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A Pluralist Approach to Joint Responsibility

I. INTRODUCTION

Sometimes reactive attitudes target groups rather than individuals.¹ This suggests that groups are sometimes morally responsible. A growing number of moral philosophers agree with this, yet fail to recognize just how diverse the set of morally responsible groups is. Dominant approaches to group responsibility thus suggest that only one type of group is morally responsible, namely, those groups that have emergent capacities that mirror the agential capacities of rational and normatively competent individuals. Let us call these *fully-formed groups*. However, some of our reactive attitudes target not only fully-formed groups but also what I will call *aberrant groups*, namely, groups that lack one or more of the capacities possessed by fully-formed groups.

The full repertoire of reactive attitudes might not be suitable for aberrant groups, but it nonetheless seems justified that we disdain a Neo-Nazi rally, feel gratitude toward the group of strangers who spontaneously cooperate to save a child, or disapprove of a greedy corporation. These reactive attitudes are appropriate even if the Neo-Nazi rally lacks the structure that would make it capable of entering a moral conversation, if the spontaneously cooperating group of strangers is unable to form group-level judgments and decisions, and if the corporation is normatively

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1. Gunnar Björnsson and Kendy Hess, "Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 94, no. 2 (2017): 273–98; Frank Hindriks, "Collective Agency: Moral and Amoral," *Dialectic* 72, no. 1 (2018): 3–23; David Silver, "A Strawsonian Defense of Corporate Moral Responsibility," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2005): 279–93; Deborah Tollefsen, "Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility," *Philosophical Explorations* 6, no. 3 (2003): 218–34; Deborah Tollefsen, *Groups as Agents* (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2015).

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incompetent. These aberrant groups are not fully-formed moral agents, and yet, intuitively, some reactive attitudes are appropriately directed at them. In which sense, if any, are they morally responsible?

Discussing a range of what he calls marginal agents (people suffering from mania, autism, mild intellectual disability, and psychopathy), David Shoemaker has argued that there are three distinct types of responsibility—attributability, accountability, and answerability—and that each of these requires different agential capacities.² In this paper, I argue that a similar moral responsibility pluralism can help us make sense of the reactive attitudes with which we meet aberrant groups and, hence, shed new light on the moral responsibility of groups.

Section II outlines the problem of aberrant groups by distinguishing between three different types of groups—expressive groups, interpellated groups, and group psychopaths—that arguably warrant specific group-reactive attitudes. In Section III, I connect this with Shoemaker’s pluralism, which suggests that the way in which an entity is morally responsible depends on the extent to which that entity possesses different agential capacities because different agential capacities make entities susceptible to different kinds of normative claims. Sections IV and V clarify in which ways aberrant groups can have emergent agential capacities and how they can be targets of reactive attitudes. Sections VI–VIII then analyze the three types of aberrant groups in more detail. I argue, in short, that expressive groups, interpellated groups, and group psychopaths possess the emergent capacities necessary for attributability, accountability, and answerability respectively, and that this is why we meet them with the reactive attitudes that we do. Section IX considers two objections, namely, that aberrant groups only warrant what Strawson calls the objective attitude and that it is unfair to blame group members for being parts of aberrant groups. I conclude in Section X by highlighting some of the advantages of adopting a pluralistic approach to group responsibility.

II. THE PROBLEM OF ABERRANT GROUPS

The dominant approaches to group responsibility examine which groups, if any, possess the capacities that would make them proper moral agents, that is, which groups possess the capacities that would make them moral

2. David Shoemaker, *Responsibility from the Margins* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

agents in the allegedly only way in which something can be a moral agent. Individual agents possess these capacities by virtue of their psychology; groups must have them by virtue of their organization. Different accounts take different capacities to constitute proper moral agency and thus emphasize different kinds of organization, but most assume that there is only one way for groups to be morally responsible.³

These accounts have a taken-for-granted commitment to moral responsibility monism. But given the fact that social life is populated by many different groups, it is hardly self-evident that only one type of group is morally responsible. Intuitively, we meet many of these with morally charged responses. And according to P. F. Strawson, such morally charged responses, what he calls the participant reactive attitudes, are constitutive of moral responsibility.⁴ This gives us *prima facie* reasons for believing that many different types of groups are morally responsible. I suggest that this is so because different types of groups are morally responsible in different ways.

In this paper, I will focus on three different types of groups.

- (1) *Expressive groups* are capable of having and expressing a largely coherent set of cares or commitments. They typically lack the capacity for communication (e.g., a spokesperson) and for group-level decision-making (e.g., a board) and the empathic and coordinative capacities that would enable them to understand and act on the way in which other agents depend on them. Examples of expressive groups are mobs, spontaneous uprisings, and disorganized political rallies that, despite their lack of formal structures, seem to have a joint evaluative outlook.
- (2) *Interpellated groups* have the ability to cooperate to satisfy the moral demands imposed upon them by another agent. The members of interpellated groups can understand how their joint effort can prevent some harm, they can understand how other agents depend on

3. Cf. Stephanie Collins, *Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Peter A. French, "The Corporation as a Moral Person," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (1979): 207–15; Christian List and Philip Pettit, *Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Carol Rovane, "What is an Agent?," *Synthese* 140, no. 1/2 (2004): 181–98.

4. P.F. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008).

them, and they can track and respond to each other's behavior in pursuit of (what they take to be) a joint goal. Interpellated groups typically lack the capacity for communication and group-level decision-making and, beyond their joint capacity for empathy, the members of interpellated groups typically do not share cares and commitments.

Examples of interpellated groups are random groups of strangers called to stop a violent assault on a train⁵ or people getting together to save a child from being carried away in a runaway hot air balloon.⁶

- (3) *Group psychopaths* have the capacity to deliberate, judge and make decisions. They might have the capacity for communication but necessarily lack normative competence, i.e., the ability to recognize and respond to moral reasons. This includes both abstract moral reasons such as those provided by the categorical imperative and concrete moral reasons such as those available to empathic agents aware that other agents depend on them for their well-being.

Classical examples of group psychopaths are corporations such as Monsanto, Amazon, or the fictional Soy lent Corporation, or military units like the SS or the Wagner Group.

Expressive, interpellated, and psychopathic groups populate the social world. But they leave us uneasy. On the one hand, they are not proper moral agents. And so, we seem to have no more reason to praise or blame them than we have to praise or blame a dog, a laptop, or a baby. But, on the other hand, aberrant groups intuitively do prompt reactive attitudes. I *disdain* the (expressive) group of Neo-Nazi protesters marching down the street, *feel gratitude* toward the (interpellated) group of strangers who saves a child, and *disapprove* of the (psychopathic) hedge fund that invests in weapons and child labor.

The solution to the problem of aberrant groups is not to plead with and try to modify our group-reactive attitudes. Strawson famously argued that our person-reactive attitudes are “naturally secured against arguments suggesting they are in principle unwarranted or unjustified.”⁷ This is likely

5. Virginia Held, “Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible?,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 67, no. 14 (1970): 471–81.

6. Christopher Kutz, “The Collective Work of Citizenship,” *Legal Theory* 8, no. 4 (2002): 471–94.

7. P. F. Strawson, *Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties* (London; New York: Routledge, 2008), 41.

also true of our group-reactive attitudes. The attempt to reduce our group-reactive attitudes to aggregate person-reactive attitudes is similarly unsuccessful (or so I will argue). Instead, I propose that aberrant groups leave us uneasy because they are morally responsible in some ways (and thus appropriate targets of some reactive attitudes) but not in others.

III. ATTRIBUTABILITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND ANSWERABILITY

It only makes sense to hold an entity responsible for meeting or failing to meet a normative standard if that entity is capable of meeting that standard. A beetle cannot *fail* to add two and two together because the beetle lacks the capacity for mathematical reasoning. Monists about moral responsibility claim that there is only one type of moral standard and only one set of capacities that makes entities susceptible to it. Pluralists claim that there are several moral standards and that entities must possess different capacities to be susceptible to these.

Recent work focuses on three such moral standards. The first concerns who an entity is; the second concerns how an entity regards or concerns itself with others; and the third concerns how that entity judges or responds to reasons. Shoemaker's tripartite theory thus claims that when we morally assess someone, we assess either their *character*, their *regard* for other entities, or their *judgment*.⁸

These domains are distinct and irreducible. One neither implies nor presupposes the other. Accordingly, there are not just one but three types of moral responsibility. Focusing on our reactive attitudes (or, as he calls them, "responsibility responses"), Shoemaker distinguishes between *attributability* that assesses character by way of disdain and admiration, *accountability* that assesses regard by way of anger/resentment and gratitude, and *answerability* that assesses judgment by way of approval or disapproval.⁹

8. For a phenomenologically-informed pluralism with interesting and unexplored analogies to Shoemaker's tripartite theory, see Irene McMullin, *Existential Flourishing: A Phenomenology of the Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

9. Like Shoemaker, I will use these specific emotion terms to refer to the reactive attitudes that characterize the different types of moral responsibility. As I argue below, this terminology tracks a discernible phenomenological difference regarding the target of the reactive attitude. I am less certain that this difference is actually reflected in ordinary language, but this is not crucial for my argument. People should feel free to choose more appropriate emotion terms if they so please or to use the same term to refer to several phenomenologically distinct reactive attitudes although that would be confusing for present purposes.

An entity must have different capacities to be morally responsible in these ways. Attributability requires the capacity for being emotionally and evaluatively responsive to one's surroundings but also the capacity to be so in a way that is largely coherent over time. Accountability requires the capacity for empathy and the capacity for acting on what we believe is good for the other. Answerability requires the capacities for abstraction, deliberation, and communication.

IV. EMERGENT AGENTIAL CAPACITIES

If we want to attribute moral responsibility to a group rather than to the individuals that constitute it, the group must have some kind of agency above and beyond the agency of its members.¹⁰ At the same time, however, we do not want to claim that the group *exists* independently of its members, i.e., that there are some mysterious sui generis social substances. To navigate these treacherous waters, I propose that group agency should be seen as a set of emergent properties or, more precisely, emergent capacities. Roughly speaking, something is emergent when it has properties that the components that constitute it do not have on their own. Using this terminology, the monist would hold that one and only one set of emergent capacities warrants group-reactive attitudes. My pluralist claim, on the contrary, is that there is a plurality of such morally relevant emergent capacities and that aberrant groups can possess these. To understand why this is so, we must see, first, that groups can have emergent capacities even if they are not fully-formed and, in the next section, how emergent agential capacities can be targeted by reactive attitudes.

10. This amounts to what Phillip Pettit calls "anti-singularism." Phillip Pettit, "Three Issues in Social Ontology," in *Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate*, eds. Julie Zahle and Finn Collin (New York: Springer, 2014). Anti-singularists claim what singularists deny, namely, that groups can be centers of actions and attitudes over and above the individuals that compose them. It is widely agreed that non-reductive group responsibility presupposes anti-singularism. Cf. Andras Szigeti, "Collective Responsibility and Group-Control," in *Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate*, eds. Julie Zahle and Finn Collin (New York: Springer, 2014).

The first step of my argument is to see groups as complex dynamical systems.¹¹ Complex dynamical systems have properties that cannot be fully explained by an understanding of their components.¹² Instead, they have three important features that help us understand how they can have agency above and beyond that of their members.¹³ First, they consist of several interacting components. In the case of social groups, these components are agents. Second, these systems have emergent properties in the sense that the collective behavior of the components forms a pattern that could not be predicted from the behavior of the components taken individually. Third, the group is self-organized in the sense that the emergent behavioral pattern is not under the control of a single component agent but is the result of several interlinked component processes.

The idea that groups are complex dynamical systems sheds new light on how groups can have emergent agential capacities. Where monistic conceptions of group responsibility operate with a strict dichotomy between fully-formed individual agency and fully-formed group agency, the pluralist approach suggests the following: Several agents can mutually interact, regulate and constrain each other with the result that they exercise their capacities in a way that is counterfactually different from how these agents would have exercised their capacities if they were not arranged in that particular composition. This constitutes an emergent agential capacity in the sense that the capacity cannot be predicted from the behavior of the members separately and must therefore be attributed to the group as a whole. Importantly, an emergent agential capacity can be self-organized in the

11. Rick Dale, Riccardo Fusaroli, Nicholas D. Duran, and Daniel C. Richardson, "The Self-Organization of Human Interaction," in *The Psychology of Learning and Motivation*, ed. Brian H. Ross (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013), 43–95; Gerhard Thonhauser and Martin Weichold, "Approaching Collectivity Collectively: A Multi-Disciplinary Account of Collective Action," *Frontiers in Psychology* 12 (2021): 740664; Robin R. Vallacher and Stephen J. Read, "The Dynamical Perspective in Personality and Social Psychology," *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 6 (2002): 264–73; Martin Weichold and Gerhard Thonhauser, "Collective Affordances," *Ecological Psychology* 32, no. 1 (2020): 1–24.

12. Richard Gallagher and Tim Appenzeller, "Beyond Reductionism," *Science* 284, no. 5411 (1999): 79.

13. Michael J. Richardson and Anthony Chemero, "Complex Dynamical Systems and Embodiment," in *The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition*, ed. Lawrence Shapiro (Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2014), 39–50.

sense that mutual interaction, regulation, and constraint do not require top-down control.¹⁴

Building upon this conception of emergent agential capacities, it is helpful to distinguish between what I suggest we call soft and firm emergence.¹⁵ An agential capacity is *softly* emergent if and only if the higher-order agential capacity, A, is realized through functionally similar lower-order agential capacities, $a_1 . . . a_n$. Here, A exists only by virtue of how it regulates or constrains $a_1 . . . a_n$. An agential capacity is *firmly* emergent if and only if the higher-order agential capacity, A, is realized through functionally different lower-order agential capacities, $b_1 . . . b_n$. In a composition with a firmly emergent capacity A and the functionally similar lower-level agential capacities $a_1 . . . a_n$, A can be exercised independently of $a_1 . . . a_n$.

To see the difference between soft and firm emergent capacities, consider the different ways in which groups are said to share emotions. If the emotion of the group is the sum of how the individual group members happen to feel and their feelings are not altered by their group membership, there is *no* emergent group emotion but merely an aggregate emotion. If the emotion of the group is softly emergent, it is realized through the lower-level emotions of the individuals. This happens, for instance, when each of us feels in a specific way because we are affecting and affected by how the rest of us feel. In this case, our feelings are mutually constrained by a feedback loop so that we, as a composition, feel differently than we would outside of the composition even if *our* emotion is realized by or located in *my* and *your* emotions.¹⁶ Finally, if the emotion

14. The monistic claim that there is one and only one form of group agency is plausibly supported by the implicit assumption that some kind of top-down control (e.g., a unifying and operationally distinct decision-making procedure) is necessary for actions and attitudes to be truly emergent. Seen in this light, the difference between monists and pluralists appears also to be a difference between two types of anti-singularism. The pluralist claims that anti-singularism can be the result of self-organization.

15. This should not be confused with the well-known distinction between weak and strong emergence, e.g. David J. Chalmers, "Strong and Weak Emergence," in *The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion*, eds. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). Weak emergence is typically seen as the epistemological claim that truths concerning a composition are unexpected given what is known about the lower-level components. Strong emergence is typically seen as an ontological claim holding that higher-level truths can *in principle* not be predicted from lower-level truths.

16. See Gerhard Thornhauser, "Towards a Taxonomy of Collective Emotions," *Emotion Review* 14, no. 1 (2022): 31–42.

of the group is firmly emergent, it is realized by different means than our lower-level capacities for having feelings. Along these lines, Margaret Gilbert has argued that a group has an emotion if the members of that group are *jointly committed* to having that emotion as a single body.¹⁷ According to Gilbert, this entails that the members normatively require each other to have the thoughts and perform the actions typically associated with that emotion (e.g., a feeling of guilt) but not necessarily to actually feel that emotion. In this case, the group emotion is realized through a (cognitive and conative) “feeling rule” rather than the exercise of the lower-level capacity for emotions themselves.¹⁸

This account of emergent capacities allows that some lower-level agential capacities are overdetermined in their exercise, e.g., that a group member feels X whether he was in the group or not. The distinguishing feature is at the level of the composition that must have a different counterfactual pattern compared to the same lower-level agential capacities arranged differently.

V. EMERGENT AGENTIAL CAPACITIES AND REACTIVE ATTITUDES

I propose that the distinguishing feature of group-reactive attitudes is that they, in contrast to person-reactive attitudes, target the exercise of morally relevant *emergent* capacities. Let me unfold this idea in a bit more detail by distinguishing between three different ways in which we hold groups responsible.

First, sometimes our reactive attitudes simply target an aggregation of people based on how each of them exercises their individual agential capacities. Such “groups” cannot be appropriate targets of reactive attitudes because there is no emergent agential capacity that would make it possible for them to meet a normative standard. Any blame must hence be fully distributed among the individuals. Let us call this *shared responsibility*.

Second, current literature focuses on a much stronger form of group responsibility, namely, *collective responsibility*. Collective responsibility suggests that a group is praise- or blameworthy independently of its members. In the words of Tracy Isaacs, “claims about the responsibility of

17. Margaret Gilbert, “Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings,” *The Journal of Ethics* 6, no. 2 (2002): 115–43.

18. Mikko Salmela, “Shared Emotions,” *Philosophical Explorations* 15, no. 1 (2012): 36.

collectives do not entail (or erase) claims about the responsibility of individual members.”¹⁹ On a reactive attitudes approach, this requires that we target the emergent capacity but not necessarily the lower-level capacities as this would imply, say, that the members share some of the blame. This seems implausible if the emergent capacity is self-organized for, as argued above, a self-organized emergent capacity consists of nothing but the mutually constrained but irreducible interaction and regulation of component capacities. Instead, it seems that when we hold a group *collectively* responsible the target of our reactive attitude is mainly the component exercising top-down control over the composition.

Third, reactive attitudes can also target self-organized emergent capacities. In contrast to the aggregate capacities targeted in shared responsibility, the exercise of self-organized emergent capacities requires that the lower-level capacities interact, and mutually constrain and regulate each other. In contrast to the emergent capacities targeted in collective responsibility, the exercise of self-organized emergent capacities precludes top-down control. This means that if a reactive attitude targets a self-organized emergent capacity for a wrongful exercise, then that reactive attitude targets *both* the higher-order capacity *and* the lower-order capacities because these are mereologically connected. Let us call this *joint responsibility*.

Assuming that our reactive attitudes like other emotions have transparent intentionality,²⁰ they are partly individuated by their targets in a way that is phenomenologically clear to us. This means that we, by carefully attending to the experiential structure of our moral emotions, can distinguish between shared responsibility, collective responsibility, and joint responsibility. There is, hence, a phenomenological difference between blaming a collection of people separately (shared responsibility), blaming a group *as a whole* and the group members *as parts of that whole* (joint responsibility),²¹ and blaming a group without necessarily blaming its

19. Tracy Isaacs, *Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 19.

20. See Sabine A Döring, “Seeing What to Do: Affective Perception and Rational Motivation,” *Dialectica* 61, no. 3 (2007): 363–94; Peter Goldie, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Matthew Ratcliffe, “The Feeling of Being,” *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 12, no. 8 (2005): 43–60; and Jan Slaby, “Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body,” *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7, no. 4 (2008): 429–44.

21. One might worry that this is unfair to all or some group members. I discuss this in Section IX.

members (collective responsibility). This is true, I think, for both self-directed and other-directed reactive attitudes. For instance, I can blame myself *tout court*, as a group member, or I can blame a group to which I belong without blaming myself. For the remainder of this paper, I will focus on other-directed group-reactive attitudes. And for the sake of the argument, I will grant the monist that fully-formed groups are fit to be held collectively responsible. My focus is hence on how we hold aberrant groups that we do not belong to jointly responsible.²²

Having thus clarified the nature of emergent agential capacities and their relation to the reactive attitudes, we can finally turn to the problem of aberrant groups. We start with expressive groups.

VI. EXPRESSIVE GROUPS

Expressive groups are capable of having and expressing a largely coherent set of cares or commitments. In *pure* expressive groups, this capacity is the only morally relevant emergent capacity. Pure expressive groups can neither empathize with others nor make decisions although the individuals who constitute those groups often can. In pure expressive groups, the capacity for having and expressing a largely coherent set of cares or commitments is likely to be softly emergent.

Formulated differently, expressive groups are unified by how the emotions and evaluations of the members interact with, regulate, and constrain each other. There are various accounts of which psychological mechanism best explains this kind of emergence. Let us consider two very influential ones. Gustave Le Bon's crowd psychology claims that a group of people can coalesce into a crowd that is governed by a collective unconsciousness through the combined mechanisms of (i) anonymity (where individuals lose their sense of personal responsibility), (ii) contagion (where behavior and emotions spread among the group members), and (iii) suggestibility (where certain voices and impulses are made salient and come to guide the behavior of the crowd).²³ Le Bon's

22. As noted, when we hold groups jointly responsible, we blame them as wholes and their members as parts of that whole. This intentional structure characterizes a distinct set of our reactive attitudes. Whether the group members themselves must be phenomenologically aware that they exercise their lower-level capacities *as group members* in order to be fit for being held jointly responsible is a different question that I cannot settle here.

23. Gustave Le Bon, *Psychology of Crowds* (Southampton: Sparkling Books, 2009).

crowd psychology is contested for being elitist (among other things), but the central idea that a group dynamic alters how individuals feel, think, and act is common to all crowd or mass psychology.²⁴ A similar idea is found in Émile Durkheim's sociology. Durkheim coined the term *collective effervescence* to refer to the emotional regulation that unites a group or a society and makes its members share the same thoughts and participate in the same actions:

In the midst of an assembly animated by a common passion, we become susceptible of acts and sentiments of which we are incapable when reduced to our own forces; and when the assembly is dissolved and when, finding ourselves alone again, we fall back to our ordinary level, we are then able to measure the height to which we have been raised above ourselves.²⁵

It does not matter to my argument which exact mechanism causes this emotional and evaluative regulation. What matters is that some groups are unified by an emergent capacity for having and expressing a largely coherent set of cares or commitments, that this results in a counterfactually different pattern of emotions and evaluations than a mere aggregation of the same capacities would, and that this does not require other morally relevant emergent capacities.

I intend the phrase “cares and commitments” to encompass the entirety of an entity's evaluative outlook. The phrase reflects that there are two distinct ways of being an evaluator. First, you can evaluate in the sense that some of your desires are reflectively or rationally endorsed or rejected. These are what I call commitments. For example, my commitment to utilitarianism causes me to give money to charity, although I would much rather spend that money on ice cream. Second, however, you can also be an evaluator in the sense that you are emotionally disposed to do certain things, whether or not these desires are reflectively or

24. For critiques of Le Bon, see Christian Borch, *The Politics of Crowds: An Alternative History of Sociology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Clark McPhail, *The Myth of the Maddening Crowd* (New York: A. de Gruyter, 1991); and Gerhard Thonhauser, “A Critique of the Crowd Psychological Heritage in Early Sociology, Classic Phenomenology and Recent Social Psychology,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 55, no. 3 (2022): 371–89.

25. Émile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, trans. Joseph Ward Swain (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), 209.

rationally endorsed. These are what I call cares. For example, a teenager raised in a conservative religious community may have strong homosexual desires. Here we are inclined to say that the desire is more expressive of who that teenager truly is than his conscious judgment that homosexuality is wrong. Like Shoemaker, I believe that both cares and commitments are formative of an agent's character and, hence, something that can be appropriately subjected to moral assessment.²⁶

Joint commitments require both the emergent capacity for emotions and evaluations and the emergent capacity for judgment. Joint cares, on the other hand, require only the emergent capacity for emotions and evaluations. As David Silver has argued, we sometimes morally assess the cares or commitments of groups in the same way that we morally assess the character of an individual.²⁷ We admire or disdain an organization's *culture*, a crowd's *atmosphere*, or a community's *ethos*. For ease of reference, I will use the term *culture* to refer to a group's evaluative outlook.

We are naturally sensitive to the culture of both our own groups and the groups that we observe and interact with. Accordingly, our emotional responses sometimes attribute specific cares or commitments not just to individuals but to groups as a whole. Depending on how well the evaluative outlook attributed to the group resonates with our own, we then respond to the group's culture with admiration, on the one hand, or disdain, on the other hand. These reactive attitudes are our ways of holding expressive groups responsible for the attitudes or actions attributable to them. On my account,

A group is attributability-responsible for a set of attitudes or actions if and only if those attitudes or actions express the group's culture, that is, if those attitudes or actions depend on and are harmonious with the group's emergent cares or commitments.

Importantly, the attitudes of a set of group members might be attributable to the group even if these attitudes are superficially different from each other. Imagine, for instance, a political rally in which A appears fearful, B appears vengeful, and C appears agitated. At the surface level, these attitudes are different, and yet they can still depend on and be

26. Shoemaker, *Responsibility*, 47–56.

27. Silver, "A Strawsonian Defense."

harmonious with, say, the group's hatred of what they take to be a powerful ethnic minority. To borrow a term from Bennett Helm, what matters is that the group is "a subject of import," that is, that the group is jointly invested in some object or project in such a way that the group members realize a largely coherent emotional pattern.²⁸ As long as the different attitudes of A, B, and C are appropriate in light of the import of the group, the group is fit to be held attributability-responsible for these attitudes.

You might object to the idea that expressive groups warrant group-reactive attitudes if you take the reactive attitudes to be "forms of communication."²⁹ Against this common assumption, it should be noted that not all reactive attitudes, at least as conceived by Strawson, have an obvious communicative intent. David Beglin rightly points out that neither forgiveness, hurt feelings, guilt, nor the feeling of obligation fit this interpretation.³⁰ So, although some reactive attitudes presuppose the capacity for moral address, this is not the case for all. As a pluralist, I happily accept that different reactive attitudes presuppose different agential capacities. Rather than being communicative, attributability responses admire or disdain their target at a distance, so to speak.

Some think that blame is only appropriate when the action or attitude that one is blamed for is in principle sensitive to judgment or responsive to reasons.³¹ This implies, T. M. Scanlon notes, that "a collective agent can (. . .) be a possible object of blame, only if there are procedures through which it can make institutional decisions."³² I am skeptical that there is a necessary connection between responsibility and blameworthiness, on the one hand, and responsiveness to reasons, on the other hand. This thesis can be interpreted as a local claim regarding a particular action

28. Bennett Helm, "Plural Agents," *Noûs* 42 no. 1 (2008): 17–49.

29. Gary Watson, "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme," in *Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays*, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 230; cf. Stephen Darwall, *The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 75; Jay R. Wallace, *Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 164.

30. David Beglin, "Two Strawsonian Strategies for Accounting for Morally Responsible Agency," *Philosophical Studies* 177, no. 8 (2020): 2347.

31. T. M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Angela M. Smith, "Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment," *Philosophical Studies* 138, no. 3 (2008): 367–92.

32. T. M. Scanlon, *Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2008), 165.

or attitude or a global claim regarding the general capacities of the blamed agent. Both are problematic.

Scanlon, Angela Smith, and others defend the local claim that a specific action or attitude is only attributable and hence an appropriate target of blame if that action or attitude is responsive to reasons. Yet, on my view, some attitudes are so central to who someone is that they inform our moral assessments of that person even if they are beyond their reflective reach. Suppose Mike was abandoned by his parents as a child, and due to this childhood trauma, he is prone to violent fits of jealousy where he mercilessly beats his partner. Mike knows that it is morally wrong for him to beat his partner, and he has gone through years of cognitive therapy to change his ways but to no avail. The merciless beatings are, despite his best effort, beyond his rational control. How do we react to someone like Mike? Of course, the fact that he regrets his actions and has tried his very best to become a better person will lessen our reactions to him, but I nonetheless think that people are prone—and rightly so—to hold his violent disposition against him and to blame (or, to be precise, disdain) him for acting on it. If this is indeed appropriate, attitudes and actions need not be judgment-sensitive or reason-responsive to be attributable to an agent and, hence, appropriate targets of moral assessment.³³

But what about entities that are *globally* incapable of judging and responding to reasons? Are they wholly excluded from the moral community? Scanlon argues that when there is no procedure for institutional decisions (i.e., the group-level equivalent of the capacity for judgment or reason responsiveness), “there is no basis for attributing attitudes to such groups in anything other than the distributive sense, in which saying that the group holds certain attitudes is simply to say that most of its members do.”³⁴ This, he concludes, “is just stereotyping.”³⁵ But here Scanlon presupposes that some form of top-down control is necessary for capacities to be emergent. Yet, as I have shown above, emergent capacities can also be self-organized, and this gives us, pace Scanlon, a basis for attributing attitudes to groups even if they lack a centralized decision-making procedure. In short, to hold a group attributability-responsible is not, as Scanlon

33. See Shoemaker, *Responsibility*, 55 for an argument to the same effect.

34. Scanlon, *Moral Dimensions*, 165.

35. *Ibid.*

thinks, to assess it in terms of its responsiveness to reasons but in terms of its culture.

VII. INTERPELLATED GROUPS

Interpellated groups have capacities for cooperating in order to satisfy the moral demands imposed upon them by other agents in need. In the literature, the main example of an interpellated group is provided by Virginia Held: five unacquainted people witness a violent assault in a subway car, and it is obvious to each of the five people that they could stop the assault with no serious injury to themselves if two or more of them were to cooperate.³⁶ Held argues, controversially, that the five strangers have a group responsibility to stop the assault although they lack the capacity to make group-level decisions and judgments.³⁷

I believe that cases such as these are controversial exactly because groups such as the one described by Held do not warrant the full repertoire of our reactive attitudes. They are impaired or incapacitated in important ways. Yet, interpellated groups are not *fully* impaired or incapacitated. On my account, the group is (jointly) responsible for stopping the assault insofar as the group has the emergent capacity to pursue a joint goal and the emergent capacity to empathize with another agent. The reasoning is that if a group has an emergent capacity to act and an emergent capacity to understand that the flourishing of some other agent depends on the group to perform some action then the group is in principle capable of showing what Shoemaker calls *regard* for other agents. The group is accordingly an appropriate target of gratitude and resentment. This amounts to joint accountability-responsibility:

A group is accountability-responsible for a set of attitudes or actions to the extent that those attitudes or actions display the quality of regard of that group for another agent, that is, to the extent that those attitudes or actions display the group's emergent concern for another agent with whom the group has the capacity to empathize.

36. Held, "Random Collection."

37. For different arguments in support of this conclusion, see Sean Aas, "Distributing Collective Obligation," *Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy* 9, no. 3 (2017): 1-23; and Hans Bernhard Schmid, "Collective Responsibilities of Random Collections: Plural Self-Awareness among Strangers," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 49, no. 1 (2018): 91-105.

Let us consider in more detail how a group can have the emergent capacities for acting jointly and for empathizing.

First, as noted above, the vast literature on collective intentionality suggests that groups can have emergent attitudes without being fully-formed. An important subset of this body of literature focuses on joint or shared action. An influential strand of this literature, pioneered by Michael Bratman, claims to be “reductive in spirit.”³⁸ One might expect a reductive account to explain the kind of small-scale, short-lived, and egalitarian cooperation central to examples such as Held’s in terms of aggregate capacities. But a closer look shows that even reductive accounts are only plausible if they presuppose the existence of emergent capacities.

Bratman’s central claim is that we intend *J* only if (a) I intend that we *J* and (b) you intend that we *J*.³⁹ Björn Petersson (2007) has among others charged Bratman’s account for being circular since “we *J*” appears in both the analysandum and the analysans.⁴⁰ Bratman, however, claims that there is no circularity in his account since there is a decisive but subtle difference between the two. “We intend *J*”—the analysandum—refers to what it is for us *to plan to J*. The analysans then explains that this requires that each of us have an *unplanned* or *pre-reflective* understanding of what we are capable of doing together.⁴¹ Bratman’s account is reductive in the sense that the emergent capacity of the analysandum (“We intend *J*”) is explained in terms of the lower-level capacities (“I intend that we *J*” and “you intend that we *J*”). This, however, does not reduce shared action to the aggregated result of how individual and independent capacities are exercised. Rather, even Bratman’s reductive account holds that the lower-level capacities must be interconnected. The group members can only *plan to J* because each of them is already (unplanned or pre-reflectively) guided by what they can do together. In other words, the group members already disclose their environment in terms of potential joint actions rather than exclusively in terms of potential individual actions. The “We intend *J*” of the analysandum is therefore a softly emergent capacity that

38. Michael E. Bratman, *Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 108.

39. *Ibid.*, 131.

40. Björn Petersson, “Collectivity and Circularity,” *The Journal of Philosophy* 104, no. 3 (2007): 138–56.

41. Cf. Michael Bratman, *Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 15.

depends on and is realized through the interconnected lower-level capacities of the analysans. In the case of the interpellated group, this means that each agent's capacity for acting ("I intend that. . .") is guided or shaped by the group's higher-level cooperative capacity (" . . .we J").⁴²

Let us now turn to the capacity for empathizing with another agent. What, if anything, enables an aberrant group to understand how another agent depends on the group to perform some group action? Of course, it would be absurd to claim that the group has a phenomenal mind of its own. Rather, the interpellated group can have an emergent capacity for empathizing in the sense that there is an intersubjective regulation of how the group members exercise their lower-level empathic capacities. This might sound fanciful to the reductionist so before detailing how this is conceptually possible let me refer to some empirical research that (indirectly) points to the intersubjective regulation of empathy. In social psychology, "the intergroup empathy gap" refers to the fact that group membership—even in randomly assigned groups—modulates the level of empathy experienced by an observer toward another agent's pain.⁴³ These studies show a clear group bias in how we perceive the pain of in-group members as compared to the pain of out-group members. Unfortunately, there is, to the best of my knowledge, no studies examining how group membership affects empathy in moral situations and dilemmas. Research on the bystander effect does, however, shed some light on the relation between group empathy and readiness to help others in need. The influential study by Bibb Latané and Judith Rodin thus shows that people who witness an emergency often look to each other for guidance, and when they see that the other group members are also looking around rather than acting, they take the non-responsiveness of the others to indicate that

42. For an anticipation of this line of argument, see Edith Stein, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities: The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, trans. Mary Catharine Baseheart and Marianne Sawicki (ICS Publications, [1922] 2000), 258. For further discussion of Bratman's account, see Nicolai K. Knudsen, "Shared Action: An Existential Phenomenological Account," *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* (2021); Nicolai K. Knudsen, *Heidegger's Social Ontology: The Phenomenology of World, Self, and Other* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), chap. 5.

43. Benoit Montalan, Thierry Lelard, Olivier Godefroy, and Harold Mouras, "Behavioral Investigation of the Influence of Social Categorization on Empathy for Pain: A Minimal Group Paradigm Study," *Frontiers in Psychology* 3 (2012); Luis Sebastian Contreras-Huerta, Katharine S. Baker, Katherine J. Reynolds, Luisa Batalha, and Ross Cunnington, "Racial Bias in Neural Empathic Responses to Pain," *PLoS one* 8, no. 12 (2013): e84001.

the situation is in fact not an emergency and that no action is called for.⁴⁴ Although open to interpretation, this might suggest that our capacity for empathy (the extent to which we believe that a moral patient depends on us) is intersubjectively regulated.

These examples likely involve empathy as a softly emergent capacity since (i) the group empathy is realized through the lower-level empathic capacities rather than some different mechanism and (ii) the empirical research suggests that these lower-level capacities are exercised in a discernably different way as compared to aggregated capacities. It is reasonable to expect that members of interpellated groups are aware that they empathize jointly. This is not the place to go into the phenomenology of collective empathy (as group-to-individual or group-to-group empathy is sometimes called),⁴⁵ but I suggest that the members are aware that they empathize together if they are aware that they have the same intentional target, that their actions and attitudes cohere in the sense that they are all appropriate responses to the situation of the intentional target, and, importantly, for each this coherence constrains what counts as an appropriate response to the given situation.

In sum, interpellated groups have emergent capacities for pursuing a joint goal and for empathizing with other agents. This requires neither that they have a mind of their own nor that they have all of the capacities possessed by fully-formed moral agents but only that there is an intersubjective regulation or interconnectedness in how the group members exercise their lower-level capacities. By virtue of their emergent capacities, interpellated groups can meet or fail to meet the moral standard of showing regard for other agents. They are therefore fit to be held accountable.

VIII. GROUP PSYCHOPATHS

Group psychopaths have an emergent capacity to deliberate, judge and make decisions but they are insensitive to moral reasons. They lack empathy in a way that makes them blind to other-regarding considerations, and

44. Bibb Latané and Judith Rodin, "A Lady in Distress: Inhibiting Effects of Friends and Strangers on Bystander Intervention," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 5, no. 2 (1969): 189–202.

45. Cf. Thomas Szanto, "Collective Emotions, Normativity, and Empathy: A Steinian Account," *Human Studies* 38, no. 4 (2015): 503–27.

they do not acknowledge abstract moral principles unless these coincidentally accord with the group's immoral goals.⁴⁶

We can easily imagine a group whose procedural capacity for judgment is incapable of recognizing and responding to moral reasons, e.g., a paramilitary unit whose sole goal is to eliminate the enemy. The group can be normatively incompetent in its decision-making procedures even if the individual soldiers are perfectly capable of recognizing and responding to moral considerations.⁴⁷

But we can also imagine a more informal kind of emergent, normatively incompetent capacity for judgment for example when a group's internal makeup makes its members unlikely to raise moral worries and considerations even if the group's procedure is not in principle blind to them. This emergent, normatively incompetent capacity for judgment arises out of how the component agents interact, and mutually constrain and regulate each other's behavior. Following Larry May, we can imagine a corporation where the employees have internalized "the value of maximizing profit" in such a way that their moral values are completely drowned out within the restricted realm of the workplace.⁴⁸ Hannah Arendt's description of Adolph Eichmann, the Nazi functionary tasked with managing the logistics involved in deporting millions of Jews to the extermination camps, offers another illuminative but extreme example of an emergent, normatively incompetent capacity for judging. On Arendt's reading, Eichmann has no "diabolical or demonic profundity."⁴⁹ Instead, he "acted in accordance with the rule, examined the order issued to him for its 'manifest' legality,

46. And then they can hardly be said to acknowledge these principles as *moral* principles. A group psychopath can have a strong (non-moral) incentive to act in accordance with a moral principle, but they are constitutively incapable of acting *in light of* a moral principle. We can even imagine group psychopaths presenting themselves *as if* they act in light of moral principles, e.g., by declaring a commitment to some core values or to the idea of corporate social responsibility, but where this is merely part of a non-moral branding strategy. Group psychopaths can thus cite what seem to be moral reasons without acknowledging the normative force that makes them moral.

47. When a capacity for judgment emerges out of a well-established and formalized procedure, the emergent capacity is not self-organized but the result of top-down control. In such cases, my conjecture is that we hold the group collectively responsible by targeting the controlling component rather than the composition as a whole. This, however, does not exclude that we *also* hold group members responsible in some other way (e.g., personally or jointly).

48. Larry May, *Sharing Responsibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 77f.

49. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin Classics, 1994), 288.

namely regularity; he did not have to fall back upon his ‘conscience’, since he was not one of those unfamiliar with the laws of his country.’⁵⁰ The banality of Eichmann’s evil thus consists in the fact that he, as a group member, exercised his lower-level capacity for judgment in a way that was guided or regulated by the emergent, normatively incompetent capacity for judgment in a way that completely drowned out his own conscience.⁵¹

What’s the moral status of group psychopaths? Some monists claim that their capacity for judgment makes them morally responsible. Philip Pettit, for example, argues that entities are fit to be held responsible if and only if they are “conversable,” that is, if and only if they can give and ask for reasons that support some action or attitude.⁵² Attributionists agree that normative competence is not necessary for moral responsibility and that the capacity for judgment alone suffices.⁵³ Others deny that group psychopaths are morally responsible, claiming that normative competence is necessary for moral responsibility.⁵⁴ As Stephanie Collins writes,

[I]f a collective is *constitutionally incapable* (. . .) of taking morally good reasons as inputs and processing them, then the collective cannot be held morally responsible: it can neither bear obligations nor be blameworthy. This is the same for individuals: children, for example, cannot process moral reasons, and so lack obligations and blameworthiness.⁵⁵

50. *Ibid.*, 293.

51. To be sure, this does not rule out that Eichmann, in addition to being blameworthy as a group member, was also *personally* to blame for some wrongdoing. I am merely suggesting that Arendt’s thesis concerning the banality of evil can be interpreted as a thesis concerning group psychopaths and their members.

52. Philip Pettit, “The Conversable, Responsible Corporation,” in *The Moral Responsibility of Firms*, eds. Eric W. Orts and N. Craig Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

53. Scanlon, *What We Owe*; Scanlon, *Moral Dimensions*; Angela Smith, “Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability: In Defense of a Unified Account,” *Ethics* 122, no. 3 (2012): 575–89; Matthew Talbert, “Blame and Responsiveness to Moral Reasons: Are Psychopaths Blameworthy?,” *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 89, no. 4 (2008): 516–35. For an attributionist approach to group responsibility see Adam Piovarchy, “An Attributionist Approach to Group Agent Responsibility,” *The Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* (forthcoming).

54. Stephanie Collins, “Collectives’ Duties and Collectivization Duties,” *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 91, no. 2 (2013): 231–48; Collins, *Group Duties*; Hindriks, “Collective Agency.”

55. Collins, “Collectives’ Duties,” 335.

This debate attests to the moral uneasiness with which we face group psychopaths. The solution, I suggest, is to reject the monism underlying the debate. On the pluralist view, group psychopaths are incapable of showing regard for others because of their normative incompetence.⁵⁶ This makes them inappropriate targets of accountability responses. And, yet, it is appropriate to assess the group psychopath and its members in terms of its quality of *judgment* as its emergent capacity for judgment and its responsiveness to reasons are unimpaired. Group psychopaths are, in other words, fit to be held *answerable*. They thereby warrant the reactive attitudes that target an entity's (capacity for making) judgments, namely, approval and disapproval. On my account,

A group is answerability-responsible for a set of attitudes or actions if and only if those attitudes or actions are the results of an emergent capacity for judgment, that is, if and only if the group (by way of relevant group members) could in principle cite the reasons that justified the group in having those attitudes or performing those actions.

One might grant that answerability is distinct from and does not presuppose accountability but fail to see how answerability is distinct from attributability. This is understandable since many group psychopaths (e.g., greedy corporations and ruthless military units) could (and should) also be assessed in terms of their cares and commitments. We could thus explain a corporation's wrongful decision as a result of its toxic culture. This suggests that the group only has a quality of judgment because the group is already united by way of a joint evaluative outlook.

Although different types of moral responsibility often come together, it is a mistake to think that answerability necessarily presupposes attributability. They come apart most clearly, as Shoemaker has shown, when someone acts out of character, that is, when they make and act on a judgment that does not express their evaluative outlook.⁵⁷ Imagine, for

56. As Arendt notes, Eichmann was unable to speak in anything but clichés, and this inability to speak was closely related to his inability “to think from the standpoint of someone else.” Arendt, *Eichmann*, 49. As a member of an emergent large-scale group psychopath, Eichmann was unable to process moral reasons, but *pace* Collins, this hardly exempts him from blame. Unlike the child, we see his behavior not just as a chain of reactions but as actions that he can be expected to justify.

57. Shoemaker, *Responsibility*, 83.

instance, a charity that is generally committed and disposed to help people in need. But suppose that in an instance of poor judgment, the executive body of the charity decides to give all of the leading staff excessive severance packages. In this case, any appropriate moral assessment must take into account the fact that the morally objectionable decision or judgment does not express the quality of the culture or regard of the charity. This requires us to distinguish between attributability and answerability. This sounds complex, but we do this whenever we blame groups for betraying their own values.

IX. BLAME AND THE OBJECTIVE ATTITUDE TWO OBJECTIONS

Before concluding, I will consider two objections. First, Strawson contrasts the participant reactive attitudes with “the objective attitude” in which we see someone “as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something (. . .) to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided.”⁵⁸ Although he never attempts to define the objective attitude, the suggestion is clearly that we relate differently to those entities that we deem to be wholly incapable of participating in the “inter-personal human relationships” that constitute ethical life.⁵⁹ Are aberrant groups so unlike normal agents that we only ever treat them as objects of social policy, as things to be treated or trained?

In the end, a response to this objection must appeal to our moral phenomenology. Nonetheless, it is helpful to get a little clearer on the suggestive but sketchy distinction between reactive and objective attitudes. As noted above, an influential strand of the literature takes the reactive attitudes to be an incipient form of communication thereby also suggesting that entities must have communicative capacities in order to be appropriate targets of reactive attitudes. I find this too narrow. Instead, I propose that the reactive attitudes are affective responses to the perceived moral quality of how others exercise their agential capacities. By moral quality, I mean that when we adopt the participatory or reactive stance on some entity, we implicitly acknowledge that this entity has some say in how the relevant capacity ought to be exercised, that is, we implicitly acknowledge

58. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment*, 10.

59. *Ibid.*

that this entity can call our own way of exercising said capacity into question. Read this way negative reactive attitudes are our way of taking a stand on and protesting how the relevant capacities are exercised, and positive reactive attitudes express our agreement that the relevant capacities were indeed exercised in the right way. In the objective attitude, in contrast, we might recognize that a capacity was exercised in an undesirable way but we do not grant that exercise any normative force; we give it no say in how such capacities ought to be exercised. Understood this way, we do take aberrant groups to be participants in ethical life.

Second, you might object to the idea of joint responsibility that it is unreasonable to blame group members for group failings no matter how the relevant emergent capacities are realized.⁶⁰ Why should the blame “trickle down”? A fully developed answer requires an entire theory of blame, which I obviously cannot develop here, so an abbreviated account of member blame will have to do.

When we blame someone as a group member, there are contextual constraints on our moral assessment. We assess them only as components within a larger whole. For this reason, our moral assessment is similarly tied to a specific context. If I know there is a difference between A’s personal cares and commitments and the morally problematic cares and commitments temporarily felt by A as a member of an expressive group, it is appropriate for me to disdain A for his joint cares and commitments but only in the social or narrative context of that expressive group. Person-reactive attitudes, on the contrary, are usually not assumed to have contextual constraints.

Supposing that you grant that blame is sometimes context-dependent in this way, you might still have lingering concerns about the fairness of joint responsibility as it implies that it is appropriate for us to blame, say, a member of an interpellated group although they cried for help without success. Is it reasonable to blame this member considering that they seem to have exercised their individual capacities in the morally right way? The

60. One could frame this as a problem of moral luck as it violates the idea that entities are morally assessable only to the extent that what they are morally assessable for is under their control. It is worth discussing what exactly the control condition on moral responsibility implies for groups (and their members), although I cannot do so here. It seems to me, however, that this line of argument is less attractive than it first appears insofar as objections against group responsibility that are based on a rejection of moral luck endanger not only group responsibility but moral responsibility in general.

answer depends, once more, on our conception of blame. On my account, A blames B for X if and only if A believes that B's relation to X warrants some negative self- or other-directed reactive attitudes toward B. This account easily accommodates paradigm cases such as when A believes that B's relation to X warrants resentment and A resents B. But, importantly, I do not think that blame necessarily requires that A has negative other-directed reactive attitudes toward B. A also blames B for X if C resents B for X and A believes C's resentment is warranted. And A also blames B for X if B feels guilty for X and A believes that B's feeling guilty is warranted. This is important for sometimes appropriate negative self-directed reactive attitudes substitute negative other-directed reactive attitudes; sometimes it is inappropriate for me to resent you for something because you already feel terrible about it. This affects only the appropriate expression of blame, not your blameworthiness as such.

This helps explain some of the details of how we blame group members. Sticking with the example of a failed interpellated group, each of the members can reasonably be expected to be aware of what they collectively ought to have done. It is uncontroversial that we can blame uncooperative group members, but what about the group member, M, who tried to help? On my account, we expect M to see and measure himself in light of the failed group effort and, as a result, to direct negative reactive attitudes toward himself, e.g., to feel guilty, regretful, or ashamed about the group failure. This is reasonable as evidenced by the way that we would view M with suspicion and resentment if M was unaffected by the group's failure to help the agent in need and merely shrugged it off saying that he did everything he could. If we believe that M's relation to the failed group effort warrants such self-directed negative reactive attitudes, we blame M as a group member.

X. CONCLUSION

Aberrant groups leave us uneasy because they possess the emergent capacities for some but not all types of moral responsibility. This means that aberrant groups warrant non-standard sets of group-reactive attitudes. I have argued, first, that expressive groups have the capacity to possess and express largely coherent sets of cares or commitments and that this makes them appropriate targets of the reactive attitudes associated with attributability, namely, admiration and disdain. Second, interpellated

groups have coordinative and empathic capacities that make them appropriate targets of the reactive attitudes associated with accountability, namely, gratitude and resentment. Third, group psychopaths have the capacity for judgment that makes them appropriate targets of the reactive attitudes associated with answerability, namely, approval or disapproval.

When faced with the fact that aberrant groups prompt group-reactive attitudes, monistic accounts are forced to either ignore those reactive attitudes or distort them by reinterpreting them as aggregated person-reactive attitudes. They are thereby unable to account for important moral experiences and unable to ascribe moral responsibility for important and morally salient group-level phenomena. Surely, no individual agent is morally responsible for the atmosphere of hate generated by the Neo-Nazi rally, for the group dynamic that makes a group of strangers cooperate in order to save someone, or for the decisions made in a morally blind corporation. Group moral responsibility pluralism, on the contrary, can explain the reactive attitudes prompted by such aberrant groups.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no new data were created or analyzed in this study.