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## True Purposes and an Outstanding Problem of Purposiveness in Hegel

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on Hegel's claim that purposiveness or teleology is, in his unusual terminology, "the truth of" mechanism. First, I defend several important insights about this from Maragat's book, *True Purposes in Hegel's Logic*. Second, I argue that what follows from these insights is that there is an outstanding problem about Hegel's account of teleology, not solved in this book, or other recent work on the topic; I conclude with reason to expect that a solution would have to involve a radically idealist account of teleology.

KEYWORDS: *Hegel, Teleology, Mechanism, Idealism.*

RESUMEN

Este artículo se centra en la afirmación de Hegel de que la finalidad o teleología es, en su inusual terminología, "la verdad del" mecanismo. En primer lugar, defendiendo diversas intuiciones importantes al respecto extraídas del libro de Maragat, *True Purposes in Hegel's Logic*. En segundo lugar, defendiendo que lo que se sigue de esas intuiciones es que hay un problema pendiente en la explicación de la teleología de Hegel, que no se resuelve en este libro ni en otros trabajos recientes sobre el tema. Concluyo razonando la expectativa de que una solución a dicho problema tendrá que involucrar una concepción radicalmente idealista de la teleología.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *Hegel, teleología, mecanismo, idealismo.*

Hegel's philosophy is famously unusual. And this includes his views about topics relating to mechanism and teleology. To approach the unusualness of Hegel, we can start with some views that are not so unusual, but familiar and often assumed today: First (it is familiar to assume) there are causes and effects. A bunch of parts together can, considering causal relations among them, function as a mechanism. There are also agents, who can act with an intended end, purpose, or *telos*, so that teleology would be required to understand such acts. And such agents can intervene in an other-

wise mechanical world; for example, they can design and build mechanisms. So, when we ask why the second hand of a watch is doing what it is doing, this would seem to admit a mechanical explanation on one level: a spring turns a gear, etc., all in accordance with causal laws. And it would seem to admit of teleological understanding as well: it does so for the sake of the end of indicating the time; after all, it was designed and built by an agent, for the sake of that end.

So far, then: not so unusual.

Now just this much, of course, might also already suggest philosophical problems, and it is easy to understand how certain projects (not yet as unusual as Hegel's) might try to solve them. For example, interaction with an otherwise mechanical world might seem to require a body, whose parts obey the same causal laws as mechanisms, and then it can start to seem difficult to explain how teleological explanation would really make any difference: how a telos or end, just as such, would make a difference to what happens. And so, one might take this as a problem and try to solve it. One project might try to solve it in a way that will allow actions to admit genuine teleological explanations. Others might prefer to distinguish explanation from understanding and argue that only teleological understanding is needed or required. Others might take an eliminativist view, arguing that there is in the end only really mechanism.

More difficult, but not *that* difficult, would be understanding a project that Hegel certainly includes, even if it is not his larger and more unusual aim in this neighborhood. This more modest project would be to make room for yet something else, omitted from the picture above: an *immanent* teleology of life or biology, as for example a seed growing into a plant, without any reliance on *intentional* teleology, or ends as represented by an intelligent agent, or "external" teleology.

But here I want to follow the path of Maragat's tremendous book on this topic, *True Purposes in Hegel's Logic* [TP], seeing Hegel's defense of immanent teleology as essentially embedded in a more ambitious and unusual philosophical project: the project of establishing, in Hegelian terms to be discussed below, that purposiveness is "the truth of mechanism".

Here I want to explore this territory by beginning with some points on which I think we should be completely convinced by Maragat: the importance of focusing on Hegel's unusual and radical claim that purposiveness is the truth of mechanism; the need to approach this in terms of Hegel's arguments; and Hegel's position that no appeal to immediate purposiveness (for example, as will be discussed below, immediate practical access to purposive activity) can bypass the theoretical philosophical

work and engagements needed to make sense of this teleology. But I follow these points of agreement to some critical questions about Maragat's account of the untruth of mechanism, purposiveness as the truth of mechanism, and Hegel's account of purposiveness. As is probably common with the best books in philosophy, this book should carry lessons for readers generally — even if not always exactly the lessons the author has in mind. I argue that what is highlighted by the book is indeed something other than its explicit theses: namely, an outstanding *problem* concerning Hegel and teleology — and related topics like action and self-determination. The problem, in the Hegelian terms to be introduced below, is that Hegel denies that purposiveness is immediate, but also that it is mediated. I think Maragat probably leaves us too close to a view on which it would be mediated. But, what then? I have a suggestion here as to how to try to solve this problem, but my main focus is rather drawing on Maragat in order to illuminate the problem I think outstanding.

## I. THREE IMPORTANT POINTS FROM *TRUE PURPOSES*

### I.1 *Of Central Importance: Purposiveness is “the Truth of” Mechanism*

Maragat holds that, if we turn to Hegel on issues in the neighborhood of teleology and mechanism, we should not avoid what is radical and unusual about his view. It is central to Hegel to argue for a radical and unusual claim — Maragat's wisely chosen focal point—that purposiveness is “the truth of” mechanism. Or: mechanism lacks any “truth” of its own and depends on purposiveness to be its “truth”. (Or, to add a step: *immanent purposiveness* is the truth of external purposiveness, and purposiveness is the truth of mechanism.<sup>1</sup>)

Now much of the below will be devoted to debate about what this “truth of” claim could mean. But we can see why it will turn out to be a radical view, in Maragat's discussion of it here:

... for Hegel, purposiveness is not a self-sufficient causal principle *besides* necessity. In his account, the failure of necessity is not a limitation that we acknowledge when coping with extraordinary objects, as seems to be the case in Aristotle's and Kant's work; rather, it is relevant to all kinds of *explananda* [TP, p. 80].

Or, again, there is an untruth of the non-purposive; Maragat refers to “the ‘lack of truth’ that is characteristic of efficient and mechanical causes” [TP, p. 85]. Their truth can only be in the purposive. And here Maragat

reads this in terms of explanatory relevance: so, somehow, mechanistic accounts would, surprisingly, have no explanatory relevance all their own; in some respect, they would depend for any explanatory relevance on teleological accounts, or purposiveness. Any way we slice it, I think this will be a radical view. And I think this is accurate to *Hegel's* view. So far, so good — or so it seems to me.

## I.2 True Purposes as a Model for The History of Philosophy

In this section, I note some features of *True Purposes* that, in combination, make it a model of how to work in the history of philosophy. At least as I see it. So, these are points about methodology, on which I find Maraguat completely convincing. Here is his statement from his lead essay which I find so convincing:

... given the proverbial difficulty of the texts, the exegetical work is, in my experience, impracticable if not guided by a *simultaneous* effort in making sense of the underlying arguments [Maraguat (2024), p. 96].

I think *True Purposes* makes a great case for this approach. But let me build my way back to this as a compound point:

*First:* Much work on Hegel bottoms out by saying something like this: “Hegel believes”, “Hegel claims” or similar. For example, an interpreter finds themselves with a difficult problem and then a belief attributed to Hegel comes out of nowhere to solve it: perhaps it will be that Hegel ... believes ... contradictions are true, and the seeming problem evaporates. Does the sense in which this is philosophically unsatisfying disappear if one argues that the belief in question is just a common assumption of Hegel’s time, place, or collaborators? Not in my view. First, I think there are always more tensions than this kind of common-assumption approach can bring into view. But second, more importantly, a mere assumption is still no reason or argument. Hegel’s *Logic*, for example, is aiming for some presuppositionless form of reason; to say it all stems from a mere assumption — as for example about contradiction — is not to explain this, but to prematurely give up. So, mentioning some general view about contradictions, say, seem to me to rather shift the weight of the problem to the question of reasons for thinking contradictions true, and how to understand the claim in light of those reasons: Which contradictions? In what sense are contradictions true? And so on.

Or often an interpreter highlights as important Hegel’s confrontation with another philosopher, like Kant. But then says that Hegel simply

presupposes something that Kant specifically argued against. Again, this is contrary to Hegel's understanding of what he is up to, and I think we should try to make sense of that, rather than giving up from the start.

Maraguat's book, by contrast, is relentless in its pursuit of Hegel's reasons, and how he brings reasons to bear in engaging other philosophical views. And that allows it to do something that seems again to me a model of the best of the history of philosophy, namely, to propose ways of understanding what Hegel's work means in terms of an account of how that work is animated by reasons, rather than just question-begging assumptions. And that is not only great in itself, but even better in combination with another virtue:

*Second, True Purposes* focuses on understanding Hegel's view of teleology and mechanism in terms of Hegel's actual philosophical engagements. For example: with Aristotle, Kant, and (much more commonly neglected in this context) Spinoza. In so doing, it highlights rather than downplays Hegel's radical view about teleology as the truth of mechanism. And, what's more, it focuses on Hegel's *Science of Logic*. This is a hard road to go, but important. The *Logic* is certainly something like a core of Hegel's system, and Hegel's view of his work is that the various pieces are not separable from the system. This bears on the issue above about comparisons to recent philosophy. Recent consideration of teleology and life in philosophy of science would surely take as input empirical evidence about living beings, for example. But Hegel's *Logic*<sup>2</sup> is interested in philosophical issues for which such evidence is not supposed to be needed or appropriate, or issues that are supposed to rise before, as it were, empirical issues. This is a radical position, but important for Hegel.

And then I note how hard it is to *combine* these virtues: To recognize how unusual and radical Hegel's view is, and still not treat it as resting merely on assumption, but as something animated by reasons. That what makes this book, in my view, a model of a compelling project in the history of philosophy. I should say, personally, that these standout features of the book made it especially helpful for me: It helped me in a process of rethinking my own views, and I learned a great deal from this. But I will come back to that.

### 1.3 *Against Immediate Teleology*

So far, then: I am convinced by Maraguat as to where one should focus, if interested in Hegel and teleology; and I am convinced that his

approach is an ideal way to focus there. Now for a third point of agreement, which descends a bit more into the details.

Maraguat says that Hegel associates teleology with “self-determination or determination ‘from within’”,<sup>3</sup> or a kind of “self-activity”.<sup>4</sup> Since Hegel champions a kind of immanent teleology, he does not think that such activity need involve intelligent or conscious representation of ends, and then pursuit of them as such. Even in a plant growing towards the sun, there would be a kind of activity or self-activity present — activity for the sake of the end of growth or reproduction or similar — even in the absence of intelligent representation of goals.

Now a very simple version of a kind of philosophical challenge to the existence of this activity of life is above: a mechanical world can seem to leave no place for purposive activity, or for purposiveness or teleology to be of any explanatory relevance. The threat is that it would end up that purposiveness is a way we think about things, but purposes do not have any purchase on why anything actually happens.

I agree with Maraguat that one possibility in response, that should be mentioned in connection with Hegel and German Idealism, is the possibility of what Maraguat associates with Schelling, and calls “an immediate source of teleology” [TP, p. 204]. Perhaps the best way to explain is via Maraguat’s earlier statement: “Schelling appeals to a practical certainty about life” [TP, pp. 108–9n37].

I take it the idea under discussion would be something like this: We are living; we act. And, in acting, we have *immediate* access to our self-activity, the self-activity of life. This is not something that requires theoretical proof. We would lose track of it, in turning to look for a foundation of an argument, that just passively is, or waits to be enlisted in an argument. And, then again, to draw a conclusion from such an argument would be to *act*, to *do* something, and so there again would be this self-activity, prior to and accessible independently of that theoretical argument. Nor would purposiveness be something that requires an analysis into something else. We would lose track of it, if we tried to so analyze it. And, then again, to give an analysis would be to *act*, to *do* something, and so there again would be this self-activity, prior to and accessible independently of that analysis.

I agree with Maraguat’s point here: Hegel (at least in the mature period of the *Logic*<sup>5</sup>) rejects such appeals to immediacy and sees his view here as very different than Schelling’s. This tells us something important about Hegel’s commitments, quite apart from whether or not Hegel’s *interpretation* of Schelling is correct, or what Schelling’s view (at any par-

ticular point) might have been. Hegel *sees* such immediacy in Schelling, and he *rejects* it, so we know from this that whatever Schelling thought, Hegel's view is not meant to be like this. Maragat says:

... in his *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, Schelling appeals to a practical certainty about life in a way that Hegel, no matter how much the views of his old companion and friend influenced him, did not consider satisfactory [TP, pp. 108–9n37].

I should note that some readers may take this denial of immediacy to just *be* an embrace of purposiveness as *mediated* by something else, something non-purposive; for example, as *analyzed* into non-purposive terms. So, I should emphasize that I am going to argue that Hegel also squarely rejects that option (2.3). So, my point here is not to embrace it, although I will worry below that Maragat comes closer to embracing it than I think we should.

And I am convinced by something that Maragat connects with this point: there is more theoretical work to do, with respect to a philosophical account of purposiveness, than such an appeal to immediate purposiveness can recognize. And, further, Hegel sees this. Note the interplay with something I agreed with above, namely, the importance of attending (as Maragat does) to Hegel's engagements with more skeptical views about immanent purposiveness in Kant and Spinoza. So, with respect to this discussion of Schelling, Maragat says:

Schelling's confidence in the actuality and objectivity of the purposiveness of natural organisms does not arise from a genuine discussion of Kant's sceptical arguments [ibid.]

I would add to this something inspired by Maragat's attention to Spinoza as well. Hegel sees Spinoza as *arguing* that there is no freedom, no self-determination. And Hegel recognizes that this forecloses any possibility of arguing against Spinoza in a way that *begins* with freedom or self-determination or takes it up as immediate in this respect. Hegel says:

... any refutation would have to come not from outside, that is, not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system and irrelevant to it. The system need only refuse to recognize those assumptions [SL 12, p. 14].

So, a refutation cannot “presuppose”, for example, the “freedom and independence of a self-conscious subject” [SL 12, p. 15].<sup>6</sup> To take this as simply immediate would not support a real refutation of Spinoza.<sup>7</sup>

I find interesting and important Maragat’s treatment of Hegel’s rejection of immediacy in relation to the idea of a transcendental argument: the *Logic’s* argument is not one that “... provides access, by means, at last, of an argument of a transcendental kind, to an immediate source of teleology (Section 9.1)” [TP, p. 204].

So, I take it that the idea under consideration is this: *We can pursue a transcendental issue, about the conditions of the possibility of experience (or similar). And we can conclude that self-activity is such a condition. But to do this is not to treat that self-activity as mediated by the issue of such conditioning: What it is to be self-activity? It is not to be the condition-of-the-possibility-of-experience. Rather, pursuing the conditioning issue illuminates that there must be something there, without telling us what it is; it opens the space for us to consciously focus on immediate purposive activity, and to see that this is the condition.*

Maragat cedes that Schelling enlists immediate purposiveness in a transcendental argument, and perhaps the early Hegel as well:

I believe that some of Hegel’s expressions, particularly in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, make this latter perspective attractive. Indeed, some of those expressions are vividly reminiscent of reflections found in Schelling’s early work that clearly deserve a Kantian-transcendental interpretation [TP, p. 204].

In seeing the mature Hegel as ruling out immediate purposiveness, I am convinced by Maragat, and I think this places down an important marker. The marker constrains where we should and should not seek Hegel’s own answers: first of all, not there, or not with immediate purposiveness. And so, it allows us to navigate in search of Hegel’s positions, looking elsewhere. Now, I am not entirely convinced by the answers Maragat finds elsewhere, so on my account we may have more navigation still to do. But I will approach that point via some critical questions.

## II. CRITICAL QUESTIONS

I now turn, as is the norm in philosophy, to some more critical questions, first of all about Maragat’s account of the untruth of mechanism — meant to be linked to an account of purposiveness as the truth of mechanism. I think my line of questioning leads to an interesting



problem about Hegel's account of purposiveness itself — one that now seems to me central, and unresolved. I should emphasize that the critical questions I pose are not all questions to which I think I have published any adequate answer; so, this is not in the spirit of asking why Maraguat does not agree with my own work. I think I have come to see the problem much more clearly by thinking about *True Purposes*. So similar worries may apply to my own past work; but I do not want to focus here on my work — the focus is rather on learning from Maraguat.

### II.1 *The No-Regularity Argument and the Untruth of Mechanism*

So *True Purposes* shows that we should orient our sense of Hegel on teleology around the radical claim that purposiveness is the truth of mechanism, with the implication that “purposiveness ... is relevant to all kinds of *explananda*” [TP, p. 80]; and that we should approach this in terms of arguments for it, and arguments which engage as Hegel does — for example, with Kant and Spinoza.

I want to ask some critical questions here. I begin with one line of argument in Maraguat, or that Maraguat sees in Hegel. I will call this the no-regularity argument. In the book, I am thinking of this:

Mechanism cannot explain what it is meant to explain: namely, why something — a change in a state of affairs — happens when and where it happens and why something always or for the most part happens, when it, indeed, always or for the most part happens [TP, pp. 80–1].

This seems similar to the lead essay here:

...if necessity were to reign in nature — cascades of particular efficient, antecedent causes supposedly with particular effects — nature would be a spectacle of irregularity and contingency ... [Maraguat (2024), p. 99].

And Hegel “infers, then, that where regularity, and especially expediency, prevails, some other explanation must be sought, and is in fact available ...” [Maraguat (2024), p. 99]. So, the limitation of mechanism would be that it cannot explain some aspect of what happens, and specifically what happens regularly.

Perhaps this could plug into the promised conclusion, above, if it is *specifically purposiveness* that is required for explanation of what is regular. And that seems proposed as Hegel's path, in the book: given something “regular”, this “indicates” specifically purposiveness. In more detail, this

is stated in terms of an analysis of purposiveness in terms of reciprocal causal relations: With respect to “The concurrence of several objects (or ‘active substances’) to produce a certain result”,

... if ... regular or even ubiquitous, it indicates a robust and relatively autonomous complex of reciprocal causal relations that constitutes the inner truth of a state of affairs. Purposiveness will appear in the *Logis*, at the end of ‘Teleology’ and in ‘Life’, as the name of the causal involvement of the elements of such a complex. They are precisely where they are for a purpose [TP, p. 107].

But I have some questions about how the no-regularity line of argument can plug into a case for mechanism lacking a truth of its own, and in need of purposiveness as its truth. I want to start by noting — though this need not be any fault at all and will be the case in many interest arguments — the conclusion as interpreted here seems hard to accept. It is that only purposive organization, with “parts where there are for a purpose”, can explain regularity. Just as an example, the far-off planets in the solar system seem to move in regular ways, and we seem able to explain this in terms that involve no purposiveness. And Maragat seems to cede the lack of purposiveness in such a system:

...where there is *simply* a cycle of states that a system goes through repeatedly, as in the case of ... a planet rotating around a star, there is certainly no reason to say that a particular state is the *means* for reaching another, no reason to differentiate means from ends and thus no reason to speak of serving an end at all [TP, p. 146].

Maragat seems to need to deny one or the other claim that seems hard to deny: the movement of the planets does seem regular; and it does seem non-purposive.

But maybe a terminological clarification could allow one to take a more moderate position, and avoid the need to dispute this regularity without purposiveness? The first quote in this section, from the book, refers to *mechanism* not explaining regularity. But the second, from the lead essay, refers to *necessity* not explaining regularity. Perhaps we could say that attempts to explain in terms of necessary behaviors of independent parts or elements is “element-mechanistic”. Meanwhile, explanations in terms of the organization of a broader system, where this larger organization is *not* purposive, would be “system-mechanistic”. If so, then we could spare the difficulty of disputing regularity without

purpose, by preferring this more moderate kind of view: *Element-mechanistic* explanation cannot explain regularity. That would allow that a system like the solar system, without being purposive, could explain regularity.

But now I don't see how this contributes to a case that *purposiveness* is the truth of mechanism, and *relevant to all kinds of explananda*: For one thing, the moderate line cedes that non-purposive organization, or system-mechanism, can do so. And Maraguat seems to say that Hegel's conception of mechanism is system-mechanical; if so, then this seems to cede that mechanism can explain regularity. Indeed, this is the contemporary account of mechanism to which Maraguat says Hegel's is closer:

Mechanisms are entities and activities *organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions* ... [Maraguat (2024), p. 100].

This seems to cede that mechanism, in this sense, can explain regularity. What would be limited would be only what Maraguat calls "mechanical explanations, from parts to whole" [Maraguat (2024), p. 103], or element-mechanism, in my sense here.

So, to serve in an argument that mechanism has no truth of its own, and needs specifically purposiveness for its truth, it seems that something more than the more moderate claim is required; if no-regularity is to serve in this role, it would need to be a denial that mechanism (even system-mechanism) can explain regularity. So, it would seem to need to dispute the seeming non-purposive regularity of cases like the solar system.

One way to dispute this would be to cede that the solar system is non-purposive and dispute its regularity. Then we could maintain that explanation of regularity requires specifically purposiveness. But even this doesn't seem to capture the untruth of mechanism or its need for purposiveness as its truth, at least on Maraguat's reading of the implications of this — namely, purposiveness being of explanatory relevance to all kinds of phenomena. For what seems to follow is that there is in some cases regularity (e.g. life), and others not (e.g. the solar system, on this view), and that the former require, and the latter do not, purposiveness. But this seems to be the view that Maraguat *contrasts* with Hegel's here:

... for Hegel, purposiveness is not a self-sufficient causal principle *besides* necessity. In his account, the failure of necessity is not a limitation that we acknowledge when coping with extraordinary objects, as seems to be the

case in Aristotle's and Kant's work; rather, it is relevant to all kinds of *explananda* [TP, p. 80].

The threat is that the failure of necessity would be just a limitation we acknowledge in coping with the extraordinary cases, in the sense of those cases where there is or we do observe regularity.

So, it seems that making sense of mechanism's lack of its own truth would require disputing not that the solar system is regular, but rather that it is non-purposive: is purposiveness is supposed to be relevant to all kinds of explananda, it would require that all kinds of explananda are part of or influenced by some case of purposiveness. One version of this would argue that the whole of everything is akin to an organism, a case of inner purposiveness. I did not understand Maragat to argue for this, or to argue that Hegel argues for this, and his non-purposive view of the solar system above suggests Maragat does not advocate this. I myself argue that Hegel does not think the whole of everything is an organism, or alive, and that this is part of his claim about the weakness or powerlessness of nature [see my Kreines (2015)].<sup>8</sup>

And how *would* no-regularity contribute to *arguing* that everything is purposive? Say one really established that mechanism could never explain regularity, and that only purposiveness can. I suppose one could add an empirical premise that there is regularity everywhere and establish that everything is purposive. But Maragat is talking about Hegel's *Logic*, and it seems meant to operate without empirical premises. So, it is probably for the best not to suggest this argument as Hegel's. I agree with Maragat that we should try to understand Hegel's conclusions in terms of arguments or reasons animating his work; I don't see what the *reasons* could be *in that work* that would support the whole of everything as an organism; so, absent something unforeseen on that score, I think we should be very reluctant to attribute the conclusion to Hegel.

My sense is that there are two reasons for this trouble fitting no-regularity into an account on which mechanism has no truth and requires purposiveness for its truth. The argument seems to cede that mechanism does have truth of its own, in two senses:

First, it seems to argue in a way that cedes that that necessity, or causal relations, or determinism — and with them, element-mechanism — has *some* explanatory relevance and in this sense truth: they can explain what happens in isolated cases, but not regularity in what happens. (I turn to consider Maragat's worries about this below.)

Second, it seems to argue in a way that cedes that system-mechanism has some explanatory relevance, and in this sense truth. For it seems to ask us to consider one element or part, in context of different non-purposive arrangements (or, mechanistic systems), would have different consequences—shifting the explanation of regularity of the system or arrangement, but allowing non-purposive cases.

I suppose my questions for Maragat would be: Am I wrong in these worries about these ways of enlisting no-regularity? Or is there another way of enlisting it, that I have not considered? Or is no-regularity just a halfway house, only meant to redirect us to something further and more radical, and a better case for the untruth of mechanism? Something like:

## II.2 *The No-Powers Account of the Untruth of Mechanism*

Maragat also has what seems to me a different approach. Perhaps, again, the real importance of no-regularity is just a halfway station, meant to alert us that the real story is more radical. This is what I would call a *no-powers* argument. Maragat says:

The mechanical part/object is a potential component of an indefinite number of mechanisms and, strictly speaking, has no causal powers of its own [Maragat (2024), p. 101].

Similarly:

... there is no basis of non-relational properties and intrinsic capacities from which something can “emerge” [Maragat (2024), p. 106].

This certainly asserts (leaving aside argument for the moment) a rejection of the first sense of at least some truth of mechanism’s own lingering in no-regularity, above: it is a rejection of any truth of its own in element-mechanism. For on this new view, parts or elements, on their own, would explain nothing at all: there are *no* powers in independent parts, and so no powers to necessitate them doing anything at all.

I have two worries about seeing Hegel as *arguing* for no-powers as a form of the untruth of mechanism: this argument seems to me to presuppose that mechanism, in both senses above, does after all have some truth, some explanatory relevance, all its own.

First, the proposed argument seems to me to again trade on the second sense of some truth of mechanism — on the explanatory relevance of system-mechanism, or organization (even if non-purposive). So, I am

not sure how something established on this basis could get us to no truth of mechanism, and a need specifically for purposiveness as its truth.

To see this, consider the first quote above: What the part does depends on what *mechanism* it is present within. This could be an indefinite number of different “mechanisms”. So, the argument seems to cede that behavior can be explained by non-purposive organization, or mechanism in this sense.

Second, to me the argument for no-powers seems to trade on... there being powers. For the argument seems to be that the causal powers of each element on its own can produce many different overall effects given that each element is only ever present in relation to many others; so, holding the causal powers of the object constant, those very powers will cause it to behave in any number of ways. I don’t know how to state that argument without enlisting causal powers of the elements, and so recognizing their reality.

Take Maragat’s example of gravity. This could cause so many different behaviors that it could cause something to rise: in the case of a house supported, or a pulley [Maragat (2024), p. 101]. This seems to cede the causal power of gravity; so, I don’t see how this kind of consideration can generate a no-powers conclusion.

Similarly, Maragat cites Cartwright referring to “environments in which the Coulomb *repulsion* between two negatively charged particles *causes them to move closer together*” [Cartwright (1999), p. 59]. This way of arguing seems to build off of a recognition, and testify to the reasonableness of this recognition, of the power or force we call “Coulomb repulsion”. The force could cause so many different behaviors that, in the right environment, *this force would cause* two negative charges to move closer together. Natural “capacities” have been so important to Cartwright, for so long, that they are right at the start of the title of her 1994 book: “Nature’s Capacities”.<sup>9</sup> This seems to be what Maragat wants to deny in no-powers:

... there is no basis of non-relational properties and intrinsic capacities from which something can “emerge” [Maragat (2024), p. 106].

Granted, perhaps Cartwright has had all along something *grammatically* like the claim that *there are no powers*, at least since *How the Laws of Physics Lie* (1983). But this would seem to be the claim *there are no laws*. At least in the sense that “the fundamental laws of physics do not describe true facts about reality” [Cartwright (1983), p. 54]. But we must take care

that this argument against laws requires a specific account of what it is to be a law — it must take a law to be something like an exceptionless regularity or generalization in what happens. Then you can deny laws if you think the capacities/powers always present in such complicated circumstances that no exceptionless regularity in behavior results. So, this is more a denial of regularity than a denial of powers or capacities; it seems based on recognition of powers or capacities. The worry about a law, in this sense, doesn't seem to be a worry about causal powers, but seems to trade on realism about them.

So, the argument against causal powers seems to me to presuppose causal powers. I *think* this sense in which Maraguat says he is “well aware that Hegel is trying to have his cake and eat it too”. I take this to mean: trying to “have” powers in an argument that also “eats” them (in the sense of eliminating them). He says that making sense of this would have to wait for an account of Hegels “dialectical idealism”, on another occasion [Maraguat (2024), p. 6n3]. It is fair enough to say that no one book, or essay can do everything; but I am not sure how delaying that issue can fit with this — salutary, in my view — methodological commitment:

... given the proverbial difficulty of the texts, the exegetical work is, in my experience, impracticable if not guided by a *simultaneous* effort in making sense of the underlying arguments [Maraguat (2024), p. 96].

For this commitment seems to me to suggest that if we leave the argument in need of a way of making sense of how it could support rather than undercutting its conclusion, then we leave open also what the text really means — for example, whether the text is really committed to no-powers at all.

But maybe here is a sketch of the kind of argument that might be called dialectical, and might serve here: Perhaps one could argue that, precisely if there were causal powers of independent elements, there would not be; so, there are not. Or alternatively, if we posit powers, this forces a denial of powers, and so a contradiction.

If I had to try for such an argument, on the basis of what Maraguat offers, I would try this: If there were causal powers (e.g. Coulomb repulsion), they would produce indefinitely many different behaviors based on relations to everything else around (e.g. negative charges moving away from one another, or towards one another, etc.). But then, just as a warmup, “repulsion” would be a bad name for the power, since it can also make particles move towards one another. More importantly, we might argue this leaves us without any grasp on what such a power is:

For however we grasp the power, it might make things behave in ways that *oppose* that grasp. And this (it would be argued) leaves the power as at best an unspecifiable = X. But then X could play no role in explanation of anything. And then we would have no reason to posit X in the first place. A preference for simplicity would demand its elimination. So: if causal powers, then, no causal powers. Or, for this reason, if powers, then a contradiction.

However, I do not anticipate being convinced that this kind of argument is strong, as such. Take the argument from Coulomb forces, again. It is not like we would, according to this very argument, lose all sense of what the power was: as far as I can see, the argument for variable behavior trades on our having a precise grasp of the mathematics of the force, in terms of the product of the charges divided by the distance squared. Say we are calculating what would happen, in Cartwright's unusual system, with respect to two like charges in that system: charge1 and charge2. So, show that they would, in these unusual circumstances, move towards one another, I assume she will do a calculation of a vector applied to charge1, pointing away from charge2 (on account of repulsion), and vice versa. But she will calculate many vectors, as there are more parts of the system, and add them together. The vectors represent *something*, but they do not represent output *behavior*. It would represent force. To predict behavior, we would still have to calculate the same way for everything else in the system. And then I assume that Cartwright is pointing out that the resulting vectors would point from the first to the second, and vice versa, and they would move towards one another.<sup>10</sup> So I cannot find any real threat, on account of this kind of argument, to the reality of powers.

To my mind the argument for the elimination of powers would have to add a more general principle, which would then really be doing all the work. It would be a principle along the lines of this: We cannot meaningfully refer to anything over and above behavior. Probably this would take empiricist form: behavior is empirically manifest, but any supposed power over and above behavior (this kind of empiricist would argue) is not, and so (it would be claimed) is not something to which we can meaningfully refer. And so there would be nothing else for force to be, other than regularities in behavior; and then perhaps we could deny that there are such powers inherent in parts or elements.

But, first, I cannot imagine being convinced that *Hegel* is this kind of empiricist. He has such a wonderful and powerful *critique* of this kind of empiricism.<sup>11</sup>



Second, to me it seems that considerations about mechanism are really turning out to play little if any role in the case: adoption of *that* kind of empiricist principle seems obviously destined to rule out such powers. To put it another way: I cannot imagine any friend of powers accepting the empiricist principle, so I can't see it as any argument addressable to those who deny the conclusion.

Finally, this argument form would threaten apply with radical results far beyond the case of powers. If it worked, imagine what view of the self it would fuel! Would the self be nothing but observable behavior, or (if there were no self just in behavior) unreal? And I note that my argument via restriction to unknown X, for example, parallels Berkeley's case for the elimination of *matter*; I am not sure there are many who find *that* argument compelling, nor many who think that it parallels *Hegel's* kind of idealism.

As a philosophical rather than interpretive matter, it would seem interesting to me to really dig in trying to support the general empiricist principle and allowing that extremely radical conclusions follow. But to me this now seems quite removed from Hegel on mechanism and teleology, and indeed Hegel.

As far as Cartwright goes, to me it seems there is too much empiricism here to help with interpretation of Hegel's *Logic*. Further, I buy the argument of those who see a tension in her views at the time of her 1983 rejection of laws.<sup>12</sup> She is essentially insisting on an *empiricist* conception of what a law would be, namely, a regularity. And then the argument about powers and configurations would show that there are no laws (assuming that conception of what a law is). But I cannot see how that view of what a law is could stand if one is willing to let go of empiricist worries about causal and power realism: the view of law needs motivating by an empiricist principle that would, if at all compelling, force a similar account (in terms of observable regularity) of what it is to be a power. And then the defender of laws can fall back on the idea, common in my view as well to Kant and Hegel, to understanding what laws are (at least in part) on the basis of real powers.<sup>13</sup> Granted, there may be other reasons to be skeptical about laws on the basis of a realism about powers; one might argue, for example, that powers doing the work leaves no work for laws to do. As for Cartwright, the co-authored paper cited by Maragat suggests that this argument (more promising, to my mind) is part of her agenda, but is not yet completed by the time of that paper.<sup>14</sup>

Since I've agreed that we need to interpret what Hegel means on the basis of how he argues, and I haven't yet seen how he would argue

for no-powers, I am not yet convinced of a no-powers reading. But I admit that I am convinced that Hegel denies that mechanism has any truth of its own, and so thinks it relies on purposiveness for whatever truth it has. And I admit that Maragat has proposed an account of this: no-powers. I have not done so here. Until and unless I matched Maragat in kind, I will still lack any kind of complete argument against reading Hegel in this way. Here there will only be space, at the end, for the barest, yet unclarified suggestion.

### II.3 *The Outstanding Problem about Purposiveness in Hegel*

In a sense, Hegel's account of what inner purposiveness *is* can seem easier to tackle than his account purposiveness as the truth of mechanism, and mechanism without truth of its own. It seems easier to argue that there is something coherent to the idea of a purposive system without any need of external, intelligent representation of ends. For that there is something to this is easy for us to just assume: we treat the heart as beating for the sake of blood circulation, even without thinking anyone represents that end, or any such representation is available to cause what happens.

But, to return to the start, I think Maragat takes the salutary approach of approaching Hegel throughout in light of the more radical and unusual claim that is no doubt central to Hegel's own sense of what he is doing. I think demands of making sense of the "truth of" claim — and problems about this above — suggest an outstanding difficulty concerning Hegel's attempt to account of what inner purposiveness is. For — or so I now argue — it suggests that we cannot give inner purposiveness the kind of account that is common in recent philosophical discussions of teleology, function and life. My worry about Maragat here is that I think he may try to give something too close to this kind of analysis; but that will be a question here. As far as the constraint on an account of inner purposiveness, I would say this: I would put the point in Hegelian terminology is that the "truth of" claim rules out purposiveness being "mediated" (e.g. by causal relations, or element-mechanism, or similar). But I agreed with Maragat that Hegel denies that purposiveness is *immediate* [IP, p. 13]. So, this seems to me an outstanding problem: how could Hegel account for inner purposiveness if it is neither mediated nor immediate?

To begin with, then, I think the demands of linking with a case for the untruth of mechanism would force a Hegelian account of inner pur-

posiveness too far very far away from some recently popular views to which Maragat compares Hegel. For example, Maragat says that Hegel's treatment of teleology "anticipates Larry Wright's work in the 1970s on teleological and functional explanations". Maragat sketches the account:

For Wright, when we say that X has a function Y, we mean that (1) X exists (or is there) because it does Y and (2) Y is a consequence or result of the fact that X exists (or is there) ... [TP, p. 152n13].

I do think Wright's account is wonderfully clear, and so a great orientation point around which to try to understand other views.

However, I think an account of the untruth of mechanism will preclude anything like this. To begin with, take Maragat's no-powers claim:

There is no basis of non-relational properties and intrinsic capacities from which something can "emerge" [TP, p. 9].

But I think that, for any analysis like Wright's, there must precisely be such capacities: X must really have the capacity to cause Y. To put it another way, the presence of X must cause and, in this way, explain Y. And then, this kind of account builds up from there to an account of teleological function. But, for Maragat: "Hegel condemns the explanation by efficient causes for the charges of vacuity, indeterminacy and arbitrariness ..." [TP, p. 80]. Wright's analysis seems to me to require that "Y is a consequence or result of the fact that X exists (or is there)" is a non-vacuous explanation of Y.

Now my worry in the last paragraph drew on a no-powers reading of the untruth of mechanism. No-regularity would be a different story if pursued without the no-powers claim: it would leave causal powers there, to do the work required of them in such an analysis. But I worried above that this would seem to allow that mechanism has some truth of its own, leaving us without an account of the untruth of mechanism and its need for purposiveness as its truth.

So: Say we read Hegel's account of inner purposiveness in light of his claim that mechanism has no truth of its own, as I think Maragat powerfully argues we should. It seems to me to follow that Hegel's account of inner purposiveness cannot be anything like Wright's, in this respect.

And the result does seem to me more general than just a point about Wright: An analysis like Wright's seems to require that mechanism — in the sense of causality, or some causal power of the elements — has

at least some truth of its own, to feed into the analysis; if mechanism has no truth of its own, then an analysis like Wright's seems foreclosed. My broader worry here is that something like this is true of Maraguat's own takes on Hegel's account of inner purposiveness. To begin with, thinking of parts, we can look to where Maraguat compares Hegel to Wright:

For Hegel, the *function* is determined by the work that the organ does right now, but only insofar as it contributes specifically to keeping it alive, that is, to keeping it actively reproducing itself by regeneration (healing) ... [TP, p. 152n13].

I would think that, in this formulation, there would have to be something — the work that the part or member (the organ) does, or its contribution — to then feed into this analysis of function: the organ has those effects; those effects keep a whole alive; and, in that case, we have teleological function.

In terms of inner purposiveness, this is supposed to be present where "... the parts of a whole produce each other ... Hegel seems to think that nothing else is required" [TP, p. 152]. But then the parts seem to need to have the capacity to do something, to contribute to this self-production. Or, think in terms of causal powers or effects, in this idea: "a reciprocal interaction of mutually reassuring causal factors, that is, to a 'system' or 'organised being' of causal principles". But this seems to require some truth to causality, or causal powers. Or:

... a robust and relatively autonomous complex of reciprocal causal relations that constitutes the inner truth of a state of affairs. Purposiveness will appear in the Logic, at the end of 'Teleology' and in 'Life', as the name of the causal involvement of the elements of such a complex. They are precisely where they are for a purpose [TP, p. 107].

Here we have an account of purposiveness, but it seems one that requires there to be causal relations — given causal relations, in a particular configuration or feedback, we would have inner purposiveness. It requires that these have at least some truth of their own, to feed into the account. So Maraguat seems to here go for an account that is inconsistent with his no-powers claim. And an account whose consistency is unclear, and problematic, with respect to any reading on the table of Hegel's claim that mechanism has no truth of its own. Does Maraguat endorse such an account? If so, how would he reconcile it with the untruth of mechanism? I am not sure.

To borrow from Hegelian terminology, we could say that these accounts seem to make purposiveness mediated: they treat it as something we gain access to through (or mediated by) access to causality, so that we can then consider a particular “complex” of causal relations — e.g. reciprocal; and they treat it as something that is what it is through (or mediated by) its relation to something else, namely causality; and so they seem to need to take causality as having some truth in itself, through which we gain access to purposiveness.<sup>15</sup>

Now it might initially seem that we could evade the worry in the manner of the following paragraph:

*Hegel, again, associates teleology with terms like the “autonomous” in the last citation — or, with “self-determination or determination ‘from within’”,<sup>16</sup> or a kind of “self-activity”.<sup>17</sup> And that (we might say to evade the worry above) is the answer a question like: what is purposiveness? That is the counterpart, in this sense, to Wright’s analysis that rested on causality. We might then say that one illustration of something that might be autonomously done, or one form that self-determination might take — although not at all essential to what self-determination is — would be arranging a system of causes. (This still seems to cede that causes are non-vacuous, but at least it doesn’t make purposiveness depend on their being some.) Or maybe there is something else to say here, like: If one thought that there were causal powers, then one might mistake these true cases of self-activity for a reciprocally arranged complex of causes, or the like—that this is as close as you could get, if trying to think in terms of causal powers, to what really needs to be thought to think purposiveness.*

But I don’t think that Maragat wants to go this way. For this path takes purposiveness again as *immediate*: our attention to causal determinism, even in feedback configurations or the like, would just be failing to capture purposiveness, opening up the space for us to recall or highlight that we rather grasp true self-determination or self-activity *immediately*, and as itself *immediate* (not built, as it were, out of causal relations or deterministic relations, or in any way parasitic on or intelligible through any truth of deterministic, causal, or mechanistic relations).

Maragat, again, sees Hegel as denying immediate purposiveness. So, Maragat, I think, would not go this route. I think he is right about Hegel on this point, so I wouldn’t want to go this route. And I think Maragat has highlighted a good reason *why* Hegel would refuse: there are philosophical problems concerning the possibility of inner purposiveness; Kant and Spinoza have highlighted many of them; more seems required, by way of theoretical work in reply, than just saying that we

have immediate access to something — purposive self-activity — that undercuts the worries or renders them moot. So, again Maragat says of Schelling's appeal to immediacy:

Schelling's confidence in the actuality and objectivity of the purposiveness of natural organisms does not arise from a genuine discussion of Kant's sceptical arguments [TP, pp. 108–9n37].

I think a way to put this is to say that there are arguments that purposiveness is merely apparent; we cannot adequately meet them by beginning immediately with appeal to what they have argued is merely apparent.

Above I added to this case my own additional example: Hegel thinks it inadequate to treat self-determination as immediate in engaging with Spinoza [see section I.3 above].

But if my arguments have been on the right track here, then there is a genuine and outstanding problem about immanent purposiveness in Hegel. In short, it is on the one hand, inadequate to treat purposiveness as immediate, for reasons just mentioned. On the other hand, it is inadequate to the radicality of Hegel's position to treat purposiveness as mediated: there would need to be something non-purposive to mediate it.

### III. AN INCOMPLETE IDEALIST SUGGESTION AND A CONCLUSION

I suppose someone might think that the problem I've raised is obviously impossible to solve: purposiveness, they might say, could not avoid at once being either mediated or...not mediated. Someone interested in the philosophical issues might conclude the purposiveness is after all incoherent. Someone interested in Hegel, since this is not his conclusion, might conclude that I must have gone astray in my interpretations above.

Perhaps I have gone astray, but I do not think we should rule out in this way the possibility that Hegel requires accounts of purposiveness, and self-determination, as neither mediated nor immediate. After all, immediacy and mediation are the topics of the first two of three books of the *Logic: The Doctrine of Being and of Essence*. So, it seems here too — on the level of the broadest structure of the *Logic* — success requires overcoming the dualism of immediacy and mediation.

There is no space here for a complete account of how that might work, but it might be worth making an admittedly very incomplete suggestion. Here is the passage in Maragat that gives me most hope of Hegelian solution:

It is by undermining efficient-causal explanations by and large that he [Hegel; J. K.] is able to introduce in the development of thought-determinations of *The Science of Logic* the notion of a self-determining causal principle, namely, of purpose. Thus, it is by means of an argument against ‘determinism’ (as he puts it) that Hegel vindicates the truth of teleology [TP, p. 85].

The promise here is a radical account, on which we grasp the self-determination first in its truth for the first time at the end of the *Logic*, in thinking through transitions between thought-determinations. I think the idea would be that thinking in the *Logic* is supposed to begin without presupposition. And each stage is supposed to reveal to thinking the necessity of transitioning to the next stage. If so, then thinking in the *Logic* makes itself what it is. It is in this sense self-determining.<sup>18</sup>

Further, thinking in the *Logic* is not a form of mediation: it is not that one thing *causes* and so stands in a causal relationship with another (or grounds, etc.). Rather, thinking would develop *itself*: its own thinking would distinguish stages, but as moments of one process, its own. Nor would this be a form of *immediacy*: The *Logic* argues at its start that immediacy ends up indeterminate and empty; thinking in the *Logic* distinguishes its determinately distinct stages or moments. Thinking would only grasp itself as what Hegel calls “self-determining and self-realizing movement” [SL 12, p. 238] at the end. Contra Spinoza, “the absolute cannot be a first, an immediate”, but only in this sense a “result” [SL 11, p. 376]. But not in the sense that we grasp truth in each of these moments or stages, and only through (or mediated by them) grasp thought as absolute. Rather, it is through grasping the lack of its own truth, in each, the reason that demands moving to another stage, that thought comes to know itself as such self-determination or self-development.

If the self-determination of thought is the standard of explanatory relevance, then I think we could retrospectively look back and finally have found a truth in mechanism, but not any truth of its own — a sense in which it requires, for its truth, the self-determination of thought. Take Hegel’s account of mechanism in terms of the power of gravitation, and of that power in terms of the rotation of matter around a center of gravity. Here this idealist Hegel could say that there is explanatory relevance in such terms, insofar as they are an approximation of the self-determination of thought, even if incomplete. A rotating system of matter rotates itself, as it were. As to its incompleteness, consider Marquat again:

... where there is *simply* a cycle of states that a system goes through repeatedly, as in the case of ... a planet rotating around a star, there is certainly no reason to say that a particular state is the *means* for reaching another, no reason to differentiate means from ends and thus no reason to speak of serving an end at all [TP, p. 146].

The explanatory relevance would be incomplete in the sense that it does not explain any differentiation: we could “chunk” out the matter however we like, but it is strictly indifferent to this. It would be, Hegel says, a “totality indifferent to determinateness” [SL 12, p. 138].<sup>19</sup> Contrast thinking the thought-determinations mentioned by Maragat: this thinking would distinguish one determination, and in finding it to fail on its own, distinguish it from the next.

What would then the retrospective account of mechanism be that would capture mechanism as having some truth, just not truth of its own? Well, the question would be: What *is* mechanism? Or what is it to be a mechanism? And the answer to succeeded here would not *just* refer to causal powers or forces, or the idea of system organization. The supposedly successful answer, at the end of the *Logic*, would be this: to be a mechanism is to be an approximation of the self-determination of thought, but a distant approximation insofar as it would be indifferent to determinate differences.

Such an account would allow *some* truth in causal powers, and some explanatory relevance — at least in this case of gravity. They would have no truth *of their own*, in the sense that mechanism would have no explanatory relevance of its own. But we could find an explanatory relevance for it, insofar as it depends on something else: on the self-determination of thought. In this sense, the truth of mechanism would be the self-determination of thought.

Perhaps a similar account could be given of powers explaining interaction between kinds, as in “Chemism” in the *Logic*. All this would be there, as it were, to be *used* by *life*. But say we ask: what *is* life? On such an account we could not answer that it just is such powers or causes in any kind of arrangement, reciprocal or otherwise. Rather, we would need an account on which to be living is to be an approximation — now less distant — of the self-determination of thought.<sup>20</sup>

Nor could, on such an account, inner purposiveness just *be* any arrangement of causes. Perhaps there is some broad sense of inner purposiveness in which the self-determination be a case of inner purposiveness. If so, I would think self-determination would have to itself be the complete and defining case of inner purposiveness. So, it could not be that



we take something else, inner purposiveness, and *add* something to it, to get the special case of self-determination.

Space constrains me to break off at this point. I hope there is some use, for Maraguat and for others, in my suggested way of spinning out a citation in Maraguat into a solution to the problem I posed.

But my focus here has more been to, first, highlight many cases in which I am completely convinced by Maraguat's *True Purposes*, and then on that basis to argue that there is an outstanding problem concerning Hegel on purposiveness: purposiveness can be neither immediate nor mediated; so, what is it?

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#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> TP, p. 111 and *passim*.

<sup>2</sup> By Hegel's Logic, I mean here both the self-standing Science of Logic (SL); and "First Part: The Science of Logic" (EL) of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline.

<sup>3</sup> TP, p. 80 and many references to self-determination throughout.

<sup>4</sup> Strictly, Hegel on Aristotle, but I think Hegel adopts this, and I think Maraguat agrees.

<sup>5</sup> That is to say, beginning at very least by 1812.

<sup>6</sup> The remark may be more targeted at Fichte than Schelling, and targets also the claim that this would be the *only* refutation — it is no refutation at all.

<sup>7</sup> I think these worries about immediate purposiveness are similar to a worry Koch develops (2021) for Ng's account (2020).

<sup>8</sup> Another way to make good on a no-regularity version of the "truth of" claim would hold that, although reality is not one big organism, reality is composed of organisms all the way down, as it were. Leibniz, for example, some-

times seems to suggest. But, again, I didn't note Maragat arguing this or arguing that Hegel argues for it.

<sup>9</sup> Maragat cites a 2013 paper, but I think she's been working with powers/capacities for longer.

<sup>10</sup> I would say, the *law* of electromagnetism is also ceded, but this would depend on an argument about what it is to be a law of nature.

<sup>11</sup> For example, EL § 28An. For more, my Kreines (2015), ch. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Chalmers, A. (1993), pp. 196–205.

<sup>13</sup> My Kreines (2009), on Kant, and Kreines (2015), on Hegel.

<sup>14</sup> “It might be objected that the account of powers we offer does not eliminate the need for laws of nature since it still leaves need for rules of combination that are independent of the powers in nature.... We concede that this may be so ... This remains work for the future” [Cartwright & Pemberton (2013), p. 94].

<sup>15</sup> I allow that this might serve as a criticism of some of what I have published in the past on this topic as well! My views develop. In part, they develop through engagement with interesting work by others — like Maragat's book. But, I keep the focus here on Maragat.

<sup>16</sup> TP, p. 80 and many references to self-determination throughout.

<sup>17</sup> Strictly, Hegel on Aristotle, but I think Hegel adopts this, and I think Maragat agrees.

<sup>18</sup> The most I've published about this at this point is Kreines (2019), on self-determination.

<sup>19</sup> I focused on this as a limitation of mechanism in Kreines (2004); see also this theme in the account of Hegel on the dependence of mechanism on purposiveness in Koch on individualisation [Koch (2023), ch. 5; and Koch (2022)].

<sup>20</sup> The most I've published about this idea is Kreines (2020).

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