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What Is Worth Salvaging in Modernity

A Realist Perspective from Non-Philosophical Marxism to Žižek’s Universalism

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Refracting the Vectors of Modernity through the Lens of Non-Philosophy

I intend to propose a comparative reading of two perspectives on the notion of subjectivity and its centrality for the legacy of modernity that both purport the possibility to think of or in relation to the Real albeit by admitting its radical foreclosure, that of non-Marxism and Žižek’s universalism as conceived in his works of the early 2000s. Non-Marxism is, let us explain briefly, an approach to Marxism inspired by the method provided by François Laruelle called non-philosophy or nonstandard philosophy that seeks to radicalize what it identifies as both the scientific and realist core of Marx’s thought. It is realist, or rather “correlating with the real,”¹ without establishing “amphibology” between the Real and thought² by way of ridding Marxism of philosophy or rather the “principle of philosophical sufficiency.”³ In what follows I will provide an
explication of what the principle of philosophical sufficiency (PPS) refers to as conceptualized by François Laruelle, whereas, at the moment, suffice it to say that it is comparable to Marx’s extolling of the principle of praxis over that of philosophy as a critique of the philosophical “self-mirroring,” a thesis that pervades Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General (Marx, Manuscripts), German Ideology (1968), Theses on Feuerbach (1969). The self-mirroring thought (philosophy is) subsumes the Real itself reducing it to a postulate, to its transcendental aspect exclusively rather than reversing the hierarchy whereby thought submits to the Real albeit radically foreclosed for philosophy’s totalizing ambition. Instead of revisiting the dialectics between thought and the real, or reviving a Kantian dilemma, in his critique of Feuerbach’s materialism and the critique of Hegel’s philosophy under the aforementioned several titles, in particular in “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General,” Marx proposes that a shift toward “objectivism” would proffer a proper foundation for a truly scientific discussion of human reality. It is probably an undisputable fact that subjectivity-centered thinking and anthropocentric ontology, epistemology, and morality have determined the civilizational legacy of modernity: it begins with Kant’s practical philosophy and metaphysics of morals, if we must choose a single philosophical threshold in the Western history of ideas. Certainly, it coincides with the birth of republicanism as the model state promulgated by the French and the American Revolution and the completion of the enlightenment project.

Kant’s own vision could however only develop into a “liberal” or individual-centered foundation of a rationally organized society, and a society that presumes it is moved by invisible yet rational forces immanent to it. The individual is one’s own sovereign, metaphysical, political, and legal materialization of the cogito-modeled foundation of human subjectivity and its metaphysics (CU). The republican sovereign is the sum of such individuals called “the nation.” In contradistinction, the enlightenment project also led to a form of reason that has called itself “objective” and “scientific.” In fact, scientific breakthroughs stricto sensu that emerged as part of the enlightenment did bring forth a form of reason that sought to achieve “objectivity,” grounded in a materialist episteme and empirical study, whereas ridding thought of metaphysics has been its goal from the onset. Philosophies close to these traditions espoused the ambition of transcending metaphysics but also much of what remains of philosophy itself once one had engaged in the task of overcoming metaphysical constraints of thought (culminating in Wittgenstein).

In spite of the ambitions of philosophy and the social sciences, the possibilities of objectivity and scientific exactitude have remained reserved for the natural and the exact sciences whereas what came to be the humanities, as well as the social sciences, has been struggling to rid itself from the subjective perspective ever since. With the emergence of poststructuralism, these constantly frustrated efforts ceased by way of
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transforming them into the realization that not only in the humanities (and the social sciences) and philosophy but also even in the sciences themselves one was unavoidably “subjective.” I call this a transformation instead of a shift because, counterintuitively to its purported ambition, the affirmation of thought’s ultimate impossibility to fully account of the Real is premised on the realization about the impossibility to achieve absolute objectivity. Considering the expectation of absoluteness and thus the criterion of the absolute are in place, in spite of the admitted impossibility, the reasoning of this type remains entrapped in philosophical metaphysics. To paraphrase François Laruelle, the equation real = fiction has been replaced by fiction = real, but the equation is still the same. In other words, deconstruction, Deleuzian theory, and the entire continental tradition of the linguistic turn in philosophy have merely put the entire structure of the classical philosophical tradition upside down while remaining constricted by the laws of the very same culture. To conclude, an account of what is “objective,” to what extent or in what sense, has remained an impossibility for the poststructuralist episteme and it is so because an account of absolute metaphysical certainty of it is treated as impossible. In such an expectation that is absolute, the concession of impossibility is absolute too and the premise of absoluteness has, therefore, not been abandoned.

Nonetheless, there emerged discourses of both modernity and objectivity in the nineteenth century that pleaded for an objective point of view, such as positivism, logical empiricism, and Marxism. In the present chapter, I will focus on Marxism or rather Marx’s original writings approached with the epistemic scaffold provided by Laruellian non-philosophy. Objectivity as an inherently materialist criterion of scientific relevance, according to Marx “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General” (in Marx, Manuscripts: s.p.), neither seeks to emulate the exact sciences nor espouse positivism insofar as it is anthropocentric and thus retains a nonscientific episteme. Marx’s vision is epistemologically positioned beyond what he called a Hegelian legacy of subjectivity-centered thought that entertains idealism even when cloaked as materialism.

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not as a sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism—which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such.

Marx’s vision of modernity has never been that of (human) subjectivity structured thought, which, even when pretending to be objective, remains immanently idealist. Marx’s project of dismantling Hegel’s philosophical and political project as one ensuing from (and amounting to) the ideal of a
universal egoist, to paraphrase Marx (1959)\(^9\) ends up as a radical critique both of Hegel’s notion of (political) state and concomitant conceptualization of secularism.

In Karl Marx’s politico-philosophical project, subjectivity, political state, and secularism are not what a modern society should consist in but quite the opposite their transcendence by way of sublation when confronted with a materialist, objective science of the species-being of humanity. Secularism is, argues Marx in *The Jewish Question*, a name for a “political” state that has alienated itself from the society precisely by way of relegating everything pertaining to the individual to the so-called “civil society.”

The relation of the political state to civil society is just as spiritual as the relations of heaven to earth. The political state stands in the same opposition to civil society, and it prevails over the latter in the same way as religion prevails over the narrowness of the secular world—i.e., by likewise having always to acknowledge it, to restore it, and allow itself to be dominated by it. In his most immediate reality, in civil society, man is a secular being. Here, where he regards himself as a real individual, and is so regarded by others, he is a fictitious phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where man is regarded as a species-being, he is the imaginary member of an illusory sovereignty, is deprived of his real individual life and endowed with an unreal universality.\(^{10}\)

The split between the purely “political state” and the “civil society” is immanently bourgeois maintaining an alienation of the citizen from the reality of the social relations taking place in the “civil society,” but also an alienation of the “private person” from their role of “citizen.”\(^{11}\)

In *Less than Nothing*, Slavoj Žižek argues that subjectivity-centered reason and secularism lie at the core of modernity: “[. . .] it is absolutely crucial for emancipatory politics to remain faithful to the universalist/secular project of modernity” (*LN*, 70), and a bit further in the same text, he proffers an addition to this definition by saying “premodern organic society that denies the infinite right of subjectivity as the fundamental feature of modernity” (*LN*, 206). He is most probably right when one looks at the liberal-democratic tradition based on the idea of the republican enlightenment-inspired idea of modernity. Yet, I argue, there are insufficiently explored niches of alternative possibilities for the modernist political, epistemic, and onto-metaphysical potential predicated on the aforementioned critique forwarded by Marx.

Let us explore how an abstraction such as “humanity” can be rendered real, proffering a materialist account of it, albeit while affirming the realness of its abstract nature, and in doing so avoiding the trap of idealism as well as anthropocentrism. In order to do so, one ought to embrace Marx’s notion of objectivity and consider social relations as objects among objects, seen from a “third party’s perspective,” a concept
I will elaborate in the pages that follow. Humanity is an abstraction that is real, but that does not make it a self-standing idea. It is rather what I might call a “real abstraction” constituting the species-being of humanity. Such abstractions are called real by the Austrian Marxist epistemologist Alfred Sohn-Rethel (1978). Regardless of the fact that an abstract category such as “humanity,” but also “labour,” “value,” is predicated on a material reality that is its embodiment and an ontological property, it is also real in and of itself insofar as an abstraction. By affirming its realness as an abstraction, one does not fall back into idealism, but quite to the contrary—its real abstractness is affirmed as well as its material effects. However, the real abstraction of “species-being” of humanity or *Gattungswesen* is not an ersatz-entity, it is not an *ousia*—it is yet again a product of human (cognitive) labor that is inhabited by incalculable number of physical bodies, and should be addressed as such, as that reality shaping and instituting category it is.

By decentering scientific thought from humanity as its legislating principle, as its teleological sense, by transcending the anthropocentric limitations of a posture of thought structured in line with the empty form of subjectivity that nonetheless emerges from humanist semantics, Marx pushes us further in the direction of posthumanism than constructivist discourse ever did. On the other hand, such a procedure of decentering does not imply anti- or trans-humanism, it remains radically humanist as Marx keeps arguing, and not only in his early works (consider *Grundrisse* (1973) and in the *Communist Manifesto* (1969). As object of study among other objects of study, humanity, seen in its very material foundations of social relations insofar as real abstractions, returns to nature as realization of human “existence”:

> The human aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist for him as a bond with man—as his existence for the other and the other's existence for him—and as the life-element of human reality. Only then does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here has what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and nature become man for him.\(^\text{13}\)

This realization is possible through a communist resolution of the fundamental contradiction of capitalism—humanity’s estrangement from nature, materialized as social relations of a political-economic base but also of a metaphysics pertaining to said base, inextricably constituting one another. Building on the non-idealist or perhaps anti-idealist basis of modernity, we might explore a possibility for the left that builds on Marx’s scientific project, which is, however, something quite different and more often than not at odds with the tradition of “scientific Marxism” in Leninist vein. Here, we are engaged in a reading of Marx’s authorship, and, in this
process, we are aided by the methodological instruments furnished by François Laruelle and Alfred Sohn-Rethel.

Marxian Objectivity of the Subject from the Perspective of Sohn-Rethel’s Epistemology

Sohn-Rethel’s epistemology relies on one simple premise—a materialist methodology, science, and the science of the species-being of humanity more specifically, including political economy, must have a materialist account of the abstractions that constitute human lives. Social relations, economy being part of it insofar as human productivity, are abstractions that have a real or material effect on human realities, as well as on other forms of living and non-living physical reality. Economic reductivism is not part of the reasoning I propose building on Marx’s and Sohn-Rethel’s texts: economic analysis is always political-economic and it is intrinsic to a particular worldview, or simply—metaphysical position. Or put in Marx’s own words (that do not include the word “metaphysical”) it is described as follows:

To the extent that we are considering it here, as a relation distinct from that of value and money, capital is capital in general, i.e. the incarnation of the qualities which distinguish value as capital from value as pure value or as money. Value, money, circulation etc., prices etc. are presupposed, as is labour etc. But we are still concerned neither with a particular form of capital, nor with an individual capital as distinct from other individual capitals etc. We are present at the process of its becoming. This dialectical process of its becoming is only the ideal expression of the real movement through which capital comes into being. The later relations are to be regarded as developments coming out of this germ.

As argued earlier, let us underscore, a position on human alienation, a possible eschatology of its resolution through a return to nature, is a metaphysical stance. I have elaborated this argument in detail elsewhere, whereas for the moment, suffice it to say—one’s belief in human progress through technology, even the very belief in progress is not only ideology but also metaphysics, and, therefore, not even sciences can avoid metaphysics entirely. They should not be seeking to do so either as metaphysical quizzing is what moves sciences and overall human productivity—one can, however, rid this process of the problem called “principle of philosophical sufficiency.” To affirm that an abstraction, such as social relations or value is a reality in its own right, however, does not mean that there is no material or physical determination of the last instance. The determination of the last instance should not be confused with essence or substance or “purpose
or reason of being” of the forms of physical reality of objects of scientific enquiry.

I choose to refer to “forms of physical reality” due to the fact that Nature is a notion heavily indebted to philosophy and theology (as a form of philosophy), an argument brought forth by authors such as Donna Haraway (1990) but also those associated with the “speculative turn,” for example, in the work the non-philosopher Anthony Paul Smith’s (2013). I also tend to avoid the use of “material,” even though I do not insist on discarding its use entirely, for the same reasons Marx avoided it and instead resorted to the terms “real” and “physical” (sometimes “sensuous” too): to circumvent the possibility of being mistakenly assumed to espouse the spontaneous use of “philosophical materialism,” for example, that of the Young Hegelians and Feuerbach whom Marx criticized. The core of this critique is the argument that Feuerbach remains entrapped in a form of idealism because his materialism is subjected to the same legislating principles that found and govern philosophy (all philosophy, its apex being Hegel). A central legislating principle that institutes philosophy as a vicious circle of auto-referentiality, a view comparable to Laruelle’s critique of “the principle of sufficient philosophy,” is, argues Marx in Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General as noted earlier, the centrality of the notion of Subjectivity, demonstrating that it is always already human subjectivity, unavoidably so. Even if semantically emptied of human content, Subjectivity, and in particular in Hegel’s phenomenology, can be but human due to the very structural conditioning of thought.

In other words, philosophy cannot escape the form of idealism, and that is why philosophical materialism, be it Feuerbachian or Hegel-inspired Leninist materialism, is merely different semantics filling up the same structure, that of idealism. In order to overcome this problem, and move philosophy toward science of humanity’s “species being” Marx argues an Ausgang (exit) from philosophy is required (Theses). Marx’s own work, the execution of his project in Capital and Grundrisse is a demonstration of how one departs from philosophical “abstractions” that are in fact generalizations, “philosophically spontaneous” abstractions, cumulative imaginary projections combining science, philosophy, common sense, and mythology of the quotidian in a vague assemblage of a manifest image of reality), only to arrive at the concreteness that constitutes them. This permits an extraction of abstractions in the methodological, not ontological sense, extrapolations of formalized and formalizable notions from the examined material reality. The prerequisite for such a posture of thought and an ensuing process of scientific operation that nonetheless departs from philosophy is to shift the position of the philosophical gaze, to carry out a non-Euclidian shift, and, thus, do away with a subjectivity centered thought.

As already noted, subjectivity as the legislating principle of philosophical enquiry is identified, in particular, in Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy
in General but elsewhere too, as the main culprit of philosophy’s self-centeredness, auto-referentiality, and inability to produce accounts of the real. Let us remark, in passing, that it would not be an error to liken this barred Real with the Lacanian real, if that helps get the point across more easily, but also to Laruelle’s always already foreclosed real. In Hegemony, Contingency, Universality (2000), co-written with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau, Žižek demonstrates that it is possible to construe a political language around the Real albeit while affirming its radical foreclosure, or rather that any political language is necessarily conditioned by the Real (CHU, 223). In this sense, his argument is very similar to that of François Laruelle in Introduction to Non-Marxism (2013), a scientific language, including that of radicalized Marxism, is affected by the immanence of the Real,23 while nonetheless affirming the Real’s “indifference,”24 non-reciprocity, by way of the method of “unilateralization.”25 In said exchange with Butler and Laclau, Žižek demonstrates not only that universalism is the path of true socialist emancipation but also that universalism is possible only by way of “interrogating the Real” (ITR), as a form of realism informed by the sensibilities of poststructuralism yet moving away from its particularistic and atomist utopia. Laruelle’s notion of the generic, occurring more persistently in his later works, and Žižek’s concept of the universal seem to be similar in the sense that they are both aided by attributing relevance to the real in creating a new episteme and a novel political language, one that transcends the boundaries of the poststructuralist paradigm.

This universal subject megalomanically expanded by Hegel to the universal principle defining all possible reality morphed into the Spirit that cuts across history and ultimately manifests itself realized or materialized through the negation of its materiality, is a mere projection of the human ideal, of enlightenment humanism taken to its infantile extremes bordering with the grotesque. Subjectivity-centered metaphysics, ideology, and civilizational foundation, that of what I term earlier as the liberal-democratic and bourgeois modernity, is an inherent contradiction within the wider legacy of enlightenment determined modernity. Scientific reason (in contradistinction to Reason insofar as Spirit), the pursuit of objective and positive knowledge, and, finally, materialist metaphysics (or an inevitable foundationalism) is the dialectical other of said contradiction. A Marxian stance would expect a sublation leading to a materialist worldview, social relations that are not at odds with nature treating it as mere resource but rather as an inalienable element of the real abstraction they are, determined by the direct “interests of the proletariat”26 or the “free producers.”27 Subjectivity-centered thinking is replaced by what Marx proposes as properly materialist method, that of the “third party view,”28 a resolution of the contradiction through sublation according to generically conceived and not only Hegelian dialectics.29
Marx’s Posthumanism and Why We Should Call It Non-Humanism

The solution to the inevitably idealist constitution of any philosophy or simply of philosophy itself Marx proposes is a methodological one—even though it implies a metaphysical shift too—to assume a third party’s position that sees human subjectivity and thus humanity as object among objects. This is, I argue, a post-humanist proposal par excellence. It enables a radical defense of the “species being” of humanity in ecological balance with nature and technology, one placed beyond anthropocentrism (always already present in any form of subjectivity-centered philosophy).

To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have object, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third party, is one and the same thing.30

Building on Marx’s proposal to exit philosophy’s self-circumscription but rejecting the idea of fully doing away with philosophy as untenable, François Laruelle proposes a science of philosophy and a science operating with the conceptual repository of philosophy that would transcend a single yet key axiomatic problem—that of the principle of philosophical sufficiency. As explained earlier, the principle of sufficient philosophy refers to and is grounded in the procedure of philosophical amphibology, as Laruelle terms it. He elaborates the problem of the amphibology of thought and the Real in the following way: philosophy’s identity of the last instance31, rather than generalization, consists in the presupposition that the Real and thought ought to establish an ontological unity, become one and the same thing, an ambition sciences proper never had. The Real is thus always a philosophical product, and whatever its decision on what constitutes the Real co-constitutes thought itself too. That implies that the admission of poststructuralism that the Real in itself is inaccessible and thus any discourse of the Real should be abandoned as futile, is simple the obverse of the old metaphysical expectation that thought should penetrate, control, and become one with the real. I would add that any philosophy, beginning with the Greek, is determined by the ambition to produce truth that would be more real than the Real itself, the Real itself rid of meaning being recast as senseless and therefore worthless of any examination. One can easily notice that such is the stance of poststructuralism too—being unable to account of the real, fiction is declared to be more real than the Real itself or simply the only Real available to us and therefore the only Real there is.32

All philosophy is indeed idealism—thought and the Real are equated in the form of philosophical truth, there is no other form of truth in philosophy, one that would be beyond the aspiration of such an equation, even when said equality is declared impossible, as in poststructuralism. The first and
foremost category of philosophy, Being is the principle, “principle” in the temporal and axiological sense of the word, product of the amphibology at issue: thought and the Real constitute a single form of reality, transcendence (a truth) posturing as immanence, whereby the Real and the thought that relates and mediates it are unified into an Entity—τὸ ὄν, that is presumed to be the “true real,” thus not merely real but Real endowed with truth. This dream of reality imbued with truth, with (human) Spirit, elevated or sublimated reality whereby the Real becomes more real than the Real itself because human knowledge and the Real have collapsed in a perfect unity, this unity is what Laruelle’s identification in the last instance (not reduction) of all philosophy to the act of philosophical decision is all about. Therefore, to criticize “philosophical decisionism” in Laruellian terms is not to claim that philosophy or science should not postulate about the Real but rather not to decide what it is in and of itself and instead admit its radical foreclosure. Once this foreclosure is admitted, thought seeks to mediate it, explicate it, convey knowledge (and therefore control) of it without seeking to “merge” with it, and institute a union of thought and the real. To assume this posture of thought means, according to Laruelle, to assume a position vis-à-vis human cognitive activity and reality as exteriority that is by its constitution equal to that of scientific thought. In this way, one might remain with philosophy and continue operating with “philosophical material” while staying outside of it, miming the scientific posture and ambition of thought.

Therefore, the relation is unilateral—the Real remains indifferent to thought’s ambition, whereas the latter continues to “clone” the Real as Laruelle would say. Thereby, a radical dyad of thought and the Real is constituted, never amounting to a unity of the two elements, to a reconciliation of a duality, to acquiescence of their tension but quite to the contrary affirming it. The dyad is radical because it always remains a dyad, it is not a duality or dualism that seeks to be overcome either through some synthesis of reconciliation (the vulgar dialectics) or a playful affirmation of a paradox (postmodernism). Also, it is not an ontology—it does not speak the truth of how things are with regard to what is and what isn’t (real), it does not legislate the Real (already affirmed as foreclosed). It is a method. The “non”—in non-philosophy and non-Marxism does not stand for “anti-”, but quite the opposite—radicalization of the conceptual core in the both by way of ridding the doctrines of their philosophical legacy structured in line with the “principle of philosophical sufficiency.”

Doing away with anthropocentrism as the foundation of all philosophy leads us to the notion of the nonhuman (rather than post-human), which in line with the episteme of non-philosophy would mean radical humanism rid of the philosophical concept of the human, placed beyond any form of anthropocentrism and human-centered thought. At the level of subjectivity, we can apply the same method and recognize the prelingual Real at the heart of the nonhuman on the one hand and the signifying automation the
language is and its effect—the Subject, on the other hand. The Real of the human-in-human is indifferent to the processes of signification just as the Real of some exteriority is indifferent vis-à-vis the unilateral tendency of “thought” (Laruelle) to signify it, relay it, mediate it, create knowledge or “truth” of it. This originary alienation is never to be overcome by the non-human conceived as a radical dyad (of a foreclosed Real and the signifying automaton and its effect, the subject). It is a real abstraction that yields material effects, an abstraction that yields effects of the Real, an instance of transcendence, and a material reality of cognition that is real and allows for a materialist account in and of itself. Finally, this is a purely formal category, just as “labor” or “social relations” are and as such it cannot be reduced to some semantic contents—such gesture, in Marxist terms, would be an error of reification, and an analogy of capitalist commodity fetishization.

Thinking oppression from the “third party perspective,” a method developed by Marx, abandoning human-centered thought, which remains such even when it is termed post-, trans- or even anti-humanist, enables scientific practice of philosophical enquiry, aided by the method of Laruelle’s nonstandard philosophy and Marxism. Anthropocentric philosophical reason and its capitalist rationalizations can be surpassed through the notion of the nonhuman, which does away with subjectivity-centered thought as proposed by both Marx and Laruelle. It is a posture of thought that enables a radical structural critique of an endless sequence of intersecting forms of inequality and subjugation of humanity by being situated beyond subjectivity-centered reasoning. The latter is a form of thought that inevitably engenders the dogma of identity politics even when trying to be antidogmatic (postmodernism/poststructuralism), obfuscating the possibilities of structural resistance and reimagining a world beyond capitalism.

Notes

2 Laruelle, *Philosophie*, 12; 23; 27–9; 34–6.
3 Laruelle, *Philosophie*, 17.
5 Laruelle, *Philosophie*, 231.
7 The Soviet edition of this and other titles in English by Marx I am citing here were available to me only online and without pagination. In order to be more specific, I am referring to titles of chapters such as “Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy in General,” which is part of the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. 


9 “The self-abstracted entity, fixed for itself, is man as abstract egoist—egoism raised in its pure abstraction to the level of thought” (Marx, *Manuscripts: Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy in General*).


12 Marx, *Manuscripts*.


20 A contested term by some of those associated with it, in particular those that build on to a lesser or greater extent on Laruelle’s non-philosophy or non-standard philosophy; consider Ray Brassier’s statement in the interview given for *Kronos* in 2011 (Brassier, Ray. “I am a Nihilist Because I Still Believe in Truth,” interviewed by Marcin Rychter. *Kronos* 16, no. 1 [2011]. https://kronos.org.pl/numery/kronos-1-162011/ [accessed February 20, 2021]).


22 Marx, *Grundrisse*, 41.


29 When I say “generically conceived dialectics” I am referring to the use of the notion we find in Marx’s doctoral thesis, where he seems to be relying mainly on the original meaning of the term in Greek philosophy, and sees Hegel’s appropriation of the notion as one of the possible correct uses—true to the original, Greek or etymological meaning—Marx himself would, however, amend with the perspective of “historical necessity.” (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Collected Works Vol. 1* [Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975], 491–2).

