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REPRESENTATION AND POIESIS

THE IMAGINATION IN THE LATER HEIDEGGER

John W. M. Krummel

Those who have studied Heidegger's relationship to Kant are familiar with his ontological broadening of the significance of the imagination (*Einbildung, Einbildungskraft*). But what about Heidegger's view of the imagination in his later works from the 1930s on? In the Kant-reading of the 1920s, especially in his famous "Kant-book" (*Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*) of 1929, Heidegger certainly did not limit the imagination to its more traditional understanding as a faculty of images (*Bild, Bilder*) (or representations) but rather broadened and deepened it, making its sense coincide with his own notions of the ontological opening of man's being-(t)here (*Dasein*). The assumption was that the imagination, identified with this ontological opening, is the originary unity from out of which the separate faculties of the cognizing subject, its spontaneity and its receptivity, sprout. This was in reaction to the Neo-Kantian hylo-morphic prioritization of form over matter in cognition. To bridge the gap between form and matter, subject and object, Heidegger looked to the imagination in Kant's placement of it between conceptual understanding and receptive sensibility. In Kant's epistemological system, however, the imagination is a faculty of intuition and of synthesis. That is to say that in its transcendental-formative role, despite its positioning between sensation and understanding, the imagination, strictly speaking, belongs to the stem of spontaneity as opposed to receptivity (to which is relegated raw sense-data). One might then say that the equation of the imagination in Kant with the originary unity of the stems *qua* ontological opening was founded upon Heidegger's (mis-)taking of one of the stems, intentionally or not, for their deep uniting root.

If one takes a look at another work from 1929, *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, one could also say that this reading of Kantian imagination was based upon the inseparability Heidegger

discerned between the "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*) and the "projection" (*Entwurf*) of human existence in "transcendence" (*Transzendenz*).¹ On the one hand, we always already find ourselves finitized by a whole set of environing conditions, i.e., the world into which we are thus "thrown," and on the other hand, we comport ourselves to things in view of a picture or image of the world (*Welt-Bild*) that we project and that gives meaning to the situation wherein we find ourselves. These two aspects of our being-in-the-world are united in what Heidegger calls "transcendence," the fact that in dealing with beings, we are always simultaneously moving-beyond ("transcending") them toward being itself in the assumption of the very meaningfulness (or "sense," *Sinn*) of being underlying those very beings that we are comporting to. In that case, although Heidegger broadens the imagination and equates it with that ontological opening of our being-in-the-world designated as transcendence, Kantian imagination itself in the strict epistemological-representational sense then would itself have to be grounded in that very ontological opening that unites projection and thrownness and that would make the harmonious fitting of spontaneity and receptivity in cognition possible. In his subsequent works—which I would suggest also moves beyond the mere relegation of the sense of being to time as our ontologically finitizing mortality—Heidegger names that opening event of being, *Ereignis* among other names.

My focus in this essay lies in Heidegger's attitudes toward the imagination subsequent to his initial Kant reading in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* of 1929.² A certain shift (*Wendung*) in his thinking becomes noticeable in the 1930s. In the following decades he turns away from his previous attempt to understand being through an analysis of human existence that makes use of the terminology of transcendence and the horizon of projection, and to

ward being itself in its historical-epochal unfoldings and as the world-opening "enowning event" (*Ereignis*) whereby human existence is itself opened and shaped.³ Heidegger's later (post-1930) Kant-readings for the most part do not discuss the imagination.⁴ But the imagination is discussed in other works. What we find when we look at these later works together is a certain ambiguity or duplicity in his stance toward the imagination. For in some works, its ontological pre-empting is maintained and developed while in other works the imagination is depreciated as a merely representational faculty, the significance of which is restricted to the modern epoch. What may be noticeable, I think, in these multifarious moves from the 1930s to the 1960s, however, is an approach that listens to that which is beyond the productive imagination taken as a representational faculty of the individual subject, hence also beyond the spontaneity of subjectivity as emphasized in modern epistemology. And as Heidegger discards the transcendentalizing hermeneutologies of his past, his new approach listens to that which cannot be confined to mere projection or horizon of projection—the motifs of the earlier fundamental ontology. That is to say, the focus moves even beyond the time of mortality and inward toward the "spacing" of the world whereby man is finitized and to which he must be receptive. An ambiguity lies exactly where the imagination stands in relation to that opening occurrence of being.

In his earlier Kant reading of the 1920s, *Kant und das Probleme der Metaphysik*, Heidegger made the cryptic remark that the "imagination" is no longer an adequate designation for understanding the root of the epistemic stems: "In the end, what has hitherto been known as the transcendental power of imagination breaks up [*dissoviert*, *auflöst*] into more originary 'possibilities' so that by itself the designation 'power of imagination' becomes inadequate" (KPM 140g/96c). This remark is made in the middle of that book, the aim of which was to retrieve the imagination as the hidden root of the faculties. Is this remark indicative of a nagging question that bothered Heidegger during his completion of the work? Does it foreshadow the shift that unfolds later in his attitude or is it, at least, a recognition of the inadequacy of the terminology, which then

leads to the change of concepts in his later works? This statement, he tells us, is compelled by "the uncovering of further 'strangeness' (*Befremdlichkeit*) at the point where the root of the stems lies (KPM 140g/96c). What lies hidden there at the ground of the faculties, is so deep that even the name "imagination" does not do it justice. For the root of the stems, if understood ontologically as what unifies and grounds human existence, must lie at a locus exceeding the confines of human subjectivity, whether understood epistemically or even artistically or creatively. We find that in some of his later works, Heidegger places the imagination upon the stream of history, as contingent to—and as but one manifestation among others of—that deeper unfolding of being. Nevertheless we find in some of his other later works that a broadened significance of the imagination is still paradoxically maintained as well.

The imagination, in Heidegger's post-1930 decades, stands on a precarious foothold. In some works it is disparaged as a representational faculty belonging, as an epochal feature, to modernity. And yet in other works, its ontological broadening is developed and further clarified in terms of the clearing or the *poiesis* of the unfolding of being that opens the world and man's (there *Da*). The direction of his paths, while multiple, in general move extrinsic to any focus upon, or link to, the spontaneous activity of human subjectivity, beyond its all-too-human will, so as to instead pronounce the finitude of man in will and reason in the face of that which overwhelms it to silence, e.g., what Heidegger calls, in the mid to late 1930s, the "enowning event" (*Ereignis*) that "en-owns" (*erwägt*) man's being-(there or, in the 1940s and 1950s, the "regioning" (*Gegenart*) of the "region" (*Gegend*) as "that-which-regions" (*Gegnet*). His later discussions of being no longer confine the *poiesis*-matter to the horizontal-essential structure of our encounter with being as in his previous *Das Sein und die Geschichte*. Instead he attempts to listen to what echoes from beyond the horizon. The path of the existential analytic must still be seen as preparatory for his later thinking,⁵ but there is a shift in the angle of approach to the subject-matter of being that moves from within the horizon to what lies beyond it. It takes this shift as underscoring the *otherness* of being and the *receptivity* of human existence—a

receptivity *vis-à-vis* that ontological unfolding by which the human being-(there is finitized and opened. It is in the face of this alchemy of being as extra-horizontal that in some of Heidegger's later works the imagination—despite of its former central significance of forming the horizon of phenomena—becomes deprecatd as a merely representational faculty. As such it is placed upon the history of thinking *vis-à-vis* that historical unfolding of being, as belonging to the modern epoch. This coheres with his positioning in his later readings of Kant, as the discoverer or thinker of the productive function of the imagination upon that historical-epochal unfolding of being. And yet in other works, seemingly contrary to this move, the understanding of the imagination in its broadened ontological significance from his earlier Kant reading, is developed further in terms of the very clearing or *poiesis* of being, that very ontological opening and unfolding to which human existence is contingent. We thus need to look into this apparent contradiction in Heidegger's views toward the imagination in relation to that originary event of the opening of being and its historical unfolding. I shall spend the first section looking at several works from the 1930s up to the 1960s wherein Heidegger demotes the imagination as a mere representational faculty *vis-à-vis* that which is ontologically more primordial. And then I will spend the second section looking at two works, one from the 1930s and the other from the 1950s, wherein an ontologically broadened significance of the imagination is maintained and further developed. Both senses—depreciated and broadened—of the imagination appear in the latter piece (1951), which may provide a clue for unravelling the apparent contradiction in Heidegger's stance toward the imagination.

Imagination as Representational and as Ontologically Derivative

First there is Heidegger's placing of the imagination in history. When focusing upon its significance as an image-forming power that objectifies being, Heidegger, in some of his post-1930 works, takes the imagination to be a manifestation of that historically conditioned will-to-power of the modern subject, operating behind reason, striving to reduce the totality of

beings into image/object. So, along with the understanding (*Verstand*), e.g., in Kant, he associates the imagination with the power of objectification that runs rampant in the modern epoch, which in itself however is a consequence of the historical destined of being operating behind the agency of the subject's will. The imagination, together with the figure of Kant, becomes positioned as a representational faculty subjected to the unfolding destining of being in history. It is riding upon the historical stream of being. Thus what earlier was broadened beyond its epistemological meaning as indicative of the ontological temporality of human existence, Heidegger now regards to be an epochal configuration in its obscuring power of reducing being to representation. That is, Heidegger associates the imagination in its representational significance with the concealing (or forgetting) of being even as it takes part in, and expresses, the historical-epochal unfolding of being. And yet this oft-mentioned is simultaneously still a self-concealing, a mode of being's unconcealing, i.e., an historical configuration of the unconcealing-concealing of being. Its "productivity" or "formativity" still points to that anonymous formativity, the *poiesis* of being, unfolding in history.

Heidegger regards the imagination in that historicization as a feature of modernity but in that respect as ontologically derivative. And in this aspect the imagination becomes demoted from any claim to autonomous creativity, whether for the sake of a more anonymous and primordial making-process (*poiesis*) on the part of being or for the sake of a non-representational mode of comportment on the part of man *vis-à-vis* the presencing of being. We notice this in works from the 1930s, such as *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* and *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* as well as one of the Nietzsche lectures,⁶ wherein Heidegger takes the imagination to be a consequence of the rise of modernity as man asserts his position amongst beings to objectify the whole of beings into an image (*Bild*). And yet such self-willing of man through imagination is itself regarded as but contingent to the epochal unfolding shaping human destiny. Deeper than modern subjectivity, with its faculty of imagination, then is the *poiesis* and *aletheia* of being that open up the world making possible man's dwelling and

subsequent representational activity. In *Die Sprache* of 1950,¹ Heidegger undertakes this demotion of the imagination even in regards to its poetic role as a creative or artistic faculty, to underscore its finitude *vis-à-vis* the ontologically primordial and ulterior non-human source of its spontaneity, proving its creativity to in fact really be a receptivity toward that which exceeds it. And in his Zollikon seminars of the 1960s as well Heidegger denigrates the imagination as a mere representational faculty.² Here Heidegger distinguishes from imagination what he calls "making-present" (*Vergegenwärtigung*) as our more primordial "being-with beings" that allows for our comportment and openness to beings without, and prior to, the involvement of any representational image-making. In this first part of the present essay, we shall examine these above-mentioned words in closer detail.

In the 1938 lecture, *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* ("The Age of the World Picture"), Heidegger historicizes the imagination as a station in the "history of the forgetfulness of being" (see HW 101/QCT 141/OBT 76). He tells us that it is in the modern age—rather than the ancient or medieval—that the world as the totality of beings becomes represented in a picture or image, *Bild*, and thus objectified by man. Simultaneously it is in modernity that man comes to assert his position in the midst of beings as their underlying *subjectum*. That is, in the modern age world becomes *Bild*, man becomes subject, and truth becomes representation.³ The reduction of being to mere image (*Bild*) is accordingly seen as an occurrence parallel to the modern self-dedication of consciousness: "That the world becomes image/picture [*Bild*] is one and the same occurrence as man's becoming *subjectum* in the midst of beings" (HW 92/QCT 132/OBT 69). The more the subject asserts itself as center of the universe, the more the universe—anthropomorphized as man's projection—is itself transformed into an image/picture (*Bild*): "The more extensively and thoroughly the world is available at man's disposal as conquered, and the more objectively the object appears, all the more subjectively, that is assertively, the *subjectum* rises up, and all the more importantly observations and teachings about the world transform into a doctrine of man, into anthropology. It is no wonder that humanism

first arises where the world becomes image/picture [*Bild*]" (HW 93/QCT 133/OBT 70). And just as every age has its own metaphysics that determines the being of beings, so is this objectification of beings and their world through the representing power of imagination (*Ein-bildung*) related to the metaphysics of modernity, the fundamental way in which being is obscured and forgotten in this era.

We can see that Heidegger's concern in thematizing the imagination here as image/projection is no longer the problematic of grounding cognition upon human existence *per se* as it was in his 1929 Kant reading. Imagination is but a function of the modern subject that assumes itself to be the central point of the world:⁴ "Man as representing subject . . . fantasizes, i.e., he moves in *imaginatio* insofar as his representing images [*gebildete*] beings as the objective in the world as image/picture [*Bild*]" HW 106/QCT 147/OBT 80). The imagination in the post-1930 Kant readings—*Die Frage nach dem Ding* of 1935–36 and *Kants Thesis über das Sein* of 1961—is subordinated to or eclipsed by the understanding. But in works such as this, the imagination in its own right—along with Kant who recognized its power and activity of objectification and representation—is seen in light of the historical-epochal way of the self-showing of being. Put differently, it also becomes viewed as an human theoretical response to the unfolding of being in correspondence with the purview set by the modern epoch. It is sighted as an all-too-human faculty contingent upon the ontological anomaly shaping human destiny—a destiny to which human dwelling, including thinking, can only co-respond. As a figure of the representational mode of picturing the world that reigns in modernity, the imagination has thus apparently been historicized. However with this "historical" perspective, Heidegger seeks to overcome the modernist standpoint with a thinking directed upon being itself.⁵

The demotion of the imagination in its historicity from a position that previously suggested ontological precedence coincides with the implication that can be drawn from some of Heidegger's other works, namely that we do not make the beings we encounter, or at least we are not ultimately the makers of their being, their presenting, even their sense or meaning. That is, even our objectification of beings,

making (*bilden*) them into images (*Bild*, *Bilder*), is historically (and environmentally) conditioned. Even as (epistemological or instrumental) subjects we are subjected, and there is a more primordial making-process than our own. This more primordial "making" or *poiesis* is a theme that takes center-stage in some of Heidegger's works of the 1930s. As we have seen above, Heidegger in *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* relegates the concept of imagination to its representational sphere involving images, a sphere in turn taken as contingent to the epochal unfoldings of the modern era. In other works it becomes downplayed for its subjectivistic nature in favor of the Greek *poiesis* designating a production more primordial. This move is made, for example, in his lecture, *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* ("The Origin of the Work of Art") (1935–36), wherein Heidegger questions whether the modern notion of the productive imagination can truly explain creativity. Heidegger's guiding hypothesis here is that the conceptual dualistic scheme of form-matter, traceable to the serviceability of things made into equipments,⁶ has been used throughout the history of metaphysics to understand beings in general, including non-equipmental beings. The metaphysics of modernity, including Kant's (and Neo-Kantians') transcendentalism with its *hylo-morphic* scheme (i.e., the received sense-matter on the one hand and the spontaneity of forms of intuition and conception on the other hand), is no exception (see HW 15/PLT 30/OBT 11). However even the being of equipments cannot adequately be reduced to such a scheme according to which, through fabrication, some form is given to some piece of matter. Heidegger here argues that the form-matter structure is insufficient for understanding the thingliness of things. Rather "equipment acquires its equipamental being from a more distant source . . . a deeper origin" (HW 20/PLT 35/OBT 15). The implication is that if the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*) is the faculty of imposing form (*Bild*, *Form*) upon sense-matter—not only in the cognition of objects but also in the making of equipments—this deeper and *befremdlich* origin of the being of beings then cannot be understood adequately in terms of it. The suggestion set forth instead points to something

beyond the in-forming of form upon matter, as truly *freud* (alien). In search of this deeper ontological origin of things, Heidegger in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* looks to what he considers to be the tension or strife between world and earth. The world is that wherein man finds his dwelling⁷ and the earth is that upon which the world is set up. Things open up the world and find their meaningful place within it. But this world itself cannot be known as object. Nor is it "a merely imaginary [*eingebildeter*] framework added by our representation to the sum of things that are present" (HW 30/PLT 44/OBT 23). Likewise the earth—as the unmasterable bearer of the world—remains man's withheld objectification (see HW 33/PLT 47/OBT 25). The imagination in its epistemic and even in its creative functions, our knowing and our making, is thus denied mastery over world and earth: "The known remains an approximation, what is mastered inescapable. Never is a being . . . something of our making or merely our representation" (HW 39/PLT 53/OBT 29). Taking "poetry" in light of the Greek sense of *poiesis* as a creativity ontologically more primordial than the intentional workings of man, Heidegger states: "It becomes questionable whether the essence of poetry, that is, projection, can be adequately thought of in terms of . . . the power of imagination" (HW 60/PLT 72–73/OBT 45). Its creativity rather is characterized as involving the mysterious picturing of earth and world in creative strife, opening a world upon the earth as ground. The imagination, even with its productive-projective force, is thus to be rejected as insufficient for designing this "art" of creation because the bringing-forth of what is, which Heidegger calls "truth"—but with an eye toward the original Greek meaning of "truth" as "unconcealing" (*α-ληθεια*)—can no longer be reduced to a human doing. It is not our subjective that is in control but rather "the unconcealment of beings [that] puts us into such an essence that all our representing remains set into, and in accordance with, unconcealment" (HW 39/PLT 52/OBT 29). We gain access to things not with our making or forming but rather through "the allowing [of oneself] . . . ecstatic [*ekstatische*] entrance into the unconcealment of beings" (HW 55/PLT 67/OBT 41; see also HW 40/PLT 53/OBT 30; HW 48/PLT 60/OBT 35–36).

Heidegger's intention is to turn our focus away from the autonomy or spontaneity claimed by modern man and instead to *poiesis*—as well as to its reception—as an anonymous happening of truth and being, which indigests each successive epochal world. For Heidegger here all "art," creation, formation in general, is such "truth" as unconcealing and is thus essentially "poetry" (*Dichtung*) in the sense of *poiesis* (see HW 59–60/PLT 72–73/OBT 44–45). In a quotation we just cited, a few lines above, Heidegger mentions "projection" (*Entwurf*) as the essence of poetry (HW 60/PLT 72/OBT 45). We recall that projection earlier in *Sein und Zeit* was associated with man's hermeneutical-ontological understanding. But here its sense, taking off from its 1929 explication in its putting with thrownness in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, is briefly mentioned at the very beginning of this essay, and which will become further developed in the mid-to-late 1930s in the *Beiträge* in terms of the opening of being as an "enowning event" or *Ereignis*, is fundamentally not so much a human doing but rather the "saying" (*Sagen*) of a human saying but the anonymous "language" of being in its unfolding, opening, releasing. Consequently Heidegger can remark a couple of years later in his *Beiträge*: "understanding as thrown project; the thrower of the project is a thrown thrower... first in and through the throw" (B 259/C 183).¹⁸ What seems to be underscored here is the primacy of the throw over any all-too-human projection or intention. Both art and projection here are rather regarded anonymously as such *poiesis*, referring to the strife of world and earth from out of which things emerge as what they are (see HW 61/PLT 74/OBT 46). The imagination then in its formative function in the hylo-morphic scheme may be left at its traditional Kantian locus. And yet on the other hand, this locus itself is a constellation of the unfolding of being. The standpoint of the imagination in its productivity—whether epistemological or instrumental or creative—is here regarded as a tendency belonging to the subjectivism of the modern period that views the world anthropomorphically to misinterpret creation as the production of the supposedly autonomous subject. But with further unfoldings of being in the turnings of late modernity, newer avenues are opened up. The imagination can no longer

occupy the center of creativity with the decentering of subject and world and with the self-dis-possession of will.

At the end of the decade (1939), in one of the Nietzsche lectures dealing with Kant, unlike in his other major Kant readings of post-1930, Heidegger does bring the imagination into the picture in his Kant-reading, albeit briefly. The imagination along with Kant, however, as in the two works mentioned above is here historicized. In this lecture Heidegger regards Kant with his doctrine of the transcendental imagination as the first to explicitly see and think through the formative "poetizing" (*dichtend*; creatively/inventive) force lying behind reason. This is the force operative behind reason's advance positing of an "identity" beyond the variability of the given. Heidegger here takes Kant's thought itself to be an expression of reason on the basis of modern metaphysics.¹⁹ That is, Kant's theory expresses the experience of modern reason as the subjectivity of the subject representing beings in their objectivity and thus as "imagination [*Einbildungskraft*], without qualification" in that it "forms and images [*zu- und abbildet*] to itself everything that beings are." (NIW 180/NT 385/n3 96). Or more succinctly, reason is imagination in its objectification of things. And such objectification is in accordance with the general direction of Western thought (and unfolding of being) in that stage of its history.²⁰ What is interesting however is that a link is made between both reason and imagination as belonging to the spontaneity of subjectivity, and the productive force that expresses the historical unfolding (or *poiesis*) of being. Imagination as both objectifying and image-forming (i.e., representational) on the one hand and as creative-formative or "poetizing" (in the broader ontological sense) on the other hand, points to a certain duplicity that we also find, for example, in his 1950s work...*dichterisch wohnt der Mensch*... which we shall discuss later in the second section. In one sense it is expressive of the unfolding of being but in another sense is limited to the epoch of representation (or objectification).

Heidegger continues his demotion or depreciation of the imagination *vis-à-vis poiesis* in his 1950 lecture, *Die Sprache* ("Language")

(in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*). Here the demotion is explicitly of the imagination even in its artistic-creative role as the "poetic imagination" (*dichterische Einbildungskraft*) involved in poetic composition and expression, as opposed to its epistemological representational and objectifying, cognitive sense. Heidegger views the imagination here, when taken as an artistic faculty involved in poetic creativity and expression, to be a "self-pre-forming" (*sich-vor-bilden*) of what the poet intends to say, that brings-forth beings in their imaginative representation and then linguistically expresses that lived experience in the utterance of the poem. As such imagination is still a form of representational thinking.²¹ In *Die Sprache*, Heidegger explains that such poetic imagination is thus not ontologically primordial in man's relation to being. It is but one aspect of poetic comportment (in thinking and speaking). But when poetic comportment becomes understood derivatively in terms of such imaginative making-present, it becomes reduced to an act of representation whereby the poet pre-forms or pictures ("images," *bildet... vor*) to himself something that could be present (*möglichst-weise Anwesendes in seinem Anwesen*), which then in turn becomes spoken through the composed poem (US 17/PLT 197). Poetic comportment however has another aspect in the reception of its essential determination that exceeds that representational horizon set-forth by the imagination. This other and non-representational aspect of poetry involves what Heidegger calls "commemoratively" or "recalling" thinking (*andenkende Denken*) as opposed to representing thinking (*wortrelleinde Denken*), a thinking that is receptive of the saying of the other-than-self as opposed to a thinking that is all-too-ready to impose its subjective a priori categories upon things.²²

Heidegger goes on in *Die Sprache* to tell us that the naming act in a poem involves more than simply applying terms to imaginable objects and events. It calls-out into the distance and calls things forth into manifestness, bringing them closer into presence (*Anwesen*) as determined through their very absence (*Abwesen*) (US 18/PLT 198–99).²³ In being called-forth through naming, the thing gathers and assembles a surrounding context—which Heidegger during the years surrounding this work, in the 1940s and 1950s, discusses in

terms of the "fourfold" (*Gewirk*) of sky/heaven and earth, mortals and divinities (*Himmel und Erde, Sterblichen und Göttlichen*)—unfolding the very world wherein it can be present and abide in relation to man (US 19/PLT 199–200, US 21/PLT 201–02). This mutual presenting or "essencing" (*Wesen*) of world and thing in their interrelation occurs through a mutual "diff-ference" (*Unter-Schied*) that constitutes their presence (US 22/PLT 202). Heidegger describes this presenting of world and thing in their difference (*Unter-Schied*) in terms of the "enowning event" (*Ereignis*)²⁴ of things into the bearing (*Geldrden*) of world—a "thinging"—and of world into the granting (*Gewen*) of things—a "worlding" (US 22/PLT 202–03, US 27/PLT 207). Through their difference, world and thing each comes to be what it is *vis-à-vis* the other. Their presenting is in mutual reference to, and distinction from, one another. Heidegger cautions us that such ontological happening that presences world and thing in their differentiations—which he calls "the peel [or: 'chime,' 'echo'] of stillness" (*das Geläut der Stille*)—is not up to man's willion. Rather man himself is "enowned" (*ereignet*), brought into his own (*eigen*) being, through this event (*Ereignis*) (US 27/PLT 208). In the authentic experiencing of poetry then, man—whether poet, reciter, or listener—is brought into his ownmost (*eigentlich*) being; and this is not an accomplishment of the imagination but rather the enowning event (*Ereignis*) of being. The imaginative invention, speaking, or understanding of mortals cannot be accomplished apart from what the very fundude of their mortality entails. We are first required to listen to what is given—over so subtly—in the presenting of world and thing, "the peel of the stillness of diff-ference" (*das Geläut der Stille des Unter-Schiedes*) (US 28–29/PLT 208–09). This means that the poetic saying of mortals is ultimately a responding (*das Entsprechen*, "corresponding") that is a receptive listening (*hörendes Zuhören*, "listening") that still sound, a reply in acknowledgment of (*anerkanntes Entgegen*, "acknowledging reply to") the presenting of being (see US 29/PLT 209). Representing in general—projective and impersonal of its forms—including poetic imagination, must

presuppose the prior occurrence of being whereby beings become manifest. Poetized beings are not only imaginatively represented. Even prior to their in-formation (*Einbildung*, imagination), they are determined in their presence from out of the unconcealment (*Unverborgenheit*) of their being, over which the poet declares no power. In this respect, poeticizing even prior to being an exercise of subjective spontaneity is a *leithing*-presencing (*Anwesen-lassen*) of beings.²² In short, even our poetic experience of composing or listening to poetry entails something more primordial than, excessive and alienated to, the imagination. It involves the anonymous, non-human, occurrence of the enowing event of being, the unconcealing of being that presences world and thing in mutual distinction, opening up a context for man's meaningful dwelling and comportment.

The imagination in its traditional modern significance is again dealt with but briefly and to be cast down, a decade and a half later, in one of Heidegger's Zollikon seminars of the 1960s. This particular seminar is from March 1965, a few years after Heidegger's third major Kant-reading (*Kants These über das Sein*, 1961) wherein the imagination is conspicuously neglected. In this seminar for psychologists, psychiatrists, and doctors, Heidegger turns his focus back upon the existential structures of man that he once analyzed in *Sein und Zeit*. But in this context, he engages the imagination anew. In this work, as in the works we examined above, Heidegger takes the imagination as a species of representation. In distinction from his claim in *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, the imagination here is not to be placed on the same level with our being-(*Da-sein*). This is so, he explains, because worldly comportment in its pre-epistemic level does not take the form of anticipatory "images" for representation. From imagination in that representational sense, Heidegger distinguishes what he calls "making-present" (*Vergegenwärtigung*).²³ He defines this latter as one way of "being-with" (*Sein bei*) beings in the sense of being-directed toward them, whereby one can comport to something that oneself is not and stand open for (*Offenstellen für*) its presencing, regardless of whether or not that thing be bodily (*leibhaftig*) present (Z 93-95g/72-74e). This may remind

one of the epistemological definition of the imagination as the faculty that makes present the no-longer or not-yet present in a re-presentation. One may also be reminded of "making-present" (*gegenwärtigen*) in its association with retaining (*behalten*) and expecting (*gewartigen*) in the three-fold essential-horizontal temporality of Heidegger's earlier *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* of 1927, the temporality with which the imagination was related in his Kant-reading. But Heidegger carefully delineates making-present (*Vergegenwärtigung*) here as a mode of being with beings (*eine Weise der Seins bei Seindem*), and explicitly distinguishes this from imagining (*einbilden, Einbildung*) now taken as a mode of representation (see Z 91-92g/71e). While representation is itself a mode of comportment and hence one way of our being, imagination is ontologically derivative in comparison to making-present. Heidegger points out that while *Vergegenwärtigung* does not necessitate the involvement of an actual representation (*Verstellung*) or "image" (*Bild*) (see Z 87-88g/68-69e, 92g/72e). In getting to the train station—Heidegger's example is that before one gets there, that is, be aware of its coming presence even if not explicitly or thematically. But this comportment, in one's being directed toward it, involves no imagination of the not-present. In other words, one is not required to mentally picture the station in a re-produced or anticipatory image (Z 92g/71e).

To comport to it in such a way pre-thematically, as one walks toward the train station on one's way to work, while thinking about the weather or imagining a pretty girl or day-dreaming, differs not only from explicitly having a thought about—a representation of—the train station but also from having any sort of an ontological unfolding that is already in an image of it floating in one's mind. It refers to one's engagements with the world—without however necessitating not only physical or actual presence but also imaginal or ideal presence, hence in a pre-thematic, pre-epistemic, pre-cognitive, non-representational comportment. This is the sense of what Heidegger calls "being-with" or "being-at" (*Sein bei*) (Z 90g/70e, 93g/72e). And making-present as a mode of such being-with is thus seen by Heidegger

as a way of our being-in-the-world, a mode of our standing-open (*Offenständigkeit*)—hence a mode of "being-with . . . in standing-open" (*Offenständigkeit* *Sein bei*)—here taken as a derivative characteristic of being human (Z 95g/73e). In contrast to making-present as this "standing-open being-with" (*Offenständigkeit* *Sein bei*), which also involves the lived body (see Z 96g/74e and 110g/84e), Heidegger here thus relegates the imagination instead to representation as a derivative mode of being and comportment. And representational thought (*Verstellung*) as a derivative mode of comportment (*verhalten*) is in turn seen as inadequate for grasping the ontological structure of the human being-(*Da*)here's comportment to beings in its openness to being.

Heidegger's view of the imagination in the Zollikon seminars then differs from his earlier conception in his first Kant reading as well as that of some phenomenologists starting with Husserl who attributes to it a broader scope of activity. The seminar session curiously ends with a critique of modern thought—of which Kant (as well as Husserl) without being mentioned would be a prime example—in its hubristic self-blinding tendency. Heidegger tells us that its calculative thinking incapacitates us from a *receptive* (*hinnehmend ausgesetzt*) experiencing of being that addresses us through our openness to beings (Z 96g/74-75e). Imagination as representation is thus contrasted with this non-representational opening of our existence into the world. Comporting in the world, one is already beyond any self-enclosed mind and involved with things other than "I." Our existence as existence is already in tune with the alterity of things, as an opening that is being-toward-other, beyond and outside of our mental appropriations of these things in representation. But the thinking mind (*cogito*), as the realm of representation, is precisely where the imagination is now confined in contrast to its earlier broadening to the ontological (i)here of human existence. We already exist in the world outside of that wherein the imagination belongs. One could also draw an implication from these discussions that pre-epistemic sense of "spatiality," irreducible to any form of intuition, in excess to the scope of representational imagination, is operative in the structuring of our existence and ought to be taken into consideration along

with temporality. That is not the purpose of this essay, however, so I shall not go into that here.

What we find then, in short, in the above mentioned works is a demoting of the imagination vis-à-vis the more primordial presencing or *poiesis* of the enowing event whether understood in terms of historical destining, the *delethic* strife of world-earth, the presencing of world and thing *via* the sounding of their mutual difference, or the pre-representational comportment of making-present as an opening. However among Heidegger's post-1930 works, there are also those wherein he seems to maintain that ontological broadening of the imagination from his earlier Kant reading of 1929 but developing it further. We now turn to those works.

The Imagination and the Open in the

Later Heidegger

The imagination as an epochal aspect of modernity that reduces being via representation must presuppose the historical unfolding of being. Heidegger understands being qua time in the later works in terms of this history, as the destining configurations of unconcealment-concealment, presencing-absencing. Thus in the works we examined above, the imagination is depreciated in its contingency to that streaming history of being as modern representation. And yet in two other post-1930 works, which we shall examine in this section, the term "imagination" is used in a sense that appears to contravene that demotion to a representational faculty as an epochal feature of modernity. It is instead used to designate that very unfolding opening of being. In a work from the mid to late 1930s, the imagination is equated with the "clearing" (*Lichtung*) along with that enowing event (*Ereignis*) we mentioned above. And in the early 1950s the imagination is more explicitly doubled within a single text as fabulational (or representational) image-making on the one hand but also as the ontological *poiesis* on the other hand. Such additional twists and turns in these later works, unfolding a complexity involved in the issue, should preclude any one-dimensional understanding of the imagination's role and significance for Heidegger.

The imagination as a representational faculty that comes to prominence in modern epis-

ontology cannot itself be identified with the ontological grounding that opens the world to contextualize man's way of being. And yet it was precisely the imagination in Kant, because of its time-formation and schematism, that the early Heidegger found to be indicative of, or even equatable with, man's transcendence and ecstatic-horizonal temporality. This may have had something to do with the use of conceptual schemes inherited from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology with its transcendental temporal horizon. In his post-1930 works discussed above, however, Heidegger reduces the role of the imagination to a merely representational faculty. But as we mentioned just now this is not the whole picture of the matter. For Heidegger does combine references to the imagination in a broadened ontological sense in a couple of other works after 1930. For example in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie* of 1936-38, the "projecting-thrown grounding" (*die entwerfend-geworfene Grundung*) that opens man's being-(*ih*)here (*Da-sein*) is itself named to be the highest actuality in the domain of imagination, but with the qualification that this is understood not as a transcendental faculty of representation but as *enowning* (*Er-eigen*) itself and as the occurrence of the *clearing* (*Lichtung*) itself. "Imagination . . . [is] not only a faculty of the soul and not only something transcendental but rather *enowning* itself. . . . 'Imagination' as occurrence of the *clearing* itself. Only, 'imagination,' *in-zugleich*, is the name that names from within the perspective of the direct receiving of *on*, a being" (B 312/C 219). Imagination (*Einbildung*) is here—as *clearing*, *enowning*, opening—as ontologically broadened, may then be taken in its literal sense, as the process of ontological formation or "forming-in" (*ein-bilden*) in the configurations of unconcealing-concealing. In fact that literal sense, taken ontologically, is made more explicit in the other work (from 1951) which we shall examine below. Heidegger's meaning of "clearing" (*Lichtung*) here is of an opening wherein world and beings become manifest, the place of being's unconcealment delimited by the surrounding dark that conceals being. In his second major Kant reading, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, also of the same period (1935-36), Heidegger appears to have something similar in mind when he speaks of a "circular happening" (*kreisende*

Ganzheitens) of the "between" (*Zwischen*) of knower and known, subject and object, i.e., an opening that exceeds the terms of cognition (subject and object) while making them possible by encompassing them (e.g., see FND 46/WIT 47, FND 242/WIT 242). In that second Kant-book, however, there is no mention of the imagination. In the *Beiträge* on the other hand, the imagination is equated with that ontological *clearing* or opening in the occurrence of *enowning* (*Er-eigen*). The imagination of the cognitive subject, spatio-temporally forming the received sense-matter and constituting images of objects so that they may conform to the same as this ontologically more originary opening of the world. Under the light of Heidegger's discussion in the *Beiträge* of the *enowning* event (*Er-eigen*) and the *clearing* (*Lichtung*), the imagination reduced to its modern epistemological and representational conception is certainly insufficient to refer to that deeper unfolding-opening of being itself. What is enigmatic however is that this clarification of the ontological broadening of the imagination in its identification with the *clearing* of *enowning* in the *Beiträge* of 1936-38, occurs during the very same period as its demotion to an epochal feature of modernity in *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* of 1935-36 and *Die Zeit des Weltbildes* of 1938, both of which we examined in the previous section. We see then a duplicity in Heidegger's attitude toward the "imagination"—on the one hand relegated to its epistemological function and as a modern property, and on the other hand, ontologically broadened beyond and distanced from representational subjectivity as the *clearing*-opening of being—a duplicity which becomes maintained and explicit within the confines of a single text in the 1950s. . . . *dichterisch wohnt der Mensch*. . . ("... Poetically Man Dwells. . .").²⁸

In . . . *dichterisch wohnt der Mensch*. . . of 1951—one year after relegating the imagination in its poetic role to representation in *Die Sprache*—Heidegger re-defines that imagination in terms of its *poietic* significance and distinguishes this sense from the imagination of representation that copies or imitates in images as well as from the more mundane notion of the imagination in the sense of dream-inducing fantasy and illusion. Initially at the start

of this lecture, the imagination is downplayed as it was in *Die Sprache* of 1950. Heidegger, in discussing Hölderlin, suggests that "poetry" (or "art") is not the mere play-thing of human imagination. Referring to Hölderlin's poem that begins with the line, "In lovely blueness blooms the steeple with metal roof," Heidegger tells us that the phrase appearing in it, ". . . poetically man dwells . . ." does not "say that the poetic exhausts itself in an unreal play of poetic imagination [*poetischen Einbildungskraft*]" (VA 192/PLT 214). Imagination in this impoverished sense is an all-too-human faculty demigrated back down to its more mundane significance as fantasy. The task of surmounting the earth to fly into an unreal realm, that is, the aim of "metaphysics" in its pejorative significance, is to be left to the imagination in this sense as phantasm. What Heidegger here calls "poetry" on the other hand is that which places us "on this earth," allowing us to dwell as belonging to the earth (see VA 193, 196/PLT 215, 218). "Earthly" dwelling is thus contrasted with "metaphysical" imagination. From this perspective, even the Kantian pursuit to ground metaphysics and cognition would be a metaphysical concern, no longer of interest to Heidegger. One of the points Heidegger seems to be making during this period is to not willfully posit a ground or principle of truth but rather to let truth unfold "poetically," i.e., in its *poietic*, referring to truth understood as unconcealment (*aletheia*). This is the *other* aspect of poetic component to which Heidegger had already pointed in 1950 (*Die Sprache*) in its distinction from the representational aspect as imagination. Heidegger tells us here that the necessary "measure" for man's dwelling upon earth and amongst beings requires "poetry" as a response to this call of being, i.e., the "peal of the stillness of difference" discussed in *Die Sprache*. That is, "poetry" is the gauging of the allotted dimension of our dwelling, and as such institutes the unconcealment of being and opening-up of the world in a receptive-*letting* of this opening-unconcealing-unfolding. So in general there is an agreement here with the discussion in *Die Sprache* of poetry and *poietic* that we touched upon above.

Yet after the initial and seeming disparagement, the "imagination" within this same work comes to take on an other and less pejorative

sense. That is, Heidegger in this lecture also speaks of different senses of "imagination" by rendering it in the plural as *Ein-Bildungen* ("imaginings," "imaginings," "in-formations") and equating it with the showing of that which brings to man the measure of dwelling and to which poetry responds—the "poietic" occurrence of being.²⁹ Heidegger tells us that to the extent that poetry gathers together the "darkness and silence of the alien" with the "brightness and sound of heavenly appearances," it speaks in "images" (or "forms") (*Bilder*) and thus involves "imaginings" (*Ein-Bildungen*) of sorts (VA 205/PLT 225-26). The "image-form" (*Bild*) here however is not the image that appears in the mental act of representation. This is not "poetic imagination" (*dichterischen Einbildungskraft*) in its merely representational aspect as discussed in *Die Sprache* of 1950. Instead, in its hyphenation, the term is broadened beyond its mental-representational significance to mean the *poietic* provision of an ontological measure from that which exceeds our capacity to know—thus "dark and silent." *Bild* comes to mean that which is "formed" in a formation (*Bildung*)—no longer understood as the mere doing of the subject, not confined to mental subjectivity—that allows for the unfolding of being, the presencing of beings, and our dwelling and comparing to things. How does *Bild* here compare with the *Bild* that was the horizon of being in the earlier Heidegger? In *Vom Wesen des Grundes* of 1929, the *Bild* was of the world as a whole, which in its prior projection makes all component to, and presencing of, beings possible. Imagination in the early Kant-reading of that year (1929) had an implicit connection to that world-*Bild* projection as we discussed above. The sense of "imaginings" (*Ein-Bildungen*) here inherits that earlier broadened significance of the imagination.³⁰ Perhaps taking account of what he had noticed much earlier—that the term *Einbildungskraft* with its Kantian or epistemological conception is inadequate to designate that event of being—Heidegger has now added hyphens, while pluralizing it, as if to underscore its more literal sense: the "formations" of beings in the ongoing configuration of being's unconcealment-concealment.

Heidegger in most of his work at this stage of his life is no longer using the

a human faculty of representation would certainly fail to express that ontological opening in the face of its excess.

The spontaneity ("form") that faces receptivity ("matter") in Kant's epistemology then must presuppose their ontological unity qua "freedom" as that clearing of the ennobling event allowing man's being-(*ph*)ers, opening into that open, we always already find ourselves thrown, as existing. The excess of its de-limiting power ultimately de-stabilizes any self-possession claimed by the modern subject. Heidegger in his . . . *dichterisch wohnt der Mensch*. . . appears to have in mind that ontological receptivity of human dwelling in its founding upon, and by, that anonymous *giving of powers*, the heteronomy of "in-formations" (*Ein-Bildungen*), and in turn making possible any epistemological dichotomization between spontaneity and receptivity, form and matter, or subject and object. The positing of the free will of spontaneous subjectivity in its representational functions is then but a derivative response to the *aleithic* unfolding of being in modernity. In Heidegger's view, the authentic response of human existence *vis-à-vis* that *poiesis* of being is thus not a willing (*wollen*) but a *letting* (*lassen*). Heidegger calls such a sponsive dwelling *qua* letting, "poetic dwelling." Man dwells only by *letting* (*lassen*) being's *poietic* giving, its historical desisting, its

ongoing *aleithic* configurations of unconcealment-concealment, its "releasement" (*Gelassenheit*) of being, that opens the space for man's dwelling, "Imagination" in that broadened sense, whether as clearing (*Leistung*) or as in-formations (or "imaging," *Ein-Bildungen*). Involves that spacing of being in its alerity *withdrawn* from our willful grasping, in excess to any representational capacity of human subjectivity, as also extrahorizontal (even in the phenomenological sense), and hence not of man's possession. Within the greater expanse of the open that exceeds the horizon of our projection in its very thrownness, we do not own but are enowned (*erwiegen*), opened; we cannot will but only *let*.

In conclusion and in summary, we may discern from Heidegger's various musings that if the hylo-morphism of the imagination as an epistemic faculty *vis-à-vis* the receptivity of sense-data requires a prior unity of its spontaneity with that receptivity, ultimately indicating the ontological unity of human existence in relation to the world as being-in-the-world, then that unifying power that unfolds being in the *aleithic* formations (*poiesis*) of being, is in excess to, albeit to, any faculty or spontaneous power of subjectivity. The imparting of being in its turning to human existence, opening the world, hence cannot adequately be designated by the name of such a faculty.

ENDNOTES

1. *Vom Wesen des Grieches Hegematen* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), its English translation appears in a bilingual edition published as *The Essence of Reason*, trans. Thomas Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Also more recently it has been translated as "On the Essence of Care" by William McNeill in *Pathmarks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
2. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991, 1929), translated as *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. Richard and Ted McNeill; Indiana University Press, 1990). Quotations from this work will be cited as KPM with the page number followed by § for the German original and e for the English translation. However, whether this must be taken as an alteration of the basic standpoint is disputable and has been
3. debated. See Heidegger's letter of 1962 to Wilhelm Richardson, which is included as the preface to Richardson's *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (Gronin: Fordham University Press, 2003), xiv, where Heidegger states, "The thinking of the nothing [overruled] is a shift [change, turn] in my thinking. But this shift is not a consequence of altering the standpoint, much less of abandoning the fundamental basis, of *Being and Time*." Further quotations from this text will be identified as LR followed by the page numbers with § for the German and e for the English.
4. The two major Kant readings of this later period, are his 1935-36 lecture course on Kant published as *Die Frage nach dem Ding (What is a Thing?)* and his 1961 lecture *Kants These über das Sein* ("Kant's Thesis of Being"), Heidegger's second major book-

length work on Kant is *Die Frage nach dem Ding: zu Kants Lehre von den transszendentalen Grundsätzen* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1984), translated as *What is a Thing?* trans. W. B. Barton, Jr. and Van Dusen (Chicago: Henry Regency Co., 1967). *Kants These über das Sein*, appears as part of Heidegger's *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), 445-80. Available English translations are: "Kant's Thesis About Being," trans. Ted Klein and William Paul, *The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 4 (1973): 7-34, and a revised version of the same translation in *Pathmarks*, 337-63.

5. In his letter to Richardson in Heidegger's *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, Heidegger writes, "only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] I?" (xvii).
6. "Making" or "production" in Greek.
7. Both works appear in Heidegger's *Holzwege* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977), which will be cited as HW. They also both appear in the English translation of the entire volume of *Holwege: Off the Beaten Track* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), which will be referred to as OBT. In addition, *Die Zeit des Weltalters* also appears in English in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), referred to as QCT. *Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes* also appears in English in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), which will be referred to as PLT.
8. This lecture forms a part of *Nietzsches Lehre von Willen zur Macht als Erkenntnis* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1989) identified here as NLMW, and of *Die Wille zur Macht als Erkenntnis in Nietzsches Ernster Band* (Frankfurt: Neske, 1961) identified as NI. The English translation is *The Will to Power as Knowledge in Nietzsche Volume III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics* included in *Nietzsche Volume III and IV* (the two volumes comprising one book) (San Francisco: Harper, 1991). The Nietzsche books in German published by Klostermann will be identified by their initials and those published by Neske will be identified with a capital N followed by Roman numerals for the volume; the English will be identified by small a followed by Arabic numerals for the volume.
9. The work appears in Heidegger's *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1959). References will be identified with US. In English translation appears in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), referred to as PLT.
10. Published as *Zollnerer Seminare: Protokolle-Gespräche-Briefe* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1987). The English translation is *Zollner Seminars: Provincial-Conversations-Letters* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001). This text will be identified with a Z. And the page numbers followed by § will refer to the original German edition and followed by e will refer to the English translation.
11. For Heidegger in much of this later work, representation becomes a main characteristic of modernity. Through representation, being becomes object for the subject of representation to be thus dominated and controlled. Things in general become reduced to mental phenomena or images. Man thus becomes conceived as the center to which all beings must refer in their being. For Heidegger the prevalence of representational thinking makes us blind to the original sense of truth as the unconcealment of being and to the sense of being as presenting (*Anwesen*).
12. The whole preoccupation of grounding the knowledge of being that on Heidegger's part has led to an analytic of man's existential openness in the late 1920s then may itself be regarded as a response to that very modernist preoccupation with the subject—a perspective historically conditioned by configurations, which however by the mid-1900s is already being rendered inoperative and which thus nonetheless constitute a necessary preparation for the shift in his approach to being. On the one hand, with the focus upon the history of thinking, it is possible to view the earlier essential analytic and fundamental ontology as a consequence of human historical self-understanding interpreting being as it unfolds through time. This self-understanding is not to be construed as the self-positing of a spontaneous subjectivity but rather its reverse: "Being" into which *Being and Time* inquired can not long remain something that the human subject posits. It is rather being ramped as presence by its time-character. [that] makes the approach to being-(*ph*)ers" (Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, xvii). On the other hand, time as the individual's mortality might also be read as at least setting the stage for an understanding of time as the history of thought.
13. Thus one change noticeable in the 1930s is the shift from the "destruction" of metaphysics to its "overcoming." Reiner Schickman has expressed in this lecture, that in the context of "destruction," metaphysics was the "emptiness of Dasein itself" and it was possible to look at an author like Kant to determine what sets his system in motion, imagination, to show the being of man as what occurs in relation to the being of being. With the shift in Heidegger's later thinking, metaphysics comes to have a beginning and an end, as a period marked by the forgetting of being's presenting, within the history of Western culture. So the purpose of words like *Die Frage nach dem Ding* is to overcome this forgetfulness. See

- Rainer Schickmann, "Heidegger as Interpreter of Kant" (Lectures notes for course) (New York: New School for Social Research, n.d.), 48 and 63. Remotely after the shift in thinking, which focuses upon the "turning" (*Umdrehung*) of being (*Sein*), *Sein* itself in the knowing of man, however, the history of being may be interpreted as the time that allows itself to be temporalized into Dasein's *da* (the *(D)here* of being-*(D)here*) and be determined for cognition, to make possible the understanding of being in terms of objectivity—but which however is in light of modernity. Heidegger's existential reading of the imagination offers one's attention to the temporality of being-*(D)here* so as to prepare one for an eventual turning of one's attention to the very turning (*Umdrehung*) itself on the part of being (*Sein*) as the knowing event (*Erkenntnis*) that turns one's being-*(D)here*—in spite of the imagination's inadequacy to designate that very opening or enclosing of being. In this sense as well, while "only by way of what [Heidegger] has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. . . . This thought of [Heidegger] I becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] II" (Richardson, *Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought*, xxii).
14. That is, things are made into equipments or tools through the projection of ideas (i.e., "forms") we have of their usability upon pieces of material and through the shaping (i.e., "forming") of them accordingly.
15. Dwelling (*wohnen*) is how Heidegger describes the being-in-the-world of man in some of his later works. It involves our comportment to beings in accordance with an allotted measure that, ultimately surprising man himself, is taken from the world and the self-dwelling of beings as a whole.
16. Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1996) referred to as B; translated as *Contributions to Philosophy (From Ereignis)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999) referred to as C. This in spite of the fact that he also equates imagination with enclosing, an equation we shall examine below.
17. This rendering of the forces of reason/imagination as *dichtend* (creating/transforming) would seem to point to, but manifestly and from within the special confines of modernity, that which Heidegger calls the "poetic" (*dichtend*) in reference to *poiesis* as the anonymous impending that opens up the world. More on this below.
18. See Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hege als Ereignis Zu Heideggers "Beiträge zur Philosophie"* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994), 264, 287, 288-89. My analysis here borrows much from Herrmann's reading.
19. See ibid., 265, 267.
20. See ibid., 297.
21. *Ereignis* is a key word in Heidegger's thinking of the 1930s. In colloquial use, *Ereignis* means "event." The term has thus been variously translated as "appropriation," "the event of appropriation," or "enwinding," and may be understood as connoting an event that brings something into its "own" or "proper" domain. In Heidegger it designates the fundamental historical occurrence of being in its unfolding, as the emergence of beings into their own. But this event necessarily realises the sense of a uniqueness and singularity of happening that escapes conceptualization in its immediate withdrawal for the sake of what (i.e., beings) it grants. As such it precludes appropriation or "owning" by man. By *Ereignis* Heidegger then does not mean that man "owns" being or "owns" even his own being but rather that man's being is "appropriated" or "enwined" (*ereignet*) by being in this very event. Etymologically, the term also has the sense of "bringing into view." Hence for Heidegger *Ereignis* has the sense of an occurrence that brings something into the open, which he often speaks of as the opening. See Thomas Sheehan's discussion of this topic in "A Paradigmatic Shift in Heidegger Research," *Continental Philosophy Review* 34 (June 2001): 196-98.
22. See Von Herrmann, *Hege als Ereignis*, 305.
23. *Wegenerwärtigung* is commonly translated as "envisaging," but here the term has a special Heideggerian significance.
24. This lecture (. . . *dichtend wohnt der Mensch* . . .) is published in Heidegger's *Aufträge und Aufsätze* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2000), identified as VA. The English translation (. . . "Poetically Man Dwells . . .") is in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), identified as PLT.
25. On this see John Sallis' discussion in *Epoches* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 185-86 and 189. His take on the imagination in general in Heidegger however is somewhat different from mine.
26. Furthermore this broadening of both imagination and poetry may be behind another association of the two in the 1934-35 lectures on Hölderlin, which initially appears quite mundane: "Dichten—das vollzieht sich vor allem mit Hilfe der Einbildungskraft" ("Poetizing—this is accomplished before anything else with the help of the imagination"), Heidegger's *Hölderlins Hymnen "Carmen" und "Der Rhein"* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1980), 26. The imagination here is then man's receptive response to the unfolding of being.

27. In fact this provision of the measure of dwelling upon earth from the aliveness of being—to which poetry is a response and on the basis of which, Hölderlin states that there really is no measure on earth—reminds one of what Heidegger elsewhere

28. In his other readings of Hölderlin speaks of as "becoming home" in being unhomely: "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit" appears in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976); and is translated as "On the Essence of Truth" in *Pathmarks* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

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