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Towards a New Feeling Theory of Emotion

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Abstract: According to the old feeling theory of emotion, an emotion is just a feeling: a conscious experience with a characteristic phenomenal character. This theory is widely dismissed in contemporary discussions of emotion as hopelessly naïve. In particular, it is thought to suffer two fatal drawbacks: its inability to account for the cognitive dimension of emotion (which is thought to go beyond the phenomenal dimension), and its inability to accommodate unconscious emotions (which, of course, lack any phenomenal character). In this paper, I argue that the old feeling theory is in reality only a pair of modifications removed from a highly plausible account of the nature of emotion that retains the essential connection between emotion and feeling. These modifications are, moreover, motivated by recent developments in work on phenomenal consciousness. The first development is the rising recognition of a phenomenal character proper to cognition—so-called cognitive phenomenology. The second is the gathering momentum behind various ‘connection principles’ that specify some connection that a given state must bear to phenomenally conscious states in order to qualify as *mental*. These developments make it possible to formulate a *new* feeling theory of emotion, which would overcome the two fatal drawbacks of the *old* feeling theory. According to the new feeling theory, an emotion is a mental state that bears the right connection to conscious experiences with the right phenomenal character (involving, among other elements, a cognitive phenomenology).

1. Introduction: The Old Feeling Theory of Emotion

The pre-philosophical, ‘naïve’ view of emotions is that they are essentially feelings—often complicated and subtle feelings, eluding straightforward literal description, but feelings nonetheless. I am persuaded that this is a rather good view of emotion, notwithstanding common wisdom in philosophical circles. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the standard objections taken to be fatal to this view have less merit to them than is commonly thought, and that a proper development of the naïve view could produce an eminently plausible ‘feeling theory’ of emotion. Whether it is the *best* theory of emotion is a separate matter; but arguably, given its status as the pre-philosophical position, pending genuine difficulties with it we should at least provisionally embrace it.¹

Feeling theories of emotion are of course not unfamiliar in philosophy. The so-called James-Lange theory (James 1884, Lange 1885) identifies emotion with feelings of bodily occurrences. These occurrences are claimed to be typically visceral (in the literal sense of occurring, or rather being felt to occur, in the viscera), but sometimes also muscular or skin-related. On this view, at least some

1 changes in one's viscera, muscles, and skin are *felt*, and one's feeling of them
2 *constitutes* one's emoting—the emoting *just is* the feeling of such bodily events.²

3 The feeling of bodily events is what we call today 'somatic phenomenology',
4 and so the James-Lange theory can be stated simply as the view that emotion is
5 somatic phenomenology—to emote is to undergo an experience with somatic
6 phenomenology. To formulate the theory more precisely, let us adopt the thought
7 that what a philosophical theory of emotion is supposed to do is to provide
8 identity and existence conditions for emotions, in the sense of emotional states. We
9 can then offer a more spelled out statement of the James-Lange theory in terms of
10 what makes an emotional state the emotional state it is (identity conditions) and
11 what makes it an emotional state at all (existence conditions)—as follows:

12
13 (JLT) For any emotional state E, what makes E the emotional state it is
14 (rather than another emotional state), and an emotional state at all
15 (rather than a non-emotional state), is that E has the somatic
16 phenomenology it does (rather than another somatic phenomenol-
17 ogy), and has one at all (rather than having a non-somatic phenom-
18 enology or no phenomenology).
19

20 The more 'portable' version of this, if you will, is the simple thesis 'emotion =
21 somatic phenomenology'.³

22 The apparent simplicity of the James-Lange theory hides a layer complexity,
23 however. For it is profitably factorized into two distinct theses. One thesis is
24 about the *nature* of emotion, the other about the *feel* of emotion. The thesis about
25 the *nature* of emotion is precisely that the nature of emotion is one and the same
26 as the feel of emotion. Emotions are essentially phenomenal states. Emotional
27 nature/essence is emotional phenomenology. The thesis about the *feel* of emotion
28 is that it is one and the same as the feel of bodily sensations. Emotional feels
29 are nothing but somatic feels. Emotional phenomenology reduces to somatic
30 phenomenology.

31 It is easy to see that these two theses together *entail* the James-Lange theory.
32 To do so, we need only frame the two theses—call them NATURE and FEEL—in
33 terms of identity and existence conditions:
34

35 (NATURE) For any emotional state E, what makes E the emotional state
36 it is, and an emotional state at all, is that E has the emotional
37 phenomenology it does, and has one at all.

38 (FEEL) For any emotional state E, what makes E have the emotional
39 phenomenology it does, and have one at all, is that E has the
40 somatic phenomenology it does, and has one at all.
41

42 The portable versions here would be 'emotion = emotional phenomenology' and
43 'emotional phenomenology = somatic phenomenology' (respectively). Whether
44 in their portable or spelled out articulation, it is clear that the conjunction of
45 NATURE and FEEL is logically equivalent to JLT.⁴ Thus the James-Lange theory's
46 apparent simplicity hides a certain degree of structure.

1 The James-Lange theory has attracted more attention than followership.⁵ But
2 my view is that later generations of scholars have drawn exactly the wrong
3 lesson from the theory's demise. Many have rejected NATURE while adopting
4 FEEL. That is, they have tended to accept the Jamesian view of emotional
5 phenomenology as exhausted by somatic phenomenology, rejecting only the
6 claim that such phenomenology captures the nature of emotion (in the sense that
7 it can account for their identity and existence conditions).⁶ A certain collusion
8 between these two tendencies may be observed: it is partially the starving of
9 emotional phenomenology—its reduction to a relatively simple, unsophisticated
10 kind of feel—that made it singularly unfit to capture the essence of emotion.

11 My own inclination is to take the opposite route, adopting NATURE and
12 rejecting FEEL. My contention is that a more accurate portrayal of emotional
13 phenomenology would cast it as rich and multi-faceted, involving not only
14 somatic components but also cognitive and conative components, and perhaps
15 even an irreducibly affective component—a sort of proprietary emotional phe-
16 nomenology not accountable for in terms of any other kind of phenomenol-
17 ogy.⁷ Once emotional phenomenology is appreciated in its full glory and
18 sophistication, moreover, it becomes a much better candidate for capturing the
19 nature of emotion. The result is a feeling theory of emotion, though of a
20 distinctly non-Jamesian bent. I call this the *new feeling theory* of emotion. The
21 precise formulation of this new feeling theory will emerge as the discussion
22 unfolds.

23 What I want to discuss are the main reasons to reject the James-Lange theory;
24 I wish to argue that they fail to carry over to the new feeling theory. Extant
25 objections to the James-Lange theory are many, but two are standard and
26 paramount. One is that the James-Lange theory leaves out the cognitive dimen-
27 sion of emotion, offering an impoverished picture of them. The other is that it
28 cannot be right, since emotions can occur not only consciously but also uncon-
29 consciously, and when they do they are deprived of any phenomenology, somatic or
30 otherwise. The next two sections address these objections in turn, arguing that,
31 although cogent when targeting the old (James-Lange) feeling theory of emotion,
32 they have little or no force against the new feeling theory of emotion, when the
33 latter is properly developed.

34 35 **2. Emotion, Feeling, and the Cognitive**

36
37 The charge that the feeling theory leaves out the cognitive dimension of emotion
38 has sometimes been framed in terms of the notion of *intentionality*. The claim is
39 that emotions cannot be mere somatic feelings, because they are also possessed
40 of intentionality—they are *of*, or *about*, or are *directed at* certain things (their
41 'intentional objects').⁸ Bare somatic feelings, by contrast, are not directed at
42 anything—they are mere bodily sensations.

43 In this form, the objection can be overcome simply by denying that somatic
44 phenomenology is non-intentional. According to intentionalists about phenom-

1 enal consciousness (e.g., Dretske 1995), all phenomenal properties are reducible [1]
2 to intentional properties. This plausibly applies to the somatic phenomenology
3 characteristic of emotions. For note that James does not identify emotions with
4 bodily occurrences themselves, but rather with *feelings of* bodily occurrences. The
5 'of' in 'feelings of bodily occurrence' seems to be the 'of' of intentionality: the
6 experiential feel is *directed at* the bodily occurrence.⁹ With this in mind, Tye
7 (1995), for example, develops an account of somatic, and thence emotional,
8 phenomenology in terms of intentional directedness toward bodily events.¹⁰

9 We can debate the plausibility of this account, but its *coherence* shows that the
10 James-Lange theory is not inherently incapable of accounting for the intention-
11 ality of emotion. For one may identify emotion with somatic phenomenology
12 and still hold that emotion is essentially intentional, so long as one accepts an
13 intentional account of somatic phenomenology. What the objector must insist on,
14 therefore, is not just that emotion has intentionality, but that it has a specific kind
15 of intentionality, one that is distinct from the intentionality implicated in somatic
16 phenomenology; that it has, if you will, a non-somatic intentionality.

17 The natural way to develop this objection is to argue that emotion has a
18 specifically *cognitive* intentionality. 'Cognitive intentionality' is to be understood
19 here in terms of *what* and *how* intentional objects are presented. Different kinds
20 of intentionality present (or involve the presentation of) different objects in
21 different manners. We need not develop a systematic account of cognitive
22 intentionality to note that it is distinguished from somatic phenomenology in
23 that it is not directed only at *bodily* events but also at *worldly* events (as well as
24 worldly particulars and states of affairs), where 'worldly' is used technically to
25 contrast with 'bodily'.¹¹ The objection at hand is that emotion involves cognitive
26 intentionality inasmuch as it is intentionally directed not (only) at bodily events,
27 but (also) at worldly (non-bodily) events (particulars, states of affairs). Thus
28 construed, the 'cognitivist objection', as we may call it, can be expressed as
29 follows: 1) emotions involve a cognitive intentionality; 2) somatic phenomenol-
30 ogy does not involve cognitive intentionality; therefore, 3) emotions are not
31 exhausted by somatic phenomenology.

32 In this form, the objection is quite powerful. It is hard to see how one might
33 resist Premise 2, and while Premise 1 is more controversial, on this score I am
34 satisfied that the common wisdom on emotion is correct: emotion does involve
35 presentation of worldly particulars, events, and states of affairs. As an adoles-
36 cent, I experienced grief at my grandfather's death; somewhat trivially, the grief
37 was intentionally directed at my grandfather and his death, not (only) at inner
38 bodily changes (if such there were) consequent upon the realization and emo-
39 tional processing of his death. Similarly pedestrian observations apply to almost
40 all emotions.¹² Thus the cognitivist objection, when properly understood, under-
41 mines the James-Lange theory rather straightforwardly.

42 Where I think common wisdom overreaches is in claiming that the objection
43 undermines not just the James-Lange theory, but the feeling theory of emotion
44 as such. Recall that the James-Lange theory is just one feeling theory—the one
45 committed to FEEL above. The generic feeling theory, consisting merely of

1 NATURE, is much more flexible than the James-Lange variety, and, I contend, has
2 the resources to withstand the cognitivist objection. Adapted to target the generic
3 variety of the feeling theory, the cognitivist objection would look like this: 1)
4 emotions involve a cognitive intentionality; 2) emotional phenomenology does
5 not involve cognitive intentionality; therefore, 3) emotions are not exhausted by
6 emotional phenomenology. This objection can be handled by rejecting Premise 2.
7 The remainder of this section makes the case for such rejection.¹³

8 Start with a distinction between two notions of grief: grief as a *process* and
9 grief as an *episode*. The process of grief is often prolonged and involves as
10 components many episodes.¹⁴ For all I know, the process of grieving over my
11 grandfather's death is ongoing. But the episodes of grief are more local, and take
12 minutes (or hours) each. When I consider carefully an early grief episode about
13 my grandfather's death, I find that a central element of it was the experience of
14 *loss*. What was lost, clearly, was not any bodily occurrence. It is not bodily events
15 that were presented as lost, but a person—a person of special importance. Thus
16 the experience of loss had a cognitive intentionality, insofar as it was directed
17 onto a worldly, non-bodily object. What I want to emphasize is that the loss was
18 also *phenomenal*—it affected very distinctively the overall way it was like for me
19 to undergo an episode of grief. It is not as though my grief consisted in bodily
20 sensations accompanied by a bloodless, unfelt, unconscious, non-experienced
21 appreciation of loss. It is not as though the representation of loss was a mental
22 event occurring in me sub-personally, with the only thing actually showing up
23 in consciousness being the somatic feelings. On the contrary, the loss itself
24 showed up in consciousness—it was 'experientially encoded', if you will. The
25 conscious awareness of loss was part of my overall experience. In that respect,
26 the loss of my grandfather was not only *represented*, but *experienced*. Thus
27 although the awareness of loss was an intentional component of my grief
28 episode, the intentionality in question was of a distinctively experiential or
29 phenomenal variety.

30 In this respect, understanding the intentionality involved in such emotional
31 episodes requires use of the notion of *phenomenal intentionality*. It has been
32 recently noted that, while some intentionality occurs outside phenomenal con-
33 sciousness (in unconscious mental activity, and perhaps outside the mental realm
34 altogether), some intentionality is inextricably tied up with phenomenal char-
35 acter.¹⁵ There is a kind of *felt aboutness* that many of our conscious experiences
36 exhibit: they *feel* directed at the world. How exactly to characterize this kind of
37 felt aboutness, or phenomenal intentionality, is a matter for debate, but one that
38 need not be entered into here.¹⁶ The point is just this: the component of grief
39 naturally called 'the experience of loss' is very clearly a phenomenal-intentional
40 component, insofar as it is both phenomenal and intentional but in such a way
41 that the phenomenality and the intentionality are inextricably tied together.¹⁷ It
42 is thus an instance of phenomenal intentionality. More generally, emotions in
43 general appear to be possessed of characteristic phenomenal intentionality—
44 what Goldie (2002) calls 'feeling-towards', an intentionally directed kind of
45 phenomenal feeling.

1 Another notion of relevance in this context is that of *cognitive phenomenology*.
2 Just as traditionally many mental states considered essentially phenomenal were
3 assumed to be non-intentional, so traditionally many mental states considered
4 essentially intentional were assumed to be non-phenomenal. The paradigm here
5 is occurrent thoughts: thinking is always thinking-that, that is, a mental state
6 with a propositional content, but contrary to a long tradition, upon reflection it
7 is also a *phenomenal* state, insofar as there is something it is like to think that
8 something is the case. For one thing, there is certainly something it is like to
9 think that it is raining as opposed to merely entertaining that it is raining.
10 Additionally, however, it is plausible that there is something it is like to think
11 that it is raining as opposed to thinking that it is snowing. This element of what
12 it is like to think is cognitive phenomenology. That there is such cognitive
13 phenomenology is not altogether uncontroversial, to be sure, but as I (and
14 others) have argued for this elsewhere, I will proceed on the assumption that
15 there does exist cognitive phenomenology.¹⁸

16 The reason I introduce the notion of cognitive phenomenology is that the
17 experience of loss essential to grief, which is a form of phenomenal intention-
18 ality, strikes me as an instance of *cognitive-phenomenal* intentionality, that is, the
19 kind of phenomenal intentionality that cognitive-phenomenal states possess (as
20 opposed to the kind possessed by other phenomenal states). It is likely that in
21 addition to the awareness of loss built into grief, there are many other cognitive-
22 phenomenal components in grief. Many who have lost dear ones will be familiar
23 with the experience of trying to grasp the non-existence, the ceasing-to-be, of the
24 grieved person, a ceasing-to-be that feels elusive and at some level ungraspable
25 for at least a few hours. This too is an entirely cognitive exercise, but an
26 experienced one nonetheless—another aspect of the (typical) cognitive phenom-
27 enology of grief. These elements appear to involve a kind of cognitive inten-
28 tionality that is grounded in a corresponding phenomenal character, a
29 distinctively cognitive kind of phenomenal character. That is, they appear to
30 involve cognitive-phenomenal intentionality.¹⁹

31 Similar observations apply to other emotions. The phenomenology of frus-
32 tration and the phenomenology of indignation certainly often involve bodily
33 sensations, but they also involve much more than that, including centrally an
34 experienced cognitive appreciation of a failure (for frustration) or an injustice
35 (for indignation). Indeed, it is arguable that the somatic phenomenology of
36 frustration and indignation is in fact indistinguishable, and the only phenomenal
37 element that separates feeling disappointed from feeling indignant is this
38 cognitive-phenomenal element.²⁰

39 In addition to its cognitive element, emotional phenomenology arguably often
40 involves a *conative* component as well—a feeling of ‘doing something about it’.
41 Thus, in addition to the experienced appreciation of a wrong, feeling indignant
42 typically, perhaps universally, involves also an experienced nudge (of varying
43 phenomenal intensity) to *rectify* the wrong. Depending on its phenomenal
44 intensity, the nudge may not be powerful enough to actually move one to action.
45 But there is a felt force in the direction of action nonetheless. It is an open question

1 whether feeling this nudge is *constitutive* of such moral emotions as indignation or
2 merely a contingent-but-stubborn feature of it. But it is not really an open question
3 that the phenomenology of indignation typically *has* this conative component.
4 And the same applies to many other (including non-moral) emotions. Feeling rage,
5 for example, typically involves a felt desire to exact revenge, inflict violence or
6 otherwise evince excess energy (e.g., run until one is exhausted).

7 It is thus entirely implausible, borderline perverse, to construe emotional
8 phenomenology as consisting in nothing but somatic phenomenology. As we
9 have seen, emotional experience involves much more than bodily sensations.
10 Indeed, visceral phenomenology can be quite vivid, but otherwise it is rather
11 peripheral to the overall experience of most emotions. Cognitive and conative
12 forms of phenomenology are much more central. It has sometimes been argued
13 that emotions even have an *irreducibly affective* phenomenology, a kind of
14 phenomenology that goes beyond the somatic, the cognitive, and the conative
15 and is proprietary to emotional experience (Stocker 1996 Ch.1, Montague 2009).²¹
16 It is not my concern to evaluate this claim here. For our present purposes it
17 suffices we note the rich multifaceted phenomenology of emotion, which makes
18 room for cognitive intentionality aplenty, contrary to Premise 2 in the cognitivist
19 objection to the generic feeling theory.²²

20 These considerations undercut not only the cognitivist objection to the generic
21 feeling theory, but also the theoretical overreactions it has often inspired, namely,
22 the development of 'cognitivist theories' that deny any phenomenal component
23 in the essence of emotion. According to such theories, emotions are just judg-
24 ments of a certain sort (often: 'evaluative' judgments), or else combinations of
25 belief and desire (judgment and preference).²³ Such cognitive accounts are
26 standardly presented as *opposing* feeling theories, the suppressed assumption
27 evidently being that feelings cannot be cognitive or conative, that is, that there
28 is no cognitive or conative phenomenology. Once this assumption is rejected, the
29 introduction of cognitive and/or conative elements into the theory of emotion is
30 seen to be entirely consistent with a feeling theory.²⁴

31 In fact, it is instructive that cognitive theorists have typically preferred the
32 term 'judgment' over 'belief'. For at least as far as ordinary talk is concerned,
33 unlike belief, judgment is essentially a conscious act: it is something that one
34 consciously does, and that there is something it is like for one to do. This is not
35 the case for belief. One can (truly) say of a person fast asleep or absorbed in
36 drawing 'she believe that 13.426 > 12.307'; but one cannot (truly) say of such a
37 person 'she *judges* that 13.426 > 12.307'. Beliefs can be latent, tacit, unconscious
38 states—judgments are always acts of consciousness.²⁵ There is no duality of
39 terms in the case of desire, wanting, or preference (all can be used to denote
40 either a conscious or an unconscious state). Nonetheless, it is notable that often
41 in the course of discussing this aspect of emotion, cognitive theorists employ
42 (what are most naturally interpreted as) phenomenal descriptors. Thus, it is
43 common to stress that the relevant desire may be *strong* or *intense* (see, e.g.,
44 Marks 1982), where this is most naturally understood as an ascription of
45 something like *phenomenal vivacity*.

1 Thus I contend that the animating sensibilities behind cognitive theories of
2 emotion can perfectly well be accommodated in a new feeling theory of
3 emotion, a feeling theory that allowed emotional phenomenology to encompass
4 cognitive and conative elements. What is responsible for the development of
5 cognitive theories in a different, anti-feeling direction appears to be an attach-
6 ment to the picture of the mind as dividing neatly into phenomenal aspects
7 and intentional aspects. This is what Horgan and Tienson (2002) call 'separa-
8 tism', which they argue has exerted considerable (and in their view negative)
9 influence over much twentieth-century philosophy of mind. According to sepa-
10 ratism, some mental states are phenomenal (e.g., perceptual and bodily sen-
11 sations) and some are intentional (e.g., beliefs and desires), but none are both.
12 Against the background of separatism, accepting the cognitive dimension of
13 emotion does lead directly to rejecting the feeling theory. But separatism is
14 forsooth quite implausible: on the one hand, perceptual and bodily sensations
15 seem possessed of (phenomenal) intentionality, and on the other, beliefs and
16 desires can often have (cognitive or conative) phenomenology. In any case,
17 separatism certainly appears to underwrite the uncritical leap one discerns in
18 the literature—from accepting the cognitive dimension of emotion to rejecting
19 any feeling theory thereof.

20 It may be objected that I am casting as a substantial, deep, and important
21 point what is in fact nothing but a verbal matter. Cognitive theorists simply use
22 the term 'feeling' to denote not just any old conscious state, but only somatic or
23 visceral ones. They need not oppose the notion that emotions are essentially
24 feelings if that notion is not taken to imply that emotions are raw bodily
25 sensations with no cognitive dimension. Thus there is nothing in the letter or
26 spirit of their view that precludes their embrace of the 'new' feeling theory of
27 emotion, where the term 'feeling' is used quite differently from the way they
28 use it.

29 My response is threefold. First, insofar as cognitive theorists are happy to
30 embrace the new feeling theory of emotion, I have no quarrel with them.
31 I nonetheless suspect the objector is overplaying her openness to the substan-
32 tive core of the new feeling theory. The substantive core is the claim that
33 emotions are essentially phenomenal states. It may well be that some cognitive
34 theorists are open to this, and simply use 'feeling' to denote not just any
35 phenomenal properties but specifically somatic or visceral ones. I suspect,
36 however, that many also use 'feeling' just as I do, namely to denote any
37 phenomenal properties, and differ from me precisely on the substantive matter
38 of whether there exist cognitive-phenomenal properties in addition to the
39 more widely discussed somatic-phenomenal and perceptual-phenomenal ones.
40 This is, in any case, a sociological matter not much more titillating than any
41 verbal matter. What matters to me is only the consistency of two ideas: that
42 emotions have a cognitive dimension, and that they are essentially phenom-
43 enal states.²⁶

44 Second, unlike terms such as 'phenomenology' and 'somatic', the term
45 'feeling' is *not* a term of art. The term enters the theory of emotion not by way

1 of theoretical postulation, but via the mundane, pre-theoretical use of such
2 expressions as 'feeling angry', 'feeling scared', and 'feeling excited'. To use it in
3 a technical sense divorced from its role in such mundane expressions is to court
4 confusion.²⁷ Now, it is fairly clear, I think, that in its mundane usage the term
5 'feeling angry' is not intended to denote a specifically somatic phenomenology,
6 but whatever phenomenology turns out to be linked with anger. Thus insofar as
7 cognitive theorists use 'feeling' to denote specifically somatic phenomenology,
8 my claim is simply that they ought not.²⁸

9 Third, even if cognitivism were considered just a version of the new feeling
10 theory, and thus not immediately problematic for the view I wish to defend, it
11 would still be a very specific version, to which I may not wish to commit.
12 According to this specific version, the identity and existence conditions of
13 emotional phenomenology are fully determined by cognitive phenomenology, or
14 else by a combination of cognitive and conative phenomenology. This is not
15 obviously implausible, but there is no reason for the new feeling theory to rule
16 out other options: that emotional phenomenology is a combination of cognitive,
17 conative, and somatic phenomenology; that emotional phenomenology is an
18 irreducibly (*sui generis*) affective phenomenology; that emotional phenomenol-
19 ogy consists in cognitive, conative, somatic, and irreducibly affective phenom-
20 enology; and so on.

21 The fact that there are four potential forms of phenomenology—cognitive,
22 conative, somatic, and affective—that might be implicated in emotional phe-
23 nomenology means that there are 15 possible accounts of emotional phenom-
24 enology: one for each possible combination of at least one among the four.²⁹ It
25 may turn out, of course, that there is no such thing as *sui generis* affective
26 phenomenology proprietary to emotion, in which case there would be only
27 seven possible accounts of emotional phenomenology (assuming still that there
28 do exist cognitive, conative, and somatic phenomenologies).³⁰ Either way, it is
29 clear that the identification of emotional phenomenology with somatic phenom-
30 enology, as per the James-Lange theory, is only one option among many
31 more—quite possibly among 15 coherent and viable positions. It is, moreover,
32 not a particularly antecedently plausible one. Certainly the views that emotional
33 phenomenology is constituted by a combination (a) of cognitive and conative
34 phenomenology, (b) of cognitive, conative, and somatic phenomenology, and (c)
35 of cognitive, conative, somatic, and affective phenomenology are far more
36 antecedently plausible. Indeed, to my mind imagining a creature capable of
37 somatic phenomenology only, and no other phenomenology, is imagining not
38 only a perceptual and cognitive zombie but also an emotional zombie. Thus in
39 the absence of strong reasons to the contrary, it would be wiser to adopt an
40 account of emotional feel that identified it with (a)–(c) rather than with somatic
41 phenomenology only.

42 In light of the above, I conclude that FEEL is extremely implausible. What I
43 would like to assert in its stead is a thesis that identifies emotional feel with
44 some combination of cognitive, conative, somatic, and/or affective phenomenol-
45 ogy. This may be formulated as follows:

(FEEL*) There is a combination C of cognitive, conative, somatic, and/or affective phenomenology, such that for any emotional state E, what makes E have the emotional phenomenology it does, and have one at all, is that E has the C-phenomenology it does, and has one at all.

Some clarifications are in order. First, FEEL* as such does not commit to the existence of each of the four mentioned kinds of phenomenology; merely to the existence of at least one of them. (In particular, FEEL* is not committed to the existence of *sui generis* affective phenomenology.) Second, FEEL* should be distinguished from a disjunctive thesis that identifies emotional phenomenology with *any* rather than *some* combination of the four mentioned phenomenologies. Thus it disallows that different emotions can have the emotional phenomenology they do, and have one at all, in virtue of *different* combinations of the four mentioned phenomenologies.³¹ Third, note that FEEL* in itself makes no commitment on the nature or essence of emotion. It is a thesis merely concerning emotional feel that is silent on the question of emotional nature.

At the same time, FEEL* is *consistent* with a feeling theory of emotion, and provides the resources for such a theory to resist the cognitivist critique of the old feeling theory of emotion. Conjoined with NATURE, it would generate the following Relaxed Feeling Theory of emotion:

(RFT) There is a combination C of cognitive, conative, somatic, and/or affective phenomenology, such that for any emotional state E, what makes E the emotion it is, and an emotion at all, is that E has the C-phenomenology it does, and has one at all.

I contend that, despite retaining the commitment to the phenomenal nature of emotion, RFT survives the cognitivist critique that undermined the James-Lange theory. Unfortunately, however, there is another kind of critique of the James-Lange theory that it does not survive. This is the topic of the next section.

3. Emotion, Feeling, and the Unconscious

The other major objection to the old feeling theory of emotion is the Freudian-inspired one that much of our emotional life is unconscious, and when it is it involves no feel whatsoever, as unconscious states do not *have* a phenomenal feel. If so, NATURE cannot be right. For some emotional states are not such (and perforce are not the emotional states they are) in virtue of their phenomenal feel.

It may be, however, that a variation on NATURE may still be tenable. Consider, for instance, Searle's (1992) 'connection principle', according to which every intentional state is potentially conscious. Given that every conscious state has phenomenal character, the connection principle entails that every intentional state potentially has phenomenal character. If one held that every emotional state is intentional, it would also follow that every emotional state potentially has a phenomenal character. This would be an alternative connection principle, one

1 connecting not intentional and conscious states but emotional and phenomenal
2 states. Moreover, if one did not hold that every emotional state is intentional, one
3 might still find such an alternative connection principle (connecting emotional
4 and phenomenal states) independently plausible.

5 How does a connection principle of this sort help the cause of a feeling theory
6 of emotion? It may inspire a weakened version of NATURE that relaxes the
7 connection between the identity and existence conditions of emotion, on the one
8 hand, and emotional phenomenology, on the other. Perhaps it is false that what
9 makes an emotion the emotion it is, and an emotion at all, is the emotional
10 phenomenology it *actually* has. It may yet be true that what makes an emotion
11 the emotion it is, and an emotion at all, is the emotional phenomenology it
12 *potentially* has. The idea would be that while some emotions may have no
13 phenomenology (the unconscious ones), all emotions are such that they *poten-*
14 *tially* have a phenomenology.

15 There are many problems with this kind of move. First, the very intelligibility
16 of the connection principles under consideration is questionable, insofar as it is
17 unclear what is involved in mental states being 'potentially' phenomenal (Fodor
18 and Lepore 1994). Second, Searle's original connection principle suffers from
19 certain straightforward counter-examples (Davies 1995, Horgan and Kriegel
20 2008, Kriegel 2011 Ch.4), and the alternative principle (connecting emotionality
21 with phenomenality) is in all likelihood equally susceptible.³² Third, Searle's own
22 argument for his connection principle is highly problematic (Fodor and Lepore
23 1994, Kriegel 2003), and moreover does not carry over to the alternative
24 (emotionality-phenomenality) connection principle, leaving the latter unmotiv-
25 ated.³³ Finally, either connection principle is in fact far weaker than what a
26 feeling theory of emotion would require: the former impose a *necessary* condition
27 on the existence of an emotional (or intentional state), whereas the latter requires
28 also a *sufficient* condition on the existence of such a state, one which moreover
29 is a sufficient condition on the *identity* of the state and furthermore *grounds*
30 ('makes') its existence and identity.

31 The literature on these problems offers a number of possible responses
32 in defense of some connection principle. Some authors have attempted to
33 unpack potentiality talk in modal terms (Fodor and Lepore 1994, Kriegel 2003)
34 or dispositional terms (Mendelovici 2010, Smithies Ms, but see also Cohen
35 1992 Ch.1).³⁴ Some have offered alternative connection principles in which
36 the connection is non-potentiality-based (Loar 2003, Horgan and Graham
37 forthcoming). Others have offered alternative arguments for their connection
38 principle (Horgan and Tienson 2002, Loar 2003, Bourget 2010, Kriegel 2011
39 Ch.1, Smithies Ms), some that may well carry over to the case of emotion.
40 Rather than sift through this ever growing literature in search of help for a
41 feeling theory of emotion, I will proceed by articulating the generic kind of
42 connection principle that would be needed and then propose an argument in
43 its favor.

44 As noted above, NATURE is falsified by the existence of unconscious, non-
45 phenomenal emotional states. Still, the spirit of a feeling theory of emotion

1 can be preserved if some essential connection can be established between any
2 emotional state and emotional phenomenology. The generic form of such a
3 connection would be to claim that there is some relation R that every emo-
4 tional state E must bear to some phenomenal emotional state(s), and in virtue
5 of which E is the emotional state it is and an emotional state at all. R may
6 be the relation of *potentially being*, but it may also be some other non-trivial
7 relation.³⁵ A strengthened connection principle would claim that bearing R is
8 both necessary and sufficient for, and moreover grounds, E's being the emo-
9 tional state it is and an emotional state at all. The result would be the
10 following variation on NATURE:

11 (NATURE*) There is a relation R, such that for any emotional state E,
12 what makes E the emotional state it is, and an emotional state at all,
13 is that E bears R to the emotional phenomenology it does, and bears
14 R to an emotional phenomenology at all.

15 NATURE* effectively constitutes a connection principle connecting emotionality
16 and phenomenality in a sufficiently strong way to generate a feeling theory of
17 emotion. That the spirit of the feeling theory of emotion is preserved here can
18 be appreciated from the fact that NATURE* is not merely a thesis offering
19 necessary and sufficient conditions for a state being emotional, but a thesis
20 about what *makes* a mental state emotional—about the *grounds* of its status as
21 an emotional state. In fact, NATURE* is a relaxation of NATURE, insofar as
22 NATURE is just NATURE* where R is construed as the *having* (or *instantiating*)
23 relation.³⁶

24 The argument I will sketch in support of NATURE* is non-demonstrative and
25 proceeds in two phases. The first phase concerns a central problem of the
26 philosophy of mind that has received oddly little attention in recent decades: the
27 question of what constitutes the mark of the mental, what makes a given state
28 a *mental* state. I will argue (mostly by elimination) that the most promising view
29 is that mental states are distinguished from non-mental states in being suitably
30 related to phenomenal states. The second phase of the argument suggests that
31 this view of the mark of the mental leads naturally to NATURE*, through two
32 considerations of general theoretical unity. I start, then, by considering possible
33 approaches to the mark of the mental.

34 35 *Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental*

36
37 The notion of the mark of the mental is due to Brentano (1874), who argued
38 that intentionality is it. Some have argued that intentionality is too *narrow* to
39 mark the mental, as some mental states (e.g., moods) are non-intentional
40 (Searle 1983).³⁷ The more serious challenge to intentionality as the mark of the
41 mental is that it appears to be too *broad*: linguistic expressions, traffic signs,
42 and paintings all appear to be about something, be contentful. Yet they are
43 clearly not mental.

1 *Privileged Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental*

2
3 It may be retorted that although non-mental phenomena are sometimes inten-
4 tional, they are so only parasitically and derivatively—for they derive their
5 intentionality from mental states. This may suggest that *underived* (or 'intrinsic')
6 intentionality may be the mark of the mental. Such a view solves the breadth
7 problem by ruling out the relevant non-mental phenomena. There is still the
8 narrowness problem, but many hold that it is no problem at all, and that in fact
9 all mental phenomena—including moods—are (non-derivatively) intentional
10 (Seager 1999, Crane 2001).³⁸ The real problem with this mark thesis is a certain
11 instability regarding the scope of underived intentionality. On the one hand, it
12 has sometimes been argued that linguistic expressions are possessed of the very
13 same underived intentionality that mental states are (Millikan 1984 Ch.3).
14 Meanwhile, other philosophers have argued that in truth only *phenomenal* mental
15 states are non-derivatively intentional (McGinn 1988, Kriegel 2003, Bourget
16 2010). What both camps have in common is an insistence on the equal status of
17 non-phenomenal mental states and linguistic expressions. And indeed it is
18 difficult to see what is supposed to set them apart. What would endow an
19 unconscious mental state, such as a tacit belief or a sub-doxastic state of visual
20 cortex, say, with an intentionality inherently different from that of a linguistic
21 expression? They both track their environments, play a certain functional role
22 within their respective systems, and so forth.^{39,40}

23
24 *Functional Role as the Mark of the Mental*

25
26 Given the prominence of functionalist theories of the mind in the past half-
27 century, it might be thought that mental states could be distinguished from
28 non-mental phenomena by their functional role. Put this way, the suggestion is
29 clearly unworkable, as many non-mental phenomena play a functional role in
30 other, non-mental systems.

31
32 *Privileged Functional Role as the Mark of the Mental*

33
34 What this suggests, however, is that there may be a privileged functional role
35 *peculiar* to mental states. One suggestion, for example, might be that mental states
36 play an *intra-cranial* functional role. But this is doubly problematic. On the one
37 hand, there are hormonal states of the brain that are clearly non-mental but play
38 an intra-cranial functional role (this is a problem of breadth). On the other hand,
39 there are extra-cranial states that some philosophers have argued are mental
40 (Clark and Chalmers 1998) precisely on the grounds that they play the same
41 functional role as unquestionably mental states (a problem of narrowness). In
42 addition, there appears to be something arbitrary and non-substantive about the
43 appeal to the cranium: even if all mental states are in it after all, that would appear
44 to be an accidental feature of the mental. A more 'scientifically sounding' variant

1 might appeal not to intra-cranial functional role but to something like *neuro-*
2 functional role. But the above problems appear to apply with similar force: some
3 neuro-functional states are likely non-mental; some mental states may be realized
4 in non-neural substrate (perhaps in silicon chips following corrective surgery); and
5 the neural (as opposed to non-neural) realization of the mental in any case appears
6 to be accidental rather than essential to the mind.⁴¹ One might hope that there be
7 some other way to specify a special, privileged kind of functional role allegedly
8 common and peculiar to mental states. However, it is unclear why, for any given
9 functional role, there could not be some element in some entirely non-mental
10 system (an ecological system, say) that played an isomorphic functional role in it.
11 This consideration generates an a priori suspicion that a privileged functional role
12 would always be too broad a mark for the mental.

13
14 '*State of a Mind*'

15
16 These considerations suggest that what makes a mental state mental is not so
17 much the properties it has in isolation, but rather its being a state of a *mind*. Thus
18 the mark of the mental should first demarcate mental *systems* and then elucidate
19 mental *states* in terms of those, rather than the other way round. The question
20 here, of course, is how to demarcate mental systems.⁴² The best answer I can
21 think of appeals to phenomenal consciousness: a mental system is a system
22 endowed of phenomenal consciousness, or a system capable of entering phe-
23 nomenally conscious states.⁴³ This would, however, straightforwardly entail a
24 connection principle: a given state is mental only if it is a state of a system
25 capable of entering phenomenally conscious states.⁴⁴

26 There are a number of other potential and actual mark theses that are likely
27 to collapse into a phenomenally based marks under reasonable assumptions.
28 Consider, for example, the claim that the mark of the mental is introspectibility:
29 all and only mental states are introspectible (Tartaglia 2008). Regardless of how
30 plausible this is (and the existence of non-introspectible sub-personal represen-
31 tations in the visual system suggests that it might be too narrow), depending on
32 one's account of introspection this may well collapse onto a phenomenally based
33 mark thesis. For it is quite plausible that all introspectible states are phenomenal,
34 or potentially phenomenal, or otherwise necessarily related to phenomenal
35 states. Likewise for the notion that the mark of the mental is *privacy* (Ducasse
36 1961): in all probability, once the notion of privacy is adequately elucidated, it
37 would turn out that all and only phenomenal states are private in the relevant
38 sense.⁴⁵ Full argumentation for the kind of collapse I am claiming would require
39 a foray into the nature of introspection and privacy that would take us too far
40 afield, so I will leave the case in this germinal form. If nothing else, it can be
41 taken as a challenge to the opponent of a phenomenally based mark of the
42 mental: show us a mark that plausibly avoids reference to the phenomenal.

43 Elsewhere, I have developed an account of the mark of the mental that (1)
44 casts the concept of mind as a prototype concept and (2) identifies the prototype

1 with phenomenal states (see Horgan and Kriegel 2008). A prototype concept is
2 one whose instances qualify as such in virtue of resembling certain prototypes,
3 or more generally bearing some crucial relation to prototypes (Rosch 1973). If the
4 concept of mind is such a concept, then states qualify as mental in virtue of
5 bearing the right relation to prototypical mental states. It is highly plausible that
6 the prototypical mental states are all phenomenally conscious.⁴⁶ This can be
7 understood either as an empirical hypothesis about the folk concept of mind or
8 as a philosophical thesis about a more nuanced, more developed concept of
9 mind. Either way, the result is a thesis according to which a state qualifies as
10 mental iff it bears the right relation to states with some phenomenology.

11 This thesis leads, in turn, to NATURE* through two non-demonstrative consid-
12 erations having to do with general theoretical unity. Observe, first, that the mark
13 thesis just stated concerns only the *existence* conditions of mentality, without
14 commenting on its *identity* conditions. Yet typically existence and identity
15 conditions do not really come apart: the existence condition is simply the
16 determinable of which the identity conditions are determinates. Thus, those who
17 hold that properties are just funds of causal powers (e.g., Shoemaker 1979), such
18 that what makes a property a property is that it has *some* causal powers, typically
19 also hold that properties *individuate* in terms of their causal powers, such that
20 what makes a property the property it is (and not another property) is that it has
21 the causal powers it does (and not others). It would be extremely odd, and very
22 much in need of justification, to maintain causal existence conditions for prop-
23 erties but reject causal identity conditions (or conversely). Likewise, then, with
24 the mark thesis according to which what makes a state mental is that it is suitably
25 related to phenomenal states. It would be odd and puzzling to hold it in
26 dissociation from the corresponding thesis about the identity of mental states. The
27 latter is the thesis that a mental state is the state it is (and not a different one) in
28 virtue of being suitably related to the phenomenal states it is (and not to others).
29 Together, the two theses amount to this:

30 There is a relation R, such that for any mental state M, what makes M
31 the mental state it is, and a mental state at all, is that M bears R to the
32 phenomenology it does, and bears R to a phenomenology at all.

33 Clearly, this is a generalization of NATURE* from the case of emotion to the case
34 of mentality in general. As such, it recommends NATURE*. For consider: if one
35 maintains (as is plausible) that the mind divides into different more or less
36 'natural' dimensions or faculties, one would need also mark theses for the
37 various subdivisions of the mental: the mark of the cognitive, the mark of the
38 conative, and indeed the mark of the emotional. Although the phenomenally
39 based mark of the mental we have settled on nowise *entails* similarly formed
40 marks for those mental subdivisions, it nonetheless creates a *presumption* in their
41 favor, inasmuch as it naturally goes hand in hand with them, offering a relatively
42 unified portrait of the mind. And again the generalization from existence to
43 identity conditions would be natural as well. According to the emerging portrait
44 of the mind, what makes a cognitive state the cognitive state it is, and a cognitive

1 state at all, is that it is suitably related to states with cognitive phenomenology;
2 what makes a conative state the conative state it is, and a conative state at all,
3 is that it is suitably related to states with conative phenomenology; what makes
4 an *emotional* state the emotional state it is, and an emotional state at all, is that
5 it is suitably related to states with emotional phenomenology; and so on. This
6 last is effectively NATURE*.

7 Thus given the generic phenomenally based mark of the mental, there are
8 general theoretical considerations that create a presumption in favor of a generic
9 phenomenally based mark of the emotional—NATURE*.⁴⁷ This is a *defeasible*
10 presumption, of course, which may be defeated by special undermining or
11 rebutting considerations recommending a picture of the mind that is *not* com-
12 mitted to NATURE*. For that matter, the very case for the phenomenally based
13 mark of the mental I have adopted was non-demonstrative, and relied on a
14 merely partial argument by elimination. That, too, then, was merely a *prima*
15 *facie* case for that mark thesis. Still, until an *ultima facie* case for a different mark
16 thesis is presented, and/or concrete defeaters for the inference from the mark
17 thesis to NATURE* are offered, we are well justified—*prima facie* and defeasibly
18 justified, but justified nonetheless—in holding on to NATURE*.

19 I conclude that, although the old feeling theory's identification of emotion
20 with emotional feel is untenable, given the existence of unconscious emotional
21 states, a subtler thesis of the same spirit is not only tenable but highly plausible.
22 This subtler thesis maintains that while some emotional states are unconscious,
23 and thus involve no feel, all emotional states must be somehow connected to
24 emotional feelings, and the connection in question in fact *makes* them the
25 emotional states they are (and emotional states at all). Thus it appears to go to
26 the essence of emotion that it is suitably connected to a certain kind of feeling.

28 4. Conclusion: The New Feeling Theory of Emotion

29
30 Recall that in Section 2 we formulated an account of emotional feeling, or
31 phenomenology, that is considerably subtler than the old feeling theory's; this
32 was FEEL*. When we combine FEEL* with NATURE*, we obtain what I call the
33 New Feeling Theory of emotion:

34 (NFT) There is a combination C of cognitive, conative, somatic, and/or
35 affective phenomenology, and a relation R, such that for any emo-
36 tional state E, what makes E the emotional state it is, and an
37 emotional state at all, is that E bears R to the C-phenomenology it
38 does, and bears R to a C-phenomenology at all.

39 According to NFT, the identity and existence conditions of emotional states are
40 indirectly determined by a certain type of phenomenology, though not the
41 emaciated phenomenology designated by James and Lange, but a rather rich
42 phenomenology including, among other things, a cognitive dimension. NFT is
43 doubly subtler, and more plausible than, JLT (the James-Lange Theory): first

1 insofar as NATURE* is subtler and more plausible than NATURE, and secondly
2 insofar as FEEL* is subtler and more plausible than FEEL.

3 My contention is that the old feeling theory of emotion had the right idea: that
4 the phenomenology of emotion is somehow essential to emotion. Its specific way
5 of developing this insight, however, was implausible. On the one hand, it
6 misconstrued the nature of the essential tie between emotion and phenomenol-
7 ogy, casting it as tighter and simpler than it truly is. On the other hand, it
8 misconstrued the character of emotional phenomenology, casting it as barer and
9 simpler than it truly is. When these two wrong turns are avoided, however, a
10 highly plausible picture of the nature of emotion emerges. This is the picture
11 made precise by NFT above. On this picture, it is in the essence of emotion to
12 be connected in the right way to a certain combination of cognitive, conative,
13 somatic, and/or affective phenomenology.⁴⁸

14
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NOTES

20
21
22
23 ¹ This would be a matter of what is sometimes called the theoretical virtue of
24 'conservatism,' or the maxim of minimum mutilation (Quine and Ullian 1970), recom-
25 mend the least departure necessary from established belief.

26 ² It is not entirely clear whether James (or Lange, for that matter) thought that every
27 feeling of bodily occurrence constituted an emotion or only the converse, that every
28 emotion was constituted by bodily occurrences, allowing some bodily occurrences not to
29 constitute an emotion. If the latter is the case, then we would have to refine the statement
30 of the thesis in the text. It is noteworthy that James' contemporaries appear to have taken
31 him to mean the former. Thus, Cannon 1915 argues against James that the same visceral
32 changes that sometimes occur in emotional states can also occur in non-emotional states.
33 This would be a criticism of James only if he was committed to the thesis that every
34 feeling of bodily occurrence constituted an emotion.

35 ³ Given the previous note, we may need to change the portable version of the thesis
36 to 'emotion = subset of somatic phenomenology'. A corresponding change to the spelled
37 out articulation of JLT would require specifying a *kind* of somatic phenomenology. Similar
38 adjustment would be called for in the case of the other indented theses to be discussed
39 later in this section, but I am not going to remark on this matter again.

40 ⁴ It is also clear that a generic 'feeling theory' of emotion is committed only to
41 NATURE, not to FEEL. The generic theory insists that the nature of emotion can be captured
42 in terms of their feel, what it is like to experience them. It is altogether silent on the
43 question of what emotional feel is in fact like, what the characteristic phenomenology of
44 emotion is.

45 ⁵ The theory is often dismissed as hopeless, for reasons we will encounter shortly. A
46 rare exception is Prinz 2004, who defends a broadly Jamesian theory of emotions as 'gut
47 reactions'.

1 ⁶ The rejection of the feeling theory of emotion is well-documented and is in fact the
2 starting point for many philosophical theories of emotion of the past century. The implicit
3 acceptance of the Jamesian account of emotional phenomenology has been less high-
4 lighted, but is evidenced over and over in twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind.
5 One prominent mid-century instance is Armstrong's account of emotion (1968 Ch.8), a
6 later one is Tye's (1995 Ch.4). I will discuss Tye's views later, but here is a representative
7 passage from Armstrong (1968: 180; emphasis in original): 'I suspect that this close
8 connection between emotion and bodily sensation explains why we speak of "feeling"
9 emotions. The etymologically original sense of the word "feel" seems to be that connected
10 with tactual and bodily perceptions (see *O.E.D.*). Bodily perceptions (that is, sensations)
11 are phenomenologically conspicuous in first-person experience of emotions, and so we
12 speak of *feeling* angry. (And where the sensations are absent, it is natural to speak of *being*
13 angry, but not *feeling* it.)' I should stress that none of this is meant to imply that there have
14 been no exceptions to these tendencies. One philosopher who has resisted both, as I will
15 later on, though in an importantly different way, is Stocker 1996.

16 ⁷ The notion of 'proprietary' phenomenology comes from Pitt 2004, who explicates it
17 as follows: a type of non-perceptual mental state M has a proprietary phenomenology if
18 there is a kind of phenomenology that M exhibits which is different from perceptual
19 phenomenology in the same way that the phenomenologies of perceptual experiences in
20 different modalities differ from one another. Thus to say that emotional states have a
21 proprietary phenomenology is to say that there is a phenomenology they exhibit which
22 differs from perceptual phenomenology in the same way perceptual phenomenologies
23 differ from one another.

24 ⁸ For influential early work on the intentionality of emotion, see Kenny 1963, though
25 the matter is also discussed, without the terminology, by Dewey 1894, indeed precisely in
26 the context of criticizing the James-Lange theory. Here as often elsewhere, however, the
27 very first modern discussion of emotion's intentionality can be found in Brentano (1874
28 Chs. 6, 8).

29 ⁹ It might be said that the feel *represents* the bodily event. This implies that it can also
30 *misrepresent* it—and indeed it can, for example in cases of pain experienced in phantom
31 limbs. This consideration is often adduced in defense of an intentionalist account of pain
32 (see, e.g., Tye 1997). 4

33 ¹⁰ Tye holds (a) that emotional phenomenology is nothing but somatic phenomenol-
34 ogy and (b) that somatic phenomenology is intentional. Consider the following passage
35 (Tye 1995: 126; emphasis in original): 'Suppose you suddenly feel extremely angry. Your
36 body will change in all sorts of ways: for example, your blood pressure will rise, your
37 nostrils will flare, your face will flush . . . These physical changes are registered in the
38 sensory receptors distributed throughout your body. In response to the activity in your
39 receptors, you will mechanically build up a complex sensory representation of how your
40 body has changed, of the new body state you are in. In this way, you will *feel* the bodily
41 changes. The feeling you undergo consists in the complex sensory representation of these
42 changes.'

43 ¹¹ There is an obvious sense, of course, in which the body is part of the world, and
44 so anything bodily is also worldly. This is why the present usage of 'worldly' is technical:
45 it is built into it that it is not merely bodily. Note that the difference between cognitive
46 and somatic intentionality presented in the text concerns *what* intentional objects are
47 presented. In addition, it is plausible, though entirely unnecessary for the point I am
48 making here, that there is a difference in *how* intentional objects are presented. A *cognitive*
49 intentionality presents worldly particulars as *existing*, worldly events as *occurring*, worldly

1 states of affairs as *obtaining*, etc. It presents its intentional objects, in other words, as *real*.
2 Arguably, somatic intentionality presents its objects as *stimulating* (or as 'irritating' in an
3 archaic sense).

4 ¹² Sustained analyses of the intentionality of emotion as cognitive in this sense (of
5 being directed at the world as opposed to the body) can be found in Kenny 1963 and
6 Lazarus 1994, among others.

7 ¹³ This is not to say that I reject the argument's conclusion as well. In the next section,
8 I will argue that the conclusion is strictly speaking true, though a modification thereof can
9 be rejected that retains its spirit.

10 ¹⁴ This is not to say that grief process is *nothing but* the sum of those grief episodes.

11 ¹⁵ The notion of phenomenal intentionality is introduced under this terminology
12 independently by Horgan and Tienson 2002 and Loar 2003. But the general idea that there
13 is a distinctively experiential kind of intentionality is present already in Loar 1987 and
14 McGinn 1988, and indeed Brentano 1874.

15 ¹⁶ For my own take on the matter, see Kriegel 2011 Chs 1–3. For a partial survey of
16 work on this notion, see Kriegel forthcoming.

17 ¹⁷ I offer my own account of what phenomenal intentionality exactly is, including
18 how we should understand talk of being 'inextricably tied,' in Kriegel 2011 Ch.1.

19 ¹⁸ The term 'cognitive phenomenology' comes from Pitt 2004, but the notion
20 expressed by it, and the phenomenon denoted by it, are argued for already by Goldman
21 1993 and Strawson 1994.

22 ¹⁹ In any event, such elements of grief involve a phenomenal intentionality is directed
23 at (non-bodily) worldly objects.

24 ²⁰ Solomon 1976 argues for the somatic indistinguishability of many emotion pairs.
25 Solomon also infers from this a *phenomenal* indistinguishability, though I contend that he
26 does so only because of an illicit acceptance of the Jamesian conception of emotional
27 phenomenology. It is remarkable that from a first-person point of view we can certainly
28 effortlessly and non-inferentially distinguish disappointment from indignation, which
29 suggests (though not entails) that there is more to their overall phenomenology than their
30 somatic phenomenology.

31 ²¹ Arguably this is also Brentano's 1874 view. Brentano argues that the emotive and
32 the conative belong together in one department of the mind, opposed as it were to the
33 cognitive. He does not propose, however, to reduce the emotive to the conative. His
34 reason for classifying the conative and the emotive together is that, on his view, their
35 intentionality presents the *good* in the same sense the cognitive presents the *true*. The
36 claim that emotion presents the good is in fact shared by Stocker (1996 Ch.2) and thus is
37 unlikely to undermine the irreducibility of affectivity.

38 ²² This is (recall) the objection that proceeded as follows: 1) emotions involve a
39 cognitive intentionality; 2) emotional phenomenology does not involve cognitive inten-
40 tionality; therefore, 3) emotions are not exhausted by emotional phenomenology.

41 ²³ For pure cognitivism, see Solomon 1976 and Nussbaum 2001; for what we may call
42 'impure cognitivism,' see Marks 1982 and Gordon 1987—all *inter alia*.

43 ²⁴ Indeed, although I am not going to go over this here, a superficial survey of
44 discussions of the cognitive (or conative) dimension of emotion in the relevant literature
45 reveals that the kind of cognitive (or conative) state the author belabors is virtually always
46 a paradigmatically conscious one, the kind of state that is a perfect candidate for being
47 described as possessing cognitive (or conative) phenomenology. I entreat the reader see
48 this for himself or herself by looking at the relevant literature (e.g., the cognitivist authors
49 cited above).

1 ²⁵ It is an independent question whether beliefs can also be conscious. In everyday
2 talk, the expression seems somewhat forced, and some have argued that belief is
3 necessarily unconscious (Crane 2001).

4 ²⁶ Thus whatever the place of the term 'feeling' in one's bookkeeping system, as long
5 as the cognitive dimension of emotion is agreed to be consistent with the notion that
6 emotion is essentially phenomenal, I am happy. To the extent that cognitive theorists are
7 happy with this as well, there is indeed no disagreement between us here. To the extent
8 that cognitive theorists are unhappy with this, and take their cognitivism to undermine
9 the essential phenomenality of emotions, there is.

10 ²⁷ If a technical notion is needed for some theoretical purpose, let a theoretical label be
11 introduced for it—' α_{17} ' might prove good, as it would wear its technical nature on its sleeve!

12 ²⁸ I suspect that what in fact happened was rather subtle process, whereby the
13 separatist picture that casts feeling as essentially non-intentional had been at some point
14 so entrenched that commitment to the non-intentionality of feeling had become so deep
15 that it treaded on the vague border zones between what is analytic to 'feeling' and what
16 is synthetic. Sadly, this dynamic appears pervasive in philosophy.

17 ²⁹ They are: (1) cognitive; (2) conative; (3) somatic; (4) affective; (5) cognitive and
18 conative; (6) cognitive and somatic; (7) cognitive and affective; (8) conative and somatic;
19 (9) conative and affective; (10) somatic and affective; (11) cognitive, conative, and somatic;
20 (12) cognitive, conative, and affective; (13) cognitive, somatic, and affective; (14) conative,
21 somatic, and affective; (15) cognitive, conative, somatic, and affective.

22 ³⁰ They are combinations (1), (2), (3), (5), (6), (8), and (11) in the note 29.

23 ³¹ This kind of brutally disjunctive thesis would be better stated as follows: for any
24 emotion E, what makes E have the emotional phenomenology it does, and have one at
25 all, is that E has the cognitive, conative, somatic, and/or affective phenomenology it does,
26 and has one at all. This differs from FEEL* with respect to the scope of the universal
27 quantifier.

28 ³² Davies' 1995 counter-example is of sub-personal computational states in the visual
29 system—Mark's 1982 '2.5D sketches'. Different examples also involving sub-personal
30 mental states—whether computational or neural—are provided in Horgan and Kriegel
31 2008 and Kriegel (2011 Ch.4). It is plausible that, just as the visual system has compu-
32 tational and neural states that are not even potentially conscious, so the emotional system
33 has such states. Thus, surely some emotional processing in the amygdala results in
34 cerebral states that qualify as emotional but that are not even potentially conscious.

35 ³³ Searle's argument is that the intentionality of mental states exhibits an aspectual
36 shape (e.g., they can represent Venus as Phosphorus without representing it as Hesperus),
37 and this is a feature that only consciousness can bring into the picture—brute neural
38 states cannot discriminate between Phosphorus and Hesperus. This argument is prob-
39 lematic in a number of ways, discussed by the commentators cited in the text. In addition,
40 it is a substantive claim that emotional states' intentionality also features aspectual shape,
41 though arguably quite a plausible one (see Montague 2009).

42 ³⁴ Writing independently of Searle, as far as I can tell, Cohen (1992: 4) writes this: 'belief
43 that *p* is a disposition . . . normally to feel it true that *p* and false that not-*p*, whether or not
44 one is willing to act, speak, or reason accordingly.' In addition, he explicates the 'feeling of
45 truth' as follows: 'Feeling it true that *p* may thus be compared with feeling it good that *p*.
46 All credal feelings, whether weak or strong, share the distinctive feature of constituting
47 some kind of orientation on the "True or false?" issue in relation to their propositional
48 objects, whereas affective mental feelings, like those of anger or desire, constitute some kind
49 of orientation on the "Good or bad?" issue.' (ibid.: 11)

1 ³⁵ The non-triviality is intended to rule out, for example, relations specified in
2 disjunctive terms. Consider the relation of being either identical to or conscious. This is
3 a relation to conscious states that any mental state bears, yet it does not seem to
4 underwrite the kind of substantive connection principle we seek. It would be nice if we
5 had a general and informative characterization of what makes a relation non-trivial, but
6 short of that I am just lumping them all under a label . . .

7 ³⁶ Thus just as FEEL is only one particularly restrictive version of FEEL*, so NATURE is
8 just one particularly restrictive version of NATURE*.

9 ³⁷ It used to be something of an article of faith that moods are non-intentional. In
10 recent years, more and more philosophers have come to think that moods are intentional
11 but have a somewhat peculiar intentional profile. More on this momentarily.

12 ³⁸ Consider this passage by Seager (1999: 183; emphasis in original) on what is
13 perhaps the paradigmatic mood, depression: 'Being depressed in this way is then a way
14 of being conscious in general: everything seems worthless, or pointless, dull and profit-
15 less. That is, more or less, *everything* is represented as worthless, or pointless, dull and
16 profitless. It is, thankfully but also significantly, impossible for a conscious being to be in
17 a state of consciousness that consists of nothing but unfocussed depression; there always
18 remains a host of objects of consciousness and without these objects there would be no
19 remaining state of consciousness.'

20 ³⁹ The general strategy of ruling out non-mental phenomena by homing in on a
21 particular, privileged kind of intentionality may yet be viable, even if the version that
22 identifies that privilege with being underived is not. Obviously, though, some concrete
23 suggestion of how this would work would still be needed.

24 ⁴⁰ It might be suggested that mental states are distinguished by their potential to
25 become phenomenally conscious, say, but this would clearly make the Privileged Inten-
26 tionality suggestion collapse onto NATURE* (rather than present an alternative to it).

27 ⁴¹ Indeed, this is arguably the main insight behind Putnam's 1967 argument for (and
28 from) multiple realizability.

29 ⁴² It cannot be a matter of being a system some states of which are (non-derivatively)
30 intentional or play a certain (privileged) functional, for the reasons encountered in our
31 discussion of the previous proposed mark theses.

32 ⁴³ It may be thought an intuitive cost of this view that it casts zombies as non-minded
33 creatures. However, it is unclear that this is indeed a consequence of the view, nor that
34 it is an untoward consequence. It may not be a consequence of the view for the following
35 reason: although zombies are defined as creatures who are never in phenomenal states,
36 it is not clear that they are *by definition* incapable of being in such states. It is a priori
37 coherent for there to be a creature that never enters a phenomenal state but is nonetheless
38 perfectly capable of doing so. Consider views of phenomenal consciousness according to
39 which a state is phenomenal just in case it represents the right environmental features;
40 and consider a creature that lives in a possible world that simply happens to contain none
41 of those features. It would seem that, on such representational theories, the creature is
42 never in a phenomenal state, but is nonetheless perfectly capable of being in one, at least
43 in the sense that if it lived in a different possible world it would routinely represent the
44 relevant environmental features. Thus it is only creatures who are incapable in principle
45 of entering phenomenal states that are ruled unminded on the suggestion under
46 consideration—and for such creatures it seems, upon reflection, quite plausible that they
47 are not genuinely minded.

48 ⁴⁴ Indeed, it would entail a substitution instance of a certain generalization
49 of NATURE* to all mental states (and not only emotional ones), namely, where

1 R is the relation of *x*-being-a-state-of-a-system-capable-of-entering-states-that-have-
2 *y*.

3 ⁴⁵ Ducasse's suggestion is also clearly too narrow, as many unconscious states are not
4 private in all but the most esoteric senses of the term. For both Tartaglia and Ducasse, it
5 makes sense to route their mark theses through the whole system: a mental state is a state
6 of a system capable of entering introspectible/private mental states. The probable
7 co-extension of the introspectible/private with the phenomenal would then make the
8 suggestion collapse onto that of the last paragraph. In the same vein, one might hold that
9 a state is mental just in case it is a state of a system capable of entering states possessed
10 of phenomenal intentionality (something like this appears to be in the background of
11 Horgan and Graham forthcoming). This is clearly a phenomenally based mark thesis.

12 ⁴⁶ Horgan and Kriegel 2008 suggest that they are, in fact, all phenomenal-intentional
13 states, and more particularly are probably visual experiences and conscious occurrent
14 thoughts possessed of cognitive phenomenology.

15 ⁴⁷ I remind the reader that NATURE* is the following thesis: There is a relation R, such
16 that for any emotional state E, what makes E the emotional state it is, and an emotional
17 state at all, is that E bears R to the emotional phenomenology it does, and bears R to an
18 emotional phenomenology at all.

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