The Meta Problem of Consciousness: To Question the Nature of Human Reports

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Abstract

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining subjective experience. This problem is based on the notion that explaining brain functions cannot lead to explaining experience (Chalmers, 1995). The meta problem of consciousness is the problem that why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. David Chalmers suggests that solving the meta problem deals with human reports of the hard problem- named problem reports. He notes that since problem reports are facts of human behavior we can consider them explainable by functional terms. Therefore, the meta problem is an easy problem (Chalmers, 2018). In this article, we are trying to question the nature of human reports.

Main Text

Chalmers (2018) suggests that in order to solve the meta problem, we should explain dispositions to make specific problem reports and judgments. He names those dispositions as “problem intuitions”. It is not clear for us why Chalmers narrowed the view of problem reports to the problem intuitions. We think that the nature of human reports cannot be summarized in intuitions. At least, we can consider there have been lots of thoughts about the given subject before the examination of a specific intuition. This notion can be further developed to concurrent conceptual phenomenal states while making reports. If we pose an inclusivist position about those states, it is not clear that why we should eliminate them from the explanation.

References