**Imagining and Judging What’s Fictionally True**

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1. *Introduction*

In *Explaining Imagination*, Peter Langland-Hassan argues that ‘imagination’ is not a *sui generis* concept. In the wake of Amy Kind (2013)’s influential argument that no single mental activity can satisfy all the roles assigned to imagining, the book aims to demystify just what imagination is. Treating ‘imagination’ as an umbrella term for more basic folk psychological states, Langland-Hassan argues that mental states like beliefs, desires, judgments, decisions and intentions can come together in different combinations and contexts to produce the complex phenomenon we’ve been calling ‘imagination’.

Like many before him, Langland-Hassan divides imagining into two broad kinds: imagistic imagining (I-imagining), which involves mental states that have a sensory character; and attitude imagining (A-imagining), which allows us to step outside of what we really believe without involving sensory thoughts. A-imagining, which is the book’s focus, is valuable in part because it enables us to think about the fantastical, fictional or otherwise untrue in a manner that is epistemically safe, i.e., epistemically compatible with things not really being the way they are being thought about (5).

Two maxims guide the book: *Don’t Assume Content-Mirroring* and *Don’t Assume Homogeneity.* I find them to be ingenious and effective. The first maxim says that the folk psychological state that constitutes imagining need not have the same mental content in order to count as an instance of imagining. For example, **imagining** *that one forgot to turn off the oven* isn’t reducible to **believing** *that one forgot to turn off the oven*, but more plausibly reducible to **believing** *that one might have forgotten to turn off the oven*, or **inferring** *one would return home if one forgot to turn off the oven*. The second maxim states that an instance of imagining may be reducible to more than one basic mental state. For example, **to imagine** *Darcy is emotionally unavailable* might be **to infer** *that Darcy is emotionally unavailable* (in *Pride and Prejudice*), or **to decide** *that I will experience Darcy as emotionally unavailable* (in *Pride and Prejudice*). The two maxims widen the possibility of just what kind of mental state or action can count as an instance of imagining.

In this article, I’ll be focusing on chapters 9 and 10 which concern our engagements with fiction. In particular, I’ll focus on the metaphysical questions about fiction: what determines truth in a fiction? And what makes a given textual work fiction or nonfiction? Langland-Hassan argues that we use A-imagining when we consume fiction, and that such imaginings can be explained in more basic folk psychological terms. Given this aim, the application of his account will, ideally, apply to all the different kinds of imaginative engagement involved in consuming fiction.

The fundamental concern I’ll raise is that Langland-Hassan’s account seems unable to capture all the psychological richness of engaging with fiction. Below, I’ll raise worries about operators, incompleteness, imaginative resistance, and formal features, developing the book’s ideas where possible. These more local problems add up to a larger trend, which is that not all aspects of our engagement with fiction – some having to do with fictional truth, others not – can be explained with his account. I’ll conclude by sketching a way forward for the definition of fiction. I agree with Langland-Hassan that expectation is an important ingredient in the fiction-nonfiction distinction, but we should focus on the readers’, and not the authors’, expectations.

1. *An Analysis of Fictional Truth*

 Fictional truth is a puzzling concept. We’d happily say “Tatooine has two suns” is true, but Tatooine doesn’t have two suns in the same way that Kepler-16b has two suns. What is it for something to be fictionally true, and what makes certain things, and not other things, fictionally true? Langland-Hassan offers *Doxastic Intentionalism* as the answer:

“In the Fiction F, *p*” is true iff F (or its author) prescribes or intends the reader to *judge that,* in the fiction F*, p”* (206).

What it is for a work to prescribe imagining *p* in response to F, or for an author to intend the reader to imagine *p* in response to F, is for the work or the author to intend that the reader judge that, in the fiction F, *p*. The prescription or intention is enough to fix fictional truth; the reader need not successfully carry out the judgment.[[1]](#footnote-1)

I will discuss how Doxastic Intentionalismhandles fictions with incompleteness, imaginative resistance, or formal features. But before we test the account with particular phenomena, let me raise a worry about fictional operators in general.

1. *Operators*

Langland-Hassan’s *Operator Claim* states that all imaginings conducted in relation to fictional truth involve an operator: “when recovering fictional content from a fiction *F* in which *p* is the case, we do not simply imagine that *p*; rather, we imagine that, in the fiction *F*, *p*” (211).

This must be the right characterization for *some* of our imaginings. If not for the source indexing that operators enable, how could we keep track of what we learn about Glinda according to *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz* from what we learn about her from *Wicked*?

However, there is a lurking worry: Langland-Hassan’s analysis of the operator seems circular. As mentioned, he explains that “In the Fiction F, *p*” is true when F or its maker prescribes or intends the reader to judge that, in the fiction F, *p*. The way he spells out the meaning of the operator includes the “in the fiction, F” clause that the analysis is meant to explain. What precisely is it to judge that, in the fiction F, *p*? Other analyses that rely on a more distinct cognitive attitude to analyse fiction and the operator – such as Walton who uses props and make-believe or Stock who uses F-imagining – don’t suffer from the same circularity worry.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Another worry with the operator claim is that not all imagining about fiction – so, making judgments about fiction – can be neatly captured with an operator. For sentences like “Glinda is a good-natured witch”, applying the operator is straightforward since what we *really* believe is “In the fiction, Glinda is a good-natured witch”. But when it comes to beliefs like “Raskolnikov is angstier than Hamlet” or “My roommate needs therapy as much as Moriarty”, the operator isn’t helpful.[[3]](#footnote-3) There’s no fiction in which both Raskolnikov and Hamlet appear, so “In the fiction, Raskolnikov is angstier than Hamlet” will come out false; and since the claim about the roommate is meant to describe the real world, the operator would be misplaced.

Mark Crimmins (1998) writes that when we make comparative claims like the above, we’re not *really* comparing a roommate to Moriarty or Raskolnikov to Hamlet. Though we might be tempted to paraphrase (to something like “The degree of angst assigned to Raskolnikov in *Crime and Punishment* is greater than the degree of angst assigned to Hamlet in *Hamlet*”), it’s unconvincing that *that*’s what people really mean given the level of conceptual sophistication needed to formulate or understand the paraphrase. An additional worry with this approach is that it’s unclear whether every characteristic possessed by a fictional entity is scalable. After all, comparisons such as “being more unique than” seem difficult to paraphrase in the above manner because uniqueness as a property resists being measured. Instead, comparative statements feel more straightforward, and Crimmins argues this is because we engage in semantic pretense, which involves the pretense that there are particular persons with characteristics that we can refer to. The pretense “let[s] us express using ready, tidy linguistic resources claims that, perspicuously stated, would require cumbersome formulations or unfamiliar terminology” (1998, 6).

Though Crimmins gives us a way to make sense of comparative claims, his appeal to pretense poses trouble for Langland-Hassan’s analysis of fictional truth, which has at its core judgements that readers are prescribed or intended to make. These judgements must be genuine, and not made in pretense, since the fictional operator already fixes the scope to concern fictional states of affairs. (Note that the rival views are compatible with Crimmins’s semantic pretense since they take make-believe to characterize our engagement with fiction.)

Langland-Hassan has an account of pretense that might be helpful here. He thinks pretense involves an agent finding a resemblance between two different things and making one like the other. More precisely, a *pretense episode* takes place when an agent “intentionally makes some *x y-*like, while believing that *x* is not, and will not thereby be made into, a *y*” (153). When making comparative claims involving fictional characters, we might be making a fictional character person-like while believing that a character is not, and will not thereby, be made into a person. Acknowledging that sometimes making truth-apt claims about fiction involves pretending (in addition to judging) is one way to accommodate comparative claims.

Langland-Hassan might say that he’s just interested in fictional truth, not any and all engagement with fiction. The aim of the operator claim was to explain what fiction *comprehension* might account to: “*when recovering fictional content from a fiction F* in which *p* is the case, we do not simply imagine that *p*; rather, we imagine that, in the fiction *F*, *p*” (211, emphasis added).

But given the chapter’s aim, which is to reductively analyse all imaginative activities involved in fiction enjoyment, it’d be a shame for a theory of imagination to be unable to explain how we engage with fictions beyond settling what is true in a fiction.[[4]](#footnote-4) This brings us to more fiction-internal matters of incompleteness, imaginative resistance, and formal features. I’ll turn to them now.

1. *Incompleteness*

I agree with Langland-Hassan that comprehending fiction doesn’t involve a special or necessary connection to imagination since understanding a fiction’s content utilizes the quotidian skill of understanding what is said without believing it to be true—say, when we take in a politician’s testimony or understand a joke (188). We first comprehend what’s put forward by a work, and we judge some of them to form the content of the fiction, i.e., be fictionally true.

Now, consider how no work of fiction can specify every possible detail. All fictions are incomplete, and readers can always ask a question about states of affairs a fiction leaves open.[[5]](#footnote-5) How does this routine feature of fiction—that sometimes it is neither *p* nor *not-p* in a fiction— interact with Doxastic Intentionalism? When we encounter fictional incompleteness, we wonder about content that is neither fictionally true nor untrue. Since there is no fictional content to comprehend, the mental actions involved with basic comprehension don’t apply here.

While engaging with a work of fiction, we can always imagine things that aren’t specified by the text. For example, while reading Raymond Carver’s “The Cathedral”, we might imagine the blind man to look like Jeff Bridges. In cases like these, Langland-Hassan says we’re *deciding to develop* a fiction a certain way, “doing a bit of storytelling ourselves” (198).

 I think it’s right that fiction consumers often co-create fictional content. Sometimes readers are licensed to fill out the picture however they will. But at other times, we are not to imagine *p* nor *not-p*.[[6]](#footnote-6) For example, works with what I’ll call “deep” incompletenesspresent incompleteness in a manner that doesn’t invite us to simply pick some way to continue. The kind of ambiguity present in *Bladerunner* might fit this description. Both the novel and the film leave ambiguous whether Deckard is a human or an android, and the incompleteness is an aesthetic merit of the film. To respond by taking up creative agency and deciding how we’ll envision Deckard is to miss the point of the work, which is to remain in imaginative uncertainty (Williams and Woodward 2019, 428).

Frank Stockton’s “The Lady or the Tiger” provides another example of deep incompleteness. In the short story, a princess’s secret lover is caught, and he is subject to a trial by ordeal where his guilt or innocence is determined by his fate. He must choose between two doors—behind one is a hungry tiger and behind the other, a beautiful woman he is to marry— and the princess, who managed to find out what’s behind each door, discreetly nudges her lover to the right, which he opens. The story reminds us that the princess will lose him either way and concludes: “And so I leave it with all of you: Which came out of the opened door – the lady, or the tiger?”

 In an exchange hosted on *The Junkyard*, Langland-Hassan wrote that “all cases of imagining that p, carried out as a means to recovering content from a fiction F, are cases of judging that, in F, p” (Friend and Langland-Hassan, 2020). But the back-and-forth that characterizes our engagement with deep incompleteness doesn’t fit this model. When we imagine a tiger behind the door, we’re not judging what’s true in the fiction, nor are we deciding to co-create the fictional truth that there is a tiger behind the door. Similarly, when we imagine a woman behind the door, we’re not judging that to be the case in the fiction, nor are we deciding to develop the fiction in that way. There seems to be a kind of imagining that doesn’t reduce to judging or co-creating. And if I’m right about this, then we need another folk-psychological state to explain the phenomenon.

Perhaps deep incompleteness calls for conditional reasoning. Langland-Hassan argues that conditional thinking, too, doesn’t require a *sui generis* sense of imagining because inductive inference and using prior knowledge amount to conditional reasoning (26–27). We first form the question “is there a tiger behind the door?” and process what this would mean by accessing judgments about the princess’s personality and beliefs about how people like that tend to act. Finally, the reader would use the judgement-belief combination in an inductive inference to reach the conditional belief that if their judgment about the princess is correct (e.g. that she’s more jealous than loving), then there would be a tiger behind the door.

I think these steps might accurately capture the deliberation process. However, the point of the exercise isn’t to form a belief, and this makes the weighing unlike conditional reasoning. Again, works with deep incompleteness ask us to dwell in the uncertainty; forming one’s own belief about the story by reasoning conditionally misses something important about the fact that we alternate imagining *p* and *not-p* not in order to form judgments or beliefs or even intentions, but to do something else—say, appreciate the significance of either option, marvel at the fact that either option could be true, hunt for additional clues within the work, or otherwise acknowledge the ambiguity as an aesthetic feature.

Treating incompleteness as a puzzle to be solved and trying to judge, create, or reason conditionally out of the ambiguity doesn’t capture how we tend to engage with deep incompleteness. Understanding fictional truth as “what’s to be judged as the case in fiction” is not satisfactory because the analysis focuses too much on the *post-hoc* taking stock. There’s much more that goes on while we are reading that judging (or creating or conditional reasoning) doesn’t capture. This is an issue that doesn’t affect accounts of fiction that don’t analyse fiction-induced imaginings as judgments or beliefs.

1. *Imaginative Resistance*

 As mentioned, A-imagining is cognitively beneficial because it allows us to think about the possible, fictive, pretended, and fantastical in a fashion that is compatible with things not really being the way they are being thought about. The fact that we can imagine things without epistemically jeopardizing ourselves makes A-imagining epistemically safe. But some accounts of imaginative resistance identify the source of the resistance to be worries about imagination contaminating our beliefs. Does imaginative resistance raise worries about A-imagining’s epistemic safety?

Bit of relevant background: Langland-Hassan makes use of possible worlds to explain how readers work out implicit truths in fiction. For realist fiction, we fill out the details of the fictional world by imagining the nearest possible world where the fiction is told as known fact. If the protagonist is human, we take it as an implicit truth that she is cordate since a possible world where she has a heart is closer to the actual world than a possible world where she lacks one.

 The book doesn’t dwell on the puzzles that characterize imaginative resistance, and Langland-Hassan confesses that he only finds the “fictionality puzzle”—why we resist judging certain things to be true in a fiction—interesting. He also questions whether the puzzle is well founded since our introspective reports about whether or not we imagine *p* is not always to be trusted (186). But in a long footnote, he diagnoses imaginative resistance to be a kind of surprise that takes place “when we come upon a proposition that suddenly suggests we were way off in our initial appraisal of how close that nearest possible world [where the fiction is told as known fact] is” (187, fn2). A problem arises as “we don’t really *get* what the fictions are talking about in cases of such resistance—we don’t know how to fill out the fictional world with additional, related truths” (187, emphasis in original).

Analyses of imaginative resistance divide into two camps: the *cantian view* and the *wontian view*.[[7]](#footnote-7) The cantian says that imaginative resistance is rooted in the fact that we can’t imagine certain things; the wontian locates the resistance in our unwillingness to imagine certain things. Langland-Hassan opts for the cantian view when he aligns resistance with an inability to understand the fictional world.

Langland-Hassan’s diagnosis doesn’t match our phenomenology in three ways. First: most, if not all, examples of imaginative resistance aren’t long enough to lull us into the realist framework only to spring a surprise on us. Walton (1990)’s example is a sentence long, and examples from Stephen Yablo (2002) and Brian Weatherson (2004) are a paragraph long. There simply isn’t enough time to form an initial appraisal of how close the fictional world is to the actual world such that we can be surprised.[[8]](#footnote-8)

Second: Langland-Hassan’s diagnosis suggests that imaginative resistance only kicks up when we concern ourselves with implicit truths. But often, resistance is activated before implicit truths enter the picture. Readers immediately feel an inability to judge “female infanticide is morally right” as true in the fiction. Taking *p* to be fictionally true is to judge *p* to be the case in the fiction, and the problem with resistance is that we’re unable (or unwilling) to judge morally (or mathematically/logically) deviant states of affairs to obtain in the fiction. The question, then, is why some readers fail to judge certain things to be true in the fiction, and an answer that appeals to implicit truth recovery doesn’t answer the question.

Third: the diagnosis makes imaginative resistance sound like an initial reaction that can be overcome when really, the resistance seems to abide for most people who feel it. If the problem is just that we underestimated how far the fictional world is, then getting used to the further world and shifting our thoughts would be sufficient to overcome the resistance. Indeed, Langland-Hassan writes that further context can help us overcome imaginative resistance (187), and Weinberg and Meskin (2006) write that sometimes fiction tells us how to approach imagining an impossible thing (191, fn18). The fact that our resistance is modulated by genre considerations also supports the view that resistance can be overcome with more information or context.[[9]](#footnote-9)

However, my sense is that those who encounter imaginative resistance just don’t think female infanticide can be the right thing *anywhere*, or that there can be no oval five-fingered leaf ever (as long as we’re holding fixed the meaning of ‘oval’ and ‘five-fingered’).[[10]](#footnote-10) If they are right, then imaginative resistance is not the kind of thing that is born out of a surprise and correctable with more information.

The better diagnosis of imaginative resistance for Langland-Hassan might be that resistance is felt whenever there is an impossible fictional content that can’t be accommodated by the possible world framework. Some consider moral (or mathematical/logical) truths to be necessary truths, which would render them invariant across all worlds. A fictional world that posits the falsity of a necessary truth would be an impossible world, something that a possible-worlds approach to understanding fictional truth cannot accommodate. (I think the inability to accommodate impossible states of affairs is too high a price to pay for a theory of fiction, but I’ll leave open whether it’s a feature or a bug in Langland-Hassan’s approach that impossible things can’t obtain in fiction. See Wildman and Folde 2017, Wildman 2019, and Xhignesse 2021a, 2021b for discussion.)

This strict standard of possibility can explain why we feel resistance when we’re invited to look for a world where female infanticide is morally right. But the explanation also has a cost: now A-imagining doesn’t always seem so epistemically safe since there is fiction when imaginatively deviating from necessary moral (or mathematical/logical) truths. A-imagining “infanticide is morally good” to be true isn’t epistemically compatible with it being false in the actual world.

What about the wontian who says she won’t imagine a fictional world where female infanticide is morally good? She might take this stance because we “export” truths from fictions all the time.[[11]](#footnote-11) For example, the common misperception that Vikings’ helmets had horns on them can be traced back to a costume design choice made for Wagner’s “The Ring of the Nibelung” in 1876.[[12]](#footnote-12) If worries about exporting from fiction can also give rise to imaginative resistance, we have on hand another case where A-imagining isn’t epistemically safe since imagining what isn’t the case puts us in danger of exporting a false belief. A-imagining might not be innocuous or fail-safe in relation to what’s true in the actual world.

1. *On the Definition of Fiction*

I’ll conclude with a discussion of the fiction-nonfiction distinction. Langland-Hassan defines a work of fiction as “a set of sentences *S*, put forward by anauthor with the expectation that readers will believe that much, if not all, of whatis said and implied by *S* is not true” (208). The first thing to note is that this definition can’t cover all works of fiction because only linguistic fictions contain sets of sentences. What the definition concerns, then, are works like novels, short stories, and dramatic poetry, and not works of fiction per se.

Even if we were to narrow the scope to linguistic fiction, the definition isn’t adequate because a work of linguistic fiction has more than explicit and implied sentential meanings in its arsenal when generating fictional content. For instance, Elicker (2020) and Kim (2022) observe that graphic features of the printed text or other visual and sonic features can create fictional truths without relying on sentence meanings. Font size can indicate the volume of an utterance, and indentation levels can “label” speakers’ contributions in a group conversation to specify who said what. If form-related features such as italics, spacing, and repetition can produce fictional truths without requiring sentences that state or imply the same fictional truths, then we need to acknowledge formal features as a distinct way of generating fictional content.

One might ask: why doesn’t the “implied by *S*” clause capture formally generated fictional truths? If by “implied” we mean “arrived at through inference”, then “implied” would capture the way we move from formal features to fictional truth. Upon seeing that some text is italicized in *The Sound and the Fury*, we might wonder why Faulkner made such a choice and infer from context that the italicized sentences must be indexed to the past. We’d just need to remain open to the fact that what’s doing the implying isn’t always sentence meanings.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Still, the definition needs revising because “set of sentences *S*” doesn’t capture all the relevant data that generate fictional truth. Sometimes typographic features found within sentences, such as italics and text size, generate distinct fictional truths. But at other times, elements that don’t concern sentences—such as spacing, chapter division or a blank or black page—create fictional truths. What allows us to run inferences aren’t always sentences or phrases. Since fictional content outstrips what sentences say or imply, Langland-Hassan’s definition might be revised to something like the following, with the new additions in bold:

“A work of **textual** fiction is a set of sentences *S* **and formal features *FF***, put forward by anauthor with the expectation that readers will believe that much, if not all, of whatis said, implied, **or formally conveyed** by *S* **and *FF***is not true.”

Accordingly, what it is to judge what the author intends for us to take as fictionally true should also be revised to something like the following:

“to judge that the author intends for us to judge that *p* is true in the **textual** fiction *F* is to judge that the author of *F* intends for us to judge that *p* is stated or implied **or formally conveyed** by a set of sentences *S* **and formal features *FF***that the author has put forward with the expectation that readers will believe that much, if not all, of what is said and implied **and formally conveyed** by *S* **and *FF*** is not true.”

Though I think these revised definitions are improvements, I still have concerns about both.

First, the judgement-centered analysis of fictional truth isn’t attentive to non-propositional fictional truths. Langland-Hassan’s account makes it difficult to explain why, for instance, Faulkner chose to use italics in the manner he did, and how that choice leads to fictional truths that aren’t necessarily propositional in nature. Langland-Hassan writes that “[r]ecovering fictional content—and thereby filling out one’s understanding of the fictional world—is simply a matter of engaging in counterfactual reasoning of a certain sort”, one that involves imagining “what else would be true in a world where the explicit content of the fiction is true” (195–96). But a discerning reader goes beyond counterfactual reasoning when she acknowledges a non-explicit fictional truth from formal features. For example, she might note how the text moves fluidly between the italicized and non-italicized portions in *The Sound and the Fury*, providing a sense of how Benjy’s mind works, e.g., how he associates events not through a temporal connection but an emotional connection. The experience of a mind that works a certain way is not something that we can judge to be ‘true’ because it’s not something that is well lexicalized. Rather, the formal features provide a reading experience that *shows* us what Benjy’s experience of the world is like, the resulting fictional truth something like “Benjy’s mental life is like *this*,” where ‘this’ points to the reader’s own experience.[[14]](#footnote-14) And this kind of fictional truth is not necessarily a proposition that readers can affirm as true or false.

My second worry with the definition is that focusing on authorial intention and expectation deems too many things to be fiction. For example, if all “sentences and formal features put forward with the expectation that readers will believe what’s explicitly, implicitly, or formally conveyed is not true” count as a work of fiction, then a conspiracy writer who knows their theory won’t catch or a historian from an oppressed social group believing that her account won’t be believed would count as fiction writers. This is an unwelcome result, and we need a way to distinguish fiction writers from nonfiction writers whose work’s content isn’t believed to be true.

I suggest that we fix the problem by shifting whose expectation it is that matters. The important criterion is not what authors expect readers to do, but what readers expect authors to have done. Once we say it’s the reader’s expectation, and not the author’s, that determines a work’s status, then we can accommodate nonfiction writers whose works’ content isn’t believed to be true: it isn’t the result of the work, but the expectation surrounding the creation and aim of the work, that fix the work’s status. The new definition of fiction could go something like:

“A work of **textual** fiction is a set of sentences *S* **and formal features *FF***, **read with the expectation that** much, if not all, of whatis said, implied, **or formally conveyed** by *S* **and *FF***is not true.”

Focusing on the reader’s expectation also captures the fact that readers don’t care about the fiction/nonfiction distinction unless they’re unclear about the expectations or aims of a work. Of course, authors will write with readers’ expectation formations in mind, and they’ll craft their work in a way that invites particular expectations or simply label their work to help with expectation formation. More needs to be said about a definition of fiction that focuses on reader expectation, which I leave for future work.[[15]](#footnote-15)

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1. This is in line with Walton (1990) and Stock (2017) who argue that prescription or intention, and not *actual* imagining, is key for fictional truth. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Thanks to Neil Van Leeuwen for this point. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Sainsbury (2014) for a discussion on the variety of fictional operators and Savage (2020) for more trouble with fictional operators. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Hill, Van Leeuwen, and Tuna in the symposium also discuss how our imaginings go beyond believing certain things to be true in fiction. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. There’s disagreement on whether the incompleteness is epistemic or metaphysical in nature. A possible worlds approach would take incompleteness to be epistemic in nature; those focused on authorial intention might think there’s no fact of the matter about certain fictional states of affairs, so the incompleteness is metaphysical. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See Williams ad Woodward (2019) for a discussion of the permissivist vs. prohibitionist approach to resolving incompleteness. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. The terminologies come from Gendler (2006). See Tuna’s piece in the symposium for more discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Thanks to Jonathan Weinberg for this point. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Liao (2016) for discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Though Stock (2017) and Weatherson (2004) think an impoverished context and an implicit “that’s all” clause trigger resistance. My point is that most fictions don’t provide further context or a way out of the implicit clause as to reverse the resistance. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Gendler (2000) for discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Thanks to Michel-Antoine Xhingnesse for this example. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See Kim (2022) for further discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Thanks to Jonathan Weinberg for this point. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Thanks to Neil Van Leuwen, Emine Hande Tuna, Michel-Antoine Xhignesse, and Jonathan Weinberg for feedback on a previous draft and to Kyle Kirby for help in preparing the manuscript. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)