Theism and the Problem of Consciousness: Waiting for Fallacy of the Closure of the Physical

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Main Text

It has been argued that theism is not compatible with the “closure of the physical”. In other terms, there cannot be any role for the divine action if we consider that the physical is not -and has not been- affected by a non-physical thing, agent, etc. (Narimani et al., 2020). On the other hand, the problem of consciousness is currently in the point that there is not an explanatory picture for the physicalist view, explaining how the subjective experience can be explained by functional terms (Chalmers, 2007). Dualist views on consciousness have been blamed for their incompetence about explaining issues raise from duality. Considering relative coherence between dualism and theism, we are trying to provide some opinions.

In our opinion, the key option for addressing the problem of consciousness that should be pursued by theist thinkers is somewhere in the fallacy of “closure of the physical”. This tendency famously affects Descartes judgments led to introduce his dualist metaphysics. We think that not only Descartes, but also any theist thinker will encounter a problem with the closure of the physical when addressing consciousness. In other words, there cannot be any theory for consciousness that is compatible with both theism and closure of the physical. Therefore, the best strategy for theist thinkers who work on the problem of consciousness is to focus on possible problems raised by accepting the closure of physical.

References
