# Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus

New Directions for the Future Development of Humankind

## W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz

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This book is dedicated to Dr. David Hayes.

No man ever achieves anything, new or old, fundamental or peripheral, sound or fantastic, through his own unaided efforts.

Bronislaw Malinowski

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### **Preface**

Almost one hundred years have passed since Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. In this book, Wittgenstein reduced the world to a set of facts and removed values from it. In a world that is the totality of facts, there can be no ethical propositions, ethics cannot be expressed, and there can be no philosophical reflection on a good life.

Over the past hundred years, humankind has survived two world wars, the massive tragedy that was the Holocaust, and many other cruel events that resulted in the destruction of entire cultures and nations. A distinctive feature of this period is the presence of ide-ologies, from left to right wing. It seems that in spite of the signifi-cant technological advancement that has occurred in the last hundred years, humanity has undergone an ideological enslavement and lost the ability to think independently and rationally about politics.

My book attempts to prove that the world created by human beings is primarily a world of values, and that ethics and political thinking are possible. I present a vision of the good state and a happy society. I show that the main value of social life and the basis of politics is cooperation. Like Wittgenstein, I use numbering to designate the issues discussed, and the sections numbered 7 to 7.54 are my responses to the propositions included in his sections 7 and 6.4 to 6.54.

As a philosophical work, my book is motivated by the search for truth. However, I am not of the opinion that the truth of the thoughts communicated here is unassailable and definitive. An "unassailable and definitive" truth is usually a dogma, and dogma is the basis of ideology, not philosophy. Rather than presenting the final clarification of all problems, my book instead indicates a new direction for humanity to take in order to complete its task and reach happiness: the way of cooperation and conscious evolution.

W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz

## Acknowledgments

Two years after the publication of *Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus* by Derewiecki in Poland as a bilingual Polish/English edition, the English version of the *Tractatus* is published by Routledge in the United States. I have also added an introduction to the new edition. I have also made minor changes in the text and some corrections in numbering.

I would like to thank Natalja Mortensen, Political Editor at Routledge, and her colleagues for preparing the publication of my book. I am also very grateful to my reviewers for their helpful comments and generous opinions. In addition, I want to express my gratitude to Robert Turner for proofreading and my deep appreciation to professors Edward Niewiadomski and Adam Olech for their insights, advice, and encouragement. Finally, I wish to thank Zayed University for supporting the completion of the *Tractatus* by a research grant.

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### Introduction

Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus (Political-Philosophical Treatise) aims to establish the principles of good governance and of a happy society, and to open up new directions for the future development of humankind. In an age that has so often declared the end of philosophy, a philosophical treatise on politics may be received with surprise. Therefore, in this introduction, I will try to show that philosophy is still a viable enterprise. To prove my thesis and provide the background of my work, I shall discuss human evolution, refer to the new science, describe the new politics, as I envision it, and explain my methodology.

#### On Human Evolution

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One of the most powerful and comprehensive philosophical ideas is that of human evolution. It has been discussed by Teilhard de Chardin, Julian Huxley, <sup>1</sup> and other thinkers, <sup>2</sup> and is linked to the evolutionary view of reality. The concept of evolution, the idea that reality or what-exists emerges in phases, cosmic, biological and human, in a process that generates novelty, variety, and sophistication, does not need to be understood as challenging the creation view, namely, that the world was created by God. Evolution is a creative process. Divine creation can proceed by the way of evolution. Whether reality is created or originates by itself or has always existed, science can-not answer. What is existence? Why does the world exist? How did it come about? Was it created or did it originate by itself? What was there before? These questions belong to the Mystery of Existence and transcend the limits of human understanding. They are philosophical or theological questions that fall outside the scientific domain.

#### 2 Introduction

It is characteristic of human beings that they can subject their lives to self-reflection, create culture, purposively change their environment, and thus engage in conscious evolution. Human evolution is still to a degree biological, depending on gene selection and proper nutrition; but primarily it is cultural, based on transmission of knowledge and values. We are no longer subjected to the automatic agency of natural selection. We are not mechanically determined in any way. The character of our future existence largely depends on our consciously and purposely developed material, moral, and intellectual environment: on our prosperity, education, beliefs, ideals, and traditions. Variations in them are reflected in individual, ethnic, national, class, and religious differences. Further, we need to realize that outcomes of both cosmic and biological evolutions are essentially completed, and their results can be seen in the natural environment of Earth.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps among billions of celestial bodies in the universe we can find one that has equally good conditions for biological life as ours. However, because of the complexity of the evolutionary pro-cess, the probability of finding such a place is very low. Similarly, perhaps among countless planets we can find one that has creatures like human beings. However, again, because of the sophistication of our mental abilities, the probability of finding such a being is very low. Thus, it is very likely that we are the only beings in the whole universe who have the capacities to carry evolution on.

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Josef Hoene-Wroński, a nineteenth-century mathematician and philosopher, described human evolution in four basic stages, which in my contemporary reading are as follows. First, as humanity emerges from barbarity, where there is no established moral order, the initial stage of human evolution comes with the great codes of law. These are the laws of Hammurabi in Babylon, of Moses in Israel, of Manu in India, and of other lawgivers in places where early civi-lizations started to develop. The task of these legal codes was to pro-vide human beings with a basic moral guidance. Inspiring the fear of punishment, they tried to inspire obedience by acting on the threat of external force alone. The second stage of evolution takes place in ancient Greece and Rome. Not only is political freedom then discovered and practically implemented in the Athenian polis, and later in the Roman republic, but also, with the beginning of philosophy, there is a development of free rational inquiry and of ethical think-ing based on virtue. The ideas of virtuous conduct and of natural

law then discovered refer to our inner moral qualities, and not to an external threat. Morality is further internalized in the third stage, which begins with Christianity. We cannot be forced to love others but can only internalize love in ourselves. The essential Christian ethical teachings are thus founded on our inner discipline and moral selftransformation. They introduce into our lives an element of spiri-tual freedom, which has creative and transforming influence on both our personal inner experiences and on the historical destiny of our societies. They produce an essential social dynamism, which causes that the changing of the world for better becomes an integral part of the Western ideal. Then, the fourth stage of evolution comes with modernity, which represents progress, but at the same time a decline. Modernity, grounded in the idea of a positive self-transformation, adopts the idea of progress as one of its leading ideas. However, it understands it in a narrow sense as a scientific progress and the improvement of material conditions of life, while it dismisses reli-gion and its moral teachings. Ethics becomes increasingly removed from politics in both theory and social practice. Thus, while making so many wonderful scientific and technological advancements, mod-ern humankind experiences at the same time numerous social prob-lems, revolutions, and wars. Because our vast technological powers have been separated from morality and even partially from rational-ity, there is a real danger that humanity will retreat to the first stage of its evolution, or even to barbarity.

When in the early nineteenth century he wrote his *Messianisme*, Hoene-Wroński did not have the abundance of sources of informa-tion about different civilizations that we have today. Thus, his views may sound rather Eurocentric. Certainly, we can enrich his picture by tracing the evolution of moral concepts and their impact on societ-ies in India, China, and in the Muslim world. These developments do not need to be parallel to each other because each civilization depends on its own traditions and values, and develops at its own pace. Nevertheless, his observation that in addition to the lust for power and wealth, which is so evident in European history, we can also find in the West the transforming intellectual and moral dynam-ics, which have contributed to a positive social and technological world change, is worth considering, as well as his conclusions.

The next, fifth stage of human evolution, which is not yet completed, but which he believed had already begun during his times,

#### 4 Introduction

is the age of revolutionary changes and severe conflicts. All sorts of potentially conflicting issues that divide humanity are there: reli-gious, economic, political, civilizational; and they are often presented in a rigid, dogmatic form and defended furiously by opposing camps. As a result, there is excessive violence, largely ideologically moti-vated. Everyone fights everyone, not just for power or for wealth, but for beliefs and particularly for the ultimate superiority of one's own belief. This is the current stage of the most scientifically and techno-logically developed humankind. It comes with the forgetfulness of who we really are, weakening of our religion, and the erosion of our morals. The consequences of these are major world wars and numer-ous smaller conflicts. Is there a way out? Like de Chardin and Hux-ley, Hoene-Wroński believes that, first of all, we need to recognize our true human identity and our destiny as humankind. Power is not the proper goal. The true end is not for any particular nation, religion, ideology, or political or economic system to overcome all the rest and affirm its unchallenged world domination. We have a higher task to be completed. We are vehicles of further evolution. In this phase evolution is no longer related merely to matter, but proceeds through the development of mind, as it is expressed in our scientific and technological achievements. However, the expansion of knowledge aimed at our intellectual perfection is not enough, if ethics is lack-ing. To bring "absolute Truth" and "absolute Goodness" together, as Hoene-Wroński writes—or in my words, to pursue both intellectual and moral perfection, by the way of self-transformation—is to put humanity on the right track again. The precondition for this is, as I advise in this *Tractatus*, to depart from a world turn apart by conflict and proceed by the way of cooperation.

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Julian Huxley, whose ideas on human evolution, presented in *Evolutionary Humanism*, are very inspiring, made one serious mistake. He tried to replace traditional religions with his new religion of humanism. Other secular humanists go even further in their attempt to remove divinity and religion completely from the world. However, if we really want to proceed further with evolution, as Huxley certainly desired, we cannot alienate large groups of people—in this particular case, those who believe in God—and create divisions among humankind that can lead to fervent conflicts. It is impossible to cooperate always with everyone; however, as a general rule, human progress can be achieved only if we work

cooperatively together. "Cooperation is based on the issues that unite people, as opposed to those that divide them" (1.52). The can be achieved on the basis of the needs and beliefs that we can share in common. Therefore, we cannot disregard people's religious sensitivities and declare that we now want to remove something that they regard as most important for their lives. Further, we can possibly develop successfully a new science or a new philosophy, for these enterprises can be planned and involve rational inquiry; but we cannot create by will any new religion because religion is not just a domain of rationality, but a domain of feelings and is usually a product of extraordinary vision and inspiration. Hence, the project of a new, humanist religion, based on reason alone, can never succeed and can only be regarded as a utopia.

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Huxley wanted to construct a new secular religion because he believed that traditional religions involve negative aspects, such as dogmas and superstitions. This observation is correct, mainly if we consider religions at a popular level. However, we can note that secular ideologies are also not free from dogmas. These are results of our limited understanding of complex phenomena and our tendency to simplify them. Dogmas and superstitions are then not only a religious issue but also an ideological one, and are related to inherent limitations of the human mind. Further, like other secular humanists, Huxley overlooks a positive aspect of traditional religion; it is its moral teaching. On the positive side, religion "shapes the character of human beings, influences their moral education, builds their community of values, produces solidarity among them, and fills their minds with a higher content than do the things of everyday life" (3.822). It develops us morally and protects us from demoralization. Consequently, human evolution cannot advance by alienating traditional religions. On the contrary, it requires including them in the evolutionary process and directing them wisely to the source of their own spirituality. At the deep, spiritual level of religion, which is a moral level, humanity can find a common ground. It can proceed beyond superficial religious and civilizational barriers, and come to mutual understanding and peace. "In today's situation of large-scale manipulation and escalating conflict in the world, the peace that humanity desperately needs should begin as peace among religions" (7.632). Thus, instead of attempting to weaken or even to destroy religions, we should rather invite

them all to participate in the moral and intellectual development of humankind.

There is one fundamental objection against human evolution that is stressed by some theologians and political scientists in the West. They claim that, because of their nature, human beings cannot be morally improved. For Reinhold Niebuhr the "idea that humankind can perfect itself by its own efforts . . . is the essence of sinfulness and the refusal to acknowledge human finiteness." Niebuhr's theological belief in origi-nal sin and the incurable corruption of human beings, at least in this world, is echoed by Hans Morgenthau's description of human beings as essentially power driven and egoistic, and by the beliefs of other international relations scholars that wars, even if we recognize them as being extremely destructive and morally ugly, will occur again and again, and that there will never be a truly lasting peace.

In response, I would argue that the opinions provided above are metaphysical visions of some sort. They potentially construct our reality rather than provide its factual descriptions. Certainly, we as human beings have capacities to do both evil and good. This can be proven by countless examples. However, whether we treat our neighbor with love or hatred or whether there should be war or peace largely depends on our own choices. As many Christian theologians say, to perfect ourselves by our own efforts may not be enough, and we might need God's grace. But more importantly, in Christianity the possibility of human perfection is acknowledged in Christ's say-ing: "Be perfect, therefore, even as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48). Our moral imperfection can eventually be overcome by faith and love. Human moral perfectibility is also recognized in Islam. Muslims believe that although human beings have an inclination to err, they can also recognize goodness. Falah (success) in building a moral order depends on our submission to Qur'anic guidance. 11 Then, in Indian thought, our perfectibility is not only possible, but constitutes the essence of human life. Hindus and Buddhists believe that each of us will have to be reborn, unable to escape the circle of life and death, until his or her personal perfection is realized. To conclude: "Human nature is unalterable" (2) and "cannot be transformed by any revolutionary change" (2.1). This is not because we are permanently either good or bad, but because we are evolutionary beings, capable of self-transformation and of moral and intellectual improvement, and to perfect ourselves and carry on evolution is our destiny.

Our biological evolution was basically completed several thousand years ago. Since then human bodies and brains have remained structurally the same. However, this does not mean that we are complete. Future technologies can improve our bodies. Moreover, we have already moved from biological to cultural evolution. This has been proved by so many wonderful human achievements, the results of the development of conceptual thought and symbolic language. Last but not least, the case of human evolution, particularly its intellectual side, is strongly supported today by the development of the new sci-ence: by its fresh, hitherto unthought-of, ground breaking discoveries and the novel perspectives that it opens for humankind.

#### On the New Science

According to the classical, Newtonian science, the natural world is deterministic and predictable. This picture has in turn determined how human phenomena are studied. Beginning with Thomas Hobbes 12who, following the scientific model of his epoch, wanted to make political science as precise as geometry, considered the universe as nothing but body in motion, and studied phenomena by applying the reductionist method-social scientists have tried to describe human beings as if they were bundles of appetites and aversions, to make them into living machines, to reduce complex social phenomena to their parts, and to subject politics to deterministic laws. But in the meantime physics has changed. It has discovered that at the subatomic level determinism no longer applies and the character of occurrences is probabilistic. Today's physicists no longer try to reduce all aspects of phenomena to the interactions of their smallest constituents, but rather stress their relationships, and particularly the relations with their environment. The universe is no longer considered as a machine, but rather as a dynamic whole, whose parts are interrelated. Moreover, the Cartesian division between mind and matter has been challenged. It has been discovered that the mind of the observer is not only necessary to observe things, but also to bring about their properties. However, perhaps the greatest challenge that the new science presents to the older worldview is related to the context of discovery. It questions the standard empiricist or positivistic position that no substantial thesis about the world can be accepted in science independently of observation and experiment. It shows that we cannot separate scientific

inquiry from philosophical assumptions, and that it is philosophical, intuitive thinking that is essential for the expansion of knowledge.

The achievements of today's science are astonishing. Scientific knowledge continues to grow rapidly and subjects to its research new domains of phenomena, creating as a result new disciplines such as cosmology or molecular biology. In addition, science continues to stimulate the advancement of new technologies. It is very successful both in the development of its theoretical concepts and in the wealth of its practical applications. However, scientific progress is not merely a result of meritorious studies of phenomena based on evidence and accumulation of empirical data. It depends on the acceptance of new ideas about the universe, which help to comprehend and describe it better than rival views. The success of science, as Nicholas Maxwell eloquently argues, is due to the progressive adoption of new metaphysical visions that describe the universe better than earlier views, and of methods and theories appropriate to these new visions. These visions or ideas of the universe are "assumptions concerning [its] comprehensibility and knowability." <sup>13</sup> Their progressive adoption does not refer only to the replacement of concepts based on Aristotelian metaphys-ics by those of Newtonian mechanics and then by those of Einstein's space-time and by those of quantum mechanics. Within the framework of modern physics, we can witness a continuous innovation. If we consider, for example, the scientific picture of fundamental physical entities, in Maxwell's description, they have been believed to be, in turn:

small, rigid corpuscles that interact only by contact; point-particles that interact at a distance; a rigid quasimaterialistic stuff spread throughout the universe (the ether); a continuously varied field spread throughout the space within which point-particles are embedded; a self-interacting field; curved space-time, probabilistic quantum objects; quantum fields; superstrings.<sup>14</sup>

These views of physical entities are not unrelated, but actually they represent more and more complete and accurate approximations to the nature of physical reality. New philosophical ideas or metaphysical visions that replace the old ones, extend or improve earlier approximations. They try to unveil the subsequent layers of reality itself.

What is reality? In a narrow positivistic or empirical vision, whose expression can be found in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, facts are the whole reality. He declares: "The world is

the totality of facts" and "The world divides into facts." "The whole reality is the world." These declarations can serve as an example of how positivism, which declares itself an antimetaphysical program, formulates a metaphysical thesis and at the same time is unaware of it. <sup>16</sup> For the positivists, to exist is to be perceived. Reality, what-exists, is sensible facts, denoting what can be observed. These depend on sensory perceptions of the observer. Statements about them, based on observation and experiment, are meant to be objective. They are assumed to be independent of any subjective conditions related to observations. The assumption is that we can distinguish between object and subject, and observe objects without influencing them. Thus, in the positivist worldview, one of the key characteristics of science is objectivity. Values and other qualitative attributes of the world that cannot be observed and classified as facts are considered the domain of subjectivity, the matter of personal preference, and as such are excluded from reality and scientific inquiry. Statements about them are denied any sense. This is why for Wittgenstein, as well as for other positivists, ethics, a domain of values, cannot be meaningfully expressed. Positivism in social sciences excludes the possibility of a rational, theoretical discussion of a morally and polit-ically good life, and of making meaningful value choices. But as one of the leading exponents of the new physics, Fritjof Capra, claims, by transcending the Cartesian division between body and mind, the new science "has not only invalidated the classical ideal of objective description of nature but has also challenged the myth of value-free science." There is always subjectivity in objectivity. While it is not apparent in classical physics, which, as Heisenberg describes, "can be considered as that idealization in which we speak about the world as completely separated from ourselves," 18 it becomes evident at the subatomic level, investigated in quantum theory, where the observed electrons do not have properties independent from the mind of the observer. Hence, positivism conceals an implicit subjectivism that is present in the cognitive process. It does not understand that its description of reality as facts is only an interpretation, but takes facts to be reality itself and derives from this view practical consequences related to the possibility of thinking and speaking meaningfully about values.

Values can be defined as the "qualities that human beings appreciate because of their usefulness or their role in the satisfaction of human needs" (2.555). If we agree with the positivists that values

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cannot be known by direct observation such as physical phenomena, this does not mean that values cannot be known at all, or do not exist, or are merely subjective. Since in knowing the world, our subjectiv-ity is always involved—or there is always a knower and what is to be known—facts are essentially subjective. However, just as it is possible to communicate facts to others and agree on statements con-cerning them, because if we practice impartiality and neutrality, they can be made inter-subjective, and in this sense, also objective, so also it is possible to express values with sense, agree on them, and imple-ment them in our lives. Hence, rationality and meaningfulness are not merely limited to factuality. We can speak rationally and meaningfully about values as well. Further, only human beings can think and act in terms of values. They are the essential part of our human reality. To disregard them as lacking sense would impoverish reality itself, remove one of its important dimensions. In so far as human reality is concerned, the world is "something more than the totality of facts, and propositions can express something higher than facts" (7.202). "The world is the totality of values, rather than the totality of facts" (7.2021). Compared to the world as the totality of facts, the world as the totality of values is like the quantum world compared to the world of classical physics. While the latter is deterministic and can be described by causal laws, the former presupposes uncertainty and creativity. The world that human beings create, the human-made environment, "is a result of the values they adopt" (7.8). "What is our goal?" (7.71) "What will we pass on to future generations?" (7.73) In order to answer these questions, findings of science are not sufficient. Even the most advanced science remains only a partial knowledge about some part of reality; but we are asking here about the whole of reality in which we, humans, are included. Therefore, we need to engage in a philosophical reflection. Our answers will depend on the state of our current knowledge, including self-knowledge, or on the state of our consciousness. Consciousness, and particularly its states or levels, is thus another dimension of reality.

New theories, especially quantum theory, have shown that our reality, even the physical one, is far more complex than we had earlier imagined. They have brought important revisions of our earlier conceptions of the universe and our relations to it. They depict a more sophisticated natural environment than that which can be described by

the notions of objectivity and of cause and effect. Elementary particles observed by quantum scientists appear in a network of interactions. They also develop a relationship to the observer, leading us to the conclusion that at a deeper level of reality, we cannot study anything as separate from ourselves. Thus the ideal of scientific objectivity, as an object standing over and against the subject, disappears. Further, our acts of observation and of theorizing about reality are a part of the process that brings it forth. Reality is thus not merely a set of facts arrested in a process observation. It does not have a static quality, but a dynamic one. It is modified according to our engagement with it. This idea applies not only to the subatomic level, but also to social life. The dynamism of human relationships is expressed in values that we learn and adopt. Our relationship can be loving, indifferent, or hateful. It can be also friendly, respectful, and tolerant, or characterized by their opposites. Because of different values that we apply to them, social relationships allow for a great dynamism and are far more complex than those that we encounter in quantum mechanics. They cannot be easily calculated even by most complicated mathematical equations. Nevertheless, they share many similarities.

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There is now growing interest in applying the discoveries of the new science to social sciences. The evidence for this could be, for example, the recent excellent work of Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science. However, as Werner Heisenberg, a Nobel Prizewinning physicist who is known for the development of quan-tum theory, noted some time ago, we should not apply forcefully "scientific concepts in domains where they do not belong." 19 It is rather mistaken to believe that we can build a social science with the help of formal models used in quantum theory and calculate utilities by using new formulas. To do so would be an attempt to interpret discoveries of the new science in the spirit of an outdated early modern philoso-phy. It is true that human beings cannot violate the laws of physics, as Wendt argues, but it is equally true that the laws of physics can-not fully describe human behavior. <sup>20</sup> Therefore, instead of trying to relate new scientific theories directly to social phenomena, we should let them help us to overcome the narrow empiricist and materialistic interpretations of reality derived from Newtonian physics that still largely prevail over our minds. As these theories cogently explain, the world represents a system of coherent, evolving, interactive processes

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that only temporarily manifest themselves as stable structures. Its infinite complexity and ever-growing diversity can be only artificially arrested by control and reduced to uniformity. These insights derived from the new science should guide us to a new vision of politics that would be less based on fragmentation and division, as exemplified in modern individualism, but more connecting and holistic, and thus more appropriate to our new evolutionary epoch.

#### On the New Politics

As has been shown above, objectivity cannot be separated from subjectivity. If we can speak rationally and meaningfully about facts, we can also speak rationally and meaningfully about values. If state-ments concerning values could not be expressed with sense, as posi-tivists claim, and were merely a matter of personal preference, we could not meaningfully discuss political ideas, such as freedom or justice. Statements about them would then become merely something related to an individual or group choice, and assume the forms of different ideologies. We could not reasonably decide then which of these ideologies is true, and they would become like those incommensurable paradigms that cannot be measured against one another, but can only be eventually tolerated. However, since we cannot rely merely on the celebration of plurality, but also need to choose cer-tain values and ideological frameworks to guide our lives, our choice would finally depend not on reason, but on power. Whether or not it is made explicit in the positivist program, once the possibility of ratio-nal discussion and meaningful evaluation of something is removed, then power becomes what really counts in our societies at both theo-retical and practical levels. It decides about values, defines them, and like in Hobbes and his followers, constitutes the highest value itself. Thus, under the influence of positivism and other modern doctrines, will to power and desire to control become the leading features of modernity. This translates in practice into the untamed human con-quest of nature, conflict-riven societies, recurrent destructive wars, and the conflicting character of international relations. Politics is the-oretically defined as a struggle for power, with the exclusion of other views, and this is also what it becomes in social practice. It is difficult to find a better illustration of the profound, yet mostly unreflected-upon influence of philosophical ideas on human life.

Human reality is principally self-created. The force of creation belongs to our ideas and not to our material conditions, which can merely influence our thinking to some degree. By discovering new ideas in physics, we can better understand physical reality, but we cannot change it; by discovering new ideas in philosophy or politics, we can not only understand but also change human reality. We cannot alter the laws of physics; but we can alter the laws by which we are guided. "It belongs to the nature of the human being to be able to create culture" (2.54). By creating culture—our artificial environment (material, social, spiritual)—we transcend the limitations associated with our original, natural animal endowment. We proceed beyond mere obedience to biological drives and discover freedom, the possibility of self-realization. We can thus self-create and transform ourselves. Our reality is our culture or the environment that we create. "The development of culture knows no boundaries" (2.553). But culture can be adopted and developed for both constructive and destructive goals. We have the ability to build and to destroy. "Slavery and war are the results of the development of culture, just as are science and art" (2.5421). Therefore, what we will make of our lives largely depends on our choice, particularly on the choice of values that guide our lives, and our right choice depends on our correct recognition of whom we really are. "We were not born here on Earth to become consumers or militants" (7.76), nor to merely to seek wealth and power, but to fully develop morally and intellectually. Power, ability to do something, can only be a means, never the goal, which is our perfectibility. Within the universe as we know it, we represent the pinnacle of evolution. This is reflected in our ability to think, invent things, and plan ahead, and in our capacity for ethical thought. However, we are not yet complete beings. At present, there is a huge difference between the development of our scientific knowledge and techno-logical abilities, and our moral growth. Morality and rationality are dynamic phenomena; they cannot be prescribed by unchanging rules, but have to be internalized. We can still further develop in ourselves our moral sensitivity and intellectual curiosity. We may include in the basic imperative "do not harm" not only our fellow human beings, but also the animal world and even the natural world at large. We can enlarge our understanding of the place and role of human beings in the universe and our ecological awareness. At this stage, human evo-lution becomes a conscious evolution, a self-transforming process.

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It is an enormous task, which requires that human beings cooperate with each other for its completion.

The new politics is based on the awareness of human identity and on the role of human beings in the evolutionary process. With the new politics, a new age of humanity begins. It is the evolutionary epoch that replaces modernity and postmodernity. While modernity was inspired by the mechanistic, materialistic, and deterministic view of the universe emerging from Newtonian physics and tried to apply this view to living organisms and social phenomena, and postmodernity has been characterized by unsolved problems related to globalization, political instability, and a regress to irrationality, the evolutionary epoch or evolutionity is inspired by the idea of human evolution, and by the organic and holistic worldview emerging from the new science. It is not revolutionary, like most modern and post-modern intellectual and political movements, but evolutionary. It is not against traditions, but rather appreciates their value and tries to build on them. It does not want to undermine religions, but rather seeks to uncover what is truly valuable in them—their spirituality. Particularly, it revitalizes the tradition of classical rationality. "In classical rationality, reasoning is not only an instrument to achieve various benefits, but primarily an axiological reflection on what is morally good or bad, favorable or unfavorable, right or wrong" (9.212). Classical rationality, which at its core is an evolutionary one, involves thinking and speaking meaningfully about values. It is expressed in politics "in the pragmatism of actions aimed at a good life" (9.216). A good life is not only "the wealth or material prosper-ity of human beings, but also their spiritual (moral and intellectual) development" (1.21). It leads to their happiness or self-realization.

To consider happiness as a normative goal of society and the state is an old tradition that goes back to Aristotle and his notion of *eudaimonia*. However, *Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus* is not merely an Aristotleian or classical project, but one that is inspired by and advances human evolution. I agree with Aristotle that happiness is more than a passing moment of joy and signifies our flourishing or fulfilling life, our self-realization, the highest good that human beings usually desire. It is difficult to imagine that anyone would like to be unhappy, i.e., would not like to prosper materially and to develop mentally, and if we find such a case, it would be a strange one indeed. Further, I agree with Aristotle that while happiness is related

to satisfying our various needs, it cannot be reduced to sensual pleasure, nor to the satisfaction of endless desires, as Hobbes famously claimed. Nevertheless, contrary to Aristotle, I do not endorse any special lifestyle, such as the contemplative, and do not promote a particular concept of happiness related to it. My basic assumption is that all human beings have the same nature, the same basic desires and needs, and "the same goal, which is happiness" (2.5351). But because of their different social and cultural backgrounds, and their individual personalities, they can individually modify their needs and restrain their desires, and understand happiness or self-realization in various ways. "A society is a diverse community. It consists of people who differ from each other in their level of affluence, intel-ligence, and education, as well as their character traits" (3.211). What is important to all of us is a sense of achievement, a fulfilling life, which is expressed in the word "self-realization." Some people might find selfrealization or fulfillment in the theoretical life of a scien-tist, others in the active life of a politician or a business person, still others in an undistinguished life of everyday activities and of many simple pleasures; finally, many may find their self-realization in spiritual pursuits and a search for eternal happiness. What would be an advancement for some of us could be a failure for others. Further, as our societies develop in terms of their organization and sophis-tication, what most people understand by happiness can change. Consequently, we cannot mechanically prescribe the same notion of happiness or selfrealization to everyone. "A happy society is one in which everyone has an opportunity for self-realization and respects the self-realization of others" (10.03). In a happy society, we pursue happiness, as we best understand it ourselves, yet without imposing it forcefully on others or obtaining it at the cost to others. Lastly, since we are all moral and rational beings, our self-realization "is expressed most fully in moral and intellectual perfection" (2.5352).

Moral and intellectual perfection cannot be imposed on human beings from above. It can only be internalized and considered as the ultimate goal toward which we strive. Only at an early stage of human evolution can morality be forcefully imposed on people by unchanging laws. However, such an imposition does not guarantee any moral progress. It merely fixes human beings in one limited eth-ical model. Similarly, to request that people develop intellectually by following unchanging views of the world and stationary rules of

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reasoning would impede rather than stimulate their mental growth. To further develop mentally and become innovative, they need to discover intellectual curiosity in themselves, be allowed to challenge their earlier views, and be able to freely exercise their thinking.

Consequently, at later stages of human evolution, both the devel-

opment of morality and the expansion of knowledge have to become internal processes. This internality is expressed in the idea of moral and intellectual virtues, particularly in the highest ones: love and wisdom. As people become virtuous, they discover an inner joy in doing things that are ethically right, just as they find an inner joy in discovering new things and expanding their knowledge. Those who find joy in virtuous or noble acts are properly speaking the nobility. Therefore, a happy society, even a democratic one, must always include a noble element. A good democracy is *sophocracy*, an ennobled democracy (6). It must be based on virtues. If virtues, particularly integrity and wisdom, are missing from politics, then it gets corrupted. It loses its essential character of good governance and becomes a mere play of different, mainly commercial, interests. It is dominated by powerful lobbies and is populated by mediocre individuals who usurp authority since they often lack moral and intellectual qualifications for leadership. Social life becomes then increasingly commercialized, split apart by conflicts, uncertain about the future, manipulated by media, and deprived of much place for the fine arts and for deeper philosophical or religious reflection. To resist these trends and to advance human evolution, there must be in society a moral and intel-lectual elite: the elite of honor and merit. It is "the minority group, comprising people who are noble, resourceful, and educated, that in every generation contributes to the maintenance and development of various aspects of culture" (6.731). If such people are lacking or are replaced by others who are less diligent and less talented, or who, lacking integrity, merely exploit others, by forming a so-called "parasitic elite" (6.662), our culture, and ultimately our civilization, declines.

The organic conception of the world, inspired by the new science, presupposes growth and what I describe as "the laws of liberty." They are "rules for successful action—action that brings benefits to the individual or group and is not associated with doing harm to other human beings" (4.21). These laws regard societies as organisms and develop them on the basis of peoples' traditions and experiences. The

basic difference between machines (mechanisms) and organisms, as Capra rightly notes, is "that machines are constructed, whereas organisms grow."<sup>22</sup> The views of society and of the state that still dominate our textbooks go back to the Hobbesian and Lockean ideas of social contract. They refer to constructs or mechanisms. When Hobbes and Locke applied their concepts of human beings motivated by power and self-interest to social phenomena, they were guided by the inten-tion to describe human behavior by laws similar to those that govern the Newtonian universe. They conveyed to us "a mechanical picture of the human being driven by desires" (2.554). But this cannot work. We are far too sophisticated to be described by the laws of physics. Our behavior cannot be merely explained by our desires, interests, or power-drives. We are not simple mechanisms "whose operation can be reduced to the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of suffering, or to selfishness and the struggle for power, but rather a complex organism of an axiological character" (2.5541). Only in some civili-zations, namely in those that do not proceed beyond or decline to the first stage of human evolution, is there mechanization of humankind based on coercion. An example of such a civilization is the oriental-Byzantine civilization, or in short "Byzantism," which gradually "eliminates freedom by means of its all-powerful bureaucracy and its extended mechanism of control over all aspects of human existence" (5.43). It is my suggestion that to revitalize our Western civilization, we need to go beyond Byzantism and Militarism to the Classical Tradition or to our classical heritage: namely, away from domination, centralism, and uniformity to freedom, autonomy, and diversity. This is also what the new science suggests. If we want to describe human affairs, it is then better to use an organic analogy rather than to reduce them to a materialistic and mechanistic picture.

The fundamental principle of humankind is cooperation. We can perhaps imagine ourselves to be independent individuals or live in independent countries, but in fact we cannot achieve anything of importance without cooperation with others. Society is a diverse community linked by bonds of cooperation. It consists of people who differ from each other in their level of affluence, intelligence, and education, as well as their habits and character traits. They all need to work together to achieve individual and common goals. The idea of removing all differences, making all people alike, and arriving at a classless society is neither compatible with human nature

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nor conducive to human progress. Each social class or diverse social group represents some values and this is its potential contribution to the common good.

The basic values of the three basic classes which I consider the most important in society—labor, business, and honor—are freedom, entrepreneurship, and nobility (3.214). They all have their role in a happy society. Hence, instead of trying to make people or cultures the same, we shall recognize their unique differences based on their values and contributions. The greatest human advances in scientific discovery, creative art, and political leadership are usually due to remarkably gifted, exceptional individuals. Rather than being overwhelmingly concerned with equality, we should then pay more attention to quality. We must aim at increasing the quality of life. Our personalities, potentialities, and individualities constitute the world's greatest resources. Thus to move forward with human evolution, we need to cooperate to utilize our resources, work in a community, and yet retain our fruitful diversity. This applies not only to diversity based on values and contributions within societies, but also to the diversity of nation-states. They should not be replaced by a world state. Instead, they should act within the framework of an interna-tional community. The seven principles of political rationalism intro-duced in the Tractatus present a new vision of international politics. Our common task is to build a strong international community based on shared values and cooperation, with the goal of "advancing the prosperity and progress of all humankind" (9.51).

In this short introduction, only some ideas concerning the vision of the new politics can be mentioned. The *Tractatus* discusses a number of topics. To name just a few, these are: politics, human nature, the state, freedom, solidarity, democracy, civilization, family and marriage, power, international relations, war, and peace. Also, it introduces new words, such as *sophocracy*, ennobled democracy; *nativeculturalism*, an alternative to multiculturalism; or *parentsexuality*, a privileged form of sexuality. It addresses many issues that concern today's political thinkers. Some of the questions that I ask and try to answer are: What is a person? What is culture? What is civilization? What are the values of independent countries and local communities? What are the advantages and challenges related to living in multicultural societies? What is a happy society and what are its principles? How can we distinguish the morally and politically

good from the bad? What relationship should human beings have to their environment? Can we find a basis for shared values that can bring us together as humankind? On what basis can the principles of global justice and solidarity be established? The main objective of my work is to demonstrate the necessity of, and provide a guide for, the redirection of humanity. I argue that this paradigm shift must involve changing the character of social life and politics from com-petitive to cooperative, encouraging moral and intellectual virtues, providing foundations for happy societies, promoting peace among countries, and building a strong international community. I try to show that the essence of politics is not a struggle for power, which can only be its derivative meaning, but rather the ability to orga-nize society for cooperation and actualize a good life. Also, I try to remind humanity of its high task, which is moral and intellectual perfection, and the advancement of human evolution.

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#### On My Method

Philosophy and science each have their methods proper to the problems that they want to solve. In each case methodology depends on epistemology and ontology. What are my ontological assumptions? I assume that reality is in a process of evolution and unfolds to us as we are ourselves engaged in a self-transforming, evolutionary process. In order to grasp the evolving reality, which is continually unfolding to us, our thinking itself must be evolutionary. It cannot be static, but must be dynamic. It must reject any dogmatic position, whether secular or religious, which tries to arrest change, to arrive at some limited and final ideological conclusions, and to see the end of human history in a definite form. Evolutionary thinking is based on a non-dogmatic, open-ended system of ideas that help us to comprehend the world in which we live, and direct our evolution.

In *Tractatus Politico-Philosophicus*, I propose a new idea-system. Ideas concerning different topics related to politics are introduced. From the main ideas others are deduced. Ideas are formulated thoughts. They are vehicles of knowledge. But since we change ourselves and our environment by ideas, by the way we think, they also create reality. Statements expressing ideas do not merely define social phenomena, but also describe them and often give them a purpose. However, proposing new ideas cannot be arbitrary. Inventing them is

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not merely exercising our fantasy. It must be guided by some reason and must attract the understanding of others and their support. This is the essence of the method of dialectic employed by Plato. What we come to believe is verified through discussion. Dialectic is a method by which we maintain an intellectual openness. It can assume a question-answer format, which is so characteristic of Platonic dialogues, or become internalized and become a form of rational thought. <sup>23</sup> It serves the triple purpose of clarification, verification, and discovery of knowledge. To justify themselves, ideas must be subjected to a logical, thoughtful, and practical test. To illustrate this, the first idea of my idea-system is expressed in the proposition: "Politics is the art of governing; it is essentially the organization of society for cooperation" (1). This proposition does not merely define politics, but also points to its essentially cooperative character. It does not involve any logical contradiction. If we subject the idea to a thoughtful and practical test, we can come to the conclusion that politics, as the art of governing whose purpose is to sustain cooperation in society, makes sense and is possible: it can be practically implemented. As it is clear from the proposition 1.15, this idea of politics disputes the influential idea that "all politics is a struggle for power." What is then the ontological difference between these two ideas and the idea-systems to which they belong? What are the two realities that come out of these two conceptions of politics? One is the reality of cooperation; one is the reality of conflict. Which one is more true? As the proposition 1.512 says, "if life were essentially conflict, then a world transformation would be impossible, there would be no progress, and nothing would ever grow." Conflict can be regarded as a part of life but not as its essence (1.1513). Consequently, while we can find examples of both cooperation and conflict in today's political life, the argument is that the idea of politics as the struggle for power represents a morally and ontologically impoverished picture of human reality.

As a social phenomenon, politics is obviously more complicated than the simple distinction between cooperation and conflict may suggest, and to illustrate its complexity, which involve moral, ideological, civilizational, and other factors, this whole book was written. However, what emerges from our initial consideration of the first idea is that different ideas lead us to different world-pictures. Again, to decide which of the pictures is more true, it is not enough to conduct empirical social research. The survey results are not yet

sufficient to decide on what is really true. They tell us only about statistical occurrences and can eventually inform us whether something can occur or not, or what is more likely to occur. They are limited to facts, which are only one dimension of reality. They may be only factually true, but not axiologically and essentially true. In order to understand and to decide what is true to human beings, we must not only consider facts, but also values, and know what is essential to us. If we consider that we are evolutionary beings, creating culture, forming concepts and developing ideas, changing our environment, and thus self- creating ourselves, the picture of politics that is supportive of our nature and destiny would be more true to reality than a view of politics that is based merely on potentially erroneous factual evidence that is supported by a statistical majority.

Ideas that form an idea-system grow out of our thoughts and experiences. These represent worldviews, based on facts and values. What is the epistemological status of these ideas? They are holistic grasps of reality. These grasps are not direct research findings, such as quantitative results, but rather intuitive visions that may sometimes be inspired by them. Intuition is also a part of the method of dialectic. It operates on concepts and can consider their relationships in one glance. It discovers what is essential in phenomena. It belongs to our subjectivity, but it is not merely something subjective. It is based on what we already know: on what we have learned and observed. By contrast to analytic statements, which do not expand knowledge, but eventually infer conclusions from what is assumed or known, ideas based on intuitions are expressed in synthetic statements.

Synthetic, intuitive knowledge, which we find in philosophy and mathematics, is not merely a poetic imagination. It can be subjected to rational and empirical verification, of which the proof is the employment of mathematical ideas in today's physics. <sup>24</sup> Intuition can give us a vision. These visions or ideas, when applied in science, can move it forward. However, they can also be applied to other aspects of human life. If we study social phenomena by using research methods, we can eventually come to conclusions concerning how things are. But ideas that refer to holistic grasps of reality can tell us more. They can also advise how things can be and should be. Ultimately, ideas and concepts are the stepping stones of our evolution. Language is not merely a tool for communication, or a house of being; it is the creator

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of our reality. We create the world for ourselves by our language. By using a rich and beautiful language, we do not only increase our intelligence, but also our aesthetic and moral sensitivity. The role of our subjectivity is not merely, as Immanuel Kant discovered, to provide us with pure intuitions and categories, by which we can apprehend and know things as phenomena. We do not only know the world by means of concepts, but also are created by them—by all concepts that we form. As we form various concepts out of the raw material of our experience and they enter into our language, and are then used to form different ideas, they expand our knowledge and hence unveil reality. Obviously for some concepts such as "unicorn" or "phoenix" we do not find an empirical verification because they are only results of our imagination, but concepts describing values, such as courage, prudence, or freedom, refer to something real, and not merely subjective, for we can find expressions of these in the real world known to us, and can discuss ideas related to these concepts with others.

To conclude, philosophy, understood in a classical sense as a quest for complete knowledge of the whole, is possible, and we can speak meaningfully and rationally about values. Speaking about values, learning and internalizing them, develops us not only morally, but also intellectually, and expands the scope of our reality. But if we deny the possibility of expressing values and remove them from rational inquiry, we impoverish our world. The effect is that we then become demoralized, driven by will to power, rather than by will to achieve moral and intellectual perfection, which is our ultimate goal. In order to remind human beings of this goal and to move humanity in a right direction, I have written this Tractatus. It rep-resents an idea-system. The ideas it presents are interconnected and there is some argumentation. The arguments in support of essential points and against some views are perhaps more implicit than plainly stated, but they become plain to careful readers who are acquainted with current issues and debates in political philosophy and interna-tional relations theory. Yet, to make the idea-system introduced in my work more universal, and thus longer lasting, opening up new directions for the future development of humankind, and not merely related to today's concerns, I have generally avoided direct refer-ences to contemporary affairs. The final words of the Tractatus are an allusion to Wittgenstein who, on the dedication page, quotes a motto that everything that can be known can be said in just three

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words. He does not say what these words are. I propose: "life, freedom, and cooperation" and conclude with the statement: "The purpose of the evolution of life is its fullness and perfection. Human evolution is a journey to ever greater freedom and to moral and intellectual perfection." This is my message to humanity.

#### **Notes**

- 1 See Julian Huxley, *Evolutionary Humanism*; Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*.
- 2 Among Indian philosophers who viewed human beings in an evolutionary perspective was Sri Aurobindo, who was particularly in the inner process of evolution as reflected in the evolution of human spirit or consciousness. See A. (Aryasamayajula) Ramamurty, *Vedanta and Its Philosophical Development*, pp. 123–125.
- 3 Transhumanists emphasize the possibility of human enhancement by science and technology. See *Humanity Plus Minus: Transhumanism and Its Critics*. However, while genetic engineering and other new techniques can possibly improve our intelligence, health and longevity, they cannot make us wiser or more virtuous. To transcend the present human condition and to develop morally and intellectually, we need a self-conscious cultural evolution.
- 4 See Steven Pinker, *The Better Angels of Our Nature*. Pinker describes a "pacification process" through which tribal warfare, feuding, and brigandry were brought under control by harsh laws, to be followed by a "civilising process."
- 5 The Muslim Sufi poet and mystic Rumi envisaged human beings as emerging from lower forms of nature and evolving spiritually to higher angelic forms till their realization in God.
- 6 Julian Huxley, Evolutionary Humanism, pp. 105-106, 223-225.
- 7 Numbers following quotations refer to numbered paragraphs of the *Tractatus*.
- 8 See Harold Coward, The Perfectibility of Human Nature, p. 188.
- 9 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 25-26.
- 10 Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," s. 8–9.
- 11 Harold Coward, The Perfectibility of Human Nature, pp. 81-82.
- 12 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan.
- 13 See Nicholas Maxwell, The Comprehensibility of the Universe, p. 2.
- 14 Ibid., p. 217.
- 15 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1.1; 1.2; 2.063.
- 16 See Julian Marias, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 342–343.
- 17 Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point: Science, Society, and the Rising Culture, p. 87.
- 18 Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 106.
- 19 Ibid., p. 199

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- 20 See Alexander Wendt, Quantum Mind and Social Science, p. 10.
- 21 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics.
- 22 Fritjof Capra, The Turning Point, p. 268.
- 23 See Ann M. Kinney, The Meaning of Dialectic in Plato, p. 243.
- 24 See Roger Penrose, *The Road to Reality: A Complete Guide to the Laws of the Universe*, pp. 1014–1034.