Proponents of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology claim that a variety of epistemic matters, such as knowledge and epistemic virtue, are sensitive to practical factors, and so the pragmatic encroaches on the epistemic. After surveying pragmatist views that have been presented in the literature, we find that while these pragmatist views are superficially relativistic, they reject a central tenet of epistemic relativism, that competing epistemic frameworks are incommensurable and cannot be compared from a neutral standpoint. Thus, I conclude the discussion by exploring a novel pragmatist view about measures of epistemic strength and propose that this radical position may be attractive to both anti-skeptical infallibists and epistemic relativists.

Epistemology engages in an exploration of the epistemic realm, seeking a better understanding of epistemic concepts and norms. But, in order to provide a more synoptic view of epistemology, we might want to step back and ask, what is the relationship between the epistemic and the practical? On one extreme is the view that the epistemic realm is wholly independent of the practical realm, that our epistemic concepts are wholly independent of our practical ones. What we know, how strong our evidence is, and whether we possess epistemic virtues are all wholly independent of what is moral and what we care about. On the other extreme is the view that there is nothing which is purely epistemic. And on this view, practical considerations are always relevant when addressing epistemic concerns. Knowing, justifiably believing, having faith, and possessing epistemic virtue are all sensitive to practical considerations.

Theories that embrace pragmatic encroachment (henceforth PE) can be characterized as rejecting the former view to some degree or other. However, pragmatic encroachment resists a universally accepted characterization for a variety of reasons. First, proponents of PE represent a wide range of philosophical views and approaches. The above characterization in terms of the demarcation between the epistemic and practical realm was intended to provide as inclusive an account as possible. However, most discussions of PE are narrow in scope, focused on a specific epistemic concept, so most characterizations of PE are also fairly narrow in scope. The debate has primarily
focused on knowledge, though more recent discussions have explored questions about degrees of belief and epistemic virtue.

Next, when pragmatic encroachers speak more systematically about their philosophical viewpoint, they often present themselves as adopting a new philosophical methodology or approach rather than advocating a new taxonomy. For example, Brian Kim and Matthew McGrath write, “the disputes about pragmatic encroachment have helped to open up a new area of philosophy, one focused not only on the relatively narrow question of whether the orthodox approach to knowledge is correct or not, but on a range of issues concerning epistemology and its interface with practical philosophy” (2019: 5).

Another reason why PE resists a universally agreed upon characterization is that in order to explore the demarcation between the practical and the epistemic, we need to specify what we mean by both. And we shall see in section 4 that this is a non-trivial task. However, for the sake of concreteness, let us begin our discussion with a standard view of “the practical” that demarcates a practical factor from a non-practical factor in terms of whether or not that factor is truth-relevant. So relative to some proposition p, a factor is practical just in case it is non-truth-relevant. And a factor is non-truth-relevant just in case it does not affect the subjective or objective probability that p is true or false.

Using this account of the practical, I will offer in section 1 an overview of some varieties of PE. In section 2, I then explore the relationship between PE and epistemic relativism. We will find that there is a minimal sense in which these varieties of PE are relativist but most pragmatist views are incompatible with a central tenet of relativism. In section 3, I explore a radical view on which practical factors encroach on measures of epistemic strength. The view requires a wholesale revision of our understanding of the epistemic because it undermines our working distinction between the practical and the epistemic, and it embraces the view that nothing is distinctively epistemic. I motivate this view by tying it to the pursuit of a non-skeptical infallibilism about knowledge. More
importantly, as it pertains to our current discussion, I show that this radical view is compatible with a robust epistemic relativism.

1. **Variety of PE views**

Using our initial characterization of the practical, we can work with a more precise characterization of pragmatic encroachment. Pragmatists believe that practical factors (i.e. non-truth-relevant factors) are relevant for determining whether or not certain epistemic claims are true or false. Let’s start with a narrow view of the epistemic as that which concerns knowledge. So if, as is standardly assumed, knowledge is a conjunctive concept with alethic, doxastic, and justificatory components, then the epistemic concerns truth, belief, and justification (or whatever it is that makes true belief knowledge). Of course, by definition, practical factors are not relevant in determining whether or not a proposition is true. So we are left with two varieties of PE.⁵

**Belief Encroachment**: Practical factors are relevant in determining whether or not a subject believes that p.

**Justification Encroachment**: Practical factors are relevant in determining whether or not the strength of a subject's epistemic state is strong enough to meet the epistemic standards required for knowledge.

Unfortunately, this list is not comprehensive because there are a variety of epistemological questions that are not, in any obvious way, connected with questions about knowledge. For example, epistemologists are interested in the nature of faith, though whether or not one has faith is not directly relevant to whether or not one knows (Synder 2013). Thus, in order to capture the totality of pragmatist views, we need to expand what counts as epistemic. For example, one can adopt a pragmatist view with regards to a broad range of epistemic states, such as faith, trust, and commitment. There are also pragmatist views about cognitive attitudes (e.g. degrees of belief),

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⁵ We could have included in this list contextualist views on which practical factors are relevant for determining the truth or falsity of knowledge attributions and denials. However, the inclusion of contextualism as a variety of PE is controversial since it is often presented as a competitor to pragmatic views (See DeRose 2009). In either case, since the relation between contextualism and relativism is covered elsewhere in this volume, I shall set it aside.
about epistemic virtues and vices (e.g. open-mindedness and myopia), and about epistemic standards (e.g. rationality).^7

2. **PE and Relativism**

Having offered an overview of the varieties of PE, we will now turn to consider the relationship between pragmatist epistemologies and epistemic relativism. I shall primarily focus on justification encroachment as it is the most widely discussed view in the PE literature. Nevertheless, most of my observations about the relationship between relativism and justification encroachment apply straightforwardly to the other pragmatic views mentioned above. In what follows, we shall consider some core tenets of and common motivations for relativism, identifying areas of agreement and disagreement with pragmatist epistemologies.

2.1 **Minimal relativism**

Minimally, epistemic relativism requires that the truth and falsity of epistemic claims are relative to or sensitive to factors in another domain.^8 On this minimal criteria, pragmatist views of knowledge, such as justification encroachment, are paradigmatically relativistic. And the variety of relativistic views proposed by pragmatists can be categorized them in terms of the various domains of relativization.

2.1.1. **Relativization to individuals.** The most common pragmatic view of knowledge is an individualistic one on which the practical situation of the subject of knowledge is relevant.^9 For example, some have proposed that the standards required for knowledge that p is directly correlated to the size of the p-related stakes governing the subject’s practical context. And the size of the stakes relative to p is determined by the difference between the potential gain and loss given the truth or falsity of p in one’s practical context. For example, if Bill is betting on the truth of p, and guessing correctly yields $100 and guessing incorrectly yields $0, then the size of the p-related stakes

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^7 For an attempt at a more comprehensive taxonomy of pragmatist views, see Kim (2017).

^8 Haack (1996) describes the family of relativistic views in this way and suggests that relativistic views can be categorized by the domain of relativization.

^9 Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005) or Fantl and McGrath (2009) all argue for this type of view.
is $100. The pragmatist proposes that the larger the stakes, the higher the standards required to know. Thus, the primary type of relativism advocated by pragmatists are ones where knowing is relativize to an individual’s practical situation.

Within this individualistic view, there is some debate about how to demarcate an individual’s practical situation. For example, on the stakes-related view, there will be disagreement over whether we should demarcate what is at stake from a subjective point of view, in terms of what the subject personally cares about and is aware of, or from an objective point of view, in terms of what the subject ought to care about.\(^ {10} \)

2.1.2. Relativization to morality. While the relativization to individual viewpoints is the most common pragmatic view, other domains of relativization have been proposed. Some have argued that moral considerations are relevant (Pace 2010). For example, one may possess a decent amount of evidence for an otherwise racist belief that an Asian woman is passive and subservient. However, the morally impermissibility of this belief may deem the belief unjustified. There are, of course, many ways of viewing the interaction between moral and epistemic norms.\(^ {12} \) Moral and epistemic permissions and obligations can interact and conflict in a variety of ways and one must sort out how these norms fit together.

2.1.3. Relativization to communities. It may also be argued that the standards required for knowledge are relative to cultures or communities. Gerken (2019) argues that pragmatic encroachment on knowledge is incompatible with some of the distinctive features of scientific knowledge. He notes that scientific knowledge is typically backed by discursive justification, which is inter-subjectively available and replicable. As a result, scientific knowledge appears to be more stable than pragmatist views allow, and practical factors do not appear to play a prominent role. In reply, the pragmatist could retort that when we talk about scientific knowledge, we are really talking about knowledge possessed by the scientific community. And groups can possess their own distinctive epistemic standards.\(^ {13} \) For example, some pragmatic accounts claim that knowledge-level

\(^ {10} \) Baril (2019) and Kim (2019) both argue that we need externalist versions of pragmatic epistemologies. 
\(^ {12} \) Basu and Schroeder (2019) discuss a variety of these interactions.
\(^ {13} \) This social view of knowledge-level justification can be derived from the individualistic view of knowledge-level justification. After all, scientific knowledge is just the knowledge possessed by the scientific community. And on
justification is equivalent to the level of justification required to take a proposition for granted in inquiry (Kim 2019). Since the scientific community has a much higher standard for taking a proposition for granted in inquiry, then it may turn out that the scientific community must possess all of the distinctive features noted above in order to know.

So we have found that (1) pragmatist views are minimally relativistic and that (2) the variety of relativistic views in the PE literature mimics the variety found in other fields.

2.2. Incommensurability and Robust relativism

While pragmatist epistemologists are minimally relativistic in virtue of relativizing the epistemic to the non-epistemic, they generally reject the relativistic view that there is an incommensurability between the norms governing different perspectives. In order to be truly relativistic, one’s epistemology should entail that the epistemic norms governing one context cannot, from a neutral standpoint, be compared to any incompatible epistemic norms governing a different context. Each context possesses its own normative sovereignty, and there is no privileged perspective from which we can evaluate the norms.

One way for incommensurability to arise is when the epistemic norms themselves, such as those that determine standards of justification or knowledge, are deemed relative to different frameworks. On this view, different norms operate relative to different perspectives, and there is no way of adjudicating between the competing norms and frameworks. For example, in community A but not B, there may be an epistemic norm to consider the totality of evidence when evaluating a belief. And relativists would claim that there is no neutral perspective from which we can compare these norms.

The pragmatist theories surveyed above do not embrace this more robust relativism. Take for example the version of justification encroachment on which knowledge-level justification is determined by, what is called, a practical adequacy standard. One version of this standard imposes the following necessary condition: “in a decision setting, one knows p only if one’s actual preference

the individualistic view, if the subject is a community, then the community can determine the standards required for a true belief to count as knowledge.
and one’s preference conditional on p match” Anderson and Hawthorne (2019: 108). On this view, there is just a single norm that governs knowledge-level justification. There are no distinct, competing norms that arise in different perspectives. Suppose Jade and Amber possess the same evidence yet given the differences in their practical contexts, Jade knows and Amber doesn’t. The practical adequacy view does not propose that there are different norms governing Jade and Amber’s practical context. Rather, there is a single norm of practical adequacy, which entails that Jade’s belief is practically adequate and Amber’s is not because the standards required for practical adequacy are higher in Amber’s practical context.

Thus, when we ask whether the higher standards governing Amber’s context is better or worse than the standards governing Jade’s context, we can give a straightforward answer. They are equally appropriate. And they are equally appropriate because the standards are entailed by the single demand for practical adequacy. The commensurability of standards makes these pragmatist views of knowledge incompatible with a robust relativism.

2.2. PE and the Motivations for relativism

2.2.1. Disagreement. One of the primary motivations for relativism comes from the existence of pervasive and long-lasting disagreement. And pragmatist views of knowledge have been explored for similar reasons. Hawthorne (2014) developed the pragmatist account to avoid skepticism. Moreover, the resulting pragmatic view allows for both the skeptic’s and dogmatist’s perspective to be equally valid. Given the differences in their concerns, different standards govern the skeptic and the dogmatist. And this difference may help to understand the long-standing disagreement between the two points of view.

2.2.2. Under-determination. Another motivation for relativism, especially in the philosophy of science, comes from appeals to under-determination. And such appeals also lie at the heart of Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath’s argument for justification encroachment. Fantl and McGrath (2009) present their case by highlighting a central problem for fallibilist accounts of knowledge. On their view, epistemic fallibilism is the view that one can know that p even though there is a non-zero

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15 See Kim (2019) for an alternative version of the practical adequacy requirement.
epistemic chance that not-p. This raises the obvious question, what counts as knowledge-level justification? If knowledge is compatible with an epistemic chance of being wrong, how much of a chance is acceptable?

This problem has been dubbed the “threshold problem”, and both pragmatists and non-pragmatists have offered a variety of solutions. Fantl and McGrath argue that the specification of knowledge-level justification is under-determined by epistemic (or truth-relevant) factors. Thus, in order to specify an appropriate and non-skeptical threshold, we must appeal to practical factors. This argument for justification encroachment is structurally identical to the arguments for pragmatic and relativistic views about theory choice in the philosophy of science. Proponents of these views have argued that the under-determination of theory choice given a set of evidence shows that others factors such as practical factors must come into play when deciding which theory ought to be accepted.

3. A Radical Pragmatism

While existing pragmatist epistemologies have some commonalities to epistemic relativism, their rejection of incommensurability makes them, to my mind, incompatible with a genuine relativism. So to conclude our discussion of PE and relativism, I want to identify and explore a radical type of pragmatism that could serve as a foundation for a relativistic epistemology. Given the scope of our discussion, the exploration will be limited to summarizing a reason for pursuing such an account and identifying, what I take to be, the central problem with the plausibility of the view. I end by exploring the view’s connection to relativism.

3.1 Pragmatic Infallibilism. As noted above, pragmatists have argued that their view resolves the threshold problem for fallibilism. As they tell the story, a fallibilist epistemology is obscure and going pragmatist is the best and perhaps only way forward. Infallibilism lies in the other direction, but as the story typically goes, infallibilism leads to skepticism. To my mind, this narrative of the epistemological landscape reveals only half of the allures of the pragmatic turn. Just as Fantl and McGrath propose that going pragmatic offers the fallibilist the resources to address its central

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problem, the threshold problem, I believe that going pragmatic offers the infallibilist the resources to address its central problem, the skeptical problem. My discussion here will be limited to identifying the main difficulty in developing a plausible version of the view and sketching how we might go about addressing this difficulty. As we will see, the main difficulty is that an anti-skeptical pragmatic infallibilism is committed a radical view about measures of epistemic strength.

Let’s take for granted Fantl and McGrath’s view that fallibilist epistemologies are ones where knowledge that p is compatible with a non-zero epistemic chance that not-p. So infallibilism, as the denial of fallibilism, is the view that knowledge is incompatible with a non-zero epistemic chance. Alternatively, infallibilism is committed to the claim that knowledge entails epistemic certainty.

Clarifying what epistemic certainty amounts is the central task of the non-skeptical infallibilist. However, we can work with a simple characterization. Epistemic chance measures the strength of a subject’s evidence for or against any given proposition. There is zero epistemic chance that not-p for some subject just in case the subject’s evidence is incompatible with not-p (i.e. rules out all not-p possibilities). And one is epistemically certain that p just in case there is a zero epistemic chance that not-p.

Given our aim of developing an anti-skeptical epistemology, we shall assume that any plausible infallibilism must allow for circumstances in which subjects are epistemically certain about propositions that we ordinarily presume to know. That I have hands and that the earth is very old are both ordinary propositions.

On the pragmatic variant of infallibilism, whether or not one’s evidence underwrites certainty may depend upon practical features of a subject’s context. So if we combine the anti-skeptical and pragmatic components of the view, then the type of infallibilism we seek is one in which there are contexts where one’s evidence guarantees that ordinary propositions are true. This is also compatible with the possibility that there are some contexts where one’s evidence does not fully eliminate skeptical alternatives.17

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17 I take this way of talking from Lewis (1996).
18 If we accept certain closure principles, our desired infallibilism should also entail that there are circumstances in which we can be epistemically certain that radical skeptical alternatives do not obtain.
19 My discussion will limit our discussion of the subject’s practical context to a subject’s deliberative context.
alternatives. And what makes this a pragmatic view is that the difference between the former and latter contexts may be purely practical in nature.

To summarize, our anti-skeptical pragmatic infallibilism is committed to three central claims.

1. Knowledge entails epistemic certainty.
2. There are contexts in which one may be epistemically certain that ordinary propositions are true.
3. Whether or not one is epistemically certain can depend upon practical features of the subject’s context.

The resulting account offers an interesting twist on the pragmatic view of knowledge. Most pragmatic accounts embrace justification encroachment, where the practical encroaches on the epistemic by determining what counts as knowledge-level justification. In contrast, pragmatic infallibilism proposes that the epistemic standards for knowledge are invariant across all contexts. Knowledge always requires epistemic certainty. Instead, what can vary from one practical context to the next is whether or not one’s evidence underwrites certainty. Epistemic certainty is an upper bound on our measures of a subject’s strength of evidence. Thus, if practical factors encroach on epistemic certainty, then that entails that practical factors encroach on how we measure the strength of a subject’s epistemic state.

3.2 PE on measures of epistemic strength. Pragmatic infallibilism has been left relatively unexplored in the recent literature. I believe that the lack of exploration is due to the fact that the view requires a commitment to pragmatic encroachment on strength of evidence. And it may seem crazy to think that practical factors can affect how strong one’s epistemic state is with regards to any given proposition. After all, if we fix the evidence or information that a subject possesses across any two contexts, then surely the strength of the subject’s epistemic state (i.e. evidence) for or against any given proposition should also be fixed. Pragmatic infallibilism denies that evidential strength

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20 This does not entail that one’s epistemic position is maximally strong. There are many dimensions to the assessment of one’s epistemic position. See Gardenfors and Sahlin (1998, chap. 1) for discussion.
21 The recent discussion in Weatherson (forthcoming) is the exception. There is also a critical discussion of this view in Comesana (2013).
22 As we will see, I will be making a distinction between evidence and counting as evidence. And for that reason, I think it is useful to use the term “information” instead of “evidence” since I think the latter is ambiguous between possessing information and possessing evidence for or against relevant proposition.
supervenes on the information a subject possesses. And the rejection of this supervenience thesis is the main obstacle to its plausibility.

In order to overcome this obstacle, we need to develop an account of evidence and strength of evidence on which the former can remain fixed while the latter can vary depending upon practical features of the subject’s context. Given the limited scope of this paper, I will only try to point in the direction of how to do so.

The empirical research on choice behavior has emphasized the importance of distinguishing between how one frames a decision problem and evaluates a decision problem. So if we need to develop an account of how practical factors can affect the evaluation of evidence, it is worth looking into questions about how we frame our inquiries. As it pertains to the evaluation of evidence, we can look into questions about how we demarcate what counts as evidence for or against propositions that are relevant to our decision problems. So for example, if we are betting on the outcome of a coin flip, we can ask, what questions are relevant to the evaluation of the likelihood that the next flip lands heads or not (i.e. tails)? Clearly, this proposition is practically relevant to the decision problem. And if we could ask some infallible oracle any questions which questions would be relevant to ask? Is the proportion of heads in the past flips of the coins relevant? Is the order of outcomes in the past flips relevant? Is the physical material of the coin relevant? Is the color of the coin relevant? Is the weather relevant?

Presumably, there is an infinite number of questions one could ask. This raises an important problem, how do we determine which questions are relevant? Is every question and every piece of information relevant? Or are there reasons to exclude certain information from our epistemic evaluations? And if there are reasons to exclude information, then on what basis do we exclude such information?

In the ideal case, all information is relevant. We seek as much information as we can, and we consider every possibility. Unfortunately, this is practically impossible, even with computational assistance.

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23 The well-known discussion in Tverksy and Kahneman (1981) of framing effects and discussion following the discovery of preference reversals Lichtenstein and Slovic (2006) have both pointed to the importance of framing in understanding choice behavior.

24 This is different from the questions of restricting which questions we think are worthwhile to ask. Relevance does not entail informational value.
There are obvious economic reasons why we must restrict what is relevant to our inquiries. We are bounded agents with resource limitations and without such restrictions, we would be overwhelmed and would be unable to proceed with deliberation.\textsuperscript{25} Thus there appears to be an essential epistemic aspect to the framing of inquiry, which is to determine what counts as evidence for or against the propositions that are practically relevant.

How can we frame our inquiries to determine what counts as evidence for or against? Here, I simply want to raise a problem that can be used to motivate the pragmatic account. It’s important to note that how one epistemically frames an inquiry will determine what count as evidence. And so presumably one cannot, in a non-circular way, use one’s evidence to determine what counts as evidence. Thus, this presents an opportunity for the pragmatist to develop a new under-determination argument. Just as under-determination arguments are used to motivate pragmatic accounts of theory choice (or induction) and fallibilism, there is space to develop an under-determination argument in favor of a pragmatic account of evidential strength. Since the information one possesses under-determines what counts as evidence for or against, then practical factors could play a role in determining how strong one’s epistemic state is.

3.3 PE and epistemic relativism. While my discussion of the pragmatic view of evidential strength has been incredibly cursory, I hope to have offered, in broad outlines, the path one might take to develop such a view. In the very least, I hope to have motivated the idea that how we frame our inquiries could affect what we count as evidence. And since how one frames an inquiry determines what counts as evidence, then non-epistemic factors might play a role in framing inquiry.

Pragmatist views of epistemic or evidential strength are radical. Usually when we compare different subjects, we can say which is in a stronger or weaker epistemic state with respect to any given proposition. So even if the truth of other epistemic matters is relative, we typically assume that there is some purely epistemic perspective from which comparisons can be made. Most discussions of PE have indeed assumed that our measures of epistemic strength are purely epistemic. In fact, our working distinction between the practical and the epistemic depends upon the existence of a purely

\textsuperscript{25} Kim (2014) argues against all-things-considered rationality and argues that any psychologically and normatively realistic theory of instrumental rationality must incorporate how we restrict what counts as relevant to our decision problems.
epistemic measure. After all, a non-practical (i.e. truth-relevant) factor relative to p is a factor that affects the probability that p. However, if the probability that p is sensitive to practical factors, then these so-called non-practical factors can be sensitive to practical factors.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, we might be left with the extreme view on which nothing is purely epistemic.\textsuperscript{27}

This extreme view should be of interest to the relativist because it is compatible with (though does not entail) the incommensurability of epistemic norms and standards. Justification encroachment rejected incommensurability because on that view, a single context-sensitive norm determined what counted as knowledge-level justification in every local context. Of course, we could have a similar view about our measures of epistemic strength. On one version of our radical view, once we fix the relevant features of the practical context, we have thereby determined what information counts as evidence for or against. So there may be some general way of measuring the strength of a subject’s epistemic state that is simply sensitive to practical factors. But on this view, we would be able to compare and contrast the appropriateness of different measures in different local contexts.\textsuperscript{28}

There is, however, an alternative that is grounded in the epistemological perspective advocated by C.S. Peirce. Peirce proposed that belief is the removal of doubt but that only genuine doubt is relevant (Peirce 1877). And genuine doubts require the appropriate attitude. They do not arise simply because one has written down or asked a question. Accordingly, one of the central aims of epistemology for Peirce is to determine the norms or methods governing the resolution of genuine doubt. Furthermore, from what I can tell, Peirce did not believe that that there were questions that ought or ought not to be asked. He thought it was merely a descriptive matter of fact as to which questions were asked and what doubts one possessed. If we combine this view about question-asking with our pragmatic account, then we have the start of a relativistic epistemology. For if we have no norms that determine which questions are genuine, and, as a result, have no norms governing what doubts or assumptions may or may not frame our inquiries, then there isn’t a normative perspective from which we can evaluate the appropriateness of the assumptions and questions governing different inquiries. There is simply the fact of the matter of what questions we actually ask and what assumptions we actually

\textsuperscript{26} This is assuming that the probability that p corresponds in some way to strength of evidence.

\textsuperscript{27} One may be a pluralist about measures of epistemic strength, and if one is a pluralist, there may be some measures that are purely epistemic.

\textsuperscript{28} For example, the Cartesian view that distinguishes moral and metaphysical certainty could be interpreted as a view of this kind.
make. This Peircian version of the pragmatic account of epistemic strength embraces the incommensurability thesis, and I believe it a view worth exploring for both the pragmatist and the relativist.

References


