

To Leave Open the Possibility for Hardness of the Meta Problem

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Abstract

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining subjective experience. This problem is based on the notion that explaining brain functions cannot lead to explaining experience (Chalmers, 1995). The meta problem of consciousness is the problem that why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers suggests that solving the meta problem deals with human reports of the hard problem- named problem reports. He notes that since problem reports are facts of human behavior we can consider them explainable by functional terms. Therefore, the meta problem is an easy problem (Chalmers, 2018). In this article, we are trying to to leave open the possibility for hardness of the meta problem.

Main Text

An explanatory solving of the meta problem through explaining reports, requires *a complete picture* of what happens during a single report. In order to have a complete picture, it should be considered that various phenomenal states exist at that moment when a human makes a single problem report. It seems to us that those phenomenal states are at least parts of a complete explanation for the question that why she thinks there is a hard problem. Therefore, in order to solve the meta problem, phenomenal aspects of the answering moments should also be explained. Thus, if it is true that explaining brain functions of problem reports will not lead to explaining problem reports, a hard problem will rise for the meta problem.

References

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