that in order to get to West Hollywood from LAX, one either takes La Cienega, or one takes a detour down the 10 and 405.*

In §2, we argued that T2 explained T3, the latter of which encoded Tom’s skill in navigating Los Angeles traffic. The knowledge featuring in T3 was “easy” because it was parasitic on his know-how, and he could avail himself of justification for this knowledge by mentally rehearsing the relevant skill. In unreflective moments, or perhaps if circumstances were a bit different and Tom didn’t mentally rehearse, he would nevertheless be in a position to know the relevant skill-encoding proposition. And note that in SUPPOSITION, the following three claims are true:

S1. *Stew knows the wall is red,*

S2. *Stew is competent with (knows how to employ) the perception rule,* and

S3. *Stew knows that if the wall looks red, the wall is red.*

According to the rational competence-based view we’ve been exploring, S2 explains S3. In particular, Stew is (*a priori*) propositionally justified in believing S3 in virtue of S2, and he can avail himself of this justification by engaging in trivial suppositional reasoning that employs the perception rule. Stew’s knowledge that *if the wall looks red, the wall is red* plays a relatively minor role in the drama of his gaining perceptual knowledge. His
possessing such knowledge (or being in a position to, in virtue of facts about what he is propositionally justified in believing) is not a part of what explains S1; it is instead a necessary consequence of S2.

This parallel between TRAFFIC and SUPPOSITION is important and non-coincidental. It suggests that practical skills play a role in the epistemology of mental rehearsal analogous to cognitive skills in the epistemology of suppositional reasoning. In each case, by imaginatively simulating one’s (practical or cognitive) skills, one can come to possess easy know-that encoding the skill being simulated. Moreover, even when one does not imaginatively simulate one’s (practical or cognitive) skills, one is in a position to acquire easy know-that encoding the relevant skills. Consequently, in both cases, the resulting know-that is “easy,” ultimately grounded in one’s skill, competence, or know-how.

The connection between mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning has been largely ignored in the action theory debate. Our proposal explains the connection between intentional action, know-how, and know-that in a way that not only – as we will see in more detail in §§4-5 – renders the connection between the epistemic and actional non-mysterious, but also in a way that renders the connection between the practical and the cognitive non-mysterious, via connecting the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning.

22 Though see Pavese (2022b) for recent discussion presuppositions in connection with Carroll’s Regress.
Of course, in articulating our view, and in developing the parallels between the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning, we have relied on the idea that the agents engaged in rehearsal or supposition are in a position to know rather task-specific, plan-encoding propositions. One might worry that this is too demanding on the agent, in the sense that they might have only limited powers of imagination, or that their mental rehearsal might be highly general or partial. Moreover, even those with know-how who undergo mental rehearsal that is highly specific are not ‘clairvoyant’ – viz., the imaginative simulations they undertake will at best be rough approximations of the relevant means that they in fact go on to take – except in the most highly idealized cases.

To make this worry more concrete, one might consider for example the kind of mental rehearsal undertaken by expert athletes such as Tiger Woods, who may have robust powers of imagination in matters golf, but who describes mentally rehearsing a mere partial visualization of the swing. How is Tiger Woods in a position to know a task-specific, plan-encoding proposition via mental rehearsal when that mental rehearsal is “incomplete”?

We grant that, when mentally rehearsing a skill, one might only imagine exercising that skill in some general sense, or one might imagine approximately the circumstances one will face in actually employing the skill. And so, through engaging in mental rehearsal, one might come to know something more general than or approximating
what one in fact does intentionally. This does not undermine the idea that, in virtue of possessing a practical skill, one is in a position to know a task-specific, plan-encoding proposition too. Presumably, in virtue of one’s skill, one is in a position to know task-specific, plan-encoding propositions that are as specific or granular as the skill itself, even if one is also in a position to know more related but general or partial plan-encoding propositions. What this objection shows, we think, is only that the final and completed epistemology of skill will have to explain how skills can put one in a position to know these other, more general, partial, or approximating propositions too.  

In the next section, we explore the implications of our account for theories of control, and in particular, the extent to which epistemic control characterizes intentional action.

3. The Epistemic Condition on Actional Control

Here, we apply the epistemological framework developed in §§2-3 to offer a novel account of the epistemic condition on actional control.

Traffic and Supposition motivated the general idea that imaginatively simulating skilled behavior puts an agent in a position to know a proposition encoding the skill(s) being simulated. Tom (Traffic) imagined his way around Los Angeles traffic, coming to

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23 We have, of course, not offered the final and complete epistemology of skill here, although see [REDACTED] for a full-length treatment of this problem.
know that he could take a detour in pursuit of a timely arrival at LAX, and Stew (SUPPOSITION) reflected on potential experiences and the hypotheses that would best explain them, coming to know that if the wall looks red, it is red. In each case, what explains the agent’s skill-encoding knowledge is not any other beliefs or knowledge but rather the skill itself; the latter renders the former “easy.”

Insofar as our view is motivated by attending to these sorts of cases, two points of clarification about them are in order. First, although TRAFFIC and SUPPOSITION involved agents imaginatively simulating a skill by consciously and articulably reflecting on that skill, these features of the case were inessential. Both Tom and Stew were in a position to know the relevant proposition without engaging in mental rehearsal or suppositional reasoning, and, if we imagine that Tom or Stew were of limited powers of imagination or articulation, it would only follow that coming to know what they were in a position to know would be more difficult than otherwise.24

But once we’ve acknowledged that possessing skills begets a priori justification for skill-encoding propositions, a priori justification that puts one in a position to know the

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24 So long as Tom’s imaginative simulation of driving to LAX is guided by his knowledge of how to navigate LA traffic, he is in a position to know a proposition encoding the means to his desired end. If his know-how is inarticulable, Tom will not be in a position to know this proposition under a “semantic mode of presentation,” a way of knowing that enables him to articulate and perhaps defend what he knows. Similarly, so long as Stew’s suppositional reasoning is guided by his knowledge of how to employ the perception rule, he is in a position to know a proposition encoding the relationship between how things look and how they are, perhaps only under some non-semantic mode of presentation if his know-how is inarticulable. For agents with limited powers of articulation, perhaps it is more appropriate to say that they are in a position to know a skill-encoding proposition de re. Nothing about our position turns on whether this is so, so we do not address it further.
relevant propositions, one might naturally wonder whether *manifesting* – and not *merely* possessing – skills bears an important relationship to “practical knowledge,” the kind of knowledge that agents have about what they’re doing when they act intentionally. To that end, we consider how our position interacts with several distinct conceptions of the epistemic condition on actional control.

To start, let’s consider Pavese & Beddor’s (2022) recent defense of what they call an “Epistemic Theory of Control,” according to which the control characteristic of intentional actions satisfies the *Epistemic Condition* (or “EC”):

\[ EC: \text{Whenever an agent } \varphi \text{s intentionally, they know that they are } \varphi\text{-ing, and they have this knowledge in virtue of their knowledge of how to } \varphi. \]

(Pavese and Beddor 2022, p.922)\(^{25}\)

What *EC* purports to capture is the distinctive sense in which intentional actions are *under the agent’s control as they unfold* in a way that unintentional actions and non-actional behavior are not. Moreover, *EC* gives voice to a broadly Anscombian (1963) thesis, the

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\(^{25}\) Pavese (2022) articulates and defends a substantively equivalent thesis, according to which “[o]ne intentionally \(\varphi\)s just in case when \(\varphi\)-ing, one knows that one is \(\psi\)-ing in order to \(\varphi\) for some action \(\psi\), in virtue of knowing how to \(\varphi\).”
mark of intentional control is that whenever one φs intentionally, one knows that one is φ-ing.26

Still, one might worry that EC is too strong; it leaves no room for intentional action performed in the absence of knowledge of what one is doing. As such, it cannot, in particular, countenance cases of ostensibly intentional actions performed without a belief about what one is doing, nor can it countenance cases of ostensibly intentional actions performed with a belief about what one is doing that does not rise to the level of knowledge.27 Consider the first of these:

**DISTRACTED**: Denise is up early to catch a flight from Los Angeles to New York. To make it to LAX from Denise’s West Hollywood bungalow, she would typically take La Cienega, but recent construction has rendered that typical route unreliable, and she knows this. But Denise, like many Los Angeles drivers, is distracted; as she drives, she contemplates whether she’ll become a partner at her law firm, the rising price of eggs in her local supermarket, the war in Ukraine, whether she missed trash collection day,

26 There are other, stronger characterizations of the contents of practical knowledge. Nonreductive views of practical knowledge according to which, when an agent, S, φs intentionally, S knows that she is φ-ing intentionally. We don’t consider these stronger nonreductive views, in part because we are convinced that they face insurmountable objections. See, for instance, Pavese & Beddor 2022 and Pavese 2022 for criticism.

27 See, e.g., Shepherd and Carter (2021) for a discussion on this point. Cf., however, Pavese (2022, §5) for a reply.
and so on. She snaps out of it as she arrives at LAX, having taken the 10 to
the 405 because La Cienega was jammed.

Denise makes it to the airport on time intentionally. After all, her arriving at the airport
on time has a purposive, means-end structure that manifests a skill. But given her absent-
mindedness, it is difficult to attribute to her a belief about what she is doing as she does
it; her mind is entirely elsewhere. The problem is that, if Denise arrives at the airport on
time intentionally without a belief about what she is doing as she does it, her case is one of
intentional action that violates EC, precisely because in lacking the relevant belief, she
lacks the relevant knowledge.

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28 See Paul 2009 for extended discussion. Pavese 2022 grants this point.
29 This simple gloss of the case adverts to the epistemological platitude that knowledge entails belief. This
platitude has had scattered historical challenges (e.g., as in ‘unconfident examinee’-style cases (Woozley
1952: 155; Radford 1966; cf., Lehrer 1968). A recent line of argument due to Rose and Schaffer (2013) reports
experimental evidence that folk attributions of ‘belief’ pattern in a way predicted by the thesis that
knowledge entails dispositional belief, even if not as would be predicted by the thesis that knowledge
entails occurrent belief. We mention this because, as we see it, the import of DISTRACTED vis-à-vis EC doesn’t
turn on whether knowledge entails (as Rose and Schaffer think) dispositional rather than occurrent belief.
This is because, even though Denise lacks an occurred belief (i.e., that in order to get to West Hollywood
from LAX, she’s taking a detour down the 10 and 405 because La Cienega was jammed) she also lacks a
dispositional belief to this effect, at least on a plausible construal of the case where she is effectively
adapting on the fly without having previously endorsed the relevant content. Note: Denise might well have
(as per Audi 1994) a disposition to believe a proposition with the relevant content in DISTRACTED but unless
we assume (which we needn’t) that she has affirmed that specific content in the past, she needn’t be
understood as hosting the relevant belief dispositionally.
Nevertheless, Denise is in a position to know what she is doing as she does it, or which means she’s employing to secure her desired end, in virtue of the very skill she’s employing. Thus, the following three claims are true of DISTRACTED:

D1. Denise makes it to the airport on time intentionally,

D2. Denise knows how to get from West Hollywood to LAX, and

D3. As Denise (distractedly) navigates Los Angeles traffic, she is in a position to know that in order to get to West Hollywood from LAX, she’s taking a detour down the 10 and 405 because La Cienega was jammed.

Even if Denise arrives home intentionally without a belief about what she is doing as she does it, so that her case is one of intentional action that violates EC, one might think that this is a problem with the letter and not the spirit of that proposal. A defender of EC might hope to weaken the principle accordingly:

_Epistemic Condition - Position to Know (EC-PK):_ Whenever an agent $\varphi$s intentionally, they are in a position to know that they are $\varphi$-ing, and they are in this position in virtue of their knowledge of how to $\varphi$.

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30 Pavese 2022a suggests this sort of refinement in response to cases like DISTRACTED, although she does not explore it in detail. One might also weaken EC so that it only requires intentional actions to manifest dispositional or implicit knowledge of what one is doing as one does it. According to this alternative, what
EC-PK is strictly weaker than EC, since knowing that \( p \) trivially entails one is in a position to know that \( p \), but the reverse does not hold. And plausibly, DISTRACTED satisfies EC-PK, for if Denise were to believe, as she was driving home, that she was driving home, her belief would amount to knowledge.

Here is an obvious sense in which EC-PK fares better as a general account of epistemic control than EC: any case that EC would count as an intentional action EC-PK would also count as an intentional action, and intuitively intentional actions (like Denise’s arriving at the airport on time) that EC leaves out of its explanation EC-PK captures. This advantage is not, strictly speaking, limited to the matters of extensional fit (that is, to capturing cases like DISTRACTED). More generally, EC-PK insulates itself from difficult questions about belief attribution; to put it colloquially, whether or not we can find a way, in any given putative case of intentional action, to plausibly locate in an agent’s belief-box propositional contents concerning what the agent is doing as she does it, we can appeal to the fact that she is in a position to acquire such a belief, and that that belief would amount to knowledge. Thus, a necessary connection between intentional action and knowledge of what one is doing is preserved, and so an epistemic condition on actional control is preserved, albeit a weaker one than what is posited by EC.

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Denise lacks is **occurrent** or **explicit** knowledge that she is driving home as she is. We think this alternative faces the same worries we raise for EC-PK, so we do not consider it at length.
Here, we want to note how the view developed in §§2-3 can shed light on EC-PK, in particular on the ‘in virtue of’ relation featuring therein. According to our view, Denise is in a position to know what she’s doing as she does it in virtue of her know-how because knowing what one is doing as one does it is easy knowledge; it’s as easy as the knowledge that Tom gained (weaker: was in a position to gain) via mental rehearsal. Denise’s skills afford her skill-encoding beliefs a certain privileged epistemic status; this is why Denise’s knowledge of how to navigate Los Angeles traffic that, as she’s taking a detour down the 10 and 405, puts her in a position to know that she’s taking the detour because La Cienega was jammed. In other words, D2 explains D3.

This much fits nicely with the view developed by Pavese & Beddor and Pavese, which are explicitly “practical knowledge-first” views of actional control. But we want to note that EC-PK has a different sort of problem, one which may not move die-hard practical knowledge-firsters, but which might animate a neutral reader. In particular, there are some cases of ostensibly intentional actions in which an agent is not in a position to know what she is doing, precisely because, were she to form a belief about what she is doing, her belief would not amount to knowledge. Here we note two that have some purchase in the literature:

Paralysis: Paul has recently undergone a medical procedure that required temporarily paralyzing his right arm. The doctors informed him that the
paralysis wears off four to six hours, and as he sits at home, post-procedure, he notes that only two hours have passed. On a whim, he thinks to himself, “What harm is there in trying?” He raises his arm above his head.\footnote{Setiya 2008; Paul 2009; Pavese 2020}

MARGIN: Marge has finished a double shift at work and is really tired, but she’s signed up for a study in which experimenters have asked her to lay in a bed and to move her finger for as long as she can. Marge starts out moving her finger, but she gradually gets more and more lethargic. As the minutes go by, her finger moves less and less energetically. Eventually, she falls asleep. At some point in the process, she can be correctly characterized as trying to move her finger even when she doesn’t succeed; but as she dozes off, her intentions turn to whims. Even if she forms a true belief that she is trying to move her finger, the belief will be too epistemically hazardous to constitute knowledge. This suggests that an agent may be trying to do something and not know that she is so trying.\footnote{This case is borrowed–only very slightly modified–from Piñeros-Glasscock 2019 (see especially pp.1256-1259 for discussion)}

In PARALYSIS, Paul raises his arm above his head intentionally. His arm-raising is purposive, is non-deviantly initiated and sustained by his intention to raise his arm, etc.
But he is not in a position to know that he is raising his arm above his head, since that proposition is defeated by the doctor’s testimony. In MARGIN, Marge wiggles (or tries to wiggle) her finger intentionally, but she is not in a position to know that she is wiggling (trying to wiggle) her finger, given how close she is to possibilities in which she no longer intends to do so. Given those nearby possibilities, her belief that she is wiggling (trying to wiggle) her finger is unsafe. If PARALYSIS and/or MARGIN are cases of intentional action, then EC-PK is too strong a principle to characterize the epistemic condition on actional control; Paul and/or Marge act intentionally but are not even in a position to know what they’re doing as they do it.

One option, of course, is to bite the bullet on cases like PARALYSIS and MARGIN; if these are penumbral cases within action theory (they are admittedly not paradigmatic ones), one might think, to the victor go the spoils. But we think that there is a plausible weakening of EC and EC-PK – one that is implied by the view developed so far in §§2-3 – that accommodates all of DISTRACTED, PARALYSIS, and MARGIN:

*Epistemic Condition - Propositional Justification (EC-PJ):* Whenever an agent \( \phi \)s intentionally, they are *a priori prima facie* propositionally justified in believing that they are \( \phi \)-ing, and they have this *a priori prima facie* justification in virtue of their knowledge of how to \( \phi \).

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33 Pavese 2020; Pavese & Beddor 2022 (see footnote 3)
Note that $EC-PJ$ is strictly weaker than $EC-PK$, at least on the standard assumption that, if one is in a position to know that $p$, one is propositionally justified in believing $p$, but not the other way around (it is thus strictly weaker than $EC$ too). Notice how $EC-PJ$ explains each of the problem cases above. In Distracted, Denise is prima facie propositionally justified in believing that she is driving home because she is manifesting her skill in driving home. This is precisely – in the absence of any defeaters, and given that safety concerns are irrelevant – what puts her in a position to know that she is. In Paralysis, Paul’s belief (if he has one) that he is raising his arm above his head cannot amount to knowledge in light of his doctor’s testimony. Nevertheless, that Paul is manifesting knowledge of how to raise his arm above his head affords him a priori prima facie propositional justification for believing that he is. Although, given that his a priori justification is ultima facie defeated, Paul is not in a position to know that he is raising his arm above his head, $EC-PJ$ plausibly captures a sense in which his know-how grounds a form of epistemic control over his behavior as it unfolds that renders it actional. And in Margin, Marge’s belief that she is wiggling (trying to wiggle) her finger is too close to the margins for it to be safe, and so too close to the margins for it to count as knowledge. Even though, like Paul, Marge is not in a position to know that she is wiggling (trying to wiggle) her finger, she nonetheless has a priori prima facie propositional justification for believing that she is. And this, like in Paul’s case, plausibly affords her belief a special
epistemic status about what she is doing as she does it that grounds a form of epistemic control.

In short, one advantage of EC-PJ over EC and EC-PK is how the former handles non-paradigmatic, marginal, or defective cases. Rather than digging into a dialectical corner, as someone committed to the latter, stronger theses might be, EC-PJ allows us to see each case as occupying a more general position on a spectrum of epistemic control, each of which is ultimately grounded in the relationship between one’s know-how and the a priori propositional justification such know-how affords. It is, we think, a virtue of our view that it can agree with the practical knowledge-firsters about core cases of intentional action while accommodating these more difficult ones too. But if, in these more difficult cases, the agents act intentionally without practical knowledge, it is nevertheless true that they act intentionally with a certain kind of justification, justification that would, in more hospitable epistemic environments, yield practical knowledge. One might view our proposal as a “skill-first” picture of actional control, according to which one’s skills yield propositional justification for believing that one is φ-ing as one φs. According to this skill-first picture, the epistemic condition on intentional action is captured by EC-PJ, not by the stronger, practical knowledge-first principles like EC or EC-PK.

It’s worth pausing to reflect on what, precisely, one might want out of one’s theory of actional control, and whether, for instance, a principle like EC-PJ can really secure
those desiderata. In the post-Anscombe era of action theory, one gets the sense that any plausible theory of actional control must explain the connection between control and practical knowledge—again, the knowledge one has of what one is doing as one does it intentionally. Informally and roughly, this explanation must be able to characterize the sense in which agents acting intentionally are in a position to answer “Why?” questions (Question: “Why are you whistling?”; Answer: “To hail a cab.”). One way to view what we want out of a theory of actional control is fairly narrow: to give a theory of actional control just is to give a theory of practical knowledge, or is at least to give a theory of practical knowledge. EC and EC-PK are versions of this practical knowledge-first approach to theorizing about actional control, while EC-PJ is not.

A related but weaker way to view what we want out of a theory of actional control is that it is (at least) a theory of whatever puts agents in a position to have practical knowledge in central or well-ordered cases. Even if one has practical knowledge in well-ordered, central, and paradigm cases of intentional action, it does not follow that whenever one acts with the control characteristic of intentional action, one manifests practical knowledge.34 As we’ve argued, in epistemically hazardous circumstances like those involving considerations of safety or defeat, practical knowledge might be entirely out of the question. Still, our view preserves something like the kernel of practical knowledge,

34 Compare Paul’s (2009) “Inferentialist” account of the (contingent inferential) knowledge agents have of what they are doing as they do it in paradigm cases of intentional action.
namely the justification that, in hospitable epistemic conditions, puts agents in a position to know what they are doing as they do it. A bit informally, Paul (from PARALYSIS) may lack practical knowledge in light of the relevant defeaters he possesses, but he is surely in a position to answer “Why are you doing that?” with “Out of curiosity,” or “To see whether I need to find a new doctor.” We can make sense of his behavior as actional even if there is a legitimate sense in which it is “actionally defective,” to the extent that it falls short of some epistemic ideal of actional control (that of manifesting practical knowledge).

In our view, jettisoning the necessary connection between intentional action and practical knowledge is not, ultimately, a significant cost, especially insofar as we have offered a more general principle that explains why and when agents acting intentionally possess such knowledge. Here, we are broadly sympathetic with Piñeros-Glasscock’s remark that,

“…[T]here is an important link between intentional action and practical knowledge, one that we must respect if we are to understand their nature; but there may be an important link between the two without the need to posit a necessary connection... One way is to say that... the function of the will (understood as the capacity to act intentionally) is to yield practical knowledge. Another (compatible) way is to say that... exercises of the will
can on their own give us practical knowledge. If either of these ideas is
correct, we would expect that cases where an agent acts intentionally with
practical knowledge would form a central core of cases of intentional action.
However, since powers can sometimes fail to achieve their function, and
since even non-inferential sources can fail to yield knowledge in
epistemically inhospitable circumstances, both ideas are compatible with
the rejection of [a necessary connection between intentional action and
practical knowledge].” (2019, p.1262)

EC-PJ is a novel way to understand the epistemic control that is distinctive of intentional
action, one which gives voice to both the idea that the function of the will is to produce
practical knowledge, and that the will can give us practical knowledge all on its own.
What allows our position to secure these verdicts is that it is built out of independently
plausible considerations from within the epistemology of skill, and, in particular, the
connection between what one knows how to do and what one would be justified in
believing. In particular, if EC-PJ is correct, then practical knowledge is the mark of central
and well-ordered cases of intentional action, but as we move away from these core
theoretical data, intentional actions exhibit epistemic control along a spectrum; in
epistemically hazardous environments, ones where considerations of safety or defeat are
especially salient, one’s intentional actions might fail to exhibit the epistemic control
characteristic of paradigm cases while nevertheless enjoying some lesser but substantive epistemic status characterized by $EC\text{-}PJ$.

4. The Knowledge-Action Principle

We have laid out a position in the epistemology of skill (in §§2-3) that supports a “skill-first” conception of the epistemic condition on actional control (§4). Here, we discuss how our view fits into the larger contours of the debate around the connection between intentional action, know-that, and know-how.

Much of contemporary action theory is oriented around two theses, which we call, following Pavese (2021a), Know-How/Intentionality and Intentionality/Belief:

**Know-How/Intentionality:** If $S$ φ’s intentionally, then $S$ knows how to φ.\(^{35}\)

**Intentionality/Belief:** If $S$ φ’s intentionally, then there are some means $m_1, \ldots, m_n$ to φ such that $S$ truly believes $m_1, \ldots, m_n$ are means for oneself to φ.\(^{36}\)

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The plausibility of Know-How/Intentionality derives in no small part from its vindicating the pretheoretic datum that intentional actions are *manifestations of skill* and *under the agent’s control* in a way that distinguishes them from unintentional ones or nonactional behavior. As Ryle (1949) famously noted, the clumsy person who trips and falls is importantly different from the clown who “trips and tumbles just as clumsy people do, except that he trips and tumbles on purpose and after much rehearsal and at the golden moment and where the children can see him and so as not to hurt himself” (33).

Knowledge-how, being the mark of skill and a central component of control, seems especially suited to mark this central action-theoretic difference.

And Intentionality/Belief captures the idea that intentional actions issue from plans concerning *how to act*, which are beliefs that encode the means by which one accomplishes a desired end. Intentional actions, in some important sense, *manifest or are guided by* one’s plans concerning how to act, and this connection between plan and success is absent in unintentional actions and mere (nonactional) behavior. But familiar problems of epistemic luck—particularly cases where beliefs about plans are only accidentally true—have prompted some fans of Intentionality/Belief to reach for a stronger thesis bearing an obvious family resemblance, Intentionality/Knowledge:
Intentionality/Knowledge: If S φ’s intentionally, then there are some means \(m_1, \ldots, m_n\) to φ such that S knows that \(m_1, \ldots, m_n\) are means for oneself to φ.\(^{37}\)

Perhaps more cautiously, and being sensitive to cases like DISTRACTED, we might do better to consider a weaker principle:

Intentionality/Position-to-Know: If S φ’s intentionally, then there are some means \(m_1, \ldots, m_n\) to φ such that S is in a position to know that \(m_1, \ldots, m_n\) are means for oneself to φ.

Together, Knowledge-How/Intentionality and Intentionality/Position-to-Know yield the following “The Knowledge-Action Principle,” or KAP:

KAP: If S φ’s intentionally, then S knows how to φ, and there are some means \(m_1, \ldots, m_n\) to φ such that S is in a position to know that \(m_1, \ldots, m_n\) are means for oneself to φ.

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\(^{37}\) See Gibbons 2001; Pavese 2021b, §5.
If \( KAP \) is correct, then intentional action bears an important relationship to both know-how and know-that;\(^{38}\) Moreover, if \( KAP \) is correct, it is highly plausible to think that the relationship it captures is non-coincidental. In other words, know-how and know-that do not align in cases of intentional action by some happy accident.

Pavese (2021b) has recently argued that Intellectualism about Know-How ("Intellectualism" for short) offers an elegant account of the non-coincidental alignment of know-how and know-that in cases of intentional action, and so offers an elegant explanation of \( KAP \). According to Intellectualism:

\[
\text{Intellectualism: } S \text{ knows how to } \varphi \text{ only if, for some means } \psi \text{ for } S \text{ to } \varphi, S \\
\text{knows that it is sufficiently likely for them to succeed at } \varphi\text{-ing by } \psi\text{-ing.}
\]

To be clear, proponents of Intellectualism are not merely in the business of securing an extensionally adequate principle according to which know-how is necessarily accompanied by know-that. They are, instead, defending an explanatory principle according to which

\(^{38}\) Note that there, of course, other types intentional-action relevant 'knowledge-that' – i.e., knowledge-that with different content – that are often thought to line up with intentional action; compare, for instance, knowledge that one is \( \varphi\text{-ing when one is} \), and which Anscombe took to be necessary for \( \varphi\text{-ing intentionally.} \) We do not assume that the 'plan-based' propositional knowledge captured in Intentionality/Knowledge, and by extension in \( KAP \), implicates Anscombian practical knowledge-that; though we will discuss the latter kind of intentional action-relevant propositional knowledge in §4.
one’s know-how is or reducible to\(^3\) (weaker: grounded in\(^4\)) one’s know-that. Of course, the weaker, extensional claim is secured by the truth of the robust explanatory one.

And if Intellectualism is correct, we can readily account for why know-how and know-that accompany intentional action in the way specified by KAP. According to this way of thinking, since know-how just is a kind of know-that, and, in particular, a kind of know-that encoding the means by which one accomplishes a desired end, it is no coincidence that cases of intentional action will involve know-how and know-that. To wit, such cases will involve know-that encoding the means by which one accomplishes a desired end because the required know-how just is such a form of know-that.\(^4\) Moreover, one might think that Intellectualism gains abductive support by its ability to unify and explain the relationships KAP captures.

If our arguments are correct, however, KAP is, strictly speaking, false. Its approximate truth consists in the fact that intentional action, know-how, and know-that align in the way it describes in central or well-ordered cases of intentional action, those performed, notably, in epistemically hospitable environments. Just as the agents in cases like PARALYSIS and MARGIN are precluded from having (or being in a position to have)

\(^3\) Stanley & Williamson 2001; Pavese 2020, 2021b

\(^4\) Bengson & Moffett 2011; Carter and Poston (2018).

\(^4\) Pavese 2021a says, “[KAP’s] truth is grounded on the very nature of knowledge-how: one knows how to Φ in virtue of knowing, for some means m to Φ, that m is a means for oneself to Φ” (section 5). And Pavese 2021b says, “The intellectualist picture provides the best explanation for why [KAP] should hold. According to this explanation, [KAP] is true not just out of a coincidental aligning of propositional knowledge and know-how in intentional action. Rather, its truth is grounded in the very nature of know-how” (191).
practical *knowledge* because of salient considerations of defeat and safety, we should expect that agents can act intentionally without being in a position to have knowledge connecting means to a desired end. *KAP* is not true, but it nevertheless captures a kernel of truth around which any plausible theory of action should orient itself: intentional action, know-how, and know-that do not align by coincidence.

The non-coincidence of intentional action, know-how, and know-that is explained by the fact that intentional actions involve the manifestation of skill, the possession of which gives agents *a priori* justification for believing propositions encoding the means by which one accomplishes a desired end, which, in epistemically hospitable environments, yields knowledge.

The more fundamental principle connecting intentional action, know-how, and know-that looks like this:

\[
\text{Knowledge-Action Principle* (KAP*)}: \text{If S } \varphi \text{'s intentionally, then S knows how to } \varphi, \text{ and there are some means } m_1, \ldots, m_n \text{ to } \varphi \text{ such that S is *a priori* (and } \text{prima facie) propositionally justified in believing that } m_1, \ldots, m_n \text{ are means for oneself to } \varphi.\]

*KAP* captures what we take to be at the heart of *KAP*. And insofar as one always acts from belief-plans specifying the means by which one can achieve a desired end, the
second conjunct of $KAP^*$ will, modulo considerations of defeat and safety, give rise to propositional knowledge, thereby vindicating $KAP$ in central cases of intentional action.

What of the claim that *Intellectualism* gains abductive support from its ability to explain $KAP$? We have shown that one can vindicate the kernel of truth in the vicinity of $KAP$, namely $KAP^*$, without taking on any commitments about the ultimate metaphysics of skill. This is not an argument against *Intellectualism*, at least not a straightforward one. Instead, it is an argument against the idea that *Intellectualism* is *specially poised* to explain the connection between intentional action, know-how, and know-that.⁴²

One virtue of our position is that we can vindicate the intimate and non-coincidental connection between intentional action, know-how, and know-that that $KAP^*$ purports to capture without thereby necessarily committing to the controversial metaphysics that underwrites *Intellectualism*.⁴³ After all, our position is motivated by considerations in the *epistemology*, not the *metaphysics*, of skill; its theoretical neutrality is among its chief virtues.

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⁴² There are, to be sure, intellectualist accounts of skill on the market – most notably, due Stanley and Williamson (2017) – and which seem perfectly compatible with the crux of our easy knowledge narrative. According to Stanley and Williamson (2017), “to be skilled at the action type of $φ$-ing is to be disposed to form knowledge appropriate for guiding tokens of $φ$-ing” (715). Correlatively, for the skill-intellectualist, skill *manifests* in knowledge-wh. With this point in mind, we can see how the skill-intellectualist might purport to simply ‘subsume’ the view defended here (at least in well-ordered cases) as follows: according to one version of skill intellectualism, skill manifests in know-wh states, and mental rehearsal is nothing more than one of potentially multiple ‘triggers’ for skill manifestation. According to another, skill is propositional knowledge under a special, practical mode of presentation, and mental rehearsal is a means of knowing the same proposition in a new way. Without assessing the merits of either form of skill intellectualism here, we note simply that one could hold those views and take on board our easy practical knowledge proposal.

⁴³ See, for instance, Noë 2005; Dickie 2012; and Schwartz & Drayson 2019 for criticism.
5. Conclusion

By attending to the epistemologies of mental rehearsal and suppositional reasoning, we have offered a “skill-first” conception of the epistemic condition on actional control, according to which practical knowledge is “easy.” Even if it is, the connection between intentional action and practical knowledge is still intimate and important; since skilled behavior necessarily \textit{a priori} propositionally justifies the skilled agent in believing a corresponding skill-encoding proposition, in epistemically hospitable environments, agents acting intentionally will (be in a position to) have practical knowledge. Not only does our account bring to bear upon central topics in the theory of action traditional epistemological questions about basic knowledge, but it charts a middle way through the Scylla of Anscombian theories of action, on the one hand, and the Charybdis of denying any substantive, necessary epistemic condition on intentional action, on the other.

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