

Responsibility-Foundation: Still Needed and Still Missing

Galen Strawson argues that moral responsibility is impossible.¹ In a recent paper, Robert Hartman helpfully restates Strawson's argument as follows.²

(P1)	<u>Reasons Premise.</u> An agent S's intentionally performing an action A for which she might be morally responsible is explained by certain features of her mental constitution MC – namely, certain reasons for action.
(P2)	<u>Responsibility Premise.</u> (1) S is morally responsible for an intentional action A only if S is morally responsible for the parts of her MC that explain her performing A. (2) S is morally responsible for her MC (or some parts of it) only if S is morally responsible for an earlier action A ₁ in which S intentionally and successfully brought about those parts of her MC.
(P3)	<u>Iteration Premise.</u> S is morally responsible for A by way of MC and A ₁ as previously described only if S has performed an infinite number of even earlier free actions. (See below.)
(P4)	<u>Impossibility Premise.</u> It is impossible for finite beings like us to have performed an infinite number of past actions.
(C1)	<u>Conclusion.</u> Hence, it is impossible for finite beings like us to be morally responsible for anything.

In this paper, we argue that the impossibility argument succeeds regardless of whether Strawson's argument succeed. We argue for this on the basis of there being no basic responsibility-maker. That is, there is nothing that by itself makes someone morally responsible. We then argue that the focus on such a maker does explanatory work. Specifically, it explains why other skeptical arguments succeed.

Part One: The Argument for Impossibility

This paper argues that critics of Strawson's argument, for instance, Randolphe Clarke, John Martin Fischer, Robert Hartman, Michael Istvan, and Boris Kment, fail to defeat the

argument for impossibility even if they were to defeat Strawson's argument.³ Here's why. Responsibility requires a basic responsibility-maker, that is, a minimal state or event that by itself makes someone morally responsible.⁴ This is similar to a basic intrinsic-value maker, which is the minimal feature that makes something morally valuable (consider, for example, a state of affairs that obtains). This responsibility-maker is either a capacity (that is, a particular type of state) or a choice (that is, a particular type of event). These are the most plausible candidates for the responsibility-maker. Yet both are implausible. For the purposes of this paper, an event involves a thing changing and a state involves it not changing.

Consider a capacity. In particular, consider a person's complete psychology at a time. Intuitively, by itself, this is not enough to make a person morally responsible. This can be seen in that it intuitively seems that a newly created individual (for example, Frankenstein's monster or Suzie Instant) is not blameworthy or praiseworthy for an act made immediately after creation.⁵ If responsibility just is being praiseworthy or blameworthy to some level (perhaps zero-level), and we think this is so, then it intuitively seems that instantly created people are not morally responsible for what they do immediately after creation because they are not responsible for their psychology. This is true no matter what capacities are included in the psychology they are given.

The notion that a capacity is not a responsibility-maker can also be seen in that, despite attempts in the literature to show otherwise, it intuitively seems clear that a newly created person is no more responsible for an act immediately following creation than is a manipulated person for an act immediately after manipulation because neither has authorized, chosen, validated, or willed her psychology from which the act flows.⁶ Our view, then, is that a person cannot be

responsible for a capacity that was unchosen or for one that was chosen when the person is not responsible for the choice.

A second way to see that a capacity, rather than the exercise of it, is not a responsibility-maker is in the notion that, in general, the right and the good focus on the exercise of capacities. On various theories, basic intrinsic-value makers (for short, 'value-makers') include knowledge, love, pleasure, and virtue. They do not include the capacity for these things. It would thus be surprising if the relevant capacity (for example, the capacity to respond to reasons or a capacity for normative competence) were a value-maker. Nor does the right focus on mere capacity. Decisions or actions are thought to be right or wrong. That is, they are the bearers of rightness. Again, these are *exercises* of capacities rather than capacities. If virtue is distinct from the right and the good, and we doubt it, it also rests on the exercise of capacities rather than a mere capacity. Virtue depends on whether someone has the right attitudes rather than the capacity to have such attitudes. An objector might argue that to be virtuous just is to have certain capacities, namely, to act or respond appropriately in various circumstances (and they might call these capacities 'character traits', and name them 'bravery', 'honesty', and so forth, according to the context). But this objection would fail, as it confuses what makes one *able to be* virtuous with virtue. Similarly, trying to make a capacity the responsibility-maker would be to confuse what makes a person *capable of* acting responsibly with responsibility. Hence, it would be odd if moral responsibility, a property of the moral realm, has a strikingly different basis than do the other members of the realm: the right, the good, and virtue.

A third way to see that a capacity, rather than the exercise of it, is not a responsibility-maker can be seen if we consider negligence. A person is negligent when he is blameworthy because he does not know something but ought to know it. Negligence is more like a

responsibility-related capacity than exercise of the capacity because it need not involve the person thinking something, making a decision, executing an intention, and so on. While it is controversial, it seems to us that negligence is not a responsibility-maker.⁷ The idea, now common in the literature, is that negligence is indirectly related to an individual shaping her own life. In addition, what makes someone negligent of a relevant fact rather than merely ignorant of it involves conditions that beg the question on blameworthiness (for example, fair opportunity to know the relevant fact) or are irrelevant to responsibility (for example, incentives for due diligence). If people are not basically responsible for negligence, then they likely are not basically responsible on the basis of a capacity alone.

Consider, next, a decision (or choice).⁸ A person cannot be responsible for a decision that didn't flow from her psychology or that flowed from her psychology when she is not responsible for her psychology. The first can be clearly seen in that a random decision (that is, one unconnected to one's psychology or connected to it in an arbitrary way) is an implausible responsibility-maker. For example, if Alice's brain randomly generates a decision to kill Smith, the decision by itself is an implausible responsibility-maker. The same is true if Alice is not responsible for her psychology (it results from manipulation) and immediately after manipulation she decides on the basis of her psychology to kill Smith. Intuitively, it might be thought that with enough time or thought Alice becomes responsible for her psychology. However, this is because with enough time or thought she authorizes, chooses, validates, or wills to retain her psychology and, thus, makes it hers. Our view, then, is that a person cannot be responsible for a decision that didn't flow from her psychology nor for one that did flow from it when the person is not responsible for her psychology.

A second way to see that a decision is not a responsibility-maker is that, contra Strawson, it would not be present even in infinite or self-created beings. An infinite being would still have to have a basic responsibility-maker, capacity or decision, and because neither is plausible, infinite instances of a choice flowing from a psychology and a psychology resulting from a choice would not add responsibility to a system any more than a finite system would add it in. By analogy, a sequence of things cannot be exclusively extrinsically valuable without something in the sequence being intrinsically valuable because nothing would add value into the system.

The same is true for a self-created being. Consider, for example, if a being (for example, Chuck Norris) were so great that he didn't have a father. Instead, he traveled back in time and impregnated his mother.⁹ Self-creation would not make him morally responsible. This would even be true if it were possible for him to reach out from a possible but non-existent state to create his psychology from nothing.

It should be noted that the responsibility-maker cannot be a capacity-decision or decision-capacity sequence because, again, nothing would add responsibility into the system. Also, the prior member of this sequence would do all the work. Again, this is analogous to a sequence of things that have purely extrinsic value.

It should further be noted that our argument is independent of whether compatibilism or determinism is true. It is also independent of the particular capacity- or exercise-based theory of responsibility. That is, it is independent of whether responsibility rests on reason-responsiveness, aligned different-order desires, identification with desires, normative competence, agent-causation ability, or some other capacity. It is also independent of decisions or acts. Consider self-forming acts, agent-caused acts, or some other exercise of a relevant capacity. In addition, our theory need not address whether moral luck occurs at the level of results, circumstances, or

constitutive conditions and, in fact, whether moral luck occurs at all. As noted above, it is also independent of whether a person is infinite or self-created.

Nor is the basic responsibility-maker a pairing of a psychology and a decision. In particular, one in which a psychology in part or whole brings about a decision. It is hard to see how a person can be responsible for a psychology-decision pair unless he is either basically responsible for either the psychology or the decision. That is, it is hard to see how pairing two things for which a person is not basically responsible for would make him morally responsible. The same reasoning applies to decision-psychology pairing in which the decision in part or in whole brings about the psychology. The same is true for some number of cycles in which a person's psychology affects her decision, which in turn affects her act, which in turn affects her psychology, and so on. Repeated cycles do not seem capable of grounding moral responsibility. Many sequences of events (specifically, psychology-decision-act sequences) do not seem to be capable of being a basic responsibility-maker if no one sequence is such a maker. By analogy, sequences of extrinsically valuable things depend on one thing being initially extrinsically valuable. This in turn must rest on something being intrinsically valuable. It cannot be turtles all the way down.

We also think that not merely is there no basic responsibility-maker, but no such maker is possible. If the two most plausible candidates (decision and psychology) do not ground moral responsibility, then it is hard to see how there can be one in any possible world. Hence, even a being who makes an infinite number of decisions, performs a self-forming act (if such an act were possible), or who does wrong or bad acts in a way that is neither akratic nor negligent would not be morally responsible. In short, moral responsibility is impossible.

Here, then, is the dilemma that opponents of impossibility face.

(1)	If someone is morally responsible, then there is a basic responsibility-maker.
(2)	If there is a basic responsibility-maker, then it is a psychology (at a time) or a decision.
(3)	The basic responsibility-maker is not a psychology.
(4)	The basic responsibility-maker is not a decision.
(5)	Hence, no one is morally responsible.

Part Two: The Impossibility Argument Explains Other Skeptical Arguments

Another way to see the force of our argument is that the lack of a responsibility-foundation explains other plausible arguments against moral responsibility. One argument put forth by Galen Strawson and Robert Kane is that if someone is morally responsible, then he made an infinite number of decisions or a self-forming decision.¹⁰ But, Strawson and Kane contend, no one can make an infinite number of decisions. This is because a person only exists in time, and if a person had a first moment in time, then he would exist for, and only for, increasingly large *finite* periods of time. This is similar to the way in which if someone were to start counting numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, ..., he would never reach infinity because there would always be one more counting number. Hence, however old one might be (excluding infinity, which we address in the next paragraph), it would still be true that they did not make an infinite number of decisions.

Even if a person could make an infinite number of decisions, he would still need a responsibility-foundation to make him morally responsible. Consider again the analogy of an infinite number of extrinsically valuable goods. This is impossible if there is no intrinsically valuable good that can add value into the system. There is no such foundation. Similarly, there cannot be an infinite number of inferentially justified beliefs if there is no basic justified belief. There might be a justification-foundation or –circle, but not an infinite sequence because nothing would add justification into the system. In our view, this would also prevent there from being a

justification-circle (pure coherentism), but our argument need not rest on this claim because there is no plausible responsibility-making circle.¹¹

But Kane and Strawson depart at this point, the former arguing that self-forming actions are the out for the defender of responsibility.¹² However, one cannot make an initial self-forming decision in which the decider is responsible for the decision or what immediately follows from it. The reason is that such a decision would have to be similar to an epistemically foundational belief. An epistemically foundational belief is self-justified, or justified but not on the basis of another justifier. Even if a self-justified belief can occur, there cannot be a parallel basic responsibility-maker. That is, there is no responsibility-maker that makes itself responsible or is made responsible by something that is not a responsibility-maker (for example, a psychology or decision).

The above argument shows that the most plausible candidates for a basic responsibility-maker fail. Intuitively, it is hard to see if a psychology or decision is not itself a basic responsibility-maker, how it can make a person responsible for another thing (specifically, a subsequent psychology or decision). This explains why responsibility does not depend on an infinite sequence of decisions or a self-forming decision (or act).

Consider next Derk Pereboom's four-case argument against compatibilism.¹³ What makes the argument work is that a person is not morally responsible for manipulated thoughts and yet if the manipulation were to go from one determinist form (neural manipulation) to another determinist form (conditioning), it makes no difference to whether the manipulated individual is responsible. Similarly, switching from one determinist type of conditioning to another (intentional versus unintentional conditioning) makes no difference to responsibility if the two types of conditioning act on an individual in the same way. The reason there is no

difference is that the types of determinist manipulation and conditioning do not differ in whether they undermine or override the basic responsibility-maker. There is no such maker.

Consider next the akrasia-negligence pincer seen in part or whole in the work of Neil Levy, Gideon Rosen, and Michael Zimmerman.¹⁴ This argument runs as follows: If someone is morally responsible with a negative valence, then he is blameworthy. If someone is blameworthy, then he is blameworthy on the basis of akrasia or negligence. That is, either he knows what he is doing is wrong, bad, or imprudent and, thus, judges that all things considered he ought not do it or he does not have such knowledge and makes no such judgment.

If he knows what he is doing and, thus, judges that all things considered he ought not do it, then one of three things is true. He cannot make himself act in accord with his all-things-considered judgment, he can make himself act in accord with this judgment but does not know how to do so, or he can make himself act in accord with this judgment but chooses not to do so (or, perhaps, wills not to do so). The first prong of the trilemma (lack of control) cannot ground blameworthiness. The second prong is an instance of negligence not akrasia. The third prong makes it mysterious why a person would not choose to act in accord with his all-things-considered judgment. Such a choice would involve theoretical or practical irrationality. Such irrationality cannot make someone blameworthy.

Nor does basic blameworthiness rest on ignorance. A person is ignorant about something if he lacks a belief about it. It is intuitively hard to see how a person might be fundamentally blameworthy for lacking a belief. Intuitively, he might be responsible for lacking a belief *because* he did something blameworthy earlier (for example, he decided not to perform due diligence or not to make himself into a certain sort of person). Such *derivative* blameworthiness is not relevant here.

If a person knows what is wrong, bad, or imprudent, but does not judge it worthy of avoiding, the negligence-problem reappears. Either he knows that something wrong, bad, or imprudent is to be judged as something that all things considered should be avoided or he does not. If he does know and does not so judge it, we are back to asking whether he is unable to do so, able but does not know how to do so, or able and knows how do so but chooses not to do it. That is, we are back to the problem of understanding responsibility for akrasia.

What explains why the akrasia-negligence pincer works is that neither akrasia nor negligence is a basic responsibility-maker. Nor is either one closely linked to such a maker. As a result, neither prong will get us to something that would constitute or justify basic responsibility with a negative valence.

Consider last responsibility internalism. This is discussed in work such as that by Al Mele, Michael McKenna, Ishtiyaque Haji, and Stefan Cuypers.¹⁵ The concern here is that there is good reason to believe the responsibility-internalism is true. Responsibility-internalism asserts that a person is responsible for, and only for, intrinsic events (or states). This is because a person only directly controls internal events alone and only such events have a sufficiently close connection to their psychology. Consider, for example, one's beliefs, desires, and intentions. Intuitively, a person is responsible for, and only for, that which he directly controls and which directly flows from his psychology. Anything else he seems to be responsible for is inherited from his responsibility for the things to which he is directly connected. If nothing is added in this inheritance, the responsibility is limited to the intrinsic events.

If responsibility-internalism is true, then responsibility is limited to intrinsic events. Specifically, it is limited to a decision in a particular space and time or, perhaps, a psychology that is similarly limited. Let us focus on a decision. On this theory, a person is responsible for,

and only for, what goes on in his head at the time he decides something. If responsibility is so limited, then it is counterintuitive. A person would not be responsible for adultery, battery, murder, theft, etc. Rather, he is responsible for deciding to do these things or, perhaps, willing to do them. This suggests that our intuitive picture of responsibility has little connection to laypeople's responsibility-judgments. The striking divergence suggests that our confidence in moral responsibility is misplaced. The responsibility-foundation argument explains why. That our intuitions systematically focus on things for which we are not responsible is less surprising when we realize there is nothing that they might focus on for which we are responsible.

In the context of libertarian views of moral responsibility, the lack of a responsibility-foundation explains why even if the libertarian could provide a contrastive explanation for why a person does one act rather than another, this would still not provide a basic responsibility-maker. Similarly, the luck and disappearing-agent objections are beside the point because neither they nor the purported solutions to them get us closer to there being such a maker.

Here is a summary of the impossibility arguments and how the responsibility-foundation relates to other arguments.

Skeptical Argument	How the Responsibility-Foundation Relates to the Argument
Infinite-decision argument 1. If a person is responsible, then he made an infinite number of decisions. 2. No one does so.	The suggested need for an infinite number of decisions is an attempt, albeit an unsuccessful one, to provide a basic responsibility-maker.
Self-forming-act argument 1. If a person is morally responsible, then he performed a self-forming act. 2. No one does so.	This succeeds because a self-forming decision (or act) is not a basic responsibility-maker.
Akrasia-Negligence Pincer 1. If a person is blameworthy, then she is non-derivatively blameworthy for akrasia or negligence.	This succeeds because neither akrasia nor negligence are basic blameworthiness-makers. Nor do they inherit blameworthiness from another such maker.

2. No one is non-derivatively blameworthy for either one.	
Responsibility-Internalism 1. The evidence that people are morally responsible largely rests on our intuitions that they are responsible for their acts and the consequences they bring about. 2. If 1, then people are probably not morally responsible.	Our intuitions are systematically mistaken because they direct us away from the most plausible candidates for a basic responsibility-maker.

Part Three: Conclusion

Contrary to Clarke, Fischer, Hartman, Istvan, Kment, and other people who have attacked the impossibility thesis, responsibility is impossible because there is no responsibility-maker and there needs to be one if people are morally responsible. The two most plausible candidates, psychology and decision, fail. A person is not responsible for an unchosen psychology or a psychology that was chosen when the person is not responsible for the choice. This can be seen in intuitions about instantly-created and manipulated people. This result is further supported by the notion that, in general, the right, the good, and virtue rest on the exercise of a capacity rather than the capacity itself. It is also supported by the notion that negligence is not a responsibility-maker.

A person is not responsible for a choice that does not reflect his psychology or that does reflect it when he is not responsible for the psychology. This can be seen by considering intuitions regarding acts that are unconnected or arbitrarily connected to a person's psychology. It can also be seen intuitions about acts that result from a manipulated psychology. The problem with choice as a foundation can be further seen in that an infinite or self-created person would not be responsible despite these superhuman choice-related features.

The lack of a responsibility-maker is independent of the debates over compatibilism, derivative responsibility, determinism, moral luck, the nature of free will, the principle of

alternative possibilities, and so on. The above argument rests on the notion that similar to how extrinsic value depends on intrinsic value, responsibility depends on a basic responsibility-maker. Sadly, there's no such maker.¹⁶

¹ See Galen Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," *Philosophical Studies* 75 (1994): 5-24.

² See Robert Hartman, "Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 4 (2018): 165-183.

³ For a character-based criticism of Strawson's argument, see John Martin Fischer, *Deep Control: Essays on Free Will and Value* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 171-172. For the character-based theory underlying it, see where Fischer develops the notion of 'guidance control' in John Martin Fischer, *The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, *Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), John Martin Fischer, *My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), and John Martin Fischer, *Our Stories: Essays of Life, Death, and Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). A similar argument that responsibility for a choice must depend on at least some responsibility for a character state can be seen in Derk Pereboom, *Living without free will* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 66-68. For a helpful discussion of this issue, see Michael Anthony Istvan Jr., "Concerning the resilience of Galen Strawson's Basic Argument," *Philosophical Studies* 155 (2011): 399-420, and Boris Kment, "Free Will and Ultimate Explanation," *Philosophical Issues* 27 (2017): 114-130.

For the notion that a person is responsible for something because it expresses her evaluative judgments, that is, expresses her real self, see, for example: Angela Smith, "Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment," *Philosophical Studies* 138 (2008): 367-392; Angela Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life," *Ethics* 115 (2005): 236-271; Matthew Talbert, "Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy?" *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89 (2008): 516-535.

⁴ By analogy, consider a basic intrinsic-value state. This is the minimal property or properties that makes something intrinsically valuable. See Fred Feldman, "Basic Intrinsic Value," *Philosophical Studies* 99 (2000): 319-346.

⁵ For a discussion of instant creation cases, Alfred Mele, "Moral responsibility and agents' histories," *Philosophical Studies* 142 (2009): 161-181; Alfred Mele, "Moral responsibility and history revisited," *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 12 (2009): 463-475; Michael McKenna, "Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers," *Philosophical Issues* 22 (2012): 264-280; Michael McKenna, "Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism," *The Journal of Ethics* 16 (2012): 145-174; Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers, "Magical agents, global induction, and the internalism/externalism debate," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 85 (2007): 343-371; Michael McKenna, "Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents," *Philosophical Topics* 32 (2005): 169-192.

For related defenses of nonhistoricism, according to which instant beings could be morally responsible, see Matthew Talbert, "Implanted desires, self-formation and blame,"

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 3 (2009): 1-18; Kyla Ebels-Duggen, "Dealing with the past: Responsibility and personal history," *Philosophical Studies* 164 (2013): 141-161; and Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder, *In Praise of Desire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, Ch. 7, esp. 169-171).

⁶ For the four case manipulation argument, see Derk Pereboom, *Living without Free Will* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 110-117. For the most recent version, see Derk Pereboom, *Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 74-82. For a further defense of the force of manipulation arguments, see Patrick Todd, "A new approach to manipulation arguments," *Philosophical Studies* 152 (2011): 127-133. For some objections to the manipulation arguments, see Alfred Mele, "A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four Case Argument' for Compatibilism," *Analysis* 65 (2005): 75-80; Matt King, "The problem with manipulation," *Ethics* 124 (2013): 1-19; Hannah Tierney, "How best to handle the modified manipulation argument," *Philosophical Studies* 165 (2013): 753-763; and Michael McKenna, "A hard-line reply to Pereboom's four-case manipulation argument," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 77 (2008): 142-159.

⁷ For the notion that people are not originally responsible for negligence, see Gideon Rosen, "Skepticism about Moral Responsibility," *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (2004): 295-313; Gideon Rosen, "Culpability and Ignorance," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, CIII: Part 1; Gideon Rosen, "Skepticism about Moral Responsibility," *Philosophical Perspectives* 18 (2004): 295-313; Gideon Rosen, "Kleinbart the Oblivious and Other Tales of Ignorance and Responsibility," *Journal of Philosophy* 105 (2008): 591-610. For criticisms of Rosen's argument, see William FitzPatrick, "Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance: Answering a New Skeptical Challenge," *Ethics* 118 (2008): 589-613; Alexander Guerrero, "Don't Know, Don't Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution," *Philosophical Studies* 136 (2007): 59-97; Neil Levy, *Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will & Moral Responsibility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Michael Zimmerman, "Negligence and Moral Responsibility," *Nous* 20:2 (1986): 199-218.

⁸ See Robert Kane, *The Significance of Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), esp. ch. 5 and Robert Kane, "Responses to Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 60 (2000): 157-167. For other choice-related objections to the Strawson argument, see Randolphe Clarke, "On the Possibility of Rational Free Action," *Philosophical Studies* 88 (1997): 37-57, Randolph Clarke, "On an Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* XXIX (2005): 13-24, Chris Tucker, "Agent Causation and the Alleged Impossibility of Rational Free Action," *Erkenntnis* 67 (2007): 17-27, and Alfred Mele, *Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 223-225.

⁹ The idea for this example, comes from Chuck Norris Facts, <http://www.chucknorrisfacts.com/>, April 22, 2014.

¹⁰ See Strawson, "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility," 5-24 and Kane, *The Significance of Free Will*.

¹¹ But for a contrary view that metaphysical facts about the agent and social (or, perhaps, pragmatic or "Strawsonian") facts about responsibility practices can mutually ground responsibility in a kind of bootstrapping way, see Michael McKenna, *Conversation and Responsibility* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

¹² See Kane, *The Significance of Free Will*, especially pp. 74-78.

¹³ See Derk Pereboom, “Determinism Al Dente,” *Nous* 29 (1995): 21-45. See note 6 for further references on the four-case argument.

¹⁴ For responsibility for akrasia, see Levy, *Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will & Moral Responsibility*. For responsibility for negligence, see note 7.

¹⁵ See note 5.

¹⁶ We are grateful to [], [], [], and the [] conference for the extremely helpful comments and criticisms of this paper.