Contents

Foreword Suzanne Guerlac vii
Abbreviations x
Contributors xi

Introduction Paul Ardoin, S. E. Gontarski, and Laci Mattison 1

Part 1 Conceptualizing Bergson

1 (Re)Reading Time and Free Will: (Re)Discovering Bergson for the Twenty-First Century Mary Ann Gillies 11
2 Bergson's Matter and Memory: From Time to Space David Addyman 24
3 Comedies of Errors: Bergson’s Laughter in Modernist Contexts Jan Walsh Hokenson 38
4 Sub Specie Durationis, or the Free Necessity of Life's Creativeness in Bergson's Creative Evolution David Scott 54
5 A Reading of Two Sources of Morality and Religion, or Bergsonian Wisdom, Emotion, and Integrity Michael R. Kelly 70
6 The Inclination of Philosophy: The Creative Mind and the Articulation of a Bergsonian Method Paul Atkinson 89

Part 2 Bergson and Aesthetics

7 Bergson, Vitalism, and Modernist Literature Paul Douglass 107
8 Perception Sickness: Bergsonian Sensitivity and Modernist Paralysis Paul Ardoin 128
9 "Blast...Bergson?" Wyndham Lewis’s “Guilty Fire of Friction” Charlotte de Mille 141
10 Bergson and Proust: A Question of Influence Pete A. Y. Gunter 157
11 Joyce’s Matter and Memory: Perception and Memory-Events in Finnegans Wake Dustin Anderson 177
12 Minds Meeting: Bergson, Joyce, Nabokov, and the Aesthetics of the Subliminal Leona Toker 194
A Reading of Two Sources of Morality and Religion, or Bergsonian Wisdom, Emotion, and Integrity

Michael R. Kelly

"It is Bergsonian to look in the direction Bergson points out to us, but it is not at all so to carp at Bergsonism . . . at the pigeonhole in which it is convenient to place it."

Vladimir Jankélévitch, "With the Whole Soul"

Bergson's philosophy addresses a wide range of topics. A theory of integrity is not one of them. There is no sustained or explicit discussion of integrity in Bergson's oeuvre. Although his major works—most notably the first and last, Time and Free Will (1889) and Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932)—contain reflections on emotion, these require a fare bit of reconstruction. Conceding these points, I nevertheless want to test the hypothesis that Bergson's "description" of emotion in his last work can be read as a seminal, "Bergsonian" view of the condition for the possibility of integrity.

In these works, Bergson sets forth a "model" of the morally open and uncompromising human being who acts "freely," by which he means both with "her whole soul" harmonized and in the absence of social coercion, or with integrity. Insofar as such a genuinely free act requires a type of "conversion" to a soul acting in harmony with itself—its words and deeds or reasons and will—and insofar as Bergson identifies emotion rather than instinct or intellect as the feature of the soul that harmonizes the soul, we may say that emotion begets integrity (TFW, 165–71; TSMR, 48). This sense of integrity will have a metaphysical foundation rooted in Bergson's theory of "evolution" and time, to be sure. But in "describing" emotion, how it acts on the soul and motivates the way in which it targets the certain "objects," Bergson is able to "analyze" what the agent values and how, that is, partially or impartially, in word and deed or in word alone, and thus with or without integrity (38–9, 234). The "Bergsonian" sense of integrity I have in mind thus entails both the material and moral senses of the word—something whole, complete, or undivided, on the one hand, and a character of unwavering virtue, especially in matters of truth and justice, on the other—such as Socrates exhibit in Plato's "Apology" and "Republic." My reading of Two Sources thus seeks to harvest from the Bergsonian tree the fruit of its "description" of emotion and cultivate from its fallen seeds a Bergsonian view of integrity.

A source of Two Sources in Matter and Memory

Bergson's Two Sources is a work of sociology or sociobiology that describes two modes of morality and religion understood as the product of two vectors of evolution, the open or closed, dynamic or progressive, altruistic or egotistic. The attitudes of the kinds of souls that espouse an open or closed view of morality can be traced back to Bergson's conception of consciousness as a "hesitation." Such is the approach Deleuze takes to describe why some souls perpetuate closed morality while others create new moral paradigms when he writes that "we . . . find ourselves before an [intercerebral] interval between intelligence . . . and society.

Bergson's view of this "interval" or "hesitation" is first worked out in mature form in his Matter and Memory. In this work, Bergson seeks an alternative to philosophy's reductive solutions to the mind-body problem, realism and idealism, materialism and spiritualism, determinism and teleology, body and memory. Starting from physical nature in Matter and Memory, Bergson stipulates that at the "lowest degree of the mind," the brain connects inseparably to the whole of images, that is, matter (MM, 222). At this level, the brain functions as the switchboard through which centripetal and centrifugal forces transfer at an impersonal, nonsubjective, and purely material level (30, 45). Unlike an amoeba, for instance, which reacts immediately to or is determined by touch, the higher functioning [human] organism enjoys a minimal freedom of response, a "zone of indetermination," as Bergson calls it (30, 32, 34, 55). This zone of indetermination arises more specifically in and from this moment of "hesitation" between the stimulus and the response wherein the brain prepares possible actions and "chooses" the most efficacious neural pathway to satisfy its vital and basic needs, for example, hunger, thirst, sex, etcetera (179/29). In the tiniest cerebral interval between stimulus and response, where the cerebral interval itself is made possible by the evolved sophistication and speed of the human organism, "consciousness" first appears as a "hesitation," a delay, a freedom, a choice that emerges in and from the purely determined. In this zone of indetermination, humankind, a "poverty of consciousness" characterized by its freedom, emerges from that organism's neurophysiological reflex circuitry (38).
Regardless of what one thinks of this notion of the brain's "choosing," Bergson's point is that the consciousness emerges from matter just as freedom emerges in and from determinism and, eventually, memory emerges in and from matter. Deleuze comments on this emergence of humankind and society: "the èlan vital was able to use matter to create an instrument of freedom" (Bergsonism, 107). It is not just that freedom emerged from matter, of course, but so did the seeds of intelligence. Intelligence, as the outgrowth of this hesitation or poverty of consciousness, is a human instrument (machine) that cuts up the dynamic world of matter, renders it into static concepts deployed to marshal natural and social resources for its vital needs of survival, health, and mutual benefit, and creates habits to facilitate and preserve those actions that conduct to satisfying practical ends (TSMR, 32–3, 37).

Such findings applied at the level of socio-biology in Two Sources, intelligence first frees the human organism from mere instinctual interaction with members of its species and introduces something new. As this vector of "evolution," intelligence takes on a dual role, however. On the one hand, intelligence will remake nature such that habits (both individual and social) will create patterns and norms of behavior—duties and obligations—that will serve the vital need for socialization; these "habits" amount less to a second nature and more a reflection of nature itself, an instinct (39). On the other hand, intelligence sometimes "hesitates" and moves some human agents to rebel against society's "mechanisms" for ensuring the cooperative interaction that conduces to instinct's needs; namely, obligation (28–30). Such "resistance" can be rebellious or "transfiguring," egotistic or altruistic (36, 97). To compensate for intelligence's impetus toward individual or selfish expressions of self-love, intelligence in the mode of society has developed narratives and social roles around obligations that create in the individual a social conscience and a sense of identity—"good husband, a decent citizen, a conscientious worker, in a word an honest fellow" (20). Obligation and social conscience play off the agent's emotions in such a way as to persuade her that it's in her best interest to conform with the duties of society. All of this ensures and preserves, of course, the safety and well-being of society and individuals in society. Obligations and duties, in short, are best thought as intellectual expressions of our fundamental obedience to the instinct toward socialization, or our fundamental instinct toward socialization converted into a rational formula (29–30). That is, "obligation as a whole would have been instinct if human societies were not . . . ballasted with variability and intelligence" (20, 28).

When life is going along swimmingly, we don't notice our obligations and duties, we simply execute them—automatically. As we all have experienced, however, obligations regularly become inconvenient and thus we regularly wish to resist them. Yet social conscience—the consciousness that relates to society's outlined duties and our identity derived therefrom—draws one back to obedience to obligation:

there occur cases where obedience implies an overcoming of self. These cases are exceptions; but we notice them because they are accompanied by acute consciousness as happens with all forms of hesitation—in fact, consciousness is this hesitation itself; for an action which is started automatically passes almost unperceived. (19)

When, for example, making a meeting and picking up groceries and cooking dinner and cleaning dishes and writing the paper due to the editor last week all seemingly cannot fit into the day—at least not in a way that leaves time for oneself with one's beer—obligations weigh on us, "pressure" us (49). One draws oneself back from the tendency to forego one of the duties—and make time for one's beer—perhaps because of fear of punishment or disgrace or social ostracizing. Wanting the warmth of the social—its protection, its conveniences, one's identity, et cetera—one resists the resistance, confirms society's values, and performs one's duties.

A new mode of hesitation, a "resistance to resistance," thus emerges (21). The original "hesitation" traced in Matter and Memory generated the "poverty of consciousness" and became intelligence. Intelligence, however, developed obligations and duties that became social pressures, the social analogue to the closed, determined system of nature; this was an instance of intelligence doubling-back on its own tendencies to transform or break free from. The consciousness first rooted in freedom from nature—the "hesitation" that is the poverty of consciousness—now becomes the pause before transgression or transformation of societal obligations: "Obedience to duty means resistance to self" (20).

This "resistance to resistance" thus seems to be spelled out as "resistance to self," for that is what obligation is for the "hesitant" consciousness. But the notion of a "resistance to resistance" is a rather vague expression and it seems reasonable to say that it can be understood in (at least) three broad ways, for example, resistance to duty, resistance to society, resistance to change, et cetera. First, as we've just seen, the soul motivated by selfish, rebellious tendencies, even when it resists its own resistance to obligation, returns it to conformity with duty out of self-love and social conscience. Second, the soul that aims to transform society resists the resistance to change, resists the closed dimensions of duty, the tyranny of the majority and its often imperfect practices and customs. Third, there is the soul characteristic of one who recognizes the need for change in a society but buckles under the pressure of the tyranny of the majority (social conscience), that is, resists the resistance because he's resistant to change, and thus reasserts the instinctual desire for socialization and the preservation of one's social identity (Ansell-Pearson and Mullarkey, "Introduction," 40). The first and third souls differ in degree and reflect a lack of integrity, whereas the second soul differs in kind from these others and is the embodiment of integrity metaphorically and morally. The first and third souls manifest an inconsistency between what one says and what one does, what one thinks and what one really wants, that is overcome by the second kind of soul (31).

Though the resistance to resistance, however understood, seems motivated by reason in allegiance to obligation, Bergson does not accept this explanation (89). Rather, the resistance to resistance is motivated by the emotive moment, according to Bergson, because (i) "beyond instinct and habit there is no direct action on the will except feeling"—intellect is mediate—and (ii) "the potency of the appeal lives in the strength of the emotion" (39, 84). As Deleuze puts it,

What is it that appears in the interval between [the resistance of] intelligence and [the pressure of] society? We ... must ... carry out a genesis of intuition, that is,
determine the way in which intelligence itself was converted or is converted into intuition. . . . What appears in the interval is emotion. . . . Only emotion differs in nature from both intelligence and instinct, from both intelligent individual egoism and quasi-institutional social pressure. 14

Whether the agent (i) wishes to resist for selfish reasons, (ii) wishes to resist for altruistic reasons and fights against the current of culture, or (iii) wishes to resist for altruistic reasons but cannot get beyond the current of culture, the motive to resist always stems from emotion. And in Two Sources Bergson does precisely the work of excavating emotion's place in morality, "attributing to emotion a large share in the genesis of the moral disposition" without endorsing emotivism (Ansell-Pearson and Mullarkey, "Introduction," 47).

E-movere: The movements of souls and the two sources of morality and religion

Bergson's Matter and Memory is a good demonstration of his method of reasoning that pits popular and opposing theoretical viewpoints against one another to dissolve false or "philosopher's" problems. It is a method of reasoning that creates the space for the positive feature of his work, which is the demonstration of the "complexity of movement" in life in which we see "opposites comingling." 15 As Bergson's corpus develops, we see a layering of this approach, an application of it to different elements of life. Bergson's approach of working through opposites continues, for example, in his Creative Evolution (1907), where he develops in more detail his unique view of "evolution" understood as unexpected creation or the new. 16 And, as noted above, the method and the major themes developed in these (among other of his) works—for example, the "evolution" of humankind out of the material world, intelligence as an instrument of utility, and the elan vital—provide the framework for Two Sources. Recomposing the matter from section one briefly, we could say that the view of "evolution" and intelligence elaborated in Creative Evolution is applied in Two Sources to the social domain. In his 1932 work, Bergson shows how intelligence, understood as an instrument for coping with one's environment, developed out of or broke free from instinct (vital need) only to grow to the point where instinct reasserts itself when the obligations constructed by intelligence "crystallize" and a particular vector of evolution closes off (28). 17

Despite these structural and thematic similarities throughout Bergson's most recognizable major works, some have considered Two Sources misleadingly titled. Lacey wonders somewhat critically, "what does [Bergson] mean by the 'sources' of morality and religion?" (198). One cannot answer that the sources are the closed-society and the open-society, for that would mistake the effect for the cause. Bergson himself seems to confirm this when he notes that these two moralities are "two complementary manifestations of life" (96). Lacey teems Bergson's apparently misleading title by claiming that "it is types rather than origins that there are really meant to be two of" in Bergson's Two Sources (198). That Bergson presents two different kinds of society rather than types, however, should give readers reason enough to pause before accepting Lacey's suggestion. Ansell-Pearson and Mullarkey, on the other hand, remind us that "there are two sources of morality and religion and both are biological . . . because there are two major facets to Bergson's theory of evolution . . . evolution itself and fragments of the evolved. Two facets of time . . . time flowing and time flown" ("Introduction," 39). Though quite accurate, some might find this effectively succinct summation of Two Sources circular at worst, uninformative at best.

Instead of asking what Bergson means by "sources," since this question rightly cannot be answered by pointing to the open- and the closed-society, we should push "further" (TSMR, 43) and ask the question: How are the two facets of "evolution" and time construed in Two Sources? Again, Bergson's Two Sources is undoubtedly a work of sociobiology—Bergson himself claims this—in which he applies his dual critique of determinism and teleology in favor of a view of evolution as the new, the unexpected, the creative. Yet, when we look more closely, we see that Bergson converts (1) the hesitation, which in Matter and Memory was the poverty of consciousness, into the soul or person who resists resistance in one form or another, and (2) the elan vital, which in Creative Evolution was duration, into a specific dimension of life operative in the personal and social sphere, namely, emotion. Emotion not only acts on the will differently than instinct and intelligence, according to Bergson, but also and "above all" signifies "creation" or evolution (39, 45). 18 Since Two Sources, like all of Bergson's works, is a text about two facets of evolution, two kinds of time, we can most revealingly understand its spirit by reading it as a text about the motion of the soul—emotion, in the literal sense of the term, e-movere—an "affective stirring of the soul," "the enthusiasm of forward movement" (43, 51, 53). Hence, I am suggesting that the two sources of morality and religion are two kinds of emotion or attitude that not only disclose, but also shape and "indicate" the different values one holds.

In an important but heretofore underdeveloped way, Two Sources is a work about the emotion or attitude of the soul. Two points obviously need justification at this stage: First, that we can consider emotion or attitude as functional equivalents in this text; second, that this is a work about the soul and the role emotion plays in its character. Let's treat these points in reverse.

No term of art with the exception of "religion" appears more in Two Sources than "soul." The word "soul" appears roughly 157 times, compared to "morality," which appears 117 times, and "religion," which appears 167 times. That the word "soul" appears almost as frequently as one of the key words in the title and relatively more frequently than the other is striking and not at all trivially true. Two Sources is a book about souls, about one's "attitude" toward the world and their respective "effects" on morality and religion (37-9). That is to say, and concerning the aforementioned first point, Two Sources is a book about the e-motion or attitude of the soul. We've seen that Bergson uses the term, "emotion," in the literal sense of "to move out," or a "sort of motion" (38). Bergson, in turn, articulates "attitude" as "some sort of motion," thereby constructing emotion and attitude as functional equivalents. Moreover, since Bergson identifies "psychic attitude" with "psychic motion," the motion of the psyche or soul, we may say that Two Sources describes the motion of the psyche and thus two sources of morality and religion (38-9).
Such a reading positions us to see that different kinds of emotion express different facets of time, "evolution." One kind of emotion, which we shall term cognitive emotion, expresses time-flowed in the person and social. The other kind of emotion, which Bergson terms "creative emotion," expresses time-flowing in the person and the social. One kind of emotion is distinguishable from and follows thought, thus expressing a soul not whole with itself, not acting freely from social coercion and thus lacking integrity; in cognitive emotion, that is, opposites remain polarized, intellect and "sensibility" (44). The other kind of emotion is one with thought because it gives birth to new thought and new ideas, thus expressing a soul at one with itself, acting freely from social coercion and thus embodying integrity; in the emotive act, that is, sensibility and ideas "coming." As Bergson puts it, "antecedent to the new morality and also to the new metaphysics, there is the emotion . . . "creation," evolution (49). But this new emotive act eventually will crystallize:

...that . . . morality expresses a certain emotional state . . . that . . . yield[s] not to a pressure but to an attraction, many people will hesitate to acknowledge. The reason is that we cannot . . . get back to the original emotion in the depths of our hearts. There exist formulae which are the residue of this emotion, and which have settled in what we may call the social conscience according as, within that emotion, a new conception of life took for, or rather a certain attitude toward life . . . [W]e find ourselves in the presence of the ashes of an extinct emotion. (49)

The formulae amount to an intellectual mediation of the original motion that was the source of some morality or religion. The emotion, as Bergson implies, remains within us only at a surface level as the metaphorical ash. While we are one, so to speak, we're fractured, and thus living as one in word and deed, reason and motion (or action), is something with which we inheritors of morality all struggle. Integrity is something with which we all struggle.

The "lived-experience" of emotion: Two not of a kind

The hesitations Bergson describes in the resistance to resistance concern different kinds of motion of the soul, e-motions; better, two different kinds of motion of the soul generate different kinds of motion to resistance. It is not only that "beyond instinct and habit there is no direct action on the will except feeling," but it is also the case that what one loves and how one loves it will motivate why, what, and how one resists, for example, love for self or love of others (39). The sources of morality and religion are always a matter of love, for Bergson, for love and hate are the foundational emotions. There is a love that expresses what is instinctual and out of which intelligence grew into obligations and duties; this love responds to pressure—halfheartedly, if you will—and satisfies itself with reinforcing society's articulated obligations as noted above in character sketches one and three, which fundamentally express love for self (39, 51).

Then there is the love that expresses what is creative and evolving; this love responds to attraction—wholeheartedly, if you will—and "aspires" to moral progress as noted above in character sketch number two (51). The former kind of love is characteristic of the "normal working of life"—the normal, the patterns, the habits, the closed—while the latter is characteristic of "progress"—the exceptional, the "evolving," the creative, the open (34, 49–51).

The formulae of the closed society, however, are misleading in a way that enables its closed character; the formulae of the closed society prevent challenge to themselves because they speak in a way that suggests that one need not reflect on or question it or attitude. Starting from the primitive and instinctual drive for self-preservation and that which ensures it, namely, obligation, society "says" that love for family is crucial to cultivate because it is the foundation for love for fellow-countrymen and love for nation. These latter types of "love," moreover, supposedly cultivate love of humanity:

We are fond of saying that the apprenticeship to civic virtue is served in the family, and that in the same way, from holding our country dear, we learn to love mankind. Our sympathies are supposed to broaden out in an unbroken progression, to expand while remaining identical, and to end by embracing all humanity. This is a priori reasoning, the result of a purely intellectualist conception of the soul [. . . And] we conclude that a progressive expansion of feeling keeps pace with the increasing size of the object we love. (32)

The a priori assumption, the assumption made independent of experience, of course, assumes that "the bigger the object, the bigger the love." There is only one kind of love which targets different objects, and so from this assumption society "would like to have it believed that 'human society' is already an accomplished fact . . . that . . . we have duties towards man as man" (30). In practice, however, the love for family, for country, for others, reflects only one kind of emotion that serves the recognized and intellectualized goal of preserving oneself against one's enemies, an instinct (22). Bergson's claim is that with a "primitive instinct" underlying society's articulated obligations and cultivated loves generated by intelligence, society can not realize its idealized "target," love of humanity (33).

Bergson is not just skeptical about what society "says"; he in fact argues that society can not grow from love for family into love of humanity. His objection runs along two lines. Concerning what we could call the "intentional" object, for example, self, family, nation, Bergson argues that love of humanity is "too vast" an "object" to motivate action with regard to it. Concerning what we could call the "intentional act," which is an emotive intentionality and in which lies the strength of appeal, since the "object is too vast," the affect on the soul will be "too diffuse" (36). To see how Bergson defends this claim, we first "must agree upon the meaning of the words, 'emotion,' 'feeling,' and 'sensibility'" (43).

Bergson's first move is negative and consists in an implicit rejection of the view of emotion defended by his intellectual friend, William James, who thinks "that. . . bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and . . . our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion." James reduces emotion to its physiological substrate.
by separating the exciting perception—the cognitive—from the excited bodily change—the sensible. Contra James, Bergson holds that it is clear that "emotional states [are] distinct from sensation, and cannot be reduced, like sensations to the psychical transposition of a physical stimulus" (43). Bergson is not denying that emotions contain a sensible or affective or feeling component. Emotions are affective but not, for example, mere agitations like pains or tickles, according to Bergson. A racing heart—a felt bodily change—cannot alone tell us if we're experiencing love, fear, or anger, or even if we're standing at the starting line or the finish line of a race. There is also a distinction to be drawn, for Bergson, between turbulent and "calm passions," e.g., the intense, palpable feeling of love early in a relationship and the calm feeling of love in a long and enduring marriage (39).

Bergson's point is that "an emotion is an affective stirring of the soul" bound up with our engagements with the world. Bergson views emotions as intentional, if you will. But, Bergson continues, "a surface agitation is one thing, an upheaval of the depths another" (43). Bergson moves very quickly with this claim. First, insofar as Bergson notes that emotion is distinct from and not reducible to sensation, it is clear that the surface agitation of which Bergson writes in this passage indicates a kind of emotion experience quite distinct from James' reduction of emotions to the physiological "feeling." What thus becomes equally clear, second, is that Bergson distinguishes between two kinds of emotion, that both kinds of emotion are distinct from the Jamesian view, and that each kind of emotion is distinct from the other.

The emotion that is the affective but surface stirring of the soul is a cognitive emotion, which Bergson has termed the intellectualist conception. This kind of emotion is not the result of a physiological state but "is the consequence of an idea,... the result of an intellectual state" (43). On the other hand, there is the emotion that is the affective and profound stirring of the soul. This kind of emotion is a creative emotion and "is not produced by a representation [... but] is pregnant with representations [... and] can alone be productive of ideas" (44). Neither kind of emotion is divorced from the affective; neither kind of emotion is reducible to the physiological; and neither kind of emotion is unrelated to the cognitive or intellectual. Bergson distinguishes these two kinds of emotions by the way they relate to the cognitive component. The cognitive emotion follows from and is separate from the idea or apprehension of the world that generates the emotion; it follows from the formulae society offers in its articulation of morality that tells us what to love and how. The affective-apprehension, by contrast, is one with, "pregnant with," the idea that it will bring forth into the world; it follows from the depths of our hearts. Not only can we see that one form of movement is fractured while the other is one with itself, that one is passive and the other is active, that one is caused and the other is causal, but a closer examination of the former also reveals why Bergson claims that love for family cannot grow to love of humanity because the object is too big and thus the affect too diffuse.

In contrast to the Jamesian view, the cognitivist view that all emotions are intentional, i.e. directed to or about the world, dominated during Bergson's time. On this view, perception is the necessary condition for the emotion. Bergson recasts this position by making three points. First, the cognitivist will "contrast sensibility with intelligence" (44). Second, "feeling is made to hinge on an object" such that "emotion is held to be the reaction of our sensory faculties to an intellectual representation" (40). Third, the cognitivist view "will... define feelings by the things with which they are associated" (38). Taken together, we can see that Bergson interprets the cognitivist view to maintain that feelings are "outward expressions" that "incline" us to or repel us from some things in the world. The emotions might be bound up with our engagements in the world, but they're fundamentally reactive and only derivatively intentional or active insofar as the cognition conditions them. The cognitivist makes "of emotions a vague reflection of the representation" (44).

The cognitivist classifies emotions based on their formal and particular objects. The formal object of fear is the dangerous and the particular object is that object that fits this descriptive property; for example, my heart may race when I see a certain kind of snake if I am afraid of snakes. To say that I'm afraid of certain snakes is to say (in part) that I've perceived or believe that there are certain qualities in certain snakes that make them dangerous. That I'm not afraid of snakes in films or even in tanks in pet-shops is not surprising because in those conditions those creatures matter little to me insofar as I do not see them as dangerous. To say that I'm afraid of a certain snake when a certain pet-shop owner removes a snake from its tank and puts it before—taunting me to hold it and promising all will be fine if I go—reveals that emotions are not detached and abstract conceptual apprehensions of some part of the world in relation to oneself. As such, it is the particular object—the snake in that charming pet-shop owner's hands—that is the "cause" of the emotional reaction. The formal object cannot be the cause of my fear because it is not an object at all but a general evaluative category. Even if I mistake the mouse as dangerous and fear it, it remains the case that this particular object causes the emotional reaction and is the target of focus of the emotive act (Lyons, Emotion, 101-2).

As the cognitivist view of emotion thus links to how the world matters for me, it holds that emotions are rational and intentional to the extent that they are reactions to how we take the world to be. The emotional reaction indicates, on the cognitivist view, that the person with love for family, for country, and of humanity regards each particular object as instantiating the properties of the loveable. And Bergson entertains this a priori reasoning concerning emotion in his critical discussion of society's claim to move from love for family to love of humanity:

A psychology which is too purely intellectual, following the indications of speech, will doubtless define feelings by the things with which they are associated; love for one's family, love for one's country, love of mankind . . . The fact that these feelings are outwardly expressed by the same attitude or the same sort of motion, that all three incline us to something, enables us to group them under the concept 'love,' and to express them by one and the same word; we then distinguish them by naming three objects, each larger than the other, to which they are supposed to apply. This does in fact suffice to distinguish them. (TSMR, 38)

In the cognitivist's language, "the three objects," the particular objects or the focus of the emotion, enables us to distinguish them. But, Bergson asks immediately after this concession, "does it describe them? Or analyze them" (38)? Indeed, it analyzes them, for
analysis as Bergson means it denotes "the dividing of things according to the perspective taken."28

The particular object is meant to be the "cause" of the emotive reaction. The objects that are readily graspable, for example, the self, family, extended family, friends, and perhaps even nation, can "cause" feelings of love in me, even passionate love. These particular objects seemingly grow "naturally" from one another, and the idea of each can affect one. There is a natural sense of social cohesion that holds between these particular objects (family, country, nation). The primitive instinct of love for self extends to and relates to each of these objects, for "it is primarily as against all other men that we love the men with whom we live" (33). Even still, as we know, the affect in the first case (the self) becomes more diffuse in the last case (nation) (43). Generating a concept of the particular object, humanity, however, is not natural, does not stem from a natural or instinctual sense of social cohesion. We naturally relate to the social and not the human. We have to have a sense of the object—the object has to have some sense for us—in a significant way if we're to react affectively to it. I don't resist running out on my check at dinner for of love of the humanity of the server, for instance. I may think, however, about the law, or about not shaming my family, or about my "self-respect" (54). And even here it is not the dignity of humanity in myself but my view of myself that motivates me. As Bergson puts it with respect to the possibility of "mankind" becoming a particular object that will instantiate the formal properties of the loveable, "the object is too vast, the effect too diffuse" (36).

In a moment of hermeneutic suspicion, Bergson charges, "I know what society says...but to know what it thinks and what it wants we must not listen too much to what it says, we must look at what it does" (31). Love for family, which can grow to love for fellow-countrymen and even love for nation, never can grow to love of humanity because love for family and love for country are loves cultivated out of the desire to have the self protected from foreign threat or influence, and such "love for" implies a "choice...an exclusion" (39). The love for something, Bergson is claiming, is a restrictive love, a prejudicial and exclusionary love. The choice "for" something is always already the choice "against" something else. "Love for" thus does not "exclude hatred" for those against whom we are not "for" (39).

Bergson's linguistic analysis turns the cognitive analysis of love on its head and exposes its pretense. The cognitive view of emotion is an analysis, a division of things according to the perspective taken, a division of love into the love that serves love for self but in its love for self wants to see itself as something more than egotistical. Bergson's is a description of the language that society develops so that we may express our interests in and thus obligations toward our society. Bergson's linguistic analysis of the for and against of the cognitive view of love espoused by social morality is literally an articulation of the social. And although we should not listen to what society says but look at what it does, Bergson has shown what society wants by looking at what society says! And this can be confirmed by noting not what society says but what it does, particularly in times of strife.

If we took away "all the material and spiritual acquisitions of civilization"—which is what Hobbes and company realize would occur in the state of war—the instinct of noncivilized communities would reappear and the "essential characteristic" of the latter would revive, namely, the desire "to include at any moment a certain number of individuals and exclude others" (30). Since in times of war such an attitude of exclusion emerges "so easily, generally and instantaneously," Bergson concludes that society's claim to have achieved a "human society" with "duties towards man as man" grown out of love for family is nothing but words (30-1, 37). The cognitivist view of love, the view of love with which we live, is a love that is not whole, that is not one with itself. Consequently, when it speaks of love of humanity, it all it has in mind is words, formulae, and the love one has for self, for family, or for country will never be sacrificed for love of humanity. The intellectualist conception of the soul and emotion, that is, cannot be one in word and deed. The "love for," the love society cultivates, "at first dispersed among general precepts to which our intelligence gave itself allegiance, but which did not go so far as to set our will in motion" (35). "However much our intelligence may convince itself that this is the line of advancing, things behave much differently. What is simple for our understanding is not necessarily so for our will" (53). Regardless of the esteem in which a human society holds itself and its citizens in times of peace, convenience, and facility, societies "aim at social cohesion; whether we will or not they compose for us an attitude which is that of discipline in the face of the enemy"; indeed, as we have seen, the defense of family and, further, self if necessary would triumph in such a time of conflict, for both self and society are "self-centered" and concerned at bottom with "self-preservation" (31, 37).

Conversely, Bergson articulates a superior kind of emotion that is "all love" characterized by a love that takes no object (39). That this other kind of creative love has no object means that it takes no particular object over or against another particular object (40). This superior kind of emotion has no object because it will create a new object, a new idea, because it is pregnant with a new idea. It is all activity, all free movement that responds to the appeal of love of humanity rather than the pressures of social conscience. It is, as Bergson puts it, the emotive expression of a heroic individual, for example, Jesus Christ, and "heroism itself is a return to movement and emanates from emotion—infected like all emotions—akin to the creative act" (53). The creative emotion is the kind whole with intellect because it is pregnant with a new idea, the kind that thus evolves and creates the unexpected, the kind that is and begins integrity.

Whether one would like to classify this state of open, creative emotion and moral heroism as a mood or sensibility insofar as this kind of emotion, like moods and sensibilities, takes no object is a matter for philosophers to dispute. It is not an uninteresting question, but Bergson's philosophy is concerned with action. What already and more importantly appears available for our understanding is that Bergson's account of emotion is concerned with how our affective states direct us toward the world and how we will act in the world depending on our emotive condition. Bergson's theory of emotion provides an account of the condition for the possibility of having and acting with integrity.

Bergsonian wisdom: Emotion and the conditions for the possibility of integrity

As Jesus Christ speaks of and lives love of neighbor, which amounts to love of humanity, one might think it convenient for Bergson to propose the Son as an
exemplar of the open soul, the exceptional character driven by this creative kind of love to expose the hypocrisies of his culture and instate a new religion. But Bergson makes a more provocative move; he turns to Socrates (63). This is intriguing because Socrates, of course, promotes above all else the examined life of constant rational reflection on the most important things, the virtues and the soul. Under the most difficult social, political, and economic circumstances—Socrates, of course, is broke, resented by a large and powerful contingent in his Athenian culture, and brought to an unjust tribunal facing the most decisive of penalties—he sacrifices himself for truth, renounces his life for truth, and along the way gives generously for the future of humanity. It is only because it is omnipresent in the text that emotion seems absent in Plato’s presentation of Socrates’ defense. Emotion is in fact everywhere in this picture of the infancy of love of wisdom, *philosophia*. What moves Socrates to exalt the virtue of wisdom and the active life of reason, in Bergson’s words, is “the emotion present in [his] moral teaching”—the love he has for the child of wisdom which he birthed and uncompromisingly and unwaveringly nurtured for humanity—a “teaching, so perfectly rational, [that nevertheless] hinges on something that seems to transcend pure reasons ... creative emotion, the emotion present in [Socrates’] moral teaching” (62).

Socrates’ love for philosophy is his love for the liberating power of the examined life (the life of critical reflection on the most important things, namely, virtue and wisdom) for human life in the face of dogmatism, coercion, vice, and injustice. The love that gives Socrates the courage to defend justice in the face of death is the same love through which he can claim his integrity: “Throughout my life, in any public activity I have engaged in, I am the same man as I am in my private life.” Through his wholehearted commitment to his vocation to philosophy comes his practical wisdom, moreover, to know that shrinking to save his life by abandoning his principles—he love—will improve nothing for humanity. Socrates’ freely chosen end to his life is critical. It exemplifies a life of action fully free from even the most coercive threat, namely death. There is no hesitation, no wavering on commitment. We his inheritors see the model of the wholeness of love, the wholeness of the love of wisdom translating into a commitment to the highest ideals of and for humanity. It demonstrates, moreover, in the most profound way that Socrates does not primarily preach what he loves but enacts it and indeed keeps it a living, growing, and dynamic movement, for talking about it rather than writing it is his way of life (61). Socrates has a vocation to truth and justice and it is his emotion, his love of wisdom that drives him to exalt reason as the means to by which humanity liberates itself, keeps itself open.

But what of us? When something greater than us that is true and good affects us in such a way that we pause and consider sacrificing social conscience for it, what of us? We’ve surely all been moved by the intention to act, especially to act out of love of another, even when she appears so different from us, or is unknown to us and perhaps never will be known to us. We know this is right and important, and so like the prisoner in Plato’s cave we shake the most immediate shackles, trying to stand, to take a stand. But the intention, the thought, is often only partial, i.e. often only occurs part of the way. As Bergson notes with a startling frankness about socialized human beings, “there will be a wide gap between this aspect of the intellect and a conversion of the will” (48). That we at all will turn and look and say, “that practice is unjust and must be rejected,” requires an affective stirring of the soul, however “surface an agitation” it may be. But then we must act with this affect and insight. And it is when this time comes, if it comes, as Bergson notes, that we often find we have only words.

The partiality of the soul is often seen when one emotion in response to one reason overcomes another, when the reason to which we’ve habituated ourselves exerts the force of inertia over the force of the movement of the new, when the cowardly overcomes the courageous, the closed overcomes the open, society and social conscience overcomes humanity. Think of the “moderate whites” who so frustrated Martin Luther King, Jr.: I must confess that over the last few years I have been grossly disappointed with the white moderate ... the white moderate who is more devoted to ‘order’ than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says, ‘I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I can’t agree with your methods of direct action’.

One emotion—love for fellow countryman or self—presses against and wins out over another—an indignation that reflects love of humanity. The latter emotion as a new emotion not within our habituated and socialized character occurs in response to reason and too much as a “surface agitation,” the effect of which is “too diffuse.” We feel and know that bigoted and hateful treatment of persons is horrific, sinning, but the feeling dissipates when the atrocity is not before our eyes or in our radius. This cognitive emotion is not deep enough to motivate the resolve to conversion, to shake the shackles and begin walking the steep slope that leads out of the cave (48). We have not given ourselves entirely. We are the student who returns from a semester abroad during which she was exposed to the tragedy of third-world poverty. With a soul stirred, she feels strongly about justice, about love of humanity. But the affect diminishes in correlation with the increased distance and time between the experience and the new semester. Chores take over. More immediate duties put pressure on her; she now “moves” in response to them. There are reasons and there are regrets, and there are reasons to explain away the regrets. With croaking voice we say to ourselves: “I think of the disadvantages this could bring; of the danger that comes from sacrifice of self; of the vulnerability that renouncing the self requires; of the gullibility displayed when one acts in charity toward the beggar who will use that dollar for alcohol; of the self-advancement of others in society who simply do not consider such actions. And, besides, what difference will it make or can I make? There is any number of reasons why reason cannot convert us from selfishness to love of the Other. We “make a feeble start” (36).

We are souls stirred by the precepts of society and coerced by the desire for socialization. In Bergson’s disquieting assessment, we are self-centered (37). We do not give ourselves entirely. We do not perform deeds that match—indeed actualize—the noblest Intentions and formulae we gave ourselves. We speak to one another and even to ourselves of “sacrifice of self, the spirit of renunciation, charity”—in short, love of humanity—but in practice “we have in mind at such times [nothing] more than words.”
for the heroic and denied, by definition, to the majority of us. The hero introduces the new and introduces it to those of us with hearts to feel (not just ears to hear) and eyes to see. The hero passes down to us her example. The one who converts is the one who gives herself entirely, one who acts wholeheartedly, if you will. And thus one embodies integrity through the “simple act”; one becomes a listener by listening, a volunteer by volunteering, an adventurer by boarding the ship, an altruist by doing altruistic deeds: “The solution germinates and shapes itself in the initiative,” writes Jankélévitch (163). Yet nowhere is this sentiment better put than in Bergson’s own words,

“Let no one speak of material obstacles to a soul thus freed” (53)!

***

Whether the interpretations and hypothesis in this essay motivate asser or even interests, one final and worthy concern remains. Bergson’s works now and more and more are being taken seriously in the academy and it means scrutinized, industrialized, viewed developmentally, et cetera. Time and Free Will commonly is read, for example, as an immature work that has not yet freed itself from certain one-sided psychological commitments that Bergson begins to purge from his thought in Matter and Memory.39 Jankéliévitch himself mentions that Time and Free Will “says that the free man is one who totalizes himself but it does not tell us what must be done [. . . and] is . . . a little optimistic” (159). These are good, accurate, and important observations. And it is a wonderful and welcome development to see that Bergson studies are continuing to blossom once again; to see that Bergson’s thought is getting its justly earned desserts; to be able to hold more than hope that Bergson might finally be getting the school of followers we (at least the contributors to and readers of this volume) might agree he always has deserved. Yet this means at minimum that the line of argument I’ve tried to draw in this essay cannot be one done with a steady hand. I leave this point for scholarly dispute.

If the interpretation I am presenting does not suffice at the scholastic level, I hope it contributes at least to the revival of another neglected dimension of Bergson’s thought—a dimension that our all too frequently rarified and increasingly culturally irrelevant humanities scholarship cannot address. That is, I would be gratified if my interpretations and hypothesis were to evoke once again the dimension of Bergson’s thought that “average interested reader[s]” once found enticing and inviting about a philosophy that was once popularized without having been trivialized; as one American commentator long ago summarily put the matter of the average readers’ popular interest in Bergson’s thought, Bergson had “indeed given men more power to act and to live.” Bergson’s philosophy doesn’t encourage “Bergsonism,” it exhorts its readers—perhaps
Notes

I'd like to thank my friend and colleague, Christopher Arroyo, for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.


3 Bergson notes at a critical moment in his account of emotion that the standard account of emotion "does in fact suffice to distinguish [emotions]." But he then asks, "Does it describe them? Or analyze them?" (TSMR, 38).

4 "It is the whole...which gives rise to the free decision." Bergson, *Time and Free Will*, 165–72, 231; see also, *Creative Evolution*, trans. A. Mitchell (New York: The Modern Library, 1944), 201, 271. I use the term, "model," in a way that we can take it both as the model for free and open action and as an ideal limit, which is how Bergson understands the open and the closed (TSMR, 84, 213).

5 Writing of the most profound kind of emotion, Bergson claims "it is still more metaphysical than moral in its essence," which means, of course, that it is moral, nonetheless, as well (TSMR, 234). If I can support my hypothesis, the upshot will not be a reading of Bergson’s philosophy that will make a contribution to the philosophy of emotion. I don’t think Bergson’s philosophy of emotion can make such a contribution—at least not one that the dominant paradigms of contemporary philosophy of emotion would countenance—even if an account of Bergson’s view of emotion might prove valuable to interested readers of Bergson. What I am proposing in this essay, I hope, will provide at least a new and more detailed reading of Bergson’s view of emotion. See, for example: Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam (New York: Zone Books 1991), 110–12; A. R. Lacey, *Bergson* (New York: Routledge, 1989), 204–6; E. T. Moore, *Bergson: Thinking Backwards* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 30, 32–5; J. Mullarkey, *Bergson’s Philosophy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 90–1, 144–7. The one exception to this circumstance is Leonard Lawlor’s *The Challenge of Bergsonism* (New York: Continuum Press, 2003).

6 This is to play on Bergson’s metaphor of a soul that executes a free act and with integrity, a "self," as he describes, that "lives and develops by means of its very hesitation, until the free act drops from it like an over-ripe fruit" (TFLW, 176).


8 Bergson first presented this conception of consciousness as a "hesitation" in TFLW, 175–6.

9 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 109. Deleuze mentions but develops neither Bergson’s theory of emotion nor the various ways in which the "hesitation" manifests in human conduct. In this section and section three, I shall develop in more detail Bergson’s notion of the "hesitation" in Two Sources and his account of the role of emotion in the different kinds of hesitation.

10 K. Ansell-Pearson and J. Mullarkey, "Introduction," in *Henri Bergson: Key Writings*, ed. Pearson and Mullarkey (London: Continuum, 2002), 40. Insofar as Bergson mentions that language as a system of symbols divides the continuity of duration, intelligence amounts to a "representation," a "crystallization" of the "emotion peculiar to a soul opening out, breaking with nature" (47, 52). Intelligence articulates and explices emotion in categories of re-presentation or "formulae which are the residue of this emotion and which have settled in what we may call social conscience" (49).

11 Bergson writes at minimum in Two Sources of a selfish soul, an exceptional or heroic soul, and a feeble soul.


13 Obviously, because integrity entails a commitment to justice, we’re presuming to pass over without further comment the notion that consistency in acting out against society for selfish and destructive reasons could constitute integrity.

14 Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, 109–10. I shall argue slightly differently from Deleuze that the original "hesitation" in one form of emotion becomes a "hesitation" turned against itself, while in another form of emotion the hesitation becomes a hesitation without hesitation, or an impulsion.


20 As Bergson writes of the transfiguring, second kind of resistance to resistance, "heroism is a return to movement and emanates from an emotion...akin to the creative act."

21 In a recent and very rewarding study, Alexander Lefebvre more specifically examines this passage as Bergson’s critique of Durkheim’s view of the source of human rights, presenting compelling evidence that it is Durkheim Bergson has in mind when he rejects this view of love for family as continuous with love of humanity. See, "Bergson and Human Rights," 245–6.

22 William James, in "What is an Emotion?" in *Mind* 9 (1884): 188–205; "My thesis...is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS THE emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are
insulted by a rival, are angry and strike... [T]he more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth" (188-9).


Husserl, for instance, insists feelings have cognitive content and their intentional structure discloses what the agent manifesting the emotion values and how she values it. Viewed as "genuine acts," the feelings "owe" their intentional relation to certain underlying presentations. But it is part of what we mean by such "owing" that they themselves really now have what they owe to something else (LU §153a). That feelings "owe" their intentional directedness to "something else" means that they are founded on cognitive acts; Husserl writes, "acts of emotion seem to be founded acts, and indeed founded on intellectual acts. Every act of emotion grounds itself, and necessarily so, on any represented object or any object posited as existing, on any state of affairs, on assumptions or certainties, presumptions and the like." "Genufsake scheiden ihrem Wesen nach fundierte Aktion zu sein, und zwar fundiert in intellektiven Akten. Auf irgendwelche vorgestellten oder als existierend gesetzten Objekte, auf irgendwelche Sachverhalte, Annahmen oder Gewissheiten, Vermutungen und dergl. gründet sich jedes Genufs, und notwendig" Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertelehre, 1908–14, ed. Ulrich Melle (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) (Translation by Christopher Arroyo).

24 The founded "feeling" gives us the felt object, the object disclosed with an emotional and/or affective tonality, that reveals how we value or e-value an apprehended or perceived situation.


28 Ibid., 33a. Benjamin Jowett translates this passage as follows: "But I have been always the same in all my actions, public as well as private."

29 Martin Luther King, Jr., "Letter from Birmingham Jail."


32 This is, as I understand it, the point of Jankélévitch's epigram to this essay: Jankélévitch, "With the Whole Soul," 155–66.

### The Inclination of Philosophy: The Creative Mind and the Articulation of a Bergsonian Method

Paul Atkinson

*The Creative Mind,* first published in French as *La Pensee et le mouvant* in 1934, is a collection of articles and lectures that extend across 20 years of Bergson's career and which, as the philosopher states in the preface, address specifically the issue of philosophical method. It is Bergson's last major publication, released only two years after *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion* in a period when he was increasingly subject to illness and only seven years before his death. One of the main themes of the book is the difference between the methodological aims of philosophy and science, and yet it appears 27 years after his most comprehensive investigation of this topic in *Creative Evolution.* This raises questions as to why Bergson chose to publish a work on his method at such a late stage in his career and why a collection of articles, most of which were written for other purposes including introducing or commemorating the work of fellow philosophizers or scientists, was considered to be the most suitable format for this task. Certainly a number of the articles are direct statements on method, most notably "Philosophical Intuition" (1911) and the "Introduction to Metaphysics" (1903), but there still remains a question as to the cohesiveness of *The Creative Mind* due to the fact that the articles were written over such a long period of time, from 1903 to 1923, and would, therefore, exhibit some degree of theoretical variation. These questions are important insofar as they can be used to better understand how the method is informed by time rather than as the pretext for a quest to discover the most consistent or orthodox iteration of Bergson's method. For Bergson no philosophical approach should presume to stand outside of time. The method cannot be separated from the time in which it is written, the revelation of the ontology of time as duration (durée), or in the alteration of the object it purports to know. The founding principle of durée, as Bergson so often notes, is that "time is what hinders [empêche] everything from being given at once" (CM, 110) and what this means when applied to a philosophical method is that its pauses, its overall movement and direction must be given equal standing with its claims. What this means for an investigation of *The Creative Mind* is that we should put to one side questions of consistency and generality and instead look to the method's continuity, where difference is incorporated into the movement of thought and where the lived time and theoretical inclination of the philosopher must also be taken into consideration.