

Introduction

What is development ethics?

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When we tell people that we work in development ethics, they typically understand us only well enough to be puzzled. They think they understand ‘ethics’. They think they understand ‘development’. But ‘development ethics’ – what is that? *Our* question, after hearing this so often, is why ‘development ethics’ seems so perplexing to so many people. The answer, we think, is relatively simple and yet reveals much about the concept of development ethics. So it is a good starting point for this book.

We pursue that question in the next section. Three further questions are taken up in subsequent sections. First, what are the values or goals that distinguish development that is worthwhile from that which is undesirable? Along which dimensions is some development comparable to others, as better or worse? Here we introduce the seven broad values around which this *Handbook* is organized: well-being, equality, agency and empowerment, environmental sustainability, human rights, cultural freedom, and responsibility. Second, why is it important for development decisions and processes to be ethically justifiable? Does their legitimacy depend on public justifiability? Third, the foregoing demonstrates how open and inclusive development ethics is to people working in development practice as well as to people in many different academic disciplines. Since both of the editors are philosophers by profession, we want to complete this introduction by discussing the particular contributions that our fellow philosophers are well suited to make, if they would like to join the development ethics team.

Judgment and justification

Consider the following comments made in later chapters of this book:

The paradigm of development as economic growth has been particularly pernicious in generating and entrenching inequalities within and across borders and specifically with respect to gender.

(Chapter 11, p. 117)

Governments and funding agencies, on the other hand, cling to vague expressions like ‘meaningful consultation’, leaving the details of how these are actualised largely to project proponents. Thus while national and international policy guidelines are firm and clear about unacceptable outcomes, they are slack and opaque about unacceptable exclusion of stakeholders from decision-making.

(Chapter 19 p. 203)

Indigenous tribal communities in valleys continue to suffer from the trauma of displacement, including the hardships and treacheries of resettlement and the ongoing struggle for justice; international funding agencies support the expansion of projects that aim to provide for aspiring urban sections of society, regardless of the environmental and cultural cost to marginalized communities.

(Chapter 33, p. 377)

After independence, the French-speaking countries of Africa were propelled towards a model of development that was greatly influenced by the colonial period. This institutional legacy, which is evidenced by France’s continued leverage, has left a trail of political cronyism and corruption.

(Chapter 36, p. 398)

These comments about models, projects, or processes of socio-economic development include critical assessments. They raise issues about practices of development – from individual projects to entire strategies. The thrust of criticism is not just that these practices were ineffective but that they reflect badly on the agents and institutions that chose them *because these were the wrong things to do*. The criticism is that, on the great spectrum from doing the right thing towards the many wrong things to do, these practices are closer to the wrong end. Since this right-wrong spectrum is the domain of ethical judgment, these judgments about development practices belong to development ethics.

If we think of development ethics in this way – as recognizing wrongdoing in development practices – then discussions of development ethics are perhaps more widespread than we would otherwise think. Discussing development ethics, in this sense, is reminiscent of speaking in prose, according to Moliere’s M. Jourdain: ‘Good heavens. For more than forty years I have been speaking prose without knowing it’ (Moliere 1671, act 2, scene 4; Ratcliffe 2017). So, too, many likely have been discussing development ethics without knowing it.

Why then does ‘development ethics’ seem so puzzling? The reason, we suggest, is that development ethics also has another domain: it is not just about judgments; it is also about their justification. Passing judgments is easy. But if we are interested in knowing about the right conduct (here, the right ways of conducting development) then we should also be seeking the right judgments, and so we will demand justifications for these judgments. So development ethics involves seeking and giving justifications for judgments about the right and wrong ways of conducting development. This may account for some of the puzzlement: the space of judgment seems familiar, but the space of justification may not. People may recognize that ethics involves ethical judgments, and they may also recognize ethical judgments that can be made about development, but the business of justifying those judgments may seem daunting. In other words, there is a divide between judgment and justification. As Des Gasper explains: first development ethics must identify ‘ethical concerns about development experiences and policies’, but from

there it must go on to examine ‘major valuative concepts and theories used to guide, interpret or critique those experiences and actions’ (Gasper 2004, xii). Crossing this divide takes a further step that may seem unfamiliar and uncomfortable.

Whereas development thinkers and practitioners have approached this divide from one end, philosophers have approached it from the other. That is to say, when philosophers discuss applied ethics, they are often better informed about evaluative theories and concepts than they are about the practices that need to be evaluated. David Crocker was first asked to teach development ethics at a time when neither he nor anyone else knew what this might entail. As a philosopher, his initial response was to reach for well-known applications of evaluative theories and concepts related to practices that seemed to be relevant to development, particularly the arguments about duties of famine relief that were made prominent in the 1970s by Peter Singer. (Parallel arguments were drawn later from different ethical theories, notably the Kantian arguments by Onora O’Neill (1986, 1993; Aiken and LaFollette 1977).)

There can be much uncertainty on both sides of this divide. On one side, people with strong, clear judgments about the wrong things to do for development may be less certain about how to justify these judgments. On the other side of the divide, people who know enough about moral theories and concepts to evaluate nearly anything may be less certain of what the actual issues are in development practice. Crocker noticed this early on. For example, he noticed that the way in which Singer had framed the issue of international aid was incomplete, being oblivious to ‘how national development was conceived and what developing nations were already doing (or failing to do) to bring about good or better development’, giving too little attention to the agency of the people that aid was meant to benefit, and failing to recognize ‘deeper, more structural problems, such as maldistribution of wealth and power’ (Crocker 2008, 8–9).

Crocker responded by working both sides of this divide and promoting interaction across it. In the 1980s he drew upon the thinking of Denis Goulet, whose approach to values and justification was more anthropological than philosophical (Gasper 2011; Goulet 1971, 1995, 2006), and the thinking of Costa Rican philosophers Luis Camacho and E. Roy Rodriguez (Crocker 2008, 12). After, Crocker and his Costa Rican colleagues organized a Development Ethics Working Group in 1984 and held the first conference of the International Development Ethics Association in 1987 (IDEA 2017). Since then, many others joined this effort – including the co-editors of this book. IDEA has held ten international conferences and numerous smaller workshops on five continents on a wide range of themes, including economic crises; alternative development models; development needs, capabilities, and rights; environmental sustainability; dependency; globalization; corruption; global justice; and gender justice (IDEA 2017).

For the question of what development ethics is, this gives a good first answer: development ethics is ‘working both sides of the divide’ between ethical justifications and ethical judgments about development practices.

While this characterization is correct as far as it goes, it neglects two other important dimensions. One is that the term ‘development’ itself is often used normatively. Hence we should not just look to external moral theories and concepts for guidance; we should also consider what people mean by ‘development’ when they advocate for development as a social goal. What is meant when people use ‘development’ as a standard for evaluating how well or badly a society, its government, or its leaders are doing? The other neglected dimension is political. Governments direct much development activity and even private sector development takes place within legal and regulatory frameworks. Either way, some exercise of power is involved. If this exercise of power is not justifiable, then its legitimacy is open to question. Insofar as development ethics targets ethical justifiability, it bears on political legitimacy.

Acknowledging these two further dimensions of development ethics is one of the hallmarks of this book. Each has its own rationale. The first dimension expands the space of justification to include more people's values – the values that are implicit when people demand development as a social goal. The justificatory space, then, is not just for philosophers. While philosophers have much to contribute to this space, it is not their fiefdom. The second dimension answers a particular kind of political skepticism about ethics. 'You say that our development strategy is not ethically acceptable? So what? You can't make an omelet without breaking eggs.' The short answer is: if your omelet-making is not justifiable to those for whom, by whom, and with whom the omelet is made, then your claim to be a legitimate chef may vanish. Both points deserve to be discussed less metaphorically, more analytically, and this is what we will begin to do in the next two sections.

Normative dimensions: goals and values of worthwhile development

Even narrowly conceived as 'economic development', the concept of development has, since the middle of the twentieth century, undergone remarkable change. Currently, economic growth is only one part of its meaning according to a recent account, which defines 'economic development' as 'the process in which an economy grows or changes and becomes more advanced, especially when both economic and social conditions are improved' ('Economic development' 2017). As the term was used in the 1950s, the definition could have been reduced to the first part, '... the economy grows', as a measure of 'improvements in material well-being' (Okun and Richardson 1961, 230). Restricting the concept of development to growth, even in the 1950s, seems implausible to some, like economist Jacob Viner, who found it 'a paradox to claim that country is achieving economic progress as long as the extent of... poverty has not lessened...' And yet, at the time, Viner feared that including poverty reduction as part of the meaning of 'economic development' would entail 'separating myself from the whole body of literature in this field' (Viner 1952, 126–127). Nevertheless, over the next twenty years this restriction could not hold out, and indeed by the 1970s poverty reduction had been incorporated into the dominant conception of development in the major institutions.

This was just one way in which the conception of development came to be expanded in this period, from mere growth to a richer conception of human development (Gasper 2004). Our question is, why did this change the concept of *development*? To say that the concept of development had to change in order to recognize the importance of poverty reduction is not sufficient as an explanation. What was wrong with calling for development (meaning growth) *plus* poverty reduction? Why was it necessary to think of development *as including* poverty reduction? The only plausible explanation acknowledges that 'development' had a normative connotation, the connotation of 'improvement' noted in the contemporary dictionary definition from which I began. If 'development' implies valuable social change, then it makes sense to feel uneasy about including, as development, a process of growth that fails to reduce poverty. We hear the same unease in Dudley Seers's famous 1969 address on 'The Meaning of Development', when he says, 'One cannot really say that there has been development for the world as a whole, when the benefits of technical progress have accrued to minorities which were already relatively rich' (Seers 1969, 6).

Denis Goulet identified this normative connotation and based his call for development ethics upon it. As early as 1960 he stressed the importance of distinguishing between kinds of economic and social change that are worthy of being pursued as social goals, which sometimes he called 'authentic human development', and those undesirable kinds which he sometimes called

‘false development’ (Goulet 2006, 5) or ‘anti-development’ (Goulet 2006, 45). This terminology echoes and amplifies the normative connotation of the term ‘development’.

Goulet’s great legacy to development ethics is the idea, on which he expanded in his 1971 book *The Cruel Choice*, that this distinction between ‘authentic development’ and ‘false development’ or ‘anti-development’ or ‘maldevelopment’ is an ethical, value-based distinction:

Ancient barbarisms were characterized by the triumph of might over right. Today’s false development, which assigns supremacy to mere economic might, would lead to a new form of barbarism, on which is all the more dangerous because it hides behind the mask of progress and civilization. Today’s world is at a crossroads: either it will leave behind the ancient impasses bred of privilege and of limited solidarities, or it will get bogged down in new patterns of violent servitudes. If the world is to succeed in its development efforts, it needs to discover, to promote, and to propose an ethics which takes full account of the requirements of authentic development.

(Goulet 2006, 4)

This has enormous implications for where we locate discussions of development ethics. First, ethics is not isolated from politics or power, not disengaged from the messy world of conflict, privilege, solidarities, and servitudes. This entanglement of power, politics, public reason, and legitimacy with development ethics is discussed at greater length in the next section. Second, ethics is not confined to applying ethical theories to development practices. Rather, development ethics must also include discussions of what ‘development’ must be, in order to satisfy the normative connotation of the word – to be ‘authentic’ development, as Goulet called it. Development ethics is part of the discussion defining what else ‘development’ must mean (besides economic growth) in order to be the kind of worthwhile change that satisfies its normative meaning.

From this perspective the numbers of development ethics discussions are multiplied many times over, even if the discussants do not recognize themselves as ‘development ethicists’. More prose.

These discussions were treated in a systematic way as discussions of development ethics by Des Gasper in his 2004 book *The Ethics of Development: From Economism to Human Development*. Ideas of ‘human development’ insist that development must enhance people’s well-being, it must be equitable, and it must be empowering, and it must be environmentally sustainable. Mahbub ul Haq, who is widely recognized as one of the founders of the human development approach, included these four values among the ‘pillars of human development’ (Haq 1995). In addition to these four, Jay Drydyk’s ‘Development Ethics Framework’ of 2011 identified three more values that have been relied upon to distinguish worthwhile development from undesirable maldevelopment: human rights, cultural freedom, and integrity (Penz et al. 2011, Chapter 6).

This *Handbook* is structured by those seven values. Some of the contributors refer to them as ‘ethical goals’ of development, and this may provoke questions about exactly *whose* goals these are. The answer is that they have been discovered, in wide-ranging public discussion of how ‘development’ can go wrong, as values that distinguish development that is worthwhile and justifiable from other processes of economic growth and social change that may be called ‘development’ in some quarters but do not live up to the normative connotations of the term. Rather than ‘goals’ it may be less misleading to refer to these values as dimensions in which development can be better or worse, succeeding or failing to meet justifiable normative expectations.

Why then do we need several chapters on each one? The reason is that these broad values are usefully vague: we can agree on them in general terms while disagreeing on exactly what each of them entails and requires. For example, we may agree that development is worthwhile

to the degree that it enhances people's well-being, yet disagree about how 'well-being' should be understood: should we understand it in terms of wealth and income, satisfaction of preferences, basic needs, capabilities to live well, or subjective satisfaction? It is here that some of the most important discussions of development ethics occur, for which our prior agreement that development enhances well-being only sets the stage.

If we can know, even approximately, the goals and dimensions of worthwhile development, this knowledge will yield many consequences not only for particular development projects but also for the legitimacy of the governmental, institutional, and corporate policies and practices that support these projects.

A memorable example is provided by the Kariba dam project, built 1955–59, across the Zambezi River. The main beneficiaries of this project were electricity consumers, copper mines, and other industries that could enjoy greater supply and lower prices for electricity. Some 57,000 Tonga people, who relied primarily on agriculture for their livelihood, were displaced and resettled onto replacement land that was of poor quality and would not support their customary farming methods. Food production fell, a famine occurred in the period following resettlement, and the Tonga ceased to be self-sufficient in food production for decades to come. Resettlement of the Tonga on different sites divided by the Zambezi River led to their isolation from each other, especially when the river became a boundary between the independent states of Zambia and Zimbabwe. Some resettled groups melted into host communities, losing their language and Tonga identity. (For references see Drydyk 2015.)

Consider this in light of the value dimensions of development. Displacement and resettlement harmed the Tongas' well-being, not least in terms of food security. While *their* well-being was diminished, electrical power consumers (from industries to urban dwellers) benefited. So this project had a negative impact on well-being and equity alike. While some consultations were held and some concessions were granted, these were not convincing to many of the villagers, who resisted and were evicted and resettled by force. The colonial denial of human rights made this possible. Finally, the project had a negative cultural impact: merging with host populations, some resettled Tonga lost their language and culture; thus their cultural freedom was also diminished. Well-being, equity, empowerment, human rights, and cultural freedom are five dimensions in which development can go well or badly, and in all of them this project was impressively bad – 'maldevelopment five times over' (Drydyk 2015, 101).

Public reason and political legitimacy

The ethical risks of maldevelopment may also entail political risks. To see this, we should consider what basis or grounding the values of worthwhile development have. If they are grounded by public reasoning, and if the exercise of power depends on public justifiability for its legitimacy, then the political risks of maldevelopment may be considerable.

The idea of public reason, though much debated, is much less difficult to understand than it might seem. Earlier in this chapter we drew attention to two spaces in which ethical discussion occurs. In one, we make judgments about which practices are right and which are wrong. In the other, we discuss whether those judgments are justified. Various ideas can come up in such a discussion. Is this practice helpful or harmful? What if everyone did that? Is this what a good person would do? Does it respect others' dignity, autonomy, reason, or rights? How does it impact people's relationships or community? Now consider a subsection within this space, limited to discussions of how to exercise power. Minimally these are discussions of state power, from how to organize and limit it constitutionally, to legislation, to policy and program choices. It could be objected: these are not purely ethical choices; politics is not reducible to ethics. While

we might accept this, we would add that it is not possible to segregate ethical considerations (concerning what are the right and wrong things to do) from other political considerations. ‘Public reason’ refers to this space, where justifications are sought for choosing among different options for exercising state power, and ‘public reasoning’ refers to the kinds of discussions appropriate to this space.

‘Public reason’ is most often discussed in relation to state power, although this may be too restrictive. Arguably, corporations exercise power when the choices they make asymmetrically affect the choices that others have. Whether this exercise of power is legitimate surely requires justification. The exercise of power along gender and racial lines is distinguished by its unjustifiability, for though history is littered with attempted justifications, these have never stood the tests of reason. There are limits to the justifiable power that parents can exercise over their children. Whether religious power relations are justifiable – even among believers themselves, as well as in connection with state power – has long been controversial. Our view is that the limits and legitimacy of all such exercises of power are in principle subject to evaluation by public reason, though this is probably a minority view among philosophers at the present time (Quong 2018).

For any practice that we need to evaluate, we may find that different evaluations follow from different normative ideas. Suppose a developer proposes to evict riverside villages in order to build a bridge across a dangerous river crossing. Cost-benefit analysis and some forms of utilitarianism might condone evicting the villagers for this purpose while many other views would answer, ‘not so fast’. These critical views could include Kantian opposition to treating the villagers as mere means; concern for the villagers’ security of tenure as an element of their human right to adequate housing; Buddhist compassion; the Golden Rule; and, of course, Christians might ask, ‘What would Jesus do?’ None of these perspectives can be dismissed out of hand, because they all give reliable answers to other moral questions. Moreover, different people are more familiar and confident with some of these ideas than with others – for example, some people are Kantians, others are Buddhists – and it would seem wrong to deny them use of the particular moral tools in which they have the greatest confidence. This ‘fact of pluralism’ presents a dilemma for public reason. If public reason is open to many normative ideas that do not always agree, how can we avoid stalemate and settle on a single evaluation? On the other hand, it would seem arbitrary to achieve agreement by excluding some of these ideas from consideration, since they are in other cases reliable.

This dilemma also confronts development ethics. Why? As we observed earlier, development ethics must include not only ethical judgments about right and wrong development practices, but also justifications for those judgments. Since development practices involve exercise of power, these justifications fall within public reason. More particularly, the values that distinguish worthwhile development from undesirable maldevelopment were discovered through public reasoning about the failures of development strategies adopted by governments and international development institutions. If the fact of pluralism poses problems for public reason, it also poses problems for development ethics.

These problems are real and prevalent enough that we should not expect a decisive answer from public reason on every question of development policy; there will be stalemates. Yet public reason can also be remarkably robust. Disputes about human rights are a stunning example, which is also significant for development ethics insofar as worthwhile development entails progress in realizing human rights. Human rights movements have become adept and experienced at motivating human rights protections in ways that draw upon the particular ethical traditions of each region. From time to time political actors have pitted human rights against regional traditions to claim that development in their regions must be unfettered by human rights. And yet this claim is not so plausible when people experience the reality of being unprotected

against states and development strategies that do not respect human rights. What enables public reason to be conclusive, despite the fact of pluralism? According to John Rawls (1999), we must restrict ourselves in public reasoning to giving only reasons that our fellow citizens can accept, based on purely political ideas that are not tied to comprehensive doctrines; Amartya Sen opposes this restriction and opts for an ‘open impartiality’ in which all voices are heard and yet everyone’s good is given equal consideration, as would be done by the ‘impartial spectator’ famously discussed by Adam Smith (Sen 2009, Chapters 5–6, 114–152); Charles Taylor (1999) adds that people who evaluate the same practices from different normative perspectives should at least appreciate each other’s perspectives. This is not a debate we can settle here. Still, we can frame the question optimistically. Despite the fact of pluralism, public reason can and does seem to remain conclusive about matters as important and sometimes controversial as human rights protections. So why should public reason be any less conclusive and robust about the boundaries of worthwhile development?

Does development ethics carry any political weight? We believe that it can, *especially if it is grounded in public reason*. This claim is based on the idea that political legitimacy is conditional on public reason. A weak version of this idea can be found in Kant’s famous article, ‘What Is Enlightenment?’, which concludes that it would be prudent for monarchs to allow public reasoning rather than to censor it (Kant 1996 [1784]). This may have been the strongest endorsement of public reason that Kant could sneak past the Prussian censors in 1784, but as the public sphere bulked larger over the next 250 years, so did ideas that heeding public reason is a necessary condition for political legitimacy in some way or other.

In what way it is necessary remains a matter of debate. In a remarkable passage in *Political Liberalism*, John Rawls links it both to the structure of political power and to its exercise. Starting from the premise that political power is fundamentally the combined power of citizens, exercised collectively, he explores what it could mean for each to have ‘an equal share in the coercive political power that citizens exercise collectively over one another’ (Rawls 1993, 217). Two things are required, he finds. First, the allocation of power must be constitutional, structured in a way that is acceptably conducive to fair political give-and-take among citizens (‘reasonable’) consistent with citizens’ life priorities (‘rational’) as they understand them (Rawls 1993, 217). This, he says, is ‘the liberal principle of legitimacy’, to which he immediately adds a second requirement, that ‘since the exercise of power itself must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes . . . the duty of civility . . . to be able to explain to one another . . . how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason’ (Rawls 1993, 217).

As we noted earlier in this section, in Rawls’s model of public reason shared conclusions are to be reached only from shared values that are purely political, meant for application only in political life, rather than comprehensive ideas meant to hold throughout life, in every dimension. We also noted that this is only one conception of public reason, as there are others that involve converging on shared conclusions based on diverse values. Can we also put these wider conceptions of public reasoning forward as a necessary condition for political legitimacy? Rather than starting from an ideal, Rainer Forst begins by considering what we mean justice to avoid, and with this in mind he argues that the core concept of justice is that social life should be free of all forms of arbitrary rule or domination (Forst 2012, 189). ‘Arbitrariness’ can be defined (again, negatively) by a process of justification that screens out unacceptable claims of privilege (Forst 2012, 194). ‘Justice means first and foremost that the social relations within this system can be justified; the fundamental equality is the justificatory equality of individuals’ (Forst 2012, 194). Forst adopts a ‘strong reading’ of political legitimacy that ties it to this conception of justice,

and, hence, to justificatory equality in public reason (Forst 2014, 213). Note that this requires not merely that some particular structure or exercise of power *could be* justified fairly, but that those over whom this power is exercised have the power to *make it so*. ‘Power, understood as the effective “justificatory power” of individuals, is the highest good of social justice: . . . the “discursive” power to provide and to demand justifications, and to challenge false legitimations’ (Forst 2012, 196).

The upshot is that development decisions that defy public reason are themselves lacking in legitimacy and count against the legitimacy of the constitutional or institutional arrangements that authorize them. In this way ethical risks are risks to political legitimacy.

Does development ethics have any particular political identity? Can we locate it anywhere in particular on a political spectrum? Politics embracing the values of worthwhile development would call for improving well-being, reducing inequality, empowering people to engage in their own development decision-making, realizing human rights and cultural freedoms, promoting environmental sustainability, and eliminating corruption. We can locate this more precisely as a political orientation if we divide the political spectrum into four segments, in relation to economic growth and corporate power. For this purpose we can define ‘corporate power’ simply and uncontroversially in the following way: many of the business decisions that corporations *make* asymmetrically determine the choices that human beings *have* – for example, in the way that investment decisions affect people’s employment options. The politics at one end of the political spectrum calls for preserving and enhancing (‘freeing up’) corporate power in ways that promote economic growth and for limiting corporate power only as necessary to protect economic growth and public security. At the opposite end we would locate a post-development politics that views capitalist economic growth processes as tyrannical and seeks to detach communities from them. Development ethics is not particularly conducive to politics of these two types: it holds that other values may warrant regulation of corporate power, but rather than opposing growth per se, it holds processes of development and growth accountable to those values. (Nevertheless we cover post-development thinking in Chapter 4 of this *Handbook* because it is an important perspective that must be given due consideration.) Between these two extremes we might identify two other segments. In one we might place the various strands of counter-hegemonic politics aiming to reverse what they perceive as subordination of the people and their democratic self-rule to corporate power. In the other segment we might place reformist politics aiming to regulate corporate power so that such a radical role reversal is not necessary. Development ethics can be conducive to counter-hegemonic as well as reformist politics and does not make any *a priori* choice between them. By the same token, development ethics would hold both reformist and counter-hegemonic politics accountable to the values of worthwhile development.

Going forward

The earliest contributions to development ethics discussed in this introduction date more than fifty years back, to 1960. At present, development ethics is not just a dream or demand, as it was for Denis Goulet in 1960, but an actual ongoing set of discussions, research, political interventions, and policy initiatives. So the best question to ask about its future is: what forms of cooperation are required to continue this work best? In particular, we want to conclude this introduction by considering helpful forms of *cooperation* between philosophers, other academics, and practitioners.

In part, we frame the question in this way because the contributions of philosophers to development ethics has been understated so far in this introduction. We did so intentionally, so as to stress the inclusive nature of development ethics – that it is *not* the exclusive domain of philosophers. Nevertheless, philosophers do have special contributions to make, and this introduction would be incomplete if we did not mention them.

We can begin reflexively by pointing out that the account of development ethics that we have given in this introduction is actually quite philosophical in character. Just as many may have been speaking prose and doing development ethics without knowing it, in this chapter we have already been doing philosophy, perhaps without the readers knowing that they were engaged in a philosophical exercise, as we analyzed the concept of development, arguing that ‘development’ has a normative connotation that requires looking beyond (but not without) moral theories. We then made arguments on whether and how development ethics is grounded in public reason and derived implications concerning the legitimacy of the policies, institutions, and power relations in which development is carried out.

To continue in this vein, then, what are some other kinds of philosophical work that might contribute to the further development of development ethics? It may be useful to distinguish between three different domains in which this work may be done.

Meta-ethics considers higher order questions about the nature and scope of argumentation and knowledge about normative (moral and political) claims and judgments. As Anna Malavisi shows in Chapter 5, numerous topics and trends in epistemology have direct and important applications to development ethics: social epistemology, feminist epistemology, epistemologies of ignorance, and the concept of epistemic injustice. Conversely, moral epistemology has much to learn from development ethics.

Applied or practical ethics considers more specific issues or realms of human action in a way that generates subject-specific guidelines or positions on specific questions: for example, the realm of medical ethics, or the specific question of whether or not physician-assisted suicide is morally permissible. Conventionally, especially in introductory teaching of applied ethics, an attempt is made to reach conclusions about these issues from principles that have been articulated in *normative ethics*. One example is Immanuel Kant’s humanity formula, that we ought never treat humanity whether in ourselves or another person merely as a means, but always as an end. Another is Jeremy Bentham’s utility principle that we ought to approve or disapprove of every action according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question. In addition, different sub-fields of applied ethics (such as bioethics, environmental ethics, business ethics) may have principles and concepts that apply to their issues and practices specifically, as for example patient autonomy and doing no harm apply in medical ethics.

Social philosophy and global ethics discuss theories of justice, whether and how they are applicable globally as well as socially, and other ethical principles that may apply when cross-border interactions raise ethical issues. Greater awareness of issues specific to development would clearly enrich discussions of these theories and principles, and, conversely, high-level principles can also shed new light on particular development issues.

Personal or integral ethics (Keleher 2017, 2018) is the domain in which we as individuals must consider the moral dimensions of our particular actions as an individual part of the various realms of life in which we participate and how we might integrate choices made in various spheres of our lives, including commitments, duties, relationships, abilities, and resources. For example:

... consider Samantha, an agro-economist who works for a large development firm whose work undermines sustainability. Samantha personally believes that sustainability ought to

be a high priority, especially in development interventions. How does she reconcile this belief with her work at the firm? She has used the established channels to suggest changes, but finds that people in authority simply dismiss her. She suspects that these dismissals are at least in part because she is a woman and the people in authority at her firm are all men. Quitting her job would mean losing the health plan that pays for her expensive medications, and would compromise her ability to provide for her three children.

(Keleher 2018)

In this domain we deal not only with actors and actions, but with webs of relationships and responsibilities – often conflicting responsibilities. Philosophical attention has been given to this domain by approaches including relational theory (see Chapter 11 and Koggel 2002 and 2012), care ethics (Tong and Williams 2016), and virtue ethics (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016).

This *Handbook* demonstrates how robust development ethics *research* has become. However, the scope of *teaching* and *grassroots discussion* of development ethics remains very limited, especially when compared with fields of applied ethics such as environmental ethics, business ethics, or bioethics. Outside universities, scope for discussion of development ethics is equally limited, if not worse. As Chloe Schwenke observes in Chapter 30, there are few ongoing venues in development organizations or institutions in which the people who work on development policies, programs, and projects can discuss emerging ethical issues as they experience them. Moreover, the ways in work is structured and directed in these organizations and institutions leaves little space and time for that discussion.

Different fields of applied ethics offer different models of how to further extend the field of development ethics beyond academia. We suggest the following steps. Development and anti-poverty organizations like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), OXFAM, the World Bank, and others, ought to have designated positions for development ethicists who are trained and hold degrees in development ethics, similar to the positions hospitals and large medical organizations have for medical ethicists. In addition to designated development ethics positions, and in smaller organizations where it is not possible to designate an entire position to development ethics, qualified development ethicists should be brought in to consult and train others on specific topics whenever applicable. Moreover, qualifications in development ethics should be recognized as advantageous and listed as *desiderata* for a wider range of positions held throughout development agencies. Finally, associations, including the International Development Ethics Association (IDEA), ought to be more widely recognized as providing valuable opportunities for interdisciplinary discussions among scholars and practitioners.

Within academia, philosophy departments and interdisciplinary programs ought to give greater recognition to development ethics by regularly teaching courses and offering specializations in development ethics. After all, billions of people throughout the world live below the poverty line, and given that all nations struggle with issues of inequality, limited resources, and sustainability, there are good reasons to hold that all nations are developing nations. Likewise, development scholars outside of philosophy who have been implicitly speaking in the ‘prose’ of ethics and critical thinking would do well to directly engage and explicitly recognize the value of philosophical insights and tools in development work. Development ethics courses ought to be offered in programs for public policy, development economics, peace studies, and so on. Scholars and theoreticians within university ought to seek to establish working relationships with development practitioners.

Clearly, much remains to be done. Readers who would like to join this effort are invited to contact either the co-editors, or the authors of particular chapters, or the International Development Ethics Association via its website.

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