

# Moses Hess, Marx and Money<sup>1</sup>

## I

The aim and scope of this discussion is limited. I wish to explore a few themes within the Young Hegelian conceptual framework, in order to place within it Moses Hess's essay *On the Essence of Money*. However, I prefer to talk of a 'triadic framework' instead of the 'Young Hegelian conceptual framework,' for several reasons. The phrase 'the Young Hegelian conceptual framework' is very vague while it pretends to be specific. Consequently, while it gives only a rough indication of my subject matter it can invite criticism: one might justly ask what is meant by 'the Young Hegelian conceptual framework' and be lost for an answer.

To talk of a 'triadic framework' also gives some unity to the themes I am exploring, while not limiting me to its specifically Hegelian version. Triads do crop up in the writings of the Young Hegelians and it would be a mistake to see them either as corrupt versions of their classic appearance in the Hegelian system or just as oddities that can be ignored. There can be two different kinds of variety in the triadic pattern. One kind of variation is when the patterns themselves have different logical forces and serve different functions. In the other kind the pattern is the same but is filled with different contents, the assumption being that the logical force of the pattern will be transmitted to the new contents.

We shall see examples of both kinds of variation and combinations of them. The first kind, for instance, is that between (a) the triadic pattern of three succeeding ages of mankind, and (b) the triadic pattern of original unity, fallen or alienated existence, and return to unity on a higher level. We shall see both of these exemplified in Hess's writings. The first is his *Sacred History of Mankind* with the ages of God the Father, God the Son and the coming age of the Holy Spirit; the second is in his present essay where he argues that money is our alien-

ated essence and that mankind will achieve a higher level of unity by overcoming this alienated state. We shall also briefly analyse a third type of pattern, the triad of head, heart and stomach, a symbolism which recurs in the writings of the Young Hegelians. Its decipherment throws an interesting light on the similarities and differences between the views of Hess and Marx about the role of the proletariat.

The above three are different types of triadic patterns. It is in connection with the second kind of variation, when the same type of triadic pattern is filled in with different contents, that we shall see the great significance of Hess and especially of his present essay. Even the title of his essay echoes Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity*. Hess placed a different human essence in what he understood to be Feuerbach's pattern of human alienation: it is not our consciousness of the infinite, that is, the consciousness of our infinity, which is projected into a Divine Being, but it is our co-operative productive work and exchange which, as our essence, is projected into an alien object, into money.

One of my brief critical comments later will concern the question whether, quite apart from the truth or falsity of the story, this triadic pattern has a power or logical force only with something like its Hegelian content, or whether its power can be transmitted to new contents. At present I just want to note that the significance of *On the Essence of Money* within the whole kaleidoscope of the Young Hegelian pattern of ideas is that it replaced the content of a powerful model that dominated the Young Hegelians. In another article Hess himself describes this move more succinctly than anywhere in the present essay:

Money in the practical life of alienated men is just as all important and ever present, just as much the source of blessedness and grace as God is in our theoretical life. Why did not Feuerbach follow up this important practical consequence of his principle? The essence of God, says Feuerbach, is the transcendental essence of Men and the true study of the divine essence is the study of human essence: theology is anthropology. This is true but not the full truth. The human essence, it must be added, is the social essence, the co-operation of various individuals for the same cause, for exactly the same interest, and the true study of mankind, the true humanism, is the study of human society, that is, anthropology is socialism. It is self-evident that the essence of God and the essence of money are identical in the same way, in the sense that it is in the same way man's transcenden-

tal, practical externalised essence. But Feuerbach did not come to this practical consequence.<sup>2</sup>

Another concise statement of how Hess's achievement was understood in his time is found in the third section of Marx's *The German Ideology* dealing with the True Socialists:

Feuerbach only partially completed, or rather only began, the task of anthropology, the regaining by man of his estranged nature...; he destroyed the religious illusion, the theoretical abstraction, the God-Man, while Hess annihilated the political illusion, the abstraction of wealth, of his activity ... that is, he annihilates wealth. It was the work of Hess which freed man from the last of the forces external to him, and made him capable of moral activity...<sup>3</sup>

In our time great claims have been made for Hess's essay on money. David McLellan emphasises the influence which Hess had on Marx's two articles 'On the Jewish Question': 'Many of the themes of this article ["On the Jewish Question"], particularly that of money and the Jewish-Christian relationship, are taken directly from an article by Hess entitled "On the Essence of Money".<sup>4</sup> In his earlier work, after outlining shrewdly-perceived parallels between the two articles, McLellan concludes: 'These parallels between the two texts are more than enough to justify the statement that Marx copied Hess's ideas at this stage.'<sup>5</sup> Then after quoting Professor Silberner who describes this essay as 'one of the most important publications of early German socialist literature' he goes on to say: 'but it took a louder and more persistent voice to convey its message,' meaning of course the voice of Marx.<sup>6</sup> Silberner, in his authoritative work on Hess's life, speaks even more strongly of the inspiration Marx gained from Hess, and he in turn quotes Cornu who described Hess as 'une influence profonde' on the young Marx.<sup>7</sup> Tucker also emphasises the influence of this essay on Marx's articles 'On the Jewish Question,' claiming that the reasoning there 'turns wholly on Hess's thesis'.<sup>8</sup> Julius Carlebach disputes the hypothesis that Hess influenced the articles 'On the Jewish Question': 'If anything, it is possible to argue a much stronger case to show that the "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts" of 1844 show signs of Hess's influence,' and he goes on to draw parallels in the two texts.<sup>9</sup> But Carlebach very wisely reminds us of several other influences working here.

Perhaps the widest claim for Hess's essay is made by Lobkowitz. After outlining some of the ideas in Hess's essay, Lobkowitz claims that what Marx does in the 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' is 'to articulate Hess's ideas just sketched, to enlarge them in terms of economic analysis supplied by Engels, and then elevate them *à la hauteur des principes* in terms of a reinterpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*.'<sup>10</sup>

To these suggested connections we can add two more: Heine already described Hess as 'one of the most outstanding of our political writers,' and it was Hess who converted Engels to communism. In a letter to Auerbach on July 19, 1843, Hess reports that they were talking about the problems of the time, and Engels, 'ein Anno Eins Revolutioner, schied von mir als allereifrigsten Kommunist' (a Year One revolutionary, left me as a full-blown Communist).

Although inevitably I shall have to talk about influences, they are not my primary concern. I shall agree with Carlebach that reading Hess's *On the Essence of Money* will help us understand better what Marx is doing in his 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts' rather than what he is saying in his articles 'On the Jewish Question,' but not on the grounds of the type of historical data on which Carlebach based his arguments. Instead of influences I shall be looking for the choreography of the movements of ideas.

Historical influences do not just happen. They come about only in those configurations of conceptual forces where a new conceptual move either has to be made or is welcome. They have to arrive when someone is already grappling independently with a train of thought, and then they provide the missing link, creating either a confluence or a combustion under the right conditions.

I intend to trace one of the configurations in a kaleidoscope of complex patterns. I find presentations of other configurations of ideas in this field not only possible but sometimes even convincing. The very nature of our subject matter is such that we can entertain different possibilities without having to choose between them. Understanding here consists of seeing as many interesting possibilities and configurations as possible rather than in finding an orthodox line of development, parts of which, like tributaries, must all contribute to the final formulation of Marxism. Anyone who looks for such orthodoxy should, I think, take Althusser's way out and claim that there was a 'radical break' in Marx's development. Just as something radical happened on

the river Jordan, so that the person who spoke after the Spirit descended on him was not merely the son of a carpenter whom his kinsmen knew and who was influenced by all the complex turmoil in Galilee and in the Judean desert, but someone who spoke with authority; so one might claim that at some time in Marx's life there was a similar radical break. I for my part do not think so but would like to present the essay here translated as just one of the many Dead Sea scrolls of Marxism.

In what follows I shall first give a brief outline of Hess's life and then analyse some theoretical themes that have a bearing on the significance of Hess's essay on money.

The first theme will be a brief consideration of Hess's first two works, *The Sacred History of Mankind* and *The European Triarchy* where, through two different triadic patterns, Hess sets the scene for the development of the ideas we shall be concerned with.

Then I shall try to decipher the recurring symbolism of 'head, heart and stomach,' which, I hope, will throw new light on the relationship of Marx's ideas to those of Hess, especially with regard to the problem of True Socialism and the role of the proletariat.

My final theme will concern *On the Essence of Money* most directly. I shall show that it is neither an economic nor a sociological treatise but a transformation of certain key ideas from Feuerbach's *The Essence of Christianity*. In tracing this we shall see what it is that Hess and Marx wanted to eliminate when they wanted to eliminate money and private property, and what result they expected. Since, as we saw, strong claims have been made for the influence of Hess's essay on Marx's articles 'On the Jewish Question,' I shall make some tentative comments on this problem, but my main preoccupation will be to decipher the structural transformation of both Hess's and Marx's conceptual systems insofar as the essay on money throws some light on these transformations.

## II

Hess was born in Bonn's Judengasse in 1812. When he was five his parents moved to Cologne where his father established a sugar refinery. Apparently there was no Hebrew school in Cologne and young Moses was left behind in Bonn to be educated by his grandparents. Later Hess described his grandfather as 'a man very learned in the Scriptures who had the title and knowledge of a rabbi without making

a profession of it'. He was only thirteen when his mother died and his father asked him to join him in Cologne. In fact his father would have liked him to join his firm, but there was a growing estrangement between the two. The young Hess with his keen and restless intellect threw himself into reading Spinoza, Rousseau and Fichte, and travelled to Holland and France where he was impressed by the various socialist and liberal ideas and movements. Although he attended Bonn University for a short time while Bauer was still teaching there, he was virtually a self-taught man. Even more than most of the Young Hegelians, whose circle he now joined, he distanced himself from the traditions of his upbringing. In the intellectual milieu that he now moved in outside his home, Judaism was regarded as it were symbolically, as a type, representing limitation, particularness and heteronomy. Christianity represented the middle stage in the development of consciousness, but even Christianity had to be overcome in the highest universality. Hess acted out in his own life that view of mankind's development which Bauer was to express later in its most succinct form, the view that while Christians had to make only one move to emancipation, the Jews were two steps behind. If one accepts the view that the history of mankind's journey to full emancipation is the history of religious consciousness from Judaism through Christianity, then no wonder Hess rejected what he came to regard as narrowness and particularness—and these characteristics for a socialist also meant egoism—to dedicate himself with the same love and concern that was his grandfather's to the universal liberation of mankind.

Even in his marriage he may have acted out his theories and ideals. Legend has it that his wife Sibylle Pesch was a prostitute, whom he married either in order to rescue her from her way of life, or perhaps as an idealistic act of atonement for the sins of the bourgeois world. Silberner disputes this legend, arguing that it partly originates from the disapproval of Hess's family towards his living with an uneducated Christian girl of humble origins.<sup>11</sup> Jenny Marx mentions 'Hess und seine Frau' as belonging to Marx's circle in Paris in 1844, but in fact Hess and Sibylle were not officially married until 1852, after the death of Hess's father.

My own contribution to this is the perhaps unscholarly remark that a biographer of Hess might well wish that the legend were true. Although the social crime which would have called for such an act of atonement was thought to have been committed by the bourgeois world

that had forsaken true humanity, one cannot help thinking of the Book of Hosea: 'When the Lord first spoke through Hosea, the Lord said to Hosea: "Go, take yourself a wife of harlotry and have children of harlotry, for the land commits great harlotry by forsaking the Lord" ... And the Lord said to me: "Go again, love a woman who is beloved of a paramour and is an adulteress; even as the Lord loves the people of Israel, though they turn to other gods and love cakes and raisins".' As we shall see, it was the love of cakes and raisins, 'the sense of having,' that Hess found so abominable.

'It was perhaps this childlike quality,' wrote Isaiah Berlin, referring to this legend, 'Hess's unworldliness and purity of character, rising at moments to genuine saintliness, that so deeply irritated the tough-minded "realists" among his fellow socialists, who looked on him as a benevolent ass. Yet even Marx, who utterly despised him, could discover no moral vice or fault to cast in his teeth.'<sup>12</sup>

Hess's first published work was *The Sacred History of Mankind, by a young disciple of Spinoza*, as he described himself in the title.<sup>13</sup>

Then in 1841 Hess published, also anonymously, his *The European Triarchy*. It was published by the avant-garde publisher Otto Wigand and it brought him into the Young Hegelian circle. While in the *Sacred History* it was said to be Spinoza who proclaimed the third age, now it is Hegel who stands at the threshold between the old age and the new. By its content Hegel's philosophy belongs to the new age but insofar as it is still a spiritual act of knowing it belongs to the previous age. Hess refers to Cieszkowski's *Prolegomena zur Historiosophie*, as equally acknowledging the perfection of theory and as giving the direction to the next step, to practical action in history, by bringing the perfected theory into this world. Thus Hess, along with Cieszkowski, gives the signature tune to one of the main preoccupations of the Young Hegelians, the problem of how to 'realise philosophy,' or, in terms of another symbolism, how to unite 'head' and 'heart'.

During the summer of the same year, in 1841, Hess was asked by George Jung, a Hegelian liberal, to co-operate with him in founding a paper in Cologne, which first appeared in January of 1842 as the *Rheinische Zeitung*. Hess was editing the paper until December when he went to Paris to become its Paris correspondent. This was of course the paper of which Marx became the editor. Hess first met Marx in the late summer of 1841, without converting him to communism, but about a year later he converted Engels to communism. From the arti-

cles of this time one can have a general idea of the grand reasonings he must have used to convert Engels. As to how he argued in person there is an interesting description of him in an intriguing document prepared for the Zurich authorities in 1843 under the title: *Die Kommunisten in der Schweiz, nach den bei Weitling vorgefundenen Papieren*. It was compiled by Dr J. Bluntschli, who was then a professor of law and a councillor at Zurich. In one of these papers 'a correspondent from Paris' in a letter dated 15th May 1843 reports to Weitling that Hess is a communist because he is the most consistent of the Young Hegelians, one of the purest type, and communism follows with the sharpest necessity from the Hegelian system. 'Hess is very effective,' he goes on to say,

in converting the highly educated, but he talks in concepts and not directly, and so is unintelligible to those who are not highly educated. So far all German philosophers are the same. He realises this and says he will improve. He also has some baroque turns of phrase... But apart from these weaknesses Hess is very good.

Hess, through his reports from Paris, and mainly by his review of Lorenz von Stein's *Socialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs* for the *Rheinische Zeitung*, was largely responsible for the transmission of French socialist ideas into the German environment. In 1843 he contributed several articles for the *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz*. In the following year Marx wrote in his 'Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts':

It goes without saying that besides the French and English socialists I have also used German socialist works. The only *original* German works of substance in this science, however,—other than Weitling's writings—are the essays by Hess published in *Einundzwanzig Bogen* and *Umrisse zu einer Kritik der Nationalökonomie* by Engels...

The title *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz* was specially designed to spite the censors, as a publication with twenty-one pages or more was considered to be scholarly work and exempt from censorship. Hess contributed to this collection the *Philosophie der Tat*, *Die eine und ganze Freiheit*, and *Socialismus und Kommunismus*. This latter is partly a continuation of his discussion of Stein and a further elaboration of his



views already expressed in *Die Europäische Triarchie* on the partnership of German philosophy and French political practice. We shall see how important this recurring theme of the unity of German philosophy and French practice is among the Young Hegelians, but its present significance in the life of Hess is that here he is now in Paris during the preparation of the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*. He met Arnold Ruge, with whom Marx was to edit this paper, in August 1843. Even the title of the journal should be seen in the light of these ideas and not as an indication of some practical German and French co-operative effort. In fact there were no French contributions to the journal, but later in one of his essays Hess refers back to the *Jahrbücher* as only the first step in the all-important union of German Theory and French Praxis. It was to this journal that Hess first submitted *On the Essence of Money*, along with his 'Letters from Paris'. The essay was not published however, and was printed only a year and a half later in the *Rheinische Jahrbücher* in Darmstadt.

The fact that the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* went bankrupt after the first issue cannot explain why Marx did not publish Hess's essay on money, for we have a letter of Marx written from Paris to Fröbel, the publisher, dated November 21st, in which he writes: 'I have had to reject the articles so far sent to me by the local people (Hess, Weill, etc.) after many protracted discussions'. McLellan suggested that Marx 'copied heavily from Hess's essay presuming it would not be published' without implying that this was Marx's reason for not publishing it.<sup>14</sup> Carlebach speculates that Hess's dogmatic unequivocal call for the adoption of communism went too far for Marx, especially against his editorial policy.<sup>15</sup> I find this unlikely, especially as Marx, at least soon after reading it, adopted so many of its crucial ideas, including the idea that communism is the resolution of our alienation.

This is only the first of the complex and controversial problems about the relationship between Hess and Marx until their final break in 1848. Hess returned to Cologne and continued publishing articles and working in communist associations. The following year he joined Engels in Wuppertal and organised meetings in the Gasthof in Elberfeld. Engels wrote the most enthusiastic letters to Marx about their success, saying that everybody talks of nothing but communism, 'there is truly communism in Wuppertal, it is really a force'. Their only complaint was that there was not a single proletarian among them. In view of the fact that the essay on money begins with a long quotation from

'Queen Mab' it is interesting to note that one of the activities at these meetings was to have readings from Shelley.

What complicates the relationship between Hess and Marx before 1848 is that it is during these years that Hess became the leading figure of the 'True Socialists' and it is also during these years that Marx turned against his former associates, which included the 'True Socialists'. He never explicitly criticised Hess however, not even in the sections devoted to the 'True Socialists' in *The German Ideology* and in the *Manifesto*. In fact Hess himself contributed to *The German Ideology* in the small section on George Kuhlmann.<sup>16</sup>

If we observe that Hess's style would have been an ideal target for Marx's sarcastic kind of criticism, the silence is even more puzzling. Let us consider only the examples which Hess took from nature to illustrate his contention that man consciously sacrifices his life for the life of the species if there is a conflict between the two, and that hence love is mightier than egoism. To prove this he says:

The hen takes up a quite unequal fight if it has to defend its chickens from an attack. Cats will allow themselves to starve if they must, in order to satisfy their sexual desires, or in their sorrow when wicked men take away their kittens. Nature is always concerned with the preservation of the species, with the preservation of the life of the species, with the real life-activity.<sup>17</sup>

Now consider against this the sensible and refreshing reference to nature in St. Matthew's gospel: 'Consider the lilies of the field.' Marx's comment on this is also refreshing: 'Yes, consider the lilies of the field how they are eaten by goats, transplanted by man into his button-hole, how they are crushed beneath the immodest embraces of the dairymaid and the donkey driver!'<sup>18</sup> Imagine what Marx could have made out of the immodest embraces of stray cats in order to ridicule Hess's contention that love is mightier than egoism—a view that in fact Marx wanted to ridicule.<sup>19</sup>

György Bence, to whom I owe this lively illustration, follows Mönke in suggesting that Hess differs from the other 'True Socialists' in not neglecting the importance of revolutionary *praxis*, and that is why Marx spares him. This presupposes the idea that Marx's main concern at this time was to safeguard what later became some of the main tenets of Marxism. Rather, he had many other problems to contend with,

and the moves he made to overcome these problems later became part of what we now know as Marxism.

I think that in this matter Hess's personality was just as important as his theoretical views. I do not just mean that his unworldly character made Marx reluctant to offend him, but that with Hess's disposition for admiration and enthusiasm, his readiness to change his mind and 'to improve,' he had the makings of a potential disciple of the sort Marx needed. As it turned out later, he did not after all become a shadow of Marx, a 'second fiddle', as Engels described himself to Hermann Becker after Marx's death.

We should also ask another question: why is it that Marx in *The German Ideology* criticises so many of his own recent views in general terms only, without ever referring directly to any of his own writings?

If someone changes his mind and yet would like to preserve the image that he has always been right, then he has to adopt one or another version of a historical theory of knowledge. He has to maintain that certain theories were at one time true and correct, and in fact were appropriate and historically necessary stages in the development of Truth, while at the same time denying that they are any longer true or appropriate. In order then to stay attuned to the development of the Truth a scheme must be created in which one can so place oneself that one's statements are guaranteed by one's very position within that scheme. This cannot be demonstrated in detail here, but this psycho-conceptual device of justifying one's own correctness while abandoning one's views must be kept in mind as at least partially explaining why Marx is criticising both his own and Hess's recent views without specifically criticising their own actual writings. 'Matters,' writes Marx in the *German Ideology*, 'which are quite vague and mystical even in Hess, although they were originally, in the *Einundzwanzig Bogen*, worthy of recognition, and have only become tiresome and reactionary as a result of their perpetual reappearance..., at a time when they were already out of date, became complete nonsense in Herr Grün's hands.'

On 28th July 1846 Hess wrote to Marx: 'Necessary as it was in the beginning to tie communistic efforts to the German ideology, so it is now just as necessary to base them on historical and economic assumptions, otherwise we will never be finished with the "Socialists" or with opponents of all colours.' He does not say that they were ever mistaken. He tried to show that 'True Socialism' was justified in the early forties but was no longer so under the changed historical circumstances.

Now the only event one can think of which changed the 'historical circumstances' is the publication of Stirner's *The Ego and His Own*, which had a shattering effect on the Young Hegelians. Stirner was no ordinary opponent. The threat did not come from his bulky and wild arguments, but from the logical force of his position within the Young Hegelian development of ideas.<sup>20</sup> We shall be able to appreciate the shattering effect of Stirner only after we have analysed in the last section of this discussion how far Hess's thesis depended on Feuerbach and how far Marx's ideas during his Paris period were a combination of the ideas of Feuerbach and Hess. Here I might mention a small point, referring explicitly to Hess. Ruge's ground for refusing Hess's request for further collaboration at this time was that Stirner had destroyed Hess's philosophical communism.

Hess and Engels were among the first to receive an early copy of Stirner's work, and Engels in turn sent it on to Marx. It was Hess who straight away got down to work writing his reply 'Die Letzten Philosophen,' while Marx and Engels, with some help from Hess, began work about a year later on their own reply, the unpublished *German Ideology*.<sup>21</sup>

However much Hess and Marx might have fought different wars, during these years they fought the same battle. In the event they had to evacuate their positions and move to new ground, and then they themselves attacked their own previous positions. This is why it was 'necessary' at the beginning 'to tie communistic efforts to the German ideology' but later 'just as necessary to base them on historical and economic assumptions'. Besides Engels, Hess was perhaps Marx's only ally in these manoeuvres, which explains why Marx in all his criticisms of their recent theories never criticised Hess himself, or acknowledged his own involvement with those theories.

For a while Hess himself moved towards expressing his theories in economic terms. In his article 'Die Folgen einer Revolution des Proletariats' published in 1847 in the *Deutsche-Brüsseler Zeitung* he argued that wages were governed by the same laws as the prices of other commodities; the value of labour, like that of other commodities, will be what it costs to produce it, hence wages will be kept at the subsistence level.

But these were not only times of revolutionary theory but also of political manoeuvres in which Hess was too honest to be successful. He stood by Weitling and tried to defend Kriege. Weitling, writing to Kriege in America, was complaining about the cunning intrigues: 'I

am to be polished off first, then the others and finally their friends, whilst in the end of course they will cut their own throats... Hess and I are quite alone on this side, but Hess is boycotted also'.

One episode from all this intrigue is worth mentioning. When in June 1847 members of the 'League of the Just' renamed it the 'Communist League' with branches among German workers in London, Brussels and Paris, they wanted to formulate their aims and ideals in a manifesto, or, as they put it at the time, in a 'confession of faith,' and they canvassed various branches for suggestions for such a confession. At the end of October Engels wrote to Marx from Paris:

*Strictly between ourselves, I've played an infernal trick on Mosi [Moses Hess]. He had actually put through a delightfully amended confession of faith. Last Friday at the district [a committee of the Communist League] I dealt with this, point by point, and was not half way through when the lads declared themselves *satisfaits*. Completely unopposed, I got them to entrust me with the task of drafting a new one which will be discussed next Friday by the district and sent to London behind the backs of the communities. Naturally not a soul must know about this, otherwise we shall be unseated and there'll be a deuce of a row.<sup>22</sup>*

It is of this that Engels wrote again to Marx a month later: 'Give a little thought to the Confession of Faith. I think we would do best to abandon the catechetical form and call the thing: Communist *Manifesto*...' <sup>23</sup>

With Marx's criticism of the 'True Socialists' in the *Communist Manifesto* the final break came. We will look at one aspect of this criticism later on when we analyse the apparent disagreement between Hess and Marx with regard to the role of the proletariat in the final transformation of mankind. We should note, however, that it is in the section on the 'True Socialists' that Marx denounces the use of the term 'alienation'. Marx ends that section of the *Manifesto* by saying that 'with very few exceptions, all the so-called Socialist and Communist publications that now circulate in Germany belong to the domain of this foul and enervating literature'.

Defeats of revolutions have the most varied effects on those who were waiting for them, worked for them, or participated in them. There are many studies of what happened during and after the successful revolutions to those who worked for them; studies, too, of how they

were betrayed or eliminated. But we also need comparative studies of the effects of unsuccessful revolutions on those who were looking forward to them. Even a small group such as the Young Hegelians might yield interesting results.

Engels added a footnote to the section on the 'True Socialists' in the 1890 edition of the *Communist Manifesto*: 'The revolutionary storm of 1848 swept away this whole shabby tendency and cured its protagonists of the desire to dabble further in Socialism...' In fact Hess's revolutionary as well as theoretical activities continued unabated. According to his wife he was even condemned to death *in absentia*, which may not be true, but no such pious legend originated about Marx or Engels. Hess was head of the Geneva section of the Bund der Kommunisten, but more importantly he co-operated with Lassalle in the formation of the Allgemeine Deutsche Arbeiterverein, the General Federation of German Workers, which is the foundation of all organised social democracy, not only in Germany but in the whole of Europe. In 1863 Lassalle asked him to represent his movement in the Rhineland. In his first speeches to Lassalle's organisation in Cologne and Dusseldorf he admitted the possibility of reform, and appealed again to such favourite True Socialist notions as the 'creative spirit of the people' to build a better world.

Marx in London was furious. He wrote: 'So Lassalle collects those who were excreted from our party twenty years ago for his dung factory with which world history shall be manured. So he has named Moses Hess his viceroy in the Rhine province. Oh youth, oh youth, what were you thinking when you let yourself be hanged on Herwegh and Moses Hess.'<sup>24</sup>

A more empirical attitude characterised Hess's work now. Like Marx, he abandoned the 'species-being,' though not because of Stirner's theoretical criticisms but for empirical historical reasons. From the abstract universality of mankind he returned to practical problems, and by turning to the particular he even returned to the community of his grandfather. As Nathan Rotenstreich has said, 'The return of Hess to Judaism was clearly the result of his rejection of myth and his adoption of a more genuinely historical attitude.'<sup>25</sup>

With his publication of *Rome and Jerusalem* in 1862 one can say that he became the father of Zionism, and so he was the founder of two important movements originating in the nineteenth century, social democracy and Zionism.<sup>26</sup>

The fact that Hess abandoned the 'iron laws of history' in favour of 'the creative spirit of the people' also pointed up the difference between the two prophets. One in London regarded the failures of 1848 as showing that the time was not yet ripe for the still inevitable destruction, and thus he studied yet more urgently the signs of the coming deluge. The other, Hess, saw in 1848 a sign that after all God loved the world and would not destroy Nineveh with all its wickedness and inadequate institutions; this, however, was no reason to be complacent.

### III

Some theories, especially some theories of history, are like devices with which people can hoist themselves into favourable positions *vis-à-vis* other people, or can help themselves out of predicaments when they are conceptually cornered or feel themselves conceptually defeated. Theories can do this when they are not about an independently existing world of which we are spectators but when they are about a world in which we are participants as in a drama.<sup>27</sup> To be in a predicament from which such devices can provide a way out one must already be a participant in some drama on a world stage. The device rewrites the script.

One such theory of history is associated with the name of Joachim of Flora, a late twelfth century Calabrian monk. Joachim gave a temporal twist to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. He believed in the unity of the three Persons of the Trinity but gave them each a special age, a special sphere of influence. It was not only respect for authority that made him continue to believe in the unity of the Trinity; it is an essential part of such a theory to show that it is the same principle which is developing and which is now coming to fruition.

The age of the Father was characterised by law and obedience. The age of the Son, beginning from the time of Christ, is devoted to the upbringing of mankind through education, through institutions and through the sacraments to the time when, as some modern theologians would say, 'man comes of age'. This may sound pious and edifying until we realise the revolutionary implications of the claim that the third age supersedes the second as the second superseded the first. Man come of age will do without institutions, without the sacraments and without the authority of those who educated him up to now. What must make such a theory infuriating to those who are representatives

of the second age is that they are not rejected as non-believers. Their conceptual system is well equipped to cope with such a rejection. The heralds of the Third Age patronisingly insist on the importance and even validity of the Second Age 'for its time,' and by the help of the very logic of the Second Age they incorporate the representatives of the previous age within their own conceptual system.

One of the most important ingredients of such a theory of history was provided by the early Christians when they claimed to live in the age of Grace which superseded the age of Law, believing that their new covenant replaced the old. The claim lifted a whole people above another people by virtue of placing themselves in a new historical epoch. The simplest Christian was thereby on a higher level than the most learned Jew. Another permanent consequence of the claim was that it turned the continued existence of Judaism into a conceptual oddity.

But has the promise of the New Age been fulfilled? Is *this* what it looks like? To answer this uneasy feeling, which was already in existence among the first generation of Christians, Tertullian devised the triadic version of history, claiming that the present dispensation is only a transition to the age of the Spirit which is about to come. He reported eyewitnesses who saw above the old city of Jerusalem a new Jerusalem descending.

The pattern is so attractive that one does not necessarily need to be influenced by a previous formulation of it in order to employ it when the need arises. All the same Lessing probably had Joachim and his followers in mind when he adopted it to proclaim the arrival of the Enlightenment:

Perhaps even some enthusiasts of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had caught a glimmer of this new eternal gospel, and only erred in that they predicted its arrival as so near to their own time.

Perhaps their 'Three Ages of the World' were not so empty a speculation after all, and assuredly they had no bad intentions when they taught that the new covenant must become as antiquated as the old has become. There remained with them the same economy of the same God. Ever, to put my own expression into their mouth, ever the self same plan of the education of the human race.

Only they were premature. They believed that they could make their contemporaries, who had scarcely outgrown their childhood,



without enlightenment, without preparation, at one stroke men worthy of their *third age*.

And it was just this which made them enthusiasts. The enthusiast often casts glances into the future, but for this future they cannot wait....<sup>28</sup>

In Lessing's view the revelation of the second age, what we normally call Christian revelation, spoke to men from the 'outside,' it spoke to the 'material man,' and, what might sound more of a paradox, it is polytheistic. The revelation of the third age, on the other hand, speaks from the 'inside,' it is the voice of reason, and (with this the paradox in the remark about polytheism disappears) it is universal.

Lessing did not say that he preferred reason to Christianity; he claimed that reason was the final revelation, its voice the real Eternal Gospel, its age the Age of the Holy Spirit for which Christianity was a preparation, valid 'for its time,' during the time when people could not yet hear the voice of reason and thus had to listen to the teaching of the Church. But now, as some present-day theologians would say, 'God has taught us to do without Him'.

Some might think that Lessing's way of expressing the claims of reason is still tainted with theological and metaphysical views characteristic of his age, whereas we in our scientific age would no longer put our case in his way. But to think this only shows the attractiveness of the scheme. For Comte, who also referred to Joachim, replaced the content of the three ages by claiming that the first age was the theological, the second the metaphysical, and that now we begin to live in the age of science.

We noted earlier that Hess's first publication was *The Sacred History of Mankind*. The Age of the Father lasted until Christ, but the Age of the Son now extends to the French Revolution, and the Age of the Holy Spirit is about to begin. He subdivided each age and made various patriarchs and representative figures preside over each subdivision. Such an elaborate scheme is very similar to Joachim's detailed subdivisions of each age. According to Joachim the new age was heralded in by St. Benedict, so his own time was already the gestation period of the Third Age. Anyone who would simply copy the story of the three ages might want to leave out such details as irrelevant, just as manuscript copiers were wont to leave out bits of the script that did not make sense to them, but such details do serve a purpose in the scheme:

they give an assurance that the third period is already under way. In Hess's *Sacred History* Spinoza replaces Benedict as the herald of the period of the Holy Spirit. 'With Spinoza began nothing less than the time which he [Christ] and his first disciples desired, hoped for and prophesied,' said Hess in his *Sacred History*. 'The time of the Holy Spirit began, the Kingdom of God, the New Jerusalem.'

Moreover, this gestation period is characterised both in Joachim and in Hess by an intensification of the conflict between the old and the new. Thus the empirical evidence which might be against the coming of the new age becomes evidence in *favour* of its coming: the worse things are, the more they are evidence for the coming of the better, spiritual age; not only has the decisive event already happened but it has brought about a powerful resistance on the part of the old dispensation, which is surely the proof of its death struggle. Some people who see themselves as actors in such a drama might even see it as their duty to conjure up and polarise the forces of evil as a service to the progress of mankind.

So Joachim interpreted the corruption of the secular clergy and of the Church as a sign and necessary prerequisite of the coming age of the Holy Spirit. In Hess we find the increasing concentration of capital, the tendency of the rich to become richer and the poor to become poorer, as the sign of the coming new age.

Hess gives support to his argument for the three ages by an analogy from nature:

What is born in time develops in three periods. In the first period it takes root, forms a unity, and lives internally—that is the root of life. In the second period it grows, is divided and lives externally—that is the crown of life. In the third it waxes, is united again and ripens—that is the fruit of life.

Weiss, in a footnote to his study of Hess, comments that political theorists in the first half of the century tend to draw their analogies from plants, animals and men, while after 1850 it is more customary to find analogies from physics and chemistry, which shows the growing prestige of science and is 'one more indication of the transition from romanticism to realism'.<sup>29</sup> This may be true of writers who merely want to use illustration. Otherwise an analogy has a logical force of its own, and its use cannot be governed only by fashion or familiarity. Even in

analogies drawn from nature there is an important difference between those drawn from plants and those that make use of the human body. As far as I know Plato did not draw any analogies from plant life. It would have implied growth and development. The organic theory of society Plato wanted to illustrate can use only the human body. Though the human body grows, growth in the analogy is not like that in a plant; the growth does not produce new shoots. On the other hand when Maimonides wanted an illustration to show that the maker has a special knowledge of his creation, he used the analogy of a clock to illustrate this, well before the industrial age.

Joachim is a master of illustrations, and apart from his triangles and his eagle the prominent illustration he uses is the tree. A tree with its root and trunk and branches, or even better, with its flowers, is the most compelling image by which to put across the Joachimite triadic view of history. Similarly, well into the industrial age, Kandinsky made use of the same image when he argued that he was not rejecting previous forms of art. Representational art might have been valid for its time, for a more material man who had to use perceptions from the outside. Kandinsky's spiritual or abstract art is only a necessary culmination of all previous developments; it is the art of the third, spiritual epoch. All this is accompanied by a characteristically relativist theory of knowledge.

“Truth” in general and in art specifically is not an X, not an always imperfectly known but immovable quantity...,’ writes Kandinsky in his *Reminiscences*. ‘Art is like religion in many respects. Its development does not consist of new discoveries which strike out new truths and label them errors.’ Its development consists of illuminations which show

new perspectives in a blinding light, new truths which are basically nothing more than the organic development, the organic growing of earlier wisdom which is not voided by the later, but as wisdom and truth continues to live and produce. The trunk of the tree does not become superfluous because of a new branch: it makes the branch possible. Would the New Testament have been possible without the Old? Would our epoch of the threshold of the ‘third’ revelation be conceivable without the second? It is a branching of the original tree trunk in which ‘everything begins’. And the branching out, the further growth and ramifications which often seem confusing and des-

pairing, are the necessary steps to the mighty crown: the steps which in the final analysis create the green tree.

One would not expect that the third age in art, as opposed to that in the social or moral world, should be born in apocalyptic travail, or that there should be a worst time before the best can arrive, but this is how Kandinsky announced the new age:

Today is the great day of one of the revelations of this world. The interrelationships of these individual realms were illuminated as by a flash of lightning: they burst unexpected, frightening, and joyous out of darkness. Never were they so strongly tied together and never so sharply divided. This lightning is the child of the darkening of the spiritual heaven which hung over us, black, suffocating, and dead. Here begins the great epoch of the spiritual, the revelation of the spirit. Father — Son — Holy Spirit.<sup>30</sup>

This is no digression. If one had the space even more attention should be devoted to the analysis of various triadic patterns throughout history, in order to understand the Young Hegelians and in particular Feuerbach, Hess and Marx. One or another form of triadic pattern, or a combination of them, took such a hold on the Young Hegelians, that if I were another Young Hegelian myself I would like to say that the triadic pattern is their alienated essence which took on an independent existence and dominated them. For a proper study one should analyse in more detail the variety of patterns with their various logical forces.

Hess in the *Sacred History* superimposed on the model of organic development another model which has elements of Feuerbach and of Spinoza's theory of knowledge incorporated in it. In the first age, from Adam to Christ, mankind lived in natural unity and harmony, but during this time men could not separate the universal from its concrete manifestations, they could not discern the essential nature of things. Adam was also unaware of the conflict between fact and hope, real and ideal. It was 'perfection unearned'. It was also a time innocent of private property. During the second period the universal, the proper object of intellectual knowledge, was freed from its concrete manifestations—but at a terrible price. The price mankind had to pay for this was the fragmentation which resulted from the separation of

the ideal and the real. In the third age the lost unity will be regained by knowing each object as a part of a total unity and by each human being becoming part of a harmonised whole. No wonder that the third age was said by Hess to be heralded in by Spinoza.

The power of the triadic model here is different from the Joachimite model. Here each of the first two stages has a 'positive' aspect and a 'negative' aspect. The first stage is harmony and unity, but on a primitive, undeveloped level. It is implied that there can be no further development in that stage without a drastic transformation. This is achieved by some sort of inner spirit or essential element of the original unity escaping and freeing itself. It can then perfect itself in its liberated form, which is the important 'positive' contribution of the second stage. Its 'negative aspect' is that this perfection happens outside those whose essence is so perfected.

I spoke of the 'power' of the model advisedly. There is no logical reason for all this to happen, and far less is there any logical reason for expecting that the alienated essence, now perfected, will return in the third stage. Yet until one stops to ask the simplest questions about the model one has a feeling that 'of course' this will happen.

Rousseau operates with such a triadic model. The 'positive aspect' of the first stage in his scheme is that we are free, while the 'negative aspect' is that we are not social. In the second stage we are social but not free. Although there is not alienation on a grand scale in the second stage, nevertheless one has the feeling of 'of course' when the third stage unites only the positive aspects of each of the previous stages and we become social beings and yet free, both at a higher stage.

Now turn the kaleidoscope slightly and we have a new configuration. Hess begins his next work, the *European Triarchy*, with a claim which, as we noted, is like a signature tune for much of the Young Hegelian endeavours:

German philosophy has fulfilled its mission, it has led us to full truth. What we have to do now is to build bridges which will again lead us from heaven to earth. What remains in separation, be it truth itself, when it remains in its high distinctness, is untrue. Just as reality which is not penetrated by truth, so truth which is not realised, is imperfect.

As we know, Marx also, along with other Young Hegelians, wanted to 'realise philosophy'. We shall consider that move in the next section.

Let us notice that the description Hess just gave us is the description of the second age, Philosophy perfected, waiting to be reunited with the world. It is German philosophy which is perfected, and for the Young Hegelians that means Hegel's philosophy. In the *European Triarchy* Hegel's philosophy is now also one element in a further triad: it is Germany's contribution to a triad, other parts of which are French political life and English economic life.

But to want to realise philosophy is the most un-Hegelian thing to want to do. Not only does Hegel explicitly warn against such a project but his views on the cunning of reason should warn us that any conscious effort of ours would produce, so to speak, inadvertent results. More important is the fact that Hegel's philosophy is not about a subject knowing itself merely as a thinking subject, but about a subject knowing itself as it develops in nature and history. If Hegel's Spirit has not in fact developed *in the world*, in nature and history—if it has perfected itself only as a thinking subject thinking about its own thinking—then there is just no Hegelian philosophy to realise.

There were others, philosophers, who continued developing and arguing in detail about Hegel's philosophy. Had the Young Hegelians done this they would be called neo-Hegelians, not Young Hegelians. The Young Hegelians' relationship to Hegel was of a different nature: they regarded what they believed to be Hegel's achievement as itself an event, a decisive event, not only in human but in cosmic history. Their disagreement about Hegel's philosophy was not the continuation of Hegel's philosophical thinking, but a disagreement about the nature of this event and a disagreement about their own various schemes, within which Hegel's philosophy as an event plays but one role.

Some theologians and Scripture scholars argue that the early Christians transformed the role of Jesus in a similar way and they describe the process by the phrase 'the proclaimer became the proclaimed'. I suggested earlier that such claims that a decisive event has happened can create crises when people look around and see that the world does not after all look as though such an event took place. I believe the Young Hegelians lived in such a conceptual crisis for a few years in the 1840s. One solution to such a crisis, as we saw, is to characterise the present as a transitional age, thus saving the existence of the Kingdom by expecting it to come as a third age.

As we noted, in the opening paragraph of the *European Triarchy* Hess gives us a characterisation of the second age. But there is also an

additional assurance: perfection has arrived, but only in theory. The world does not look as if perfection has arrived because the task of the present age is precisely *to realise* philosophy. Some Young Hegelians argued that criticism will turn all institutions into rational institutions. Others argued that this is the age of *praxis*. Still others argued that 'it is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself, reality must strive towards thought'. The empirical conditions in Germany are far from being a refutation of the approach of the Kingdom; it is precisely because Germany is most backward that it will be the agency of the coming realisation of the already perfected philosophy. This is made to look plausible by superimposing the notion of perfected theory onto our triadic model, turning the perfected theory into the perfected alienated essence against which stands the world emptied of its own essence. Hence the sphere which is most empty and degraded is the candidate for the crucial role of receiving the perfected essence. '*The emancipation of Germany*,' says Marx, 'is the *emancipation of man*. Philosophy is the *head* of this emancipation and the *proletariat* is its heart.'

Before we turn to the triad of 'head,' 'heart' and 'stomach' in the next section, let us complete the picture that was formed in Hess's *European Triarchy* by turning the kaleidoscope. As the title of this work suggests, the need is for a unity of the three leading nations of Europe, each with its specific contribution: Germany with her philosophy, France with her political praxis, and England with her economic development.

We are familiar with the claim made by Marx that Germany's revolutionary past is theoretical, it is the Reformation, and 'as the revolution then began in the brain of the *monk*, so now it begins in the brain of the *philosopher*'. It is this claim which is argued by Hess in *The European Triarchy*. He compares the French Revolution to the German Reformation to demonstrate that Germany too has had a revolution. The comparison still bedevils orthodox Marxist historiographers who try to accommodate such claims about Luther in their scientific history.

The role of France is in the world of praxis. 'The speculative German lives in the ideal, while the action-loving Frenchman works in the real,' said Hess. Along with Cieszkowski, Hess introduced the notion of *praxis* into this discourse. This did not make it, however, less of a discourse. It turned it into a theory claiming itself to be not a theory, it turned it into a theory claiming itself to be *praxis*.

We need a new Section to investigate how the proletariat replaced France as the symbol of *praxis*.

#### IV

That the coming of socialism is tied to the special role of the proletariat is supposed to be one of the crucial areas of difference between Marx and the True Socialists. For the True Socialists socialism was a moral demand which should appeal to anyone who could respond to such demands. As we noted, Hess appealed to the 'creative spirit of the people' and not to socio-economic trends and necessities. To be sure, the coming of socialism was tied to historical factors, but only to those historical factors which indicated to so many of the Young Hegelians that 'the hour is nigh,' and which gave them urgency and assurance that they lived in the fullness of time. Otherwise, however, socialism should have a timeless and classless appeal.

Marx's critique of the True Socialists in the *Manifesto* brings out this difference well, or, as one might prefer to say, it in part creates and constitutes the difference. There he criticises the True Socialists for allegedly borrowing their demands for socialism from France, for being the 'silly echo' of French social criticism, but forgetting the different economic and political conditions of France and Germany. According to Marx's argument, France had already had a bourgeois revolution, therefore the next, socialist, revolution was proper for French conditions. In Germany, however, the bourgeoisie was still the growing revolutionary force destined to destroy the feudal conditions, especially the absolute monarchy. According to Marx, the True Socialists transferred to Germany the socialist criticism of the bourgeoisie before the conditions were ripe for such a criticism, and thereby in effect they joined forces with the absolutist feudal government: while the government resisted the bourgeoisie from above, the True Socialists attacked from below. They should leave the bourgeoisie alone, on this assumption, or even join forces with it while it carried on its historic mission of destroying feudal conditions and establishing its liberal institutions, and attack it only afterwards. Marx accused the True Socialists, in his characteristic style, of 'representing not true requirements, but the requirements of truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of human nature, of man in general, who belongs to no



class, has no reality, who exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy'.

I want to argue nevertheless that Marx, at the time of writing the *Introduction* to his *Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, when he first introduced the notion of the proletariat, entertained a distinctly True Socialist view of the role of the proletariat, a view which, because of later developments, is obscured in retrospect. For my argument we have to understand the symbolism of head, heart and stomach in the Young Hegelian iconography and also the symbolic significance for them of France, England and Germany.

We saw in the previous section that Hess in his *European Triarchy* advocated a dialectical union of the three leading nations of the time, Germany with her philosophy, France with her political life, and England with her economic and industrial developments, each contributing their historically allotted elements to the coming final synthesis. Heine had already drawn a parallel between German philosophy and French political life in 1835, the details of which Hess criticised, but the theme was a recurring one. Feuerbach wrote in his *Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy*:

The true philosopher who is identified with life and man must be of Franco-German lineage. Do not be scared by this mixture, you chaste Germans. The *Acta Philosophorum* had expressed this idea already in 1716: 'If we weigh the Germans and the French against each other and judge that the latter have more nimbleness in their temperament and the former more weightiness, then we can say justly that the *temperamentum Gallico-Germanicum* is best suited for philosophy, or we can say that a child which had a French father and a German mother would (*ceteris paribus*) be endowed with a good *ingenium philosophicum*'. Quite right [commented Feuerbach on this], only we must make the mother French and the father German. The *heart*—the feminine principle, the *sense* for the finite, the seat of materialism—is a French disposition; the *head*—the masculine principle, the seat of idealism, is German. The heart revolutionises, the head reforms; the head brings things into being, the heart sets them in motion.<sup>31</sup>

Let us again read Marx in his *Introduction* to *Toward the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*.

But a *radical* revolution in Germany seems to encounter a major difficulty.

Revolutions need a *passive* element, a *material* basis... It is not enough that thought should seek to realise itself; reality must strive towards thought.

[G]ermany, which likes to get to the bottom of things, can only make a revolution which upsets the *whole order* of things. The *emancipation of Germany* will be an *emancipation of man*. *Philosophy* is the *head* of this emancipation and the *proletariat* is its *heart*.

There are two important points to note in this passage. One is that here the proletariat seems to be replacing France (I shall argue that it replaces France *only in Germany*, while in France, because France *still* represents the heart, there is *no need for the proletariat*). The other point is that the proletariat represents the heart, and I shall argue that, according to Marx at that time, only Germany needed such a heart.

For the significance of the proletariat representing the heart we have to return to Hess for a minute. We saw that in his long essay, *On the Socialist Movement in Germany*, Hess refers back to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher* as being only the first step in the all-important union of German theory and French praxis. More important, however, is the critical comment Hess goes on to make in the same essay on Lorenz von Stein, who in his work on the French social movement first diagnosed the difference between the poor and the proletariat, and who connected the emergence of socialism with the rise of the proletariat as a class. Hess's critical comment is this:

It is an error—and this error is due to the egoistic narrowness which cannot rise to a truly human outlook—yes, it is an error diligently spread by the reaction, and by Stein above all, that socialism develops only among the proletariat, and among the proletariat only as a question of fulfilling the needs of the stomach. The French have given no excuse for this error. The French socialism comes not from the necessity of thought, not from the need of the head, not from the need of the stomach, but from the need of the heart; it comes from the sympathy for the suffering of mankind.<sup>32</sup>

At first sight this might indicate a difference between Hess and Marx. As we have seen, Marx had just introduced the proletariat as

an agency of revolution and here is Hess denying that the proletariat is the agency to bring about socialism. Much of the strength of the claim that Marx at this stage of his development already differed from the True Socialists rests on this apparent difference between them. As we saw, the argument runs that Marx, however vaguely, already recognised the important role of the proletariat, while Hess still believed in the generosity of the spirit, in the political idealism of the people, and relied on these to inspire political action. This is what enabled Marx to criticise the True Socialists in the *Manifesto* for not recognising the relative development of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in France and Germany.

There is, however, no difference in substance between Hess and Marx at this stage of their development. Hess rejected the idea that the proletariat was the agency of socialist revolution only insofar as it was represented by Stein—or as Hess understood it to be represented by Stein—as acting out of selfish material interest. If we take our clue from Hess's claim that socialism is not 'a question of fulfilling the needs of the stomach,' nor does it come 'from the need of the head' but it comes 'from the need of the heart,' we find agreement between him and Marx. Marx is not talking about Stein's version of the proletariat; Marx introduces the proletariat as something that Germany needs, and needs as the heart of that emancipation of which philosophy is the head. As far as France is concerned, according to Marx, *there is no need for the proletariat*. 'In France,' says Marx, 'every class of the nation is *politically idealistic* and experiences itself first of all not as a particular class but as representing the general needs of society'. This observation about France, just as much as Marx's observations about the proletariat, is so removed from any empirical, historical or sociological study that it can make sense only as part of the iconography we are deciphering.

I said earlier that Marx substituted the proletariat for France as the heart. We can see now how this happened. In a way France is still the heart, as Germany is the head. This is why France is politically idealistic and there is there a generosity of spirit. Marx agreed with Hess that this appeal to the heart would do the work for France—provided that the French would learn more German philosophy as well. But Marx was sceptical about the generosity of the German spirit. He thought, so to speak, that if only the proletariat would become hungry enough their stomachs would turn into hearts. It is because, as Marx

complains, in Germany there is lacking a 'generosity of spirit' that Germany needs a proletariat as a heart. Hess would not criticise this notion of a proletariat as he criticised that put forward by Stein. In Germany, says Marx,

There is equally lacking in every class that breadth of soul which identifies itself, if only momentarily, with the soul of the people—that genius for inspiring material force toward political power, that revolutionary boldness which flings at its adversary the defiant words, *I am nothing and I should be everything...* In France it is enough to be something for one to want to be everything... In France every class of the nation is *politically idealistic* and experiences itself first of all not as a particular class but as representing the general needs of society...

Where then is the positive *possibility* of German emancipation?

*Answer:* In the formation of a class with *radical chains*, a class in civil society that is not of civil society, a class that is the dissolution of all classes, a sphere of society having a universal character because of its universal suffering and claiming no particular right because no *particular wrong* but *unqualified wrong* is perpetrated on it...<sup>33</sup>

The proletariat is then introduced as the suffering Redeemer: 'a sphere, in short, that is the *complete loss* of humanity and can only redeem itself through the *total redemption of humanity*. This dissolution of society as a particular class is the proletariat.'

I want to look, very briefly, at the well known economic interpretation of history in Marx's Introduction to *A Critique of Political Economy*, and argue that there is no place and no role for the proletariat in that scheme. The theory is a miniature model of a Hegelian dialectical development. Men, the Subject, in their productive activities create certain objectively existing conditions, the purpose of which is to help those activities. When new means of production come into being these, after a while, can no longer be accommodated within the objectively-existing conditions, and so these conditions become fetters of production. What was a rational arrangement turns into a self-contradictory irrational state of affairs. But why is it *irrational* to have steam engines under feudal modes of production? After all, they could be used for pumping up the ornamental fountains in the

gardens of Versailles, or be used as playthings in village squares. In order to create a self-contradictory state of affairs that needs to be resolved in a higher, more rational synthesis, two further conditions are needed. One is that the new instruments should be regarded as *means of production* and not regarded under some other formal aspect such as 'amusements' or 'the devil's work'. If the invention of the steam engine is regarded as the devil's work devised by an alchemist, rather than a means of production invented by an engineer, then it will not come into conflict with the existing relationships of production. The other requirement is that the standard of rationality must be identified with the fullest possible use of productive forces. Only if we regard the fullest possible use of productive forces as the standard of rationality can we say that arrangements that do not help this are irrational and must give way, whether they are the land rights of feudal lords or primitive tribes, or such parts of our 'superstructure' as our enjoyment of the beauties of our lakes and countryside. It is never suggested that the alleged contradiction might be resolved by curtailing the means of production.

My point, however, is not that this model is the expression of the bourgeois entrepreneurial mentality universalised, as ideology, into a philosophy of history. My point is that the proletariat does not fit into this model. The peasants were the oppressed class of feudal society, but capitalism did not come about by peasants overthrowing the feudal lords in order to establish capitalism after a brief period of the dictatorship of the peasantry. Why would one even think of such an absurd idea if in this historical progression the proletariat as the new oppressed class had not been cast into this role of establishing the next stage of history? If there was a class struggle, it was not between the peasants and the feudal lords: a new class grew up with the new means of production, which wanted to create more liberal institutions for its economic practices, and also eventually brought forth people like Hess, Marx and John Stuart Mill who wanted to make these institutions even more liberal and human according to their image of what is human. But this new class, the bourgeoisie, was not the oppressed class of feudalism. If we want to follow *this* pattern of development, then we should expect within the capitalist world a new class to develop with new means of production, which leaves behind the bourgeoisie and the proletariat as the bourgeoisie left behind the feudal lords and peasants.

In order to claim that one has found a scientific law of history, one should be able to produce at least two examples to support that scientific hypothesis. And we have two hypotheses here. On one hypothesis it is the oppressed classes which by their struggle bring about the new stage of history, in which case we are committed to the claim that the peasants brought about capitalism by overthrowing the feudal lords. On the other hypothesis it is the new means of production and the people associated with those productive forces that bring about the new stage of history, in which case the proletariat is as irrelevant as the peasants were in the previous process.

As a matter of fact there is no place for the proletariat in this theory, nor did Marx intend one. Nor is there any possibility for the other scenario of a new class emerging with a new means of production that cannot be accommodated within the existing relations of production. For a revolutionary situation to occur, according to this scientific theory of revolution, the ossified relationships of production should be unable to accommodate the new instruments of production. But this is what Marx has to say about the bourgeoisie in the *Manifesto*:

The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in unaltered forms, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away; all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into the air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life and his relations with his kind.

This is a tremendous insight to have had in 1848. I also think that Marx's other insight in the *Manifesto*, that the True Socialists are actually helping the absolute monarchy by attacking the bourgeoisie whose natural task it is to break the shackles of absolutist governments, is a very important insight.

Marxism is composed of many strata and to understand Marxism one needs the skills of a geologist and an archaeologist. My claim is that the notion of the proletariat belongs to the layer where Marx was concerned with the iconography of head, heart and stomach and not to the layer of his economic investigations, even if various forces later pushed that earlier layer into a new stratum.<sup>34</sup> There are of course other elements in that layer. Marx's search for 'the capability of a universal class to be really universal'<sup>35</sup> is part of his criticism of Hegel, and I am not disputing the view that Marx's proletariat is also a substitute for Hegel's bureaucracy.

As far as empirical life is concerned, the example in front of Marx and Hess was the developing bourgeoisie. In fact Marx's disagreement with the True Socialists in *The Communist Manifesto* was not over the role of the proletariat, but, without their realising it, over the role of the bourgeoisie, and I think Marx might have been right in defending their role in working for those liberal institutions that he there so eloquently described.

## V

Hess, like Marx, talks almost interchangeably about private property and money, and they both wanted to abolish private property and money. I do not wish to take issue with them for confusing the two, for we can separate them even conceptually only in our empirical socio-economic life, and neither Marx nor Hess was concerned with that. When we discover what it was that they wanted to abolish we shall find that in that respect the two are indistinguishable.

Hess in *On the Essence of Money* writes:

For our Philistines, our Christian shopkeepers and Jewish Christians, the individual is the end, while the life of the species is the means to life. They have created for themselves a world apart. In theory the classical form of this inverted world is the Christian heaven... Practically, therefore, in our commercial world, as it is in theory in the Christian heaven, the individual is the end, the species only the means of life. Here likewise the life of the species is not at work in the individual and by means of him; here, just as in heaven, it is placed outside individuals and reduced to a means for them; here, in fact, it

is money. What God is for its theoretical life, money is for the practical life of this inverted world: the alienated potentiality, the bartered life-activity of men.<sup>36</sup>

A couple of months after Marx read this essay, he was writing some notes on James Mill in which he approved of Mill characterising money as the medium of exchange, and then went on to say:

This *mediator* is ... the lost, estranged *essence* of private property, private property which has become *alienated*, external to itself, just as it is the *alienated* species-activity of man, the *externalised mediation* between man's production and man's production. All the qualities which arise in the course of this activity are, therefore, transferred to this mediator. Hence man becomes the poorer as man, i.e., separated from this mediator, the *richer* this mediator becomes. Christ *represents* originally (1) men before God; (2) God for men; (3) men to man.

Similarly, *money* represents originally, in accordance with the idea of money: (1) private property for private property; (2) society for private property; (3) private property for society.

But Christ is *alienated* God and alienated *man*. God has value only insofar as he represents Christ, and man has value only insofar as he represents Christ. It is the same with money.<sup>37</sup>

A few months earlier, in the second of his articles 'On the Jewish Question,' Marx had already written that 'Money is the general, self-sufficient *value* of everything. Hence it has robbed the whole world, the human world as well as nature, of its proper worth. Money is the alienated essence of man's labour and life.'<sup>38</sup>

As I said earlier, my primary aim is not to trace influences. Even if we could document precisely who read and wrote what at what time and could also document what was said when in the various Gasthauses, beer halls or coffee houses, the interesting question would still remain: Who would be influenced, by reading Hess, to write what Marx wrote? The point I want to make is that we have to recreate a frame of mind where Hess's remarks (or Marx's for that matter) would not just be swept aside as strange speculations but would be taken so seriously that a man would risk the wrath of governments or be prepared to suffer exile for them, and where a wrong step in an argument would be regarded as a wrong step for mankind.



What I want to investigate is what it was they wanted to abolish when they wanted to abolish money and private property, and why they thought it should be done, or indeed would happen anyway in the progress of world history. The abolition of private property has been advocated many times and for several reasons ever since men yearned for a better world. But never was it argued, I think, for more grandiose reasons or with the expectation of more profound results.

Before we come to Hess and Marx I want to consider briefly two types of reasons for wanting to abolish private property, reasons which have been systematically confused with each other, and both of which are very often mistakenly thought to be Marx's reasons. Arguments that mistake them for Marx's reasons usually switch back and forth between the two types of reasons. So, for clarity's sake, before turning to Hess and Marx, we should look at them first.

We should distinguish between what I want to call the moral reason from what I want to call the economic reason for abolishing private property.<sup>39</sup> The economic and moral considerations are the opposites of each other in every way. The economic considerations are about the means of production, while the moral considerations are about private consumer goods that we want to buy or to have. Whether the arguments are right or wrong, the economic considerations are concerned with the better functioning of our economy, with more efficient production. These arguments do not say that we shall be better persons, but that we shall be able to produce more, or that our economic life will run more smoothly if the means of production are not privately owned. Rather, on the contrary, it is claimed sometimes by the proponents of these arguments that—at least temporarily—economic developments should take precedence over favouring liberal institutions which would help the development of freer autonomous persons. According to Durkheim these considerations have their origin in the modern state and the industrial mode of production, and these arguments want to connect the two; it should be the concern of the state to develop the economy, and it should be economic considerations that influence state policy.

The moral considerations are not tied to any historical conditions. They go back to Plato and come up over and over again throughout our history, as for instance in Campanella or Thomas More or in any one of a host of thinkers whose concern was to liberate us from the pernicious influence of money and the greed that is supposed to ac-

company it. When St. Francis threw away all his money and expressed his loathing of it in demonic terms he did not go on to organise cooperative economic associations for the poor in order to improve their standard of living, nor did he dig sewage systems for them. He thought that to be poor, to be without possessions, was a good thing. When Plato recommended the abolition of private property for the rulers of his city, he did not do so because this was the best way to overtake the olive oil production of a more advanced city by the end of the second five-year plan. He did so because the vocation of the rulers was virtue and wisdom, and this could be developed only if the sense of having, along with other inclinations toward the particular, was radically eliminated from their lives. He did not connect, but separated, economic affairs from state affairs. The ‘appetitive’ class, the stomach of the city, had to have private property as an incentive to fulfil its vocation which was production, but those who were supposed to have wisdom and virtue could have these qualities only if their ‘sense of having’ was eliminated by making it impossible for them to have anything.

We must also note, surprising as it may seem, that the moral consideration is *not* concerned with the just distribution of goods. The desire to redistribute property at all, in equal or unequal rations, still originates from the ‘sense of having,’ as against the moral consideration which aims at creating a better type of man by freeing him completely from the possession of any property at all and thus from the sense of having. Marx describes the redistribution of goods as crude communism in his ‘Third Manuscript’:

[T]he domination of *material* property bulks so large that it wants to destroy *everything* which cannot be possessed by everyone as *private property*... Immediate, physical *possession* is for it the sole aim of life and existence. The condition of the *labourer* is not overcome but extended to all men. The relationship of private property remains the relationship of the community to the world of things... This communism—in that it negates man’s *personality* everywhere—is only the logical expression of the private property which is this negation. Universal *envy* establishing itself as a power is only the disguised form in which *greed* re-establishes and satisfies itself in *another way*... Crude communism is only the fulfilment of this envy and levelling on the basis of a *preconceived* minimum.<sup>40</sup>

Marx's own version of communism is a '*positive* overcoming of *private property* as *human self-alienation*, and thus as the actual *appropriation of the human essence* through and for man.' It is this 'positive' overcoming of private property which is so essential for Hess and Marx. This leads us to a third type of reason for abolishing private property and money. Abolishing private property here means abolishing human self-alienation. The reason for abolishing private property is none other than *the regaining of our human essence*. But now since the Feuerbachian alienated essence, God, is replaced by the Hessian alienated essence, money, and at the same time the relationship of alienated men to each other and to the world of things is described as the relationship of private property, private property and money are spoken of interchangeably.

The abolition of private property and of money will bring a new type of man onto the stage of world history. We are not talking here of moral effort or of any practical steps on the part of moral agents to achieve a better human life. The new type of man will arrive as the culmination of cosmic history. The end result of this history will be not only an organically organised mankind, but mankind existing on a qualitatively higher plane because of the transformation of human sense-perception. To understand how a transformation of perception can result in an ontological transformation of both the perceiver and the perceived we shall have to turn to Feuerbach. Such a combination of epistemology and ontology is an indispensable part of Feuerbach's argument for the divinity of our species. It seems however that Marx in his Paris Manuscripts did not apply it to his purpose directly from Feuerbach. It was Hess, in his articles in the *Twenty-One Pages*,<sup>41</sup> who saw how this theory of knowledge can be applied to show the dehumanising effects of private property. Marx in his third 'Manuscript' refers to Hess to indicate what he means:

[P]rivate property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is *ours* only when we have it... Hence *all* the physical and spiritual senses have been replaced by the simple alienation of them *all*, the sense of *having*. Human nature had to be reduced to this absolute poverty so that it could give birth to its inner wealth. (On the category of *having*, see Hess in *Twenty-One Pages*.)

The overcoming of private property means therefore the complete *emancipation* of all human senses and aptitudes....

For not only the five senses but also the so-called spiritual and moral senses (will, love, etc.), in a word, *human* sense and the humanity of the senses come into being only through the existence of *their* object, through nature *humanised*. The *development* of the five senses is a labour of the whole previous history of the world.<sup>42</sup>

Let us sum up briefly what seems to be the theory we shall have to make sense of. Both Hess and Marx claim that parallel to a story of alienation in terms of religious consciousness there is an alienation in terms of private property and money. Our essence is productive life-activity and this essence is alienated into private property and money, so the abolition of private property and money will result in our regaining our human essence. But the effect of alienation is also described in terms of our *perception*, both empirical and the 'so-called spiritual (or mental) and moral (or practical) senses'. The abolition of private property/money will result in a state of affairs which is also described in terms of a transformation of our human senses, along with the transformation of the objects of our senses, and all this has some world-historical significance.

One way of making sense of all this is not to take it seriously but to water it down to something within our everyday experience and translate it into an aesthete's critique of cultural philistinism. But just as it is bad sociology or anthropology to express a tribal mythology in our own familiar cultural terms so it would be shallow to read the Young Hegelians through our own preoccupations. Rather, I shall try to make sense of these claims by placing them within the context of some of Feuerbach's arguments. In particular we should investigate (a) Feuerbach's arguments for the divinity of our species, and (b) the triadic pattern of original unity, separation and return.

Feuerbach suffers from being 'well known' and from having been 'placed' in relation to Hegel and Marx by a popularly accepted line of development. I say this by way of warning because there is often a 'reader's resistance' to an exposition of a theory when the theory is both puzzling and strange *and* unfamiliar, or even runs counter to a popularly accepted view.

Feuerbach did not argue against the existence of God but only about His location: he relocated Divinity in the human species. And he did not argue for our divinity by turning Hegel the right way up, by

making us the subject and God the predicate. In fact we shall see him claiming explicitly that *individual* human beings are '*predicates*,' 'each new man is a new predicate, a new phasis of humanity'.<sup>43</sup>

Feuerbach's argument for our divinity hinges on a theory of knowledge which is at the same time an ontology. I have coined the term 'episto-ontology' to refer to this theory which is at the same time both materialist and idealist. 'The essence of a being,' says Feuerbach in his *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, 'is recognised only through its object; the object to which a being is necessarily related is nothing but its own revealed being.'

As we can see, this is not only a theory of knowledge. In the same sentence in which he claims that the essence of a being is recognised only through its object, he goes on to say that 'the object to which a being is necessarily related is *nothing but its own revealed being*'. So we not only recognise what an object is by observing what it, in its turn, takes as its object. The nature of the object is determined by what it takes as its object. This applies right through the scale of being, from inanimate things like stones, through plants to other living organisms like caterpillars to human beings.

It is as if he applied our notion of intentional objects to the inanimate world as well, in the sense that *their* objects are, as it were, intentional objects. At the same time *our* relationships to our intentional objects are to be interpreted in the sense in which the relationships of material objects to each other are to be interpreted. It is in this sense that the theory is inseparably both materialist and idealist at the same time.

When Feuerbach says that 'the object to which a being is necessarily related is nothing but its own revealed being,' the term 'necessarily' is ambiguous. If one were to put a piece of paper in front of the clarinet in an orchestra playing Mozart, Feuerbach would mean by 'necessary relationship' both the vibration of the paper in response to the waves coming out of the clarinet and the enjoyment of the audience in response to the music played. This is how I recognise that one object is paper and the other object is a special type of human being, or a human being at a special level of development, i.e. a music lover. Moreover, the *objects* of these objects are different: it is waves to the one and music to the other, and the next step in this theory is that their respective objects are nothing but *their own nature*.

In *The Essence of Christianity*, after stating that ‘the object to which a subject essentially, necessarily, relates is nothing else than this subject’s own, but objective nature,’ the first example he goes on to give is this:

Thus the Sun is the common object of the planets, but it is an object to Mercury, to Venus, to Saturn, to Uranus, under other conditions than to the Earth. Each planet has its own sun. The sun which lights and warms Uranus has no physical (only an astronomical/scientific) existence for the Earth; and not only does the Sun appear different, but it really is *another* sun on Uranus than on the Earth. The relation of the Sun to the Earth is therefore at the same time a relation of the Earth to itself, or to its own nature... Hence, each planet has in its sun the mirror of its own nature.<sup>44</sup>

Feuerbach, to be consistent, should have said that if a planet has only astronomic/scientific existence for an object, then that object is not another planet but a scientist, and this is what makes him a scientist. For a scientist there exists neither Sun nor music but only waves; and waves, light or sound waves, exist only for a scientist.

We can already see that on the basis of a theory like this, if we were inclined to claim divinity for ourselves what we would need to establish is that *our* object is the Infinite. But before I come to outline how Feuerbach does this, or attempts to do this, I would like to dwell briefly on an example Feuerbach gives, the example of musical sounds. I do this partly for its own sake, as it further illustrates Feuerbach’s theory, and partly because, through what I call the archaeology of examples, this example links his theory to Marx’s views in the manuscripts he wrote in Paris.

If thou hast no sensibility [says Feuerbach], no feeling of music, thou perceivest in the finest music nothing more than in the wind that whistles by the ear, or than in the brook which rushes past thy feet ... The splendours of the crystal charm the sense, but the intellect is interested only in the laws of crystallisation.

[T]he animal is sensible only to the light beam which immediately affects life; while man perceives the ray, to him physically indifferent, of the remote star. Man alone has purely intellectual, disinterested joys and passions; the eye of man alone keeps theoretical festivals.<sup>45</sup>

Now turn to some of the familiar passages from Marx's third Manuscript:

It is obvious that the *human* eye appreciates differently from the crude, inhuman eye, the human *ear* differently from the crude ear etc... [T]he most beautiful music has *no* meaning for the unmusical ear—is no object for it, because my object can only be the confirmation of one of my essential capacities and can therefore only be so for me insofar as my essential capacity exists explicitly as a subjective capacity, because the meaning of an object for me goes only so far as *my* senses go (only makes sense for a corresponding sense)...

*Sense* subordinated to crude, practical need has only a *narrow* meaning. For the starving man food does not exist in its human form, but only in its abstract character as food. It could be available in its crudest form and one could not say wherein the starving man's eating differs from that of *animals*. The care-laden, needy man has no mind for the most beautiful play. The dealer in minerals sees only their market value but not their beauty and special nature; he has no mineralogical sensitivity.<sup>46</sup>

This is how the 'forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present'. There is no music if there are no musical ears, and only if I perceive what is there *as music* am I the type of being that I am. If, as a being, I responded to 'it' not by enjoying it, but, say, by growing, then I would perhaps be a plant. It is interesting to note how Feuerbach himself connects the division of labour to this theory. In the *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future* he says:

[T]he object of herbivorous animals is the plant; however, by means of this object they essentially differentiate themselves from the other animals, the carnivorous ones. Thus, the object of the eye is neither tone nor smell, but light. In the object of the eye however its essence is revealed to us... We therefore also name in life things and beings only according to their objects; the eye is the 'light-organ'. He who cultivates the soil is a farmer; he who makes hunting the object of his activity is a hunter; he who catches fish is a fisherman; and so on.<sup>47</sup>

Hess and Marx operated with this episto-ontology. 'Private property has made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours

when we have it,' and so 'the sense of having' replaced all other senses. This perception, the perception of all objects as commodities, reduced us and the world to a lower, in fact to the lowest level of existence, not only figuratively but literally, ontologically; and, in a reciprocal relationship, the world is also correspondingly 'dehumanised'.

This is an ontology and not just an aesthete's complaint about our vulgarity. The aesthete's prejudice does come through, however, in that neither Hess nor Marx argues why it is more *human* to see the beauty of minerals than to make steam engines out of iron, and why it is against nature, akin to a medieval natural-law sense of 'against nature,' to do the latter rather than the former. When Marx says that 'a dealer in minerals has no mineralogical sense' he does not explain why we all ought to be lapidarists rather than only some of us.

But we still have to return to Feuerbach to see how he argues for our divinity and for the alienation of our divinity. As I remarked, in order to show that we are infinite he has to show that our object is infinite. And indeed this is what Feuerbach is doing in the first chapter of *The Essence of Christianity*. There are however at least four or five different senses of 'infinity' in these pages and Feuerbach moves from one to the other almost imperceptibly. There is a sense in which everything is infinite. Then there is the sense in which only we, as against the brutes, are infinite in that we have consciousness. This kind of infinity itself has two varieties: one is that we are infinite because we are conscious of the infinite, the other that we are infinite because everything and anything can be the object of our thought. In the last two crucial senses the imperfect individual is contrasted with the species which is infinite and then with mankind as a collective. I say this not so much to show some inconsistency but because the last two senses will be crucial for illuminating Hess's remarks on the Christian heaven and on egoism and because they are also the proper targets for Stirner's criticism.

In a sense for Feuerbach everything is infinite, for the limit of any creature's perception is the limit of its world, and in this sense even a caterpillar is infinite. 'A being's understanding is its sphere of vision. As far as thou seest, so far extends thy nature; and conversely. The eye of the brute reaches no farther than its needs, and its nature no farther than its needs. And so far as thy nature reaches, so far reaches thy unlimited self-consciousness, so far art thou God.'<sup>48</sup> But the genuine sense of infinity comes with consciousness. By definition, 'consciousness, in the strict proper sense, is identical with consciousness of



the infinite'. 'The consciousness of the infinite is nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of the consciousness; or, in the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object the infinity of his own nature.'<sup>49</sup>

In a very important little footnote on this page Feuerbach adds:

The obtuse Materialist says: 'Man is distinguished from the brute *only* by consciousness—he is an animal with consciousness super-added'; not reflecting, that in a being which awakens to consciousness, there takes place a qualitative change, a differentiation of the entire nature.

It is in this sense that Feuerbach wants to say that it is religion that distinguishes man from the brute; not in the sense in which we talk about a religious person or a religious institution but in the vacuous sense in which even an atheist is, insofar as he is a conscious being, a religious being. It is in this context that we should read Marx's claim in *The German Ideology* that it is not religion that distinguishes us from the brutes but the fact that we produce, while in the 'Manuscripts' he still follows Feuerbach: 'The animal is immediately one with its life-activity... Conscious life-activity distinguishes man immediately from animal life-activity. It is just because of this that he is a species-being.'

The sense in which even the brute is infinite leads Feuerbach to the crucial claim that it is the species and not the individual which is infinite. The brute is not aware of any limitation but man is, though allegedly this rests on an error, partly on an intellectual and partly on a moral error:

Every limitation of the reason, or in general of the nature of man, rests on a delusion, an error. It is true that the human being, as an individual, can and must—herein consists his distinction from the brute—feel and recognise himself to be limited; but he can become conscious of his limits, his finiteness, only because the perfection, the infinitude of his species, is perceived by him, whether as an object of feeling, of conscience, or of the thinking consciousness. If he makes his own limitations the limitations of the species, this arises from the mistake that he identifies himself immediately with the species—a mistake which is intimately connected with the individual's love of ease, sloth, vanity, and egoism. For a limitation which I know to be

merely mine humiliates, shames, and perturbs me. Hence to free myself from this feeling of shame, from this feeling of dissatisfaction, I convert the limits of my individuality into the limits of human nature in general.<sup>50</sup>

This imprecise sense of the infinitude of our species is replaced or specified a few pages later by the notion of our species as a collectivity of which the members complement each other in such a way that the whole conglomeration adds up to an infinity.

Each new man is a new predicate, a new phasis of humanity. As many as are the men, so many are the powers, the properties of humanity. It is true that there are the same elements in every individual, but under such various conditions and modifications that they appear new and peculiar. The mystery of the inexhaustible fullness of the divine predicates is therefore nothing else than the mystery of human nature considered as an infinitely varied, infinitely modifiable, but, consequently, phenomenal being... One man is a distinguished musician, a distinguished author, a distinguished physician; but he cannot compose music, write books, and perform cures in the same moment of time. Time, and not the Hegelian dialectic, is the medium of uniting opposites, contradictories, in one and the same subject.<sup>51</sup>

The striking relationship of Feuerbach to Hess's message in *On the Essence of Money* comes out when we see how in the section on 'Christianity and Heathenism' Christianity is made into the villain of the piece. According to Feuerbach 'The ancients sacrificed the individual to the species; the Christians sacrificed the species to the individual... [But] the Christians are distinguished from the heathens in this, that they immediately identify the individual with the species...'<sup>52</sup> To do this, for Feuerbach, is also a sign of egoism.

This leads us back to the passage I quoted from Hess's essay on money at the beginning of this section. He begins Part V of his essay, from which I quoted the passage, by saying: 'The individual elevated to an end and the species debased to a means: that is an absolute reversal of human and natural life.' Feuerbach's idiosyncratic notion of Christianity is Hess's model for his 'inverted' world. 'In theory the

classical form of this inverted world is the Christian heaven.' What Hess did was not only to replace the Feuerbachian alienated essence, God, with money, but to argue for some sort of relationship between the two which is an embryonic version of economic base and theoretical superstructure. It is somewhat confused, but not more confused than Marx's similar double-decker view of economic and religious life in his second article 'On the Jewish Question'.

'Christianity is the theory, the logic of egoism. The classical basis of egoistic practice, on the other hand,' says Hess, 'is the modern Christian commercial world'. He also describes the practitioners of this modern Christian commercial world as 'Christian shopkeepers and Jewish Christians' for whom 'the individual is the end, while the life of the species is the means to life'. Not always, but often, the economic base takes primacy in our emancipation. 'We may emancipate ourselves theoretically from the inverted world-consciousness as much as we please, but so long as we have not escaped it in practice, we are obliged, as the proverb has it, to hunt with the pack.'

Although at the end of his second article 'On the Jewish Question' Marx also comes down on the side of the empirical base as the prime agency of change, he does so not for any sound or unsound sociological reasons but as a further move in the choreography of symbolic characters. He does it, as we shall see, to short-circuit the triadic progression of Judaism, Christianity and full emancipation. In the bulk of the article, however, the causal connections between the two levels run both ways, and we shall discover only a thin line of reason why this should be so.

'The Christian egoism of eternal bliss in its practical fulfilment necessarily becomes the material egoism of the Jew,' says Marx; 'heavenly need is converted into earthly need...' In the very next sentence, however, he reverses the direction: 'We do not explain the Jew's tenacity from his religion, but rather from the human basis of his religion, from practical need, from egoism.'<sup>53</sup> Hess, by replacing Feuerbach's egoistic Christian heaven with the world of egoistic Christian shopkeepers and 'Jewish Christians,' while keeping the Christian heaven as a sort of theoretical counterpart, with reciprocal relationships between the two, generated the theory of economic base and superstructure.

In order to see whether there are any important connections between Hess's views and Marx's two articles 'On the Jewish Question'

we have to turn to the other topic we set out to investigate: the triadic pattern of original unity, separation and return. So far we have only investigated Feuerbach's argument for our divinity, and we saw that he operated with several notions of 'infinity' in arguing for the infinity of our species. Some of Feuerbach's arguments rested on what I called his 'episto-ontology'. Hess and Marx made substantial use of this theory in their characterisation of our alienated state. To conceive and to practise our relationship to each other and to the world as the relationship of private property is akin to perceiving the world and each other through the 'sense of having,' and this has drastic ontological consequences both for us and for the world we perceive.

Feuerbach then slides into another sense of the infinity of our species. This is not an infinity for which he argues by claiming that our object is infinite and we are what our object is. This other sense of the infinity of our species is the sense in which mankind as a whole makes up an infinitely perfect organic being where individual imperfections and limitations are compensated for by corresponding virtues in others. Christianity is then, oddly, taken to task for regarding *each individual* as somehow perfect and identical with the species, as against the proper view which is that each individual is a partial predicate of the perfect whole. This is then taken over by Hess as 'the inverted world' of the Christian heaven, as the theory, the logic of egoism. This egoistic heaven is realised in the individualist bourgeois world and in the political and human rights of individuals: '... the egoism of heaven was also achieved on earth... Practical egoism was sanctioned by declaring men to be single individuals, ... by proclaiming human rights, the rights of independent men, ... and so making out isolated persons to be the free, true and natural men.'<sup>54</sup> These are the rights that Marx criticised in his comments on the American constitution.

But Feuerbach is better known for the claim that God is our alienated, projected essence. We have seen however that as individuals we *have* to project the best of our nature onto our species. It would be 'egoistic' and 'Christian' to do otherwise. It was precisely because we tended to project our failings onto our species through claims like 'to err is only human,' that we obscured from ourselves the truth that on the contrary, the essential human nature, our species, is perfect. What Feuerbach considers to be wrong with the Christian theological view of God is that it is an *overprojection*. He does not express it in these

words, but his point is that divinity is projected further than it should be. It is as if in casting our essence onto mankind it leapt off as in a game of ducks and drakes and ended up in heaven.

However, this looks like *overprojection* only if we take real individual human beings as our starting point. It did not look like overprojection to Feuerbach, Hess and Marx, but only as a simple projection or alienation of our essence; for to them the organic unity of mankind was the natural order of things. This natural unity which existed during a heathen or a primitive stage of human development was torn asunder by Christianity, and now we are waiting for the reunion which will result in unity on a higher level. We have seen this model already in Hess's *Sacred History of Mankind*.

As Hess presents it, in the first stage the human essence is united to us but in an undeveloped manner and scattered among our communities. The positive aspect of this stage is that we are united with our essence, though in an undeveloped form. Our essence however cannot develop or perfect itself in this stage. In the next stage our essence is liberated from its scattered embodiments and in its liberated form attains its perfection. It does this, however, outside ourselves, turning us into scattered individuals, into lifeless, alienated beings. In the third stage there are two possibilities. One is the communist, the other the anarchist model. Or, to give them philosophical nicknames, one could be called the Spinozistic model, in which each individual is taken up into one perfect being as an indivisible part of a whole, the other the Leibnizian model, where each individual is a complete monad mirroring all aspects of the universe. In both models the perfected essence is, as it were, re-contained, and this is the culmination of the whole development.

Hess's influence is not evident in the first of Marx's articles 'On the Jewish Question'. Marx in that article speaks of our human essence as being *political life*, rather than the Hessian *mutual exchange* between productive human beings. It is only in his notes on James Mill, which he wrote a few months after reading Hess's essay on money, that Marx himself spoke of the Hessian mutual exchange, rather than political life, while setting out his triadic model. Still later, in *The German Ideology*, Marx spoke of *productive forces* rather than political life or mutual exchange as being the true human essence.

In his first essay 'On the Jewish Question', Marx explicitly draws the analogy with the original content of the model which was the model

of alienation in terms of religious consciousness. The first stage in this case is not located in prehistoric time but in feudal times:

The old civil society had a *directly political* character, that is, the elements of civil life such as property, the family, the mode and manner of work, for example, were raised into elements of political life in the form of landlordism, estates and corporations... Thus the vital functions and conditions of civil society always remained political, but political in the feudal sense....

Then, in the next stage:

The political revolution ... *abolished the political character of civil society*. It shattered civil society into its constituent elements—on the one hand *individuals* and on the other the *material and spiritual elements* constituting the vital content and civil situation of these individuals. It released the political spirit, which had been broken, fragmented and lost, as it were, in the various cul-de-sacs of feudal society. It gathered up this scattered spirit, liberated it from its entanglement with civil life, and turned it into the sphere of community, the *general* concern of the people ideally independent of these *particular* elements of civil life.<sup>55</sup>

We see here a vivid description of how the political element, which in the feudal society was scattered and fragmented but in a primitive way united to individuals and communities, was liberated and became universal, leaving behind the individuals now merely fragmented without the political element.

Political emancipation is a reduction of man to a member of civil society, to an *egoistic independent* individual on the one hand and to a *citizen*, a moral person on the other.

Then, in the third stage:

Only when the actual, individual man has taken back into himself the abstract citizen and in his everyday life, his individual work, and his individual relationships has become a *species-being*, only when he has recognised and organised his powers as *social* powers so that social force is no longer separated from him as political power, only then is human emancipation complete.<sup>56</sup>

Marx draws a clear parallel with the Feuerbachian model. In the second stage, the stage of political emancipation, when the political spirit is liberated, the political state does achieve its perfection and universality, but this perfected universality now stands over against us, as God stood over against us in our religious alienation. Some of the phrases in which Marx describes this do echo Hess, but, as I said, the content is not yet Hessian.

Where the political state has achieved its full development, man leads a double life, a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or consciousness but in *actuality*. In the *political community* he regards himself as a *communal being*, but in *civil society* he is active as a *private individual*, treats other men as means, reduces himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The political state is as spiritual in relation to civil society as heaven is in relation to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society and goes beyond it in the same way as religion goes beyond the limitations of the profane world, that is, by recognising, re-establishing, and necessarily allowing itself to be dominated by it.<sup>57</sup>

It is worth stopping to see what this triadic development which Marx presents to us means in practical terms. It is tempting to assume that since political emancipation was a good thing, however partial it was in its achievements, the next emancipation, social emancipation, will be an even better thing, completing what political emancipation left undone. The story however has a happy ending only in terms of our triadic sacred history. In real terms the picture looks quite different.

Before political emancipation the possession of various political rights depended on man's status, whether as peasant or lord, Jew or Christian, Catholic or Dissenter. In simple terms, political emancipation made all these and other differences irrelevant for the possession of political rights. It indeed separated, if one wants to put it that way, the political element from one's social life. The possession of political rights now does not depend on a man's being a Christian or a Jew, on being the lord of the manor or a pioneer settler in New England. The struggle for this ideal was and is long and it is a different struggle from the one which tries to eliminate or ameliorate our social disadvantages and problems. When the Jews in Germany, like Catholics and Dissenters in England, tried to gain political emancipation they did not

regard their respective religions as disadvantages—like poverty—that they wanted to be rid of. They wanted political rights because they wanted to practise their religions unhindered by political restrictions. Marx's point about political emancipation was just the opposite of this: the fact that you are a Jew, a Christian, a Muslim or a believer in the Australian Aboriginal Dreamtime is taken by him to show that you are still a limited, partial being. Social emancipation is not a further improvement on political emancipation but is its reverse. It aims to eliminate that for the practice of which political emancipation was demanded. This applies not only to religion but to anything in which one has an interest and for the sake of which one would wish to form what Rousseau described as a 'partial association' such as a trade union or a students' or a writers' association. The claim that only those who possess the universal and true consciousness can express the will of society is already present here in the 'early,' supposedly 'humanist,' Marx. It is significant that Marx quotes Rousseau towards the end of this article:

Whoever dares to undertake the founding of a nation must feel himself capable of *changing*, so to speak, *human nature* and *transforming* each individual who is in himself a complete but isolated whole, into a *part* of something greater than himself from which he somehow derives his life and existence, substituting a *limited* and *moral existence* for physical and independent existence. *Man* must be deprived of *his own powers* and given alien powers which he cannot use without the aid of others.<sup>58</sup>

The triadic sacred history is not empirical history, and the remedies it prescribes are not remedies of this world. We are asked to envisage a kind of substance which continues to be the same throughout its development; it attains perfection while separated from us, and the remedy for the imperfections of mankind is for us to be reunited with this perfected substance which is really our essence. This can be transcribed into Rousseau's language by saying that in our fragmented state we are like Rousseau's individuals following our particular wills, while when we are in the possession of our universal essence we express the General Will.

Hess envisages this essence almost literally as the organic life-giving and sustaining substance. 'Life is the exchange of productive life-activities... What is true of the bodies of small units is also true of



large ... social ones.<sup>59</sup> The social world is envisaged by Hess as a large organic body where mutual exchange is like the nervous system and the circulation of the blood in the body. When this essence is alienated and turns into money Hess describes it as if our blood had been solidified into money. 'Money is the congealed bloody sweat of the wretched who bring to the market their inalienable property, their most intrinsic powers, their life-activity itself, so as to exchange it for its *caput mortuum*, a so-called capital, and to dine like cannibals off their own fat... Because money, which we live off and for whose acquisition we work, is our flesh and blood, which, in its alienated form we must struggle for, grab and consume.'<sup>60</sup>

Here the organic analogy is no longer a tree. The dead branches of the tree could not be used as an image for the purpose Hess has in mind here. One might describe members of a movement one wants to be rid of as 'dead branches' to indicate that they should be left behind for good, and to reassure oneself that they are not living opponents who diminish the life of one's own movement. Now Hess wants to introduce an *evaluative* distinction in terms of what is 'natural' into a world the whole of which is supposed to be 'nature'. He achieves this by distinguishing between a living, organic body and dead matter. 'This general trash, money, is not an organic, living body. Yes, it is *supposed* to represent the social body, the organic species-life and our social relationships, but it *cannot* do this because by its very nature it is inorganic and without articulation or inner differentiation; it is nothing else but dead matter, a sum or number.' Part XII of *On the Essence of Money* is an especial elaboration of this theme. Here he also makes use of the Lockean notion of property as the extension of one's body, through the shades of meaning in the German words 'Eigenthum,' property, and 'eigenthümlich,' that which is proper. 'Money can never be *property* [Eigenthum] ... it must appear *improper* to man [dem Menschen nicht Eigenthümliches betrachten werden] ... The man of honour, the genuine man, is so wholly identified with his property, with his real social possessions, that he is fused into and absorbed in it as his soul is with his body.'<sup>61</sup> Part XII of Hess's *On the Essence of Money* reads more like the attitude of the gentry or of the aristocracy to the rising commercial world than the voice of someone from the next stage of historical development after capitalism.

The cruder expressions of organic analogies could not have been to Marx's taste, though there are echoes of such analogies in his early

writings, and so there should be, because part of the evaluative force of Marx's writings does rest on what is presented as *natural*, living, organic and proper. Marx did, however, take over the real content of Hess's essay, which is that our essence is productive life-activity and exchange, and it is this which is alienated in money. So, within a few months in the development of Marx's thought, the role which he had assigned to political life was now assigned to productive life-activity, and in the second stage of the triadic development, in place of the Christian God, it is money rather than the perfected political state which dominates us. In his 'Comments on James Mill' Marx wrote:

[T]he *mediating activity* or movement, the *human*, social act by which man's products mutually complement one another, is *estranged* from man and becomes the attribute of money, a *material thing* outside man ... It is clear that this *mediator* now becomes a *real God*, for the mediator is the *real power* over what it mediates to me.

We noted earlier, quoting from this same passage, that money is 'the alienated species-activity of man'.<sup>62</sup> Perhaps the neatest way Marx puts the case is in his Paris Manuscripts:

The more the worker exerts himself, the more powerful becomes the alien objective world which he fashions against himself, the poorer he and his inner world become, the less there is that belongs to him. It is the same in religion. The more man attributes to God, the less he retains in himself.<sup>63</sup>

About two years later Marx assigned yet another content to our essential natures. It might look as though there is only a shift of emphasis from 'exchange of productive life-activities' to 'productive forces' but the shift indicates Marx's move away from his earlier philosophical positions and from his Young Hegelian friends. But although he moved to new ground in *The German Ideology*, the pattern of movement of productive forces still reflects the triadic pattern of sacred history. In this new version Marx discusses what he calls the 'natural division of labour': for one individual it could be, say, shoemaking, for another carpentry, and so on. The productive forces are themselves fragmented but united to individuals. Under the capitalist mode of production these productive forces are separated from the individuals and belong

to them only insofar as they constitute property. Even in the case of the capitalists who alone are assumed to have property, this new relationship between individuals and productive forces no longer constitutes an organic unity; even capitalists are alienated because even their relationship to productive forces is now in the form of private property. This is then the second stage:

Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have, as it were, taken on a material form and are for the individuals no longer the forces of the individuals but of private property ... On the other hand standing over against these productive forces, we have the majority of individuals from whom these forces have been wrested away, and who, robbed thus of all life-content, have become abstract individuals...<sup>64</sup>

In the third stage everything falls into place: 'the appropriation of a totality of instruments of production is, for this very reason, the development of a totality of capacities in the individuals themselves'. Furthermore, just as in the second stage the alienated essence has to be perfected before it can return, the productive forces have to be perfected in their alienated form in the capitalist mode of production, before their return in socialism.

Earlier in this section we had to consider various reasons for wanting to abolish private property and money, in order to distinguish them from the reasons Hess and Marx had for wanting to do so. Unless we understand these reasons we cannot fully appreciate that there are arguments for saying that nationalising the means of production results not only in practical changed social and economic arrangements but also in the arrival of an ontologically and morally new man on the stage of world history, though few would put it so eloquently as to say that it would result in 'the true resolution of the antagonism between men and nature and between man and man', and that 'it is the true resolution of the conflict between existence and essence, objectification and self-affirmation, freedom and necessity, individual and species. It is the riddle of history solved and knows itself as this solution.'<sup>65</sup>

Shortly I shall make a few critical comments about the whole logical scheme, especially about the logical blind-spot which allows us to assume that the power of a formal structure which received its original impetus from a specific content can be indefinitely transmitted to new

and different contents which are successively put in place of that original content. First, however, I would like to make a few observations about the second of Marx's articles 'On the Jewish Question,' and again I limit my observations to further decipherment of the triadic model.

Carlebach's detailed arguments to show that Hess did not influence Marx's articles 'On the Jewish Question,' which rest mainly on the accurate dating of the compositions of the respective documents, could allow for an influence on the second of Marx's articles, for I can well imagine that Marx could have written such a short angry outburst in a matter of hours, and these hours could be fitted in somewhere between Marx's reading of Hess's essay on money and the publication of the *Jahrbücher*. What would be hard to comprehend, however, is how the reading of Hess could explain such an outburst.

I am fully aware that I am dealing with a very delicate problem here. At one extreme Marx's remarks could be interpreted as an uncharacteristic aberration on his part, and on the other they could explain most of his life's work. Luckily I have the excuse of restricting myself to the variations of the triadic pattern.<sup>66</sup> I shall concentrate on Bauer's claim that while the Jews have to take two steps to full human emancipation, the Christians need take only one. Bauer's actual argument is more subtle, but here we have a triadic progression, a progression that Hess himself lived out in his own life before he returned to Judaism.

Now if an orthodox Benedictine monk would read, say, Charles Reich's once-popular *The Greening of America* he would not be offended if he found that according to the arguments of that book he might belong to 'consciousness one' or 'consciousness two' and that he would have to take one (or two) steps to reach 'consciousness three'.<sup>67</sup> The reason why he would not be offended is that as long as he is an orthodox monk he would not think for a moment that this is the direction in which history is going and he would not think that he has to take any steps at all. My guess is that an orthodox Jew would similarly be unoffended by Bauer's argument and would not know what Bauer is talking about except as an odd theory; certainly he would not apply the invitation to himself to take two steps while he is outside the Young Hegelian conceptual framework. Bauer's suggestion could seem rather impertinent only to someone who is using the Young Hegelian road map to find his way in the world.

Whether Marx was offended or not, he certainly made a master-move to short-circuit Bauer's triadic development, even though his

master-move created or reinforced a tragically misguided symbolism. In reply to Bauer, Marx asserts that Christianity did *not* overcome Judaism. Christianity is *not* the second stage. These are daring and revolutionary remarks in the context of the Young Hegelian conception of history—indeed in the whole Christian conception of history. But now comes the hitch. The Judaism which is still continuing is the world that Hess described as the world of ‘our philistines, our Christian shopkeepers and Jewish Christians’. Hess uses startlingly gory language:

Money is social blood, blood externalised, blood which has been shed. The Jews, whose world historical mission in the natural history of the world of social animals was to evolve the predator out of mankind, have at last fulfilled the work they were called to. The mystery of Judaism and Christianity is revealed in the modern Jewish-Christian world of shopkeepers.<sup>68</sup>

It is however on the structure of Marx’s argument rather than merely on his language that we might detect some Hessian influence. After eliminating Bauer’s three stages and indeed the Christian view (before Joachim added the third stage) that Christianity overcame Judaism, Marx recreates the second stage of the triad in the form in which we have met it in Hess. The reason why Christianity could not overcome Judaism was that Christianity was ‘too *noble*, too spiritual, to eliminate the crudeness of practical need except by elevating it into the blue.’ Judaism whose essence is practical need is still continuing in our civil society; civil society is its continuation. Thus we get the double-decker universe we considered earlier. ‘Christianity is the sublime thought of Judaism, and Judaism is the common practical application of Christianity.’ As it should be in the second stage, the ideal is perfected: this application of Christianity ‘could only become universal after Christianity as a religion *par excellence* had *theoretically* completed the alienation of man from himself and from nature. Only then could Judaism attain universal dominion and convert externalised man and nature into *alienable* and saleable objects subservient to egoistic need, dependent on bargaining.’

The content of the triadic model in Marx’s second essay ‘On the Jewish Question’ differs markedly from that in the first of his articles. Although Hess’s influence is not as clear as it is in his notes on Mill,

Hess's gruesome imagery and his double-decker triadic pattern might have given hints to Marx as to how to tackle Bauer whose views pre-occupied him at the time. Not that Marx copied Hess. It was Feuerbach, not Hess, who wrote that 'Judaism is worldly Christianity; Christianity, spiritual Judaism,' and that 'Christianity has spiritualised the egoism of Judaism into subjectivity'.<sup>69</sup> If Hess had an influence it was in providing a pattern within the choreography of symbolism. To fully appreciate that the second of Marx's essays just as much as the first is constructed on a triadic pattern but with a different content we should observe that the third stage, the resolution, is again expressed in terms of overcoming the conflict 'between the individual sensuous existence of man and his species-existence' by transcending it.

When society succeeds in transcending the *empirical* essence of Judaism—bargaining and all its conditions—the Jew becomes *impossible* because his consciousness no longer has an object, the subjective basis of Judaism—practical need—is humanised, and the conflict between the individual sensuous existence of man and his species-existence is transcended. The *social* emancipation of the Jew is the *emancipation of society from Judaism*.<sup>70</sup>

In this strange last sentence, 'Jew' stands for the actual Jew, and 'Judaism' for the universalised egoism that has been realised in civil society and idealised in Christianity. Marx talks here about the religious nature of the Jew and about the consciousness which is a reflection of the conditions of civil society. This consciousness will disappear when that of which it is a reflection is transformed. According to the logic of this model, however, this reflection should be Christianity and not the Jewish religion, which according to Marx was always practice, not theory, and is now continuing in civil society. Indeed, as we know, he will talk of Christianity and our whole intellectual life, and it is in its later version that we meet the familiar tag that 'religion will wither away' and that all our intellectual life is but a reflection of our economic base. Much has been written by some historians and sociologists taking this view as their scientific theory of history. Marx never made this view clear, and never gave arguments for it, but here we can see its origin.

I described Marx's move in his article as a master-move, but it is so only insofar as it was a transformation of Bauer's three stages into

the three stages of Hess's and his own sacred history. Otherwise I did not mean it as a word of praise. Sometimes it is argued in Marx's favour that he did not talk about the real actual Jews but about a type, but this is precisely what is wrong with what he does. But even by the standard of his own conceptual pattern and symbolism it is a confused piece of work.<sup>71</sup> My main critical comment, however, is not about the confused version of the conceptual framework we have been surveying but about its purest form.

The original use of the alienation model, or the use which gave it its power, was a certain creation story combined with a theodicy explaining the existence of evil and imperfection. Creation is the externalised objectified Deity, and the imperfection of creation is gradually eliminated by the gradual struggle of this alienated essence to become again what it is supposed to be, divine. This optimistic view of progress and history makes sense only if it is rationality which tries to realise itself by the gradual elimination of contradictions in progressive stages. Only in connection with what is rational can we talk of contradictions, and only that which wants to achieve rationality wants to do so by eliminating its contradictions. Here God's relation to nature and history is God's relation to Himself in an externalised manner. Now already the Feuerbachian version of this story should not make sense. The feeling that it does make sense needs to be analysed. If for the sake of argument we suppose that God made us, then reversing the argument we suppose that we, on the contrary, made God, it is clear that the suppositions of making, the makings in question, are very different. The claim that God created us is a claim about a real movement, about the coming into being of some objective entity, the world. The claim that we created God is not a claim to the effect that we brought into being a real existing entity; rather it is the denial of the existence of a supposed entity. By eliminating an 'alienated essence' we are not re-absorbing into ourselves a really-existing essence, but are eliminating an imaginary object; and we are left as we were before, only now without thinking about an imaginary object. The claim that 'God is really man' may be true or false but, if it makes sense at all and is not just a meaningless metaphor, it makes sense only if there is a Divine Being who either chose to become human in a special act of Incarnation, or happened to become human through alienating Himself. If, however, the existence of a supposed Divine Being is a mere

stage in the development of our religious consciousness, then the claim 'God is really man' is a figurative and misleading way of denying His existence, and all the statement means is that 'man is really man'.

If imperfect beings project a perfect Being above themselves, then it is true that one has to do something practical to cure the imperfection. What certainly does not follow however is that the cure will result in perfect beings. It is a fallacy to suppose that a person who is cured of imperfection will be as perfect as the Being that he was imagining as a result of his illness. Someone with distorted vision who keeps seeing giants will not himself become a giant if we restore his proper eyesight. He will have his eyesight corrected, and stop seeing giants. The man might even become more wretched and full of *angst*, having lost his imaginary giants whom he also imagined to be his protectors. For better or for worse, however, one can see how Feuerbach's recommendation to us to rid ourselves of the idols that dominate us would have some effect, precisely because they are imagined idols. Here I am myself trying to get rid of a conceptual model that holds some of us captive. If however we replace our imagined idols with money, steel works, coal mines and factories, then however much it is true that we have to manage them better than we do, our triadic model cannot cope with them.

The curious logic of preserving the power of the story when the original content from which it derived its power no longer exists, is beautifully illustrated by a *Peanuts* cartoon. Lucy and Linus are looking at something which is lying on the ground. 'Well, look here!', says Lucy, 'A big yellow butterfly! It's unusual to see one this time of year unless, of course, he flew up from Brazil ... I'll bet that's it! They do that sometimes, you know ... They fly up from Brazil, and they ...' 'This is no butterfly ... This is a potato chip!' interrupts Linus. 'Well, I'll be! So it is! I wonder how a potato chip got all the way up here from Brazil?'<sup>72</sup>

Feuerbach once remarked that "the Absolute Spirit" is the "deceased spirit" of theology which as a spectre haunts the Hegelian philosophy'. Indeed the 'deceased spirit' still haunts Hess's and Marx's systems, as the idea that big yellow butterflies come from Brazil still haunts Lucy when she is confronted with a potato chip.



# Moses Hess: *On the Essence of Money*

Commerce has set the mark of selfishness,  
The signet of its all-enslaving power  
Upon a shining ore, and called it gold:  
Before whose image bow the vulgar great,  
The vainly rich, the miserable proud,  
The mob of peasants, nobles, priests, and kings,  
And with blind feelings reverence the power  
That grinds them to the dust of misery.  
But in the temple of their hireling hearts  
Gold is a living god ...  
All things are sold: the very light of Heaven  
Is venal; earth's unsparing gifts of love,  
The smallest and most despicable things  
That lurk in the abysses of the deep,  
All objects of our life, even life itself,  
And the poor pittance which the laws allow  
Of liberty, the fellowship of man,  
Those duties which his heart of human love  
Should urge him to perform instinctively,  
Are bought and sold as in a public mart  
Of undisguising selfishness, that sets  
On each its price, the stamp-mark of her reign.  
Even love is sold; the solace of all woe  
Is turned to deadliest agony, old age  
Shivers in selfish beauty's loathing arms ...  
But hoary-headed Selfishness has felt  
Its death-blow, and is tottering to the grave:  
A brighter morn awaits the human day,  
When every transfer of earth's natural gifts

Shall be a commerce of good words and works;  
 When poverty and wealth, the thirst of fame,  
 The fear of infamy, disease and woe,  
 War with its million horrors, and fierce hell  
 Shall live but in the memory of Time,  
 Who, like a penitent libertine, shall start,  
 Look back, and shudder at his younger years.

(Shelley: *Queen Mab*)

## I

Life is the exchange of productive life-activities. The *body* of every living thing, plant, animal or man, as the *medium* through which the productive life-activity of that thing is *exchanged*, is its indispensable means of existence, the *medium of its life*; consequently those parts of the body that are the centres of exchange are its noblest and most indispensable organs, as for instance the brain and the heart. What is true of the bodies of small units is also true of large, and equally true of inanimate celestial bodies, so-called, as of conscious, social ones. The atmosphere of the Earth is the indispensable medium for the exchange of earthly products, it is the earthly life-element; the sphere in which men exchange their social life-activities—i.e. intercourse in society—is the indispensable social life-element. Here men relate as conscious and consciously acting beings to the sphere of exchange of their social life, just as they relate unconsciously, as bodily units, to the sphere of exchange of their bodily life-activities, to the atmosphere of the Earth. If separated from the medium of their social life they can no more live than they are able to exist physically if separated from the medium of their physical life, that is, if the life-giving air is denied to them. They are related to the whole social body as the individual members and organs are related to the individual body. They perish if they are separated from each other. Their real life consists only in the mutual exchange of their productive life-activity, only in co-operation, only in their connection with the whole social body.

## II

The reciprocal exchange of individual life-activity, intercourse, the mutual arousal of individual forces: such co-operation is the real es-

sence of individuals, their real potentiality. They cannot realise their powers, cannot utilise, actualise, manifest or bring them to life at all—or if they have done this, will again find them dying—so far as they do not mutually exchange their life-activities in intercourse with fellows of the same community, or members of the same body. As the terrestrial atmosphere is the workshop of the Earth, so the intercourse of men is the human workshop wherein individual men are able to realise and manifest their life or powers. The more vigorous their intercourse the stronger also their productive power and so far as their intercourse is restricted their productive power is restricted likewise. Without their life-medium, without the exchange of their particular powers, individuals do not *live*. The intercourse of men does not originate from their essence; it *is* their real essence, and is indeed both their theoretical essence, their true life-consciousness, and also their practical real life-activity. Thinking and acting come into being only through intercourse, through the co-operation of individuals—and what we speak of mystically as ‘spirit’ is in fact this life-giving air, this workshop, this co-operation. Every free activity—and there is no other but free activity, because what a being does not do from himself, that is freely, is *no* act at all, or at least not his own but another’s—every real life-activity, therefore, either practical or theoretical, is an act of the species, a co-operation among different individuals. Such co-operation first realises the productive power, and hence the real essence of each individual.

### III

The essence of man, man’s intercourse, develops like every other, in a historical process through many struggles and disturbances. Like everything authentic, the true nature, the co-operation of individuals constituting the human species has a history of its development or origin. The social world, the organising of men, has its own natural history, its genesis, its creation story, like every other world, and like every other organic body. The natural history of mankind however began when the Earth’s natural history had come to completion, when the Earth, that is, had already brought into existence its last and highest organism, the human body, and with it the sum-total of its bodily organisms. The natural history of the Earth, which in the opinion of geologists probably lasted several million years, stopped and came to a close several thousands of years

ago; the Earth is complete. On the other hand the natural history of mankind has not yet come to an end; we are still immersed in the struggle. Mankind is not yet completed but it is close to its completion. We already see in the distance the vaunted land of organised mankind; already we can reach it with our eyes, this promised land to which all man's previous history points, though we cannot yet set foot upon it. It is false to see in the completion of nature's history, in the end of man's creation-history, the end, the 'doomsday,' of mankind itself: an optical illusion which has ever imposed itself upon those who could think of no reality save the existing one—though that did not satisfy them and they therefore wished for another—and who therefore saw in the downfall of their evil world and the coming of a better, the end of this world and the beginning of the next. So likewise are they victims of the 'doomsday' illusion who expect no better afterworld, but also no better world than that now existing—who accept the Christian dogma of the imperfection of this world, but without the consolation of a hereafter—who dream of infinite progress, but suppose no other end or completion for it save death, or some lifeless phantom they call 'spirit'. The philosophers, likewise, are among those who can think of no other reality than the present evil one—are among the antediluvian creatures who see in the downfall of the old world their own destruction, and nothing but death in the completed organism of mankind—because a correct instinct tells them that they themselves form an integral part of the old, decaying, evil reality. If the monsters before the flood—which were spawned by the Earth, while still in its 'raw youth,' before it had ripened and reached maturity—if these monsters had possessed consciousness they would have argued and speculated precisely in the manner of our philosophers, theologians and priests. They too would not have believed in any higher creations, in any completed product of Earth, in any man; they too would have fancied they saw in the destruction of the primeval fauna the approaching destruction of the world. However, just as the completed pattern of Earth makes, not the end, but rather the beginning of its real life, so the completed pattern of mankind, its perfection that is, makes, not the end of man, but rather his true beginning.

#### IV

Human development, its genetic or natural history, the *story of the creation* of man, requires as a necessity its mutual *destruction*, proceeding

from the contradiction of its *intercourse* in the context of its *isolation*. The developmental history of human nature or of mankind appears primarily as a self-destruction of this nature. Men were already sacrificing themselves to their heavenly and earthly gods long before there was a heavenly or earthly, religious or political *economy* to justify it. They destroyed each other because at first they subsisted only as isolated individuals, because they could not co-operate in harmony as members of one and the same organic whole, as members of mankind. If an organised exchange of products, organised activity, the co-operation of all, had already existed beforehand, then naturally there would have been no necessity for men to wrestle or work for their mental and material needs as isolated individuals, by their own efforts, with brute force and cunning deceit; they would not have needed to seek their mental and material goods outside of themselves; they could have developed themselves through themselves, that is, could have exercised their capacities in common. But this would have amounted to saying that human beings would have come into existence as developed human beings, and in this case they would not have had to go through their development history. In other words: if mankind had not begun with isolated individuals it would not have needed to fight out its egoistic struggles for the goods that were still alien and external to them. By now, at the end of this brutal struggle for our nature, once that nature—in theory anyway—has been formed, we can at least think of a human society *without* self-destruction and carry it into practice, a rational, organic human society, with manifold, harmoniously co-operative forms of production, with manifold, organised spheres of activity, which would correspond to the varying proclivities, the manifold activities of men, so that every mature individual can freely exercise his capacities and talents in society, as calling and inclination suggest. This we can do now; for human capacity, human nature (production and dissemination of the propensity to consume products, for the sake of further production) are now developed to excess. The forces of nature no longer confront man as alien and hostile; he knows and uses them for human purposes. Men themselves draw daily closer together. The bounds of space and time, of religion and nationality, the bounds of individuality, are falling asunder, to the horror of narrow minds and the joy of all men of good will! We have only to hail the dawn of freedom, to banish the guardians of night, and we can all clasp hands in rejoicing. Yes, now man has come of age; nothing prevents him

from entering at last into his heritage, the fruit of so many millennia of slavish toil and primitive endeavour! His present misery is indeed the most striking proof of this; for it is not a consequence of want, but of superfluity, in productive capacity. England is pressing into the Earth's remotest corners to seek consumers; but already, or before long, the whole Earth will be too small a market for her products, which continue to multiply in geometrical progression, while her consumers increase only in arithmetical progression, so that Malthus' theory—whereby consumers grow in geometrical, and production in arithmetical progression—is really the very opposite of the truth. Yes, now indeed are men ripe for the full enjoyment of their freedom, or their life. This was not so in the beginning. The human productive powers had first to be developed, the human essence evolved. At first there were merely raw individuals, simple elements of mankind, who had either not yet come into mutual contact and drew their sustenance and bodily needs directly from the earth as plants do, or had made only such contact with each other as to join forces in the brutish warfare of animals. Hence the first form of product-exchange, of intercourse, could only be murder-for-gain, the first form of human activity the labour of the slave. On this basis of historic right, as yet uncontested, no organised exchange could take shape, and only a bartering of products was possible—which was what in fact occurred. The laws that rest on this historical basis have merely regulated murder-for-gain and slavery, have merely erected into a rule or principle what at first occurred by chance, without consciousness or will. Past history till now is no more than a history of the regulation, justification, execution and universalisation of murder-for-gain and slavery. We shall show in what follows how we have at last reached the point where we all, without exception and at every moment, traffic in our activities, our productive powers, our potentialities and our very selves; how the cannibalism, mutual murder and slavery with which human history started have been elevated into a principle—and how out of this general exploitation and universal vassalism the organic community can first be born.

## V

The individual elevated to an end and the species debased to a means: that is an absolute reversal of human and natural life. Man consciously sacrifices his individual life for the life of the species if there is a con-

flict between the two. Even the as yet unthinking creatures, the animals who only feel, forget their instinct of self-preservation, their drive to self-maintenance, if it clashes with their drive to self-propagation, their nature as a species or productive instinct. Love, wherever it may appear, is mightier than egoism. The hen takes up a quite unequal fight if it has to defend its chickens from an attack. Cats will allow themselves to starve if they must, in order to satisfy their sexual desires, or in their sorrow when wicked men take away their kittens. Nature is always concerned with the preservation of the species, with the real life-activity. Individuals always die in the natural order of things and begin to do so, indeed, the moment they have ceased to be able to reproduce. For many members of the animal kingdom, the very day of their mating is the day of their death. In man, who can also do service to his species by means of thought, feeling and will, the gradual decline of his mental powers is the sure presage of his natural death. On this order of things is based the natural world-outlook which sees life itself in the species and regards the individual only as the means to life. In the state of egoism, however, the inverted world-outlook rules because it is itself the state of an inverted world. For our Philistines, our Christian shopkeepers and Jewish Christians, the individual is the end, while the life of the species is the means to life. They have created for themselves a world apart. In theory the classical form of this inverted world is the Christian heaven. In the real world the individual dies; in the Christian heaven he goes on living; in real life the species is active in the individual and by means of him; in heaven the essence of the species, God, lives outside individuals, and they are not the medium whereby God works, whereby the essence of the species lives, but on the contrary, it is individuals who live by means of God. Here the essence of the species is reduced to a means for the life of the individual; the Christian 'self' needs his God, needs Him for his own individual existence, for his holy immortal soul, for his spiritual salvation! 'If I did not hope to partake in immortality, I should care nothing for God, nor for all the creeds.' These few words, uttered by a man of great piety, contain the whole essence of Christianity. Christianity is the theory, the logic of egoism. The classic basis of egoistic practice, on the other hand, is the modern Christian commercial world—another heaven, another fiction, another imagined, suppositious benefit to the life of the individual, sprung from the morbid egoistic craziness of corrupt mankind. The individual, who does not wish

to live through himself for the species, but through the species for himself alone, has also to create for himself in practice an inverted world. Practically, therefore, in our commercial world, as it is in theory in the Christian heaven, the individual is the end, the species only the means of life. Here likewise the life of the species is not at work in the individual and by means of him; here, just as in heaven, it is placed outside individuals and reduced to a means for them; here, in fact, it is money. What God is for its theoretical life, money is for the practical life of this inverted world: the alienated potentiality, the bartered life-activity of men. Money is human value numerically expressed—it is the seal of our slavery, the indelible brand of our servitude—men who can buy and sell themselves are in fact slaves. Money is the congealed bloody sweat of the wretched who bring to the market their inalienable property, their most intrinsic powers, their life-activity itself, so as to exchange it for its *caput mortuum*, a so-called capital, and to dine like cannibals off their own fat. And all of us are wretches such as these! We may emancipate ourselves theoretically from the inverted world-consciousness as much as we please, but so long as we have not escaped it in practice, we are obliged, as the proverb has it, to hunt with the pack. Yes, we are obliged continually to alienate our nature, our life, our own free life-activity in order to sustain our miserable existence. We continually purchase our individual existence by the loss of our freedom. And of course it is not just we proletarians but also we capitalists who make up these wretches who suck their own blood and feed upon themselves. We none of us are able to live our lives freely, to create our work for each other—all of us are able merely to eat up our lives, to prey simply upon each other, if we do not want to starve. Because money, which we live off and for whose acquisition we work, is our own flesh and blood, which, in its alienated form we must struggle for, grab and consume. All of us—and we should not hide it from ourselves—are cannibals, predators, vampires. And remain so as long as we are not all working for each other, but are each obliged to fend for ourselves.

## VI

According to the principles of political economy, money is held to be the universal means of exchange, and hence the medium of life, the power of man, the real force of production, the real treasure of man-



kind. If this externalised treasure really corresponded to the internal one, every man would be worth just so much as the amount of cash or credit he possesses—and as a consistent theology values a man solely according to the measure of his orthodoxy, so a consistent economics ought to value him only according to the weight of his moneybags. In fact, however, neither economics nor theology cares anything about human beings. Political economy is the science of the earthly acquisition of goods, as theology is the science of their acquisition in heaven. But men are not commodities! For the strictly ‘scientific’ economists and theologians people have no value at all. But where these two sacred sciences are applied, in the practice of our modern world of commerce, man is indeed valued only according to his moneybag—just as in the practice of the Christian Middle Ages, which to some extent still flourishes, he was valued according to his profession of faith.

## VII

Money is the product of men mutually alienated, of the externalised man. Money is not ‘precious metal’—we have now more paper money, state- and bank-notes than metal coinage—money is what does duty for human productive power, the real life-activity of mankind. Capital, therefore, according to the economists’ definition, is accumulated, stored up labour—and insofar as production comes about through the exchange of products, money is exchange value. What cannot be exchanged, cannot be sold, has no value. In that men can no longer be sold, they are now not worth a rap—though they certainly are so insofar as they sell or ‘commodify’ themselves. The economists maintain, indeed, that a man’s value increases to the extent that he can no longer be sold and is therefore obliged to sell himself in order to live, and concludes from this that the ‘free’ man is ‘worth’ more than the slave. This is quite correct. Hunger is a stronger motive to work than the whip of the slave-owner, and avarice is a stronger incentive for the private owner to do his utmost than the gracious smile of the satisfied master. What the economists forget, however, is that the ‘value’ of ‘freedom’ must again decline, the more widespread it becomes. The more ‘free’ men flock into slave-labour, the more available, and thus the cheaper, they are or become. The bane of competition lowers the price of ‘free’ men—and the truth is that on the basis of egoistic private

ownership there is no other way of increasing their 'value' again but by the re-establishment of slavery.

## VIII

Ancient slavery is the natural form of the social order based on murder and robbery; it is also its most human form. It is natural and human to allow oneself to be sold only against one's will. It is, however, unnatural and inhuman to sell oneself freely. Only the modern commercial world, through Christianity, the epitome of the unnatural, has been able to attain to this supreme degree of baseness, unnaturalness and inhumanity. Man had first to learn to despise human life in order to cast it freely away from him. He had first to cease regarding real life and freedom as priceless values, in order that he might offer them for sale. Mankind had first to go through the school of serfdom so as to pay homage, in principle, to slavery. — Our modern traders are worthy descendants of the medieval serfs, as these latter, the Christian slaves, were worthy descendants of the pagan slaves. As medieval serfdom is ancient slavery raised to a higher power, so the modern Christian commercial world is a similarly enhanced form of medieval serfdom. The ancients had not yet turned the alienation of human life into Christian self-alienation, were not yet conscious of the decadence of human society, had not yet made a principle out of this fact. The ancients were naive; they accepted uncritically what lay in the nature of the world they moved in (and in which we still move today)—the alienation of man. As religion took over from the ancients the human sacrifices it demanded, so politics did the same, without trying to provide any 'scientific' justification for this barbarism, or to excuse it hypocritically to their still unawakened consciences. — When the latter awoke, Christianity came into existence. Christianity is the sophisticated expression of depraved mankind's awakened bad conscience, the desire to be freed from its reproaches. But the Christian does not free himself from remorse by freeing the wretched of the earth from their misery; he persuades himself rather, that this human wretchedness is not crazy but right and proper, that real life is by right the external form of life, that the alienation of life is the normal condition of the world as such. — The Christian distinguishes between the 'inner' and the 'outer' man, that is, between the real and the unreal. The human soul, that is, the remainder left over when everything corporeal is taken

away—and this remnant is invisible because it is actually nothing—the human soul is the sacred and inalienable life of man; the human body on the other hand is an unholy, bad, contemptible, outer and therefore alienable life. The unreal man cannot sell himself as a slave; but the real man is in any case a depraved being, so he not only can but ought to be wretched; the poor shall inherit the Kingdom of Heaven. — The immediate consequence of this teaching was to leave the reality of slavery as it was, and even to regard it as justified, save only that it was no longer men but mere bodies that were sold—a great step forward—but a step yet further into the morass. Once the principle of saleability had triumphed in this fashion, the road was open for universal serfdom, for the general, mutual and free self-bartering of present-day commerce.

## IX

The essence of the modern commercial world, money, is the realised essence of Christianity. The mercenary state, the so-called 'free' state, is the promised Kingdom of God, the commercial world the promised kingdom of heaven—just as, conversely, God is but idealised capital, and heaven merely the commercial order in theoretical form. — Christianity discovered the principle of saleability. It did not yet worry, however, about the application of its principle. Since reality for it was evil and transitory, it could have no concern for reality at all, and so none for the realisation of its principle. It was therefore quite indifferent whether people really became alienated, that is, became serfs, bodily slaves. It left this 'outside' practice to the 'outside,' 'worldly' powers. And so long as these too were still in a state of theoretical alienation, were more or less in the grip of Christian belief, and so long as they had not yet arrived at practical Christianity, the real serfdom in spite of its theoretical justification remained something purely accidental. Christianity did not in reality change anything in classical slavery to begin with; the existing slavery remained—it was merely enriched with a principle. A new principle, however, is not yet a new existence, a distinction with which our newest Christians, the most recent philosophers, are very familiar. Can anyone, indeed, be surprised at such acumen? If only a theory is given—and Christianity, like philosophy, has merely provided a theory—then its relationship to the *praxis* of life becomes a matter of indifference; the theory is a 'truth' which is taught

and learned, offered and accepted 'for its own sake,' not for the sake of its application. For this reason in the Middle Ages as in the ancient world, it was just as much a matter of accident whether a man actually became a slave or remained free in the 'real world'. The difference between medieval serfdom and ancient slavery lies only in the idea involved. In their reality on the other hand there was not a hair's breadth of difference between them. Neither was better or worse. Neither in the Middle Ages nor in antiquity could one lay claim to real freedom on the ground of one's nature—for in antiquity they did not recognise this nature and for this reason did not acknowledge it, while in the Middle Ages the nature of man was acknowledged only in 'spirit' and in 'truth,' in the divine hereafter, and for this other reason did not acknowledge it in real life;—but still there was no more intention in the Middle Ages than there was in antiquity to enslave man as such, that is, to turn every man into a real slave. Thus in both cases there was *some* freedom; in the Middle Ages as in antiquity, there were *in fact*, that is, *accidentally*, besides those 'certain' people who, as Aristotle thought, were 'born' to be slaves, also 'certain' others who were born free, 'well-born,' 'very well-born,' 'of noble birth'. Thus serfdom was still in reality the natural form of the order based on robbery and murder. Medieval serfdom in reality was not a self-alienation of men, nor could it have been so; for man cannot turn himself directly into a natural serf on his own account. Man's immediate life, his natural body, can be appropriated only by other men. Direct serfdom required other people who were not serfs. The medieval serf could not possess serfs, he had nothing—he did not possess even his own body as his property—so how could he possess other bodies? Had Christians cared about the legislation of this world, they must soon have seen that 'worldly' circumstances still contradicted their principle, that far too much 'naturalness' still held sway there. But they did not worry about this since Christians were *theoretical* egoists. But when in course of time people became enlightened and practical, and wanted to realise Christianity also in this world, when they sought to apply 'pure' Christianity and to realise its 'idea', they then came to see that the 'spiritual' freedom and equality proclaimed by Christianity was still not realised at all. In order to carry the clever distinction between body and soul into life as well, one had to go about it very much more cleverly than the purely theoretical egoists had done. One had to find a form of social life in which the alienation of men was effected just as univer-

sally as in the Christian heaven. Free disembodied spirits had also to appear in this world—a truly colossal absurdity, but one which the cleverness of our modern, Christian-educated legislators and political economists has brought into existence. Christianity is realised in the contemporary commercial world.

## X

The modern legislators, who as enlightened and practical Christians could not rest content with legislating for the next world but wanted to realise the Christian world, their heaven, on earth, had to make the spirits of heaven appear in this world. Such a conjuring of ghosts was not witchcraft however; everything was already prepared for it and the modern legislators, though no sorcerers, were thus able to bring about this piece of magic conjuring act. All that was needed was to canonise and sanctify the already available private man of the medieval bourgeois society which had evolved from serfdom—to sanctify this abstract ‘personality,’ this dead remnant of the real man, who had stripped and divested himself of everything belonging to the life of his species, abstracted it and offered it in heaven, i.e. in theory, to God, and on earth, i.e. in practice, to money. Thus was the neuter, emasculated individual of the Christian heaven made real also in this world. In other words: it was only necessary for what had already happened to *theoretical* life from the point of view of religion and theology to happen to *practical* life from the point of view of politics and economics—it was necessary only to elevate into a principle not merely the theoretical but also the practical alienation of life; and the egoism of heaven was also achieved on earth. This in fact was done. Practical egoism was sanctioned by declaring men to be single individuals, by asserting abstract bare persons to be the true men, by proclaiming human rights, the rights of independent men, and hence alleging men’s independence of each other, their separation and individualisation, to be the essence of life and freedom, and so making out isolated persons to be the free, true and natural men. These monads, naturally, could no longer enter into traffic with each other, which in our kind of trade, based as it is on robbery and murder, amounts to this: they are no longer to be brought to market to be bought and sold directly. This direct trading, this immediate dealing in men, this outright slavery and serfdom had to be abolished, for otherwise people would have still depended on each other;

but in place of immediate serfdom there had to be a mediate kind; in place of serfdom in fact there had to be serfdom in principle, which makes all men free and equal, i.e. isolated and done to death. — With the abolition of actual slavery, it was not murder and robbery that were abolished, but direct murder and robbery. That which now did away with ancient and medieval slavery was nothing else but the application of logical egoism. Only now could the principle of slavery—the externalisation of human nature by the isolation of individuals and the degradation of this nature into a means for their existence—be generally realised in life. The thoroughgoing egoism of the modern commercial world abolishes all direct relationships, all direct life, in theory as in practice, in this world as in the next, and permits this life only as a means to private existence. But where all human relationships, all human activity, is directly abolished and can still be exercised only as a means to egoistic existence; where from the most natural love, from the relationship of the sexes, to the exchange of ideas in the whole cultural world, nothing can be done without money; where there are no other practical men but those who are cashed and traded; where every heartbeat has first to be turned into money before it can come to life: there the heavenly souls wander on earth, there the dehumanised man exists also in this world, there the ‘blessedness’ of the next world has become the ‘good fortune’ of this, there theoretical egoism has become practical egoism, the mere fact of actual slavery has been elevated into a principle and is systematically put into effect.

## XI

The distinction between private man and member of the community, between domestic and public life, has always existed in fact, for it is nothing else but the distinction between person and property. The abstract ‘personality,’ separated from all the means of his existence, this bodiless and lifeless ghost, has been seeking his lost body from the beginning of history, and has sought it at times in the *heavenly* otherworld, in God, the purveyor of ever-distant, never-attainable blessedness, and at times in the *earthly* otherworld, in money, the purveyor of ever-distant, otherworldly, never-attainable happiness. This separation of person and property, which has existed in fact ever since religion and politics have existed, needed only to be recognised in principle and to be sanctioned, and it was thereby asserted that money

alone was the essence of the community or the state, while man was merely its paid servant, and indeed a mere ragged purse-bearer. In the modern state, therefore, not man but the moneybag is the law-giver, and just as the private man replaces the holy 'personality,' so the functionary replaces the holy 'property'. Just as in old times the legislators received their authority from God, so they now receive it from property, from money. The sanctity of abstract 'property' divorced from persons and people presupposes no less the sanctity of the abstract, naked, empty 'personality,' divorced from its property, as this latter presupposes the former. The abstract, alienated, external and alienable 'property' can only appear in its holy purity, separated from everything human, if 'personality' likewise appears in its holy purity, separated, that is, from all genuine property. So a sharp boundary-line was drawn round every individual, within which the holy personality was to be located. These holy personalities are the blessed spirits of heaven walking on earth; they are the bodies of these shadows—their boundary-line is their outer skin. The objective atmosphere of men, however, which in heaven is God, the superhuman good, is on earth the extra-human, non-human, tangible good, the object, the property, the product divorced from the producer, its creator, the abstract essence of relationships: *money*. This is how the 'person' came to be declared holy, not indeed because it is a human essence—on the contrary its essence is completely separated from it; in egoism the universally human is left out of account—but because it is an 'I'. — On the other hand 'property' came to be declared holy, again not because it is human—for it is indeed only an object and not even a superhuman one, like God in heaven, but something extrahuman—it is holy, rather, because it is the means of egoistic existence, because the 'I' uses it (in practice the egoism of the next world becomes tangible). But egoism, which seeks to preserve only the naked person, removed from or independent of its natural and human environment, separated from its physical and social atmosphere, and endeavours to maintain that person in a lifeless, inorganic, inactive, stony existence—egoism which cannot feel beyond its outer skin and cannot see beyond its nose—this narrow-minded essence is in fact destructive of the real life of the individual himself. It simply did not occur to the wise Christian lawgivers that one cannot separate man from the atmosphere in which he breathes without miserably suffocating him in his isolation; that his natural or physical life includes not only what lies within the boundaries of his

body which they had drawn, but the whole of nature; that his spiritual or social life-activity includes not only the products, thoughts and feelings that remain within him, but all the products of social life. It did not occur to them that the man cut off from his environment is an emasculated, flayed being with no more life in him than raw meat with the hide off, or a breathing creature deprived of air. They took all life-giving social atmosphere away from man, and left it to him instead to create a vapour around himself, and if possible to preserve himself with money, the materialised Christian spirit of God. And this spiritualised holy corpse they declared to be the free man, the untouchable, holy, infinite personality! — What do these holy corpses do in order to preserve themselves? They try to take away from each other this spirit, their discarded essence, without which they would rot; they rob each other in order not to be without property—they murder each other to live, that is, in order to exist in misery. Thus human freedom and equality were taken to be established by systematically realising the freedom of beasts of prey, based on the equality of death. This freedom was called man's natural freedom! What enlightened lawgivers! They spoke to poor men somewhat as follows: 'You are free by nature, and your natural freedom, your naked personality, are to remain your untouchable, inalienable property. But as to that which pertains to your social life (and of course everything belongs to this; you cannot even sustain your natural life if you do not acquire the food produced by society), you must wrest it individually from each other. You must use your natural freedom to obtain the means for life. And you obtain these by alienating your natural freedom—but by alienating it voluntarily. Nobody is *forced* to alienate his natural freedom, to sell, hire, or commodify himself, if he prefers to starve. But take care not to disturb others who understand better how to cash and convert their natural freedom; do not disturb these worthy folk in their acquisition! If you want to acquire, you have to surrender voluntarily your natural freedom and offer it for sale, as the other worthy people do. In return, however, when you have acquired something, you can buy and use the natural freedom of other people.'

The trade in human beings, the trade in human freedom and human life, has become too universal nowadays for it to be noticeable at first sight. Indeed one cannot see the wood for the trees. It is by no means only the propertyless who barter away their freedom for the means of their existence; the more a person has 'acquired' already, the



more he wants to go on 'acquiring' until in the end he would like to drain the whole world for his private purpose. Yes, we get so used to trading with our own and other people's freedom that finally we are hardened to it and are left with no idea or memory of free activity and real life. If slavery is more visible among the propertyless, among the propertied it is all the more a state of mind. But for this generation of born slaves, even visible slavery is invisible! Our working men and women, our day-labourers, servants and maids who are happy to have found a master, these are free workers, according to our modern notions, and the master who keeps many hands busy and feeds many mouths is 'respectable' (usually also extremely enlightened), and is a 'useful member of civil society'... But what about those blacks in 'free' North America who work for a master exactly as our 'free' workers do, for slave-owners, who exactly resemble our worthy, enlightened, useful members of civil society, in keeping many hands busy and many mouths fed? — Oh, how un-Christian! But at any rate there is a difference between the 'infamous' human trade on the coast of Africa and the respectable human trade at our doorsteps! There is even an essential difference between the modern slavery of the Christian North America and the ancient slavery of pagan Greece. The Greeks kept slaves so that they could devote themselves to public life, live in freedom, and cultivate the arts and sciences in a free manner; the ancients still had no machines which might have made the slaves, the human machines, superfluous, but had they possessed the new discoveries, then, as Aristotle clearly stated, they would have had no slaves to labour for their greed. The moderns on the other hand, the Christians, buy human beings only because it is cheaper to work with bought rather than with hired men, but yet they declare infamous this trade in human beings, as soon as it threatens to become less profitable or even dangerous to the trader's existence. And now what of the human trade at our doorsteps! What an essential difference! With us slavery is no longer one-sided but mutual: not only do I make you, but you make me, a slave, not by directly robbing each other of our freedom, for this cannot be done, but by mutually taking away the means to our freedom and our life. Thus we can no longer be sold against our will; we have to sell ourselves voluntarily! We cannot even *sell* ourselves any more; no, we must simply hire and make a commodity of ourselves—as I said, we must simply give up our freedom in a wholly voluntary fashion. Yes, our modern lawgivers have distinguished well between

selling and putting on the market. Such cleverness is frightful! But alas! The cleverness of our modern lawgivers is only the slave mentality. — As I said, to the modern commercial world even visible slavery is invisible.

## XII

The world of commerce has solved the problem of realising Christianity. This is the task of taking away absolutely all and every kind of ability from men, not only in fantasied theory, but in genuine real life and practice, and conferring all this on an imaginary chimerical Being; it is the task under pretence of turning the earth into a palpable heaven, of converting it into an equally palpable hell—of depriving men of all the life-giving human air of social life and putting them into the air-pump of egoism, and then representing the death-struggle of these miserable beings as the normal life-activity of men. — Compared with our social relationships, not only antiquity but even the Middle Ages were still human. Medieval society, with all the accursed appendage of its barbaric laws and institutions, did not disfigure men through and through as modern society does. In the Middle Ages, beside the serfs who were nothing and had nothing, there were also people who had a social position, and social character, people who were something. The estates and guilds, merely egoistic associations as they were, had a social character, and a social spirit, however limited; the individual could enter into his circle of social activity and be absorbed into the community, in however limited a way. — It is quite different now, when the formula has been found for *universal* serfdom. The social life of man is now completely devoid of any noble motives. There is no social property or living possession; no man who may really have or be something. This general trash, in which people fancy themselves to possess something, is a phantom we pursue in vain! — What does genuine social property consist of? It consists in the means of living and functioning in society. Property is the body of social man and as such is his first requirement for living in society, just as the natural body, our natural property, is the first requirement of living at all. But what is *our* social property? — This general trash, money, is not an organic, living body. Yes, it is *supposed* to represent the social body, the organic species-life and our social relationships, but it *cannot* do this because by its very nature it is inorganic and without articulation

or inner differentiation; it is nothing else but dead matter, a sum or number. How can the value of a living being, the value of man and his highest life and activity, how can the value of social life be expressed in sums and numbers? We were able to arrive at this absurdity only by robbing the real life of a man's soul, dividing and dismembering it and placing one half in the other world and the other half in this. Let us imagine on the one hand a world of spirits without bodies, a chimaera, and on the other a bodily world without spirit, without life, a dead world of matter, and thus another chimaera—and now let us suppose these bodiless spirits rushing after this soulless matter in order to grab hold of smaller or larger bits of it and make off with them: we then have a faithful picture of the chimerical world in which we live. However much we seize and acquire of this dead, soulless and inorganic matter, this general trash that we pursue as ghosts hunt for their lost bodies, we still do not gain from it any genuine living property or social possession, nor anything which would determine and make possible our life and function in society, our social activity; we gain only the materialised Christian God, the ghost or spirit in which we can preserve and maintain our earthly corpses in a dead stony existence. Money can never in any way be *property* [*Eigenthum*]; on the contrary, to anyone whose nature is not yet corrupted it must appear so alien, so *improper* to man [*dem Menschen nicht Eigenthümliches betrachten werden*], that precisely what is characteristic of all genuine and real property, the internal fusion of owner and owned, appears here as the most repulsive and contemptible vice. The man of honour, the genuine man, is so wholly identified with his property, with his real social possessions, that he is fused into and absorbed in it as his soul is with his body; he fills his post so completely that it is quite impossible to think of him as separated from his sphere of activity—a phenomenon that is now the exception since the content of all social endeavour nowadays is money. For what makes a man man is not the Christian and philosophical aloofness from ordinary life, but the mutual devotion of living and working for each other. The fusion of possessor and possession is thus what characterises genuine property, the social no less than the natural, as such. Everything that I have really appropriated, which is thus my living property, is intimately fused with me; must be, and therefore ought to be. — But what is he who has become fused with our *so-called* property? Who so far identifies himself with his money that he cannot be separated from it? A miserable creature! — And yet

we have to regard this general trash as the first requirement of our lives, as our indispensable property, because without it we cannot preserve ourselves. Hence you must strive eternally to appropriate something which cannot be appropriated, which eternally remains remote and inaccessible to you. In your money you can own only a soulless body that you can never animate, that can never become your property. You must count yourself lucky to have a body that does not belong to you; lucky to be able to exchange your *own* flesh and blood, your life-activity for this trash, and thus to be able to sell yourself—a thing that in the Middle Ages and in antiquity was at least still considered a misfortune,—whereas now you must count yourself lucky to be a modern serf. For you are constantly exposed to the danger of lapsing into that original state of the blessed spirits which our legislators conjured down from the Christian heaven and have declared to be the normal state of ‘natural’ men; you are constantly exposed to the danger of becoming a pure, free, naked person.

### XIII

The commercial world is the practical world of appearances and lies. Under the appearance of absolute independence, absolute necessity; under the appearance of the most lively communications, the deadly isolation of each man from all his fellows; under the appearance of an untouchable property assured to all individuals, an actual deprivation of all their powers; under the appearance of the most universal freedom, the most universal servitude. No wonder that in this realised world of lies fraud is the norm and honesty an offence; that baseness achieves all the honours and the lot of the honourable is misery and shame; that hypocrisy rejoices in triumph while truthfulness is held indecent; that the half-hearted half-hold a majority while firmness is firmly in the minority; and finally, that the freest vision is the most destructive while the crassest servility is the most conservative element.

### XIV

A man torn off from his life-giving roots and from his life-element, like a rotten fruit fallen from the tree of life, and thus a dying, isolated individual, can only artificially be preserved from decay. A living being does not conserve himself but is active and creates himself anew at

every moment. But in order really to live, that is, to be able to bestir or create oneself, the different individual members of the self-same greater organic body must be inseparably connected with each other as well as with their communal life-element or life-material; they and their bodies and their life-atmosphere must not be separated from each other. This separation, isolation and disintegration of individuals is the characteristic feature of the animal world and egoism, and the reason why mankind have hitherto had this animal characteristic is that they were still developing; for the animal world itself is nothing else but mankind caught in the process of development. Mankind, in fact, has a twofold history of development: one, men's first history, represents the development of their still unconscious or bodily existence, and this we find in the *natural* animal world; the other, their second history, which follows from and after the first, and whereby they first exist in a completed, developed and perfect form, consists in the development of their conscious, spiritual or social existence, and this we encounter in the social animal world. We find ourselves now on the peak, at the culminating point of the world of social animals; and hence we are now social predators, complete, conscious egoists, who sanction in free competition the war of all against all, who uphold in the so-called rights of man the rights of the isolated individual, the private person, the 'absolute personality,' who condone in the freedom of trade the mutual exploitation of each other, the lust for money, which is nothing else but the blood-lust of the social beasts of prey. We are no longer herbivores like our guileless ancestors who, though also social animals, were not yet social predators, in that most of them, like good-tempered domestic animals, only required to be fed: we are bloodsuckers who mutually flay and devour each other. As the animal enjoys in blood his own life merely, though in a bestial, brutal fashion, so man enjoys in money his own life in a brutal, bestial, cannibal manner. Money is social blood, but blood externalised, blood which has been shed. The Jews, whose world historical mission in the natural history of the world of social animals was to evolve the predator out of mankind, have at last fulfilled the work they were called to. The mystery of Judaism and Christianity is revealed in the modern Jewish-Christian world of shopkeepers. The mystery of Christ's blood, like that of the veneration of blood in ancient Judaism, appears here at last quite openly as the mystery of the predator. In ancient Judaism the blood cult was only a prototype; in medieval Christianity it became theoretic-

cally, ideally, logically realised: one really consumed the externalised, poured-out blood of mankind, but only in imagination the blood of the God-man. In the modern Jewish-Christian world of shopkeepers this besetting urge of the world of social animals has at last appeared, no longer symbolically or mystically, but in wholly prosaic form. In the religion of the social predators there was still poetry. Even if not the poetry of Olympus, it was still the poetry of Walpurgisnacht. The world of social animals became ordinary and prosaic only when nature again reasserted its rights and the isolated man, this poor slave of antiquity and serf of the Middle Ages, was no longer content with heavenly food; he began to strive, not for spiritual but for material treasures, and wished to juggle his alienated life, his shed blood, no longer into his invisible belly but into his visible pocket. Then the sacred conjuring trick became profane, the heavenly fraud an earthly one, the poetic contest of gods and devils a prosaic animal struggle, the mystical God-eating [*Theophagie*] an open devouring of man [*Anthropophagie*]. God's church, the heavenly tomb, where the priest, the hyena of the social animals, conducted an imaginary funeral feast, has now been transformed into the money state, a worldly battlefield where predators with equal rights guzzle each other's blood. In the money state, the state of free competition, all privileges and differences of rank are at an end; here, as we said, there prevails an unpoetic freedom of the predator, based on the equality of death. Against money, kings have no more title to command because they are the lions among human animals, than does the black-garbed priest still have the right among them to regale himself upon the odour of death because he is their hyena. On the contrary, they have their rights, like other human animals, only by virtue of their common right of nature, their common quality as predators, blood-suckers, Jews and wolves of money.

## XV

Money is the means of exchange which has turned to a dead letter and kills life, just as letters are the means of communication which have turned to dead money and kill the spirit. The invention of both money and the alphabet is attributed to the Phoenicians, the same nation which also invented the Jewish God. A literary wit supposed, therefore, that he was making a very telling point against the elimination of money when in one of his writings, under the title of 'The Movement of Pro-

duction,' he compared the spiritual capital that we possess in writings (especially his own) to the material capital that we possess in money, and then went on to say: 'The elimination of money would thus have the same significance as the elimination of writing: it would be a command to world history to return into its womb.' But, to begin with, Herr Schulz has overlooked the difference between the material capital that we possess in money and the spiritual capital that we can appropriate through writing. This difference is nothing less than the difference between genuine and false property. Without doubt I can appropriate spiritual treasures through writing. But it would not occur to anyone to label the treasures that we appropriate through words and writing as the individual's private property that he could in turn bequeath to private heirs. Of course I can inherit or acquire a library, a so-called treasury of literature; I can even obtain so-called revelations through holy writ; but the more this acquisition approximates to the acquisition of money, the more external and accidental it is, the more it is subject to loss and gain, the more valueless, the more spiritless, my 'spiritual' treasure becomes. Or does Herr Schulz think that I have already garnered the spirit with the letters and the books? Language is the living, animate means of communication but it is not the letters that count. Spiritual money has value only so far as it is organically interfused with man. Language can be organically fused with men because it is an organic, structured whole. But, as was already shown earlier, money cannot fuse organically with men, and therefore resembles writing, not in the sense of living language, but in the sense of dead letters. It is said—and it is indeed very significant—that letters, like money, were invented by those who invented *Moloch*. Language, however, was not invented in this place or that. If an invention is no longer needed or useable, and has even become harmful, then people no longer use it though without therefore needing to return to the 'womb'. That letters and coins were 'useful' inventions, and even 'necessary' discoveries is not in dispute. The question is simply whether they will therefore also be 'useful' and 'necessary' in the future. It is perfectly true that in the isolated condition and mutual alienation of men that has existed until now, an external symbol had to be invented to represent the exchange of spiritual and material products. During this period of alienation such an abstraction from genuine, spiritual and living relationships strengthened men's capacity and productive power; for in this abstract means of relationship they had in fact a

mediating essence of their own alienation; because they were themselves not human, that is, not united, they had to seek the uniting factor outside themselves, that is, in a non-human, superhuman being. Without this non-human means of relationship they would simply not have come into relationship at all. But as soon as men unite, and a direct relation can occur between them, the non-human, external, dead means of relation must necessarily be abolished. This dead and deadening means of relation cannot and will not be abolished by an act of choice; its abolition no more occurs by 'command' than its creation did. Just as, during the inner fragmentation of mankind, the need for an external means of unity brought spiritual and material idols into being, so the need for direct inner unification of men will bring these idols to nought again. The love, which took refuge in heaven when earth was not yet able to comprehend it, will again have its dwelling where it was born and nourished, in the human breast. We shall no longer seek our life vainly outside and above ourselves. No foreign being, no third intermediary will again force itself between us to unite us externally and in appearance, to 'mediate,' while internally and in reality it separates and divides us. Together with commercial speculation, philosophical and theological speculation will come to an end; together with politics, religion will also disappear. Driven by the inner necessity of our nature and the outer need of circumstances we shall once and for all finish with all the nonsense and hypocritical rubbish of our philosophers, learned men, priests and politicians which harmonises so beautifully with the inhumanity and baseness of our bourgeois society; and we shall do it by uniting ourselves into a community and by ejecting as alien bodies all these external means of relation, all these thorns in our flesh.

## XVI

The organic community we envisage could come into being only through the highest development of all our powers, by means of the painful spur of necessity and of evil passions. The organic community, the ripe fruit of human development, could not come into being so long as we were not yet completely developed, and we could not develop ourselves if we did not come into contact with each other. During the development of contact, however, we have continued to struggle with each other as isolated individuals. We have fought with



each other over our spiritual and material means of contact because as isolated individuals we needed these means of contact in order to live. We needed them because we were not yet united; but the unification or co-operation of our powers is our life. We have therefore had to look for our very life outside ourselves and to attain it by mutual fighting. Through this fight, however, we have attained something quite different from what we were trying and hoping to attain. We had thought to attain an outside good, and we have merely developed *ourselves* thereby. But this madness was beneficial and useful to us only so long as it really helped to develop our powers and capacities. After they are developed we would only mutually ruin each other if we did not turn to communism. The struggle no longer develops our powers any further, if only because they are now developed. But we can also see daily that on the one hand we merely squander our powers fruitlessly and that on the other they simply cannot develop any further because of the superabundance of our powers of production. If the bourgeois liberals still regale us with the necessity of progress through the competitive struggle, it is only because they are thoughtless twaddlers, because they perpetrate anachronisms, or because egoism has made them blind and incapable of grasping truths apparent to anyone who merely opens his eyes. If we do not unite with each other in love, then at the stage of development that we have arrived at we can only go on mutually exploiting and devouring each other. Not centuries, as the unthinking liberals assume, not even decades will pass before the hundredfold increase in productive powers will have pushed into the deepest misery the great majority of those who must live by the work of their hands, because their hands will have become valueless; while those few who busy themselves with the accumulation of capital will revel in abundance and ruin themselves in vile pursuit of pleasure, if they have not first hearkened to the voice of love and reason or succumbed to force.

## XVII

The history of the development of society is completed; soon the last hour will strike for the world of social animals. The clock of the money machine has run down and our political exponents of progress and reaction are trying in vain to keep it on the move.

## 11. Nature and Convention

1. *De Corona*, 5.
2. Cf. his *Sense and Sensibilia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), 70–73.
3. I cannot remember off-hand whether Arthur Lovejoy recorded over forty or over seventy different usages of ‘nature’ in his article “‘Nature’ as an Aesthetic Norm’.
4. *The Writings of the Young Marx*, ed. and tr. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), 141.
5. Diels, *Fragm.* 125.
6. *Treatise*, Book III, Pt. 1, Sec. 1.
7. *Commentary*, June, 1980.

## 12. Moses Hess, Marx and Money

1. Several years ago, after I translated Moses Hess’s essay *On the Essence of Money*, I asked Professor Peter Heath of the University of Virginia whether he would be kind enough to read it. The result of this request was such a drastic transformation of my text that had my original version still not weighed on his elegant style I would have liked to call this a joint translation.

While Peter Heath so improved on my English translation of a German text, my wife did her best to improve the English of my English discussion of Hess’s thought. Though she wished I would turn to saner subjects, she helped with more than style.

Professor Eugene Kamenka wrote copious helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay. Though he did not see this present completely rewritten text I would like to express my gratitude for his earlier comments as well as for his constant help whenever one turned to him.

Anyone who writes on Moses Hess cannot help but be indebted to Professor Silberner’s authoritative work on the life of Hess. I also relied on Professor John Weiss’ work, and of course on Professor Isaiah Berlin’s lively essay. Finally I would like to thank Robert Castiglione, who helped me to clarify so much while we were disentangling the complexities of Feuerbach.

2. ‘Über die Sozialistische Bewegung in Deutschland,’ *Neue Anekdoten*, Darmstadt, 1845, in *Moses Hess, Philosophische und Sozialistische Schriften*, ed. W. Mönke (Vaduz: Topos Verlag, 1980), 2nd ed., 293–94.

3. Marx is quoting here from F.H. Semming, 'Communism, Socialism, Humanism,' in *Rheinische Jahrbücher*, 1845, Vol. 1. He quotes it in *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 95–96.
4. David McLellan, *Marx Before Marxism* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 141.
5. David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx* (London: Macmillan, 1969), 158.
6. *Ibid.*, 158. The reference to Silberner is to Edmund Silberner, 'Die Tätigkeit von Moses Hess,' *Annali*, Milan, 1963, 431.
7. Edmund Silberner, *Moses Hess: Geschichte seines Lebens* (Leiden: Brill, 1966). Silberner discusses the problem on pages 184 ff. For the reference see page 192.
8. Robert C. Tucker, *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 112.
9. Julius Carlebach, 'The Problem of Moses Hess's Influence on the Young Marx,' *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute*, Vol. 18, 1973, 27–39. The article also forms part of Chapter VI of Julius Carlebach, *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).
10. Nicholas Lobkowicz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), 292.
11. For Silberner's arguments see E. Silberner, *op. cit.*, 166–169. Jacob Leveen in his brief pamphlet on Hess writes that 'Hess took for his wife a Christian woman, whom he had nobly rescued from a life of prostitution'. A nice little point is that in the British Library copy of this pamphlet someone has crossed out the word 'prostitution' and written 'degrading poverty' on the margin as a replacement. Hess was in no position to rescue anyone from degrading poverty, but the legend of the noble act must go on. (Leveen's pamphlet *Moses Hess* was published in London in 1926.)
12. Isaiah Berlin, *The Life and Opinions of Moses Hess*, 1957 Lucien Wolf Memorial Lectures (Cambridge: Heffer and Sons, 1959), 10–11, reprinted in his *Against the Current. Essays in the History of Ideas* (London: Hogarth Press, 1979).
13. Moses Hess, *Die Heilige Geschichte der Menschheit* (Stuttgart, 1837; reprinted Hildesheim, Gerstenberg, 1980).
14. David McLellan, *The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx*, 155.
15. Julius Carlebach, 'The Problem of Moses Hess's Influence on the Young Marx,' 30.
16. Hess's co-operation in *The German Ideology* is discussed by W. Mönke, 'Über die Mitarbeit von M. Hess in der "D.I.",' *Wissenschaftliche Annalen*, Vol. 6, 1957.

17. See Hess's essay, page 189 in this volume.
18. *The German Ideology*, 102.
19. I owe this point to György Bence's article on Hess, 'Moses Hess a Filozofiatörténelemben,' in *Magyar Filozofiai Szemle*, Budapest, 1967, Vol. XI, No. 2, 262.
20. To be fair, one must quote Ruge's remark in one of his letters that Stirner was responsible for 'the first readable book in philosophy that Germany has produced.' On Stirner's crucial role in the development and disintegration of the Young Hegelian movement see especially Lawrence S. Stepelevich, 'Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 39, 1978, 451–463; Nicholas Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice*; and Karl Lowith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche: the Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought* (London: Constable, 1965). I took Bauer's remark from Stepelevich's article, page 457.
21. There exists now a translation of Hess's article 'The Recent Philosophers' in Lawrence S. Stepelevich's anthology *The Young Hegelians: An Anthology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
22. Engels to Marx, 25–26 October, 1847, *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975–1994), 47 Vols, Vol. 38 (1982), 138–139.
23. Engels to Marx, 23–24 November, 1847, *Marx, Engels: Collected Works*, Vol. 38, 149.
24. Marx to Engels, 15 August 1863, *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Werke* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1961–1991), 43 Bände, Band 30 (1964), 369.
25. Nathan Rotenstreich, 'For and Against Emancipation—The Bruno Bauer Controversy,' *Year Book of the Leo Baeck Institute*, London, 1959.
26. That the two were not unrelated in Hess's mind is well argued by Shlomo Avineri, 'Political and Social Aspects of Israeli and Arab Nationalism' in Eugene Kamenka, ed., *Nationalism* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1973).
27. See Julius Kovesi, 'Marxist Ecclesiology and Biblical Criticism,' *Journal of the History of Ideas*, January–March 1976, Vol. 37, No. 1, 93–110, and pages 75–93 in this volume.
28. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 'The Education of the Human Race,' in *Lessing's Theological Writings*, tr. and ed. Henry Chadwick (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1956), 97.
29. John Weiss, *Moses Hess, Utopian Socialist* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1960), 69.
30. Kandinsky, 'Reminiscences' in *Modern Artists on Art*, ed. by Robert L.

- Herbert (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), 38–40.
31. Ludwig Feuerbach, 'Provisional Theses for the Reformation of Philosophy,' which first appeared in Arnold Ruge's *Anekdoten*, 1843. Now translated by Daniel O. Dahlstrom in Stepelevich, *The Young Hegelians*, *op. cit.*
  32. Auguste Cornu and Wolfgang Mönke, eds., *Moses Hess, Philosophische und Sozialistische Schriften* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1961), 303.
  33. *The Writings of the Young Marx*, ed. and tr. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967), 261. Hereafter: Easton and Guddat.
  34. It is interesting to see Engels' reference to 'the egoism of the heart' in a letter to Marx on the 19th November 1844. After referring to Hess's views on Feuerbach and Stirner, Engels goes on to say: Hess 'also hates any and every kind of egoism, and preaches the love of humanity, etc., which again boils down to Christian self-sacrifice. If, however, the flesh-and-blood individual is the true basis, the true point of departure for our "man," it follows that egoism—not of course Stirner's intellectual egoism *alone*, but also the *egoism of the heart*—is the point of departure for our love of humanity, which otherwise is left hanging in the air. Since Hess will soon be with you, you will be able to discuss this with him yourself.' *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works*, Vol. 38, 12–13.
  35. Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'*, ed. Joseph O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 50.
  36. See Hess's essay, pages 189–190 in this volume.
  37. Karl Marx, 'Comments on James Mill...', *Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels: Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 212.
  38. Easton and Guddat, 246.
  39. I have based my distinction on a similar one made by Durkheim in his *Socialism and Saint Simon*.
  40. Easton and Guddat, 301–302.
  41. George Herwegh, *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz* (Vaduz: Topos Verlag, 1977).
  42. Easton and Guddat, 307–309.
  43. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, tr. George Eliot (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1957), 23.
  44. *Ibid.*, 4–5.
  45. *Ibid.*, pages 9 and 5.
  46. Easton and Guddat, 308–310.
  47. Feuerbach, *Principles of the Philosophy of the Future*, tr. M.H. Vogel (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), 9.

48. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, 8; see also 17.
49. *Ibid.*, 2–3.
50. *Ibid.*, 7.
51. *Ibid.*, 23. Echoing the familiar tag ‘The king is dead, long live the king,’ Marx writes in his third Manuscript: ‘*Death* seems to be a harsh victory of the species over the particular individual, and to contradict the species’ unity, but the particular individual is only a *particular generic being* and as such mortal’ (Easton and Guddat, 307).
52. *The Essence of Christianity*, 152 and 154; see also 158–159.
53. Easton and Guddat, 248.
54. See Hess’s essay, page 195 in this volume.
55. Easton and Guddat, 238–239.
56. *Ibid.*, 241.
57. *Ibid.*, 225.
58. Rousseau, *Social Contract*, Book II, quoted by Marx in Easton and Guddat, 241. The italics are Marx’s.
59. See Hess’s essay, page 184 in this volume.
60. See Hess’s essay, page 190 in this volume.
61. See Hess’s essay, page 201 in this volume.
62. Karl Marx, ‘Comments on James Mill...,’ *Marx-Engels: Collected Works*, Vol. 3, 212.
63. Easton and Guddat, 289–290.
64. Marx and Engels, *German Ideology*, 65–66.
65. Easton and Guddat, 304.
66. For a proper study of the problem, see Carlebach, *Karl Marx and the Radical Critique of Judaism* and Rotenstreich, ‘For and Against Emancipation, The Bruno Bauer Controversy’.
67. Charles A. Reich, *The Greening of America: How the Youth Revolution is Trying to Make America Livable* (New York: Random House, 1970).
68. See Hess’s essay, page 203 in this volume.
69. Feuerbach, *The Essence of Christianity*, 120–121.
70. Easton and Guddat, 248.
71. To my amazement István Mészáros gives the impression that Marx, and he himself following Marx, is talking about actual history in his views about Judaism. See Mészáros, *Marx’s Theory of Alienation* (London: Merlin Press, 1970).
72. *Peanuts Treasury* by Charles M. Schulz (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).