

Developing Appropriate Emotions

Xiaoyu Ke, Zhejiang University, xke2024@gmail.com

(This version of the article has been accepted for publication after peer Review but is not the Version of Record and does not reflect post-acceptance improvements, or any corrections. The Version of Record is available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04630-y>.)

Abstract: A central thesis held by neo-Aristotelian virtue theories is that virtues require robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions. This thesis is challenged by a particular form of situationism, which suggests that human beings cannot develop this kind of emotional disposition because our integral emotions are too easily influenced by morally and epistemically irrelevant incidental affect. If the challenge stands, it implies that human beings cannot be virtuous. In response to the challenge, I propose an agential solution that's grounded in the affective sciences. Drawing from empirical evidence, I argue that agents can develop ameliorative abilities such as emotion differentiation to guard against the influence of incidental affect, thereby developing more robust emotional dispositions. My arguments thus defend the psychological plausibility of this key component of virtue.

Keywords: Virtue development, Emotion, Situationism, Virtue Responsibilism, Virtue Ethics

Introduction

Adam is disposed to feel compassion for people in need. However, his disposition often varies in situations that call for compassion: whether it's seeing a person collapsing to the ground or learning about children who are suffering from starvation, given the same people with the same sorts of needs, he feels more compassion when he is in a good mood and less compassion when he is in a bad mood.

Sophie is a researcher who is disposed to worry about contrary evidence that hasn't been found. However, Sophie's disposition, like Adam's disposition to feel compassion, often varies in situations that call for worry: whether it's working on independent or collaborative projects, given the same evidence, she feels less worried about potential contrary evidence when she is in a good mood and more worried when she is in a bad mood.

Is Adam a kind person? Is Sophie an intellectually conscientious person? According to neo-Aristotelian virtue theories in ethics and epistemology, Adam does not have the virtue of kindness and Sophie does not have the virtue of intellectual conscientiousness. This is because neo-Aristotelian virtue theories maintain that virtues require robust dispositions to feel appropriate emotions. I'll call this the "appropriate emotion requirement".¹ Given the appropriate emotion requirement, Adam does not have the moral virtue of kindness, because his disposition to feel appropriate compassion is not robust, and Sophie does not have the intellectual virtue of conscientiousness, because her disposition to feel appropriate worry is not robust.²

Moreover, there are reasons to worry that, given the appropriate emotion requirement, Adam and Sophie cannot ever develop the virtues of kindness and intellectual conscientiousness, respectively. In line with the situationist critique, research on the interplay between integral and incidental affect³ shows that human beings do not possess robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions because they are too easily influenced by morally and epistemically irrelevant affect.⁴

¹ Defenders of neo-Aristotelian virtue theories include Hursthouse, 2002; Battaly, 2008; Code, 1987; Zagzebski, 1996; Montmarquet, 1992; Baehr, 2011; Roberts & Wood, 2007; Hookway, 2003; Sherman & White, 2003. On the appropriate emotion requirement, see Hursthouse, 2002; Kamtekar, 2013; Sherman, 1997; Zagzebski, 1996, 2003; Sherman & White, 2003; Morton, 2010; Brady, 2019.

² There is an issue concerning how robust a disposition must be in order to be virtuous. I set this issue aside as this is not the focus of my paper.

³ "Affect" used throughout this paper is an umbrella term for all affective states in general, including emotions, moods, feelings, and so on.

⁴ See, for example, Alfano, 2013; Fairweather, 2017; Battaly, 2014; Smith, 2017; Coplan, 2010; Olin & Doris, 2014; Doris, 1998, 2002, 2009.

This raises the possibility that this kind of influence is part of human nature – that we cannot help but be influenced in this way. If so, we cannot acquire robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions, and the appropriate emotion requirement cannot be met.

In this paper, I argue that we can develop emotion-related abilities to guard against the influence of incidental affect, particularly the skill of emotion differentiation. The upshot of my argument is that recognizing the power of situational affect does not require denying the possibility that people can develop robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions. Existing responses to situationism have focused on changing the environments we commonly find ourselves in to be more conducive to virtuous conduct, rather than taking an agential approach of exploring how to develop more robust dispositions.⁵ However, situational affect is simply unavoidable, and changing the environments does not seem like a promising method. In contrast, my solution will be agential by exploring ways in which people can take control of their emotional dispositions.

The paper is organized as follows. In section 1, I explain the appropriate emotion requirement and what it means for a disposition to be robust. In section 2, I present the situationist challenge to the possibility of meeting the appropriate emotion requirement. In section 3, I show how people can guard against situational affect by developing abilities such as emotion differentiation.

1. The appropriate emotion requirement

According to the appropriate emotion requirement, moral and intellectual virtues require robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions. In this section I'll clarify and explain this requirement and its role in neo-Aristotelian virtue theories.

⁵ E.g., Battaly, 2014; Pritchard, 2014; Alfano, 2013.

Aristotle maintained that virtue requires “having...feelings at the right times, about the right things, towards the right people, for the right end, and in the right way” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1106b). In line with this, neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists argue that moral virtues require dispositions to have appropriate emotions, where “appropriateness” refers to an intermediate state that is neither excessive nor deficient, as well as having emotions for the right reasons. For example, Hursthouse (2002) writes that in moral virtues “emotions will be felt on the right occasions, towards the right people or objects, for the right reasons” (p. 84). This line of argument is extended by virtue responsibilists to include emotions involved in intellectual virtues.⁶ These virtue theorists argue that emotions play essential motivational and attentional roles in all virtues.

Different virtues involve different emotions. For example, the virtue of open-mindedness might involve curiosity, while the virtue of courage (moral and intellectual) might involve both confidence and fear. I suggested, above, that the virtue of kindness involves compassion and the virtue of intellectual conscientiousness involves worry. Whichever emotion is involved, given the appropriate emotion requirement, having the virtue requires that one be disposed to have that emotion in an appropriate way.

To further illustrate the idea of appropriateness, consider one way of failing to have appropriate emotions. A misanthrope who does not feel much compassion when seeing someone collapsing to the ground in distress is deficient in the feeling of compassion. On the other hand, people who are easily pained by even the slightest sign of suffering also fall short of being virtuous because their compassion is excessive. Inappropriateness could also be manifested in other aspects, such as in having wrong reasons. For example, feeling worried about whether an experimental

⁶ See Sherman & White, 2003; Morton, 2010; Zagzebski, 1996, 2019; Brady, 2019.

result is true because one wants to profit from it does not seem to be an appropriate reason to have the emotion, and thus also not proper to the virtue of intellectual conscientiousness.

I am going to assume that the dispositions to have appropriate emotions must be *robust*, where a robust disposition is a tendency to respond in a relatively enduring and consistent fashion across time in trait-affording situations (Roberts et al., 2009; Doris, 2002; Alfano, 2013; Miller, 2013; Fairweather, 2017). This assumption is not unfounded. It follows naturally from virtue theorists' view that virtues are a species of character traits, where a character trait is defined as a temporally stable and cross-situationally consistent disposition to behave in certain characteristic ways (Sreenivasan, 2013). Since the dispositions to have appropriate emotions are an important component of virtue, it is reasonable to assume that they must also be robust.

What does it mean for a person to respond in a relatively enduring and consistent fashion across time in trait-affording situations? Psychologically, it means that a person acts, feels, or thinks in the *same* characteristic way in response to certain features in a variety of situations. In the context of virtue, the features are those that call for virtuous behaviors and thus are relevant to virtuous traits. For example, there is a variety of situations that involve features that call for courageous behavior, such as when a person is threatened by a criminal in the street, a child is drowning in deep water, or someone is confronted by a bear in the wild. Although different in their specific ways, these situations all involve someone in danger. This feature calls for courageous behavior and is a virtue-relevant feature. A person's disposition to act is robust if she is disposed to respond to this feature in the same characteristic way across all these situations. Such a disposition is virtuous if the characteristic way is acting courageously, such as by risking herself to save someone from danger.

In the same vein, possessing robust dispositions to have emotions means that a person is disposed to respond emotionally in the same characteristic way across situations to features that are relevant to the emotions. Robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions are a subset of robust dispositions to have emotions. Possessing robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions means that a person is disposed to feel in the same appropriate way across situations that call for such feeling. Thus, if Adam's disposition to feel appropriate compassion were robust, it would have been the same whether he is in a good mood situation or bad mood situation so long as the features that are relevant to compassion across these situations have not changed.⁷ If the relevant trait-affording features – features that call for virtue – stay the same, we expect that the virtuous person be disposed to feel the same as a result of recognizing these features.

Robust dispositions must be “global traits”, not “local traits”, according to Doris (1998). “Local traits” are dispositions that are only consistent in a narrow range of situations, and thus do not amount to being “cross-situationally consistent”. For example, the disposition to have “compassion-only-in-good-mood” is local because it only holds in the specific situation where the individual is in a good mood. Local dispositions cannot meet the requirement of virtue because the virtuous person is supposed to act and feel virtuously *whenever* virtue is called for, not just when circumstances are conducive to doing so.⁸

⁷ It should be noted that situations can be individuated by virtue-irrelevant features or virtue-relevant features. For example, i) “having a good conversation with a friend and seeing a person collapsing to the ground”, ii) “having a bad conversation a friend and seeing a person collapsing to the ground”, iii) “having a good conversation with a friend and learning about children who are suffering from starvation”, and iv) “having a bad conversation with a friend and learning about children who are suffering from starvation” are four different situations. Whereas i) and iii) involve a virtue-irrelevant feature which elicits good mood, ii) and iv) involve a virtue-irrelevant feature which elicits bad mood. Virtue-irrelevant features (or trait-irrelevant features, more generally speaking) are also called “irrelevant situational variables”, which I mention in Section 2. All four situations, however, involve compassion-relevant features. Thus, if Adam's disposition to feel appropriate compassion were robust, he would be disposed to feel compassion across all these situations by responding to the compassion-relevant features.

⁸ It's worth noting that there may be kinds of local traits. For example, “compassion-only-when-seeing-someone-collapsing-to-the-ground” is a local trait, but its situation is individuated by trait-relevant features. In contrast, “compassion-only-when-in-good mood” is also a local trait, but its situation is individuated by trait-irrelevant

Robustness clearly comes in degrees. Just how robust must a disposition to have appropriate emotions be to satisfy the appropriate emotion requirement? I shall assume that a relatively high level of robustness is required. Baehr (2017) distinguishes three levels of virtue: maximal, robust, and minimal. According to him, possessing a maximal virtue is when a person is disposed to act virtuously across *all* virtue-relevant contexts and *always* engages in virtuous activities; possessing a robust virtue is when a person is disposed to act virtuously across *a wide range of* virtue-relevant contexts and *often* engages in virtuous activities; and possessing a minimal virtue is when a person is disposed to act virtuously across *some* of virtue-relevant contexts and *sometimes* engages in virtuous activities. Although this distinction is helpful conceptually, in practice it would be difficult to demonstrate which level of virtue one has achieved. Thus, I will not devote further effort to specify “robustness” but rely on a commonsensical idea of “engaging often in virtuous activities in a wide range of virtue-relevant contexts”. I will also not be concerned with the issue of whether virtues should be viewed as normative ideals because my focus will be on whether people can *actually develop* robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions.⁹ This requires us to investigate the empirical basis for virtue development. If virtues are merely normative ideals that no human can approximate, there would be no need to care about whether they are psychologically realizable.

2. The situationist challenge to the appropriate emotion requirement

In challenging the psychological presupposition of the virtue theoretic framework, philosophical situationists have focused most of their attention on empirical evidence against robust dispositions to act. As they argue, evidence shows that behavior is largely predicted and

features. As Alfano (2013) rightly points out, “both trait-relevant and trait-irrelevant features should be allowed to vary if global virtues are being investigated” (p.71).

⁹ For discussions of this issue, see Baehr, 2017; Doris, 1998; Sreenivasan, 2013.

explained by irrelevant situational variables (i.e., trait-irrelevant features) rather than dispositions. Because behavior is easily influenced by irrelevant situational variables, people rarely possess robust behavioral dispositions, let alone virtuous ones. Moreover, this also undermines virtue theorists' assumption that people are potentially responsive to the reasons that a virtuous person would consider (Alfano, 2013). That is, even granted that most people do not possess robust dispositions, the virtue theoretic framework still assumes that people can become more virtuous by becoming responsive to reasons. The fact that behavior is predicted by situational factors which are not reasons for action, however, seems to undermine that possibility as well.

Empirical evidence on whether someone acts virtuously, however, is not necessarily indicative of whether they *feel* virtuously, because the presence or absence of virtuous-seeming actions does not entail the presence or absence of virtuous emotions. Furthermore, although incidental affect has often been cited as a type of situational variable in the situationist literature, most of the empirical studies cited in the literature make no mention of appropriate emotions, and thus there is little discussion on the challenge to the appropriate emotion requirement.¹⁰

The literature on integral affect and incidental affect fills this void. In this section, I argue that growing research on the interplay between integral and incidental affect constitutes a distinctive form of situationist challenge to the appropriate emotion requirement. Evidence shows that what we take to be the integral affect is easily influenced by incidental affect, resulting in combined affective reactions. This suggests that we rarely possess robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions because *an emotion is appropriate only if what we take to be the integral affect is "purely" integral, not combined*. Because our affective mechanism functions in a way

¹⁰ An exception might be Miller (2013) who cites many studies involving appropriate emotions, although Miller does not focus on the situationist challenge. Alternatively, Kristjánsson (2018) discusses several virtuous emotions without touching on the situationist challenge.

that does not seem to allow much agential control over emotional responses, it casts doubt over the idea that people can *develop* robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions.

Over forty years of work on emotion and decision-making has consistently found two kinds of pervasive affective influence on judgments and decision-making: the first is integral or task-related affect, which is affective reaction (often an emotion) that arises from a judgmental target at hand; the second is incidental affect, which is affective reaction that does not arise from the judgmental target at hand but is carried over from other sources (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Pham, 2007; Lerner et al., 2015; Västfjäll et. al., 2016). Research on integral and incidental affect have seldomly crossed paths until recently. A growing line of research is focusing on interactions between the two, noting that our affective reaction to a judgmental target is often a combined effect, and thus it is important to study the interplay between the two kinds of affect, especially the various ways by which they are integrated (Västfjäll et. al., 2016; Garg et al., 2005; Singh et al., 2018; Ferrer & Ellis, 2021).

Studies show that people often *take* an affective reaction to be “integral” when it is in fact a mixture of integral affect and incidental affect.¹¹ Such “taking” is a process of “affect misattribution” (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), which happens when a person mistakenly attributes the cause of their incidental affect to be the current judgment and thereby treats the incidental affect to be *about* that judgment. In other words, affect misattribution results in combined affective reactions, which the subject takes to be “integral”. Furthermore, Schwarz and Clore (2007) argue that our feelings only influence judgment when they are taken by the subject to be relevant. This

¹¹ It should be noted that not all affect misattributions involve integral affect. It’s entirely possible that no integral affect occurs in the judgment or decision-making process, and yet incidental affect is still misattributed to the judgmental target. For example, in the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) proposed by Payne and colleagues (2014), an implicit attitude measure, the typical judgmental target is intentionally designed to be ambiguous items that presumably illicit no affect.

means that if incidental affect is taken to be “integral” to the judgmental target, it will influence judgment.

Numerous research shows that affect misattribution is a pervasive phenomenon found in a wide range of contexts and different types of integral emotions (for reviews on this, see Lerner et al., 2015; Västfjäll et. al., 2016). Because affect misattribution happens so often, it indicates that what we take to be the integral affect is easily susceptible to the influence of incidental affect.

Why is affect misattribution so pervasive? According to Schwarz and Clore (2007), affect misattribution occurs when the affective system cannot distinguish integral from incidental affect. Integral affect and incidental affect are difficult to disentangle because people usually consider their affective experiences to be “about” whatever is in the focus of their attention. Moreover, misattribution is thought to take place very often because incidental affect has the largest impact on moderate and low intensity integral emotions, and people have moderate to low intensity integral emotions most of the time, presumably because prolonged, high-intensity experiences would ultimately exhaust the human biological system (Clore et al., 1994; Västfjäll et al. 2016).

Research shows that what we take to be morally relevant integral emotions are susceptible to incidental affect. Västfjäll and colleagues (2015) tested the integral feeling of warm glow and compassion that arise from the decision to donate money to help a child in need. Warm glow is a positive feeling one experiences when they do something good for someone. To test how integral feelings are affected, the researchers set up a scenario where one child could be helped while six others could not. They found that warm glow and compassion towards the child who could be helped were significantly dampened by negative feelings that arose from learning about the children who could not be helped. The negative feelings are, however, normatively irrelevant because the fact that one cannot help other children should not influence the decision to help a

child who can be helped. Nor did these negative feelings causally arise from the decision to help the child. Thus, these negative feelings were incidental to the decision to help the child who could be helped. In a subsequent study, Västfjäll and colleagues found the same dampening effect on integral affect when negative incidental feelings were elicited by irrelevant, non-child stimuli (random pictures taken from the International Affective Pictures System). This series of studies showed that what people take to be the integral compassion and warm glow are easily influenced by irrelevant negative feelings.

Affect misattribution has been found in other emotions which we take to be integral to moral judgments. Cameron and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that the presence of incidental disgust increased the degree to which people judge cultural practices to be morally wrong, arguing that this is because people had difficulty differentiating between their incidental disgust and the integral emotions arising from moral considerations of these cultural practices. Singh and colleagues (2018) showed that incidental fear led to higher levels of ethical judgment under high moral intensity condition as compared to incidental anger.¹²

¹² It should be noted that several recent studies have reported failure to replicate the effect that incidental disgust amplifies moral judgments (Landy & Goodwin, 2015; Ghelfi et al., 2020; Johnson et al., 2016). Casting doubt over incidental affect's influence on moral judgments, authors of these replication studies suggest that the situationist's evidence is empirically ill-founded. This has led philosophers such as Alfano (2018) to argue that virtue theorists need not worry about the situationist challenge anymore. I think that there are still reasons to take seriously the evidence considered in this section. First, these replication studies only tested disgust, so one cannot yet claim the same holds for the role of affective states in judgments and decision-making more generally. On the other hand, there is still a wealth of evidence on affect misattribution that's been widely acknowledged in the psychological literature. The evidence for replication failure is not conclusive, and the replication project is still an ongoing development. Second, research suggests that many factors could potentially influence whether affective states play a causal role in judgments, but the replication studies thus far have not taken these factors into consideration. For instance, Gasper and Clore (2000) argue that whether affect is used as a basis for judgment in a situation may depend substantially on attention to affective cues and perceptions of their relevance. What these replication studies suggest is that more nuanced study designs are needed, and researchers on affect misattribution should pay more attention to potential moderating factors that could affect whether an effect turns out to be significant. In fact, there are already some studies showing that certain moderating factors could have such an influence (e.g., Singh et al., 2018; Garg et al., 2005).

More generally, Västfjäll and colleagues (2016) point out that many factors can influence how integral and incidental affect are combined into a single affective reaction. The combined affective reaction—what the subject takes their integral affect to be—may result from additivity, averaging, or cancellation of the two kinds of affect, and how the “affective arithmetic” is done depends on the type, valence, or intensity of the two kinds of affect, as well as characteristics of the judgmental task or decision, such as whether it involves global or local contents. The specific patterns of “affective arithmetic” remain underexplored.

Given these considerations, the evidence that shows what we take to be the integral affect is easily influenced by incidental affect, I argue, is direct evidence showing that some appropriate emotions are susceptible to incidental affect because being integral is necessary for being appropriate, in the sense required by neo-Aristotelian virtue.¹³ Being appropriate requires that the virtuous agent correctly attributes the intentional object of their emotion to what really caused it. If a person cannot correctly attribute their feelings to what really caused them, they cannot be said to feel about the right objects (things and people) and for the right reasons. An appropriate emotion therefore must be integral. Consider when Sophie feels “worried” about the truth of her experimental result, but part of her “worry” is caused by the weather being bad. In this case, such “worry” is a combined affect, which is composed of an integral worry caused by the consideration about the truth of the experimental result and an incidental mood caused by the bad weather. Sophie mistakenly takes this combined affect to be entirely caused by the truth of her experimental result when part of it is actually caused by an irrelevant event. Sophie cannot be said to feel about

¹³ Being integral is not sufficient for an emotion to be appropriate. The concept of appropriate emotion also concerns whether an emotion fits a situation in a way that is proper to virtue. Correspondingly, there are ways by which one can fail to fulfill the appropriate emotion requirement other than affect misattribution. For example, some may fail to feel compassion because they simply lack the ability; others may possess vicious emotional dispositions such as feeling hatred towards a certain race. The situationist challenge is different from these issues.

the right object because she did not correctly attribute her mood to what really caused it. She also cannot be said to feel for the right reasons as her affective reaction is now partly motivated by disliking the weather, which cannot be counted as a reason for feeling worried about a scientific project due to its irrelevance. Furthermore, being easily susceptible to incidental affect means that what one takes to be their integral emotional dispositions would rarely be robust, but would change from one situation to another, depending on what incidental affect irrelevant situational variables cause one to have.

Importantly, the pervasiveness of affect misattribution suggests that susceptibility to incidental affect may be a characteristic of the human affective system, and the affective mechanism functions in a way that does not allow much agential control over misattribution errors, which explains the lack of robustness. This matters, as many neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists think that robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions *can* be developed through agential control. For example, both Hursthouse (2002) and Sherman (1997) have suggested that appropriate emotions can be cultivated by reason. Hursthouse (2002) in particular argues that feeling emotions appropriately would not be possible without the influence of reason (p. 84). If the human affective system lacks robustness, then we probably shouldn't even think about developing it. As Alfano (2013) argues, humans are easily swayed by situational non-reasons, which are things such as incidental affect that do not provide the agent a reason for virtuous conduct but nevertheless are hugely influential. Thus, to defend the thesis that dispositions to have appropriate emotions can be developed through agential control, virtue theorists must provide more evidence to show that humans are capable of guarding against incidental affect. In the next section, I propose such an agential solution in virtue theorists' favor.

3. Developing robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions

I argue that it is possible for people to get better at resisting the influence from incidental affect by developing emotion-related abilities, in particular the skill of emotion differentiation. In what follows, I first explain how developing emotion differentiation and other related abilities can help guard against incidental affect. Then I discuss implications for this agential approach.

Several psychologists argue that affect misattribution occurs because of low source awareness (e.g., Lerner et al., 2015; Clore & Huntsinger, 2009). Low source awareness means that an affective state is not tied to a specific cause. When such an affective state is present at the time when a person is attending to a judgmental target, it is especially likely to be tied to that target, causing misattribution. Consistent with this explanation, numerous research found that increasing source awareness through experimental manipulations significantly decreases the likelihood of making misattribution errors (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 1998; Gasper & Clore, 2000; Keltner et al., 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2012). A typical way of manipulation is giving participants instructions about the relevance of a given affective state to the judgmental target. It has been shown that, when an attribution manipulation makes the cause of an incidental affective state salient, it is no longer perceived as relevant to the judgment at hand, and misattribution errors are thereby eliminated or reduced.¹⁴ This effect has been replicated by many studies, with various ways of manipulating source awareness. It has also been widely found in experiments on various types of judgments, such as moral judgments, judgments of well-being, and financial decisions involving risk-evaluation (Cameron et al., 2013; Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).

¹⁴ Different moods may respond differently to source awareness manipulations. For example, Schwarz and Clore (1983) showed that the reduction effect of misattribution is greater for negative than positive moods, suggesting that different valenced moods may respond differentially to source awareness manipulations. However, this should not mean that increasing source awareness is not effective for incidental good mood. For example, other studies such as McFarland et al. (2003)'s showed that increasing source awareness is effective for both positive and negative moods.

Although increasing source awareness is key to misattribution reduction, this kind of experimental manipulation is not a realistic method to use in a daily context. In the experimental setting, the effects are usually induced by giving participants instructions right before the presentation of judgmental targets. In a daily context, it seems impossible to manipulate source awareness in this way since it is impossible to predict when someone is going to be influenced by incidental affect. Furthermore, the effect of such external interventions is likely short-lived, and thus it does not help develop a cross-situationally consistent resistance to misattributions. As soon as the intervention is over, people may go back to the old state of being easily influenced by incidental affect again. The question, then, is whether there are ways for people to acquire better source awareness on their own, without the aid of external intervention. A more promising approach is thus investigating why some individuals are consistently better at detecting the sources of their emotions than others. If individual differences in source awareness exist, it would suggest that some people are better at guarding against incidental affect, which likely allows them to have more robust emotional dispositions.

Research shows that having the skill of emotion differentiation is closely related to individual differences in source awareness. Emotion differentiation is conceptualized as the skill of parsing emotional experience in a discrete, differentiated fashion, particularly by using emotion-word labels to construct and represent momentary affective experiences with a high degree of specificity (Barrett et al., 2001, 2006; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008; Kashdan et al., 2015). Cameron and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that emotion differentiation is not only positively correlated but also causally connected to resistance to misattribution. They argue that individuals who have a better ability in emotion differentiation make less misattribution errors *because emotion differentiation allows them to have better source awareness*. Their correlational evidence showed

that for participants low on emotion differentiation, incidental disgust increased the strength of moral judgments (participants made harsher judgments on the extent to which a practice is morally wrong); by contrast, for participants high on emotion differentiation, no influence was found. Their causal evidence showed that the influence of incidental disgust disappeared only among participants who received training on emotion differentiation. In other words, the causal results showed that participants' judgment-making was not biased by incidental affect exactly because of the emotion differentiation training that they received. Although such training on emotion differentiation is also an experimental manipulation, its purpose is to teach participants a skill rather than simply making the source salient, and thus is different from the one-time intervention mentioned before.

Cameron and colleagues' proposed explanation for the connection between emotion differentiation, source awareness, and misattribution reduction is that emotion differentiation reduces misattribution errors because after identifying affect as a specific emotion, people access knowledge about that emotion's typical causes, appraisal structures, and consequences, which can clarify what is causing the emotion in the current situation. Because the skill of emotion differentiation requires having highly activated discrete emotion knowledge that involves the cause of an experience, its relational context, and possible courses of action, it is likely that one gains source awareness while exercising this skill. By contrast, having undifferentiated affective states increases the susceptibility to misattribution errors because they do not activate such knowledge.

Having source awareness, I argue, helps us feel properly by allowing us to feel about the *right* objects. This is because knowing the sources of our feelings helps us correctly attribute the intentional objects of our feelings to what really caused them, thereby preventing us from taking combined affective reactions to be "integral" to the judgmental targets at hand. When we take a

combined affective reaction to be “integral”, our judgment is partly influenced by incidental affect because we take the incidental affect to be relevant to our judgment. Since our feelings only influence judgment when they are taken to be relevant, once we know the source of incidental affect and realize that it is irrelevant to the judgmental target, the incidental affect loses its informational value and no longer influences judgment. As a result, we would only take the integral affect to be relevant to our judgment, which means that we would then feel about the right object.¹⁵

Furthermore, increasing source awareness by developing the skill of emotion differentiation helps us feel properly in a more robust way by equipping us with the ability to feel about the right objects more often across a wide range of situations. Since incidental affect arises from trait-irrelevant situational features, it means that our emotional dispositions would be more robust by being more able to guard against such situational influences.

Knowing the sources of our feelings makes a difference to how we feel. Before having source awareness, our affective experience is an undifferentiated, mixed one toward an object. After having source awareness, the affective experience transforms into a discrete set of feelings toward distinct intentional objects. This is a kind of affective change that’s brought by a cognitive change. The idea that knowledge of the sources of one’s emotions can bring changes to one’s affective experiences coheres well with neo-Aristotelian virtue theorists’ view of emotion. Neo-Aristotelians hold that emotions are partly constituted by thought contents and can be shaped by them (Sherman, 1997; Hursthouse, 2002). From this perspective, it is natural to understand how knowledge of the sources of one’s feelings can directly change one’s emotional experiences.

¹⁵ To be more precise, if misattribution is the only factor that we are concerned here, then we feel about the right object by only taking integral affect to be relevant to our judgment. There are, of course, other ways of failing to feel about the right objects.

The fact that knowing the sources of one's feelings has a profound impact on our judgments and feelings is supported by the abundant evidence showing that manipulations (direct or indirect) of source awareness causally change our judgments. It suggests that people fall prey to the influence of incidental affect because they do not realize that it is irrelevant to judgment. Notably, elimination of incidental affect is not needed to achieve this. There is ample evidence showing that the experience of incidental affect does not dissipate when people realize that it is unrelated to the judgment and correct their misattribution errors. Several studies demonstrated that, while making people aware of the source of incidental affect substantially reduces its influence on judgments, the affective experience itself is not altered at all (Västfjäll et al., 2016; Lerner et al., 1998). For instance, Lerner and colleagues (1998) showed that dismissing incidental anger as irrelevant to the judgment did not make participants feel any less angry than participants who did not dismiss it. This suggests that we do not need to go so far as to eliminate the incidental affect to make its influence go away.¹⁶

In a more general sense, it might be argued that developing what Salovey and Mayer (1990) call "emotional intelligence" might also be independently helpful to guard against misattribution, in addition to emotion differentiation. Emotional intelligence is conceptualized as a set of skills that involve accurately perceiving one's emotions, making good use of emotion-related information, understanding how one's emotions work, and efficient emotion regulation. As these

¹⁶ There could be other ways by which incidental affect influences judgment, other than interacting with integral affect. In other words, even if we are not making misattribution errors, our judgment process could still be influenced by incidental affect. More specifically, incidental affect could influence judgment through changing our cognition, such as by changing our access to affect-related memories and thoughts, attention/orientation to the environment, process of decision-making, and so forth (Alfano, 2013, p.47). In the same vein, Crippen (2023) argues that negative moods such as sadness or depression may reduce one's action capacity or cognitive abilities. If these moods become the incidental affect, they may also influence our judgment by having a global effect on our capacities. However, these issues are not the focus of the current paper as they focus on the cognitive, not affective, aspect of a person. How they should be dealt with may be the topic of a different paper.

skills seem related to the development of emotion differentiation, one may argue that these skills could all contribute to misattribution reduction.

For example, there are reasons to think that emotional clarity, a dimension of emotional intelligence that appears to be similar to emotion differentiation, helps increase source awareness and reduce misattribution. Emotional clarity is conceptualized as an ability to identify, discriminate between, and understand one's feelings and concerns people's meta-knowledge of their affective experiences (Boden et al., 2013; Boden & Berenbaum, 2011; Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Wranik et al., 2007; Yip & Côté, 2013).¹⁷ Like emotion differentiation, emotional clarity is also associated with source awareness. Conceptually, emotional clarity involves the extent to which people know the causes of their emotions or the capacity to analyze the cause-and-effect relations between events and emotions (Boden & Berenbaum, 2011; Yip & Côté, 2013). There is also evidence that greater levels of emotional clarity are correlated with greater resistance to misattribution errors. For example, Yip and Côté (2013) demonstrated that individuals with lower levels of emotional clarity were significantly more susceptible to incidental anxiety than those with higher levels of emotional clarity.

Although conceptually overlapping, research shows that emotional clarity and emotion differentiation are associated to a statistically insignificant degree (Boden et al., 2013; Kashdan et al., 2015; Barrett et al., 2001, 2006), suggesting that the two constructs are essentially distinct phenomena or abilities. The main reason for this is that the two constructs are measured differently. Emotional clarity is measured retrospectively and assessed by global trait measures such as the Trait Meta Mood Scale (Salovey et al., 1995). In contrast, emotion differentiation is measured by moment-to-moment experience sampling method or scenario-based assessments, which are

¹⁷ Emotional clarity is also sometimes referred to as “emotion understanding” in some literature.

performance-based measures that assess how a person uses their emotional knowledge to categorize incoming affective experiences at a particular moment. As some psychologists point out, the key difference lies in the fact that emotional clarity assesses the content of people's knowledge of their affective experience, whereas emotion differentiation assesses people's ability to *use* that knowledge to make sense of their affective experiences at discrete moments in time (Kashdan et al., 2015; Boden et al., 2013).

Thus, although both constructs relate to people's knowledge of their own affective experiences and are presumably based on an understanding of one's emotions, they are about very different abilities with different emphases. Emotion differentiation is a skill of categorizing momentary affective experiences. It focuses narrowly on the skill of representing one's momentary emotional experience with specificity. Emotional clarity concerns the general repertoire of emotion knowledge and is typically associated with reflective processes to understand emotions. To have clarity over the concept of anger, for example, one can retrospectively think over instances of anger that one has had in the past; however, to be able to differentiate anger from other affective experiences at a given moment when one is experiencing it, one needs to make sense of incoming sensory inputs at that given moment while activating one's repertoire of emotional knowledge.

While emotion differentiation, emotional clarity, and other emotion-related abilities all positively contribute to reduce misattribution errors in some way or another, there are also reasons to think that emotion differentiation may play a larger role in the process because its underlying mechanism is especially closely tied to increasing source awareness. First, the ability to momentarily categorize one's subjective experience is important for being aware of where momentary experiences come from. And to prevent misattribution, one must have awareness of the affective source at discrete moments. Second, emotion differentiation focuses exclusively on

the felt, subjective experience of affect. Considering that source awareness also refers exclusively to the subjective awareness of the source, the two thus seem particularly closely related to each other. Third, several researchers argue that people high in the skill of emotion differentiation have a better understanding of situation-specific information and can detect more specific experiential information, which allow them to make specific predictions for contextualized action (Boden et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2021; Kashdan et al., 2015). Emotion differentiation is thus uniquely suited to reducing misattribution because it allows us to detect situation-specific information that's crucial for disentangling incidental affect from integral emotions. In other words, the ability to differentiate emotions partly consists in the ability to differentiate between situations that cause incidental affect and situations that cause integral emotions. The ability to detect situation specific information also seems to help the development of cross-situational consistency because it helps people recognize which features call for the same feeling and which do not across a range of situations. Those who fail to have more robust emotional dispositions may be individuals who fail to detect situation specific information.

It's likely that the development of emotion differentiation depends on other emotion-related abilities. Kashdan and colleagues (2015) argue that emotion differentiation depends on the development of emotion concepts and vocabulary because people need to use them to categorize incoming sensory inputs into refined, granular emotional experiences. Emotion differentiation also requires a working memory capacity to deploy one's knowledge to conceptualize momentary experiences.

Developing emotion differentiation may require a different type of practice than emotional clarity. As Boden et al. (2013) argue, emotional clarity is developed through reflection, but emotion differentiation should be trained through learning how to make sense of affective

experiences on-line. On the other hand, the development of emotion differentiation may also heavily depend on the development of emotional clarity. Being able to make sense of affective experiences on-line requires that one already has a good grasp of emotion concepts, such as knowing how the concept of anger differs from the concept of disgust.

The development of emotional clarity starts as early as childhood and involves multiple processes. Children acquire conceptual knowledge about emotion through observing how adults use emotion terms to label someone's behaviors (Wranik et al., 2007). In the process, they extract information about the relevant psychological situation, interoceptive environment, behavioral responses, and regulation strategies. They also learn causal connections between events and emotions by observing how adults respond emotionally to events (Yip & Côté, 2013). In addition, children can also develop understanding by mimicking the behaviors of their parents, or through their parents' emotional coaching. For example, when children experience anxiety, some parents provide explanations to their children about the sources of their anxiety (Saarni, 1999).

In sum, I argued that developing emotion differentiation and related abilities can ameliorate situational influence from incidental affect by increasing source awareness. The thesis that I developed responds to the situationist challenge in two ways. First, it shows an empirical possibility to develop more robust emotional dispositions. Given that individual differences in source awareness exists, it's not true that the affective mechanism functions in a way that does not allow much agential control over misattribution errors. Second, it responds to the worry that people cannot become more virtuous because they cannot be responsive to the reasons that a virtuous person would consider and are easily susceptible to situational non-reasons. Acquiring source awareness through developing skills like emotion differentiation is a way of regaining responsiveness to reasons and reducing such susceptibility. And because the solution I argued for

is grounded in our affective system, it applies to all emotions in the development of both moral and intellectual virtues.

The solution I argued for is agential. Instead of making our environments more conducive to the development of virtuous emotional dispositions, I've shown that we can make ourselves more conducive to the development of virtuous emotional dispositions. Although affect misattribution is pervasive, and we are often unable to choose what kinds of situations we step into, it doesn't necessarily follow that people cannot change their degree of susceptibility to situational affect. My arguments imply that there is room to exercise our agential power to gain more control of our affective experiences.

Consider Adam and Sophie again. Adam and Sophie might be strongly motivated to be morally and intellectually virtuous but bad at being aware of the actual sources of their feelings, so they are easily influenced by incidental affect. As a result, they do not have cross-situationally consistent dispositions to have appropriate emotions. But suppose now that Adam and Sophie start to learn to categorize incoming sensations from the world and their bodies. They do so by acquiring more emotion concepts and practicing the skill of conceptualizing affective experiences and transforming them into more refined, granular emotional experiences. Whereas before, their affective reactions to situations are mixed and undifferentiated, and they only know that they are feeling good or bad, now they know they are feeling compassion, anger, sadness, worry... This transformation allows them to access what the concept of each emotion consists in, where the emotions come from, and how the emotions are tied to the specific contexts. As they practice more, they would improve their abilities and become more readily aware of the correct causes of their affective experiences. While incidental affect might be unavoidable, as moral and epistemic agents Adam and Sophie would be better equipped to be less affected by it.

4. Conclusion

I argued that a distinctive form of situationist challenge is pressing for neo-Aristotelian virtue theories, on which virtues require robust dispositions to have appropriate emotions. If the challenge stands, it implies that people cannot develop the required emotional dispositions. I then suggested solutions to the challenge. Drawing from empirical data, I argued that people can develop ameliorative abilities to guard against situational influence. I suggested that emotion differentiation is particularly suited for this task, although on a more general level they might all be helpful.

My arguments touch upon a less discussed area as the mainstream literature has thus far been focusing mostly on the situationist challenge to the behavioral component of virtue. In addition, it shows that research on the interplay between integral affect and incidental affect, which has so far received little attention, has significant relevance to neo-Aristotelian accounts of virtue development.

References

- Alfano, M. (2013). *Character as moral fiction*. Cambridge University Press.
- Alfano, M. (2018). A plague on both your houses: Virtue theory after situationism and repligate. *Teoria. Rivista di filosofia*, 38(2), 115-122. <https://doi.org/10.4454/teoria.v38i2.49>
- Aristotle (2019). *Nicomachean ethics* (T. Irwin, Trans.) (3rd ed.). Hackett Publishing Company.
(Original work published ca. 350 BCE)
- Baehr, J. (2011). *The inquiring mind: On intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology*. OUP Oxford.

- Baehr, J. (2017). The situationist challenge to educating for intellectual virtues. In M. Alfano, & A. Fairweather (Eds.), *Epistemic situationism* (pp.192-215). Oxford University Press.
- Barrett, L. F., Gross, J., Christensen, T. C., & Benvenuto, M. (2001). Knowing what you're feeling and knowing what to do about it: Mapping the relation between emotion differentiation and emotion regulation. *Cognition and Emotion*, 15 (6), 713–724.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930143000239>.
- Barrett, L. F. (2006). Solving the Emotion Paradox: Categorization and the Experience of Emotion. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10(1), 20-46.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1001_2
- Battaly, H. (2008). Virtue epistemology. *Philosophy Compass*, 3(4), 639–663.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00146.x>
- Battaly, H. (2014). Acquiring epistemic virtue. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (Eds.), *Naturalizing epistemic virtue* (pp. 175 - 196). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boden, M. T., & Berenbaum, H. (2011). What you are feeling and why: Two distinct types of emotional clarity. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 51(5), 652-656.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.06.009>
- Boden, M. T., Thompson, R. J., Dizén, M., Berenbaum, H., & Baker, J. P. (2013). Are emotional clarity and emotion differentiation related? *Cognition & Emotion*, 27(6), 961-978.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2012.751899>
- Brady, M. S. (2019). The role of emotion in intellectual virtue. In H. Battaly (Ed.), *The Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology* (pp. 47-57). New York: Routledge.

- Cameron, C. D., Payne, B. K., & Doris, J. M. (2013). Morality in high definition: Emotion differentiation calibrates the influence of incidental disgust on moral judgments. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 49 (4), 719–725. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.02.014>
- Clore, G. L., Ellsworth, P. C., Frijda, N. H., Izard, C. E., Lazarus, R., LeDoux, J. E., et al. (1994). “What are the minimal cognitive prerequisites for emotion?” In P. Ekman & R. J. Davidson (Eds.), *The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions* (pp.179-234). New York, US: Oxford University Press.
- Clore, G. L., & Huntsinger, J. R. (2009). How the object of affect guides its impact. *Emotion Review: Journal of the International Society for Research on Emotion*, 1(1), 39–54. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073908097185>
- Code, L. (1987). *Epistemic responsibility*. Hanover: University Press of New England.
- Coplan, A. (2010). Feeling without thinking: Lessons from the ancients on emotion and virtue-acquisition. *Metaphilosophy*, 41(1-2), 132-151. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9973.2009.01626.x>
- Crippen, M. (2023). Anticipating and enacting worlds: moods, illness and psychobehavioral adaptation. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09934-x>
- Damasio, A. R. (1994). *Descartes' error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain*. New York, NY: Putnam.
- Doris, J. M. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. *Nous*, 32(4), 504-530.
- Doris, J. M. (2002). *Lack of character: Personality and moral behavior*. Cambridge University Press.
- Doris, J. M. (2009). Skepticism about persons. *Philosophical Issues*, 19(1), 57-91.

- Fairweather, A. (2017). Introduction. In M. Alfano, & A. Fairweather (Eds.), *Epistemic situationism* (pp.1-19). Oxford University Press.
- Ferrer, R. A., & Ellis, E. M. (2021). Preliminary evidence for differential effects of integral and incidental emotions on risk perception and behavioral intentions: A meta-analysis of eight experiments. *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making*, *34*(2), 275-289.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2209>
- Garg, N., Inman, J. J., & Mittal, V. (2005). Incidental and task-related affect: A re-inquiry and extension of the influence of affect on choice. *Journal of Consumer Research*, *32*(1), 154-159. <https://doi.org/10.1086/426624>
- Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (1998). The persistent use of negative affect by anxious individuals to estimate risk. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *74*(5), 1350.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1350>
- Gasper, K., & Clore, G. L. (2000). Do you have to pay attention to your feelings to be influenced by them?. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *26*(6), 698-711.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167200268005>
- Ghelfi, E., Christopherson, C. D., Urry, H. L., Lenne, R. L., Legate, N., Ann Fischer, M., ... & Sullivan, D. (2020). Reexamining the effect of gustatory disgust on moral judgment: A multilab direct replication of Eskine, Kaciniak, and Prinz (2011). *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science*, *3*(1), 3-23. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245919881152>
- Hookway, C. (2003). How to be a virtue epistemologist. In L. Zagzebski & M. DePaul (Eds.), *Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology* (pp. 183–202). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Hursthouse, R. (2002). *On virtue ethics*. Oxford University Press.

- Johnson, D. J., Wortman, J., Cheung, F., Hein, M., Lucas, R. E., Donnellan, M. B., ... & Narr, R. K. (2016). The effects of disgust on moral judgments: Testing moderators. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 7(7), 640-647. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616654211>
- Kamtekar, R. (2013). Ancient virtue ethics: An overview with an emphasis on practical wisdom. *The Cambridge companion to virtue ethics*, 29-48.
- Kashdan, T. B., Barrett, L. F., & McKnight, P. E. (2015). Unpacking emotion differentiation: Transforming unpleasant experience by perceiving distinctions in negativity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 24(1), 10-16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721414550708>
- Keltner, D., Ellsworth, P. C., & Edwards, K. (1993). Beyond simple pessimism: effects of sadness and anger on social perception. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64 (5), 740. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.5.740>
- Kristjánsson, K. (2018). *Virtuous emotions*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Landy, J. F., & Goodwin, G. P. (2015). Does incidental disgust amplify moral judgment? A meta-analytic review of experimental evidence. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 10(4), 518-536. DOI: 10.1177/1745691615583128
- Lerner, J. S., Goldberg, J. H., & Tetlock, P. E. (1998). Sober second thought: The effects of accountability, anger, and authoritarianism on attributions of responsibility. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24(6), 563-574. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167298246001>
- Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision making. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 66(1), 799–823. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043>

- Lindquist, K., & Barrett, L. F. (2008). Emotional complexity. In M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, & L. F. Barrett (Eds.), *The handbook of emotions* (pp. 513-530) (3rd ed.). New York: Guilford.
- Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S. (2003). The role of affect in decision making. *Handbook of Affective Science*, 619 (642), 3.
- McFarland, C., White, K., & Newth, S. (2003). Mood acknowledgment and correction for the mood-congruency bias in social judgment. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 39(5), 483-491. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1031\(03\)00025-8](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00025-8)
- Miller, C. B. (2013). *Moral character: An empirical theory*. Oxford University Press.
- Montmarquet, J. (1992). Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 29(4), 331–341. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20014428>
- Morton, A. (2010). Epistemic emotions. In P. Goldie (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of philosophy of emotion* (pp. 385–399). Oxford University Press.
- Olin, L., & Doris, J. M. (2014). Vicious minds. *Philosophical Studies*, 168(3), 665–692.
- Payne, K., & Lundberg, K. (2014). The affect misattribution procedure: Ten years of evidence on reliability, validity, and mechanisms. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 8(12), 672-686. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12148>
- Pham, M. T. (2007). Emotion and rationality: A critical review and interpretation of empirical evidence. *Review of General Psychology*, 11(2), 155-178. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.155>
- Pritchard, D. (2014). Re-evaluating the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology. In A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan (Eds.), *Naturalizing epistemic virtue* (pp. 143 - 154). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Roberts, R. C., & Wood, W. J. (2007). *Intellectual virtues: An essay in regulative epistemology*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Roberts, B. W., Jackson, J. J., Fayard, J. V., Edmonds, G., & Meints, J. (2009). Conscientiousness. In M. Leary & R. Hoyle (Eds.), *Handbook of individual differences in social behavior*. (Chapter 25, pp 369-381) New York, NY: Guilford.
- Saarni, C. (1999). *The development of emotional competence*. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Salovey, P., & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. *Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, 9(3), 185-211. <https://doi.org/10.2190/DUGG-P24E-52WK-6CDG>
- Salovey, P., Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S. L., Turvey, C., & Palfai, T. P. (1995). Emotional attention, clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Ed.), *Emotion, disclosure, & health* (pp. 125–154). American Psychological Association. <https://doi.org/10.1037/10182-006>
- Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being: Informative and directive functions of affective states. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 45(3), 513–523. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513>
- Schwarz N. & Clore, G. L. (2007). Feelings and phenomenal experiences. E. T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (Eds.), *Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles* (2nd ed). New York: Guilford, 385407.
- Sherman, N. (1997). *Making a necessity of virtue: Aristotle and Kant on virtue*. Cambridge University Press.
- Sherman, N., & White, H. (2003). Intellectual virtue: emotions, luck, and the ancients. In L. Zagzebski & M. DePaul (Eds.), *Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology* (pp. 34–53). New York: Oxford University Press.

- Singh, J. J., Garg, N., Govind, R., & Vitell, S. J. (2018). Anger strays, fear refrains: The differential effect of negative emotions on consumers' ethical judgments. *Journal of Business Ethics*, *151*, 235-248. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3248-x>
- Smith, N. (2017). Moods and their unexpected virtues. In A. Fairweather & M. Alfano (Eds.), *Epistemic situationism* (pp. 235–255). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sreenivasan, G. (2013). The situationist critique of virtue ethics. *The Cambridge companion to virtue ethics*, 290-314.
- Thompson, R. J., Springstein, T., & Boden, M. (2021). Gaining clarity about emotion differentiation. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *15*(3), e12584. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12584>
- Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., & Mayorga, M. (2015). Pseudoinefficacy: negative feelings from children who cannot be helped reduce warm glow for children who can be helped. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *6*, 616. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00616
- Västfjäll, D., Slovic, P., Burns, W. J., Erlandsson, A., Koppel, L., Asutay, E., & Tinghög, G. (2016). The arithmetic of emotion: Integration of incidental and integral affect in judgments and decisions. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *7*. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00325>
- Wranik, T., Barrett, L. F., & Salovey, P. (2007). Intelligent emotion regulation. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 393-428). New York: Guilford.
- Yip, J. A., & Côté, S. (2013). The emotionally intelligent decision maker: Emotion-understanding ability reduces the effect of incidental anxiety on risk taking. *Psychological Science*, *24*(1), 48–55. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612450031>
- Zagzebski, L. (1996). *Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge*. Cambridge University Press.

Zagzebski, L. (2003). Intellectual motivation and the good of truth. In L. Zagzebski & M. DePaul (Eds.), *Intellectual virtue: Perspectives from ethics and epistemology* (pp. 135–154). New York: Oxford University Press.

Zagzebski, L. (2019). Intellectual virtues: admirable traits of character. In H. Battaly (Ed.), *The Routledge handbook of virtue epistemology* (pp. 26-36). New York: Routledge.