Valuing and Evaluating

encourage a learning to consideration of moral values

The appearance of moral values in 1676 came quite a span of
time before the discussion of the ethical and moral

In a lecture, a Cynthia in Oxford a few months ago, heard the following:

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jects and human skills as my examples of evaluations. I am showing the examples where we evaluate. This is the main burden of my paper, to argue against the view that we are evaluating all over the place, including our moral life; and that in order to introduce what we do in our moral life we first take ‘easy’ examples like the evaluations of fire-extinguishers and then proceed to the more difficult ones like deciding whether to tell a lie or not. This way we make our job not only difficult but impossible or, insofar as it is possible, misleading. Of course we shall find it more difficult to find out how we evaluate in our moral life if the first thing we are asked to observe is that there we are not dealing with functional objects nor with skills; nevertheless we are evaluating on the same pattern (it is the same you know, without the snake). Why not just talk about evaluation and then take functional objects as our examples, not because it is easier but because these are the sorts of things we evaluate. And when we turn to moral philosophy why cannot we recognise that there we are dealing with quite different problems, and I mean quite different.

Even outside the field of morals, however, there are cases where evaluation is rather difficult, or more complicated than in the case of functional objects. How would we evaluate pebbles for instance? Well, we don’t. We could make use of them as ballast but then we evaluate them as ballast, under a different description. We employ one of these phrases that will shift them under a different description and say ‘these are good as ballast but those are not,’ or ‘this is good for ballast’. But where we do not evaluate, do not ask how we evaluate there, but say that there we do not evaluate. Especially we should not make the mistake of thinking that the ‘easy’ examples are not genuine cases of evaluation, but that the real examples are those where it is hard to think how we could possibly evaluate something. On this view the ‘real’ example of evaluation is when we evaluate pebbles. Here there is no given standard but we, as collectors of pebbles, make up some standard of our own. So the real case of evaluation occurs when the description of what we evaluate cannot give us any help, but we provide the standard by our own decision. This may be the genesis of our prevailing distinction between evaluation and description into which I do not want to inquire now directly. Let me just say that this is carrying my snake story really too far by assuming that the real and genuine cases of what is illustrated by the snake are exactly those where there is no trace of a snake. Let me also repeat that the collector of pebbles evaluates them as geological specimens, as semi-precious stones or as beautiful objects, not as pebbles. In turn we can evaluate him as a collector and, if he is not good at his standards, he is not a good collector. But let us not pursue the collector any further because he cannot serve as an introduction to moral philosophy, not even if we make him say ‘I hereby resolve to collect shifty pebbles; do so as well’. The collector of shifty pebbles is not deciding on his standards but on a description of something which he is going to collect good examples of.

I have mainly answered by now the second objection as well, which is this: my examples of descriptions are not examples of genuine descriptions. Genuine examples of description are those that do not help us with evaluation, like describing some objects as pebbles. Instead of saying that certain objects are boats, which is cheating, I should have said that some pieces of wood are arranged in a certain way and nailed together. This is what they are, not boats. How could I evaluate this, or how could I move from this to an evaluative judgment? My answer is again simply that we do not evaluate this and we cannot move from this to an evaluative judgment. But if we want to illustrate how we evaluate something we have to take examples of those things that we do evaluate. We can of course say that this construction is good for floating on and to go out fishing in and then we are right back in the stone age and soon we shall be creating some such simple word as ‘boat’. The person who says that the object in front of him is not a boat but pieces of wood arranged in a certain way and nailed together does not only make evaluation impossible, he does not know how to describe the object, he does not know what the object is. To test this we should observe whether he can follow a rule in recognising other objects as being the same or not the same. In the next object on the water the pieces of wood are arranged differently and they are not joined by nails, and the one next to it is not even made of wood. If he keeps to his original statement then he cannot regard the second and third objects to be the same as the first, nor of course the first to be same as the second and third; therefore he does not know what even the first object was; he has no notion of a boat. Let us not ask, therefore, how someone who has no notion of what a boat is will evaluate boats in the hope that his resolution of this problem (e.g. adopting his own principles) will shed some light on the problems of moral philosophy.

There is a use of the word ‘descriptive’ according to which to describe something as a boat (or an act as stealing) is not a good example
Your prompt is not fully visible. However, based on the visible portion, it appears to be discussing philosophical or ethical considerations, possibly related to decision making or moral reasoning. Without further context, it's challenging to provide a comprehensive transcription or interpretation.
The next problem I want to bring up is the problem of the food group.

Do you know what I mean? Let's talk about the food group. If you're in a group of people eating, it's important to notice the different patterns of eating habits. For example, some people may eat more fruits and vegetables, while others may prefer meats and dairy products. These differences can affect the health outcomes and overall well-being of the group. It's essential to understand these patterns and adjust our eating habits accordingly.

In conclusion, I would like to mention these problems that complicate...