

## **GRACE AND FREE WILL ON QUIESCENCE AND AVOIDING SEMI-PELAGIANISM**

*This paper is dedicated to the memory of David Efrid*

SIMON KITTLE

INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR

**Abstract:** Several recent incompatibilist accounts of divine grace and human free will have appealed to the notion of quiescence in an attempt to avoid semi-Pelagianism while retaining the fallen person's control over coming to faith and thus the agent's responsibility for failing to come to faith. In this essay I identify three distinct roles that quiescence has been employed to play in the recent literature. I outline how an account of divine grace and human free will may employ quiescence to play one role without playing either of the others. I also note that getting clear about these roles allows us to see that so-called sourcehood accounts of free will do not need to appeal to quiescence to avoid semi-Pelagianism. Far from being a benefit of sourcehood accounts, however, this highlights a serious defect in such accounts; I draw out this defect, developing it into a general argument against sourcehood accounts of free will.

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

One project in Christian philosophical theology is that of developing an account of the interaction between divine and created agency. And one aspect of this task involves saying something about the interaction of divine grace and human free will, especially with regard to salvation. In this latter task, two positions have been judged to be beyond Christian orthodoxy. The first is *Pelagianism*, which rejects the idea of a Fall that affected the constitution of humans after Adam and Eve,<sup>1</sup> rejects the doctrine of original sin, and affirms that all of Eve's descendants are able to live sinless lives, thus making it possible for Eve's descendants to achieve salvation (or avoid the need for salvation in the first place) using their own natural powers. This threatens to undermine the Christian church's proclamation that all need Christ.

The second is *semi-Pelagianism*. Semi-Pelagians typically accept a doctrine of the Fall, endorse a notion of original sin, and agree that everyone has sinned and thus needs salvation. Semi-Pelagians affirm, however, that fallen humans can make some sort of response towards God: fallen humans can either accept God's offer of salvation in Christ outright or (if not) they can at least *begin to turn to God, try to accept God's offer*, or something similar.

Semi-Pelagianism was condemned by the Second Council of Orange in 529, and while Orange was not an ecumenical council, it was endorsed by Pope Boniface II in 531 (Tixeront 1916, p. 298). As such, Christians concerned to hew closely to the historic teaching of the church or—what is arguably more important—concerned to do justice to the theological motivations which gave rise to the statements of Orange, have good reason to seek an account of divine grace and human free will that avoids semi-Pelagianism. To get an idea of what this involves, consider some of the key teachings of the Council of Orange:

**Canon 6.** If any one says that without the grace of God mercy is bestowed upon us by God when we believe, wish, long for it, strive, toil, watch, desire it, seek, ask for it, [...] and does not ...

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1 This claim is compatible with a wide range of views on the nature of the figures of Adam and Eve.

acknowledge that it is by the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit within us that we believe, wish, or have the power of doing all these things as we ought, [...], he resists the Apostle ... (Woods 1882, pp. 23, 25).

**Canon 7.** If any one affirms that we can fitly think or choose any good thing pertaining to the salvation of eternal life, or agree to the saving [...] preaching by the strength of nature without the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all pleasure in agreeing and believing the truth, he is deceived by an heretical Spirit ... (Woods 1882, p. 25).

**Canon 18.** ... A reward is not owed for any merits preventing [i.e. preceding] grace on the ground of good works done, but grace which is not owed precedes to enable them to be done (Woods 1882, p. 37).

**Conclusion.** ... through the sin of the first man free choice was so biassed and weakened that no one can afterwards either love God as he ought, or believe in God, or work for God's sake what is good, unless the grace of Divine mercy prevents [i.e. precedes] him. ... (Woods 1882, p. 45).

These Canons make it clear that fallen but ungraced humans cannot have faith in God, pray for faith, begin to have faith, desire God, “fitly think” about or make any right choice relating to salvation, without first having received a special grace from God. Canon 18 underscores the point that the agent can do nothing meritorious without first having received an additional grace from God. The Conclusion (see also the Preface, and Canons 6 and 22) emphasises that, despite the fallen person's inability to love God, the person *ought* to do so.

It is thus implicit that fallen, ungraced persons *are responsible for not doing these things* and that they can be justly condemned for not doing them: fallen, ungraced persons “have nothing of their own” but sin (Canon 22), are “impious” (Canon 5), and do not attain to “the salvation of eternal life” (Canon 7).

These affirmations raise several questions: how can people be responsible for a state which they cannot avoid? Is divine grace necessary and also sufficient for coming to faith? If so, why doesn't the Holy Spirit make all people believe? And how could it be just for God to blame the person for not having faith? If not—if divine grace is necessary but not sufficient—won't the person's cooperation with that faith count as a good work? These are, of course, just the sort of questions that Augustine records Pelagius as asking (Schaff 1887, p. 132). Answering them requires articulating an account of the interaction of divine grace and human free will.

One way forward here is to proceed in the direction which (arguably) Orange leans, namely, to embrace what I will label (paralleling van Inwagen's (2008, p. 330) non-theological definitions) *soft theological determinism*. Theological determinism is the view that God determines everything that comes to pass, including every human “thought, word, deed, desire, and choice” (Crabtree 2004, p. 7). Soft theological determinism is the conjunction of theological determinism with the claim that some humans possess free will. Given soft theological determinism, developing an account of grace and free will becomes much easier because human free will is compatible with the necessity or inevitability that is produced by God's willing. I do not pursue this option because I am convinced that theological determinism entails, in O'Connor's words, a “direct form of divine involvement in horrendously evil human actions” (O'Connor 2016, p. 133) the result of which is to “divinize Cruelty, Wrath, Fury, Vengeance, and all the blackest vices” (Ramsay 1749, p. 406). I have offered a partial defence of this conclusions in (Kittle 2016), which is a critique of Couenhoven's (2013) defence of theological determinism; I do not discuss soft theological determinism further here.

The focus of this paper is theological incompatibilist accounts of divine grace and human free will. Theological incompatibilism is the view that human free will is incompatible with God's determining free human decisions and actions. Now, depending in part on how Orange is interpreted, the “problem of grace and free will” is best understood as a set of problems. The first problem—and the problem on which the literature has focused—is that of explaining how agents can be responsible for their lack of faith when they are not able to desire God, not able to “fitly think” about salvation, and not even able

to pray for faith. This is a specific instance of the more general problem of explaining how agents can be responsible for states (e.g. having a tendency towards evil) or actions (e.g. a particular intentionally performed evil act) which were for the agent in question inevitable and unavoidable—something which is, arguably, implicit in the doctrine of original sin implied by Orange. Several contemporary incompatibilist accounts of grace and free will invoke the notion of *quiescence* to help solve the specific instance of the problem just outlined. Quiescence is the name for a state of neutrality within the human will; with respect to any proposition, P, a human willer can either assent to it, reject it, or simply have no attitude at all towards it—it is this latter state which is called quiescence. Quiescence is supposed to help with the first problem because it purports to show how someone can be in control of whether they resist God, and thus responsible for their resisting God, even if they are unable to accept God's offer of saving faith (more on this below). The first purpose of this essay is to highlight two further problems of grace and free will, each of which could (potentially) be solved (in different ways) by invoking the notion of quiescence. The second problem is that of explaining how God's action, through which a special grace is bestowed on the person's will, does not amount to God acting violently on the person's will in a way which removes the person's freedom or undermines their autonomy. The third problem is generated, not in the first instance by the specific doctrinal commitments of Orange, but by some of the broader commitments of classical theism, in particular, the idea that classical theism entails or requires that God alone be the sole cause of all goods. Both of these problems may be addressed using the notion of quiescence (as detailed in the next section); moreover, quiescence could be used to address one of these problems without being used to address the others. It is one of my contentions that it has largely gone unnoticed that quiescence can be used to address different problems of grace and free will. I maintain that distinguishing the problems of grace and free will, and the ways that quiescence can help address each one, will improve the clarity of the debate. In the next section (section 2), I outline how quiescence may address each of the problems of grace and free will discussed above; in section 3 I briefly sketch an account of grace and free will which employs quiescence to solve just the second problem—that of detailing how God's action on the human will doesn't undermine the person's freedom or autonomy.

The second purpose of this paper, and the burden of section 4, is to show that incompatibilist source free will theorists—those who have, to date, spent the most time discussing and developing quiescence-based accounts of grace and free will—do not in fact need to appeal to quiescence in order to solve the first problem of grace and free will outlined above (i.e. the problem of showing that the agent is in control of and responsible for failing to come to faith while avoiding semi-Pelagianism). This should be surprising, given that the literature is overwhelmingly focused on this particular problem of grace and free will, and that quiescence is put forward as the key to the solution by at least a couple prominent source incompatibilists. More substantially, however, I will argue that, far from being an added benefit of incompatibilist source accounts of free will, this point reveals a serious defect in incompatibilist source accounts of control.

## II. THREE ROLES FOR QUIESCENCE

The first problem of grace and free will is that of explaining how an agent can be in control of, and so responsible for, their failing to come to saving faith while maintaining—in line with Orange—that the agent is unable to make any move towards saving faith (apart from a special grace of God); in other words, it's the problem of explaining how an agent can be in control of and responsible for their failing to have faith while avoiding (semi-)Pelagianism. This is what most contemporary discussions of grace and free will purport to be about. And it is what quiescence has been invoked to help with. Quiescence, it is thought, helps explain how an agent can be responsible for failing to come to faith because it can explain how the agent can be in control of *whether or not* they come to faith without thereby being responsible for *coming to* faith. The idea is that though the person cannot accept God's offer of grace, the person can move from a state of rejecting God's offer to a state of quiescence with respect to that offer. When the person becomes quiescent in this way, such that their will becomes neutral towards God's offer of grace, God

intervenes and alters their will to accept God's offer of faith. Stump invokes quiescence to play this role. She argues that because the state of quiescence results from the agent's own intellect and will, the agent thereby controls that state: it is "up to" the human willer whether they refuse grace or are quiescent with respect to God's offer of grace (Stump 2003a, p. 402). And Stump goes on to suggest that because quiescence is a lack or absence there is nothing positive for which the agent is responsible and so a fortiori nothing for which the agent is praiseworthy (Stump 2003a, pp. 394, 403). Stump denies that the change from refusing God to being quiescent is the result of any act of will. This claim has appeared to almost all commentators as baffling; if quiescence is not willed, in virtue of what can we say that the change is controlled by the agent? One can't simply *assert* that the agent has exercised control. Timpe attempts to repair Stump's account by positing the act of will that Stump was at pains to avoid (Timpe 2007). This move secures the agent's *control* over their resulting state of quiescence. Timpe then attempts to appeal to quiescence to block the attribution of *responsibility*: because the state of quiescence is a lack, the agent hasn't done anything for which they deserve praise (Timpe 2007, pp. 293–94).<sup>2</sup> So Timpe too employs quiescence to escape semi-Pelagianism, although in a slightly different way to Stump.

The second role I wish to identify for quiescence is that of ensuring that God's action on the person's will does not compromise the person's autonomy. Given the pronouncements of Orange and the resulting doctrine of original sin, one is constrained in providing an account of the interaction of divine grace and human free will in the following way: it must be the case that the person's faith is the result of God's action on the person, rather than any sort of achievement belonging to the human person in question. But this produces the following worry, which is distinct from the issue of semi-Pelagianism itself: how does God act so as to bring the person to faith without thereby compromising the person's autonomy? After all, the fallen person's problem is that she *does not desire, and does not want to desire*, to move towards God. Thus, it looks as if, were God to modify the person's will so as to change this, God would be reconfiguring the person's will in a manner which is not in line with the person's wishes. Although Stump does not clearly distinguish the roles as I have done here, she employs quiescence to play this role too: it is quiescence which allows us to say that God does not "deal violently with the will" (Stump 2003a, p. 393). This is because, once the person becomes quiescent, the person is neutral towards God's offer of grace and is not actively resisting God; the person's will is not set against God. Thus, according to Stump (and others), God could alter the quiescent person's will by giving them the gift of faith and this would in no way amount to God's dealing violently with the person's will—such divine action would not undermine the person's freedom or autonomy. The interesting point as far as the extant literature goes, however, is that quiescence might be invoked to address this worry *even if it is not invoked to play either of the other roles I identify for quiescence*. I will sketch an account which demonstrates this in the next section.

The third and final role that quiescence might play is that of making God the sole efficient cause of something which the agent controls. This role is closely connected to the first role above, and it might be that extant accounts of grace and free will which use quiescence have sought (implicitly) to use it for both purposes. Even so, this is a distinct role. It may be possible to use quiescence to secure the agent's control over and responsibility for failing to come to faith while avoiding (semi-)Pelagianism but without also using it to make God alone the sole efficient cause of all good. And it would be possible to use quiescence to make God the sole efficient cause of good while not using it to avoid the human agent's praiseworthiness for coming to faith.

What motivation is there for using quiescence in this way? One motivation is the thesis endorsed by some classical theists that God alone should be the cause of all goodness. This thought might lead one to think that an *additional problem* with semi-Pelagianism, over and above the worry that it leaves people praiseworthy for coming to faith, is that it contravenes this guiding assumption of classical theism. Kathryn Rogers suggests as much when she writes:

<sup>2</sup> For the idea that the crucial issue here is the agent's responsibility, and a development of the charge that Timpe's account fails to secure control while also blocking the attribution of responsibility, see Kittle (2015, pp. 96–97, 99–100, 104). This charge is also brought by Cyr & Flummer (2018) and MacGregor (2018).

Traditional, classical theism insists that all goods come from God. That is a key part of what it means for God to be omnipotent. The created agent cannot, from itself, generate any good, even the good of a good choice. The Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian views entail that the creature can be the genuine author of its own good (Rogers 2008, p. 128).

So one might invoke quiescence to avoid affirming that the creature causes some good; and it seems that one might appeal to quiescence to play this role aside from any special considerations about humanity's fallenness. To be clear: I am not suggesting that there are two entirely distinct problems of grace and free will which do not overlap. Nor do I mean to suggest that Rogers understands the problem of grace and free will as one to do with God's relationship to created goods (as opposed to do with humanity's fallenness). My point is twofold: a desire to provide an account where God alone is the sole cause of all good might be motivated by theological convictions about God's transcendence and the doctrine of creation, rather than considerations to do with the doctrine of original sin; and quiescence may address that problem even if it doesn't help with the problem of grace and free will.

I have outlined three different roles for quiescence, roles which are not typically distinguished in the literature. Paying closer attention to the variety of tasks to which quiescence can be put may help move forward the discussion on the problem(s) of grace and free will.

### III. USING QUIESCENCE TO AVOID THE CHARGE OF DIVINE MANIPULATION

In this section I briefly sketch a so-called "two-grace" account of the interaction between divine grace and human free will which employs quiescence, not to avoid semi-Pelagianism, but to avoid the charge that God's action on the fallen person's will compromises their autonomy. By a two-grace account I mean an account which affirms that people are unable to make any move at all towards God, that God must repair their wills before they can respond to God, and that God effects this repair unilaterally by giving everyone *prevenient* or *enabling* grace. This initial grace does not bring people to faith; rather, it enables people to accept God's offer of salvation, which then results in God's giving the person faith, the second grace. In the recent literature, such an account has been defended by C. P. Ragland, who summarises the position like so:

God ... gives prevenient grace to all people, implanting in them the non-necessitating inclination to accept God's offer of convincing grace. Those who then accept God's offer of convincing grace do so freely, but not from their own natural powers — they are able to accept only because of the prior activity of prevenient grace (Ragland 2006, p. 359).

This kind of view involves no appeal to quiescence and I wish to leave aside the question of whether this type of view avoids semi-Pelagianism. The present point is that this sort of view faces a further objection, namely, that it might be thought that God's universal and unilateral altering of everyone's will so that each person can respond positively to God's offer of grace is a problematic case of divine manipulation, or a case where God's action compromises the person's autonomy in an objectionable manner. That's because when God acts so as to make the person able to respond to God's offer, the person is in a psychological state which is set against making any positive response to God. God is thus acting on a person who neither desires, nor wants to desire, God's help. To alter this fact about the fallen person's psychology, it might be thought, amounts to divine manipulation and this may be considered problematic even if the manipulation is for the agent's own good.

This worry can be mitigated by modifying the account to include an instance of quiescence. On this modified view, everyone is by default resisting God and can do nothing to escape this state. To remedy this, God needs to give everyone prevenient grace which would enable the person to accept God's offer of grace. Now, assuming there is something to the charge of manipulation (which I assume, just to illustrate this use of quiescence), God cannot alter the person's will while the person is actively resisting God. But perhaps God could do this in a problem-free way if the person becomes quiescent first. Thus, the two-grace theorist might suggest that every fallen human being will, sooner or later, become quiescent. And

as soon as that happens, God then alters the person's will, making the person able to accept God's offer of (convincing) grace.

The idea here is this. It seems plausible that if agent A *desires* X and desires not to be interfered with, then if agent B alters A's will so that A desires something contrary to X, B has violated A's integrity in some objectionable way; but it is much less obvious that if agent A is *neutral* towards X and B produces in A a desire for X B has violated A's integrity in an objectionable manner. Put otherwise, if God's altering of the person's will is "wrapped" in an instance of quiescence, then the worry about divine manipulation and the undermining of the person's integrity or autonomy seems to be removed, or at least lessened. I want to make clear that I do not endorse the view just sketched. The point of the foregoing sketch is to illustrate that quiescence could be used in such a two-grace account with the express purpose, not of avoiding semi-Pelagianism, but of addressing the divine manipulation worry. And when quiescence is used in this way, the theorist is under a different set of constraints. For instance, if quiescence is used only to avoid any charge of divine manipulation, then the proponent of such an account would be under no burden to explain how the agent *controls* their becoming quiescent; nor would such a two-grace theorist need to show how quiescence secures the agent's blameworthiness for failing to come to faith but blocks responsibility for the agent's coming to faith. This illustrates the utility of distinguishing the different roles that quiescence may play.

#### IV. SOURCE ACCOUNTS DON'T NEED QUIESCENCE, AND THAT REVEALS A SERIOUS DEFECT

In this section I will defend the claim that source incompatibilists don't need to appeal to quiescence to avoid semi-Pelagianism. This should be surprising given the focus on quiescence in the contemporary literature. Far from this being a benefit for source incompatibilist accounts of free will, however, I will suggest that it reveals a serious problem with source accounts of control.

In order to present this argument I need to define some terms and articulate, (i) the difference between leeway and source accounts of free will, and (ii) the difference between two different types of source account. Shabo's (2010; 2014) work on source incompatibilism is valuable in laying out these differences. One straightforward way to present the differences is to define several different types of alternative possibility. To begin, I define a *bare alternative possibility* (AP) as follows:

**(Bare AP)** Consistent with the past and the laws of nature, it is possible that the universe unfolds differently.

A bare alternative possibility is defined with reference to the causal structure of the universe and not with reference to any sort of human action. In a deterministic universe, there will be no bare alternative possibilities. In an indeterministic universe, bare alternative possibilities will exist wherever there is causal indeterminacy. Next, following Shabo, we will define a *mere alternative possibility* as follows:

**(Mere AP)** Consistent with the past and the laws of nature, it's possible that the agent performs a different action (or refrains from acting), but the agent lacks the ability to realize this possibility; the past and the laws preclude this possibility from being realized *except* as a result of circumstances the agent doesn't control, or with respect to which her control is markedly impoverished (Shabo 2014, p. 384).

A mere alternative possibility differs from a bare alternative possibility in that it pertains to a context where an agent performs an action and it requires that the alternative possibility contain a different action to that which is in fact performed; however, the agent herself cannot realise this alternative—it is not up to the agent whether this alternative obtains. Here is an example of a mere alternative possibility:

**(Customer 1)** Sungho is on the phone speaking to a customer. The customer has asked a probing question and Sungho, pleased his company's product is suitable, explains how it can meet the customer's needs. Sungho is a diligent worker who believes in the product and enjoys his job. The only way things could have gone differently would have been if Sungho, who suffers from epilepsy, had had a fit immediately before answering. There was a non-zero objective probability of this happening. If it had happened, Sungho's left side would have begun to stiffen and Sungho, mortified despite it being in no way his fault, would have excused himself from the phone call and hung up.

In this example, there is an alternative possibility and in that alternative Sungho performs a different action to that which he does perform. But Sungho *is not able to* realise this alternative possibility; it is *not up to him* whether it occurs. First, it is not within Sungho's control whether he experiences a seizure. Second, since Sungho is diligent and loves his job, it is psychologically impossible for him to excuse himself from the call without a good reason.

A step on from a mere AP is what Shabo calls a *non-robust enabling alternative* but which, to avoid prejudging issues to do with the *robustness* or *significance* of the alternative, I will simply refer to as a Type 1 Enabling AP:

**(Type 1 Enabling AP)** Consistent with the past and the laws, it's possible that the agent performs a different action (or refrains from acting), and, further, she has the power or ability to realize this possibility. Even so ... it isn't up to her whether this possibility is realized (Shabo 2014, p. 385).

Some explanation is in order. How can the agent *have the power to realise the alternative* without it also *being up to her whether the alternative is realised*? This is possible because the agent may have the power to do something which results in them performing the action in question, but they might not realise this. To illustrate, consider the following amendment to the Sungho case:

**(Customer 2)** Sungho is on the phone speaking to a customer. The customer has asked a probing question and Sungho, pleased his company's product is suitable, explains how it can meet the customer's needs. Sungho enjoys his job but does get bored every so often; and though he shouldn't, he sometimes has a nibble of chocolate while on the phone to customers. Had he done so today, he would have unknowingly nibbled a square of chocolate containing hazelnut praline, to which he is allergic, but which his colleague gave to him without realising this. Had Sungho nibbled, he would've instantly begun to feel quite dizzy, at which point he would have excused himself from the phone call. This was the only way things could have unfolded differently.

In this example Sungho has a Type 1 Enabling AP. It is *enabling* because Sungho does have *the ability* to realise this alternative; there is something he can do to make it occur. But had Sungho exercised this ability, he would end up performing an action which he did not intend to perform. Sungho thinks he'll take a nibble from his favourite chocolate, put the wrapper down, and continue the conversation; in reality, he'll nibble hazelnut praline, feel dizzy, and excuse himself from the call. As Shabo sees it, while Sungho *is able to* do something which will, in fact, lead him to excuse himself from the call, it *isn't up to him* whether he excuses himself from the call. This is because, as before, it is psychologically impossible for Sungho to excuse himself from the call without a good reason and Sungho doesn't know he's allergic to the chocolate in front of him.

We come now to the last sort of AP. Shabo calls these robust enabling APs; I will call them Type 2 Enabling APs. They are defined as follows:

**(Type 2 Enabling AP)** As Type 1 Enabling APs, except the agent's ability is such that, in virtue of possessing it, it is up to her whether this alternative possibility is realized (Shabo 2014, p. 385).

This sort of AP is straightforward—it is the sort of AP someone has in ordinary circumstances when they face a choice between alternatives and there are no obstacles to them acting in accordance with their choices.

With these different sorts of AP identified, we are now in a position to articulate the difference between leeway and source accounts of free will.

As a first pass, let's say that leeway theorists are those who think that Type 2 Enabling APs are required whenever someone exercises free will. This thesis needs to be qualified but it does, I think, get things basically right. Before coming to the qualifications it is worth explicitly stating how the leeway theorist will—*should*—understand the notion of *its being up to* the agent whether the AP is realised. I take it that leeway theorists should explain this in terms of the agent possessing a choice or decision between more than one option; for leeway theorists, a choice or decision, understood as (something close to) an instantaneous mental action of forming an intention (Mele 2003, Ch 9), is the locus of agential control (see the focus on such by Ginet (1996) and O'Connor (2000, pp. 3–4)).

Now for the qualifications. First, as regards scope: all leeway theorists are going to allow that people can be *responsible* for some actions and events even when they don't have Type 2 Enabling APs. If leeway theorists didn't permit this, then standard drunk driving-style cases of derivative responsibility would falsify leeway accounts and there would have been no need for the volumes of literature on Frankfurt-style cases. But standard drunk driving-style cases do not falsify leeway incompatibilism, and those inclined to accept the avoidability criterion have never thought otherwise (Ginet 1996, p. 403; Copp 2003, p. 280; Zimmerman 2003, pp. 304–5). Rather, it should be understood that the AP requirement only concerns the type of control agents need to have over actions for which they are *non-derivatively* morally responsible.

Second, as regards the content of the APs: I have characterised leeway incompatibilism as holding that Type 2 Enabling APs are required whenever someone exercises free will. Note that this condition states that, if an agent F-s, the agent F-s freely only if they have a Type 2 Enabling AP *pertaining to a different action*. What is *up to* the agent who is responsible for F-ing is the performance of *an alternative action*. It should *not* be assumed that the leeway theorist must hold that the agent's F-ing is up to the agent. This would be to suppose that a symmetry must exist between the type of ability exercised in the agent's actual performance and the ability to do otherwise which the agent possessed. But this symmetry claim is mistaken, and leeway theorists do not need to endorse it. To illustrate: imagine I place someone radioactive material in my enemy's office. And suppose that there is only a 5% chance that the radioactive material kills my enemy. If my enemy dies, I am responsible for killing them. But *it was not up to me* whether I *killed* my enemy—it was too chancy an occurrence for it to be up to me. However, it was up to me whether I refrained from trying to kill my enemy. Thus, although it wasn't up to me whether my enemy died, this doesn't falsify the characterisation of leeway theories given above because that criterion only specifies the type of ability required to perform the alternative action.

It is useful to note two more points about the leeway position. As we've already seen, leeway theorists hold that an agent's non-derivative responsibility for (say) deciding to F requires that the agent had an alternative to deciding to F and that it was up to them whether that alternative was realised. Let's say the alternative is deciding to G. Now, for the action to be avoidable, deciding to G needs to be distinct to deciding to F. If my only options are choosing between the meal on the left and the meal on a white plate, but the meal on the left is the only meal on a white plate, and if I know that, then I don't have genuine options—I don't have a Type 2 Enabling AP. I need to be able to decide to have a different meal, or to decide not to eat at all. When I am able to so decide, I am *able to avoid choosing the meal on the left*, and I can fairly be blamed for my decision and resultant action because I was, as Pereboom puts it, able to get myself “off the hook” (Pereboom 2001, p. 1).

The second point is this. When one chooses or decides to F, one can usually decide *not* to F instead. In the ordinary case, *deciding not to F* is every bit as much a decision as is the *decision to F*; the former involves the active formation of an intention, it just happens to be an intention to refrain from acting and so leave things as they are. This option—the positive decision not to act—typically grounds the person's control over their decision. It is, to use Fischer's terminology, a *robust* alternative (Fischer 1998, p. 163). This will become important below when I present the argument against source incompatibilism.

Let us turn now to source incompatibilism. Pereboom glosses source incompatibilism as the idea that an agent's “moral responsibility is ... explained ... by her being the actual source of her action in a specific way” (Pereboom 2014, p. 9). Shabo describes the position by saying that what matters most for source incompatibilists is that the agent is the *ultimate source* of their action (Shabo 2010, p. 352). But, as Shabo makes clear, there are two different types of source incompatibilism: *compromising source incompatibilism* and *uncompromising source incompatibilism*. According to compromising source incompatibilists, while there is no universal Type 2 Enabling APs condition on moral responsibility, an agent's being the ultimate source of their actions requires that they are also the ultimate source of any motives which are sufficient for an action, and this in turn requires that the agent has Type 2 Enabling APs. Shabo takes Kane's (1996) influential account to be representative of compromising source incompatibilism. According to Kane, agents are the source of their motives only if those motives are the result of a *self-*



*forming action*—and self-forming actions require that the person has access to Type 2 Enabling APs. So although compromising source incompatibilists argue that sourcehood is the key to how free will should be conceptualised, they also hold that with respect to actions for which the person is non-derivatively responsible, sourcehood must be explained in terms of the person having access to Type 2 Enabling APs.

In contrast to the compromising position is uncompromising source incompatibilism, which is endorsed by Stump (1999), Zagzebski (2000), Pereboom, and Shabo (2010). According to this view, the agent does not need to be able to realise the alternative; nor does the alternative need to contain a different action. If any APs are needed at all, it is only as a side-effect of some other reason indeterminism is needed. For uncompromising source incompatibilists, then, APs may serve as *evidence for* or as an *indicator of* the kinds of conditions required by sourcehood, but they *play no role in explaining* the relevant kind of control. Uncompromising source incompatibilists thus hold that free will does not require mere APs or either type of enabling AP. It is against this version of source incompatibilism that the argument below is directed.

How does quiescence help the uncompromising source theorist who rejects any need for Type 2 Enabling APs? To be sure, the uncompromising source theorist can *allow* that agents face choices between significant alternatives, and that when they do they exercise control. They can even allow that the control associated with choices is distinctive in some way. But uncompromising source theorists cannot *require* such control for moral responsibility. So why is quiescence thought by some source theorists to be the key to a solution? I want to argue that if we take the central idea of uncompromising source accounts seriously, we will see that quiescence is not needed. I will argue for this with primary reference to Stump's account because, of all the prominent uncompromising source incompatibilists, Stump offers the most developed positive account of control. Note that to argue for uncompromising source incompatibilism by defending, say, the consequence argument or the manipulation argument on the one hand, and the Frankfurt-style cases on the other, is *not* to provide an account of control. It is to endorse arguments (against compatibilism and against leeway incompatibilism respectively) which impose *constraints* on a theory of control, but it is not in itself to provide a theory of control. Stump, however, does not defend uncompromising source incompatibilism merely by arguing against compatibilism and against leeway incompatibilism. She offers a positive account of control rooted in her Thomistic philosophy of mind.

According to Stump, the control essential to moral responsibility is “that a person be the ultimate source of what she does, that her intellect and will be the ultimate causes of her acts” (Stump 1999, p. 414). In a different article Stump puts it slightly differently: “an act is free if and only if the ultimate cause of that act is the agent's own will and intellect” (Stump 2003a, p. 304). Stump endorses a Thomist account of the agent's intellect and will, such that the intellect is a faculty of judgement and the will is an appetitive faculty directed towards rational ends. The will is dependent on the intellect in the following sense: it can only produce desires for that which the intellect judges to be good. However, the intellect is in turn dependent on the will in the following way: if the intellect has judged a range of options to be good, the will can move the subject towards any item from that range, which in turn determines subsequent inputs to the intellect (Stump 2003a, pp. 284–87). Now, for the agent to be the ultimate cause of an action, the causal history of the judgements, motivational attitudes, and intentions implicated in the production of the action must have some measure of indeterminism in their causal history: “no acts of will for which a person is morally responsible are causally determined by anything outside the willer” (Stump 1999, p. 414). But here the account faces a question: how much indeterminacy is required? Or perhaps better: what is it that needs to be indeterminate?

To answer this, let us turn to the uncompromising source theorist's analysis of the Frankfurt-style cases. Consider a Frankfurt-style case offered by Stump (2003b, p. 140).<sup>3</sup> Neurosurgeon Grey wants Jones to vote Republican. Grey can detect and manipulate the neural firings in Jones's brain, which correlate

<sup>3</sup> The case relies on the assumption that all mental operations and actions are correlated with some stretch of brain activity so it not applicable to Cartesian dualists, but that is its only limitation, and I'm happy to proceed on the assumption that Cartesian dualism is false.

with<sup>4</sup> his acts of will (and other mental operations). Whenever Jones votes Republican there is a neural sequence R which begins with firings ‘a, b, c’; whenever he votes Democrat there is a neural sequence D which begins with firings ‘x, y, z’. The firings ‘a, b, c’ and ‘x, y, z’, being only the firing of a few neurons, are not enough to constitute any act of will themselves. Grey monitors Jones. If Grey had detected ‘x, y, z’, he would have intervened and caused R to occur instead. But as it is, Grey detects ‘a, b, c’ and so he does not intervene (Stump 2003b, pp. 140–41). In this scenario, there are only two causally open options: one where neural sequence R occurs and Grey does not intervene; the other where portion ‘x, y, z’ of D occurs, Grey detects this, and as a result causes R to occur. So in both causally open alternatives, R occurs and Jones votes Republican. Stump takes this Frankfurt-style case to show that “it was not possible for Jones to do anything other than willing to vote for Republicans” (Stump 2003b, p. 141). More generally, Frankfurt-style cases show that the agent was not able to have done otherwise (Stump 1999, p. 414); that “the victim couldn’t form any act of will other than that act which the intervener wants the victim to have; ... that the victim cannot will otherwise than he does” (Stump 1999, p. 419); that moral responsibility “doesn’t require alternative possibilities” (Stump 1999, p. 420).

Now, the last quotation does not mean that Stump rejects the need for *all* types of alternative possibilities. Given her commitment to incompatibilism, some alternative possibilities must be needed. The context of the quotations cited above show that, for Stump, the control which is required for moral responsibility does not require Mere APs, Type 1 Enabling APs or Type 2 Enabling APs. We can safely conclude that Stump rejects the need even for Mere APs because, as quoted, she thinks that non-derivative moral responsibility can exist even when the victim of a Frankfurt-style case “cannot will otherwise than he does”.

Still, this is not to say that Stump requires nothing more than Bare APs. Bare APs are the alternatives associated with any measure of indeterminism at all. According to Stump, the existence of Bare APs is not sufficient as far as the indeterminacy required for control goes. But what is sufficient *as far as the indeterminacy required for control goes* is some measure of indeterminacy *in the operation of the agent’s intellect and/or will* which gives rise to the action in question. Here is how Stump summarises it: “for any act which the agent does, if there is any causal chain at all of which that act is the effect, then the causal chain must have a first or ultimate cause, and that ultimate cause cannot be anything other than an act of the agent’s own will or intellect” (Stump 1999, p. 414). The operations of the agent’s intellect and will which secure the agent’s sourcehood or origination of their action, then, must be indeterministic in nature. This does not mean that the indeterminism must exist immediately prior to the act for which the agent is responsible. It might be that indeterministic operations of the agent’s intellect and will today give rise to a set of desires and judgements which deterministically produce an action next week; such an action would be freely performed, according to Stump, because the ultimate cause was the indeterministic operation of the agent’s own intellect and will.

Note, however, that it is not open to Stump to require that it be an indeterministic manner *whether or not* the agent’s intellect and will produces a given act of will. Such a requirement would entail the need for Mere APs because there would need to be an alternative possibility where the agent forms a different act of will. But Stump is as clear as can be that (non-derivative) moral responsibility can exist even when there is no possibility of the agent performing a different act of will. Once we see this, however, we will see that uncompromising source theorists such as Stump do not need to invoke quiescence to provide an account of grace and free will which avoids semi-Pelagianism.

The uncompromising source incompatibilist could offer the following sort of account of grace and free will: soon after attaining to the age of reason, each person’s intellect and will produces an attitude of rejecting God and there is some measure of indeterminacy in the operation of either the intellect or the will (or both) which affects precisely when that attitude of rejection is produced. For this to be em-

4 Stump uses ‘correlate with’ to indicate a stronger connection between mind and brain than that supposed by Cartesian dualism, while at the same time being vague about the details of that connection—I am following her in this (Stump 1999, p. 415).

pirically plausible, we would have to assume that the generation of this attitude happens unconsciously. But this is no problem since Stump (like many other free will theorists) explicitly denies that the control needed for moral responsibility needs to be consciously exercised (Stump 2003a, 280, 291). So suppose, for instance, that Thomas will attain to the age of reason today and that as he does so his intellect and will produce in him the attitude of rejecting God. It is not indeterministic *whether or not* Thomas's intellect and will produces this attitude; but it is indeterministic *precisely when* this happens. For simplicity's sake, let's just say there are only two alternatives: either Thomas's intellect and will generate this attitude at precisely 1:00pm, or they generate this attitude at 1/50<sup>th</sup> of a second past 1:00pm. Those are the only two alternative possibilities which exist.

The Stumpian uncompromising source incompatibilist should judge that Thomas is morally responsible and blameworthy for resisting God. Thomas is blameworthy because his intellect and will are the "ultimate cause" of the attitude of rejecting God since they produce that attitude indeterministically. This picture straightforwardly avoids falling foul of the Councils of Orange; by hypothesis, Thomas is unable to perform any good action, including that of coming to faith (unless he's given a special grace). And according to this picture, if Thomas were to come to faith, that could only be because God intervened and caused Thomas's will to accept God's offer, which would mean that Thomas would not be praiseworthy for any factor contributing to his coming to faith. But each of these things holds without making any appeal to quiescence. So uncompromising source incompatibilists can provide a straightforward account of grace and free will which avoids (semi-)Pelagianism without appealing to quiescence.

In contrast, consider why the leeway theorist needs to appeal to quiescence. According to the doctrine of original sin implied by the Council of Orange, no fallen person can accept God's offer of grace. This is not an option, not an alternative possibility, for the fallen, ungraced person. Given a leeway account of free will, the lack of this option makes it hard to see how the person can be responsible for rejecting God's offer of grace. If the person cannot accept God, it looks like their only option is to reject God. And if so, that would make the fallen person's rejection inevitable and the leeway theorist would have to say the person could not be responsible for it. For the leeway theorist, control, and the moral responsibility which depends on that control, are all about which alternatives the agent can realise and avoid. The insight behind the appeal to quiescence is that quiescence yields a third alternative possibility (which is really just the person's second (genuine) alternative possibility): the fallen person can now either reject God or be neutral towards God. With this additional option (quiescence), the leeway theorist can maintain that the agent faces a genuine choice and so does in fact have the sort of control relevant to free will. So the leeway theorist has a clear need for quiescence; the uncompromising source theorist has no such need.

Prima facie, if an incompatibilist account can provide as straightforward an account of an agent's being responsible for their fallen state as can the uncompromising source theorist, then all to the better: that would seem to be a great advantage for this type of incompatibilist account over other types of incompatibilist account (leeway and compromising source incompatibilists).

In fact, however, I will argue that this feature of the account strongly suggests that the uncompromising source theorist's notion of control is inadequate. To see this, consider the following case. Let us suppose that Jimmy lives in a deterministic universe has been deterministically shaped by factors beyond his control such that at precisely 1pm today Jimmy will "decide" to steal £50 from his mother's purse (you can ignore the scare quotes if you think it straightforward that deterministic agents could decide to do things). The uncompromising source incompatibilist, just like all incompatibilists, will deny that Jimmy decides freely or is morally responsible for his decision. He lacks the kind of control needed for moral responsibility because he lives in a deterministic universe. Now compare Jimmy to Jonah. Jonah lives in an almost but not quite deterministic universe. Jonah has been deterministically shaped by factors beyond his control such that at *around* 1pm today Jonah will decide to steal £50 from his mother's purse. It is inevitable Jonah will decide to steal; Jonah cannot avoid this. However, there is some indeterminacy in the universe he lives in, and that indeterminism affects his intellect and will: it is indeterministic whether Jonah's intellect and will shall produce his decision to steal £50 at precisely 1:00pm or whether Jonah's

intellect and will shall produce his decision to steal £50 at  $1/50^{\text{th}}$  of a second past 1:00pm. According to the uncompromising source incompatibilist, this amount of indeterminacy is sufficient, as far as the indeterminacy requirements of control go, to mean that Jonah's intellect and will are the ultimate cause of his decision to steal £50. As a result, the uncompromising source incompatibilist will conclude that Jonah is morally responsible for deciding to steal £50. Hard luck Jonah! It turns out that Jimmy was fortunate indeed to live in a fully deterministic universe and thus be off the hook.

That the source theorist must say this is, I take it, a significant cost to the theory. It is opaque why this type of indeterminacy—indeterminacy which affects nothing but the very precise time at which the attitude is formed, to a degree which is never within a human being's control in any case—should be enough to secure the agent's being the ultimate cause of their decision. Note that I am not here claiming that the source incompatibilist's *motivation* is opaque. We can very well understand why source incompatibilists are led to endorse such accounts: against compatibilism, they are convinced by either the consequence argument or the manipulation argument (or both); against leeway and compromising source incompatibilism, they are convinced by the Frankfurt-style cases. But as noted above, endorsing such arguments only puts very general constraints on the accounts of control one can endorse; it does not yield a positive account of control. Stump provides such an account of control: the agent's intellect and/or will must produce the decision or action, and somewhere in the causal chain between the relevant operations of the intellect and will on the one hand and the resultant decision or act of will on the other, there must be some indeterminism. But on pain of contravening her own conclusions about the Frankfurt-style case, it is not open to Stump to hold that the indeterminism operative in the person's intellect and will must make it the case that it is indeterminate *whether or not* the person decides to *F*; uncompromising source incompatibilists have no right to maintain that the indeterminism affects *the content* of what is decided, or that it affects *which action* is performed.

I take it that the Jimmy/Jonah case I've offered above serves as a *reductio* of the broad class of accounts of control to which the uncompromising source incompatibilist is committed. I would invite any incompatibilist unconvinced of this to consider a deterministic scenario where an agent performs an action and where it is clear that the agent is not responsible (because of the determinism). Then simply add to the scenario that the operations of the agent's intellect and will which led to the action in question involved some small measure of indeterminacy; make that indeterminacy as slight as is needed so that one's intuition remains unchanged—for instance, that it pertains only to  $1/50^{\text{th}}$  of a second. The resultant scenario will be one's very own counterexample to uncompromising source incompatibilism. Next, one could ask oneself whether anything would change if such indeterminacy was a constant feature of the operation of the agent's intellect. That is, suppose that every time an agent's intellect produced a judgement, it was indeterministic whether it was produced at (say) time  $t$  or time  $t + 1/50^{\text{th}}$  of a second. If that level of indeterminacy was a constant feature of the operations of the agent's intellect throughout the agent's entire history, would that in any way incline one to judge the person morally responsible? I suggest not. I've described how the indeterminism might affect the precise timing of the formation of a given psychological attitude; doing so makes the point vivid. But we could just as easily imagine that the indeterminism attaches to some other aspect of the intellect or will's operation: for example, perhaps it is indeterministic whether neurons  $p^1, p^2, \dots, p^n$  produce the decision to *F* or whether neurons  $q^1, q^2, \dots, q^n$  produce the decision to *F* (it might be that either set of neurons would do so at precisely the same moment). There are no restrictions here, as long as the indeterminism in no way affects *which* act of will are performed; to require that—to suggest that the uncompromising source incompatibilist could maintain that the indeterminism affects the contents of the act of will, or whether or not an action is performed—is to implicitly adopt the leeway theorist's account of control.

To summarise, what I have argued is that if we take seriously the key commitment of uncompromising source incompatibilists—namely, that the control associated with moral responsibility does not require the agent to have Mere APs, Type 1 Enabling APs, or Type 2 Enabling APs—then we can see that the type of indeterminism available to the uncompromising source theorist is so slight that it is hard to see how it could either play any role in grounding the relevant sort of control *or be an indicator of any-*

*thing which did play that role.* The leeway or compromising source incompatibilist could bolster this conclusion if they were able to explain where the uncompromising source incompatibilist has gone wrong. And happily, the leeway theorist has the resources to do just this. The leeway theorist can suggest that the proponent of uncompromising source incompatibilism has made the following mistake when interpreting Frankfurt-style cases. First, the uncompromising source incompatibilist interprets the Frankfurt-style cases as involving two sequences (the actual sequence and the alternative sequence) that contain the same action. In the Frankfurt-style case discussed above, the action in question is the decision to vote Republican. This decision exists in both sequences and the only difference between them is that in exactly one of the sequences the agent decides “on his own”. The uncompromising source incompatibilist does not take this difference to be essential to the identity of the decision, so it is concluded that alternative possibilities are not needed for the control associated with moral responsibility. Second, the source incompatibilist considers what is required for moral responsibility. Having already concluded that moral responsibility does not need significant alternative possibilities of any sort, and perhaps also because all parties agree that the agent is not responsible for the action in the alternative sequence, the uncompromising source incompatibilist brackets the victim’s performance of the action in the alternative sequence. As a result, when the uncompromising source incompatibilist comes to give a positive account of control, the focus is entirely on the indeterminism in the actual sequence. In Stump’s case, the focus is on the fact that the agent’s intellect and will must operate to some degree indeterministically. With the action in the alternative sequence bracketed, it is easy enough to suppose, with Stump, that “it is up to a human willer, and to her alone, whether her will refuses grace” (Stump 2003a, p. 402). But the only reason this sounds plausible is that in ordinary cases people have the option of willing or deciding *not to act at all*. The possibility of deciding not to act at all is, I would suggest, one of our standard background assumptions. And when the uncompromising source incompatibilist (implicitly) brackets the existence of the victim’s action in the alternative sequence, and claims that the agent can be responsible, they are implicitly relying on this possibility to elicit the intuition that the agent is responsible. In other words, the uncompromising source incompatibilist’s claims sound plausible only because we implicitly compare the indeterministic production of the decision by the agent’s intellect and will with a normal scenario where the agent’s intellect and will does not produce the decision. In making this comparison, we implicitly suppose that there is a significant alternative: willing or deciding not to reject God. But the uncompromising source incompatibilist is not entitled to this background assumption; to rely on this assumption would be to ground the relevant sort of control in an alternative which contains a different act of will, something which the uncompromising source incompatibilists explicitly deny is needed. To put the point slightly differently, uncompromising source incompatibilists are not entitled to the claim that the agent’s intellect and will is responsible for *whether or not* the agent made any given decision. This claim already implicates a sort of AP which the uncompromising source incompatibilists deny are needed for the relevant sort of control.

I do not mean to suggest that all uncompromising source incompatibilists err by unconsciously engaging in the above reasoning process. Rather, the thought is that this is not an implausible explanation for how someone might conclude that significant APs are not needed even after paying sustained attention to the Frankfurt-style cases. More significantly, I’m claiming that one good way to assess any proposed account of the freedom or control required for moral responsibility is to consider how it handles a range of cases aside from any elaborate philosophical machinery such as counterfactual intervention. And the point I’ve tried to develop here is that it is non-trivial to properly assess uncompromising source incompatibilist accounts in normal or typical scenarios because such scenarios always include a significant alternative: the agent’s being able to decide not to act. This is such a pervasive feature of our ordinary control that we can even slip into assessing the agent’s decision in the Frankfurtian actual sequence with reference to this norm (i.e. by implicitly supposing that the agent could refrain). To assess uncompromising source incompatibilism, however, we need to consider a scenario with no potential intervention and where it is clear that any indeterminacy in the causal history of the action in no way affects whether the action is performed and in no way affects how the intentional component of the action should be described. Once we do that, we will see that the account of control entailed by uncompromising source

incompatibilism is itself compromised. This is a significant conclusion that will be of interest not just to philosophers of religion but also to philosophers more squarely focused on free will. And this reinforces my contention above about the fruitfulness of getting clear about the nature of quiescence and the roles it may play in philosophy of religion contexts.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> I would like to thank David Eford for the invitation to speak at the Society for Christian Philosophers UK inaugural meeting at York in 2019; this paper is based on the talk given at that conference. And my thanks go to Eleonore Stump, David Worsley, and David Eford for discussions on the ideas presented there. I would also like to thank two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful comments.

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