


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What Is Asian American Philosophy?

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ASIA, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS, and the Americas have long been joined by migration, trade, and the imaginations of the people who have occupied these areas. But, since roughly the late nineteenth century, the movement toward global capitalism and the spread of imperialism began to consolidate this loose network of relations into a large connective region. The transformation was not unlike what had been transpiring across the Atlantic, perhaps the “Black Atlantic.” And the coalescing processes involved here, as with the Atlantic, raise myriad questions about political economy, ethical relations, and historical self-understanding. By the late twentieth century, one conception of this regional formation came to be expressed in a popular celebratory language centered around the idea of a “Pacific Rim.” And it has been criticized sharply by a host of scholars and activists.¹ For the discourse highlights commerce, tourism, cross-cultural experience, migration, and the like without giving sufficient attention to, often even masking or mystifying, the wars, atrocities, poverty, colonialism, dehumanizing labor, political suppression, and environmental devastation that fill the history of this region as conditions or effects of global capitalism and imperialism.

For better or worse, then, Asia, the Pacific Islands, and the Americas have inter-suffused each other with increasing intensity for more than a century. And so, not unlike the idea of European philosophy, Asian philosophy, or some other philosophy organized around human, and often ethnoracial, geographic categories, there seems to be a basis for a “Pacific regional philosophy,” “Amerasian philosophy,” or some such philosophical orientation. This chapter, however, focuses on a subset of such an approach, namely the

part that concerns U.S.-Asia-Pacific relations, and, more particularly though not exclusively, the social worlds of Asians in America. For convenience, “Asian American philosophy” will be used to designate the philosophy born of that context. As will become clearer, I join many who regard the United States to be an empire and to have been so long before its current Eurasian or Middle Eastern incursions. Consequently, I take the political geography of this nation to stretch *far* beyond the confines of its formal fifty states. Since roughly the late nineteenth century, the United States has asserted various kinds of dominion across Latin America, many of the Pacific Islands, and much of East Asia. So we will need to broaden our conception of “Asians in America” and, hence, “Asian America” and “Asian American philosophy” as we enlarge our geopolitical gaze from a fifty-states republic to a multicontinental empire.

In giving an account of Asian American philosophy, a good deal of backdrop has to be provided, like the history of Asian Americans and America in Asia. In fact, some important aspects of the backdrop will themselves need elaboration. For example, we will need some discussion of modern Asia as such and some related political epistemology. I think it goes without saying that the wider American public knows little about these histories, let alone their implications. For the civic narratives of the United States often rewrite in “Grand Republic” style the history of America in the Asia-Pacific and of Asians and Pacific Islanders in America. And the U.S. educational system largely follows suit or ignores the “difficult” historical facts altogether. And with the philosophical focus of this chapter, the problem is compounded by a peculiar situation in which classical Asian philosophy has come to represent virtually all of Asian philosophy in the Western academy. Since what might be called “modern Asian philosophy,” of which Asian American philosophy is partly an instance, receives almost no hearing in Western philosophy, there is no preexisting niche into which Asian American philosophy can be readily inserted. A good bit of ground clearing, then, is in order. So this chapter slowly builds up to a discussion of Asian American philosophy.

In the first section, I consider the peculiar reception of classical Asian philosophy by Western philosophy and how this points to larger concerns about Orientalism and colonial modernity in Asia. The second section characterizes both the modern sociohistorical condition that forms the field-defining context for modern Asian philosophy and modern Asian philosophy itself. In the third and final section, I present an account of Asian America and Asian American philosophy that is continuous with the earlier discussion of modern Asia and modern Asian philosophy. And given

the fairly wide unfamiliarity with Asian America, my discussion of it is a fairly concrete, historically informed, political philosophical description.

Asian Philosophy and Modernity's Orient

At the outset, some clarification of the expression “classical Asian philosophy” is in order. Largely following convention, I mean to include under this label the originary texts primarily of Hinduism, Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Included as well are the many centuries of critical, sometimes divergent, reflection upon them (e.g., Theravada as opposed to Mahayana Buddhism, Mozi's critique and Mencius's reinvigoration of Confucianism, etc.) and recent discussions and advances on that general body of thought. So, for example, comparative studies of the nature of consciousness from the standpoints of Buddhism and analytic philosophy would be included under this heading (though not exclusively so). In addition, some positions on Confucianism and human rights could be cited as instances of such philosophy (and other kinds as well). I include both examples under the rubric of classical Asian philosophy (without confining them there) because both have the explicit aim of bringing to the comparative dialogue a classical Asian system conceived as such even if interpreted by means of the best contemporary analyses available. In a similar vein, though twentieth-century neo-Confucianist work might be called “contemporary Asian philosophy,” that title would be shorthand for the more ponderous “contemporary classical Asian philosophy.” Thus, the guiding concern here is system retention, not recency of analysis.² I leave open the question of how much retention is needed for establishing conceptual continuity. And, of course, significant conceptual modifications can result in a position sufficiently hybrid as to call into question whether the work remains solely or even minimally a classical Asian system. For instance, somebody might develop a position that deeply integrates political liberalism and Confucianism, maybe a kind of Rawlsian Confucianism or a Confucianist Rawlsianism. The work, then, (if coherent) would potentially be a case of both classical Asian philosophy and Western philosophy. Consequently, the phenomenon of theoretical hybridity is acknowledged, and the borders around the concept of classical Asian philosophy are recognized to be permeable.

Recently, ethnoracial philosophy, especially in its critical modes, has begun to amass some interest in the North American scene. The last few decades have witnessed a surge of creative activity in philosophical work from Africana and African American, Latin American and Latino, and

Native American approaches.³ At the first-order level, these areas have been productive for many decades, in some cases centuries, despite their near banishment from Western philosophy. And, in recent years, such institutional erasure has been an important theme in the metaphilosophy of each of these fields, generating new moral epistemic perspectives for reconstructing philosophy.

Significantly, Asian philosophy does not follow suit. Like the other ethnoracial philosophies, this one faces the communicative difficulties arising from racism, imperialism, Eurocentrism, and the like. Yet, quite unlike its cousins, Asian philosophy has had a long history of Western defenders. Importantly, this history of advocacy has identified Asian philosophy almost exclusively with one of its main species, namely *classical* Asian philosophy. I shall return to this point later. In any case, the Western advocacy has sometimes been dialogical and nuanced. <QU>At other times, it has involved stiff binaristic thinking or exoticizing romanticism. All the same, enough positive interest by enough philosophers of the West has enabled classical Asian philosophy to occupy some sort of position within the domain of philosophy proper as conceived by Western philosophy. This makes classical Asian philosophy unique among ethnoracial philosophies. For, in contrast, all the other non-Western, non-Asian philosophies have struggled for even basic philosophical recognition from Western audiences. It is hardly surprising, then, that East-West philosophy has been and continues to be both the paradigm and statistical norm for cross-cultural or global philosophy in the West. But, in spite of being granted philosophical status, it seems quite clear that classical Asian philosophy has been relegated to an inferior position within the Western framework. This problematic inclusion and the more thoroughgoing exclusion of other ethnoracial philosophies, together, indicate complexity in the racial politics of metaphilosophy. As it turns out, this politics is deeply linked to the larger modern scene in which the confrontation of Asia and the West transformed Asia and to an extent the West as well. And we get a natural entry into this sociohistorical situation through a consideration of classical Asian philosophy's special position in Western philosophy.

Whatever may be the full story of classical Asian philosophy's unique reception, I think it cannot have as its center the apparently innocent idea that early Western proponents of classical Asian philosophy simply understood and appreciated the special philosophical character and potential contributions of this foreign system of thought. For, first of all, why didn't other non-Western systems receive similar, even if not equal, appreciation? One might contend that only classical Asian philosophy involves a recog-

nizable form of philosophical argumentation and admits of the classic distinctions between metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. The basic problem with this view, however, is that it is simply false: Latin American philosophy, to take just one example, reveals these same features, at the very least because of its hybridity, yet receives nothing even remotely close to the treatment Asian philosophy has received. As noted in Latin Americanist metaphilosophy, such evidently philosophical movements as positivism, analytic philosophy, and existentialism have all made their way through the continent and exerted real influence in the philosophy there.⁴ Even if one rejects one or all of these movements, nobody, so far as I know, denies that they involve philosophical argumentation, address the classic subdivisions of philosophy, and, therefore, can lay claim to the title of philosophy. Yet Latin American philosophy remains almost entirely outside of Western philosophical discussion.

Moreover, even if those features of Western philosophy were largely absent from most or all non-Western systems, there is no reason why Western philosophy could not in any case learn from these other systems of thought, either in and of themselves or through the partial reconstruction of their terms. Consider that in philosophy of art, few deny that aesthetic discourse, art itself, and their entwined histories are basic required areas of knowledge and even sources of insight in spite of their not being philosophy. And in philosophy of science, a solid grasp of evolution, Newtonian mechanics, relativity, quantum mechanics, and the history of science is largely considered fundamental to doing good work in this field. So to do metaphilosophy well, and especially to venture making universalist or globalist claims, shouldn't it be imperative that one study the great systems of thought the world over? As it turned out, little of this was done in any comprehensive way, often not even in a partial way. And yet the universalisms or globalisms have endured, whether Western or Western-Asian systems have formed the heart.

Once we observe the larger scene, then, we find we cannot look simply at the intrinsic merits of classical Asian philosophy and the intellectual integrity of its Western advocates. Something further or something else is involved. Attention must also be paid, it seems, to the way such Western advocacy institutionally tracked the merits of classical Asian philosophy. Again, the general *type* of reason that would motivate engagement with Asian philosophy—that is, appreciation of a culturally distinctive philosophical system's internal merits or wider philosophical contributions—applies also to other non-Western, non-Asian philosophies. As well, the scope of the Western universalisms or globalisms common to East-West

philosophy would seem to necessitate not simply an examination of Asian philosophy but a far more ranging assessment of ethnoracial systems of thought. So philosophical cross-cultural appreciation by itself fails to explain interest in classical Asian philosophy, and insistence on it skirts an issue with which it is enmeshed, namely the peculiar singularity of classical Asian philosophy's legitimated status. Whatever the full story might be, it seems difficult to plausibly deny here the long-standing reign of the Hegelian world-historical hierarchy in which it is believed that only the expressions of Asian civilizations begin to approach those of Europe.⁵ The turn toward Asia, it seems, was also a turn away from Africa and the indigenous Americas, among other places. Incidentally, the entrenchment of this Hegelian structure might help to explain why, once admitted into philosophy proper, classical Asian philosophy, presumably stagnant or immature, was so often relegated to the margins and only the stalwart would defend a place for it at the center.

A full account of how and why this Hegelian configuration emerged is beyond this chapter, but *that* it did seems clear. As well, that its legacy continues should also be evident. This presses upon us the question of what accounts for the distinctive institutional turn toward Asia in the first place? Here we can find help in the literature on Orientalism and imperialism in Asia. And we come upon a second reason why the hierarchical legitimation of classical Asian philosophy is not merely a matter of Western advocates of classical Asian philosophy moving against the grain and appreciating the world of ideas aright.

<QU>Upon a nineteenth- or early twentieth-century imperial map of the world, one will find planted on *nearly every territory on the planet* the flag of England, France, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Russia, Italy, Germany, America, or Japan. As we should know, though it is often conveniently forgotten, domination was the global order of the day. The mechanisms of control took many forms. Whichever was employed in a given territory, the exercise of infiltrative powers had to be massive and sustained to suitably reorganize the colony or semi-colony. And it would be a serious historical error to suppose that the Euro-American and Japanese imperial networks were only economic, political, and military in nature. The wars that changed the face of the planet and maintained essentially a global white supremacy (and a white-Japanese one in East Asia) were fought across the mental landscape as across the literal towns and countrysides of the world. Occupying forces sought to divest the populace not only of the more overt means of insurgency but also, through various

administrative and ideological structures, the ability to control information, education, and cultural production.

Focusing on Europe's East (and to an extent America's West), Edward Said has famously argued that the West's self-conception was profoundly shaped by its material domination and correlated discursive containment of the Orient so-called. And he explained this in terms of the stronger thesis that Europe discursively created the Orient and, through the Orient's intensive relation to Europe, the West itself. Moreover, he contended that even apparently innocuous or positive conceptions of the Orient could be in the grips of a latent dominative Orientalist structure.⁶ On such an account, therefore, it is no surprise that a West obsessed so with the East would have a number of its scholars hit upon the major philosophical developments of Asia and many end up actually appreciating them. And, on a more contentious note, a Saidian analysis might yield the judgment that even the Western advocacy of classical Asian philosophy could not but play a hegemonic role and was thereby accommodated in the so-called marketplace of ideas. Now, whether or not one accepts this notion of inevitable complicity, the larger dominative context indicates that Western appreciation of Asian philosophy, even when genuine and nuanced, must be understood within broader *patterns or tendencies*. We must shift the context from mere cross-cultural encounter to *interpolity domination*.

As mentioned, this relation of subjection was not only political and economic, but cultural and conceptual. And the discourse of the Orient did not merely derogate the peoples and cultures of Asia. It also depicted them in other distorting ways, ways that made them appear, for example, safe, manageable, or in need of Western aid or governance, thereby reflecting and reinforcing their conditions of subjection. For instance, and maybe most obviously, Asians were often depicted as lacking the ability to govern themselves in a rational manner due allegedly to certain of their cultural traits or more inherently bodily dispositions. Correlatively, Westerners regarded themselves as having the ability to play a positive role in the aid or governance of Asians. This role may have been meaningful on a number of different fronts, from the pleasures of racial contempt to the "moral satisfaction" of fulfilling the duty of uplifting "inferior indigenes" to the more obvious benefits of regional control and economic advantage. And there are many other kinds of cases of conceptual distortions that facilitated polity domination. Consider, as a further example, that Asian cultures might have been regarded as a complementing counterpart, but ultimately an inferior one, to Western culture. Specifically, certain Western

theorists who were not hyperrationalists might have mapped onto the East-West polarity the emotion-reason, religion-science, and feminine-masculine dichotomies, respectively. This seems to have been rather common. But, unlike many others, these theorists might have valued both terms of the dichotomies and, hence, both East and West so conceived, even as they valued more highly the West-reason-science-masculine cluster. In such cases, Asians would be safely, perhaps even deftly, circumscribed or contained within the psyche and could be admitted under qualified conditions into some domains of the imperial polity. A variant of this last example might involve the commodification of Asian culture, food, religion, and even people as some sort of exotic, perhaps even cognitively sophisticated, product for Western cultural consumption. In these latter kinds of cases, there can be dominative Orientalism without overtly arrogant or destructive intentions.

With some modifications, Said can be understood as putting forward two projects. First, in politics, history, and arguably philosophy, he makes the imperial domination and discursive containment of the Orient a *tenacious datum*, one that should be salient across a *range* of theoretical frameworks. Second, he offers a Foucauldian-Gramscian analysis of this datum. This distinction is easily overlooked or underappreciated. The separation of the two claims means that even if one rejects the latter effort out of an aversion to Foucault or Gramsci, one must still contend with the first. Perhaps Said can be imagined here as saying that even the middle-road political liberal must acknowledge the Eurocentric linguistic and inferential patterns of the common discourse on the Orient and the West; that this was deeply shaped by the epistemic authorities and culture-makers whose polity economically and militarily dominated the peoples of Asia; and that such domination was in turn facilitated by the misshapen discourse. Nothing in the prior sentence necessarily invokes Foucault or Gramsci, but the datum of discursive containment and more generally of colonial modernity are preserved. Consequently, as we shift our focus from mere cross-cultural encounter to interpolity domination, we can see that the imperialist scene, with its project of discursive derogation or management, is comprehensible from a number of theoretical standpoints.

The foregoing clarifies the significant conceptual pull or undertow toward the so-called Orient experienced by the West. This should hardly surprise given the profound enmeshment of "Orient" and "West." Consequently, the focus on Asian philosophical systems in the Western project of global or universalist philosophy seems deeply, even if not reductively, linked to the specific kind of Western preoccupation with Asia that characterized colonial modernity. Another implication is that we must bring

some measure of critical scrutiny to Western advocacy of Asian philosophy, even if we do not regard it as inevitably complicitous with imperialism in Asia. Western characterizations of both the nature of classical Asian philosophy and the need for its inclusion within the wider philosophical forum must be examined for blatant or subtle Orientalism. And there is nothing rude or mean about this. The need for such scrutiny is an unfortunate result of the complex political and epistemic situation described. There is no claim made here that every discussion of Asia and classical Asian philosophy is Orientalist or Orientalist in the same way or degree. The focus has been directed upon patterns and tendencies. Something stronger, more totalistic, like that delivered in a Saidian analysis, will be preferred by some, but general structures are all that are needed for the case at hand.⁷

A final consideration is that anticolonialism and anti-Orientalism too must take care lest they inadvertently employ subtle Orientalist forms of thought. This is an important and controversial area of analysis. For some might contend that the use of binaristic thinking, which is common to Orientalism, in the project of anticolonialism ends up reinscribing Orientalism. Others seem to maintain that the intended or actual use of the ideas, binaristic or not, is more important for determining the status of the ideas. However we decide on this and related issues, it is clear that there are serious and far-ranging epistemological implications of discursive containment and colonial domination.⁸ And, for the purposes of this chapter, that is the main point I wish to emphasize.

I have discussed how the consolidation of a Hegelian structure and the condition of Orientalism, together, complicate any simple claim to the effect that Western defenders of classical Asian philosophy were simply following their philosophical conscience during cross-cultural encounters. One aspect of the situation not yet discussed is the transformation of Asian philosophy and the development of new forms of Asian thought. In various ways, these new forms would come to bear the marks of the Orientalist modernity to which they were in part replies. And, subsequently, these modern Asian philosophies would go unrecognized by Western philosophy in ways that partly separate them from classical Asian philosophy and partly link them to other non-Western, non-Asian philosophies. I turn now to these new developments and the bifurcation within Asian philosophy.

Modern Asian Philosophy

As noted earlier, “classical Asian philosophy” includes the originary teachings primarily of Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, and

the critical scrutiny and creative elaboration and revision they have received across the centuries up to the present moment. And there is nothing absolute here: evolution, hybridity, and multiple instantiation of disparate philosophical systems are all acknowledged possibilities. What I have called “modern Asian philosophy” makes essential reference to elements of the earlier discussion, such as imperialism, Orientalism, and modernity. It gathers reflections, mostly since the nineteenth century (and possibly in some cases since the sixteenth century), on the experience of Asians and diasporic Asians in their colonial and postcolonial lifeworlds and world-systems.⁹ There is incredible diversity across the lives and situations of modern Asians. But the broader colonial context and its legacies have been powerfully unifying *at an overarching level* and serve thereby to give some cohering force to the rubric of modern Asian philosophy. I cannot offer a full account of Orientalist modernity and its legacies. But in what follows I quickly note three relevant aspects of Asian modernity. They concern certain dialectics that emerged within the sociopolitical contexts faced by Asians and the subsequent transnationalization of many features of those contexts. Afterward, I briefly elaborate on one of these aspects, the colonial dialectic of Asian modernity, to flesh out some lines of thought that get taken up later. I then turn to modern Asian philosophy.

By the mid- to late nineteenth century, virtually all Asian peoples had to contend with existing or impending Western and Japanese domination. As noted earlier, the social worlds of Asians have been permeated by an Orientalist modernity consisting of racial, economic, cultural, and military subjection. Importantly, the formative moments within this tragic modern context have not always been one-sided. The social worlds of Asians have also been shaped by their own resistance against precisely this vast subordinating condition. The confrontation and creation took many forms, and I will discuss some of them shortly. But suffice it to say for now that this responsiveness on the part of Asians generated a kind of dialectic within colonial modernity. And many instances of it were politically radical and some very concretely threatening to Western hegemony. Among the most spectacular manifestations of the formative colonial dialectic have been the many mass-based anticolonial movements, violent and nonviolent, that emerged in many areas and forms since the late nineteenth century. Perhaps the Gandhian and Maoist variants were the most globally influential.

After WWII, a wave of formal decolonization began spreading across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. Importantly, however, most and possibly all decolonized nations faced an enormous difficulty, namely that formal political liberty did not guarantee true autonomy. For stronger nations

could avail themselves of various international structures, especially economic ones, to subtly or overtly encroach upon or control weaker or fledgling nations. Thus, as many have noted, postcolonial nations of Asia could be, and very often were, subjected to an indirect, economic, or “neo” colonialism. And this often occurred with the aid or through the agency of a dictator or set of socioeconomic elites drawn from the ranks of the people themselves. But within this postcolonial neocolonial context, as in the previous explicitly colonial condition, Asians continued to shape some part of their situation through their various replies to their altered world. And so a kind of postcolonial dialectic emerged as Asians both challenged and were influenced by their sociopolitical surroundings. Interestingly, colonial and postcolonial dialectics of the kinds mentioned here could be simultaneously present in Asia since not all nations were decolonized at the same time. Consequently, perhaps it should not be surprising that postcolonial Philippines and especially postcolonial South Korea (and colonial Puerto Rico) were in their respective ways gathered in a neocolonial fashion by the United States and made to be participants in the explicitly imperial war against Vietnam.

Finally, consider that since the last few decades a number of transpacific transnational processes have emerged and coalesced in modern Asian and American experience. The most obvious case is the massive migration of Asians of all countries to the United States after the immigration reforms of 1965. The population of Asians in America has more than tripled since the anti-Asian immigration blockades were lifted. As a result, currently more than half of Asian Americans are foreign born.¹⁰ Moreover, some Asians are now shuttling back and forth so often across the Pacific that their identities seem no longer to have classic attachments to nation-states. And, apart from populations and migration, the matrices of business, trade, and investment that straddle the Pacific have become so pronounced a phenomenon that we now have a new lingo by which to discuss the matter, like “Pacific Rim,” “the Four Dragons,” and so on. We also have a growing awareness of the problem of outsourcing to Asia and the ubiquitous presence of sweatshops. The effects of economic transnationalism can even be seen in the institutional structure of Asian studies. At the scholarly level, much funding is now being made available by organizations with close ties to national or international commerce agencies.¹¹ And, at the student level, it seems that undergraduates frequently adopt an Asian studies major or minor to supplement their business major.

As I have noted earlier, I do not offer here a full account of these three aspects of the modern Asian experience. Many books could be written on

each and still other features. Nevertheless, before turning to an account of modern Asian philosophy, I think it would be helpful to consider briefly at least some of the details of the colonial dialectic that emerged within Orientalist modernity since it offers a natural narrative starting point and since many of its aspects remain relevant.

In the colonial dialectic, Asian thought was often arrayed against Western dominion and tended to gravitate around a sociopolitical conception configured by two sets of distinctions. One distinction separated culture and thought, on the one hand, and science and technology, on the other, in the examination of a society.¹² The other consisted of a wide-ranging comparative relation—actually many of them—between “Orient” and “West.” Sometimes, East and West were conceptualized as normatively contrastive antipodes (e.g., the bad materialistic West versus the good spiritual East), as complements to each other (e.g., the scientific West and the spiritual East), as being only superficially different (e.g., the basic unity of all religious strivings, East and West), and perhaps in still other ways. Also, importantly, some sort of world-historical self-consciousness distinctive to modernity typically undergirded and integrated, not always coherently, both sets of distinctions. Nobody could deny that the world had radically changed with the dominative presence of the West and the modernization processes brought in its wake. The urgent task at hand, at every level of consciousness, culture, and the polity, was to reconceptualize and sustain a viable way of life in the face of these changes. But whether Asians sought a hermetic retreat from or a full, even self-effacing, insertion into the modernizing world-trajectory, the presence of a colonizing West and a transformed world were *constant* and *essential* reference points.¹³ Unsurprisingly, we find here many of the ideas that concerned Said about colonial discourse in the service of imperialism and even anti-imperialism. A brief tour of some of the replies to Orientalist modernity should be considered. And there are conceivably many ways to proceed. For expository ease, I offer a standard story.

On the one end of the spectrum, an Asian theorist might have rejected every form of classical Asian outlook and thoroughly embraced some version of modern Western thought as well as modern Western science. This would have been modernization-as-Westernization of a total kind. I am uncertain if there were any prominent thinkers who adhered completely to this program.¹⁴ For it would be difficult to completely extirpate earlier cultural influences and, hence, totally Westernize in taking up this sort of project. But surely the agendas of some at least approximated this extreme. On the other end, an Asian theorist might have stayed the course, as it

were, and maintained more or less the same classical philosophic system and scientific or technological outlook. I do not know how many pursued this route to its extreme. It seems not uncommon for new and powerful globalizing influences to be met by the entrenchment of local cultural forms. But few, it seems, could totally reject the efficacy or benefits of Western science and technology, whether perceived in the form of medicine, railroads, or machine guns.¹⁵ Here, too, there may have been some who approached this pole asymptotically. Most, however, followed some sort of intermediate path, and a variety of such paths emerged. Significantly, none of these conceptual options (nor the related new questions and issues taken up by extant classical Asian philosophy) would have been intelligible or felt to be urgently important were it not for the variegated structures of Orientalist modernity. Considered this way, we get a clearer sense of how there can be such a thing as “modern Asian philosophy” in spite of the diversity of Asian experience and thought. I think we can usefully differentiate at least three kinds of conceptual replies lying between total rejection of and total continuity with premodern Asian life-forms.

First, many endorsed the idea of maintaining fundamentally classical Asian culture and thought, even if partly nourished by Western streams, and adopting Western science and technology. The late nineteenth-century Japanese traveler and writer Fukuzawa Yukichi has often been identified with marrying the concepts of “Eastern Spirit” and “Western Science.”¹⁶ Later, some members of the Kyoto School of philosophy, who have subsequently been accused of complicity with Japanese imperialism, contended that Europe had reached a spiritual crisis that could only be resolved through enlightenment derived from a generally Asian but distinctively Japanese cultural form inspired largely by Buddhist tenets.¹⁷ But setting aside this grand salvific trajectory, the basic idea of Asian culture combined with Western science, and their union placed on a modernization path, has been prevalent across modern Asia. And some version of this idea, with or without the modernization impetus, has been, if not the primary, at least one of the main ways in which an “alternative modernity” was theorized by many Asian intellectuals and pursued by a host of Asian political leaders.

Second, some espoused a less purist conception of alternative modernity and developed more consciously syncretic East-West hybrid social forms to accompany the adoption of Western science and technology. Sun-Yat Sen (founder of the Chinese Republic), for example, appealed to a broadly Confucianist sense of rightness in moral and political dealings and advocated a partly Sinified version of Western civic nationalism.¹⁸

Third, some sought to raise within Asia what they conceived to be a Western variant of alternative modernity in the form of anarchist revolution and community or, later, Marxist revolution and communism. On this conception, the political economy of capitalism was the central explanatory structure (or at least a very significant one, in the case of anarchism). So modernity was conceived to be fundamentally marked by an intensification of class inequality, state suppression, and imperialism. Marxists in particular, especially after the work of Lenin, regarded global imperialism to be the highest stage of capitalism. With the order of the day conceived this way, anarchism and Marxism, though generated in the West, were understood as fundamentally opposed to the West as it had in fact historically developed and opposed as well to the feudal inequities and governmental corruption of their own Asian societies.¹⁹ Many who advocated this agenda shaped radical Western thought to fit their local contexts, which in turn sometimes influenced Western radicalism itself. The “Sinified Marxism” of Mao Zedong and its global influence, especially in the 1960s, is an obvious instance.²⁰ An earlier and interesting example is the “Third World” influence of the Indian Marxist Manabendranath Roy on Lenin regarding conceptions of national liberation generated at the Third Communist International in the interwar years.²¹ Now, it might be argued that this third type of alternative modernity, insofar as it has a partly hybridized theoretical outlook, was a species of the second type. This might be so. But the reconception of modernity in anarchism and particularly Marxism, combined with the subsequent historical importance of Marxism’s expansion and revolutionary impetus in Asia during the Cold War, seem to justify this third type of Asian alternative modernity having its own conceptual niche. Moreover, this would accommodate the fact that many who espoused this sort of agenda regarded alternative modernity of the first and much of the second kind to be alternatives in name only and to be in actuality Asian ideologies that facilitated the spread of global capitalism and imperialism, which lay at the heart of colonial modernity.

In sum, I have very briefly noted a spectrum of responses to Western dominion.²² And let me emphasize that I do not regard the three intermediary positions discussed above, all variants of a claim to Asian alternative modernity, to be exhaustive of the replies lying between complete continuity with and complete denunciation of the precolonial era. Let me also add that some cases may not easily conform to these rubrics, though they will likely be linked to them.²³ But, even if limited in some ways, this characterization of the modern Asian spectrum covers a wide array of cases, re-

veals the operations of a complex colonial dialectic, and clarifies at some level of generality the social world inhabited and partly shaped by Asians.²⁴

Clearly, this brief portrait of the modern Asian condition plays an important role in characterizing modern Asian philosophy. But we also need a general way of describing the formation of a philosophy and applying it to the case at hand. And in light of the first section of this chapter, this general account combined with the general portrait would clarify further why modern Asian philosophy is not merely contemporary classical Asian philosophy. Here, we encounter the problem of what unifies the philosophy in question. Some may seek an essence, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for all the cases that fall under a particular philosophical label. Like many, I think this has dim prospects. Others, and I follow them, focus on family resemblances or on the collection of cases in accord with a coherent metatheoretical project. We can borrow insight from the work of Lucius Outlaw on how Africana philosophy is formed.

How, then, to speak of “commonalities” or “unity” sufficient to underwrite Africana philosophy as a disciplinary field of studies with distinct boundaries and intellectual and praxiological coherence? The only appropriate way of doing so is by first recognizing that the unifying commonalities sought for are provided through the third-order organizational, classificatory, or archaeological strategies involved in “gathering” people and discursive practices under “Africana” and “philosophy,” respectively. I say “third order” because the gathered discursive practices are themselves “second order” in that they are reflections on “first order”—that is to say *lived*—experiences of the various African and African-descended persons and peoples.²

If we apply Outlaw’s metaphilosophical conception, modern Asian philosophy can be understood in terms of the following three general levels.

First and obviously, it recognizes that there are lived experiences of Asians and diasporic Asians. As I have told the story, these experiences will often bear the marks of their transformed world, and specifically the colonial and postcolonial dialectics and the transnational circuits discussed above. I think this forms the *nucleus* of the starting point for modern Asian philosophy. But there are other relevant kinds of experience at this first-order level, and their relevance derives from the deeply relational and relationally expansive nature of colonial modernity, Orientalism, and anticolonialism. For example, many kinds of Western or white experiences are linked to Orientalist modernity, whether they involve contempt,

exoticization, calculating indifference, outrage, or solidarity. Significantly, some non-Asian non-Western experiences are also relevant and interestingly manifold. For example, Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. Du Bois, whatever differences they had, often paired Africa and Asia, and Pan-Africanism and Pan-Asianism, in their critical perspectives upon global colonial modernity.²⁶ And one of the hallmarks at the start of the postcolonial era is the 1955 Bandung Conference focused upon Afro-Asian cooperation and shared resistance against neocolonialism.²⁷

Second, modern Asian philosophy is concerned with reflections, philosophical and philosophically related, upon these lived experiences or the wider context informing them. There are many—too many—such examples, and a good number of them overlap in interesting ways: Filipino anticolonial thought in the work of José Rizal,²⁸ Carlos Bulosan,²⁹ José Sison,³⁰ and others; May 4th “Chinese Occidentalism,”³¹ as in the writings of Kang Youwei³² and Liang Qichao;³³ Gandhism and the debate over its viability,³⁴ as seen in the work of Sri Aurobindo,³⁵ Rabindranath Tagore,³⁶ Ashis Nandy,³⁷ and others; Maoism,³⁸ as seen not only in the work of Mao himself, of course, but in revolutionary movements across the world since the 1960s; the Kyoto School,³⁹ as exemplified by the work of Nishida Kitaro, Nishitani Keiji, Miki Kiyoshi, and others; Asian Marxisms, like the work of Tran Duc Thao,⁴⁰ Manabendranath Roy,⁴¹ and others; Asian existentialism, as seen in the work of Lu Xun⁴² and Kenzaburo Oe;⁴³ Korean anticolonial and liberatory thought in the Tonghak movement⁴⁴ and later in Minjung thought,⁴⁵ as in the work of Kim Chi-Ha;⁴⁶ subaltern studies, as seen in the work of Gayatri Spivak⁴⁷ and Dipesh Chakrabarty;⁴⁸ Asian feminism, as in the writings of Trinh Minh Ha,⁴⁹ Uma Narayan,⁵⁰ Neferti Tadiar,⁵¹ and others; a host of work that might be grouped under critical Asian studies and Asian American studies, as in the work of Edward Said,⁵² Arif Dirlik,⁵³ Lisa Lowe,⁵⁴ Gary Okihiro,⁵⁵ E. San Juan Jr.,⁵⁶ David Palumbo-Liu,⁵⁷ Colleen Lye,⁵⁸ and so on; and still other rubrics, to be sure. Importantly, there are other kinds of reflections on Asian experience (and related non-Asian experiences). The ones listed just now are mostly Asian reflections on Asian experience. Beyond historical reclamation, like the sort just given, it is unclear whether Asian reflections necessarily form the nucleus of this second-order level as Asian experience does at the first-order level. Perhaps it may not be necessary to weigh in on this issue. In any case, it is important to recognize that non-Asian reflections on Asian and related experiences can certainly form a part of modern Asian philosophy. The sort of Afro-Asian outlook of W. E. B. Du Bois, for example, can and arguably should play an important role at this second-order level.⁵⁹

Third, modern Asian philosophy “gathers” these second-order practices, these philosophical or philosophically related reflections upon the lived experience and world-system of Orientalist modernity and its legacies, through a coherent metadiscursive project. The project here is critical, ethical, and liberatory.⁶⁰ And I leave open the question of how radical the project must be. Such a question will itself be an important issue in modern Asian philosophy. Still, some concrete considerations are in order, and in what follows I do not think that any of the normative claims are beyond the conceptual reach of middle-road liberalism.⁶¹ I think the driving idea at this third-order level is that we should not be mere observers of the tragedy of Orientalist modernity and its enduring legacies, nor mere bystanders in relation to those who struggle against it. Rather, we should be participants in the ongoing struggle, heeding the ethical call and seeking justice and social transformation. In this postcolonial era, neocolonial subjection continues to sully the rights, diminish the powers, and increase the vulnerabilities of vast numbers of Asians in subordinated polities. More urgently, this subjection, even if not solely responsible, continues to conduce to the poverty of literally millions of people, the deterioration of their environments, and the suppression of indigenous democratic movements. Relatedly, we have yet to see any serious reparation efforts for the countless injuries inflicted or goods stolen during at least the explicitly colonial era of Asia. Nor have we seen any civic culture in the United States that seriously grapples with these matters and resists thereby the political epistemology that hides or distorts the cruel facts that make the U.S.-Asia-Pacific region, among other things, a troubling ethical set of relations. In light of these considerations, we must find ways of understanding and transforming the lives and social worlds of modern Asians and the Asian diaspora. In doing so, we should strive to prevent not only Asian replications of Western colonialism, as with Japan earlier, but Asian variants of neocolonialism or complicity with it.⁶² And with the global age upon us, modern Asian philosophy, though it may have Asia as a focal point, must have a global scope. In a way that classical Asian philosophy and so much of Western philosophy could barely imagine, modern Asian philosophy must be a philosophy of solidarity.

With the foregoing conception of modern Asian philosophy before us, it is interesting to consider where some of the more philosophical figures noted above appear in explicitly philosophical texts. Many that have been mentioned—like Liang Qichao, the Kyoto School, Mao, Gandhi, and so on—appear, unsurprisingly, in Asian philosophy texts with a contemporary focus, but exactly how is worth noting. They rarely make an appearance in

contemporary studies of Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, and Buddhism. And they never show up in books on *modern Asian* philosophy as such since there have been no such texts in the first place as far as I know. They do, however, appear in studies under *nation-based* headings. There are anthologies and histories of Indian, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean philosophy that fit this model.⁶³ They indicate that not all Asian philosophy is classical Asian philosophy, even if the conception of Asian thought in Western philosophy and East-West philosophy in particular is largely dominated by a focus on Hinduism, Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. More interestingly, these nation-configured texts highlight conceptual continuity across good portions of the relevant histories covered but rely mostly on national continuity when they provide space for famous texts and figures that represent rupture in the conceptual lineages. Unsurprisingly, all of them, in some fashion or other—and most of them in a very clear way—present their respective modern philosophies as deeply connected to various of the elements of Orientalist modernity that I have discussed throughout this chapter.⁶⁴ But I sense that none of them makes their respective nation-forms a necessary structure imposed upon those philosophies. Modern Asian philosophy as I conceive it, then, gathers and unifies a cross-section of each of these and other national philosophical lineages (as well as non-national ones) under the international, intercontinental, ethical rubric of Orientalist modernity, its legacies, and the ongoing struggle against these. Having offered a general account of modern Asian philosophy, I think some loose ends can be tied, even if only loosely.

First, I do not think that modern Asian philosophy can only be produced by Asians. Unless imagination and reflection do nothing more than record experience, there is no reason why such philosophy could not be produced by non-Asians interested in various aspects of Orientalist modernity and various kinds of Asian experiences of it. Perhaps another way of putting it is that modern Asian philosophy does not require any special modern Asian cultural sensibility, either in the sense of a Pan-Asian cultural outlook, whatever that might be, or one based on a specific Asian nation or ethnicity. Only the right sort of thematic focus and ethical concern about the relevant issues seems required.

Moreover, consider that modern Asian philosophy and classical Asian philosophy may be co-instantiated, and of course this admits of degrees. Some of what falls under the first and second types of claims to alternative modernity would offer examples. So the liberatory emphasis of modern Asian philosophy, though historically focused on Orientalist modernity, is by no means opposed in principle to consideration of Bud-

dhism, Confucianism, Hinduism, and Daoism for their liberatory potential. This consideration underscores that, in the first place, modern Asian philosophy will likely involve some sort of East–West hybridity, but that the Asian element involved may not be sufficient or may not be of the right kind for the philosophy in question to count as both modern and classical Asian philosophy. There is no space for adequate discussion of this here. But let me note that this hybridity need not involve explicitly Asian philosophical elements mixed with Western philosophy. It can involve general Asian cultural elements or reflections about Asian concerns or realities with which Asian and Western philosophy proper can be brought into dialogue.⁶⁵ Moreover, cases of Asian or Western theory that may not be regarded as philosophy proper, like postcolonial theory, can be brought into the mix.⁶⁶ In a related vein, I should also note that the framework provided here can potentially accommodate the idea of post-modern realities or of postmodernist thought. Indeed, some of the globalized and decentered economic realities of the “Pacific Rim” seem to demand attention to what might be involved in the “next phase” of the trajectories and frameworks considered here. And, as it turns out, Western postmodernism—for instance, the influence of Derrida and Foucault—has already played a part in some of the reflections that could be gathered by modern Asian philosophy.

Finally, I should note that a variety of correlates to modern Asian philosophy exist or could in principle. There can be regional, subregional, supraregional, and more purely conceptual differences between philosophies linked to modern Asian philosophy. For example, a related regional correlate could be Australasian philosophy, which might be concerned philosophically with the thought and experiences of the lower region of Asia, the Pacific Islands, Australia, and New Zealand. Another, a subregional one, might be Asian English philosophy, which might cover the reflections and experiences of Asians in England and in the British empire. Presumably, the experience of the South Asian diaspora would loom large in such an orientation. Asian American philosophy would also be of this type since it would concern at least in part the Asian diaspora in the United States. But since the United States is a transpacific empire, Asian American philosophy would be very nearly a regional philosophy. A supraregional case might be called Asiana philosophy, which could be a philosophy of the reflections and experiences of Asians in the world generally. Perhaps its structure, like its syntactical schema, would parallel that of Africana philosophy. Finally, a more conceptually based approach would include Asian existentialism, Asian critical theory, and the like.

Ironically, I think it is arguable that modern Asian philosophy is the first robust form of Asian philosophy. Classical Asian philosophy is undergirded by an Asian concept primarily in terms of the general location of the origin and development of Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism. We need to ask, here, why such a wide geographic entity, Asia, should be thought to track and link these systems of thought usefully? Why not use subregional or national categories, or even no such categories at all? The idea of Asia seems not to do much work as a way of picking out the four main constituents of classical Asian philosophy. What really makes them, severally and collectively, Asian philosophy is their relation to the West, particularly the way the West has dyadically, contrastively, and hierarchically positioned Western thought over Asian thought. <QU>The deeper relation, then, is not so much geography of origins but a certain negativity, that is non-Westernness of a certain kind as dictated largely by the West. In contrast, in modern Asian philosophy, Asia is important less as descriptive geography and far more as a site of historical and ongoing ethical struggle, and this includes the struggle against the very dyadic hierarchical relation that undergirds the collation of Hinduism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism.

Asian American Philosophy

A general account of Asian America is needed to serve as context and offer some content for an articulation of Asian American philosophy. It is also necessary because relatively few have even a basic familiarity with Asian America, even though no conception of America would be complete without it. As it turns out, there is a great deal of complexity and ambiguity here, and thus many ways to characterize Asian America. In what follows, I offer a mostly standard account of two very general directionally based conditions that form Asian America. One concerns the Eastward diasporic movement of Asians to America and the various kinds of racial exclusion they faced. The other focuses on the westward racial imperial movement of the United States into and across the Pacific to large tracts of East Asia. Interestingly, these two sorts of accounts are not always combined analytically, even when aspects of each are noted in a single discussion. The resulting blend may perhaps be deemed unusual. But there is no denying both kinds of movement as constitutive of Asian America.⁶⁷

In the previous section, I suggested that we conceive of mid-nineteenth-century Asia onward in terms of an Orientalist modernity with deep and wide-ranging consequences for virtually all Asian peoples. Much

of the focus was on the dominative presence of Western empires and the Japanese empire, and the complicated responses that emerged. One of the significant effects of this general condition, and it is interesting to consider to what extent it was anticipated, was the migration of so many of the affected peoples to various of these empires. Latent in the discussion thus far has been the pervasive role of race as a hierarchical organizing principle of interpolity and intrapolity relations of an imperial system. Even if economic exploitation and correlated regional control were the engines of imperialism, race played a significant role. The rhetoric that justified imperial incursions in Asia typically adverted to white supremacist (or Japanese supremacist) ideologies at various levels of the imperial populace. So when racialized Asians wanted to migrate to Europe, America, or Australia, a serious problem for white supremacist nations emerged. For the very people who on racial grounds were deemed incapable of self-government, and probably even of being governed, were about to pass, perhaps “swarm,” across the borders.

In the case of the United States, formally racialized immigration blockades were constructed early on when Asia-America contact intensified in the nineteenth century. The first major piece of legislation was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. The rhetoric that won its passage appealed to inassimilability, more strictly biological inferiority, civilizational threat, and white labor displacement. But, since this exclusion act hardly plugged the legal hole through which other Asians could enter, Congress passed in 1917 a widening of the blockade to prohibit entry from the “barred Asiatic zone,” which covered roughly the Middle East all the way to the Pacific Islands.⁶⁸ All the while, Irish, Eastern Europeans, and Southern Europeans were being admitted in massive numbers. As these particular kinds of Europeans were being “whitened” and many even joining in the reviling of Asians, the civic structure of the United States was becoming powerfully formally arrayed against the alien-seeming and apparently inassimilable Asiatic or Oriental. As it turned out, these formal measures would not be fully lifted until as late as 1965.⁶⁹ Consequently, the fact that people of Asian descent comprise a relatively small proportion of Americans, roughly 5 percent, was a legally engineered feat. And so Asians did not *merely* increase their numbers through post-1965 immigration; their numbers increased because the state *promoted* them from the lower strata of a human hierarchy.

Relatedly, those Asians who did gain entry before 1965 faced a barrage of serious racially discriminatory laws. They ranged from, most fundamentally, prohibitions against naturalization (except U.S.-born Asians) to

denials of land ownership to various kinds of anti-Asian “Jim Crow” exclusions, including antimiscegenation laws. An overall structure of legalized disenfranchisement, then, was a basic life situation with which most Asians in America had to contend. And, of course, all this pertains to formal subordination. Demeaning social norms, segregation, cruel labor conditions, outbreaks of violence, stints of racial terrorism, and other such conditions were further outrages of their American experience. I think the significance of these events and the overall situation can hardly be overstated, for they indicate that the concept and reality of the Asian as legal pariah or citizen antithesis inform some of the deepest ideas of what it meant to be an *American* and what it meant for America to be *America*. Such meanings must be decoded to make plain their white normativity and, from the late nineteenth century onward, the specifically, though not uniquely, Orientalist character of that normativity. Whatever else may have been true, then, racism in a variety of forms was not an aberration but a central part of the social world that formed Asian America. Even in this twenty-first century, it is not uncommon to witness one of the more benign but revealing legacies of the earlier period, as when an Asian American, perhaps even a fourth-generation Chinese American, is asked “Where are you from?” and disallowed any answer with an American location.

Obviously, a crucial feature of this troubling history is the role of race. Earlier, I discussed Orientalism as a discursive structure that served Western imperialism in various ways. But its field of saturation includes the ideological terrain of domestic race relations. American Orientalism has a long and complicated history. And it is a telling fact that this history exists in spite of the relatively low number of Asians in the United States for such a long period of time. Clearly, then, Americans have been deeply fixated on the Oriental. As it turns out, American Orientalism has put forward many figurations of the Asian in popular culture from the nineteenth century onward. Cultural theorist Robert Lee tracks them and characterizes how Asians have been regarded variously as pollutant, coolie, deviant, “yellow peril,” model minority, and “gook.”⁷⁰ Perhaps one of the most peculiar aspects of Asian racialization is the simultaneous presence of positive-sounding and negative depictions, like “model minority” and “yellow peril,” respectively. According to historian Gary Okihiro, these depictions must be understood not as an evolution of tropes but as a unified phenomenon in which Asians are variously discursively contained to suit the needs of the hegemonic political context. This is why negative and positive stereotypes can morph into each other “when the situation requires,” as when Asian values, previously a civilizational threat, could,

through an emphasis on family and industry, make Asians an assimilation exemplar, or when too much of the model minority turns into a kind of Asiatic peril that would deny whites their share to some social goods.⁷¹ <QU>Recently, literary theorist Colleen Lye has contended that such recurring racial “praise-and-blame” is best understood as two aspects of a “racial form” whose underlying idea is economic efficiency and whose basic function is to help preserve the economic order of the United States at various crisis points in its profoundly Asia-enmeshed modernity, from the early problem of cheap immigrant labor to the Great Depression to inter-imperial rivalry with Japan.⁷² The work of these and other Asian Americanists offers cogent and compelling (and sometimes conflicting) ways of thinking about how and why Asians have been Orientalized.⁷³

Clearly, we still reside in a period in which Asians are racialized as a kind of model minority and as a kind of potential threat, and perhaps in still other ways. It is troubling that such racialization persists many years after formal civic equality has been achieved and so-called colorblindness has become ascendant in the public discourse. In terms of negative racial regard, anti-Asian hate crimes and potentially consequential racial stereotyping remain serious problems.⁷⁴ In the last couple of decades, we have witnessed recurring versions of yellow perilism in the Democratic National Committee’s campaign finance scandal in the 1990s; the unfounded incarceration of the alleged Chinese spy Wen Ho Lee; the eruption of anti-Asian sentiment in the wake of the U.S. spy plane incident on Hainan Island; and the continual demonization of North Korea. And, since 9-11, anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiment have escalated the number of hate crimes and intensified the general prejudice against South Asians and Asian Muslims. But, as noted, racial “praise” in the form of the model minority myth also endures. It will be a long time before the image of math whiz kids, SAT fanatics, violin virtuosos, and the like are delinked from the idea of the Asian American. What makes the model minority myth a serious problem is that it continues to racialize Asians and, as Okiihiro has pointed out, does so in a way that strategically keeps in play a host of negative perceptions. It also implies criticism of blacks, Latinos, and Native Americans for failing to “pull themselves up by the bootstraps” and thereby erases the racio-economic struggles they (and some subgroups of Asian Americans) continue to face. And insofar as people of any color buy into any aspect of the model minority myth, the solidarity so needed for eliminating racism and injustice is obstructed. In addition, such domestic racial “praise” conceptually unites with and reinforces an internationalist model minority rendering of economically “successful” nations (i.e., the “dragons” or

“tigers” of East Asia) and thereby masks the history of imperialism and Orientalism discussed at length already and the continuing legacies of economic and political subordination.

As the foregoing reveals, one of the most conspicuous features of current and historical racism against Asians is the centrality of Asia-America relations. Although virtually all acknowledge this, many restrict the referents and delimit the significance of this internationalism to human migration and commerce across the Pacific. But Asian America must be understood in terms of a westward movement of America itself to Asia, not just the eastward movement of the Asian diaspora to America. For there is no way to deny the historical fact that the nation-state that excluded diasporic Asians from or within its formal boundaries is the very same that infiltrated, invaded, dominated, or codominated various nations in the Pacific and in Eastern Asia. This marks an important asymmetry between the Asia-Pacific and the Africa-Atlantic, and it indicates a rough structural similarity between the Asia-Pacific and Latin America.⁷⁵ On strictly classic political grounds that any political liberal can in principle recognize, it is clear that America participated as an imperial power in the Orientalist modernity discussed throughout this chapter. Indeed, American late modernity overlaps significantly with the Orientalist modernity of modern Asia.

Interestingly, those who write out empire from the internationalism of Asian racialization do not deny, and of course cannot, the recurring presence of wars. Although most of the small wars of the American twentieth century were fought in Latin America, most of the large-scale wars had an Asian or Pacific theater, and only one of these was initiated because of an outright attack on U.S. territory.⁷⁶ This is more alarming when we consider how racialized and vicious the wars have been, from the Philippines, to Japan, to North Korea, to Vietnam.⁷⁷ And of course, it is only in Asia that a nuclear weapon has ever been used, and directly upon a civilian populace at that. And Asia is also the only place where a second such weapon has ever been used, again directly upon a civilian populace. For many, the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the genocide perpetrated in the Vietnam War, count as paradigm instances of atrocity and of evil.⁷⁸ Arguably, however, other U.S. wars in Asia offer further paradigms. <QU>As recent studies of the U.S. war in the Philippines and in Korea reveal, all kinds of barbarity were perpetrated directly upon civilian populations in ways that would remind many of the subsequent war in Vietnam.⁷⁹ And if it is claimed that the U.S. war with Japan did not involve any atrocities, it is still noteworthy that the mutual and racialized savagery made the Pacific front of WWII markedly different than the European front.⁸⁰ These

brief considerations already give an indication that all has not been well in the history of the so-called Pacific Rim.

Although wars may render empires naked, peace is the context in which they flourish since it is in conditions of stability and normalcy that the conditions of economic control and exploitation can ripen. The larger and longer context of the wars indicates that the United States has maintained an empire in Asia and the Pacific for more than a century. And this condition of dominance has been codified in America's foreign policy and Supreme Court rulings. In getting a general sense of this history, a natural starting point would be the series of annexations, or colony formations, at the end of the nineteenth century. In that period, America had entered a new phase of its modernity. It had traversed and claimed all the contiguous territory to the Pacific, consolidated Jim Crow after the freeing of slaves, developed a sense of racio-national mission in Manifest Destiny, contended with a troubled economy, and imagined the economic prospects of crossing a new Asia-Pacific frontier. Its short successful war against Spain in 1898 offered the occasion for the United States to absorb the former Caribbean and Pacific colonies of Spain—Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, and Cuba in part. By other means, the United States also annexed Hawai'i and half of Samoa. Although each of these nations or kingdoms is relatively small, they offered strategic positions within the center of the Atlantic and the center and base of the Pacific. These tactical positions, combined with an informal control of Latin America and in particular Panama (an Atlantic-Pacific gateway), enabled the United States to have an imperial reach that encompassed enormous tracts of waterways so crucial for transport and trade.

Preserving this hegemony is what made it so crucial for the Supreme Court to pass a series of decrees known as the Insular Cases from 1901 across the next couple decades. Basically, these rulings rendered the Caribbean and Pacific acquisitions colonies without an obvious route to statehood or national independence. Though both states (e.g., New York) and territories (e.g., Puerto Rico and Guam) must act in accord with the U.S. Constitution, they play by different rules and receive uneven powers and benefits. This is why only states can send representatives to Congress with voting power and other kinds of real influence, whereas insular territories can send only representatives with limited voice and no vote. I think most would see this arrangement, at least in the abstract, as clearly antidemocratic. It reveals one aspect of the formal and codified nature of U.S. imperialism. Yet the Insular cases went unchallenged in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Constitution, and this remains true even to this very day.⁸¹ As

the twentieth century progressed, America would consolidate various kinds of formal and informal dominion over nearly the entirety of Latin America and large portions of East Asia, granting it a multicontinental and multihemispheric empire—in a word, an *Amerasian* empire.⁸²

We now have a way of understanding more fully the wars mentioned previously. After purchasing the Philippines from a defeated Spain, the United States faced a Philippines that declared its independence, and thus began the Philippine–American War (1899–1902), the first major anti-imperial war against the United States in the twentieth century. As the Philippine–American War continued, and the waterways and land bases were being secured, the United States began to strengthen its position in Asia. Through the Open Door Policy (1899–1900), the United States was able to join various European empires and Japan in dissecting the commercial ports of China as sites of economic or early neocolonial domination, helping thereby to render China a semicolonial country. The significance of China’s colonial dissection is that unlike the dissection of Africa, there was a minimum of formal political governance so that full economic exploitation could be conducted without the fetters of colonial bureaucracy. And once the United States had pacified the Philippine resistance, important opportunities for imperial consolidation emerged. <QU>Apart from England, Japan was emerging as an important imperial rival in the Asia-Pacific. So when Japan defeated Russia in 1905 in what amounted to an inter-imperial war, the United States used the peace negotiations to establish some rules for its geopolitical chess game. In the Taft–Katsura Memorandum (1905), Japan and the United States secretly negotiated a deal in which Japan would steer clear of the U.S.-possessed Philippines, and the United States would leave alone Korea as Japan moved to annex it as a part of its own empire-building project. Later, further agreements, like the Root–Takahira Agreement (1908), would be added to consolidate a peaceable imperialist status quo in the Asia-Pacific that was structurally similar to what the United States had been developing in Latin America. In hindsight, however, we know that no diplomacy would prevent that “Day of Infamy,” December 7, 1941, when the attack on Pearl Harbor propelled America’s entry into WWII and into violent struggle with its longtime Pacific imperial rival.

Both the event and remembrance of Pearl Harbor offer a revealing context for thinking about U.S. imperialism. Pearl Harbor has a mythic presence in our civic culture. Every December 7, an air of patriotic solemnity enters the national consciousness and the “cost of liberty” is collectively remembered. What never gets discussed, however, is why there was any U.S.

military base in Hawai'i in the first place, why Japan roughly simultaneously attacked a U.S. military base in the Philippines, and why Japan claimed to be doing all this in the name of liberating Asia. The questions have their answer in the fact that Japan was extending its empire by attacking two of the most important Pacific military outposts of a rival empire. What never gets discussed on December 7 is the fault of *both* the United States and Japan, and the fraudulence of both of their claims as liberators. A military base was set up at Pearl Harbor only because, first, U.S. businessmen led a coup d'état against Queen Liliuokalani of the Kingdom of Hawai'i and, second, the United States later annexed Hawai'i as a colony. And it was not until as late as 1959—eighteen years after Pearl Harbor—that Hawai'i was granted statehood.⁸³ Infamy, therefore, preceded December 7, 1941.

After WWII, America continued its imperial enterprise, and it took on a seething character as the Cold War escalated. Although missing from the U.S. education system for obvious reasons, an established scholarly record reveals that in the name of defeating communism, the United States supported dictators and the suppression of indigenous democracy movements in various parts of Asia (and elsewhere in the Third World), like the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea, South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, and Okinawa.⁸⁴ And, of course, the hot wars of the Cold War, the large ones in any case, were fought in Asia. Although not obvious, the Korean War admits of an imperialistic reading.⁸⁵ And with less controversy, the Vietnam War can be viewed as an imperialist war. One aspect of that war that reveals empire at work is the fact that various U.S. colonial and neocolonial satellites were pushed into a war that surely none of them would otherwise have been involved in: The neocolonial Philippines offered logistical support, and neocolonial South Korea and colonial Puerto Rico offered extensive military support with tragic consequences for all sides. Much has been said about the Vietnam War, and much continues to be said about it in America's twenty-first-century wars. So I leave the matter. But one of the obvious legacies of America's hegemonic, and often catastrophically violent, presence in modern Asia is the proliferation of military bases in Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Guam, various Pacific Islands, and, for a long period of time, the Philippines. In this context, it is interesting to consider what the world and America would have been like if an enlarged China rimmed the California-Oregon-Washington coast with a similarly monolithic military presence, with spy planes hovering over the coast of San Francisco and Los Angeles, and tens of thousands of white women "servicing" Chinese soldiers on Chinese military bases in Hawai'i and the

small islands nearby San Diego and San Francisco. Clearly, world history would have to have been radically different. The inversion of this imagined scenario, America enlarged, however, is radically normalized to the point of being very nearly a nonissue for the civic culture of the United States.

The foregoing only touches upon American imperialism. But perhaps even this much conveys in a concrete fashion how Asian America is constituted in part by the westward movement of the U.S. nation-state.⁸⁶ And by considering how this enlarged America has overlapped geopolitically with East Asia for more than a century, we can also see in a general way how the U.S. participated in Asia's colonial modernity and, therefore, how Asian America is deeply linked to modern Asia.⁸⁷ Earlier, I noted that modern Asia should be conceived in terms of an Orientalist modernity and that this in turn be understood in terms of a colonial dialectic, a postcolonial dialectic, and a more recent complex set of transnational processes. Many imperial nations could be mentioned in accounts of these aspects of modern Asia. But, in light of the foregoing, no full account can leave out the United States in a consideration of any of these three respects.

One of the most important developments in the history of Asian America is a consciousness that tied together various elements of both the racial exclusions and the racial imperialism that constitute Asian America. More specifically, in the 1960s and 1970s, people of various Asian ethnic groups faced a horrendous war in Vietnam and contended with a system of racial oppression in the United States. And with the model afforded by the black liberation movement and the readings of various progressive or revolutionary leaders, particularly from the Third World, a unifying political consciousness arose among people of various Asian ethnic groups in America, generating the antiracist, anti-imperialist Asian American movement and the very title, "Asian American."⁸⁸ One participant, Glenn Omatsu, characterizes the efforts of the Asian American movement within the larger context in the following way:

They were struggles that confronted historical forces of racism, poverty, war, and exploitation. They were struggles that generated new ideologies, based mainly on the teachings and actions of Third World leaders. And they were struggles that redefined human values—the values that shape how people live their daily lives and interact with each other. Above all, they were struggles that transformed the lives of "ordinary people." . . . For Asian Americans, these struggles profoundly changed our communities. They spawned numerous grassroots organizations. They created an extensive network of student organizations and Asian American Studies classes. They recovered buried cultural traditions as well as produced a new gen-

eration of writers, poets, and artists. But most importantly, the struggles deeply affected Asian American consciousness. They redefined racial and ethnic identity, promoted new ways of thinking about communities, and challenged prevailing notions of power and authority.⁸⁹

Omatsu goes on to say that members of the movement read from Marx, Lenin, Mao, Fanon, Malcolm X, Che Guevara, Kim Il-Sung, W. E. B. Du Bois, Paulo Freire, the Black Panther Party, the Young Lords, and other resistance struggles, and that they engaged with such ideas as “Third World consciousness, participatory democracy, community building, historical rooting, liberation, and transformation.”⁹⁰

Clearly, the experiences and reflections of activists of the Asian American movement, like Omatsu, offer an important kind of paradigm for Asian American philosophy. As I have noted earlier, Asian American philosophy can be understood in part as an instance or species of modern Asian philosophy. As such, Asian American philosophy gathers thought, which may not always be explicitly philosophical, on the lived experiences of the relevant agents. The Asian American movement activists are one type of such agent. But, as I have discussed in this third section of the chapter, America has been an empire whose geopolitical dimensions far exceed the fifty states. So, though Asians in fifty-states America, like the activists, are obviously salient for Asian American philosophy’s raw materials, as it were, so are those Asians who have been deeply affected by U.S. imperialism outside of the formal fifty states. In other words, on account of geopolitical expansion, Asian American philosophy is significantly different from, say, a hypothetical Asian Canadian or Asian Brazilian philosophy.

Imperialism changes the geographic scope and the moral status of an imperial nation’s sovereignty without negating the empire’s nationhood. So if one wishes to build a philosophy in part or whole around the idea of a nation, there is no reason in principle why this project could not continue with an imperial nation and adopt a correspondingly widened scope and a critical moral stance. Therefore, those Asians who reside in America enlarged are the subjects salient to Asian American philosophy. For ease, let us call Asians in America proper or in fifty-states America “Asian Americans” and Asians in America enlarged “Asian/Americans,” where the slash or solidus symbol signifies inclusiveness and perhaps some indeterminacy with respect to the ideas that straddle it.⁹¹

Now, one might contend that Asian Americans are the *main* subjects of Asian American philosophy or, more plausibly, have *more* of a claim to this.

After all, if both the existence of Asians in America proper and of America in Asia constitute Asian America, then wouldn't Asians in America proper, which is a part of America enlarged, have double the claim on being subjects of Asian American philosophy? I think this is a plausible line of thought. And, importantly, notice that it concedes the point I have been making and simply adds gradations of salience to the broadened conception of Asian America and Asian American philosophy. However, I think this "double claim" cannot be absolute. Ultimately, Asian American philosophy, in virtue of its links to modern Asian philosophy, has a liberatory stance: The geography matters primarily because the ethical relations do. So the "double claim" derives what force it has primarily, though not exclusively, from its ethical demand. And there is no reason in principle why the ethical salience of the experiences or thought of Asian/Americans, say in the Philippines, Korea, or Okinawa, could not in certain cases or kinds of cases have a more compelling ethical salience than certain of the experiences or thought of Asian Americans, say in San Francisco or New York City. Therefore, Asian American experience and thought may have *prima facie* more salience for Asian American philosophy, but even then it is unclear just how strong that *prima facie* status is. In fact, certain kinds of Asian/American experience and thought, like those strongly pertaining to U.S. imperialism and other ethically charged conditions, may have an equal if not greater claim on Asian American philosophy. In any case, Asian/American experience and thought cannot be excluded simply on account of the absence of U.S. citizenship or absence from a physical location in America's fifty states. In fact, too much insistence on the special claim of Asian Americans on Asian American philosophy runs the risk of trivializing or obscuring the facts and moral import of America's dominative history in Asia. And this potentially represents a serious ethical problem, namely, Asian Americans obscuring and thereby aiding in the domination of Asians in Asia. The lure of a narrow Asian American nationalism that facilitates continued U.S. hegemony in Asia represents another and little discussed kind of model minority dynamic, where it is the Asian American empire-assimilationist, probably of the middle class, who stands over the Asian/American anti-imperialist.

As discussed in this third section, the lived experience of Asian Americans involves being racialized as Asian in the dominant, as opposed to subordinated, polity of an Amerasian empire. Some of the most explicitly self-conscious Asian Americans were, like Omatsu, involved in or impacted

directly by the Asian American movement. And, as seen in Omatsu's compelling remarks, they reveal a striking sense of the moral unities of being an Asian in an imperialized Asia and being an Asian in an imperial America. Specifically, this was filtered through the prism of the Vietnam War: <QU>Through moral bonds of identification, these Asian Americans saw themselves mirrored in some fashion in the lives of Vietnamese peasants waging war against the United States. And the corresponding sense of identity and action was modeled to an extent by the moral protest and antiracist racial identity offered in the black liberation movement. And, as for Asian/Americans outside of fifty-states America, their lived experience has involved the colonial and postcolonial dialectics and the transnational conditions touched upon in the previous section of this chapter and partly elaborated in this third section.

Asian American philosophy, therefore, gathers all the kinds of experiences mentioned and many kinds of philosophically relevant reflection upon them.⁹² At the ground level, Asian American philosophy can be expressed in treatments of a variety of issues that are shared with and have probably received a good deal of illumination from the interdisciplinary field of Asian American studies. But, to highlight some more explicitly philosophical work, consider the following possible themes and, where available, citations of directly relevant research: immigration, assimilation, citizenship,⁹³ imperialism,⁹⁴ war, democracy, neocolonialism, exploitation, labor, transnationalism, racism,⁹⁵ racial identity,⁹⁶ East-West comparison, the prospects of Asian American culture, exoticization,⁹⁷ intracolored and Third World solidarity or conflict, the complex heterogeneity of the Asian American community, global capitalism, modernity, indigeneity, gendered aspects of virtually every topic just listed, sex workers at U.S. military bases and mail order brides,⁹⁸ and surely still other themes. At a more metaphilosophical level, it could investigate such issues as how Asian American and Asian/American realities should be linked; how modern Asian philosophical thought, not just Euro-American philosophy, can illuminate Asian American philosophical issues; whether and how classical Asian philosophy might play a role in Asian American philosophical treatments; how Western thought has been influenced by classical or modern Asian philosophical work;⁹⁹ how Western thought has neglected or aided in the suppression of Asian American or modern Asian realities or reflections;¹⁰⁰ how Euro-American philosophy can contribute or be reconstructed to contribute to Asian American philosophy;¹⁰¹ how modern Asian and Asian American thought intersects with other forms of non-Western thought;¹⁰² how modern Asian and Asian American philosophy

might be linked substantively with other forms of liberation thought;¹⁰³ the experience or disciplinary practice of Asians and Asian Americans in the philosophical profession;¹⁰⁴ the pedagogy of Asian American philosophy;¹⁰⁵ and surely still other issues.

As its name suggests, Asian American philosophy can also be seen as a kind of American philosophy. I have placed greater emphasis on modern Asian philosophy in situating Asian American philosophy because it highlights, against the obscuring tendencies of our civic culture, the ethical, geopolitical, and ideational intersuffusion of Asia and America in a more compelling way than does an approach that merely focuses on Asian American philosophy as a kind of American philosophy. Moreover, *at this juncture*, explaining Asian American philosophy by means of modern Asian philosophy seems to offer more clarity and robustness so far as I can tell. American philosophy has a general nation-geographic structure and is typically identified with transcendentalism and pragmatism, and sometimes partly with Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Due to the primarily descriptive nature of this structure, as opposed to the normative and liberatory one that characterizes modern Asian philosophy, I am unclear as to whether there is an especially compelling reason, which is not to say there is no reason, to think of Asian American philosophy mainly in terms of American philosophy. Of course, the critical normative impulse in modern Asian philosophy can be extended to the context at hand to fashion a kind of critical American philosophy. And this seems to have already been done in the case of, for example, African American philosophy. As I understand it, this philosophy is not simply a complex meditation on the African American condition, but this with the aim of contributing to the transformation of that very condition. Asian American philosophy, then, can be conceived along these lines as well. Although I have opted to explain Asian American philosophy through modern Asian philosophy, the critical Americanist strategy of explication is clearly an important project. Indeed, some elements of such an approach, reconfigured in certain ways, should be evident in the foregoing account. In any case, given the transpacific conditions that bridge Asia, the Pacific Islands, and America, modern Asia constitutes Asian America profoundly and concretely, even if not totally. And given the imperialist realities of Asian America, the same holds for Asian America constituting modern Asia. And so, even on a critical American characterization, modern Asian philosophy will still offer an important referent and much of Asian American philosophy will still offer a way of philosophizing in the mode of modern Asian philosophy.¹⁰⁶

Conclusion

In the U.S. wars of the twenty-first century, it is a striking fact about our civic culture that the past wars in Asia have come to serve as hermeneutic devices. The attacks of 9-11 have been likened to Pearl Harbor. The wars in, and occupation of, Afghanistan and especially Iraq have been linked to the military and moral quagmire of Vietnam. The domestic and worldwide protest against these wars and occupations has been similarly analogized to the domestic and global dissent against the U.S. war in Vietnam. And finally the suppression and backlash against Arabs, South Asians, and Muslims in the United States have been likened to the internment of Japanese Americans after Pearl Harbor.¹⁰⁷ Perhaps the specters of imperialisms past are haunting the United States in its more recent Eurasian/Middle Eastern incursions. If the foregoing account holds, however, such past dominion never fully ceased. It is not just ghosts but the living that demand our attention. And now the ethical call is being issued not only from Asia (and the Americas and Africa) but also from the Middle East.

It is illuminating to pair this set of retrospective hermeneutics with the prospective and premonitionlike reflections that issued from the era of the Vietnam War and the Asian American movement. Consider, here, the haunting words of Jean-Paul Sartre after he condemned U.S. genocide in Vietnam:

[T]he links of the *One World*, this universe upon which the United States wishes to impose its hegemony, are ever closer. For this reason, of which the American government is well aware, the present act of genocide—as a reply to a people’s war—is conceived and perpetuated in Vietnam not only against the Vietnamese but against humanity. When a peasant falls in his ricefield, mown down by a machine gun, we are all struck. In this way, the Vietnamese are fighting for all men, and the Americans against all men. Not in the figurative sense or the abstract. And not only because genocide in Vietnam would be a crime universally condemned by the law of nations. But because, gradually, the threat of genocide is extended to the whole human race, backed up by the threat of atomic warfare, i.e. the absolute point of total war, and because this crime, perpetrated every day before the eyes of all, makes all those who do not denounce it the accomplices of those who commit it. . . . In this sense, imperialist genocide can only become more radical—because the group aimed at, to be terrorized, *through the Vietnamese nation*, is the human group in its entirety. (italics his)¹⁰⁸

I do not know how concretely Sartre may have anticipated U.S. expansion into the Middle East. And, arguably, he overstates his case when he says that the United States aims to specifically “terrorize,” as opposed to control

or dominate, all of humanity “through the Vietnamese nation.” But it seems clear that from the moral lens of modern Asia and Asian America, he discerned at least the outlines of a global trajectory of American hegemony. Our civic culture, as it asks whether Iraq is another Vietnam, seems to barely apprehend what Sartre began to envision decades ago from Vietnam itself. In such a time as this, Asian American philosophy (and modern Asian philosophy) may have not simply an interest in but an ethical mandate to stand with threatened humanity.

Notes

1. See the excellent compilation of essays in Arif Dirlik, ed., *What Is in a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), and in Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik, eds., *Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

2. Perhaps one further example might be helpful. In the current publication scene, we regularly see updated works on Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, and others. We also see their positions applied to contemporary issues, like abortion (e.g., virtue ethics and abortion), liberal democracy (e.g., social contract theory and modern constitutions), feminism (e.g., Hume as an early semi-feminist), and so on. Given the way I am using the expression “classical Asian philosophy,” I would here use the expression, “classical Greek philosophy,” “classical European philosophy,” or “classical Western philosophy” in a parallel fashion, and the qualifier “contemporary” to signify the recency of the work in question. Again, sufficient system retention is what concerns me.

3. Here is a sampling of this and related work. Enrique Dussel, *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, and Taylor and the Philosophy of Liberation*, trans. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1996); Anthony Appiah, *In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Ofelia Schutte, *Cultural Identity and Social Liberation in Latin American Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993); Lucius Outlaw Jr., *On Race and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1996); Lewis Gordon, *Existential Africana: Understanding Africana Existential Thought* (New York: Routledge, 2000), and Lewis Gordon, ed., *Existence in Black: An Anthology of Black Existential Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1997); George Yancy, *African-American Philosophers, 17 Conversations* (New York: Routledge, 1998), and George Yancy, *What White Looks Like: African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Charles Mills, *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); P. H. Coetzee and A. P. J. Roux, eds., *The African Philosophy Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1998); Eduardo Mendieta, ed., *Latin American Philosophy* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1999), and “Is There a Latin American Philosophy,” *Philosophy Today*, SPEP Supplement, vol. 43 (1999): 50–61; Jorge Gracia, *Hispanic/Latino Identity: A Philo-*

sophical Perspective (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000); Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Scott Pratt, *Native Pragmatism: Rethinking the Roots of American Philosophy* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 2002); Anne Waters, ed., *American Indian Thought: Philosophical Essays* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004); Yoko Arisaka, "Asian Women: Invisibility, Locations, and Claims to Philosophy," In *Women of Color and Philosophy*, ed. Naomi Zack (New York: Blackwell, 2000); Gary Mar, "Re-Orienting Philosophy," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 27–30; Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge," *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 8, no.1 (April 2004): 29–56; Elizabeth Kassab, "Integrating Modern Arab Thought in Postcolonial Philosophies of Culture," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter* 4, no.1 (Fall 2005): 2–7.

4. See Mendieta, "Is There Latin American Philosophy?" and Enrique Dussel, "Philosophy in 20th-century Latin America," in Mendieta, ed., *Latin American Philosophy*.

5. This does not necessarily mean that all East-West scholars endorsed this Hegelian outlook. Again, the critical evaluation concerns overall institutional structure. Though, let me add that all such scholars may still have some responsibility for helping to rectify the situation.

6. Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978). And for some important emendations, applications, or criticisms of his account, see James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); Lisa Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Aijaz Ahmad, *In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures* (New York: Verso, 1992); J. J. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought* (New York: Routledge, 1997); and Richard King, *Orientalism and Religion: Post-Colonial Theory, India, and the Mystic "East"* (London: Routledge, 1999).

7. There is an important implication of moving to a focus on patterns and tendencies without holding a stronger Saidian thesis. Many contend that while Said correctly points to a tradition of anti-Asian Orientalism, he goes too far and fails to acknowledge unproblematic exceptions to his claim. I think these kinds of accounts sometimes misconceive the Foucauldian-Gramscian structure of Said's account. But, more fundamentally, they forget that, by its very nature, the highlighting of exceptions does not unseat a claim to patterns and tendencies, since exceptions are *compatible* with them. Incidentally, I think such accounts often do not delve very deeply into how pro-Asian theorists from the West can nevertheless present accounts that are discursively managerial. There is no contradiction in positively cast discursive containment.

8. See, for example, Xiaomei Chen, *Occidentalism: A Theory of Counter-Discourse in Post-Mao China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Arif Dirlik, *The*

Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in an Age of Global Capitalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997); and Shu-Mei Shih, *The Lure of the Modern: Writing Modernism in Semicolonial China, 1917–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

9. The history of Western imperialism in Asia has a wider temporal stretch than the present focus. For example, following Magellan's sixteenth-century "discovery" of the Philippines, the Spanish empire colonized the Philippines and Guam. And in the eighteenth century, the British colonized South Asia. Moreover, various of the Pacific islands were colonized before the late nineteenth century. Bearing this in mind, much of the emphasis here will be on the mid-to-late nineteenth century onward.

10. See Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian American Women and Men* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Press, 1996).

11. See the introduction and some of the essays in Masao Miyoshi and Harry Harootunian, eds., *Learning Places: The Afterlives of Area Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

12. Of course, many now doubt whether that distinction is clear or defensible.

13. For a sampling of readings on various Asian responses to Western imperialism and modernity, see Wm. Theodore de Bary, Wing-Tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, eds., *Sourcebook of Chinese Tradition*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); Wm. Theodore de Bary, ed., *Sourcebook of Indian Tradition*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958); Ryusaku Tsunoda, Wm. Theodore de Bary, and Donald Keene, eds., *Sourcebook of Japanese Tradition*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); and Yongho Ch'oe, Peter Lee, and Wm. Theodore de Bary, eds., *Sourcebook of Korean Tradition*, vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

14. Perhaps the May 4th intellectual, Hu Shih, comes close. Incidentally, he was influenced by Dewey's pragmatism. See de Bary et al., *Sourcebook of Chinese Tradition*, vol. 2, ch. 24.

15. See, for example, the debate by Korean neo-Confucianists over "Western implements," in Ch'oe et al., *Sources of Korean Tradition*, vol. 2, ch. 29.

16. See his *Autobiography of Fukuzawa Yukichi*, trans. Eiichi Kiyooka (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1960).

17. Interestingly, in this case, Western modernity and Asia's alternative modernity were conceived to be integrally unified in a single world trajectory. For a sampling of the writings of the Kyoto School, see David A. Dilworth and Valdo H. Viglielmo with Agustin J. Zavala, eds. and trans., *Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). And for commentary or context, see James W. Heisig, *Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001); James Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995); Stephan Tanaka, *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993);

Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture, and Community in Interwar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Yoko Arisaka, "The Nishida Enigma: 'The Principle of the New World Order' (1943)," *Monumenta Nipponica* 51, no. 1 (1996), and "Beyond 'East and West': Nishida's Universalism and Postcolonial Critique," *Review of Politics* 59, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 541–60.

18. See Sun Yat-Sen, *San Min Chu I: The Three Principles of the People*, 2nd ed. (Taipei, Taiwan: China Publishing, 1990), and *China and Japan: Natural Friends—Unnatural Enemies: A Guide for China's Foreign Policy* (Shanghai: China United Press, 1941).

19. Marxism in Asia is a much discussed topic. See, for example, H el ene Carr ere d'Encausse and Stuart Schram, *Marxism in Asia* (London: Penguin, 1969); and Tani Barlow, ed., *New Asian Marxisms* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002). For more on anarchism in Asia, see Arif Dirlik, *Anarchism in the Chinese Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and Benedict Anderson, *Under Three Flags: Anarchism and the Anti-Colonial Imagination* (New York: Verso, 2006).

20. See Mao Tse-Tung, *Mao Tse-Tung: Selected Works*, vols. 1–5 (New York: International Publishers, 1954, 1956); and Arif Dirlik, Paul Healy, and Nick Knight, eds., *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanity Press, 1997). And I am indebted here to some illuminating discussions with Chris Connery on Maoism and what he calls the "World '60s."

21. For a sampling of his work, see Sibnarayan Ray, ed., *Selected Works of M. N. Roy*, vols. 1–4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987–2000).

22. For some sophisticated treatments of this theme in the early twentieth-century Chinese context, see Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002); Shu-Mei Shih, *The Lure of the Modern*; and Chow Tse-Tsung, *The May 4th Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

23. For example, in the first couple decades of the twentieth century, Liang Qichao, a central political thinker in pre-Republic China, both shifted the focus from a cultural to a nation-based conception of China and the West, and endorsed a modernization historical trajectory of the world that deflated the pretensions of the West's historical self-understanding. Arguably, some of his views resonated with and may have partly paved the way for the more radical views of Li Dazhao, one of the founders of Chinese Marxism, and later Mao Zedong, both proponents of the third alternative modernity project. For more on Liang Qichao's important views, see Joseph R. Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953); and Yang Xiao, "Liang Qichao's Political and Social Philosophy," in *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*, ed. Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2002).

24. For simplicity, I have left aside a complicating factor, namely that colonial modernity in much of Asia was sometimes layered with Japanese imperialism set

atop Western imperialism. This is pertinent here because many East Asians received Western training from Japan, read Western works through Japanese translations, or sought refuge in Japan when their viewpoints were formally denounced by their homeland governments. Stephan Tanaka's *Japan's Orient* offers an historical account of much of this complexity. And an account of early twentieth-century Chinese intellectuals facing this situation can be found in Shu-Mei Shi, *The Lure of the Modern*.

25. Lucius Outlaw Jr., *On Race and Philosophy* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 86.

26. See Bill Mullen and Cathryn Watson, eds., *W. E. B. DuBois on Asia: Crossing the Color Line* (Jackson: University of Mississippi, 2005).

27. Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference* (Jackson: University of Mississippi Press, 1994); and Christopher J. Lee, ed., *Bandung and Beyond* (Athens: Ohio University Press, forthcoming).

28. José Rizal, *Noli Me Tangere*, trans. Ma. Soledad Lacson-Locsin (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997); Ambeth Ocampo, *Rizal without the Overcoat* (Pasig City, Philippines: Anvil, 2000); and Anderson, *Under Three Flags*.

29. Carlos Bulosan, *America Is in the Heart* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1974); and Susan Evangelista, ed., *Carlos Bulosan and His Poetry: A Biography and Anthology* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1985).

30. José Sisson, *The Philippine Revolution: The Leader's View* (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1989).

31. See Chow Tse-Tsung, *The May 4th Movement*; Shu-Mei Shih, *The Lure of the Modern*; and Karl, *Staging the World*.

32. "Kang Youwei and the Reform Movement," in de Bary et al., *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, vol. 2, 60–73; Hsiao Kung-Ch'uan, *A Modern China and a New World: K'ang Yu-wei, Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927* (Seattle: University of Washington Press: 1975).

33. Liang Qichao, *History of Chinese Political Thought during the Early Tsin Period*, trans. L. T. Chen (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1930), and "A People Made Anew," in Wm. Theodore de Bary et al., *Sources of Chinese Tradition*, vol. 2 93–97; Joseph Levenson, *Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China*; and Yang Xiao, "Liang Qichao's Political and Social Philosophy," in Chung-Ying Cheng, ed., *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*.

34. Homer A. Jack, ed., *The Gandhi Reader: A Sourcebook of his Life and Writings* (New York: Grove Press, 1956); J. N. Mohanty, *Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern*, ed. Purushottama Bilimoria (Delhi, India: Oxford University Press, 1993); and Harold Coward, ed., *Indian Critiques of Gandhi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).

35. Peter Heehs, ed., *The Essential Writings of Sri Aurobindo* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

36. Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, eds., *Rabindranath Tagore: An Anthology* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

37. Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

38. Mao Tse-Tung, *Mao Tse-Tung: Selected Works*, vol. 1–5; Dirlik, et al., eds., *Critical Perspectives on Mao Zedong's Thought*; and Bill Martin, "Still Maoist after All These Years," in Bill Martin, *Politics in the Impasse: Explorations in Postsecular Social Theory* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996)

39. Many have regarded important members of the Kyoto School as complicit in some fashion or other with Japanese imperialism. Since, very shortly, I will emphasize the liberatory aspect of modern Asian philosophy, it may seem odd that I mention the Kyoto School here. I do so simply because ascertaining their complicity or innocence is an interestingly relevant issue and an important debate in the field. And even if they were in whole or part imperialist, we can still ask whether their accounts retain elements of philosophical and liberatory value. For a wide sampling of the work of the Kyoto School, see Dilworth, et al., eds. and trans., *Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy*.

40. Tran Duc Thao, *Phenomenology and Dialectical Materialism*, trans. Daniel J. Herman and Donald V. Morano (Boston: D. Reidel, 1986); and Shawn McHale, "Vietnamese Marxism, Dissent, and the Politics of Postcolonial Memory: Tran Duc Thao, 1946–1993," *Journal of Asian Studies* 61, no. 1 (February 2002): 7–31.

41. Ray, ed., *Selected Works of M. N. Roy*, vols. 1–4.

42. Lu Xun, *Silent China: Selected Writings of Lu Xun*, ed. and trans. Gladys Yang (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); and Leo Ou-Fan Lee, *Voices from the Iron House: A Study of Lu Xun* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987).

43. Kenzaburo Oe, *Hiroshima Notes* (Tokyo, Japan: YMCA Press, 1981).

44. Ch'oe et al., eds., *Sources of Korean Tradition*, vol. 2, ch. 30; Jong-Sun Noh, *Religion and Just Revolution: Third World Perspective* (Seoul, Korea: Voice Publishing House, 1987); and Hee-Sung Keel, "Haew?!'s Ethics of Threefold Reverence and Its Significance for Environmental Ethics Today," unpublished ms.

45. Yong-Bok Kim, "Messiah and Minjung: Discerning Messianic Politics over against Political Messianism," in *Third World Liberation Theologies: A Reader*, ed. Deane W. Ferm (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1986), ch. 33.

46. Kim Chi Ha, *The Gold-Crowned Jesus and Other Writings*, ed. Chong Sun Kim and Shelly Killen (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1978).

47. Gayatri Spivak, *The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, ed. Sarah Harasym (New York: Routledge, 1990).

48. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

49. Trinh Minh Ha, *Woman, Native, Other: Writing Postcoloniality and Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

50. Uma Narayan, *Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

51. Neferti X. M. Tadiar, *Fantasy-Production: Sexual Economies and Other Philippine Consequences for the New World Order* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).

52. Said, *Orientalism*.

53. Dirlik, *The Postcolonial Aura*.

54. Lisa Lowe, *Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996).

55. Gary Okihiro, *Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in American History and Culture* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).

56. E. San Juan Jr., *Racism and Cultural Studies: Critiques of Multicultural Ideology and the Politics of Difference* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

57. David Palumbo-Lui, *Asian/American: Historical Crossings of a Racial Frontier* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

58. Colleen Lye, *America's Asia: Racial Form and American Literature, 1893–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

59. Bill Mullen, *Afro-Orientalism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004).

60. I think a case could be made for modern Asian philosophy that is more descriptively based. However, the critical and liberatory orientation here seems to make the case more plausibly since it gets at the normative relations that ultimately undergird our ostensibly geographic categories in this context.

61. Much of this immediate discussion concerns political economy, neocolonialism, political epistemology, and reparations for imperialism. I think all of these topics can in some form be accommodated by the conceptual architecture of liberalism. For some examples, see practically any of the political texts of Noam Chomsky, like *Reasons of State* (New York: New Press, 2003); Charles Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), and *Blackness Visible*; and my “Empire’s Entrails and the Geography of ‘Amerasia,’” *City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy, Action* 8, no. 1 (April 2004): 57–88. Consider also the references to world-systems theory and underdevelopment theory in the political liberalism of Allen Buchanan’s “Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World,” *Ethics* 110 (July 2000): 697–721.

62. I think this overall characterization resonates with much of the spirit of the formative discipline-cohering agendas posited by Outlaw for Africana philosophy: “the effort to forge and articulate new identities and life agendas by which to survive and to flourish in the limiting situations of racialized oppression and New World relocations” and “the effort to recover or reconstruct life-defining, identity-confirming meaning-connections to lands and cultures of the African continent, its peoples, and their histories.” See Outlaw, *On Race and Philosophy*, 89.

63. Wing-Tsit Chan, ed. and trans., *A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Chung-Ying Cheng and Bunnin, eds., *Contemporary Chinese Philosophy*; Mohanty, *Essays on Indian Philosophy Traditional and Modern*; Dilworth, et al., eds., *Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy*; and

Korean National Commission for UNESCO, ed., *Korean Philosophy: Its Tradition and Modern Transformation* (Elizabeth, NJ: Holly Int'l, 2004).

64. Quite possibly, some of the authors or editors might balk at the overall characterization I have offered. Still, as I have noted, some elements of the characterization seem to recur throughout these works. I think a general concern that some may have—if not these authors and editors, then others, surely—is the extent to which I have politicized (though not reductively, I think) the history of philosophy. As it turns out, my view may be still more extreme for some. Though I have focused on the modern period, I am open in principle to accounts of classical Asian philosophies, like Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Daoism, requiring reference to political elements. For example, as Thomas Wilson argues, the creation of Confucianist canons in twelfth-century China by their very nature excluded as they included material from the history of Confucianist thought. And this complicated process was both formal and linked to the interests of the sociopolitical elite. See his *Genealogy of the Way: The Construction and Uses of the Confucian Tradition in Late Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

65. Martha Nussbaum has extended a generally Western liberalism to the case of India, gender, and poverty. At the very least, her deeply considered views are strongly relevant to modern Asian philosophy. And, as I have described modern Asian philosophy just now, her account might be an instance of it. See Martha Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), and Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, eds., *Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

66. See, for example, Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001).

67. There are other relevant movements—for instance, transatlantic Asian migration to the United States and northward migration from Latin America—following upon earlier transpacific and transatlantic movement from Asia. So the emphasis on transpacific movement to the United States is heuristic, and its value lies in its greater coverage of cases and its clearer links to American modernity.

68. The two exceptions, which would later be denied that status, were Japan and the Philippines. A limited number of Japanese were allowed entry due to the U.S. government's efforts to relieve tension with a rival Asian imperial nation. And a limited number of Filipinos were allowed to immigrate due to their status as colonial subjects of the American empire.

69. For more on these formal measures, see Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

70. Robert Lee, *Orientalism: Asian Americans in Popular Culture* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999).

71. Okihiro, *Margins and Mainstreams*, ch. 5.

72. Lye, *America's Asia*.

73. In this vein, I have also benefited from the work of Lowe, *Immigrant Acts*; and Palumbo-Lui, *Asian/American*.

74. A 2001 survey, conducted *prior* to the Hainan spy plane incident, on American views of Chinese Americans and to an extent Asian Americans reveals some rather serious lingering racist perceptions. In this survey, 68 percent of respondents stated some measure of dislike toward Chinese Americans, and within that group, 25 percent indicated having “very negative” attitudes toward them. Also, 24 percent of respondents disapproved of marriage with an Asian American, a percentage surpassed only by marriage with an African American (at 34%). Furthermore, respondents who oppose minority leadership were the most “uncomfortable” with the idea of an Asian American, over any other minority group representative, as president of the United States, CEO of a Fortune 500 company, or supervisor at work. These statistics are taken from *American Attitudes toward Chinese Americans and Asian Americans: A Committee of 100 Survey*, available at www.committee100.org.

75. It also suggests the need for an emendation in the concept of Americaneity proffered by Aníbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein in “Americaneity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World-System,” *International Social Science Journal* 44, no. 134 (1992): 549–54.

76. For the small wars in Latin America, see Greg Grandin, *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006).

77. See Angelo Velasco Shaw and Luis Francia, eds., *Vestiges of War: The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream, 1899–1999* (New York: New York University Press, 2002); John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon, 1986); Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: Another Country* (New York: New Press, 2004); Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945–1990* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991); Noam Chomsky, *At War with Asia: Essays on Indochina* (New York: Vintage Books, 1970); and Takashi Fujitani, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama, eds., *Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s)* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

78. See, for example, Claudia Card, *The Atrocity Paradigm: A Theory of Evil* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

79. Shaw and Francia, eds., *Vestiges of War*; and Cumings, *North Korea*.

80. Dower, *War without Mercy*.

81. See Christine Barnett and Burke Marshall, eds., *Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2001).

82. I discuss this at length in “Empire’s Entrails.”

83. Importantly, many indigenous Hawaiians would have preferred independence. And this is expressed in the current indigenous sovereignty movement in Hawai‘i. See, for example, Haunani-Kay Trask, *Native Daughter: Colonialism and Sovereignty in Hawaii* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i, 1999).

84. See, for example, Mark Selden, ed., *Remaking Asia: Essays on the Uses of American Power* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974); Bruce Cumings, *Parallax Visions: Making Sense of American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999); and Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Owl Books, 2004).

85. Some of the makings of such a case can be found in Cumings, *North Korea*. This is not the place to make this sort of argument. But let me note that the dividing line between North and South Korea was decided without any Korean involvement. This already should raise some suspicions. Let me also note that as with Pearl Harbor and the U.S. entry into WWII, both sides can be blameworthy. And this seems to hold for the Korean War as well, with both North Korea and the United States deserving blame, of different kinds of course.

86. A more complete discussion here would connect these thoughts with the sort of account offered by Anibal Quijano in "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from the South* 1, no. 3 (2000): 533–80. In a related vein, a fuller discussion would consider Asia-Latin American issues, like the nineteenth-century coolie bondage of Chinese, Indians, and others in various parts of Latin America. The topic of Asian coolies in Latin America, especially the Chinese in Cuba, is illuminatingly discussed by Lisa Yun, *Coolie: From under the Hatches into the Global Age* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, forthcoming).

87. In thinking this way, I am indebted to the work of David Palumbo-Liu and Colleen Lye, who make extended cases for this, with different sorts of emphases, in *Asian/American* and *America's Asia*, respectively. I am also indebted to the work of Walter D. Mignolo, whose account of border thinking offers a rough parallel in the case of Latino/Latin America. See his "The Larger Picture: Hispanics/Latinos (and Latino Studies) in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity," in *Hispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race, and Rights*, ed. Jorge Gracia and Pablo De Greif (New York: Routledge, 2000). Finally, a special note of thanks to Linda Martín Alcoff and Eduardo Mendieta from whom I have benefited tremendously from the many conversations we have had on this and related issues of Latin America.

88. For more on this, see Yen Le Espiritu, *Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); and Helen Zia, *Asian American Dreams: The Emergence of an American People* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2000). And for vignettes from the activists themselves, see Steve Louie and Glenn Omatsu, eds., *Asian Americans: The Movement and the Moment* (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian American Studies Center Press, 2001); and Fred Ho, with Carolyn Antonio, Diane Fujino, and Steve Yip, *Legacy to Liberation: Politics and Culture of Revolutionary Asian Pacific America* (San Francisco: Big Red Media, 2000).

89. Glenn Omatsu, "The 'Four Prisons' and the Movements of Liberation: Asian American Activism from the 1960s to the 1990s," in *The State of Asian*

America: Activism and Resistance in the 1990s, ed. Karin Aguilar-San Juan (Boston: South End Press, 1994), ch. 1, 20.

90. Omatsu, "The 'Four Prisons,'" 30.

91. The idea for using the solidus or slash comes from David Palumbo-Liu's *Asian/American*. See his book for a much fuller discussion of the possibilities of this linguistic convention.

92. For some related and interesting work on Asian American intellectual history, see Henry Yu, *Thinking Orientals: Migration, Contact, and Exoticism in Modern America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Augusto Espiritu, *Five Faces of Exile: The Nation and Filipino American Intellectuals* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); and Peter Chua, "U.S. Empire and Social Thought: Dewey, Mead, and the Philippine Problem," in a special edition of *Philosophy Today*, "Asian American and American Philosophy," ed. David H. Kim and Ronald Sundstrom, forthcoming.

93. Ronald Sundstrom, *The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice* (Albany: State University of New York Press, forthcoming).

94. See my "Empire's Entrails."

95. Falguni Sheth, "The Technology of Race: Enframing, Violence, and Taming the Unruly," *Radical Philosophy Review* 7, no. 1 (2004).

96. See Ronald Sundstrom, "Falling into the Olongapo River," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 25–27; Emily Lee, "The Meaning of the Visible Differences of the Body," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 34–37; Tommy Lott, "The Role of the Body in Asian-Pacific-American Panethnic Identity," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 37–40; Janet Farrell Smith, "Multiplicity within Identity: Asian American Cultural Experience in the Plural," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 4, no. 1 (Fall 2004); Linda Martín Alcoff, *Visible Identities: Race, Gender, and the Self* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

97. Yoko Arisaka, "Exoticism and the Phenomenology of Racialized Desire," in David H. Kim, ed., *Passions of the Color Line* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, forthcoming).

98. Lauri Shrage, *The Moral Dilemmas of Feminism* (New York: Routledge, 1994), ch. 5 and 6.

99. Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment*; and Arthur Christy, *The Orient in American Transcendentalism: A Study of Emerson, Thoreau, and Alcott* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932).

100. David H. Kim, "The Unexamined Frontier: Dewey, Pragmatism, and America Enlarged," in *Pragmatism, Nation, and Race: Community in the Age of Em-*

pire, ed. Eduardo Mendieta and Chad Kautzer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming); and Chua, "U.S. Empire and Social Thought."

101. Mariana Ortega, "Homogeneity, Heterogeneity, and Self: William James and New Asian and Latina Voices in the 'U.S. American' Intellectual Landscape," in Kim and Sundstrom, eds., "Asian America and American Philosophy"; Kyoo Lee, "Buttery Flies: Ironies of *M. Butterfly* Read through a Triangular Intersection between Rorty, Derrida, and West," in Kim and Sundstrom, eds., "Asian America and American Philosophy"; and Gary Mar, "Democratizing Higher Education: Noam Chomsky and Asian American Studies," in Kim and Sundstrom, eds., "Asian America and American Philosophy."

102. Grace Lee Boggs, *Living for Change: An Autobiography* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Ortega, "Homogeneity, Heterogeneity, and Self"; Kim, "Empire's Entrails," and "The Meaning of her Majesty's Madness: Du Bois' *Dark Princess* and Afro-Asian Anarchy," in Lott, ed., *DuBois on the Color Line* (forthcoming).

103. Gary Mar, "What Does Asian American Studies Have to Do with Philosophy," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 27–30.

104. Yoko Arisaka, "Asian Women: Invisibility, Locations, and Claims to Philosophy," in *Women of Color and Philosophy*, ed. Naomi Zack (New York: Blackwell, 2000); David H. Kim, "Asian American Philosophers: Absence, Politics, and Identity," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 1, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 25–28; and Darrell Moore, "Edward Said and Asian American Philosophical Practice," in Kim and Sundstrom, eds., "Asian America and American Philosophy."

105. Gary Mar, "New Media and New Pedagogy in Asian American Studies: Strategies for Transforming Knowledge into a Pedagogy of Empowerment," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 3, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 19–32.

106. In writing this chapter, I have been indebted to the vision and generosity of the volume's editor, George Yancy.

107. For an interesting and important angle on this connection, see Gary Ok-ihiro, "Safeguarding Democracy: Asian Americans and War," *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies* 2, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 24–25.

108. Jean Paul Sartre, "Vietnam: Imperialism and Genocide," in *Between Existentialism and Marxism* (New York: William Morrow, 1976), 83.

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