7 NEW MEDIA, OLD CONCERNS: HEIDEGGER REVISITED

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It may strike some as incongruous to discuss both new media and Heidegger in a single article. Heidegger died in 1976, so he can hardly be considered as having first-hand experience with so-called *new media*. He is best known for his endeavor of *destructing* traditional Western metaphysics, and for an organic extension of this *destruction*, his philosophy of technology. He explicitly touches upon two communications-oriented technological inventions: the radio and the typewriter. In both cases his criticism is quite obvious. Despite all this, some of his considerations make it worthwhile to further investigate his criticism.

I will start with an overview of the long-standing critical attitude toward any new media, and I will attempt to define some key terms with regard to old and new media. Then I will outline the philosophical background of the Heideggerian criticism, and investigate the lessons we can learn from Heidegger.

1. Perennial Criticism

We can hardly imagine our daily life without the possibilities provided by new media. In this sense, new media are ubiquitous and presumably unavoidable. Instant access to the staggering amount of information on the World Wide Web, games, chat rooms, blogs, constantly improving applications for mobile devices, and the amazingly seamless ways to communicate with friends, colleagues, and family, whether nearby or afar, are undoubtedly useful facilities. And yet anxiety remains an accompanying attitude regarding new media. The fear of losing privacy, bringing in potential social ill, giving more room for the dissemination of hate and terrorism, decreasing face-to-face interaction and damaging related social skills are vivid concerns. By all means, new tools and possibilities sometimes dazzle, sometimes bewilder, and sometimes remain unnoticed.

The simultaneity of these attitudes becomes quite obvious if we investigate the evolution of communications technology within the framework of the triad of *(re)mediation, hypermediation,* and *transparency/immediacy.* Jay D. Bolter and Richard Grusin suggest that hypermediation and immediacy are two strategies of remediation (2000:273), and argue that both old and new media can be described according to these terms. (2000:14f.) In what follows, I will attempt to summarize what these terms mean and complement this with observations on the cultural phenomena of criticisms that had already emerged in ancient times.

Mediation, as its Latin etymological root *medius* (i.e., "being in the middle") suggests, is a kind of transmission, conveying and relaying between two things or parties. In a strict sense, there is no communication without mediation. Or, as Bolter and Grusin put it, "there is nothing prior to the act of mediation, there is also a sense in which all mediation remediates the real" (2000, 59). In the simplest cases of communication, there is a need for something that makes an idea or a desire accessible to others, and significantly, a method by which this idea or desire can be rendered representable and understandable to others. We can think of the air as it mediates sound, or of different sign systems, such as language, which are capable of representing knowledge and/or intention. The scholars of the Toronto Circle revealed the interconnectedness of technology and the means of linguistic expression. Investigations by Harold Innis, Eric A. Havelock, and Walter J. Ong, (just to name a few prominent scholars of the Toronto School), highlighted the striking changes brought about thanks to the invention of alphabetical writing. Creating a vocabulary that makes a written record capable of substituting the acoustic sound of words was a great intellectual challenge. Interestingly, some of the most prominent scholars, such as Plato, whose terminological inventions paved the way for further abstract concepts, were the most critical of writing. He considered writing to be an instrument that destroys memory, weakens the mind, and merely "a reminiscence of what we know." (Plato, 278a)

According to Bolter and Grusin, "we call the representation of one medium in another *remediation.*" (2000, 45) Just as written records *remediate* acoustic sound, print technology remediates the manuscript. Each emerging new medium is designed from the perspective of accuracy in terms of its predecessor. That is, writing can preserve knowledge in a long-lasting form compared to oral communication; print technology makes recorded knowledge available to more readers and its production is more effective as compared with that of manuscripts. But such effectiveness requires new skills, new chains of thought, and entails new concepts, institutions, and customs.

In the age of literacy, there was similar distrust and anxiety toward print technology and silent reading.[1] However, the "invention of the printing press was only an inevitable consequence of the deep-rooted and large-scale writing culture of the late Middle Ages" (Hajnal 1993, 24). In retrospect, it was even considered as the first step toward the "overmechanization" of the word. (Balogh 1921,10) The mechanization of the word as beginning with the printing press was aptly formulated by Heidegger in his Parmenides lectures in 1942/43: "It is no accident that the invention of the printing press coincides with the inception of the modern period. The word-signs become type, and the writing stroke disappears. The type is 'set,' the set becomes 'pressed.' This mechanism of setting and pressing and 'printing' is the preliminary form of the typewriter. In the typewriter we find the irruption of the mechanism in the realm of the word." (Heidegger, 1998, 85)

In the epoch of secondary orality, where orality is based on literacy and carried by a variety of electronic instruments such as telephones, radio, various kinds of audio tapes, and television (Ong 1982, 3), Heidegger formulated his criticism quite explicitly with regard to the radio. "With the 'radio,' for example, Dasein [*Being*-there; human beings with an emphasis on their being-in-the-world] has so expanded its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance [Ent-fernung] of the 'world' a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized [übersehbare]" (Heidegger 1962, 140).

Distrust regarding new forms of remediation is inevitable since they require intellectual effort and alter the earlier practice of communication. Misgivings about losing accustomed ways of expression and institutions is based on the unforeseeable consequences of an invention and the uncertainty of success in the adoption of new means. The transformation from orality toward literacy required new, abstract concepts and general subjects in order to substitute for live situations and express knowledge understandable for subsequent generations. Later, the printing press strengthened these features of writing. Intertextuality vanishes: the printed book inspires the reader to see it as a self-contained whole. A comprehensive and reflexive manner of thinking gained ground due to the emergence and accessibility of scientific texts. After the invention of printed books, the concepts of author, originality, and creativity were born. With the emergence of electronic media, anxiety about the loss of the cultural heritage of alphabetic writing arose. Secondary oral culture "has striking resemblances to the old in its participatory mystique, its fostering of communal sense, its concentration on the present moment, and even in its formulas" (Ong 1982, 136). But after centuries of silent reading and individual reasoning, secondary oral culture raised the

fear of a dominance of illiterate, futile, subpar entertainment that forces passivity on its audience. The shared features of both waves of orality, such as the participatory mystique, the extensive use of formulas, and the closeness of mundane practice were seen as things to be avoided in a world of entrenched literacy. As was the case of old, individual intellectual effort and the world of silent contemplation of text seems to be nondesirable.

2. Similarities and Differences between Old and New Media

If we cast a glance at the history of communications technology, there is no substantial difference with regard to the criticism of emerging technological inventions. If we accept Bolter's and Grusin's suggestion that mediation is a primordial act and "[m]ediation is the remediation of reality because media themselves are real and because the experience of media is the subject of remediation" (Bolter, Grusin 2000, 59),[2] we can note that from the simplest means of communication toward recent findings of remediation, there is a need for an intellectual redesigning of ideas and the acquisition of new skills; notably, it is a threat against accustomed practices and institutions.

We can observe further similarities between old and new media. The endeavor toward *immediacy/transparency* can be found even in Socrates' time in painting. (Think of the contest of *Zeuxis* and Parrhasius.) An apt formulation of immediacy was expressed with regard to visual representation: Immediacy is a "style of visual representation whose *goal is to make the viewer forget the presence of the medium* (canvas, photographic film, cinema, and so on) and believe that he is in the presence of the objects of representation." (Bolter, Grusin 2000, 272f. Emphasis mine.) The intention of immediacy is obvious in the case of visual representation but, I believe, in the case of nonpictorial representations we can find a similar intention to be as immediate as possible. In live intercourses, the environment, immediate feedback, and the interplay of verbal expression, gestures, and mimicry allow the speaker to be less precise, less formal, less explicit compared to the written word. Although a linguistic description of a scene differs spectacularly from the scene itself, the more we are familiar with the tools of linguistic expression the less we feel its limits and the less we consider it as being an artificial substitute for that which is represented. Of course, it is not easy to find the right terms, metaphors, and the order of arguments to use, but in the case of reports, reviews or a thesis, the written form of linguistic expression is thought to be quite obvious. That is, an institutional framework evolved within which written records are not conspicuous, but are rather an obvious and immediate means of expression.

If we take into consideration that the first printed texts imitated manuscripts, we face the endeavor of being similar, almost identical to the old medium. With the recognition of technical possibilities, similarity gradually vanished and the obvious difference between the two kinds of texts became greater. That is, new technologies entail new methods and later, new institutions.

Immediacy's counterterm is *hypermediation*. With the term *hypermediacy*, we refer to the salience of the medium. "In every manifestation, hypermediacy makes us aware of the medium or media and (in sometimes subtle and sometimes obvious ways) reminds us of our desire for immediacy." (Bolter, Grusin 2000, 34) Ultimately, hypermediation becomes an accustomed form of mediation: it is not conspicuous yet we encounter images, texts, sounds, even moving images in our displays at the same time. We may know that these are different kinds of mediation or, more precisely, that each has its physical predecessor, but now it seems to be quite ordinary having a display in which all previous ones are visible at once.

In this respect, there is no significant difference between old and new media. However, new media remediate the previous, therefore, the subject of remediation is forever changing. That is, new media can be new only because they can remediate older media, but they do not reach beyond the basic mechanism or constraint of remediation. "The true novelty would be a new medium that did not refer for its meaning to other media at all. For our culture, such mediation without remediation seems to be impossible" (Bolter, Grusin 2000, 271).

In case of new media, however, the mechanism of remediation resulted in a deeper involvement and more active interaction. Old media required making a choice between whether we wanted to read, listen to the radio, or watch TV, and then paying attention to the engagement, but there were no opportunities for continuous interaction and control. Computer games, as compared with television, may be less professional in their visual performance, but thanks to interactivity and the possibility of intervening in the action, they can provide a greater sense and experience of immediacy. Also, Web cams offer the option of focusing and changing the perspective of a scene that was never possible before. One can argue that this is only a difference in the degree of interactivity and privacy. With television we gained control over the loudness, brightness, and choice among channels. With digital media and the World Wide Web, we even gain control over the perspective and the focus.

As we can see, old and new media are essentially similar with regard to the mechanisms that produce new mediators and require new skills, and

raise basically identical anxieties. Whether the difference in the entailed in-teractivity and privacy is a difference in scale or a fundamental one is a matter of debate. Heidegger would suggest the latter, since he believes that although we can find these consequences evolving gradually, the institutions that are created by this gradualism are fundamentally different or, more precisely, they are fundamentally different from the primordial ones. Although we can find paragraphs in Heidegger's oeuvre that suggest that we have been on the wrong track from almost the beginning of Western culture, he considers some changes in our cultural evolution that are related to technology in a broad sense as being essential changes, as evidenced in the case of handwrit-ing versus typewriting and handcrafted versus industrial production.

3. Criticism Reloaded

Heidegger believes humans have an exceptional status among other beings because we are capable of relating to our own *Being*. Going into detail of the Heideggerian *destruction* of metaphysics reaches far beyond the framework of this paper, but it is important to note that Heidegger suggests a radical shift of perspective from which the individuals' epistemological and ontological status is viewed. His approach can be considered as one which established a new branch in philosophy. Though his conception of *Being* entails a kind of transcendence in his philosophy, his ideas were seminal in later phenomenol-ogy, artificial intelligence, and even in the philosophy of mind.

For Heidegger, humans are neither confronted with nor face the external world but, rather, they are immersed, embedded, thrown into it. This is the reason why he calls them Being-there [Dasein]. "Being-in-the-world, accord-ing to our Interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-thematic circumspective absorption in references or assignments constitutive for the readiness-to-hand of a totality of equipment. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the world. In this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what it encounters within-the-world and be fascinated with it." (Heidegger 1962, 107)

The distinction of *readiness-to-hand* [Zuhandenheit] and *presence-at-hand* [Vorhandenheit] are different modes of being engaged in the world. Readiness-to-hand is primordial, that is, it is fundamental to *Dasein* in coping with its environment. Relying on *referential totality*, things emerged as ready-to-hand means. Entities around us emerge as present-at-hand things in case of theoretical investigations and/or in case of *unusability*.[3]

Accordingly, things around us are not mere objects, but rather they are instruments, tools, means with which we do something. Like people, the

others with whom we meet on the street, in the office: they are what they do. "The Others who are thus 'encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment, are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand; such 'Things' are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others – a world which is always mine too in advance." (Heidegger 1962, 154)[4] Heidegger believes that our primordial and dominant relation to our environment is not a distanced looking at something with an analyzing attitude; instead, we are engaged in something, and according to our engagement, things and others are an organic part of our everyday activity. We do not consider the color or shape of a hammer. Rather we look for another one if it is felt to be too heavy. We are not inquisitive about one's mental state, rather we try to cope with.

In the light of embededness, engagement, and attending-to (in the sense of concern) as primordial characteristics of humans, new media might seem as a versatile instrument; its user-friendliness can be regarded as an unambiguous referential totality that nicely fits our everyday tasks. However, as Heidegger would claim, the possibilities provided by new media are phony since they conceal our primordial relation to our environment and other people. In order to explicate this argument, we must inevitably turn to an outline of Heidegger's key concept, *viz*. that of *concealment/unconcealment.*

Heidegger believes that "[i]n the course of Western history, *logos* changes from the event of the manifestation of beings to an instrument by which man gains control over the forces of nature" (Zimmerman, 2010, 223). We can say that *logos* became logic, whereas *aletheia* (originally revealed, unconcealed) became *veritas*, truth. Both words primarily express the interplay of c*oncealment/unconcealment*, which should be our basic experience. "Emergence into the unconcealed and submergence into concealment dwell primordially everywhere." (Heidegger 1998, 67)

In the following paragraphs I will attempt to highlight the main difference between the meaning of language for the ancient Greeks and Western metaphysics, as well as between technology as handcrafted and modern industrial production in the light of concealment/unconcealment. In *Being and Time, logos* becomes manifest and "makes itself mundane" through language. Also through language, *logos* "becomes an element of the world and can be treated like other things found in the world." (Corngold 1979, 106.) AQ1 Therefore, *logos* is basically *Talk* [Rede]. As Heidegger put it: "*Lóyos-* as 'discourse' means . . .: to make manifest what one is 'talking [Rede] about' in one's discourse. . . . Discourse . . . lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse (αποφανσιζ), so far as it is genuine, *what* is said [was geredet ist] is drawn *from* what the talk is about, so

that discursive communication, in what it says [in ihrem Gesagten], makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes this accessible to the other party." (Heidegger 1962, 56) That is, *logos* means the process of making manifest or letting-be-seen in discourse, thanks to language. Language reveals the things all around and at the same time it shows up their presence or, as a preservative force, their lack of presence. In this way, we can comprehend the intimate relationship of *Being*, human beings, and things. Of course, Heidegger does not deny that language can be an object of theoretical investigation as the various phenomena of nature are for science, that is, language can be a present-at-hand thing. But, primordially, language is not a mere instrument for communication. Rather, we articulate our comprehension of Being-with-others in everyday life through it, whereas it is capable of calling to presence things of the world.[5] Language is a privilege of Dasein.

Theoretical attitudes by which we hope to improve our way of expression hide a pitfall with regard to language. When we consider words as signifiers, or representations of something (beyond the difficulty of correspondence), the intimacy between the speaker, her ambient word, and her language vanishes. Heidegger believes words and sentences are not primordially representations, but rather a kind of revealing. "The primary signification of 'assertion' is '*pointing out*' [*Aufzeigen*]. In the assertion 'The hammer is too heavy,' what is discovered for sight is not a 'meaning,' but an entity in the way that it is ready-to-hand. Even if this entity is not close enough to be grasped and 'seen,' the pointing-out has in view the entity itself and not, let us say, a mere 'representation' [Vorstellung] of it – neither something 'merely represented' nor the psychical condition in which the person who makes the assertion 'represents' it." (Heidegger 1962, 196) But when language is considered as a present-at-hand instrument, it becomes a representational means. Therefore, language is unable to call forth *beings*, hence it paves the way toward concealing the original meaning of words.

Representations are strongly alienating. Heidegger describes the meaning of representing as follows: "to represent [vor-stellen] means to bring what is present at hand [*das Vorhandene*] before oneself as something standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one representing it." (Heidegger 1977a, 131) That is, representation intermits the state of being immersed into a referential totality, and requires man to be a *sub-iectum*, which "is something lying before from out of itself, which, as such, simultaneously lies at the foundation of its own fixed qualities and changing circumstances" in the sense of "self-supported, unshakable foundation of truth, in the sense of certainty" (Heidegger 1977a, 148). Heidegger refers here to the Cartesian dualism of the cognizing subject and its external world as the object of inquiry. Heidegger

believes that because the subject is no longer embedded in its environment, it faces numerous difficulties. "Only because and insofar as man actually and essentially has become subject is it necessary for him, as a consequence, to confront the explicit question: Is it as an 'I' confined to its own preferences and freed into its own arbitrary choosing or as the 'we' of society; is it as an individual or as a community; is it as a personality within the community or as a mere group member in the corporate body; is it as a state and nation and as a people or as the common humanity of modem man, that man will and ought to be the subject that in his modem essence he already is?" (Heidegger 1977a, 132f.) That is, Heidegger relates the difficulties with regard to the integrity of the self, the relation between individuals and society, individualism, and subjectivism to the alienating force of representation, which ultimately divides humans from their habitual ambience and leads to the dominance of the *theoretical attitude*.

Like language, the history of technology shows considerable change over time. In the case of handcrafted technology, the craftsman responsibly "bring[s] something into appearance." (Heidegger 1977b, 9) The making of, let's say, a chalice unfolds the cultural setting that gave rise to the idea of a chalice, the intention of the creation of a chalice (*causa finalis*), the form in which the chalice will be manifest (*causa formalis*), the material out of which the form can emerge (*causa materialis*), and the craftsman's skill, knowledge, and activity (*causa efficiens*). The unfolded elements in the case of crafting by hand are essentially different from the case of modern technology. "The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging-forth. That challenging happens in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is in turn distributed, and what is distributed is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about are ways of revealing." (Heidegger 1977b, 16).

As technology evolved, it revealed human activity that changed into a subject–object relationship. That is, the dominant mechanisms of modern technology unfold "the realm through which man is already passing every time he as a subject relates to an object." (Heidegger 1977b, 18) All these mechanisms are condensed in the term *Enframing* [Gestell]. Because modern technology modifies human activity, our engagements are now investigating and observing, and man "has already been claimed by a way of revealing that challenges him to approach nature as an object of research, until even the object disappears into the objectlessness of standing-reserve." Like modern science, which considers nature as being a "calculable coherence of forces"

(Heidegger 1977b, 19), modern technology reveals nature, human beings, and the world in a distorted manner, where there is no difference between humans and objects, and one-sided calculative thinking dominates.

The question is whether this fallacy is avoidable. Considered in light of Heidegger's philosophy, it is inevitable. Philosophy has gone quite astray from its beginnings. *Arkhé*,[6] a term from pre-Socratic times, suggested focusing on the foundation of beings. That is, the focus at the very beginning had shifted from *Being* to the ground of beings. But beyond this historical fact, the effectiveness and the distorting power of representation made this process hardly avoidable. As in the case of language, we can see that, although language has the primordial power of *calling into presence*, thanks to the theoretical attitude it became a representational means and its revealing potential has been concealed. Although the theoretical attitude is a kind of attitude, scientific behavior is a way of Being-in-the-world. Scientific behavior requires a special kind of thinking: a scientist plans, organizes, and calculates with different parameters. Heidegger calls it in a later piece *calculative thinking* as contrasted with *meditative thinking*. "Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is." (Heidegger 1966, 46)

4. Lessons from Heidegger

In a 1966 interview (which was published in *Der Spiegel* in 1974) Heidegger summarized the current state of affairs as follows: "Only a god[7] can save us. The only possibility available to us is that by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god, or for the absence of a god in [our] decline, insofar as in view of the absent god we are in a state of decline." (Heidegger 2010, 57) What did he mean by this pessimistic prediction?

Heidegger suggests that philosophy, and its errant offspring Western metaphysics,[8] are inseparable from everyday and scientific activities as they reveal the way we relate to *Being*, and thus to our ambient world, whereas Western metaphysics is in the grip of the oblivion of *Being*. Heidegger believes that although calculative thinking dominates, "man is a *thinking*, that is, a *meditating* being. Thus meditative thinking need by no means be 'high-flown.' It is enough if we dwell on what lies close and meditate on what is closest; upon that which concerns us, each one of us, here and now; here, on this patch of home ground; now, in the present hour of history." (Heidegger 1966, 47)

However, meditating is hindered by the achievements of technology, that is, the printing press, and later the typewriter, were mediators between language and the reader/writer. Heidegger believes that the typewriter more drastically obscures the force of language to recall something from its concealment, to its presence because it mechanizes handwriting. In the case of radio, remoteness and nearness became ambiguous since radio informs us about news from afar and, therefore, draws the audience's attention toward remote issues. And this is just the beginning of the march of technology.

"What we know now as the technology of film and television, of transportation and especially air transportation, of news reporting, and as medical and nutritional technology, is presumably only a crude start. No one can foresee the radical changes to come. But technological advance will move faster and faster and can never be stopped. In all areas of his existence, man will be encircled ever more tightly by the forces of technology. These forces, which everywhere and every minute claim, enchain, drag along, press and impose upon man under the form of some technical contrivance or other—these forces, since man has not made them, have moved long since beyond his will and have outgrown his capacity for decision." (Heidegger 1966, 51) But, as Heidegger continues: "For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances." (Heidegger 1966, 53)

That is, technological inventions are part of our everyday life and activities in an ever-changing way, and it is always possible to ask about their consequences a while after they have appeared. "Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve. As the one who is challenged forth in this way, man stands within the essential realm of Enframing. He can never take up a relationship to it only subsequently." (Heidegger 1977b, 24)

What does this mean with regard to the contemporary state of affairs and concerns? The evolution of technology is inevitable. According to Heidegger's description, modern technology has its own dynamics and logic. These reveal the world in a fundamentally different way compared with handcrafting or the way ancient Greeks considered the world. The mechanism that keeps modern technology moving does not concern the difference between artificial and natural, humans and other beings. However, to a certain extent it is tolerable as the theoretical attitude is an entirely possible way of living. Heidegger's concern seems to be the one-sidedness, the almost exclusive

obligatory dominance of calculative thinking or in terms of the *Being and Time* theoretical attitude.

New media is a great challenge because it mediates knowledge and other people as if we had immediate access to them; therefore, it offers a world within which we feel at home although it definitely needs different skills than our primordial ambient world (such as the "patch of home ground"). There is no question that new media encircle the people of our time. Accordingly, new media are an accustomed part of our ambient world. Media, both old and new, mediate. Mediation is unavoidable. Any kind of transcendence (*logos*, *Being*), skill, intention, and knowledge need mediation, otherwise they cannot come to presence from concealment. (Think of the talk and the chalice.) But mediation itself entails the possibility of distortion. The only exception for Heidegger is the original, primordial ways of mediation such as talk, handwriting, handcrafting. The concomitant ways, such as print technology, the typewriter, and modern industry modify the original engagement, therefore, they reveal something new, something different. New media incorporate all earlier forms of mediation, even handwriting and talk. The anxieties that Heidegger considered as the consequence of the transmutation of humans into a subject (as opposed to objects in her external world) are based on the deepest structure of being-in-the-world and becoming manifest, coming to presence.

Just as Heideggerian criticism is unavoidable within the framework of his philosophy, new media are inevitable in our age. Although the possibilities opened by new media were inconceivable decades ago and now seem to be indispensable, it seems that we encounter new manifestations of old mechanisms. Bolter and Grusin suggest media is based on the process of remediation. On the basis of Heidegger's investigations, the erroneous path philosophy and technology follow is unavoidable, because manifestation easily becomes representation and, from this point, theorizing dominates our relationship toward our environment. The new inventions that were effective and adoptable obviously became a part of life. Even the smoothest adaption has unrequired consequences that are spectacular from the perspective of practice. Heidegger's suggestion, that is, preferring meditative thinking to calculative thinking, might keep us from some undesired consequences, or at least from forgetting to wonder upon the minutia of the mundane world.

Notes

1 In the age of manuscripts, reading was not an individual and silent activity. Because ancients believed in the power of living speech, and real understanding was considered possible only with the simultaneous functioning of visual and

acoustic experience, silent reading was strange and unnatural. Of course, technical hindrances also played a role: complicated abbreviations, and hardly recognizable words fade only with the printing press. (Balogh 1921)

2 The idea goes back to McLuhan. "The electric light is pure information. It is a medium without a message, as it were, unless it is used to spell out some verbal ad or name. This fact, characteristic of all media, means that the 'content' of any medium is always another medium. The content of writing is speech, just as the written word is the content of print, and print is the content of the telegraph. If it is asked, 'What is the content of speech?,' it is necessary to say, 'It is an actual process of thought, which is in itself nonverbal'" (McLuhan 1994, 8).

3 "The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function of bringing to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand in what is ready-to-hand. But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just observed and stared at as something present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up in the readiness-to-hand of equipment." (Heidegger 1962,102f).

4 Heidegger emphasizes the difference between the relation toward tools and other people. "Concern is a character-of-Being which Being-with cannot have as its own, even though Being-with, like concern, is a Being towards entities encountered within-the-world. But those entities towards which Dasein as Being-with comports itself do not have the kind of Being which belongs to equipment ready-to-hand; they are themselves Dasein. These entities are not objects of concern, but rather of *solicitude*" (Heidegger 1962, 157).

5 "World" has a special meaning in Heideggerian terms. It is not the collection of things, nor our environment, nor a spatial relation. Rather, it is a framework within which humans can act, attend to, and even investigate. Being-there/Dasein is Being-in-the-World. Accordingly, world " is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself" (Heidegger 1962, 92).

6 *Arkhé* was the name of entities or things from which everything was made at the beginning.

7 *God* purports to be the manifestation of *Being*. It is to express the transcendency of *Being* that is different from individual beings, but always the *Being* of an individual being.

8 Heidegger sees the main difference between philosophy and metaphysics in the relation to the so-called question of *Being* [Seinsfrage]. It was Western metaphysics that shifted the focus from *Being* toward the ground of beings, entities in the world, hence concealing the difference between *Being* and beings. This shift entails the change of attitude toward phenomena and, in the long run, analyzing and objectifying thinking gains dominance and conceals the primordial setting of being immersed, thrown into the world through engagement and care.

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Chapter 7

Q. No.	Query
AQ1	Please check the word *Lóyos* the spelling is correct.