**Multidimensionalism, resistance, and the demographic problem**

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**ABSTRACT**

Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a ‘demographic problem’. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of *explanatory pluralism* that, following Quassim Cassam, I call *multidimensionalism*. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing those involving vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural-explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually enhancing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better.

**KEYWORDS**

explanation, pluralism, structures, vices, women in philosophy

1. **Introduction.**

In her 2012 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, Linda Martín Alcoff commented on the enduring reality that the discipline of academic philosophy is ‘demographically challenged’ (Alcoff 2013). A complex and entrenched system of factors – social and interpersonal, historical and structural – conspires to artificially exclude certain social groups from entering and advancing through the profession, while, at the same time, disproportionately encouraging and facilitating the entry and ascent of those in other social groups: call this the *demographic problem*. Over the last few decades, our understanding of the causes, extent, and effects of our demographically challenged discipline has improved, thanks to careful empirical and theoretical work (see, e.g., Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius 2012, Thompson et al 2016). To take just one example, a recent report by the British Philosophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy-UK, found that, of permanent academic philosophy staff in the UK, men were 68% of lecturers, 70% of senior lecturers, 79% of readers and 75% of professors (Beebee and Saul 2021: 6). Such systematic studies are also accompanied by testimonies, informal discussions, and other opportunities for reportage, reflection, and debate (Alcoff 2003, Hutchinson and Jenkins 2013). The ultimate goal of all this is *amelioration*: taking practical measures to address the demographic problem in genuine and substantive ways.

 A significant obstacle to realisation that ideal is the fact that attempts to understand and respond to the demographic problem often encounter *resistance*. Sometimes, resistance reflects sincere and reasonable concerns; in other cases, resistance reflects the procedural concern that proposed explanations of the problems and practical solutions to them ought to be carefully assessed before being endorsed. Of course, sometimes such putative good-faith concerns are disguises. I think some resistance is principled, well-motivated, and reasonable in the sense of being responsive to evidence and persuasion. In those cases, the resistance is constructive and valuable. Often, though, the resistance either tends or intends to obstruct or delay or weaken efforts to understand and respond to the demographically challenged state of the discipline. It is these cases of *bad resistance* that are my concern in this paper. It is true that even bad resistance can sometimes have good effects; however, bad resistance will not bring about good effects systematically – which, to anticipate a later theme, is why lots of bad resistance involves various vices (cf. Cassam 2019, 11-12).

 The main aim of this paper is to defend a form of *explanatory pluralism* that I will call *multidimensionalism*. It is an epistemological claim: resistance to the demographic problem can, and often should, be explained using different kinds of explanation. This includes explanations in terms of vices and structures. I distinguish four general reasons for resistance – which also serve to *sustain* and *rationalise* resistance – and argue they often reflect a variety of epistemic vices, and then show that such vice-explanations for resistance are compatible with structural explanations. At the end of the paper, I add a stronger claim: vice explanations and structural explanations are mutually supporting in the sense that each is at its most effective when allied to the other, and indeed to other kinds of explanation. There is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations when we can and should combine them: using both together is better.

1. **Explanatory pluralism.**

Resistance to the demographic problem can take different forms. It can mean denying the reality and extent of the problem. It can mean questioning its scale of severity. It can mean bad-faith questioning of proposed causes and sustaining factors. It can mean trying to delay or dispute or otherwise undermine attempts to do something practical about the demographic problem. It can also mean trying to make it harder for people to do the epistemic, social, and practical work of understanding, planning, and acting (more on this in section 3). How could we make sense of the phenomenon of resistance?

 One option is to focus on the resistant individuals and to scrutinise their motivations, goals, outlooks, ideologies, and strategies. We could investigate their character or ‘mindsets’, assess how they use their power and resources to enact their resistance, and perhaps criticise or condemn them. Call these *individual explanations*. Critics standardly resist or reject them on several counts – as, for instance, too moralistic, as distractions from structural realities, as too tied up with unhelpful concepts and practices such as blaming and shaming, and so on (cf. Dillon 2012: 89-90). If one dislikes individual-level explanations, another explanatory option is to focus on *structures*, where the focus is on institutional and social structures and not on individual agents (see, for an influential example, Haslanger 2015). Of course, one can also employ one or the other style of explanation, while maintaining that one of the still enjoys priority over the other. Of course, there are other kinds of explanation, too.

 I want to endorse a thoroughgoing *multidimensional* *explanatory pluralism* when it comes to resistance to the demographic problem. Given the complexity of human life, we should keep open our explanatory options: otherwise, we risk inadvertently drifting into explanatory myopia. Our explanations are myopic when they lack relevant kinds of *depth* or *breadth*. Explanations are too shallow when they fail to attend to relevant levels of explanation. Explanations are too narrow when they exclude a wider range of explanatory factors. Alternatively, one could be myopic in recognising a properly deep and broad range of explanatory factors, but also exaggerate or understate their significance. Think of the criticism that evolutionary psychology overstates the significance of earlier stages of human evolution in its accounts of contemporary human life and practice (see Dupré 2001 and Rose and Rose 2000). While no-one doubts the importance of our evolutionary history, one can doubt whether reference to it can furnish a full explanation of contemporary human conduct.

Explanatory myopia might seem convenient and attractive, but it also usually entails epistemic and practical risks. It is also important to distinguish *explanatory myopia* from *explanatory monism*: the myopic fail to see, or see the relevance of, important explanatory possibilities whereas the explanatory monist has made a reasoned judgment to use a single kind of explanatory in a given situation. Explanatory myopia is an epistemic failing, whereas explanatory monism is at least in principle defensible. In some cases, monism could also be sensible: our explanatory aims can sometimes be satisfied by using one kind of explanation. Even in those cases, however, one should *end up* as a monist in that particular case, meaning that one should start off with a plurality of explanatory options.

 Consider, as an exemplary instance of multidimensionalism, the account of human epistemic failings offered by the vice epistemologist Quassim Cassam in his book *Vices of the Mind* (Cassam 2019). The book aims to explore the nature, identify, and significance of epistemic vices, defined by Cassam as attitudes, dispositions, and ways of thinking that tend systematically to obstruct the gaining, keeping, and sharing of knowledge: this is the core of what he calls *obstructivism* (cf. Cassam 2019, ch.1). Despite the title and general aims of the book, though, Cassam’s own discussion is explicitly pluralistic. Across its case studies, there is a constant emphasis on the variety of ways of explaining cases of bad epistemic conduct and also a careful emphasis on the variable relevance of epistemic vices across those cases. One vice of vice epistemology is to see everything in terms of epistemic vices, which would be an ironic kind of vice-centric explanatory myopia. Cassam is clear that vice epistemology is not at all committed to explaining any and all instances of bad epistemic conduct in terms of epistemic vices. Instead, the vice epistemologist is alert to at least the following other kinds of explanation (cf. Cassam 2019, 23-27):

* Cognitive-explanations: explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to sub-personal cognitive biases, such as implicit biases and confirmation biases (see Holroyd 2020).
* Vice-explanations: explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to personal-level epistemic vices, understood as failings of epistemic character (see Battaly 2014, Cassam 2019).
* Situational explanations: explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to specific contingent situational factors, of the sort seen in situationist challenges to claims about virtues and vices (Alfano 2013).
* Structural explanations: explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to the constraints and incentives and practical possibilities built into social structures (see Haslanger 2015).

Four kinds of explanation is already very pluralistic. We could also add other kinds, too, like interpersonal explanations that explain bad epistemic conduct in terms of the problematic relationships between individuals. We can also distinguish sub-variants of these kinds of explanations and combine them in all sorts of complicated ways. What we end up with is an explanatory methodology which is appropriately multidimensional.

 If this is right, then talk of having to choose between individual or structural kinds of explanation involve a false contrast. Given the diversity of cases, there are lots of options for us to assess. In some cases, vices do all the explanatory work. In other cases, vices and a set of situational factors are needed. In yet other cases, vices and situations and structures offer a satisfying explanatory account – and so on. Cassam emphasises the particularist character of his brand of multidimensionalism:

[T]he intermingling of structural and personal factors points to the possibility of a limited rapprochement between vice explanations and structural or systemic explanations. The idea would be to recognize a sliding scale of outcomes. At one end are outcomes that can only adequately be understood in structural terms. Social inequality is an excellent example. At the other extreme are outcomes that can only be adequately understood in vice terms. In the middle are many outcomes that have to be understood partly in structural terms and partly by reference to the epistemic vices and other personal qualities of designated actors. (Cassam 2019, 51-52)

We can more formally articulate Cassam’s explanatory multidimensionalism in terms of six closely related convictions:

1. there is a plurality of explanatory styles for human behaviour
2. explanatory sufficiency in any given case may require one or more kinds of explanation
3. the degree of priority given to kinds of explanation can vary across cases
4. we should not prejudge which kinds of explanatory style are relevant in advance of a specific case
5. we should not prejudge the priority of any style in advance of any specific case
6. the use of different explanatory styles in one case does not commit one to any similar explanatory pluralism in other cases. Being a pluralist in case 1 does not commit us to pluralism in case 2.

In practice, which kinds of explanation we need to use in a given case will likely depend on the details of the case, our explanatory aims, and the time and resources available to us. This means we should also be alert to any methodological prejudices that may interfere with our assessment of certain kinds of explanation. Explanatory myopia is often motivated myopia. Cassam sensibly argues that the best way to test the adequacy of our explanations is to look at how well they fit the evidence and then debate with advocates of rival explanations. One of his case studies is former US Secretary of State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, who took a central role in directing the invasion and occupation of Iraq following 9/11. Cassam argues that the available evidence suggests that explaining Rumsfeld’s repeated bad decisions needs reference to both his own character failings – his vices – and wider structural features of the American military-political establishment (cf. Cassam 2019, 24-26ff).

 With this account of multidimensionalism in place, I now turn to the phenomenon of resistance to the demographic problem. Before I do, though, note that my discussion is only on the explanation of resistant attitudes and behaviours, rather than engaging issues of blame and responsibility; those are live issues in vice epistemology and are obviously important to our understanding of resisters and our decisions about how to respond to them (cf. Battaly 2019, Cassam 2019, ch. 6). However, they are a task for another time. Suffice to say, I think resistance is a bad thing and some of the reasons why will become clear once we look closer at kinds of resistance.

1. **Resistance.**

By ‘resistance’, I refer to attitudes, assumptions, actions, and patterns of behaviour that tend or intend to resist attempts to understand and respond to the demographic problem. We can roughly distinguish two aspects. Epistemic resistance involves denying, doubting, distorting or otherwise resisting knowledge and understanding of its reality, extent, scale, causes, and negative effects. This could be indirect, such as refusing opportunities to learn, or direct, like spuriously disputing empirical data or bluntly rejecting salient evidence. Practical resistance involves trying to prevent, delay, dilute, or otherwise undermine the implementation, scope, efficacy, and sustainability of any practical responses. In some cases, practical resistance involves aggressive treatment of those calling for or engaging in the epistemic and practical work of understanding and action (for a fuller account of resistance, see Kidd 2018). In most cases, epistemic and practical kinds of resistance form a tight set.

 Here are some specific examples of resistant attitudes and behaviours:

* A colleague teaches a module called Moral Philosophy. It gives two weeks to ten moral philosophers, all of them white, male, and Western. Colleagues suggest the module could and should be diversified and suggestions are made. The colleague responds by renaming the module Western Moral Philosophy and adds several women philosophers to the Suggested Further Reading. The module remains all white, all male, and all Western. When this is pointed out, the colleague angrily lambasts what they see as ‘unprofessional interference’ in their module.
* A group of colleagues starts an informal EDI group within their Department. The group starts to write reports and issue recommendations, but these are all ignored because they are not a formalised committee. The Head of Department refuses to grant committee status or to provide workload allowances for the work the group does. Several other senior colleagues argue that the Department does not need an EDI group because such problems only occur in *other* departments, not this one, and refuse to grant time in a department meeting to read and discuss the group’s reports, which document in rich detail the problems in the department. A request to discuss these reports at a future meeting is repeatedly refused. Under pressure, the Head finally adds the report to the agenda of the next meeting; however, it is the last item on an already over-long agenda and no time is assigned for debate.

 The phenomenon of resistance to the demographic problem is complex. The range of resistant attitudes and behaviours is diverse, at the individual and interpersonal levels. There are complicated situational and structural dimensions to resistant behaviours. There are roles for systems of power, hierarchies of prestige, and metaphilosophical preconceptions. This means that resistance is also a historically and socially dynamic phenomenon. It takes quite different forms across time. Institutions can *enable* or *obstruct* different kinds of resistance. Moreover, resistant behaviours in the profession of academic philosophy relate in various ways to wider social and cultural trends and developments. Still, emphasis on complexity is consistent with identifying certain general *reasons for resistance*, ones that seem recurrent across a range of cases in different institutional contexts. Such reasons do different sorts of work: they can *motivate* or *explain* or *rationalise* resistance to oneself or others. What we can work towards is an account of general reasons for resistance that avoids the opposing risks of over-generalisation and hyper-particularism.

 In the remainder of this section, I describe four – ignorance, conservatism, pride, and hostility – then in the following section argue that they often express certain epistemic vices.

**Ignorance.**

Individual resistance is often sustained by kinds of ignorance. Of course, ignorance is a very complex phenomena—one should, for instance, ask whether it is active, genuine, motivated, and whether and to what extent its causes as individual, interpersonal, or structural. There is also a variety of kinds of ignorance that can be relevant to resistance. A resister might be and want to remain ignorant about the existence of the demographic problem, of its causes, or its scope, or its negative effects, or some combination of these. Ignorance can lead one to deny the demographic problem, or underappreciate its scale or severity, or to misidentify or to misunderstand the factors causing and sustaining it, and so on. Ignorance can manifest in all sorts of ways, too, ranging from utter obliviousness to the problem, to scepticism about the claims made about it, to untenable optimism about its solubility, to a preference for cosier or more comforting explanations of the issues in question, among others. In effect, ignorance of the demographic problem can lead one to refuse it the effort, attention, or urgency it needs.

 We can taxonomize the kinds of ignorance displayed by a resister in different ways. Annette Martîn, for instance, distinguishes (a) wilful ignorance as motivated by implicit or explicit desires to protect one’s psychological interests and/or protect the benefits of their ignorance and (b) cognitivist views which explains ignorance in terms of faulty reasoning or cognitive errors and (c) structuralist views that see ignorance as systematically arising from one’s active participation in unjust social structural processes (Martîn 2021). These describe kinds of ignorance in terms of their nature or source; another option is to distinguish kinds of ignorance in terms of their object, in terms of what it is one is ignorant of, which can be connected to the sorts of views described by Martîn.

 In the case of resistance to the demographic problem, we can distinguish three main objects of ignorance. Empirical ignorance involves ignorance of the demographic problem – the fact of it, its causes, its epistemic costs to philosophy, its moral costs to philosophers, the historical and social structures that generate social exclusion and marginalisation, and so on. An empirically ignorant resister, in a sense, really does not know what is going on out there, and so lacks the empirical warrant for the practical reforms that to them seem both needless and costly. Some ignorance, of course, will be feigned or faked, and here we see a way for ignorance to encourage the development and exercise of epistemic vices (Mason and Wilson 2017). Such empirical ignorance can, but need not, be wilful: a wilfully ignorance resister might avoid relevant evidence or refuse to acquire interpretive resources or refuse to consider relevant issues or might inhabit an environment that fails to supply those epistemic resources (Martîn 2021, §3).

Psychological ignorance involves ignorance of aspects of human psychology that are relevant to understanding and responding to the demographic problem. Some of the obvious examples include implicit biases, stereotype threat, confirmation bias, and other features of our minds which are related explanatorily to the demographic problem in philosophy (see Brownstein and Saul 2016, Saul 2016). Of course, there are philosophical and empirical criticisms of some of this work and some activists may have made exaggerated claims on its behalf. Moreover, universities often treat psychologically-based interventions phenomena as ‘magic bullets’, as if a little implicit bias training is all one needs to deal with these problems. Still, one ought to appreciate that ignorance of various aspects of our psychology can sustain aspects of the demographic problem. The confident faith that ‘I don’t discriminate against women!’ is both psychologically naïve and practically obstructive: a resister needs to know something about the psychology of bias if they are to grasp certain aspects of the demographic problem.

 We should also think in terms of conceptual ignorance, the lack of the concepts and ideas needed to identify and articulate the origins, realities, and effects of the demographic problem. Such concepts include ‘leaky pipeline’, ‘microaggression’, ‘structural racism’, and ‘active ignorance’, to name but a few, which if used properly can help us make sense of the data and testimonies and psychological research about the demographic problem. Without an adequate conceptual repertoire, one will find it harder to properly understand and respond to the demographic problem. As any philosopher knows, without the right concepts, certain phenomena cannot be easily identified, certain distinctions cannot be compellingly drawn, certain problems cannot be persuasively articulated, and so on (which explains why certain resisters actively impugn certain concepts and attack those who promote them).

In worst-case scenarios, instances of resistance involve all three kinds of ignorance: there is an abject lack of data and testimonies, psychological understanding, and the concepts needed to make sense of the demographic problem. Ignorance drives epistemically resistant kinds of behaviour which in turn blocks the motivations needed to do anything practically (Kidd 2017, 120ff). In some cases, ignorance is a transitory feature of an individual resister. In other cases, it starts to become an entrenched feature of their outlook. All these diverse possibilities are consistent with psychological, cognitivist, and structural explanations and with the distinctions between active/passive and sincere/sincere kinds of ignorance.

Conservatism.

A second general reason for resistance might be called ‘conservatism’, in the ‘small-c’ sense of a desire to maintain established arrangements which one judges to be favourable relative to one’s own interests. This is not a political or ideological characterisation of resistance: anyone can feel an impulse to conserve existing social or material arrangements which make one’s own life better. It is natural to want to make one’s lot easier, to stick with what one knows, and protect the ways of doing things to which one is already practically and epistemically well-adapted. The conservative impulse is also often very sensible. Much of what we do is good and, therefore, worth protecting and cherishing – that is, conserving (see McPherson 2019). If conservatism reflects a desire to protect and cherish things of value, that is not what I am criticising. In the case of resistance, at least two sorts of conservatism are problematic. One expresses laziness, the other reflects selfishness.

 The lazy conservative wants to prioritise current (bad) practice over new (and better) practices out of a reluctance to do the required work of change. Lazy resisters want to stick to the ways things have always been done, not necessarily because they think they are good, but because they are what they are used to. The work of change involves investments of time and energy and exercises of self-discipline and usually entails sacrifice and disruptions. The lazy resister might recognise a need for change, and even privately admit the work should be done; however, they lack the motivation to actually do it, even as they concede that the costs of their lazy conservatism is the persistence of conditions that are unjust and harmful. Hence the lazy resister tries to avoid doing the work. Sometimes, they also try to persuade others to resist the work and, if they have power, might order others not to act. In other cases, the lazy resister is compelled to start the work, but then becomes a slacker, quitter, or procrastinator (on these varieties of laziness, see Battaly 2020).

 A complication is that many academics are overworked and under-resourced and in their daily working lives subject to multiple proliferating demands. In those cases, what will look like laziness might be a rational response by a time-poor academic (Kidd forthcoming). A second complication is that not all refusals to do work are lazy in a pejorative sense. There are often good reasons to refuse to do certain kinds of work. I might, for instance, want more clarification about the necessity or purpose of what I am being asked to do. Mindless activity is not the opposite of vicious laziness. It can be difficult to determine how we should try and prioritise our energies. José Medina argues that laziness becomes vicious when it tends to be a means to ‘develop and maintain forms of irresponsible ignorance’ which in turn sustain oppressive social conditions (Medina 2012, 145-147). In those cases, conservative laziness becomes integral to ongoing systems of oppression.

 The selfish conservative gives a disproportionate weighting to their own needs and preferences over those of other people, especially concerning preferences and needs that are qualitatively lesser in moral urgency. If I would like the last seat on the tram, but an elderly passenger really needs it, then it is selfish of me to prioritise my comfort over their physical need. Selfishness involves failures to properly acknowledge and respond to the interests and needs of other people, especially those who are vulnerable relative to us in certain ways. The varieties of conservative resistance to the demographic problem often reflect kinds of selfish self-prioritising. The conservative resister sees that current arrangements favour them, but in ways that are unwarranted and also come at the cost of others’ interests and needs; they will therefore decide to try and conserve those arrangements. Selfish conservatism is often most visible when it comes to competition for finite goods, such as attention, publicity, invitations to contribute to edited volumes or speak at conferences, prizes, and offers of fellowships or jobs. Many selfish conservative resisters may also have morally nobler motivations, but they consistently allow them to be overmastered by their self-prioritising tendencies. ‘I want to keep what is good for me, even if it is bad for you’ is the motto of the selfish conservative. In this sense, the conservative resister is importantly different from the ignorant resister: the conservative resister generally has at least some knowledge and understanding of the reality and sources of the demographic problem. Sometimes this understanding might be tacit, but they would not be a good conservative if they were very ignorant.

Pride.

A third general kind of resistance involves a sense that acknowledging and responding to the demographic problem would be an affront to one’s own pride – to one’s moral character or intellectual integrity or professional competence. Pride is not in itself a bad thing, of course. We should distinguish virtuous and vicious forms of pride and confine our criticisms to the latter (cf. Tanesini 2018; 2021, ch.4). In the case of the demographic problem, one way that members of underrepresented groups are harmed is by having their pride impugned. A key dimension of the demographic problem is the fact that certain kinds of people have their own pride encouraged and scaffolded by features of the profession, while others find theirs eroded or denied. In the case of proud resistance, however, an individual engages in resistant behaviours because they feel that their own pride is at risk of being compromised; they take talk of structural inequalities as an insult to their achievements, for instance, or hear talk of implicit bias as an affront to their intellectual self-image.

 We can distinguish two aspects of proud resister – personal and global. By personal pride, I mean that invested in one’s self-conception of one’s abilities, capacities, intellectual and moral character, or professional identity. Imagine a proud resister who takes great pride in the image of themselves as a noble member of an intellectual elite – as a superior rational agency, objective and impartial, who has transcended the prejudices of subjectivity and is possessed of an ineffable natural brilliance that eludes the hoi polloi. Such a self-consciously proud philosopher will naturally find that self-conception challenged by many of the themes germane to the demographic problem. Perhaps their confidence in their natural brilliance is dented by work on the gendered character of attributions of brilliance. Perhaps their sense of their immunity to bias gets disturbed by work on the ubiquity of implicit biases across the human population. Since such experiences are disquieting, this philosopher can start to resist acknowledging and acting on the demographic problem. For them, defending their personal pride means going on the offensive.

 We can also think in terms of global pride, where the object of the pride is not our own achievements, abilities, or status, but rather the wider traditions or projects of enquiry, our participation in which is felt to confer a sense of pride. In the case of philosophy, a main object of global pride will be certain conceptions of the nature and value of philosophy. Our convictions about the essence of our subject will inflect our sense of the meaningfulness and worthiness of our own activities as a philosopher. ‘Our identity and dignity depend on what you are breaking down’, as one proud resister once shouted at me, after I made some rather general remarks about challenging entrenched misogynistic conceptions of philosophy, of a sort familiar in feminist historiography of philosophy (see, for instance, Lloyd 1984). For that proud resister, his sense of vocational pride and purpose was rooted in a conception of philosophy as a rational enterprise that was intrinsically insulated from contingent social or cultural biases. In such cases, resistant attitudes and behaviours are directed at anticipated or actual attacks on their conceptions of the nature and value of philosophy, which in turn will often inflect their own self-conceptions as philosophers.

*Hostility*.

The final general reason for resistance I will mention is diplomatically labelled ‘*hostility*’. It involves forms of resistance motivated by kinds of hostility towards specific persons, social groups, or intellectual communities or traditions. ‘Hostility’ can include anger, contempt, or other negative evaluative attitudes and can manifest in behaviours such as derogation, scorn, mockery, ridicule, exclusion, violence and other kinds of epistemically and practically hostile behaviour. Specific kinds of hostile resistance include sexism and racism, cultural chauvinism, and other kinds of socially or intellectually targeted hostilities. These kinds of hostile resisters are resistant because they are opposed to the interests and flourishing of the persons, social groups, and traditions in question. Hostiles are resistant because they want to cause harm to their targets by prolonging and expanding their exclusion and marginalisation and to prevent good being done to them. For these reasons, they are actively and intensely opposed to efforts to understand and respond to the demographic problem. Indeed, for these hostile resisters, the demographic situation is not a problem in the sense of something bad to correct. It is the desired outcome they want to retain.

 Hostile resisters display the same variety as the other general reasons for resistance. Depending on their particular prejudices, hostiles might be philosophers who think women ‘cannot do philosophy’, that only white people are capable of philosophising well, that there is ‘no such thing as Asian philosophy’, that religious philosophies are ‘stupid’, that analytic philosophy is ‘dumb and should be ended’, that Continental philosophy is ‘crap jumped-up literary theory’, that the inclusion of LGBTQ+ people has ‘ruined the discipline’, and so on. Obviously forms of hostile resistance are not all morally equal: all are bad, but some are far worse than others. Sexist hostile resistance, for one, involves enduring patterns of violence. It should be clear, too, that hostile resistance reflects a range of causes – psychological and social, historical and political, metaphilosophical and ideological.

When we consider these general reasons for resistance, we can ask how best to explain what causes and sustains the attitudes and behaviours in question. Recalling Cassam’s remarks, an explanation could use individual explanations (cognitive-based or vice-based), situational or interpersonal explanations or structural explanations or some pluralist combination of these. Explanatory preferences vary. Jay Garfield, a distinguished scholar of Buddhist philosophy, prioritises structural explanations of the racism of contemporary US academic philosophy as shown in its resistance to the teaching and research of ‘non-Western’ philosophies:

A social structure can be racist without any individual who participates in it being racist when it serves to establish or to perpetuate a set of practices that systematically denigrate—implicitly or explicitly—people of particular races. Philosophy as it is practiced professionally in much of the world, and in the United States in particular, is racist in precisely this sense (quoted in van Norden 2017, xix).

I agree with this account of structural racism; however, it is consistent with an emphasis on individual-level explanations, too, including those focused on the vices of individual people. As several vice epistemologists have argued, racist practices and structures can be sustained and inflected by individual-level vices such as arrogance and dogmatism (cf. Medina 2012, Tanesini 2020). More generally, racist structures cannot operate and persist within consistent patterns of vicious conduct at the individual and interpersonal levels: this is a theme of Lisa Tessman’s account of the ‘ordinary vices of domination’ which maintain oppressive systems (Tessman 2002, 54-55). If so, vice-explanations and structural explanation are not mutually exclusive.

The challenge is to explain how they can be integrated in the ways suggested by multidimensionalism. How can we think about resistance to the demographic problem in terms of individual vices while also retaining a focus on social structures? Is appealing to vices and structures merely consistent or are there deeper connections between them? These are the questions for the next section.

1. **Resistant vices.**

Resistance is often localised in specific resistant individuals. *They* are the ones who block reforms, raise spurious objections, dilute findings, deny unjust realities, delay taking action, and in other ways engage in epistemic and practical resistance. A striking feature of typical discourse about individual resisters is our use of a vocabulary of vices: resisters are selfish, lazy, dogmatic, condescending, narrowminded, closedminded, contemptuous, indifferent, and cold-hearted. Sometimes we use terms that indirectly evoke vices, such as describing someone who ‘won’t ever budge’ or ‘won’t ever change their mind’ or is an ‘asshole’ or a ‘jerk’. In vice epistemology, these are called *vice-attributions*: we attribute a vice or set of vices to a person in order to describe and explain their conduct (Cassam 2019, 72-73). Some of these vice-attributions are merely rhetorical – a way to vent frustration, for instance – but some have the further purpose of encouraging criticism: these are *vice-charges* (Kidd 2016). As a critical practice, vice-charging faces several problems, so in what follows I will focus on vice-attributions as explanatory ventures: we attribute epistemic vices to help explain the conduct of individual resisters.

 What are epistemic vices? I endorse an expansive account which is both normatively and ontologically pluralistic: epistemic vices can be different *kinds of things* that can be *bad in different ways*. On the normative side, epistemic vices can be bad in at least four senses: an epistemic vice can (a) systematically cause bad epistemic effects, (b) systematically fail to cause good epistemic effects, (c) manifest the presence of bad epistemic motivations or desires, or (d) manifest the absence of good epistemic motivations and desires. Cassam’s *obstructivism* focuses on (a). Options (a) and (b) are endorsed by Heather Battaly in her account of *effects-vices* (Battaly 2014). Ian James Kidd refers to (a) as *productive epistemic vices* and to (b) as *passive epistemic vices* (Kidd 2021, §3). Options (c) and (d) are described by Charlie Crerar, who also notes the possibility of hybrid variants, where an individual both lacks good epistemic motivations *and* also has bad epistemic motivations (Crerar 2018). Tanesini offers the most complex account of motives-vices and she also notes that epistemic vices can have *proximate* and *ultimate* epistemic ends – meaning, in effect, that vicious epistemic motivations can be directed at a range of targets (Tanesini 2021, 115f). We could also endorse further options: we might think that different epistemic vices are bad for different kinds of reasons, that some are effects-vices and some are motives-vices while others are hybrids.

 On the ontological issues, an epistemic vice can be different kinds of things and the search for epistemic vices should therefore be a search for different kinds of things. Cassam has usefully distinguish monist and pluralist accounts of vice-ontology: the *monist* thinks epistemic vices are one kind of thing, such as character traits, whereas a *pluralist* argues that epistemic vice can be different kinds of things (Cassam 2020, §2.2). In practice, the pluralist options are attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking, meaning we have *attitude-vices*, *character-vices*, and *thinking-vices* (see Tanesini 2021, chs. 2-3 and Cassam 2019, chs. 3-4). Attitude-vices are mainly defended by Tanesini using empirical work in attitude psychology. Thinking-vices include wishful thinking and conspiratorial thinking. The historical tendency has been monism given the influence of Aristotle’s own focus on character-vices. Other than the arguments made by Cassam and Tanesini, there are three strategic reasons to be a vice-pluralist when it comes to resistance. First, it seems that resistant behaviour involves attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking and that is better captured by vice-pluralism. Second, if the resistant vices are different kinds of things, then it seems plausible they will be caused and sustained by different factors which need different kinds of corrective responses (see Battaly 2016 and Tanesini 2021, ch.9). Third, narrowing our focus to one kind of epistemic vice creates the risk of missing or misclassifying certain resistant vices.

 The claim we end up with is that resistant behaviours are often expressive of a range of epistemically vicious attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking. Appreciating those epistemic vices is therefore integral to understanding resistance to the demographic problem. Three caveats are needed: (1) the claim is not that individual resistance can be exhaustively explained in terms of epistemic vices, (2) there are moral and perhaps political vices as well as epistemic vices, and (3) vices are not the only kind of individual-level failing, since there are also kinds of culpable ignorance, inadequate cognitive abilities, inadequate interpersonal skills, a narrowness of experience, and other failings. Of course, epistemic vices could play a role in causing and sustaining these other individual failings. Arrogance, for instance, often leads a person to overestimate their abilities and inflate their self-confidence. Such a person is unlikely to work on their cognitive abilities or admit their ignorance or work hard to seek out opportunities for instruction (cf. Medina 2012, §1.1; Tanesini 2020).

 The questions are therefore: what kinds of epistemic vices are plausibly involved in the kind of resistant behaviour described in the last section? What vices of the mind can we see in those patterns of epistemic resistance to the demographic problem? I will describe two vices: (1) *closedmindedness* in the case of ignorant resistance and (2) *epistemic* *malevolence* in the case of hostile resistance. If the examples are well-taken, then resistance of those sorts must be understood at least in part in terms of epistemic vices.

*Ignorance and closedmindedness*.

Ignorant resisters lack certain kinds of knowledge and understanding of different aspects of the demographic problem – its causes, effects, consequences, and so on. In many cases, they also desire to remain ignorant by engaging in kinds of active ignorance: the resister decides that they do not need to know certain things about the demographic problem, or they decide that they need not to know, in order to maintain comfortable ignorances (cf. Mill 2007). This means that certain ignorant resisters start to conduct themselves in ways that reflect the vice of closedmindedness

 According to a recent proposal by Heather Battaly, closed-mindedness is an inability or unwillingness to engage with relevant epistemic options, such as the options to reconsider a belief, adopt a currently neglected investigative method, or consult certain sources (Battaly 2017b, 2018a). Our epistemic lives consistently expose us to epistemic options which call on us to respond to them in various ways – whether to reassess our beliefs about *x*, whether to revise our understanding of *y*, or whether to adopt a different way of thinking about *z*. The closed-minded person fails to respond to these epistemic options in different ways; they may fail to recognise them, fail to acknowledge them, spuriously question their relevance, dismiss them cursorily, derogate those who offer them, and so on (see Battaly 2018a, 262-278 for further elaboration). In most cases, closed-mindedness is patterned: the epistemic options one is closed to are not isolated, but parts of whole integrated ways of knowing and making sense of the world of which the options are components. In the case of the demographic problem, a resister might want to maintain certain naïve conceptions of the realities of the discipline. For this reason, closed-mindedness is often attractive. An epistemically closed world might be stable, definite, and marked by a sense of certainty and the absence of disquieting doubts. We should not pretend that virtuous open-mindedness is wholly attractive: openness to epistemic possibilities is often a source of additional work, anxiety, and doubt which can all complicate our practical endeavours (Baehr 2011, ch. 8; Riggs 2010).

How might ignorant resisters display the patterns of inability and unwillingness that are characteristic of the vice of closedmindedness? Without being comprehensive, they can be closed off to the knowledge offered in testimonies, empirical studies, and other sources of new beliefs about the state of the discipline (such as the stories in Alcoff 2003). They could also be resistant to relevant psychological studies, refusing to engage with them, or adopting a rigid stance of unbudgeable doubt. Their epistemic closure can also involve refusing to use or take seriously necessary concepts and perhaps fortifying their closure by derogating those who offer them – as ‘woke’, ideologically-motivated, or whatever. Closedminded conduct is very diverse and can range from passive forms (such as flat non-responsiveness to evidence) through to more active forms (such as refusing to recognise the relevance of certain kinds of data). Crucially, these closedminded forms of behaviour are made possible by structural conditions—by, for instance, structural failures to circulate kinds of information, or cultures that tolerate certain kinds of ignorance about the demographic realities of the discipline. The motivations of closed-mindedness are also diverse: the ignorant resister may want to sustain a sanguine image of the discipline, or avoid morally salient kinds of knowledge, or work to block the uptake of liberatory concepts, to name but a few. Moreover, there are complex dynamics to interactive closed-mindedness. An ignorant resister is often energetic in their refusals to engage with relevant epistemic options because they are confronted with challenges and counter-objections. For these reasons, closed-mindedness often relies on the cooperative activity of other interpersonal vices, such as aggressiveness and ‘bad faith’.

*Hostility and epistemic malevolence*.

Hostile resisters are resistant because they are hostile to the interests and concerns of certain social groups or intellectual communities. They are not ignorant and might actually be well-informed about the causes of the demographic problem. They may be lazily or selfishly conservative and resent having their pride stung, as well, but those are not their fundamental motivation. The hostile resister is motivated to allow or cause harm to the members of those social and intellectual communities to whom they are opposed. We could attribute a range of epistemic vices to the hostile resister, but a central one will be what Jason Baehr has labelled *epistemic malevolence* (Baehr 2010). In its general sense, *malevolence* refers to opposition to the good as such, which can take personal or impersonal varieties: the malevolent person may be opposed to justice and equality and other goods, or they may be opposed to the good of specific people. Baehr argues that malevolence, in its epistemic and non-epistemic forms, is active and ‘personally deep’: ‘the opposition characteristic of malevolence is “active” … it tends to issue in actual attempts to stop, diminish, undermine, destroy, speak out, or turn others against the good’, and, moreover, this opposition ‘reflects the malevolent person’s fundamental cares and concerns’ and is therefore ‘importantly tied to her self-conception: it is, at least to some extent, what she is about’ (Baehr 2010, 191).

 The vice of epistemic malevolence is an active disposition to oppose the epistemic good and can take personal or impersonal forms. Unlike other epistemic vices, it tends to be esoteric, in the sense that it has been theoretically described but is not currently a feature of our public vocabularies; no-one outside vice epistemology is likely to say of someone, ‘Oh, he’s so epistemically malevolent!’, while most people happily say, ‘He’s so arrogant!’ (cf. Kidd 2021, §3). One important function of vice epistemology, however, is to expand our descriptive and evaluative resources by creating new vice-concepts or renovating older ones that have gone into abeyance: there is no reason to think that our inherited resources for describing and evaluating epistemic character are sufficiently comprehensive. But are there really epistemically malevolent people in the sense described by Baehr?

 Two of the examples of vicious epistemic malevolence offered by Baehr concern cases of oppression. A fictional example is O’Brien in George Orwell’s novel *1984* tortures Winston Smith with the goal of destroying his epistemic autonomy. An historical example is Frederick Douglass’ autobiography, which records the ways his ‘master’ and ‘mistress’ systematically opposed his efforts at epistemic self-development (cf. Baehr 2010, 206-207). These are cases of violent epistemic malevolence which, in Douglass’ case, were continuous with racist social institutions. In his later work, Cassam argues that the ‘doubt-mongering’ of Big Tobacco companies whose profits rely on creating doubt or ignorance about the health, environmental, and social costs of smoking (Cassam 2019, 89ff). We could also add climate denialists who actively intimidate climate scientists in an effort to deter them from doing and communicating research on anthropogenic climate change (Biddle, Kidd, and Leuschner 2017). I think these are plausible cases of personal and impersonal epistemic malevolence: a person or group acts to undermine or destroy the epistemic good by working to destroy and erode the epistemic abilities, self-confidence, and autonomy of their ‘enemies’ or to prevent the formation and acceptance of certain truths about the world. In each case, there are severe moral and practical harms, too.

 Is the hostile resister actively epistemically malevolent in either the personal or the impersonal senses? I think they are by definition *if* what motivates their resistance is a deep desire to oppose the epistemic good of the social groups or intellectual communities against which they feel animus. In this sense, epistemic malevolence is essentially a motives-vices, which should not obscure the importance of their bad epistemic effects; indeed, one could imagine a hostile resister who – out of cunning or cowardice – fails to enact the hostilities which they feel. Consider some examples of epistemically malevolent hostile resistance. In personal cases, the resister wants to oppose the good of specific persons against whom they are prejudiced – women philosophers, gay philosophers, or whomever their pattern of biases and prejudices disclose as an *opponent*. This will often include successful and high-profile philosophers. Epistemically malevolent actions can extend to impugning, insulting, mocking and subjecting philosophical work to weak or fallacious forms of criticism. For this reason, I disagree with Baehr’s remark that it is ‘generally easier … to undermine another person’s moral well-being than it is to undermine her epistemic well-being’ (Baehr 2010, 211). The motivating desire of malevolent actions is to oppose or undermine or destroy the epistemic good of the target.

 Hostile resistance can also be malevolent in more impersonal ways when it comes to the demographic problem. First, by trying to block efforts to understand and respond, one is effectively aiming to perpetuate social and structural conditions that disadvantage members of underrepresented groups. Sustaining a harmful environment is epistemically malevolent, and this is another way that vices interact with structures; the behaviours through which we express certain epistemic vices usually depend on structural conditions. There are ways of ‘doing’ certain vices that are only possible in certain kinds of social environment. Second, hostile resisters want to make it harder for certain social groups and intellectual communities to function and flourish. They could, for instance, want to try to minimise the infrastructural inclusion of certain groups or kinds of philosophy, or promote derogatory social stereotypes and metaphilosophical prejudices, or create institutional conditions that facilitate patterns of epistemic exclusion and violence, and so on. If institutional and disciplinary structures enable such malevolence, then they are *corrupting* in the sense of facilitating the development and exercise of epistemic vices (see section 5).

This list is hardly exhaustive, of course, but a unifying feature of these examples is a desire and determination to oppose the epistemic good of certain individuals, social groups, or intellectual communities. The hostile resister opposes the acknowledgment, recognition, respect, inclusion, teaching, study, and appreciation of what they regard as ‘targets’, where the selection of targets is tied up with invidious social and metaphilosophical prejudices. To see epistemic malevolence at work, one can look at the racist prejudices documented by the Chinese philosophy scholar, Bryan van Norden, in his book *Taking Back Philosophy*. Think of claims that ‘there is no such thing as Chinese philosophy’, that Indian philosophies are all ‘dreamy’ and ‘spiritual’, that philosophy proper is exclusively a European phenomenon, or that even if there *are* ‘non-Western’ philosophies, they must lack the significance or richness of their (obviously superior) Western counterparts (for these and other examples, see van Norden 2017, ch. 1). Insofar as such attitudes and convictions reflect a desire to oppose and undermine interest in, respect for, or appreciation of those philosophical traditions, they are expressively of kinds of epistemic malevolence sustained by racist and culturally chauvinist outlooks. In these cases, the individual-level vice of epistemic malevolence is encouraged, inflected, and sustained by wider structural realities: the vices and structures are intimately related.

1. **Epistemic corruption and multidimensional explanations.**

I think that ignorant resistance and closedmindedness and hostile resistance and epistemic malevolence show us why vice-explanations and structural-explanations can be mutually consistent (call this *weak pluralism*) and mutually entailing (call this the *strong claim*). If we want to understand these kinds of resistance, then we must investigate the individual-level epistemic failings through which they are enacted: one cannot perform active ignorance without exercising the vice of closedmindedness and to oppose the epistemic good of certain social communities and intellectual traditions simply is to be epistemically malevolent. However, vice-explanations are not explanatorily sufficient. We should also look to the structural factors which facilitate and sustain kinds of ignorance and hostility. Our social and institutional environments encourage or tolerate certain kinds of attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking, whether accidentally or by design, and in the case of the demographic problem, these are often vicious.

In effect, such investigations show us that many of the social structures of academic philosophy are *epistemically* *corrupting*, meaning that exposure to them tends ‘to facilitate the development and exercise of epistemic vices’ or the erosion or extirpation of epistemic virtues (Kidd 2022, 96; cf. Kidd 2020). Awareness of the epistemically corrupting tendencies of features of our institutional and social environments necessitates certain kinds of epistemic work, which we can articulate in terms of a kind of *institutional cynicism* (Kidd forthcoming). Processes of epistemic corruption involve dynamical interactions between individual epistemic character, interpersonal interactions, and social structures. This presupposes a conception of epistemic character as, in Robin Dillon’s words, not as static or insulated from social circumstances, but rather as ‘fluid, dynamic … as processive rather than substantive, as capable of stability without being static’ (Dillon 2012, 105). Our moral and epistemic character does not emerge *ex nihilo*, nor does it emerge fully-formed, nor is it incapable of change. On the contrary, individual character and its various components come to be ‘inculcated, nurtured, directed, shaped, and given significance and moral valence as vice or virtue in certain ways in certain kinds of people by social interactions and social institutions and traditions that situate people differentially in power hierarchies’ (Dillon 2012, 104).

A vice epistemologist can therefore interpret the epistemic vices of resisters as the complex products of those individuals interacting with corrupting conditions, influences, pressures, and temptations. Consider the definition of epistemic vice offered by Medina:

[A]n *epistemic vice*: a set of corrupted attitudes and dispositions that get in the way of knowledge […] these epistemic character traits do have a distinctive sociogenesis for subjects who occupy a particular social position. There are epistemic virtues and vices with distinctive lines of social development, and all of us, from our own social positionality, can learn some lessons from an examination of these epistemic character traits and their formation (Medina 2012, 30)

Individual resisters are characterised by epistemic vices which are caused and sustained by a constant and ongoing series of interactions with epistemically corrupting interpersonal and structural conditions. Since corruption is a dynamic process. The individual is not passive or a hostage to fortune: one can recognise and try to resist corrupting influences, respond to the warnings of others about our own subjection to corruption, and engage in kinds of critical self-monitoring and critical monitoring of the social environment. For Medina and other vice epistemologists, then, epistemic vices should not be seen *either* as individual *or* as structural since their ‘sociogenesis’ presupposes a distinction between character vices and structures: *p* and *q* can only causally interact if they are ontologically distinct.

 In the case of resisters, we should seek to explain them in multidimensionalist terms which emphasise personal temperaments, life-experiences, interpersonal relationships, social norms and practices, professional ideals, self-conceptions, and material and structural factors as well as wider metaphilosophical convictions and prejudices. Studying their vices will not be a separate task from studying their structural conditions: the one should call attention to the other and the concept of epistemic corruption can guide those enquiries (cf. Kidd 2020). Into the future, one could investigate the range of potential corruptors which encourage and sustain the variety of resistant epistemic vices. A very short list would include inequalities of power, gendered and racialised conceptions of rationality, agonistic conceptions of philosophical practice, false beliefs in an ineffable and unteachable ‘brilliance’, obsessions with philosophical ‘purity’, and a wider array of discriminatory social and metaphilosophical prejudices and attitudes.[[1]](#footnote-1) We should also note that the viciousness of resisters can also be intensified by the vices of those on the side of the angels, such as zealousness and self-righteousness. If we investigate the epistemically corrupting dimensions of these factors, then we are likely to see the ways that individual-level vices are dynamically related to structural realities in ways that confirm Cassam’s strong pluralist conviction that ‘satisfying explanations of our intellectual conduct are almost certainly going to have to be multidimensional’ (Cassam 2019, 27).

1. **Conclusions.**

The phenomenon of resistance to understanding and responding to the demographic problem requires us to understand resistant attitudes and behaviours. I argued that we should do this using an explanatorily pluralistic methodology. I endorsed *multidimensionalism*: the use of multiple explanatory styles is necessary to a perspicuous explanation of resistance. If so, we need not choose between individual, structural, or other kinds of explanation. In some cases, explanatory monism might be appropriate, but if adopted as a default, it condemns us to explanatory myopia.

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1. Quassim Cassam has described ‘a preoccupation with philosophical purity’ as ‘a type of intellectual extremism’ and one that he ‘deplore[s]’ (Cassam 2022: 8). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)