



Philosophical Plays

ISSN 1654-6296 (print) · ISSN 1654-6318 (online)

IN THIS ISSUE:

Philosophical Play: Katherine's Questionable Quest for Love and Happiness,

BO C. KLINTBERG

1-98

SCENE I. The Floridian Liti-Gator	1
SCENE II. On Battles, Wars, and Meaning	10
SCENE III. Maximum Happiness, Minimum Unhappiness	15
SCENE IV. Katherine's Real Problem	22
SCENE V. The Mustachio Man	27
SCENE VI. Death Is Nothing Like a Toothache	33
SCENE VII. Not in the Hands of the Scientists	37
SCENE VIII. Important and Unimportant Knowledge	40
SCENE IX. Physicians Can't Stop Death	47
SCENE X. Are Foetuses Potential Persons?	50
SCENE XI. The Body-Bomb	65
SCENE XII. The Cartesian Theatre	72
SCENE XIII. Radha's Microscope	78
SCENE XIV. Ontology Drives Explanation	83
SCENE XV. Another Look at Radha	90
SCENE XVI. Confessions of a Satisfactionist	94



Philosophical Plays

ISSN 1654-6296 (print) · ISSN 1654-6318 (online)

IN THIS ISSUE:

*Philosophical Play: Katherine's Questionable
Quest for Love and Happiness,*

BO C. KLINTBERG

1-98

SCENE I. The Floridian Liti-Gator	<i>1</i>
SCENE II. On Battles, Wars, and Meaning	<i>10</i>
SCENE III. Maximum Happiness, Minimum Unhappiness	<i>15</i>
SCENE IV. Katherine's Real Problem	<i>22</i>
SCENE V. The Mustachio Man	<i>27</i>
SCENE VI. Death Is Nothing Like a Toothache	<i>33</i>
SCENE VII. Not in the Hands of the Scientists	<i>37</i>
SCENE VIII. Important and Unimportant Knowledge	<i>40</i>
SCENE IX. Physicians Can't Stop Death	<i>47</i>
SCENE X. Are Foetuses Potential Persons?	<i>50</i>
SCENE XI. The Body-Bomb	<i>65</i>
SCENE XII. The Cartesian Theatre	<i>72</i>
SCENE XIII. Radha's Microscope	<i>78</i>
SCENE XIV. Ontology Drives Explanation	<i>83</i>
SCENE XV. Another Look at Radha	<i>90</i>
SCENE XVI. Confessions of a Satisfactionist	<i>94</i>

PUBLISHED BY:

Bo C. Klintberg

FOUNDER, AUTHOR, EDITOR:

Bo C. Klintberg

ART DIRECTION & TYPOGRAPHY:

Bo C. Klintberg

ONLINE EDITION (OPEN ARCHIVE):

<http://philosophicalplays.googlepages.com>

ISSN: 1654-6318

PRINT EDITION (FREE PDFs):

<http://philosophicalplays.googlepages.com>

ISSN: 1654-6296

COPYRIGHT:

All published material in *Philosophical Plays*, both in the print edition and in the online edition, is Copyright © 2007–2008 by Bo C. Klintberg. All rights reserved.

No part of these publications may be reproduced, or republished, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the author.

PERMISSIONS:

For inquiries about permission to reproduce, or to republish, or to store in a retrieval system, the material appearing in either the print edition or the online edition of *Philosophical Plays*, kindly write the author at the e-mail address provided below.

CORRESPONDENCE:

philosophicalplays.editor
[at] gmail [dot] com

Katherine's Questionable Quest for Love and Happiness

BO C. KLINTBERG

CHARACTERS:

Christianus, *a satisfactionist*

Katherine, *a lawyer*

*The scene throughout is in a
London pizzeria; it's late afternoon,
Wednesday, March 21, 2007.*

SCENE I.

The Floridian Liti-Gator

1 CHRISTIANUS. Katherine! *There* you are!

2 KATHERINE. Chris! At last! It's *so* nice to see
you!

3 CHRISTIANUS. And it's *very* nice to see you too,
my dear!

4 KATHERINE. Is it two years?

5 CHRISTIANUS. No, it's almost *three* years since
I saw you in Miami!

6 KATHERINE. Really?

7 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. Time *does* fly, doesn't it?

8 KATHERINE. It sure does!

9 CHRISTIANUS. Have you been here long?

10 KATHERINE. No. I *just* came myself.

11 CHRISTIANUS. Great! And you're not *too* mad
at me for being a little late?

12 KATHERINE. No, of course not. I was late my-
self.

13 CHRISTIANUS. Problems?

14 KATHERINE. Well, not any real *flight* prob-
lems, as such. I mean, we had some ex-
tra security procedures in Miami before
we boarded, so we got a late start. But I
don't mind *that*, if it really improves the
safety.

15 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. In these days of global ter-
rorism and suicide bombings one cannot
get too much security.

16 KATHERINE. Exactly. And then when we were
approaching Heathrow this morning, we
were already a little off schedule, so we
couldn't land immediately but had to
circle for a while. So we got even *more*
delayed. But safety-wise, there were no
problems; the flight just ended up being
very late.

17 CHRISTIANUS. Well, if *that's* all you have, then
it doesn't sound so bad, especially for a
transatlantic flight. But that *isn't* all, is
it?

18 KATHERINE. Let me put it like this, Chris:
apart from the delays, everything went
quite smoothly all the way from Miami
to the Heathrow baggage claim area.

19 CHRISTIANUS. Uh-oh.

20 KATHERINE. Yes. They *lost* my luggage! Can
you *believe* it?

21 CHRISTIANUS. Oh dear! That's *terrible!*

22 KATHERINE. So I had to spend *hours* at Heath-
row trying to deal with it.

23 CHRISTIANUS. That's *outrageous!*

24 KATHERINE. Yes. And it gets even worse: I had
some *very* important documents in my
luggage.

25 CHRISTIANUS. But don't you think that the
airline will find your things?

26 KATHERINE. Maybe. But I doubt it.

27 CHRISTIANUS. Hey! Cheer up, Katherine! I
mean, even if they *don't* find your things,
I am sure you can handle it. You are not
exactly afraid of 'expressing yourself' in
matters of civil and corporate law. After
all, you *are* known as 'The Floridian Liti-

Gator'!

28 KATHERINE. Sure. But it's still a lot of work to
litigate.

29 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, yes, of course. No doubt.

30 KATHERINE. And there is more to the story.

31 CHRISTIANUS. More?

32 KATHERINE. Yes. I left out some details that
really complicate things.

33 CHRISTIANUS. Oh, no!

34 KATHERINE. Oh, *yes!* Remember I said that
I had some *very* important documents
with me?

35 CHRISTIANUS. Naturally.

36 KATHERINE. Well, those documents are not

1:27, Floridian Liti-Gator: There are many colourful actors on the Florida scene, including some very bright litigation lawyers, some very hard-hitting American football players such as the University of Florida Gators [<http://www.gatorzone.com>], and, says BBC (2006), even some attacking alligators. Katherine's character is presumably an amalgamation of various aspects of these.

BBC (2006), 'The threat from Florida's alligators'. BBC NEWS [<http://news.bbc.co.uk>], 15 May 2006, 15:39 GMT.

1:28, litigate: According to Burton (1985, p. 317), the verb *litigate* may mean: 'altercate, appeal to the law, assert in court, bring action against, bring an

action, bring suit, bring to the bar, bring to trial, carry on a lawsuit, contend, contest in court, contest in law, go into litigation, institute legal proceedings, *litigare*, prefer a claim, press in court, pursue in court, seek legal redress, start a lawsuit, start an action, sue, take to court, urge in court'.

WILLIAM C. BURTON (1985), *Legal Thesaurus*. Complete and unabridged. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., and London: Collier Macmillan Publishers.

1:38, *The Scream*: Edvard Munch's (1863–1944) famous *The Scream* (Norw. *Serik*) exists, according to Bischoff (1997, p. 53), in more than fifty versions. The version that Bischoff calls 'the main one'

only *very* important — they are completely *irreplaceable*. So even if I take the airline to court and manage to get some recompense in dollars and cents, it's *still* not good enough. If I can't get my luggage back with *all* those original documents, I will be in a *hell* of a lot of trouble. *Personal* trouble.

37 CHRISTIANUS. I am *very* sorry to hear that, Katherine.

38 KATHERINE. Yes, it's a *nightmare!* When I realized that I actually had *lost* my luggage, I felt like I was in *The Scream*.

39 CHRISTIANUS. You mean, *Munch's* scream?

40 KATHERINE. Yes, Munch's *interminable* scream.

(in oil, tempera, and pastel) was painted in 1893 and measures 91 x 73 cm (National Gallery, Oslo). See Bischoff (1997, p. 52) for a nice colour reproduction. Another version (a lithography) was made in 1895 and is reproduced in Gombrich (1953, p. 423).

ULRICH BISCHOFF (1997), *Edvard Munch*. Köln: Benedikt Taschen Verlag.

E. H. GOMBRICH (1953), *Kunstens Historie*. With 370 illustrations. Copenhagen: Steen Hasselbalchs Forlag. Original edition (1950): *The Story of Art*. London: Phaidon Press.

1:40, Munch's *interminable* scream: Gombrich (1953, pp. 424) asserts that we will *never* know what lies behind Munch's scream. And yet, Katherine

seems to be pretty sure that Munch's scream is *interminable*. But how can she know *that*? One explanation may be that Katherine did not take Gombrich's proposition very seriously. So although she presumably *did* inspect the painting visually in order to know more about it, she may *also* have read Munch's own description of the scream in his 1892 diary: 'I was walking down the road with two friends — the sun went down — I felt like a gust of melancholy. The sky suddenly became red like blood — I stopped, leaned against the fence, dead tired — saw the flaming skies as blood and sword — the bluish-black fjord and town — My friends continued to walk — I stood there trembling of anxiety — and I felt like a big interminable scream

But it was also *my* scream, mixed together, somehow.

41 CHRISTIANUS. So perhaps I *shouldn't* say, then, 'Welcome back to London', after that interminable terminal event of yours?

42 KATHERINE. Don't worry, Chris: I am *very* happy being back in London, even though Heathrow certainly was a *much* too expressionistic experience for my taste. But I am much better now: more together, more centred. Actually, I almost feel like I am sitting in Monet's boat when I am here with you.

43 CHRISTIANUS. Ah! Your favourite Manet painting!

44 KATHERINE. Yes! You remembered!

45 CHRISTIANUS. Of course! Who can forget that

through nature' (Bischoff 1997, p. 53; my translation from the Norwegian).

1:43, favourite Manet painting: Christianus probably refers to Manet's 1874 painting *Monet working in his boat* (Neue Pinakothek, Munich). See Gombrich (1953, p. 389) for a beautiful colour reproduction.

1:51, mostly *kapha*: Ayurveda is a very elaborate system of ancient Indian medical teachings. One of its cornerstones is the *tridosha* doctrine, which to some extent resembles the Hippocratic (ca. 460–370 B.C.) doctrine of the four hu-

mours (as presented in *On the Nature of Man*) and the Galenic (ca. 129–210 A.D.) system that continued on that path (Lindberg 1992, pp. 125–126). The ayurvedic *tridosha* system teaches that there are three (Skt. *tri*) humours (*doshas*). The three *doshas* are: phlegm (*kapha* or *shleshman*), wind (*vaata*), and cholera or bile (*pitta*) (Wujastyk 2003, pp. xvii–xviii). These govern 'all biological, psychological and physiopathological functions of the body and mind' (Heinrich, Barnes, Gibbons, and Williamson 2004, p. 176). As Vasant Lad remarks, '[t]he individual constitution determines disease-proneness' (1984, p.

light, that tranquillity, that boat?

- 46 KATHERINE. Yes. It's a very serene scene.
- 47 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, and it's very satisfying for the heart.
- 48 KATHERINE. *Very!*
- 49 CHRISTIANUS. But it's not very satisfying for the *stomach*. So perhaps we can have a look at the *menu* now?
- 50 KATHERINE. Sure, but I am not all that hungry.
- 51 CHRISTIANUS. Ah, yes. You are mostly *kapha*, aren't you?
- 52 KATHERINE. Yes, I think that's what my ayurvedic doctor says.
- 53 CHRISTIANUS. I thought so. As for myself, I am predominantly *pitta*. So I simply

37). The idea is that a person whose constitution is, say, predominantly *kapha*, may experience certain diseases that are typical for the *kapha* constitution, for example 'repeated attacks of tonsillitis, sinusitis, bronchitis and congestion in the lungs' (1984, p. 38).

MICHAEL HEINRICH, JOANNE BARNES, SIMON GIBBONS, and ELIZABETH M. WILLIAMSON (2004), *Fundamentals of Pharmacognosy and Phytotherapy*. Foreword by A. Douglas Kinghorn. Epilogue by J. David Phillipson. Edinburgh and New York: Churchill Livingstone.

VASANT LAD (1984), *The Science of Self-Healing: A Practical Guide*. Illus-

trated by Angela Werneke. Santa Fe, NM: Lotus Press.

DAVID C. LINDBERG (1992), *The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

DOMINIK WUJASTYK (2003), *The Roots of Ayurveda: Selections from Sanskrit Medical Writings*. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Classic.

1:53, predominantly *pitta*: Christianus's statement may be compared to Lad's description of a typical *pitta* in-

must have something right now. I am *starving!*

54 KATHERINE. OK. What would you like?

55 CHRISTIANUS. Let's see . . . what do you think about one of these Venetian Blinds?

56 KATHERINE. Well, it sounds somewhat dangerous. I am not sure that my ophthalmologist would approve of it, since my vision already is somewhat impaired. Maybe the Romantic Romana is safer?

57 CHRISTIANUS. Could be, at least from a purely *ophthalmic* viewpoint. And it certainly sounds less eruptive than the Vesuvian Volcano, too. Does the Romana come with extra cheese, you think?

58 KATHERINE. They *say* it does; it's listed on the *first* page of the menu.

59 CHRISTIANUS. Ah, yes — *there* it is! But what would your *psychiatrist* say about ordering such a *romantic* preparation, considering your most recent traumatic divorce and your otherwise so tumultuous love life? Isn't he a Freudian?

dividual: 'Pittas have a strong appetite, strong metabolism, and strong digestion' (1998, p. 22).

VASANT D. LAD (1998), *The Complete Book of Ayurvedic Home Remedies*. Illustrations by Vasant D. Lad. New York: Three Rivers Press.

1:56, impaired: Note that Katherine uses the word 'impaired' here. According to Bradford (1999, p. 9), there is a difference between *visual impairment* (or *visual acuity impairment*) and *visual disability*: while *visual impairment* (20/80, 20/200, etc.) points to a condition of

60 KATHERINE. Sure he is. But I don't care what
he says; he's more traumatic and tumultu-
ous than *I* am!

61 CHRISTIANUS. Fair enough. It's your life.

62 KATHERINE. It certainly is. So should we share
a Romana, then?

63 CHRISTIANUS. Maybe. How big is it?

64 KATHERINE. Well, they say it's for four peo-
ple.

65 CHRISTIANUS. Hmm. I feel like *three* people
myself. How about you?

66 KATHERINE. I normally *do* have a reptilian ap-
petite. But today I'll settle for less. So if
you could feel more like *two* people in-
stead of *three*, then we may have a deal.
What do you say?

67 CHRISTIANUS. OK, sounds great! Let's order.
Waiter!

the eyes, *visual disability* (moderate low vision, severe low vision, etc.) points to a condition of the individual. So '[t]wo individuals with the same visual impairment measured on a Snellen eye chart may show very different levels of functional disability' (1999, p. 9).

CYNTHIA A. BRADFORD (1999), *Basic Ophthalmology for Medical Students and Primary Care Residents*. Seventh edition. San Francisco, CA: American Academy of Ophthalmology.

SCENE II.

On Battles, Wars, and Meaning

- 1 CHRISTIANUS. So what takes you to London,
Katherine?
- 2 KATHERINE. British Airways, as usual.
- 3 CHRISTIANUS. Of course! I certainly *do* re-
member that you have some affinity for
their evening flights and their comfy-cosy
little six-foot-plus beds. But I mean, what
are you *doing* here? Isn't the suing market
better on the other side of the Atlantic?
- 4 KATHERINE. *Sure* it's better. I am *swamped!*
- 5 CHRISTIANUS. Sounds very Floridian, indeed.
- 6 KATHERINE. Yes. So, I'm *not* here on busi-
ness.

11:3, comfy-cosy: Christianus presumably uses this construction here not just to be more concise and economical (a less concise way of expressing himself might have been, for example, 'comfy and cosy'). One reason could be that he wants to add a certain rhythm to the sentence that otherwise would not have been there; and maybe he feels that a hendiadys construction would not create, in the present case, the desired 'phonaesthetic effect' that it is sometimes used for (McArthur 1992, p. 468). Another reason could be that he wants to avoid hendiadys-related interpretation

issues, such as the one in which Hahn claims that hendiadys is a 'misnomer' in regards to Virgil, and that when Virgil wrote as if his ideas were two, 'he really *did* have two' (Preminger, Warnke, and Hardison, Jr. 1965, p. 344; my emphasis).

TOM MCARTHUR, ed. (1992), *The Oxford Companion to the English Language*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

ALEX PREMINGER, FRANK J. WARNKE, and O. B. HARDISON, JR. (1965), *Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

7 CHRISTIANUS. But it's not pleasure *either*, is it?

8 KATHERINE. No, it's more an attempt to *get away*, to stay sane.

9 CHRISTIANUS. Time out?

10 KATHERINE. Definitely.

11 CHRISTIANUS. Running out of steam?

12 KATHERINE. Sort of.

13 CHRISTIANUS. Anything you want to share?

14 KATHERINE. Well, there are so many things that are worrisome.

15 CHRISTIANUS. Like what?

16 KATHERINE. Well, just take all that fighting that is *still* going on in Iraq. Just yesterday they hanged Saddam's old VP, on the anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion.

11:3, six-foot-plus beds: British Airways [<http://www.britishairways.com>] has offered, and may still offer, their First Class customers 'ergonomically designed 6ft 6" beds' for '[u]nparalleled comfort and privacy' on their Boeing 747 jets flying from Miami to London. BA seemingly offered this service both on their late afternoon flights (BA0206) and on their evening flights (BA0208).

11:16, hanged: Mariam Karouny reports: 'Saddam Hussein's former vice president was hanged for crimes against humanity early on Tuesday, the fourth

anniversary of the U.S.-led invasion that toppled Saddam Hussein from power' (2007).

MARIAM KAROUNY (2007), 'Saddam VP hanged on 4th anniversary of invasion'. Reuters [<http://www.reuters.com>], Tuesday, 20 March 2007, 4:38 EDT.

17 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, I heard about that. And it's
four years now since it all started, isn't
it?

18 KATHERINE. Yes — and one day. And Bush
is *still* pursuing that war, even though
he doesn't have the full support of the
American people.

19 CHRISTIANUS. But that's hardly any *news*, is
it?

20 KATHERINE. No. But it's still *problematic*. And
the problem is *not just* that it fits badly
with democratic principles.

21 CHRISTIANUS. How do you mean?

22 KATHERINE. Well, the bigger issue is that we
don't know what the war is *for* anymore.
What's the *goal* of all this fighting, now
that both Saddam and his VP are perma-
nently done away with?

23 CHRISTIANUS. But isn't the official story that
the troops are there to *stabilize* the Iraqi
region, until it cools down? Or at least
until the Iraqis are able to handle their
security issues themselves?

11:18, full support: Adam Tanner writes: 'Polls show most Americans now oppose the war in Iraq' (2007).

ADAM TANNER (2007), 'More than 100 arrested in Iraq protests'. Reuters [<http://www.reuters.com>], Tuesday, 20 March 2007, 9:06 EDT.

11:27, American scholars: Christianus may here refer to scholars such as Gohbarah, Huth, and Russett who in one paper conclude that it is 'not very surprising' that civil wars kill and maim people (2003, p. 189). Some of their other brilliant observations are: '[c]ivil

- 24 KATHERINE. Sure. But how can we truly *believe* that story? Anyone with an IQ of 20 or more must realize that it is more or less *impossible* to achieve any stability in that region under the present circumstances. It's a civil war, and the citizens are practically willing to do just about anything, including blowing themselves up, to demonstrate their discontent and determination.
- 25 CHRISTIANUS. So it's a war that cannot be won by either the U.S.-led troops or by the Iraqi government, you say?
- 26 KATHERINE. Yes, that's approximately my position. They may of course win an *individual* battle or two; but not the *war itself*.
- 27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, civil wars are always difficult — even according to some American scholars.
- 28 KATHERINE. Yes, especially for *governments*: for they are no longer *in control!*
- 29 CHRISTIANUS. Indeed! But I don't understand

wars continue to kill people indirectly, well after the shooting stops' (p. 189), and 'civil wars greatly raise the subsequent risk of death and disability from many infectious diseases, including malaria, tuberculosis, and other infectious respiratory diseases' (p. 200).

HAZEM ADAM GHOBARAH, PAUL HUTH, and BRUCE RUSSETT (2003), 'Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the Shooting Stops' in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 2, pp. 189–202.

what all of this has to do with *you, personally?* Where's the connection?

30 KATHERINE. Well, I am in the midst of an on-going war *myself*, a war that also cannot be won.

31 CHRISTIANUS. *A war?*

32 KATHERINE. Well, I *am* a lawyer, right? And I am drawn into new battles, all the time.

33 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, but isn't that what lawyers like yourself are *supposed* to be doing?

34 KATHERINE. Sure. And that's my problem: I am not *satisfied* with what I am doing all day long.

35 CHRISTIANUS. How come?

36 KATHERINE. Well, even though I actually do manage to win many of those individual cases that I take on, I don't feel that I am *accomplishing* anything in the *big picture* by winning them.

37 CHRISTIANUS. But doesn't it feel good to fight all that Miami vice?

38 KATHERINE. Sure, sometimes. But that *feeling* is not enough. My point is that vice is *always* going to be there, with or without me. In other words, whatever *I* do, I can never permanently put an end to it anyway. So it feels meaningless to continue. It's a war that I cannot win, regardless of *how* hard I try. It's meaningless.

SCENE III.

*Maximum Happiness,
Minimum Unhappiness*

1 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, I think that is a very inter-
esting point. I can actually relate to your
situation quite well.

2 KATHERINE. You can?

3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. I had similar thoughts my-
self, years ago.

4 KATHERINE. Really?

5 CHRISTIANUS. *Really.*

6 KATHERINE. And?

7 CHRISTIANUS. And I had to do some serious
soul-searching to get back my motiva-
tion.

8 KATHERINE. How did it go?

9 CHRISTIANUS. It went very well. I concluded
that I couldn't get really *satisfied* unless I
changed certain things about myself.

10 KATHERINE. What *things*?

11 CHRISTIANUS. Well, one thing was that I had
to learn how to *trust* myself.

12 KATHERINE. Trust *yourself*?

13 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. I realized that I *could* get all

my questions answered, even the big and perennial ones, if only I *wanted* them answered. But I didn't have the guts to start *facing* those questions, partly because I was trusting my own mind too much. So I had to work on that.

14 KATHERINE. So it's all about trusting *oneself*?

15 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it's *one* piece of the puzzle.

16 KATHERINE. And how does this relate to *me*?

17 CHRISTIANUS. It's quite straightforward: you, too, *can* get all questions answered, including the big ones, if you only *want* them answered.

18 KATHERINE. I can?

19 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But your wicked little mind most probably tries to convince you that it is no idea even to *start* looking for any answers: 'Why waste time trying to find answers to perennial problems that simply cannot be answered?'

20 KATHERINE. Yes, I have heard similar thoughts within me.

21 CHRISTIANUS. But having heard such thoughts within you is, of course, no guarantee for that the big questions cannot be answered?

22 KATHERINE. Of course not.

23 CHRISTIANUS. And you do agree that there *are*
big questions to be answered?

24 KATHERINE. Yes.

25 CHRISTIANUS. So you need to know the an-
swers.

26 KATHERINE. Yes.

27 CHRISTIANUS. In fact, perhaps you already, on
some level, know them?

28 KATHERINE. No, I don't.

29 CHRISTIANUS. Well, you have to be perfectly
honest with yourself. *Then* you may know
them.

30 KATHERINE. But I *am* honest, Chris! I really
don't know them! I just think my life
is more or less meaningless right now.
That's all I know!

31 CHRISTIANUS. Well, maybe you don't know
those answers *as* you know the name of
your cat, or *as* you know the taste of a
freshly made pizza?

32 KATHERINE. I am not sure I follow.

33 CHRISTIANUS. All right. Let's take a break. It
is a very demanding subject matter. And
I am so hungry right now that I have a
hard time concentrating anyway.

34 KATHERINE. Why don't you take one of these
crispy breadsticks while we're waiting for

the waiter to appear?

35 CHRISTIANUS. *Excellent* idea! Thank you!

36 KATHERINE. I am sure that they are making
our pizza as we speak.

37 CHRISTIANUS. I hope you're right!

38 KATHERINE. Amazing! You really *are* a typical
pitta, getting all moody and jittery like
that! I wish *I* had *your* metabolism! I am
putting on weight all the time!

39 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, your *kapha* constitution is
quite accentuated. That makes it hard for
you to be really slim.

40 KATHERINE. It certainly does!

41 CHRISTIANUS. And being overweight also
might have a negative impact on the
length of your life, at least if we are to be-
lieve some public health statistics. But if
it's any consolation, a *pitta* constitution

III:39, *kapha* constitution: Christianus's observation may be inspired by Vasant Lad's descriptions of a typical *kapha* individual: 'Individuals with a *kapha* body type have a steady appetite and thirst, though digestion is slow. They can comfortably skip a meal or work without food, while it is difficult for a *pitta* person to concentrate without eating' (1998, p. 25); and: 'With their larger frames and constitutions dominated by the water and earth elements, *kaphas* tend to gain weight and have difficulty taking it off' (1998, p. 25).

III:43, Benthamian: Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), British social reformer, based his version of utilitarianism on the 'principle of utility', a decision-criterion that accepts an action if it may result in a maximization of happiness. Bentham was 'much less concerned with the more abstract and metaphysical questions involved' (Dye 1972, p. 281), and his idea of happiness is to be understood very concretely by the presence of pleasure and the absence of pain and suffering in *individuals* (Postema 2001, p. 138). Says Bentham (1988, p. 28): 'the only con-

like mine can be quite diabolical too: it is not entirely without metabolic complications either.

42 KATHERINE. You're a good friend, Chris. But I think that you may have misunderstood me. My motive for wanting to be slim is not primarily to be 'healthy', or to squeeze out some maximum number of years from this body; nor is to 'adhere' to some public health statistics. Rather, my main concern is simply to be able to experience *happiness*; or, if *that's* not possible, at least avoiding too much *unhappiness*.

43 CHRISTIANUS. You sound very Benthamian.

44 KATHERINE. Well, it's just that I like his straightforward style.

45 CHRISTIANUS. Many do. In fact, even those who *aren't* lawyers may quite easily relate

sequences that men are at all interested in, what are they but *pain* and *pleasure*? Bentham's maximization, according to Postema (2001, p. 139), is not limited in scope only to all individual *human* beings, but includes all sentient, suffering beings.

JEREMY BENTHAM (1988), *A Fragment on Government*. The New Authoritative Edition by J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart with an Introduction by Ross Harrison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

JAMES W. DYE (1972), 'Bentham, Jer-

emy' in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Vol. 1. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co. and The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, pp. 280–285.

GERALD J. POSTEMA (2001), 'Bentham, Jeremy' in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, eds., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Ethics*. Second edition. New York and London: Routledge, pp. 137–141.

III:45, those who *aren't* lawyers: Christianus may here refer to a passage

to his utility talk, even if they, just like the lawyers, don't always *walk it*.

46 KATHERINE. Yes.

47 CHRISTIANUS. But let's go back to *you* now, Katherine. You just said that you want to experience happiness and avoid unhappiness. What do you mean by that?

48 KATHERINE. It's quite simple: I have no *friends*, I have no *lovers*, and I am *miserable*. So I want friends and lovers. Then I'll be happy, or at least *less* miserable. How's that?

49 CHRISTIANUS. It's a start. So your idea is that losing weight will make it easier for you to find new friends and lovers?

50 KATHERINE. Yes, that's the plan. I am just *too fat* right now. I can see it in the mirror, and I can see it in people's eyes.

51 CHRISTIANUS. Maybe you are right. At least in the modern Western world, fat people are commonly perceived as rather unattractive, and therefore less appreciated, and perhaps *particularly* so by prospective lovers.

52 KATHERINE. Yes.

in which Jeremy Bentham says, 'and *pain* and *pleasure* at least, are words which a man has no need, we may hope, to go to a Lawyer to know the meaning

of' (1988, p. 28).

III:45, *walk it*: Christianus presumably wants to say that 'walking the utility

53 CHRISTIANUS. So we may say that your *kapha*
constitution really *does* affect your daily
life, including your love life, in a very di-
rect way.

54 KATHERINE. Yes.

55 CHRISTIANUS. And it certainly doesn't make
you *less* gloomy about it, does it?

56 KATHERINE. No, it doesn't.

talk' is different from just talking about it. Maybe he also wants to say that there is something *about* the utility talk that makes it harder to walk it?

111:55, make you *less* gloomy: Christianus probably tries to say that having a *kapha* constitution may make Katherine more prone to suffer from depression.

SCENE IV.

Katherine's Real Problem

1 CHRISTIANUS. So you need to *take charge* of
the situation, Katherine! And you need
to identify your *real* problem!

2 KATHERINE. My *real* problem?

3 CHRISTIANUS. Well, although your bodily
constitution, your weight, and your lack
of friends and lovers certainly may *seem*
to be causes of unhappiness for you, your
real problem is of a different nature.

4 KATHERINE. It is?

5 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But you are, of course, *not*
the only one in the universe who has ever
focused on weight-loss and *amore*. Many
souls already have been, and surely also
will be, engaged in similar questionable
quests.

6 KATHERINE. What do you mean?

7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, many people *are* very con-

iv:7, the camel: The story of the camel and the noodle that Christianus mentions is presumably *not* identical with the parable mentioned in Matthew 19:23–26, where Jesus talks about the camel and the needle. However, Jesus's parable might still be of interest to those

readers who are interested in topics such as death and immortality. For example, Metzger and Murphy seem to conclude that Jesus's point is that eternal life will be found *not* 'through a ritual that wealth makes possible', but through 'utter dependence on God' (1991, p. 28NT). Un-

cerned about their physical appearance and their potential sex appeal. And they keep on searching for some simple happiness and pleasure and try to stay clear of as much unhappiness as they can. Meanwhile, they many times leave the deeper 'existential' issues in the closet. It actually reminds me of the story about the camel and the noodle.

8 KATHERINE. Maybe we can return to the camel story some other time. What's my so-called 'real' problem?

9 CHRISTIANUS. Your *real* problem is that you are going to die. And I think that you may have realized that, at least on *some* level.

10 KATHERINE. So?

11 CHRISTIANUS. What do you mean? Doesn't that *bother* you?

12 KATHERINE. No.

13 CHRISTIANUS. Why not?

14 KATHERINE. It's only *natural* to die.

fortunately, Metzger and Murphy do not explain why such ritualistic work — especially in cases where one uses *substantial* portions of one's wealth — *wouldn't* count as (real, substantial) service unto God, or why it *wouldn't* count as being (utterly) dependent on God.

BRUCE M. METZGER and ROLAND E. MURPHY, eds. (1991), *The New Oxford Annotated Bible with the Apocryphal Deuterocanonical Books*. New Revised Standard Version. New York: Oxford University Press.

15 CHRISTIANUS. It is also natural to sometimes
get a toothache; but that doesn't mean
that we are not *afraid* of it, does it?

16 KATHERINE. Well, no.

17 CHRISTIANUS. And while toothaches may or
may not come, death doesn't normally
not show up, does it?

18 KATHERINE. No.

19 CHRISTIANUS. And while toothaches normal-
ly can be *fixed* if one only has enough
money to pay the dentist — or at least
the nerve to go to him even though one
doesn't have enough money to pay him
afterwards — death *cannot* be fixed by

iv:21, pragmatic: According to Morris (1973, pp. 1028–1029), the adjective 'pragmatic' may mean different things: (1) 'Dealing with facts or actual occurrences', or '[a]ctive rather than contemplative'; (2) 'Pertaining to the study of events and historical phenomena with emphasis on their practical outcome'; (3) 'Of or pertaining to pragmatism'. One may, perhaps, also note that Christianus has used the word 'pragmatic' and *not* the word 'pragmatical'. Morris does not indicate any difference in meaning between these words; but H. W. Fowler (1858–1933) says: 'In the diplomatic, historical, and philosophical senses, the *-ic* form is usual. In the general sense of officious or opinionated, *-ical* is commoner' (1965, p. 469).

H. W. FOWLER (1965), *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage*. Second Edi-

tion. Revised by Sir Ernest Gowers. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

WILLIAM MORRIS, ed. (1973), *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*. New York: American Heritage Publishing Co. and Houghton Mifflin Company.

iv:21, pragmatic American: One may, of course, be a pragmatic American in different ways, including when one takes the word 'pragmatic' to point to the philosophical school of pragmatism. Famous American philosophers such as Charles Saunders Peirce (1839–1914), William James (1842–1910), and John Dewey (1859–1952) did not have an identical pragmatist philosophy; however, they all shared the idea, roughly, that consequences or effects of actions

anyone, regardless of *how* much money one has.

20 KATHERINE. So?

21 CHRISTIANUS. So, being the pragmatic American you *are*, wouldn't you then agree that, empirically and 'scientifically' speaking, death is among the most certain things in everyone's life?

22 KATHERINE. Yes.

23 CHRISTIANUS. And you're *still* not afraid of it?

24 KATHERINE. I just don't see why I *should* be.

25 CHRISTIANUS. Well, then we *certainly* have a lot to talk about.

are very important: 'what practically works' is the pragmatist's measure of success. The American philosopher Richard Rorty admits that the word 'pragmatism' names 'the chief glory of our country's intellectual tradition' (1982, p. 161), but points out that Peirce's contribution 'was merely to have given it a name, and to have stimulated James' (1982, pp. 161–162). This is presumably because Rorty thinks that the 'great pragmatists' only are those which were 'breaking with the Kantian epistemological tradition altogether' (1982, p. 161). Peirce himself says, 'I devoted two hours a day to the study of Kant's *Critic of the Pure Reason* for more than three years, until I almost knew the whole book by heart, and had critically examined every section of it' (1955, p. 2); and it may be hard to claim — noting Peirce's fre-

quent use of Kantian-flavoured ideas in his texts — that Peirce *wasn't* some sort of Kantian. In any case, Rorty thinks that 'Peirce himself remained the most Kantian of thinkers' (1982, p. 161); consequently, Rorty promotes James and Dewey as the 'great pragmatists', but demotes Peirce.

RICHARD RORTY (1982), *Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972–1980*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

CHARLES SAUNDERS PEIRCE (1955), *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*. Selected and Edited With an Introduction by Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

²⁶ KATHERINE. We do?

²⁷ CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But we *desperately* need
that pizza now.

²⁸ KATHERINE. I am sure the waiter will be here
any minute.

SCENE V.

The Mustachio Man

1 CHRISTIANUS. All right. While we're waiting
for the waiter, I want to tell you a little
secret of mine that got lost.

2 KATHERINE. Got lost?

3 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. I had it on the tip of my
tongue right before you started to tell me
about your lost luggage. But then I got
so much into *your* little story that I to-
tally forgot to tell you *mine*.

4 KATHERINE. So what *is it*, that secret of
yours?

5 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it's not *nearly* as thrilling
or dramatic as *your* revelation was.

6 KATHERINE. OK, but what is it *about*?

7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it's just that your *hair*
looks *absolutely* fabulous!

8 KATHERINE. *Thank* you! I am so glad you *no-*
ticed!

9 CHRISTIANUS. It's a relatively recent creation,
isn't it?

10 KATHERINE. Yes, I just had it done. I needed
to reinvent myself.

11 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, we all need to reincarnate

ourselves a little now and then. Actually,
you look like Princess Nofret!

12 KATHERINE. Like a *princess*? How *sweet* of you!
Who *is* she?

13 CHRISTIANUS. I am not exactly sure who she
is *now*; but once upon a time she was the
consort of the Mustachio Man, Prince
Rahotep.

14 KATHERINE. Hmm, it *sounds* familiar. *Rahotep*,
you say?

15 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, he was one of those ancient

v:11, Princess Nofret: Walther Wolf (1900–1973) includes a colour photograph of a 1.18 meter high limestone statue of Princess Nofret (National Museum, Cairo), from the Early 4th Dynasty, ca. 2575 B.C. (1972, p. 81). Her straight, thick, shoulder-length dark hair — which actually was a wig, according to Wolf (1972, p. 22) — is clearly seen, with a headband.

WALTHER WOLF (1972), *The Origins of Western Art: Egypt, Mesopotamia, The Aegan*. London, England: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Original edition (1969): *Frühe Hochkulturen: Ägypten, Mesopotamien, Ägäis*. Stuttgart, Germany: Chr. Belser Verlag.

v:13, Mustachio Man: Note here that Christianus uses ‘mustachio’ instead of ‘moustache’ or ‘mustache’, etc. Henry W. Fowler observes that the noun ‘mustachio’ is ‘now archaic for *moustache*’ (1965, p. 376); but Christianus presumably uses ‘mustachio’ here to produce *exactly* that archaic effect. Another reason

to use ‘mustachio’, perhaps in addition to the first, may have been to add some more southern ring and flavour to the word, to indicate that the moustached man wasn’t very *British*, not even archaically so. There is also the possibility that Christianus may have intended ‘mustachio’ to convey some ‘macho’ qualities.

v:13, Prince Rahotep: Wolf has published a black-and-white photograph of a limestone statue of Prince Rahotep and his consort, where his moustache is clearly seen (1972, p. 26). Now, if we are to believe Arnold Hauser, the typical Egyptian artist focused on ‘thoroughness and precision of execution’ (1962, pp. 30–31), knowing that ‘originality of subject-matter’ was seldom appreciated (1962, p. 30). If we accept some such premises, we might say that it is likely that the moustache appearing on Rahotep’s statue is *not* just a product of some liberal artist’s imaginary intervention, but instead a rather accurate depiction of one of Rahotep’s more distin-

Egyptian princes.

- 16 KATHERINE. Of course! *Egyptian!* I got a little confused because of the moustache. I have seen a lot of pictures of ancient Egyptian men with fancy *beards*, but not very many with *moustaches*. So in *my* head, the words ‘Egyptian’ and ‘moustache’ just didn’t appear on the same page.
- 17 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, ancient Egyptian moustaches are quite rare commodities. They

guishing facial features.

ARNOLD HAUSER (1962), *The Social History of Art: From Prehistoric Times to the Middle Ages*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

v:16, Egyptian . . . moustaches: Katherine is not entirely wrong to say that Egyptian moustaches, and especially *ancient* Egyptian moustaches, are relatively rarely found in books on ancient Egyptian archaeology and art. Various types of *beards*, however, are much more common, as in, for example, the depictions of Amenophis III (Desroches-Noblecourt 1965, p. 74), his son Amenhotep IV (Wolf 1972, p. 42), and Ramses II (Nawrath 1963, p. 89), etc. It may be interesting to note that many of the ancient Egyptian beards were actually *wigs* — worn on special occasions for religious or representative purposes (Nawrath 1963, p. 97), and sometimes referred to as being divine or ‘of the gods’ (Desroches-Noblecourt 1965, plate xx). However, Prince Rahotep’s

moustache presumably was *not* a wig, but ‘real’ and natural.

ALFRED NAWRATH (1963), *Egypten: Land av igår och idag*. Preface by Professor Torgny Säve-Söderbergh. Stockholm: Generalstabens Litografiska Anstalts Förlag. Original edition (1962): *Ägypten: Land zwischen Sand und Strom*. Bern: Kümmerly & Frey, Geographischer Verlag.

CHRISTIANE DESROCHES-NOBLECOURT (1965), *Tutankhamen: Life and Death of a Pharaoh*. With 32 colour plates by F. L. Kenett. Preface by His Excellency Sarwat Okasha, Member of the Executive Council of UNESCO. Colour-plate captions by Dr. A. Shoukry, Director General of the Antiquities Service of the UAR. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, in association with George Rainbird.

are definitely *not* on the CBOT!

18 KATHERINE. *Definitely* not! And judging from the latest Chicago developments, they never *will* be, either!

19 CHRISTIANUS. Probably not.

20 KATHERINE. In any case, I don't *like* moustaches, so I have a tendency to forget about them very quickly. Actually, most of my female friends also *dislike* moustaches.

21 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But the *princess* presumably saw *something* in Rahotep and his moustache, right?

22 KATHERINE. Presumably. But what would that *be*?

23 CHRISTIANUS. Perhaps his moustache type can

v:17, not on the CBOT: Christianus may indicate several things by saying that ancient Egyptian moustaches are definitely *not* on the CBOT (Chicago Board of Trade). One important thing that he may want to communicate is that the lack of such moustaches being traded on the CBOT is *not* an indication of that there are no such moustaches traded *somewhere else*; for such moustaches may be sold through *much* more private channels than those that typical Chicago commodities brokers normally use.

v:18, Chicago developments: Katherine presumably knew that the CBOT had serious plans to merge with some other

exchange, such as the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange) or the Atlanta-based ICE (Intercontinental Exchange), as Reuters had reported (2007). And she may have been convinced at the time that the CBOT *would* merge, and in that process also stop to exist *as* the CBOT, in which case there would be no (old-style) CBOT left to trade *anything* at.

REUTERS (2007), 'UPDATE 2-ICE, CME ramp up rhetoric on dueling CBOT deals'. Reuters [<http://www.reuters.com>], Tuesday, 20 March 2007, 4:16 p.m. EDT.

v:24, Hitler . . . Tulp: Furneaux (1969, p. 154) publishes one photograph of Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) where his moustache is clearly visible. A close-

reveal something?

24 KATHERINE. Maybe. Was it a more rectangular-shaped one, like the one Hitler used to have? Or was it a more spread-out thing, like the one Professor Tulp sometimes had?

25 CHRISTIANUS. No, it was smaller than any of those, and *much* less bushy. If you remember Clark Gable, *then* you would know which approximate moustache model I am talking about: a more simple, straightforward, streamlined design.

26 KATHERINE. Hmm. Maybe one *could* live with one of those. It's aesthetically cleaner, more neutral. And it's very *intimate!*

27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, *very* intimate! And on top

up of the anatomy-lecturing Professor Tulp's face, including his moustache, can be found in Rembrandt (1956, p. 40).

RUPERT FURNEAUX (1969), *Dramatis-ka händelser i vår tid*. With contributions by Sten Söderberg, Birger Norman, Lars Widding, and Lars Skiöld. Edited by Marianne Särman. Translated by Jan Guillou. Höganäs, Sweden: Bok-förlaget Bra Böcker.

REMBRANDT (1956), *Tentoonstelling*. Amsterdam: Rijksmuseum and Rotterdam: Museum Boymans.

v:25, Clark Gable: Clark Gable's (1901–1960) moustache can, for example, be seen in Frank Capra's 1934 movie *It Happened One Night* (Heurling 1995,

p. 182). A similar moustache model — although somewhat more extended than either Clark Gable's or Prince Rahotep's — may be found on the upper lip of the Bible-studying Mr. Spinoza (Kenny 2006, p. 192; Bibliothèque nationale de France).

BO HEURLING, ed. (1995), *Norstedts Filmlexikon*. With Contributions by Lars Axelson, Lasse Bergström, Bo Heurling, Lars Åhlander. Stockholm: Norstedts and Svenska Filminstitutet.

ANTHONY KENNY (2006), *The Rise of Modern Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

of *that*, it's also more practical and hygienic: one would get *much* less pizza stuck in it.

²⁸ KATHERINE. Did the prince eat a lot of pizza?

²⁹ CHRISTIANUS. I am not sure; but *I* certainly eat a lot of pizza. So I am glad that I am *not* a mustachio man myself.

³⁰ KATHERINE. I am glad too.

SCENE VI.

Death Is Nothing Like a Toothache

1 CHRISTIANUS. But I am *not* glad that the waiter
is not here yet. What in the whole world
are they *doing* in the kitchen? Are they
waiting for the pizza harvest season?

2 KATHERINE. Take it easy, Chris! Why don't
you just take another breadstick, for
now? I mean, the waiter *must* be here any
second now. And you *always* tell me how
important it is to be *patient*.

3 CHRISTIANUS. OK, OK! But I am *starving!*

4 KATHERINE. Why don't we just continue our
little toothache-and-death discussion
while we wait? After all, you said that we
have a *lot* to talk about.

5 CHRISTIANUS. Maybe we could do a *little* of
that before the waiter arrives — *if* he ar-
rives.

6 KATHERINE. So where would we re-enter that
discussion, then?

7 CHRISTIANUS. Let's see. Perhaps we could try
something like this: Since you're not
afraid of death, but still hate toothaches,
you must think that death is *not* anything
like a toothache.

- 8 KATHERINE. Exactly. Death is *nothing* like a toothache.
- 9 CHRISTIANUS. How do you *know* that?
- 10 KATHERINE. Well, isn't that what *everyone* believes nowadays?
- 11 CHRISTIANUS. Well, I was talking about knowing, not believing. But, in any case, it is certainly correct to say that many people think like you do. But it is *also* correct to say that many people *don't* think like you do; and I am one of them. So why do *you* believe that death is not like a toothache?
- 12 KATHERINE. As *I* see it, it's not really *about* toothaches; it's just that death is the end of *everything* in one's life; nothing comes after that. So why worry about nothingness? Why not just embrace *carpe diem*, and live fully, right here, right now?
- 13 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, if we *were* to accept some kind of nothingness as an accurate description of our individual future state, then *of course* we would not need to worry so much about any after-death scenarios. But why in the whole world *would we* accept such nothingness *in the first place*?

VI:12, *carpe diem*: Brewer (1898) writes on the meaning of the Latin phrase *carpe*

diem: 'Enjoy yourself while you have the opportunity. Seize the present day'.

14 KATHERINE. I just think it is unscientific *not*
to accept it. For individual consciousness
obviously depends on brain activity. And
since physical death certainly means the
annulment of brain activity, the correct
conclusion must be that everyone's indi-
vidual consciousness dissolves at the time
of death. So death must be the end of
consciousness, and, therefore, the start of
nothingness.

15 CHRISTIANUS. Oh, is *that* how you think?

16 KATHERINE. Yes. And I don't see how one can
conclude anything else, if one takes the
current scientific evidence into consid-
eration.

17 CHRISTIANUS. Well, at least one thing is clear.

18 KATHERINE. What is *that*?

19 CHRISTIANUS. That you are in the hands of the
scientists.

20 KATHERINE. What do you mean?

21 CHRISTIANUS. I mean that you do not *have*
to be in the hands of the scientists, if
you don't want to. You are an intelligent
woman, and you should try to make up
your own mind about the world and, in
particular, about your own situation in

it.

²² KATHERINE. I am sorry, but you lost me
there.

SCENE VII.

Not In the Hands of the Scientists

1 CHRISTIANUS. Well, at least I didn't lose *the*
waiter! Here he comes with our pizza!
Praise the Lord!

2 KATHERINE. Ah, yes! It looks *very* good! Why
don't *you* start?

3 CHRISTIANUS. You are very merciful, my dear.

4 KATHERINE. You were saying?

5 CHRISTIANUS. I am not sure *what* I said; I lost
track. Just *smell* the pizza! Ha!

6 KATHERINE. You said something about that
I should make up *my own* mind about
what happens at the time of death.

7 CHRISTIANUS. Ah, yes; *now* I remember. Well,
I am sure that you, as a professional
lawyer, can appreciate the idea that the
scientists, like everyone else, have their
agenda. Their project is to protect *their*
theories, *their* jobs, *their* careers, and, ul-
timately, *their* position in society. They
want to convince you to sponsor *their* ac-
tivities, so that they can continue getting
paid to do what *they* want to do, namely
their own research.

8 KATHERINE. *Of course* they want to keep their
theories, jobs and careers! Who doesn't?

9 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But the fact that *they* want to keep their jobs, their careers, and their points of view does not mean that *you* must *support* them having those jobs, those careers, and those points of view.

10 KATHERINE. How do you mean?

11 CHRISTIANUS. For example, the fact that some *mafioso* is very eager to keep his ideas, his habits, his palace, his private army of gangsters, and his overall position in society does not imply that I, or you, or the government, are obliged *to support* his plans, his actions, his mobsters, or his points of view; we are certainly entitled to protest in various ways against such a man's activities, at least if we live in a country that not only advertises free speech and proper legal procedures but actually *practices* them.

12 KATHERINE. But how are scientists like *mafiosos*? Where's the analogy?

13 CHRISTIANUS. It's a long story. So let me put it like this instead: you don't *have to* accept the invitation from the scientists to support their research, their educational activities, and their perspectives if

vii:13, AAAS: This is an acronym for the American Association for the Advancement of Science [<http://www.aaas.org>];

Science [<http://www.scienceonline.org>] is one of their publications.

you don't want to. So you don't *have to* enrol at Harvard or Princeton and pay large sums of money in the form of tuition and fees; and you don't *have to* subscribe to *Science* or otherwise support the AAAS; and, above all, you don't *have to* subscribe to any Darwinism, Big Bang, or quantum mechanics, if you don't want to. It's up to *you*.

14 KATHERINE. What do you mean, *their* perspectives? Aren't the scientists interested in *objectivity*?

15 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But the scientists use *various* strategies to sell in their little theories; and the objectivity story is just one of those. But you don't *have to* accept their objectivity proposal, if you don't want to. No one has proven that objectivity is in principle *possible*, or that objectivity is the only road to knowledge, or that subjective knowledge is less worth, or any such things. And, more importantly, no one has proven that objectivity is good *for you*, or that subjectivity is *not* good for you. So why not fly your own way, like Jonathan Livingston Seagull?

16 KATHERINE. You can't be serious?

VII:15, Jonathan Livingston Seagull: There are many inspiring passages in Richard Bach's book about a seagull who

goes his own way. One passage is this: 'Jonathan nodded obediently. For the next few days he tried to behave like the

SCENE VIII.

*Important and Unimportant
Knowledge*

1 CHRISTIANUS. I am *dead* serious. But let me rephrase myself, so that I don't unnecessarily upset your so easily offended mind; for without a relaxed and cooperative mind you will not be in a position to understand very much.

2 KATHERINE. OK.

3 CHRISTIANUS. Now, do we agree, tentatively speaking, that knowledge is something that may be worth having?

4 KATHERINE. Yes.

5 CHRISTIANUS. So if one doesn't already *have* knowledge, it may be worthwhile to search for it?

6 KATHERINE. Surely.

7 CHRISTIANUS. And is it true that many people indeed *are* searching for it, and *have been*

other gulls; he really tried, screeching and fighting with the flock around the piers and fishing boats, diving on scraps of fish and bread. But he couldn't make it work. It's all so pointless, he thought, deliberately dropping a hard-won anchovy to a hungry old gull chasing him.

I could be spending all this time learning to fly. There's so much to learn!' (1973, p. 15).

RICHARD BACH (1973), *Jonathan Livingston Seagull*. Photographs by Russell Munson. London and Sydney: Pan Books.

searching for it?

8 KATHERINE. Yes.

9 CHRISTIANUS. And do we also agree that the definition of knowledge is not firmly settled, and that many philosophers have defined it in various ways?

10 KATHERINE. Well, I can't really say — *you* know the philosophers better than I do. But I actually do remember the *Daubert* case in the 1990s where neither the Supreme Court nor the scientists could present an accurate definition of what scientific expert knowledge really amounted to.

11 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, I heard about that case. So, loosely speaking, we may say that some people not only search for knowledge, but also search for *definitions* of what knowledge really is, and how it should be obtained?

12 KATHERINE. Certainly.

13 CHRISTIANUS. And perhaps we also agree that an individual man or woman cannot know *everything* there is to know about

VIII:10, the *Daubert* case: The U. S. Supreme Court explicitly addressed the adjective 'scientific' and said that it 'implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science' (509 U.S. 579, p. 590); but it didn't specify to any greater extent what those methods and proce-

dures of science amounts to, or what 'science' *is*. And in terms of the definition of 'knowledge' the Supreme Court said: 'Of course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be "known" to a certainty; arguably, there are no certain-

the universe or about himself and his body, at least not in an ordinary sense of the word, and at least not in the ordinary human condition?

14 KATHERINE. Certainly.

15 CHRISTIANUS. And he also cannot personally experience every possible situation, location, or person on this planet?

16 KATHERINE. No.

17 CHRISTIANUS. So he cannot possibly know *everything* there is to know about this planet, either from his *own* personal experience or from *other people's* experiences?

18 KATHERINE. No.

19 CHRISTIANUS. So then he must intelligently select *which* personal experiences he wants to have, and *which* testimonies he wants to listen to, right?

ties in science' (509 U.S. 579, p. 590). In addition, two interesting briefs were used in the process of this case, neither of which clarifies the matter very much. First, *Amici Curiae* 9 (by Nicolaas Bloembergen et al.) states that 'Indeed, scientists do not assert that they know what is immutably "true"—they are committed to searching for new, temporary, theories to explain, as best they can, phenomena' (509 U.S. 579, p. 590). Second, *Amici Curiae* 7–8 (by the American Association for the Advancement of Science) states: 'Science is not an ency-

clopedic body of knowledge about the universe. Instead, it represents a *process* for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement' (509 U.S. 579, p. 590; emphasis in original).

509 U.S. 579 (1993) 'Daubert et ux., individually and as guardians ad litem for Daubert, et al. v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 92-102. Argued March 30, 1993—Decided June 28, 1993.'

- 20 KATHERINE. How do you mean?
- 21 CHRISTIANUS. Let's say that you only have a few days off, and that you want to acquire some typical *vacational* knowledge on some sunny island somewhere. Must you then not *choose* between, say, *either* going to Hawaii, *or* to the Canary Islands?
- 22 KATHERINE. Well, yes. If I only have a few days at my disposal, there's only time to go to *one* of those destinations.
- 23 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly. Or let's say that you have a few years to restart a new career, and that you need some suitable *vocational* prepping for getting a new job. Must you then not *choose* between, say, *either* going to medical school *or* to business school?
- 24 KATHERINE. Yes.

VIII:21, *vacational*: This adjective is not listed in all English dictionaries, and it may or may not be a concoction by Christianus. In any case, '*vacational*' is listed in Roget (1962, p. 471), together with other synonymous adjectives: 'holiday, ferial, festal; sabbatic(al)'. It may also be important to note that one meaning associated with the word 'vacation' is 'weeks during which universities and law-courts stop work' (Hornby and Parnwell 1962, p. 478).

A. S. HORNBY and E. C. PARNWELL (1962), *Oxford English-Reader's Dictionary*. Re-

printed with corrections. Stockholm: Svenska Bokförlaget/Norstedts, and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

PETER MARK ROGET (1962), *Roget's International Thesaurus*. Third Edition. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

25 CHRISTIANUS. So then we must carefully
choose what *type* of experiences and what
type of knowledge we want to have?

26 KATHERINE. Yes.

27 CHRISTIANUS. And we agree, I guess, that the
kind of knowledge that makes a painter a
painter is not necessarily the same as that
which makes a biologist a biologist?

28 KATHERINE. Definitely.

29 CHRISTIANUS. So what is considered *impor-*
tant knowledge for a biologist may not
be *important* knowledge for a painter?

30 KATHERINE. Sure.

31 CHRISTIANUS. And, conversely, what is consid-
ered *important* knowledge for a painter
may not be *important* knowledge for the
biologist?

32 KATHERINE. Right.

33 CHRISTIANUS. In other words, what is *impor-*
tant knowledge for *one* person may be
unimportant knowledge for *another*?

34 KATHERINE. Yes, it may.

35 CHRISTIANUS. So if your *primary* goal is, let's
say, to become a practicing physician,
then you must, in regards to your own
life, regard all knowledge that pertains
to a physician's education, and to the
process of actually ending up being hired

as a physician, as the most important knowledge. Everything else is, for you, less important. In other words, the most important knowledge for you, in such a case, would be that knowledge that can ‘actualize’ your dreams of ending up as a practicing physician.

36 KATHERINE. Yes.

37 CHRISTIANUS. But if your primary goal is, for instance, to find your *soul-mate*, and you perceive your future job as relatively unimportant, then whatever knowledge that leads you to the man of your dreams must be the most important knowledge for you.

38 KATHERINE. Yes.

39 CHRISTIANUS. And this must go on until you have reached your initial goal; or, if you realize at some point that your initial goal was inadequate in some way, until you have reached some *new* goal that you have selected.

40 KATHERINE. Yes.

41 CHRISTIANUS. So ultimately *you* are the judge: *you* decide how important you should make each ‘piece’ of experience, and each ‘piece’ of knowledge.

42 KATHERINE. But it almost sounds too good to be true!

- 43 CHRISTIANUS. Perhaps. But sometimes things almost *are* too good to be true. More pizza, *mademoiselle*?
- 44 KATHERINE. Yes, please. It was *so* good!

SCENE IX.

Physicians Can't Stop Death

1 CHRISTIANUS. And now let's get back to our
real problem, namely *death!*

2 KATHERINE. But I am still *eating!* Can't we
continue that lethal conversation some
other time?

3 CHRISTIANUS. No, it's better that we proceed.

4 KATHERINE. Why?

5 CHRISTIANUS. Because in five minutes, or in
five hours, or in five days, one of us may
be dead; and *then* we can't continue this
very important discussion.

6 KATHERINE. Why would that matter?

7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, perhaps it *wouldn't* have
mattered if our final state were nothing
but nothingness.

8 KATHERINE. Yes, that's what I have been say-
ing all along!

9 CHRISTIANUS. But, as I have hinted before,
I don't see *any* good reason to take the
nothingness scenario very seriously.

10 KATHERINE. Why not?

11 CHRISTIANUS. Because it isn't proven.

12 KATHERINE. What are you saying?

13 CHRISTIANUS. I am saying that no one has
proven that the nothingness scenario is
 correct.

14 KATHERINE. So?

15 CHRISTIANUS. So why believe it?

16 KATHERINE. Well, *I* believe it because I think
 it is correct. I think it *sounds right*.

17 CHRISTIANUS. But that's not very *scientific!*

18 KATHERINE. Maybe not. But the scientists will
 soon have figured out a way to save us
 from death, anyway.

19 CHRISTIANUS. You see, that's one of your prob-
 lems: you are in the hands of the scien-
 tists. You have too much *faith* in them!

20 KATHERINE. But they are very capable and in-
 ventive!

21 CHRISTIANUS. Sometimes. But that doesn't
 guarantee that they will be able to *stop*
death. Albert Einstein, for example, was
 a very capable and inventive man, but
 he couldn't *stop death*. He died himself.

ix:21, Einstein: One may get a rough estimate of the influence of Albert Einstein's (1879–1955) work by inspecting Bynum, Browne and Porter's dictionary, where Einstein's name appears in twenty-five different entries (1981, p. 463): 'Absolute space and time, Aether, Black-body law, Complementarity, Electron, Expanding Universe, Geometry, Grav-

ity, Heat and thermodynamics, Indeterminism, Light, Lightquantum, Mach's Principle, Mass, Michelson-Morley experiment, Philosophy, Photoelectric effect, Quantum, Rational reconstruction, Relative space and time, Relativity, Simplicity, Space-time, Unified field theory, X-rays'.

W. F. BYNUM, E. J. BROWNE, and ROY POR-

They all do.

22 KATHERINE. Well, perhaps they can't stop death *right now*. But they are *trying!*

23 CHRISTIANUS. Well, they may *say* or *imply* that they are trying, so that they, for example, can get more money to do their research. But that doesn't mean that they *actually* will be able to stop death. I mean, they can't even stop *Alzheimer's* yet!

24 KATHERINE. But that's not the *same* problem!

25 CHRISTIANUS. You are absolutely right: it *isn't* the same problem. Stopping death is *much* harder.

26 KATHERINE. But *some* progress in regards to death has been made, right?

27 CHRISTIANUS. No. There is no progress in terms of *stopping death*.

TER, eds. (1981), *Dictionary of the History of Science*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

ix:23, Alzheimer's: Christianus may, for example, have read Pierson's report: 'Natexis Bleichroeder analyst Corey Davis said Alzheimer's research "has been a graveyard of failed drugs, so it is

not surprising that any such product in development would be deemed at high risk"' (2007).

RANDELL PIERSON (2007), 'Wyeth says Alzheimer program a justified long-shot'. Reuters [<http://www.reuters.com>], Tuesday, 20 March 2007, 1:24 p.m. EDT.

SCENE X.

Are Foetuses Potential Persons?

- 1 KATHERINE. Chris, don't be foolish! *Of course* there is progress! Just take the case of a pregnant woman whose life is threatened by her foetus. Nowadays the physicians can *save* the pregnant woman's life by a small operation that simply removes the foetus and lets the woman live.
- 2 CHRISTIANUS. But in order to 'save' the pregnant woman in such a life-threatening situation, they are sometimes forced *to kill* the foetus. So the progress in terms of stopping death, in such a scenario, would then translate to the ability *to kill*

x:1, foetus: An alternative form of the word 'foetus' is 'fetus', and is commonly used in the United States of America.

x:4, potential person: Mary Anne Warren has written an interesting article about abortion. She says: 'Once a pregnant woman has committed herself to the continued nurturance of the fetus, she and those close to her are likely to think of it as an 'unborn baby', and to value it for its potential. The fetus's potential lies not just in its DNA, but in that maternal (and paternal) commitment' (1993, pp. 312–313).

MARY ANNE WARREN (1993), 'Abortion' in Peter Singer, ed., *A Companion*

to Ethics. Oxford, England and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 303–313.

x:4, Chargaff-inspired: According to Mader (1990, p. 222), Edwin Chargaff's data showed two things about DNA. The first one was that DNA has 'the *variability* required of the genetic material' (1990, p. 222; Mader's emphasis). The concentration of DNA's four bases — adenine (A), thymine (T), cytosine (C), and guanine (G) — *varies* in different species: for example, in *Homo sapiens* the concentration is 31.0% (A), 31.5% (T), 19.1% (G), and 18.4% (C), while it in, for example, *Bacillus subtilis* is 28.4%

someone, namely the foetus. It is by such killings that the physicians 'save' lives.

3 KATHERINE. But that is, of course, only if we agree that the foetus is a person, or a *potential* person; otherwise it wouldn't be killing.

4 CHRISTIANUS. But why *wouldn't* we agree that the foetus is, at the very least, a *potential* person? Are you saying that the foetus has non-human DNA? Or are you perhaps *challenging* the modern DNA researchers and their Chargaff-inspired theories?

5 KATHERINE. No, I am not interested in *challenging* any DNA research right now. I know too little. And I don't think that I want to say that the foetus has non-human DNA, either. But I could, perhaps,

(A), 29.0% (T), 21.0% (G), 21.6% (C). The second thing was that DNA 'has a *constancy* required of the genetic material' (1990, p. 222; Mader's emphasis). This 'constancy' feature, sometimes referred to as Chargaff's rule, amounts to that the concentrations of the four nitrogenous bases occur in *pairs*: 'adenine in equal concentrations to thymine, and cytosine in equal concentrations to guanine' (Lapczynski 1999, p. 283). Thus, in *Homo sapiens*, the concentration of adenine and thymine are both approximately 31%, and the concentration of guanine and cytosine are both approximately 19%; similarly, in *Bacillus subtilis*, the concentration of adenine and

thymine are both approximately 29%, and the concentration of guanine and cytosine are both approximately 21%.

KATE LAPCZYNSKI (1999), 'Genetics, Historical Development of' in Jeffrey A. Knight and Robert McClenaghan, eds., *Encyclopedia of Genetics*. 2 vols. Pasadena, CA and Hackensack, NJ: Salem Press, Inc.

SYLVIA S. MADER (1990), *Biology*. Third edition. Contributors: Cellular Energy and Botany: W. Dennis Clark; Genetics: Robert M. Kitchin; Ecology: Thomas C. Emmel; Critical Thinking Case Studies: Robert D. Allen. Dubuque, IA: Wm. C. Brown Publishers.

say that that there is no *guarantee* that the foetus *will* develop in such a way that it will end up with an ordinary human consciousness. In other words, the foetus may not develop in such a way as to become a fully conscious and fully functional *person*.

6 CHRISTIANUS. But you could say that about a newborn as well.

7 KATHERINE. Sure, but the newborn is no longer in the womb.

8 CHRISTIANUS. I don't see very much difference there. In any case, let's play with your idea that the foetus may not become a fully conscious, fully functional *person*, and therefore may not even be regarded as a *potential* person.

9 KATHERINE. OK.

10 CHRISTIANUS. But that would not give us any automatic licence to *not* refer to its 'removal' as 'killing'. I mean, we commonly use the verb 'kill' *not just* when we talk about human beings, but also when talk about animals. And animals are *not* normally thought of as persons. So if we in our little thought experiment were to classify a foetus as some type of animal with a 'lower' and 'non-human' consciousness, we could *still* speak of killing it, even though it, in such a scenario, nei-

ther would be regarded as a *person* nor a *potential* person. In fact, thousands or millions of animals such as flies, mosquitoes, cows, and pigs are killed every day in private homes, slaughterhouses and medical research facilities.

11 KATHERINE. So *perhaps* we may speak of killing the foetus. How is *that*?

12 CHRISTIANUS. That's *much* better. But the *important* point in the present discussion is of course that, in the case of the pregnant woman, the physicians didn't save the woman *permanently* from dying; instead, they just gave her a little more time to live her earthly life, and they did so by *killing* the foetus. The woman still has to *die*, sooner or later, in *some other* way. In other words, not only have they *not* permanently saved the woman from dying; they have also *actively* killed the foetus. So where is the accomplishment?

13 KATHERINE. Well, you have to admit that it is a somewhat strange example: I mean, how many women *are* put in serious biological danger by their foetuses?

14 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, such cases *are* relatively rare. But it's *your* example. *You* chose it, not I. So why don't we take a much more common example in which women are *not* put in any serious *biological* danger

by their foetuses, but where women still, for *other* reasons, participate in the act of killing their foetuses?

15 KATHERINE. Are you referring to regular abortion?

16 CHRISTIANUS. Yes.

17 KATHERINE. But sometimes women are raped. Are you saying that women shouldn't be allowed to abort in such cases?

18 CHRISTIANUS. No, that's not *at all* what I am saying. I am trying, unlike *you*, to focus on the current issue, which is that there is no progress in terms of *stopping death*.

19 KATHERINE. But surely there is *some* progress? For example, many women nowadays experience *much* greater individual freedom because of the advances in abortive methods; and as a woman I really appreciate that.

20 CHRISTIANUS. I was talking about death, not freedom. In any case, there is no doubt about that some people are appreciative of the current state of affairs. But

x:20, as progress: Christianus seems to view 'progress' as something that is measured in relation to a certain philosophy, or a certain set of ideas or beliefs. This may be compared to Paul Feyerabend's discussion of 'progress',

'advance', and 'improvement' in *Against Method*: 'Everyone can read the terms in his own way and in accordance with the tradition to which he belongs. Thus for an empiricist, "progress" will mean transition to a theory that provides di-

in order to see today's state of affairs *as* progress one would have to agree that the pregnant woman's freedom of choice is the *main* concern, and that the foetus's future and freedom is of *less* concern, or even *much* less concern.

21 KATHERINE. Sure. But so what?

22 CHRISTIANUS. *So what?* The thing is, one doesn't *have to* believe that women *have* a right to decide whether or not they want to kill the foetus, just as one doesn't *have to* believe that women *have* a right to decide whether or not they want to kill *anyone* or *anything* that has, or hasn't, human DNA. For if one *didn't* think that women had such a right in the first place, and if one *didn't* think that it would be desirable to implement such a right in human society, then one *wouldn't* necessarily conclude that today's state of affairs would be any progress. One might instead conclude, for example, that the huge number of unborn babies being aborted out of existence every year using various medical technologies for various

rect empirical tests for most of its basic assumptions. Some people believe the quantum theory to be a theory of this kind. For others, "progress" may mean unification and harmony, perhaps even at the expense of empirical adequacy.

This is how Einstein viewed the general theory of relativity' (1988, pp. 18–19; emphasis in original).

PAUL FEYERABEND (1988), *Against Method*. Revised edition. London and New York: Verso.

non-life-threatening reasons is an indication of an increasing *disrespect* for human life, and a *degradation* of human society.

23 KATHERINE. Are you implying that there is something *morally* wrong with the view that women have a right to abort?

24 CHRISTIANUS. It is a very complex issue, and I don't want to get into it right now. Instead, I want to concentrate on my *main* point, namely that regardless of *whatever else* is going on in today's Western world, there is no progress in terms of *stopping death*. There hasn't been a single case in which the physicians have *permanently* saved anyone from dying.

25 KATHERINE. What about cryogenics?

26 CHRISTIANUS. You mean *cryonics*, Katherine. That's just the art of putting an already dead person in the freezer, isn't it?

27 KATHERINE. What do you mean?

28 CHRISTIANUS. I mean there is no *treatment* involved. They just quickly put the de-

x:25, cryogenics: Abate defines the word 'cryogenics' as 'the branch of physics dealing with very low temperatures' (1998, p. 202).

FRANK ABATE, ed. (1998), *The DK Illustrated Oxford Dictionary*. New York: Dorling Kindersley and Oxford University Press.

x:26, cryonics: Gallery defines the word 'cryonics' (cryonic suspension) as 'the cold storage of clinically dead people at very low temperatures, typically in liquid nitrogen at -196 celsius, until some future date when it is hoped that medical science will have progressed to the point where the body can be revived

ceased person in cold storage and hope that future medical technology will be able to bring him back; and *if* technology does come to such a point, then the cryonics people presumably just heat the poor frozen fellow up a bit, after which they immediately hand him over to the physicians; and then *the physicians* provide the actual medical treatment, whatever it might be.

²⁹ KATHERINE. But that doesn't sound so bad, does it? I mean, it's a *chance*, right? There are so many cases where emergency room physicians have successfully revived patients who have lost all their vital signs. So cryonics doesn't seem to be *totally* off, does it?

³⁰ CHRISTIANUS. Well, maybe not. But my *main* point is *still* that no physician has *permanently* saved anyone from dying. So even if cryonics and an improving medical technology may set the stage for a *temporary* revival of a previously cryossified

and the cause of death reversed' (2001, p. 131).

STEVEN GALLERY (2001), 'Cryonics' in Glennys Howarth and Oliver Leaman, eds., *Encyclopedia of Death and Dying*. London and New York: Routledge.

x:30, cryossified: This adjective seems

to be Christianus's own combination of the word 'cryo' (Gr. *kryos* cold, frost) and the word 'ossified' (Lat. *ossis* of a bone). He might refer to a fixed, bone-like state of affairs ('set in bone') that is accomplished by a process of freezing that uses cold or super-cold temperatures. The usage note on 'ossify' provided by Harber

corpse, it's not a *permanent* comeback in any case. Whoever comes back *still* has to die, a little later.

31 KATHERINE. OK, let's forget about cryonics, for now. But at least we can say that, on average, human beings live longer today than they previously did, according to current statistics?

32 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, at least in *some* countries and regions.

33 KATHERINE. Not all?

34 CHRISTIANUS. Certainly not. Far from it. At least if we are to believe the numbers in WHO's *The World Health Report*.

35 KATHERINE. What are the numbers?

36 CHRISTIANUS. The numbers are . . . ta-ta-ta-taaa-taaa-taaa-tiiiiii . . . 12 . . . 26 . . . 37 .

and Payton (1995, p. 716) may also be interesting to consult in this connexion: "the old man's attitudes have *ossified* amid the social changes of today" (= become fixed or set).

KATHERINE HARBER and GEOFFREY PAYTON, eds. (1995), *Heinemann English Dictionary*. Fully revised and updated. Oxford: Heinemann Educational.

x:34, *The World Health Report*: WHO publishes *The World Health Report* once a year, and it is available on the WHO website [<http://www.who.int>]. Christianus seems to have used the WHO 2000 and WHO 2006 reports [cf. x:42 and on-

ward].

WHO (2000), *The World Health Report 2000: Health systems: improving performance*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.

WHO (2006), *The World Health Report 2006: Working together for health*. Geneva, Switzerland: World Health Organization.

x:40, quick sample: Christianus provides a 'quick sample' reading, seemingly indicating that he is not overwhelmingly concerned with any particular level of accuracy in the reading of the WHO figures, or with whether there are

- ..
- 37 KATHERINE. C'mon, Chris! No lotto announcement, *please!*
- 38 CHRISTIANUS. All right. But sometimes it's important to play around a bit, and not take things *too* seriously.
- 39 KATHERINE. Yes, *sometimes*. So what do you have?
- 40 CHRISTIANUS. Well, there are so many numbers, so many countries, so many years. And so little time. So I'll just give you a quick sample.
- 41 KATHERINE. OK.
- 42 CHRISTIANUS. Out of those twenty-eight countries whose names start with either 'A' or 'B', ten countries have *lower* life expectancy figures for the year 2004 than

five or *fifteen* countries of the twenty-eight that have decreasing life expectancies. And although Christianus does not reveal the exact nature of his 'quick sample' reading, we may note two things about how the data in the WHO reports may have been read. First, since the WHO uses one decimal in their 1999 data, but *no* decimals in their 2004 data, Christianus's 'quick sample' reading may have rounded off the 1999 data to the nearest integer, thus reading, for example, '42.3' as '42', and '67.8' as '68'. Second, although the WHO tables present different 'uncertainty intervals' for different countries and different years, Chris-

tianus's 'quick sample' reading may not have taken these into account.

x:42, ten countries: According to WHO 2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p. 169), these ten countries (out of those twenty-eight whose name starts either with 'A' or 'B') have, on a 'quick sample' reading [cf. x:40], life expectancy figures that are *dropping* from 1999 to 2004, for either males or females or both: Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, and Burundi.

for the year 1999.

43 KATHERINE. Really?

44 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. In six countries the life expectancy drops for *both* males and females; in three other countries it drops for *males* only; and in one other country it drops for *females* only.

45 KATHERINE. But surely all the countries in the Western world are *not* among those? They must have increasing life expectancy numbers?

46 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it depends what you mean by 'the Western world'. If you, for example, count Bosnia and Herzegovina as being part of 'the Western world', then

x:42, year 2004 . . . year 1999: The life expectancy numbers ('Life Expectancy at Birth') for the years 1999 and 2004 can be found in *The World Health Report 2000* and *The World Health Report 2006*, respectively. Note that the WHO seems to compile their more recent reports in a slower tempo than they did before: up to and including *The World Health Report 2003* the report included data pertaining to the previous year; but starting with *The World Health Report 2004* they seem to delay the publication of the data one more year. This is why the 2006 report presents data from 2004, while the 2000 report presents data from 1999.

x:44, six countries: According to WHO 2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p. 169),

the following six countries have, on a 'quick sample' reading [cf. x:40], *dropping* life expectancy numbers ('Life Expectancy at Birth') from 1999 to 2004, for *both* males and females. *Afghanistan:* males go from 45.3 to 42 years; females from 47.2 to 42 years. *Angola:* males go from 46.3 to 38 years; females from 49.1 to 42 years. *Antigua and Barbuda:* males go from 71.4 to 70 years; females from 76.8 to 75 years. *Armenia:* males go from 72.3 to 65 years; females from 77.1 to 72 years. *Azerbaijan:* males go from 67.8 to 63 years; females from 75.3 to 68 years. *Belize:* males go from 69.6 to 65 years; females from 75.0 to 72 years.

x:44, three countries: According to WHO 2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p.

you may not *necessarily* be right.

47 KATHERINE. Really?

48 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the life expectancy is dropping for males.

49 KATHERINE. But isn't there room for some statistical errors?

50 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, there is always room for *that*. And this *is* a quick sample of the WHO reports, as I said — and God knows where *those* data come from, anyway. So the numbers and trends may be rather uncertain, including those that show *increasing* life expectancy figures.

51 KATHERINE. Point well taken. But at least

169), the following three countries have, on a 'quick sample' reading [cf. x:40], *dropping* life expectancy numbers ('Life Expectancy at Birth') from 1999 to 2004, for *males* only. *Barbados*: males go from 72.7 to 71 years; women from 77.8 to 78 years. *Bosnia and Herzegovina*: males go from 71.2 to 70 years; females from 75.0 to 77 years. *Burundi*: males go from 43.2 to 42 years; females from 43.8 to 47 years.

74.5 to 76 years; females from 79.8 to 78 years.

x:50, God knows: One may, for example, note the following WHO statement: 'Figures computed by WHO to ensure comparability; they are not necessarily the official statistics of Member States, which may use alternative rigorous methods' (2006, p. 168).

x:44, one other country: According to WHO 2000 (p. 156) and WHO 2006 (p. 169), one country has, on a 'quick sample' reading [cf. x:40], *dropping* life expectancy numbers ('Life Expectancy at Birth') from 1999 to 2004, for *females* only. *Brunei Darussalam*: males go from

America and Britain have *increasing* life expectancy figures, don't they?

52 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. But that may still not indicate any progress for *you*, in any case.

53 KATHERINE. Are you *insane*? Isn't it *progress* when we have increasing life expectancy numbers? Isn't it *progress* to have more years to live?

54 CHRISTIANUS. Well, the problem is just that those life expectancy numbers don't say that *you* have more years to live; they are just part of some *average* population statistics. So just as no *actual* living person has 1.7 kids or 2.2 cars in their little suburban family, the average life expectancy figures may not pertain to any specific, individual person either. Therefore, it is no *guarantee* that *you*, as an individual person, will *reach* the 'life expectancy' age and be able to 'take advantage' of the latest longevity research. So it may not indicate any progress *for you, personally*. For instance, you may be hit by a truck tomorrow and die immediately, without getting any chance of becoming the proud owner of the latest pacemaker

x:51, America and Britain: According to WHO 2000 (p. 163) and WHO 2006 (p. 177), the United States of America has, on a 'quick sample' reading [cf. x:40],

increasing life expectancy numbers ('Life Expectancy at Birth') from 1999 to 2004, for males *only*: males go from 73.8 to 75 years; women from 79.7 to

technology.

55 KATHERINE. I see your point.

56 CHRISTIANUS. And the *main* problem remains:
all people on this planet *are* dying. With
or without pacemakers, ordinary people
in this time and age do not live more
than approximately 100 years: and some
only get 80 years of life, others only 60,
40, or 20, etc. Everyone is still *dying*.

57 KATHERINE. So you are saying that there is no
difference?

58 CHRISTIANUS. There is no difference in terms
of *death*: everyone still has to die. But
there *is*, of course, some difference in
terms of what happens *just before* one
dies: the physicians *sometimes* can keep
the patient alive a few hours, days, weeks,
or months more. But they can't do it *con-*
sistently, for *all* patients; they can only do
it for *some*. And even if they *could* do it
consistently, for *all* patients, it wouldn't
be any *real* progress anyway.

59 KATHERINE. Why not?

60 CHRISTIANUS. Because *real* progress is to be
able *to live on*. That is what we *really*

80 years. The United Kingdom has, on a 'quick sample' reading, increasing life expectancy numbers ('Life Expectancy at Birth') from 1999 to 2004, for *both*

males and females: males go from 74.7 to 76 years; females from 79.7 to 81 years.

want. Only if we can continue *to live on* will we have a chance of becoming *really satisfied*. So if we accept death as the end, then there can be no *real* satisfaction *now*, and no real satisfaction *later*. So we must *not* accept death.

SCENE XI.

The Body-Bomb

1 KATHERINE. Not *accept* death? Are you *crazy*?
But we *must* die!

2 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, *of course* we must die, in
the sense that our physical bodies at some
point must become lifeless and useless,
stale and pale.

3 KATHERINE. But?

4 CHRISTIANUS. But even if we *were* to accept
such a future state of affairs for the physi-
cal body, we would *certainly* not have to
accept the idea that the individual *being*
and his or hers individual *consciousness*
must cease to exist.

5 KATHERINE. But didn't I previously give you
my argument about what happens when
the brain dies? Didn't I explain that the
individual consciousness also dies, or
ceases to be, at that time?

6 CHRISTIANUS. You certainly *did* present your
theory, and you did it *well*: it was very
concise and precise. But I didn't *buy* it.

7 KATHERINE. How can you *not* buy it?

8 CHRISTIANUS. Because I have a *better* theory.

9 KATHERINE. How do you mean, 'better'?

10 CHRISTIANUS. My theory is better simply because it makes real satisfaction *possible*, while yours doesn't.

11 KATHERINE. How does it do that?

12 CHRISTIANUS. I'll tell you about that in a minute. But first I have to ask you a personal question: do you *want* to die?

13 KATHERINE. *Of course* not.

14 CHRISTIANUS. Why not?

15 KATHERINE. Well, there's only *nothingness!*

16 CHRISTIANUS. So it's not that you are afraid that the *transition* between your current life and your postulated nothingness-state is a particularly *painful* one?

17 KATHERINE. No, that's not my worry; the transition to nothingness is not painful.

18 CHRISTIANUS. What *is* your worry, then?

19 KATHERINE. Well, it's not really a worry; it's just that I have more to do *here* before my body goes!

20 CHRISTIANUS. So you are saying, I guess, that there would be little *to do* in the realm of nothingness? Or, at least, that there would be little to do that is *worth* doing?

21 KATHERINE. *Very* little: *nothing!* I don't even *exist* anymore!

22 CHRISTIANUS. I see.

23 KATHERINE. And I have so much left to experience *here*.

24 CHRISTIANUS. Such as?

25 KATHERINE. I still have my mother, and I want to spend some more time with her. And I also want to continue to paint, and move on from acrylics to real oil paint. And then, of course, I want to find some very nice friends and lovers, so I can be *really* happy.

26 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. So you have a lot of things that you care about that you are not especially eager to give up?

27 KATHERINE. Yes. Except for my weight, of course, which I'd give up in an instant.

28 CHRISTIANUS. Naturally.

29 KATHERINE. And there is so little *time!*

30 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. That *is* your problem in a bombshell.

31 KATHERINE. What do you mean?

32 CHRISTIANUS. Your problem is that *you know* that your personal little bomb is ticking.

33 KATHERINE. My personal little bomb?

34 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it's not one of those fancy, long-range nuclear devices that James Bond usually bumps into. This one has

heart beat and is *much* more close-range. But the basic *dramatic* idea is, of course, the same: if X discovers a ticking bomb, and X knows that the bomb will blow up X if nothing is done, and then X does nothing about it, how can X *forget* the bomb?

35 KATHERINE. What do you mean, 'forget the bomb'?

36 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly! He *can't* forget it! For if he cannot either disarm the bomb or remove himself from it, he will, more or less, *always* think about it in one way or other. And if he more or less always thinks about the *bomb*, how can he get any real satisfaction in terms of anything else in his life?

37 KATHERINE. What if he *doesn't* think about the bomb?

38 CHRISTIANUS. Remember, the bomb *is* ticking; and if he cannot disarm it, it *will* go off.

x1:34, the basic *dramatic* idea: Although the word 'dramatic' sometimes may be used to refer *specifically* to theatre productions or staged representations, Christianus probably uses it here in a somewhat different sense. Maybe he uses it to express some degree of being '[e]motionally intense, as [in] *dramatic lighting*, a *dramatic romance*' (Bowman

and Ball 1961, p. 108; my emphasis); or, perhaps, to imply 'an effect or a combination of effects appropriate to the drama or a representation of a drama, such as the stirring of the imagination and emotions by vivid and expressive action, speech, or gesture, or by the exciting complications of a plot' (Nielson 1942, p. 274).

- 39 KATHERINE. But can't he just *walk away* from it, before it goes off?
- 40 CHRISTIANUS. It might be possible to do that in some situations, with *some* types of bombs; but *this* little body-bomb is tied to his chest, and goes wherever *he* goes.
- 41 KATHERINE. But since it's just a *little* body-bomb, maybe it comes only with a very small risk?
- 42 CHRISTIANUS. Does death, in a *best-case* scenario, *only* clip a rib or two, and leave the rest of the body in a normal, working condition?
- 43 KATHERINE. No.
- 44 CHRISTIANUS. So regardless of whether it's a *small* body-bomb or a *big* one, it's a *body-bomb*. His body *will* go.
- 45 KATHERINE. But didn't you previously mention something about *disarming* the bomb?
- 46 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, that's possible in *some*

WALTER PARKER BOWMAN and ROBERT HAMILTON BALL (1961), *Theatre Language: A Dictionary of Terms in English of the Drama and Stage from Medieval to Modern Times*. New York: Theatre Arts Books.

WILLIAM ALLAN NIELSON, ed. (1942), *Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms: A Dictionary of Discriminated Synonyms with*

Antonyms and Analogous and Contrasted Words. First edition. Springfield, MA: G. & C. Merriam Co., Publishers.

bomb scenarios; but this is a *body-bomb* scenario.

47 KATHERINE. So where does this leave us?

48 CHRISTIANUS. Regardless of which psycho-physical theory we subscribe to, the bomb will go off and kill all your normal bodily functions.

49 KATHERINE. So why waste my valuable time wondering about whether I should stick to *my* death-and-nothingness theory or pick *your* satisfactionist speculations, if I already know that, regardless of which theory I end up selecting, my body-bomb *always* is destined to go off?

50 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it's one thing to think that there is a body-bomb going off; it's another to think that the detonation would result in a *great loss* for *the real you*.

51 KATHERINE. But if the bomb *destroys* all my normal bodily functions, how can it *not* be a great loss for the real me? I lose my mother, my friends, my job, my money, my acrylic paintings, my memories, and my plans of a *perfect* two-week Hawaii vacation!

52 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, there are many precious things to potentially lose in a typical death-and-nothingness scenario, including consciousness *itself*. So your scenario

is *very* worrying and dissatisfying on the whole. That's why I think that you might be more satisfied with *my* theory.

53 KATHERINE. How is *your* theory better?

54 CHRISTIANUS. In my theory I do *not* accept death as the start of any nothingness; rather, I see death as an event that leads to *more* life, but perhaps not always *exactly* as we currently know it. In any case, in *my* afterlife scenario I don't *lose* my individuality or my perception; and I *certainly* don't lose my ability to *experience* things or *do* things. So in my scenario there is much less to worry about and be dissatisfied about during my earthly lifetime; and there is, unlike in *your* theory, a possibility to experience satisfaction also *after* death. So *my* scenario is *much* better than yours.

55 KATHERINE. I am sorry, but it's a little too much for me, at least right now.

SCENE XII.

The Cartesian Theatre

1 CHRISTIANUS. I can certainly relate to that. Absolutely no problem! We can talk about those particular details some other time. In fact, be sure to remind me about my Okefenokee Monster story — it's reasonably short, and easy to understand.

2 KATHERINE. Okee-dokee.

3 CHRISTIANUS. So for now, then, just think of my theory as some type of soul-body dualism, where the soul is the *real* living being who *uses* the body and the brain *as an instrument*, in order to interact with the earthly world.

4 KATHERINE. How do you mean?

5 CHRISTIANUS. In *my* theory the individual soul is the ultimate observer and perceiver of everything that is experienced. The individual soul *uses* the organs of the body to perceive things in the earthly dimension. For example, the soul uses the eyes, the optic nerve, and parts of the brain to process visual information. Similarly, the soul uses *all* of the senses and the brain as one big instrument to experience the human perspective, the human world.

- 6 KATHERINE. Well, it's easy to *say* it, but why would I *believe* it?
- 7 CHRISTIANUS. Let's talk about that. *Be patient!* Now, picture an astronomer who goes on a field trip and then, when he tries to mount his refractor telescope on his tripod to start his nocturnal observations, he accidentally drops it and smashes its front lens. Would we then say that the astronomer's own *consciousness* also stops working?
- 8 KATHERINE. No. But I am sure he's quite upset, *especially* if the night skies are clear!
- 9 CHRISTIANUS. Indeed! Or picture a biologist who is doing some last-minute research with a light microscope. But then her instrument suddenly stops working, and she doesn't have a replacement microscope in her lab. Would we then say that her *general ability to perceive things* also ceases to be?
- 10 KATHERINE. No. But I am sure she's quite irritated, especially if the deadline for her grant goes out the day after and she *must* continue using her light microscope to check a few more details for her report.
- 11 CHRISTIANUS. Certainly! And what would we say when a typical office worker's main instrument, the computer, suddenly crashes?

- 12 KATHERINE. Microsoft Windows?
- 13 CHRISTIANUS. Well, we *might* say that, especially if that *was* her operating system. But another point, and perhaps slightly more relevant to the general theme of our discussion, would be to say that although the computer and its programs crashed, the office worker's *consciousness* didn't crash, or at least not crash *as much*.
- 14 KATHERINE. So, according to *your* theory, the *general* ability to perceive is *not* dependent on the brain? Are you saying that the general ability to perceive is some non-material, non-bodily thing or feature?
- 15 CHRISTIANUS. Something like that, yes.
- 16 KATHERINE. And how do you explain all the brain activity that the neuroscientists have proven?
- 17 CHRISTIANUS. Well, if you view the brain as an *instrument* through which all perception goes, then you don't have to buy all those brain-mind identity theories that the neuroscientists are trying to sell you.
- 18 KATHERINE. But don't they think, just like you do, that the brain is *instrumental* in regards to perception and consciousness?

XII:21, no single perceiver: Dennett (1991, pp. 134–135) says: 'The natural but naïve question to ask is: Where does

it all come together? The answer is: Nowhere.'

DANIEL C. DENNETT (1991), *Con-*

- 19 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, but not in the *same way* as I do. There are, of course, many different materialist theories; but many of them simply boil down to the idea that there is nothing more to *you* and your personal consciousness than the sum total of all physical, chemical, and biological functions and interactions in the body. In those scenarios there is no soul that is the perceiver or observer of the perceptions in those scenarios.
- 20 KATHERINE. So who is the perceiver in those soul-less scenarios?
- 21 CHRISTIANUS. According to Dennett, who is one of the main materialist speculators in the philosophy of mind, there *is* ultimately no single perceiver; there's just some complex, distributed machine processing.
- 22 KATHERINE. And what about my own observation that I really *feel like* I am a single being who is perceiving things?
- 23 CHRISTIANUS. I think Dennett would say that your observation certainly is valid on some *psychological* level, and that many people are sensing the same thing as you

do.

24 KATHERINE. But?

25 CHRISTIANUS. But he would still claim that the feeling of a 'Cartesian Theatre' does not correspond to how human beings are functionally designed. And that your feeling of yourself as 'an entity' or as a 'single person' who is perceiving things from a single point or perspective, is nothing but an illusion.

26 KATHERINE. That is hard to believe.

27 CHRISTIANUS. It certainly is.

28 KATHERINE. And how did *your* explanation go, again?

29 CHRISTIANUS. Well, I agree, of course, that there *is* processing going on in the brain-senses system. But since I regard the brain-senses system simply as a *complex instrument* that is being used by the *real me*, my conclusions differ.

30 KATHERINE. What's the difference?

keeps coming back to haunt us — lay-people and scientists alike — even after its ghostly dualism has been denounced and exorcised' (1991, p. 107). In regards to the second half of Dennett's statement ('even after . . .'), it is not impossible that Christianus, in his typical style, may have replied something like this: 'The attempt to denounce X, or the attempt to exorcise X, or both, is no *proof*

for that X is wrong. So, for example, one may try to denounce and exorcise dualism all one wants; it doesn't *prove* that dualism is wrong. All it proves (if it proves anything at all) is that the denouncer and the exorcist *wants* dualism to be wrong.'

XII:25, nothing but an illusion: Dennett says: 'But isn't there also a *real* sub-

31 CHRISTIANUS. In *my* scenario the processing in the brain-senses instrument is no proof for that my *general* ability to perceive is *produced* by that brain-senses activity; for I am just temporarily *using* the brain-senses instrument to view the material world.

32 KATHERINE. Can you elaborate?

33 CHRISTIANUS. Well, on my view the processing in the brain-senses instrument just indicates that the observer's ability to perceive the earthly world *through his brain-senses instrument* is dependent on the *processing* in his brain-senses instrument. But that is a completely natural, predictable and non-thrilling consequence of my original setup with the individual soul *using* a brain-senses instrument.

ject, for whose benefit the brain must indeed mount a show, filling in all the blank spots? This is what Goodman seems to be supposing when he talks of the brain filling in all the places on the path. For whose benefit is all this animated cartooning being executed? For the audience in the Cartesian Theater. But *since there is no such theater, there is no such audience*' (1991, p. 128; empha-

sis in original). Dennett's idea, then, is something like this: 'What Goodman overlooks is the possibility that the brain doesn't actually have to go to the trouble of "filling in" anything with "construction" — for no one is looking' (1991, p. 127).

SCENE XIII.

Radha's Microscope

- 1 KATHERINE. Can you illustrate this with some
nice example or something?
- 2 CHRISTIANUS. Let's see. Have I previously told
you about Radha?
- 3 KATHERINE. Radha? I don't think so.
- 4 CHRISTIANUS. Radha is a *very* attractive young
woman that I know. She is a university-
trained biologist. And she has an electron
microscope at her lab.
- 5 KATHERINE. OK. But why is she so *very* at-
tractive?
- 6 CHRISTIANUS. Well, she is just *very* charming,
very shapely, and *very* intelligent. She's
definitely a hottie.
- 7 KATHERINE. OK, OK! I get the picture. Go

XIII:2, Radha: Many Indian parents name their children Radha. The classical Sanskrit pronunciation (and corresponding spelling in Devanagari) of this ancient name is *raadhaa* (with two long 'a' sounds), and originally refers to 'one of the most mysterious figures in all of Indian literature' (Dimock, Jr. 1989, p. 595). Macdonnell's entry 'raadhaa' lists two occurrences of that name in ancient Indian literature: 'f. N. of a cowherdess beloved of Krishna and later worshipped

as a goddess; N. of Karna's foster-mother' (1924, p. 254).

E. C. DIMOCK, JR. (1989), 'Raadhaa' in Keith Crim, ed., *The Perennial Dictionary of World Religions*. New York, NY: Harper & Row. Original edition (1981): *Abingdon Dictionary of Living Religions*. Nashville, TN: Abingdon.

ARTHUR ANTHONY MACDONELL (1924), *A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary with Transliteration, Accentuation, and Etymological Analysis Throughout*. London,

on.

8 CHRISTIANUS. All right. Radha's perception is normal: all her senses are working in an orderly fashion. She can hear, see, taste, smell, and touch things; and she perceives the ordinary, day-to-day human world much like we do.

9 KATHERINE. OK.

10 CHRISTIANUS. But unlike us, she *really* knows how to practically use a transmission electron microscope.

11 KATHERINE. All right.

12 CHRISTIANUS. Now, if Radha *doesn't* turn the microscope's power *on*, do you think that she can perceive any eukaryotic cells, with their typical membrane, nucleus, and nucleolus?

13 KATHERINE. Well, maybe she has one of those colourful cell-structure posters hanging

England: Oxford University Press.

XIII:10, electron microscope: Christianus may here indicate that there is a difference between knowing how to use an electron microscope and *really* knowing how to use an electron microscope. Compare, for example, Rodenberg's statement in regards to users of transmission electron microscopes: 'there are a growing number of users who have amazingly little understanding of what

actually goes on inside an electron column' (2004, p. 9).

JOHN M. RODENBERG (2004), 'Understanding Transmission Electron Microscope Alignment: A Tutorial' in *Microscopy and Analysis*, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 9–11.

XIII:12, eukaryotic cells: Sylvia Mader (1990, pp. 61–62) publishes two nice transmission electron micrographs of eukaryotic cells: one animal cell (mag-

on a wall nearby?

14 CHRISTIANUS. That's possible. But the question I had in mind was more like this: Can she perceive any cells *through the lens system of her electron microscope* if the microscope's power is off?

15 KATHERINE. No.

16 CHRISTIANUS. In fact, she will not see *any* microscopic objects with her electron microscope if the power is off, will she?

17 KATHERINE. Probably not.

18 CHRISTIANUS. For unless the power is on, there is no *image processing* in the electron microscope?

19 KATHERINE. Sounds reasonable.

20 CHRISTIANUS. But yet Radha *can* see the colourful cell-structure poster hanging on the wall, if she looks at the wall?

21 KATHERINE. Yes.

22 CHRISTIANUS. And she *can* see her well-used, pink-coloured coffee machine on the bench across the room, if she turns her head that way?

23 KATHERINE. Yes.

nification: x 15,000) and one plant cell (magnification: x 20,000). Purves, Orians, Heller, and Sadava (1997, pp. 72–73) publish several electron micro-

graphs of eukaryotic cells, and also use some nice graphics to illustrate the cellular structures of animal cells and plant cells.

- 24 CHRISTIANUS. By the way: should we order
some coffee?
- 25 KATHERINE. Sure! An espresso for me.
- 26 CHRISTIANUS. OK. And I'll go for a cappuc-
cino. Waiter!
- 27 KATHERINE. You were saying?
- 28 CHRISTIANUS. Well, my point was that Radha's
general ability to perceive things in the
day-to-day human world is *not* impaired
when the electron microscope's power is
off.
- 29 KATHERINE. OK.
- 30 CHRISTIANUS. So what happens with Radha's
general ability to perceive things in the
day-to-day human world when she sud-
denly flips the power switch on?
- 31 KATHERINE. Assuming that she isn't elec-
trocuted when she touches the power
switch?
- 32 CHRISTIANUS. Of course.
- 33 KATHERINE. Nothing?
- 34 CHRISTIANUS. Excellent!
- 35 KATHERINE. But isn't *something* happening

when she turns the power on?

36 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, but not with her *general*
ability to perceive.

37 KATHERINE. What, then?

38 CHRISTIANUS. Well, it's just that the *show*
starts. Radha can now perceive scenes of
microscopic worlds, since there now is
image processing going on in the electron
microscope. Previously, when the power
was off, she *didn't* perceive any scenes of
microscopic worlds, for there *wasn't* any
image processing going on in the elec-
tron microscope.

39 KATHERINE. And how does this connect to
your original theory?

40 CHRISTIANUS. Well, my idea is this: it is not
very *surprising* that Radha's perception of
the microscopic world *would* disappear
if she flips the power switch off; for her
ability to perceive *the microscopic world*
through her electron microscope is *com-*
pletely dependent on the electron micro-
scope's *processing* of the images.

SCENE XIV.

Ontology Drives Explanation

1 KATHERINE. Anything else?

2 CHRISTIANUS. Yes. It is important to use a correct *ontology*; that is, a correct view of what actually *exists*, whether it is in our ordinary human material world, or in some supra-material, supra-human world.

3 KATHERINE. Why is it important?

4 CHRISTIANUS. For ontology drives explanation.

5 KATHERINE. Can you lay it out for me?

6 CHRISTIANUS. Well, when ordinary people *explain* things they commonly use those things that they believe exist. For example, when you explain to someone *why* you won an important legal case last week, you populate your scenario with entities that you believe existed at the point of the trial; and with those entities you build an explanation to show how you ended up winning.

7 KATHERINE. Sure. So I may have populated my scenario with a judge, the opposing counsellor, myself, the jury, some guards,

some secretary, etc.?

8 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly. And then you describe those characters — including their psychology, their actions, their relations, their motives, their background, etc. — in such a way as to arrive at the main effect that you wanted to explain, namely that you finally won the case.

9 KATHERINE. Are you saying that this is *one* way to provide an explanation, and that there are *alternative* ways, and perhaps even *better* ways, to do it?

10 CHRISTIANUS. No, that's not what I am saying. At least not right now. I am simply saying that this is what ordinary people do all the time: based on *what* they want to explain, and *how* they want to explain it, they *populate* their little scenarios in different ways.

11 KATHERINE. Why is that?

12 CHRISTIANUS. Because they *know* that they can *adjust* the explanation to suit their needs by setting up the ontology in different ways.

13 KATHERINE. But would they always *admit* that they *know* that, and *do* that?

14 CHRISTIANUS. Not always.

15 KATHERINE. Can you elaborate?

- 16 CHRISTIANUS. Well, one important aspect of scenario-construction is that we normally *don't* populate our scenarios with entities that we think *do not* exist, at least not when we want to provide an explanation of events that we believe *really happened*. So if we, for some reason, think that there *aren't* any green-coloured cats, then we will not put any green-coloured cats into any of our explanatory scenarios that are geared towards explaining 'reality' as it is, or 'reality' as it was.
- 17 KATHERINE. But we can still talk about green-coloured cats, can't we?
- 18 CHRISTIANUS. Sure! We may put green-coloured cats into *other* scenarios, for other purposes than trying to describe 'real facts' or 'real events': we may, for instance, use them as part of a joke scenario, or use them in a bedtime story scenario; or we may put them in some scenario in order to try to *disprove* their existence.
- 19 KATHERINE. Fair enough. But what's your point, more exactly?
- 20 CHRISTIANUS. I actually have *two* points. My first point is this. If you populate your scenario with the *wrong* entities, it may be very hard to provide a *believable* explanation. So in our previous example, if

you do not populate your scenario with, say, a judge, it becomes very difficult to explain how you *really* could have won, in a legally binding way.

21 KATHERINE. But why would I *not* populate my scenario with a judge? Many witnesses can testify that the judge *really was* in the room, and that it was ‘business as usual’?

22 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, the judge is very hard to extricate from your scenario. But this is not only because there were so many witnesses, but also because it would be very hard for *this* particular explanation to make sense without him. For if you do not include *him*, it will be hard to explain how this alleged courtroom event could have occurred in a way as to have been legally won *by anyone*.

23 KATHERINE. So?

24 CHRISTIANUS. All explanation scenarios are not as simple as the public courtroom case. There are *more difficult* scenarios.

25 KATHERINE. Yes. Take for instance some unsolved murder mystery *without witnesses*, where there is nothing but a dead corpse lying around: no blood, no obvious weapon, no obvious break-in, no obvious things stolen, no obvious motive,

etc. Who was there? What happened?
What was the motive?

26 CHRISTIANUS. Sure. But also other scenarios may be difficult. Take those, for example, where there are *some* witnesses but where different people *still* do not agree about how to populate the explanatory scenarios.

27 KATHERINE. So the problem is then that one has many scenarios to deal with, and that it is difficult to populate them in such a way as to be able to explain the effects or phenomena in different, plausible ways?

28 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, that's *part* of the problem. But *plausibility* is not the only measure. And the fact that one *can* explain something in a 'plausible' scenario does not *prove* that it is the right explanation.

29 KATHERINE. I am well aware of that. So what is your point?

30 CHRISTIANUS. My *second* point is this: in order to have a chance to really solve the murder case, at least one of your explanatory scenarios must be populated with *the real murderer*. If you fail to populate *at least one* of your scenarios with *the real murderer*, you will *never* be able to *really* solve the case, no matter *how many* alternate scenarios you have produced.

31 KATHERINE. But it's all right, of course, to use *some* alternate scenarios in which the real murderer does *not* have a role? For then I may sound more objective and better prepared, and be able to produce a more convincing courtroom performance.

32 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, that's a good strategy. So you may populate *some* scenarios in such a way that the real murderer is *not* in them. But your 'select' scenario as a prosecutor — at least if you want *real* justice, and are unconcerned with issues such as your personal safety or future career opportunities — must be a scenario that you have populated with *the real murderer*.

33 KATHERINE. Yes, that sounds just about right. But so what?

34 CHRISTIANUS. Isn't that *enough*? Any scenario that *doesn't* include *the real murderer* is a wrong scenario, no matter how many *other* details you may get right. So any explanation of that dead body that *doesn't* include *the real murderer* is a wrong explanation. In other words, an incomplete ontology, or an incomplete *population* of your scenario, *guarantees* a wrong explanation.

35 KATHERINE. All right. That *is* an excellent

point! Perhaps I am just a little tired. We have covered so many arguments; and I have had a long day.

SCENE XV.

Another Look at Radha

1 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, that's perfectly under-
standable. Maybe you want a coffee re-
fill?

2 KATHERINE. Yes, but only a small one. I can't
stay *very* much longer.

3 CHRISTIANUS. That's fine. Waiter!

4 KATHERINE. So what else should we talk
about?

5 CHRISTIANUS. Well, why don't we just quick-
ly return to Radha's lab, just to solidify
some of my points about scenarios and
explanation.

6 KATHERINE. All right.

7 CHRISTIANUS. What we might say, then, is that
it's good that we have populated our lit-
tle lab scenario in such a way that Radha
is *one* individual entity, and the electron
microscope is *another*.

8 KATHERINE. Why is that?

9 CHRISTIANUS. Because once we have decided
what characters and what props we should
fill our little scenario with, our explana-
tion will almost produce itself. Choosing
the wrong characters and props not only

would have *guaranteed* a wrong explanation, but it may also have made it more or less unintelligible and unbelievable.

10 KATHERINE. How?

11 CHRISTIANUS. Since we know that Radha *herself* is not a *product* of some processing going on inside the electron microscope, but an independent person *using* and *controlling* the electron microscope *instrument* to see some particular microscopic world, it is easy to understand that the microscope's power switch does *not* change Radha's *general* ability to perceive the world.

12 KATHERINE. Yes, it is easy.

13 CHRISTIANUS. And it is also easy to see that even if the microscope's power switch is irrelevant in regards to Radha's *general* ability to perceive the day-to-day human world, it is *not* irrelevant in regards to Radha's more *particular* ability to see *the microscopic world with her advanced electron microscope*: for if the power is off, she *can't* see any microscopic world; but if the power is on, she *can*.

14 KATHERINE. Yes, it's easy: if the *power* is on, then the *show* is on; if the *power* is off, then the *show* is off.

15 CHRISTIANUS. Exactly!

16 KATHERINE. And once more we assume, of course, that she isn't electrocuted when she touches the power switch?

17 CHRISTIANUS. Naturally.

18 KATHERINE. And we also assume, of course, that her powering-on doesn't blow a fuse, so that everything becomes dark in the room, making her lose even her *general* ability to see things in the room?

19 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, for now.

20 KATHERINE. So what is the overall conclusion?

21 CHRISTIANUS. If one *wrongly* thinks that Radha's *general* ability to perceive the day-to-day world around her is produced by the processing within the electron microscope, then it becomes very difficult to explain how it is that Radha still doesn't lose her *general* ability to perceive the day-to-day world when the microscope's power is *off*.

22 KATHERINE. How does this connect to the theories of the materialists?

23 CHRISTIANUS. Well, once one has furnished one's scenario with an individual soul equipped with a general ability to perceive things in *any* world, including the physical world, one's *explanation* doesn't have to be so *anti-intuitive* on the *person-*

al level as the theories of the materialists are.

24 KATHERINE. How so?

25 CHRISTIANUS. In *my* explanation, then, one wouldn't have to try to explain *away* our feeling of ourselves as individuals as some sort of *illusion*; rather, in *my* theory our perception of ourselves as individuals is a completely natural one: it *naturally* follows from my original setup where each individual soul *uses* the body as an instrument.

26 KATHERINE. So after my body dies, my perception *continues*?

27 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, according to my theory.

28 KATHERINE. That is hard to believe.

SCENE XVI.

Confessions of a Satisfactionist

1 CHRISTIANUS. Well, in my early twenties, after
having been brainwashed a few years at
my local university, I thought much like
you do now. My professors were rarely
interested in preaching anything else
than their own materialist theories; so
I was basically indoctrinated to believe
that there were no *real* alternatives to
materialism.

2 KATHERINE. What happened, Chris?

3 CHRISTIANUS. Many things, of course. But the
more I studied, the more I realized that
materialism *isn't* the only game in town;
it is perfectly possible to construct *very*
coherent world-views *without* accepting
many of the core premises of modern
'scientific' materialism.

4 KATHERINE. So what is, in your opinion, un-
satisfactory about the scientific theory
that I just presented?

5 CHRISTIANUS. The *overall* problem is that your
scenario is built on the assumption that
death is the final frontier. So how can it
not be unsatisfactory?

6 KATHERINE. Any more *specific* complaints?

7 CHRISTIANUS. Well, your argument only works if one assumes that consciousness is *directly* created by, or is a *direct* effect of, the activity of the physical brain. Your theory *assumes* that consciousness cannot be had *without* the brain.

8 KATHERINE. And why is *that* unsatisfactory?

9 CHRISTIANUS. It is unsatisfactory *to me* because it is built on the unproven premise that everything is material. It's a scenario that simply is *populated* in such a way as *not* to include a soul. But if we really *are* souls who use our bodies as instruments, then basically all so-called scientific explanations that have to do with human perception and human agency are *guaranteed* to be wrong, on some level or other.

10 KATHERINE. But my scenario is not unsatisfactory *to the scientists*, is it?

11 CHRISTIANUS. You're right: your scenario is *not* entirely unsatisfactory to them. They *are* interested in trying to sell in theories that are compatible with the kind of mortal and material consciousness that is so commonly promoted in the academic world; for how can they otherwise get published, get tenure, and keep their

jobs at the universities?

12 KATHERINE. But you suggest that they are *still*
unsatisfied?

13 CHRISTIANUS. Yes, at least some of them are.

14 KATHERINE. Why?

15 CHRISTIANUS. Because they are, on some level or other, *also* aware of their own little body-bombs. So even if they may be satisfied in the sense of having managed their own academic careers well, they are still worried about their incapability to handle their own, personal *deaths*.

16 KATHERINE. Hmm.

17 CHRISTIANUS. And this is your problem, too. Even if you are a very successful lawyer, you are more or less miserable. And you can't really be anything else until you have *faced* your own little body-bomb, and done something about it. For it *will* blow.

18 KATHERINE. I have to think about that.

19 CHRISTIANUS. Certainly! But be sure to get a good night's sleep first. You must be completely *exhausted* by now, after today's events!

20 KATHERINE. Yes, I am. But I had a *really* good time here with you!

21 CHRISTIANUS. I did too! So how long will you

be staying before you go back to Florida?

22 KATHERINE. I don't know. First of all, I really *have to* get some serious rest over here, and think some things over. But I also have to, as you already know, do some serious detective work to try to find my absolutely *invaluable* documents. So I am not sure. My guess would be around two weeks; but it could be both three and four too. It depends. We'll see.

23 CHRISTIANUS. Sounds good, Katherine!

24 KATHERINE. So what do you think about meeting tomorrow? I would *love* to continue our little conversation!

25 CHRISTIANUS. Tomorrow? I am sorry, but I can't. I have already booked a lunch meeting with a physics professor that I know.

26 KATHERINE. But maybe we can meet in the evening?

27 CHRISTIANUS. Katherine, I just *can't*. You see, Tim is a *very* stubborn and demanding professor, and meeting with him is always very draining; so I expect to have *zero* conversational energy left in the evening. But what about Friday?

28 KATHERINE. Sure! Then I can take tomorrow off, and get a whole day just to myself,

for a change.

29 CHRISTIANUS. Any particular time or place?

30 KATHERINE. Why not outside your favourite café sometime in the morning? You always tell me how nice it is in your emails!

31 CHRISTIANUS. Sure, that's *definitely* doable. Would 10 a.m. work for you?

32 KATHERINE. Yes, that would be perfect.

33 CHRISTIANUS. And you have the address?

34 KATHERINE. You bet! I've already checked it out online!

35 CHRISTIANUS. All right. See you on Friday, then!

36 KATHERINE. Great! Take care!

37 CHRISTIANUS. You too!

ISSN 1654-6296 (print) · ISSN 1654-6318 (online)

<http://philosophicalplays.googlepages.com>