Part III
Perceiving Others and Narrating Selves
Theories of Mind and Literature
8 The Phenomenology of Person Perception

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INTRODUCTION

Recent discussions of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science have focused on the role of perception in facilitating social understanding. Some theorists, drawing upon phenomenological philosophy, argue that perception is our primary mechanism for understanding others. Call this the “direct perception” (DP) approach to social cognition. DP is the claim that we often have direct perceptual contact with another person’s thoughts, emotions, intentions, etc., within their behavior. Some DP proponents frame their view as an alternative to theory of mind (ToM) explanations in philosophy and cognitive science. ToM explanations appeal to extraperceptual mechanisms like theoretical inference and/or simulation to explain how we access another’s mental life and interpret and predict their behavior. From the perspective of DP, however, these extraperceptual mechanisms are largely unnecessary. Perception alone is generally “smart” (Gallagher) enough to allow us to get on smoothly with others.

First, I briefly survey theoretical perspectives within recent social cognition research. Next, I elucidate the phenomenological origins of DP to provide some historical context and clarify how DP purports to offer an alternative to the ToM paradigm. Finally, I consider some potential problems for DP and briefly clarify how it might assist the ongoing debate. I also touch on the role of narrative and literature.

THEORY THEORY AND SIMULATION THEORY

For the past twenty years or so, the social cognition landscape has been dominated by the theory of mind (ToM) perspective. Within this literature, social cognition refers to our ability to attribute mental states to ourselves and to others, and to use this ability to interpret and predict their behavior. Primatologists Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term “theory of mind” to describe this ability. It is, they argue, an inferential ability—an ability to infer from observed instances of behavior to the
existence of unobserved mental states. Two competing positions quickly
established the framework for the ToM Mind debate: theory theory and
simulation theory.

According to theory theory (TT), our social-cognitive competence rests
on our possessing mental state concepts (“believing,” “desiring,” “see-
ing,” “intending,” etc.) along with an understanding of how mental states
causally interact with each other and with behavior. This understanding
is equivalent to the possession of a tacit theory of how the mind works.
Within the TT literature, disagreement emerged over whether this the-
ory of other minds is innate, emerging from specialized bits of neural
hardware (“modules”) dedicated to theory of mind processing (Baron-
Cohen; Fodor; Leslie, “Pretense”), or rather something that emerges and
gets refined over time as we collect “data” from our ongoing interactions
with others (Gopnik and Wellman; Perner, “Many Faces,” Under-
standing). According to TT, mindreading is an exercise in theoretical reasoning
(Ravenscroft). It requires an ability to represent the mental states of oth-
ers, an ability that rests on the possession of a generalized “theory” about
the relation between mind and behavior.

According to Simulation Theory (ST), we draw upon the inner resources
of our own psychology to mentally represent, or simulate, the mental states
and processes of others (Gordon, “Folk Psychology”; Heal; Goldman). The
inner resources that guide our own behavior can, with suitable adjustments,
be modified to work as representations of others (Gordon, “Mental Simu-
lation”). For example, I can use imaginative projection to consciously and
voluntarily put myself into the “mental shoes” of another person in order to
explain and predict his or her behavior (Currie and Ravenscroft). Since this
simulation is something that I willfully initiate, it has been termed “high-
level simulation” (Goldman). “Low-level simulation” (Goldman) offers a
deflationary alternative. According to this view, simulation is an automatic
and unconscious process underwritten by specific neural mechanisms that
become active in response to the observed behavior of others (Gallese; Gal-
lese and Goldman; Hurley). For example, “mirror neurons” (Rizzolatti et
al.) in the premotor cortex and posterior parietal cortex fire both when an
agent executes and observes an intentional action or emotional expression.
According to this deflationary view, our brains are active as if we were
performing the same behavior; they generate an internal “embodied simu-
lation” (Gallese and Sinigaglia) of the observed action or expression, which
is the basis of our ability to understand others.

So how does the phenomenological approach to other minds—what I’m
calling “DP”—offer an alternative to the TT and ST? By challenging two
core assumptions concerning the relation between minds and the nature of
their encounter. First, DP challenges the supposition that there is, neces-
sarily, an ontological and epistemic gap between minds—a gap that can
be overcome only by appealing to bridging principles like mental state
attribution, theoretical inference, or simulation. Second, DP challenges the
supposition that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owner. I consider these suppositions in more detail.

PHENOMENOLOGY, EMPATHY, AND THE ENCOUNTER WITH OTHERS

Seeing Mind in Behavior

Phenomenology is concerned with elucidating the character of experience. It considers the structures of consciousness and subjectivity from the first-person perspective of the “I.” Intersubjectivity—a consideration of how the “I” stands in and relates to the common space of the “we”—has traditionally also been a core concern of phenomenological philosophy. Classical phenomenologists insist that the basic structures of subjectivity are understood only against the backdrop of a shared intersubjective world.

As Alfred Schutz notes, it is always the case that “[t]he world is now experienced by the individual as shared by his fellow creatures, in short, as a social world” (139). Maurice Merleau-Ponty speaks of intersubjectivity as a kind of “anonymous life” ensuring that we individually relate to “the social world, not as an object or sum of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of existence […] which we carry about inseparably with us before any objectification” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 421). Similarly, Husserl argues that experience puts us in contact with a world already saturated with the presence of others: “Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient ontological foundation [Seinsboden], out of which everything objective (the totality of objectively real entities, but also every objective ideal world) draws its sense and its validity” (qtd. in Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology 111).

Phenomenology is not merely concerned with the nature of transcendental intersubjectivity, however—that is, the way that a shared world comprising common languages, meanings, artifacts, environments, and norms shapes different aspects of our natural life. Additionally, all of the major phenomenologists have much to say about concrete intersubjectivity: our experience of seeing others within our face-to-face encounters.¹

Within the phenomenological tradition, this experience is often characterized as a form of empathy. Empathy is said to be the means by which we secure basic access to others as minded agents. For some phenomenologists, empathy is a unique, irreducible mode of intentionality—an “act of perceiving sui generis” (Stein 11)—that puts us in perceptual contact with the mental properties (beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions) of other people. Husserl, for example, argues that “we intuitively ascribe to (einschauen) the other person his lived experiencing, and we do this completely without mediation and without consciousness of an impressional or imaginative
picturing” (Basic Problems 84). Likewise, Scheler—who labels his view “a perceptual theory of other minds” (220)—famously insists that we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person’s joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not “perception,” for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is merely a “complex of sensations,” and that there is certainly no sensation of another person’s mind nor any stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts. (260)

Merleau-Ponty also endorses this view. He argues that anger, shame, hate and love are not psychic facts hidden at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside. They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind them. (Sense 52–53)

Against the picture of mind as an intracranial phenomenon, phenomenologists insist that there is a sense in which we directly see aspects of another’s mind in his or her concrete bodily presence—specifically, as embodied in his or her expressions and intentional actions. Empathy gives us this direct access.

A Perceptual Approach to Empathy

This is not to suggest that the phenomenological tradition offers a unified model of intersubjectivity and empathy. In fact, the tradition is notable for the diversity of its approaches to these topics one finds within it (Zahavi, Husserl’s Phenomenology, “Empathy”). Still, the point, rather, is that the phenomenological tradition is largely united in its insistence that our access to the mental life of others is a direct (i.e., unmediated) perception-based form of access.

This unity stems from shared opposition to an alternative picture of empathy introduced by the British psychologist Edward Titchener’s use of the term “empathy” in 1909 as an English translation of the German word einfühlung (“feeling into”). Einfühlung is rooted in philosophical aesthetics. It was used by German philosophers to describe our ability to imaginatively “feel into” works of art and nature. However, it was the German philosopher Theodor Lipps who broadened the term to encompass our experience of others—an “instinct of empathy” that he took
to rest on imitation. When I see another’s bodily expression of anger, say, I reproduce this anger—I imitate their expression (perhaps only internally; it need not be overtly expressed) and experience the feeling of anger myself—but then project this feeling onto the person who first evoked it. For Lipps, empathy is therefore a stepwise process of imitation plus projection; it enables us to recognize others as enjoying an inner life similar in relevant aspects to our own.²

However, phenomenologists reject Lipps’s imitation-plus-projection model of empathy. One objection is that, as Scheler observes, we are capable of seeing and understanding expressions we cannot imitate. For example, “we can understand the experience of animals, though even in ‘tendency’ we cannot imitate their manner of expression; for instance when a dog expresses its joy by barking and wagging its tail, or a bird by twittering” (11).³ Another objection comes from Stein, who notes that Lipps’s view harbors “a discrepancy between the phenomenon to be explained and that actually explained” (23). All we are warranted to infer from Lipps’s model is that imitation confers knowledge of my experience—it “only distinguishes our own from foreign experience through affiliation with different bodies”—but it remains unclear how, via imitation, I may “arrive at the phenomenon of foreign experience” (23, emphasis mine; see also Zahavi, “Empathy” 291–92).

A perceptual account of empathy, phenomenologists insist, circumvents this difficulty. Perception is always an encounter with otherness, with a transcendent object of or for perception. The encounter with an alien object, an alterity, is thus built into the very structure of our perceptual contact with the world. So, by detaching Lipps’s “imitation condition” from the perceptual dimension of his model, we arrive at an explanatorily cleaner rendering of how it is we encounter another’s mental life—one that has the added benefit of also explaining how it is that we see it as another’s. Simply put: we perceive it directly as theirs, as the experience of an alter ego.

But there is more to it than this. Our empathic encounter with other minds, phenomenologists further insist, is a distinct form of perceptual intentionality—distinct from the manner through which we perceptually encounter tables, paintings, and sunsets. This is because, although I take the other as an object of experience (i.e., as an alter ego), this description does not exhaust the character of my encounter. I do not perceptually relate to another person as I do an object simpliciter. Rather, my perceptual relation to other minds is (1) one of subject-to-subject, and thus (2) part of the character of this relation is to perceive the other as a unique kind of object—again, as a “subjective object” or first-person perspective—necessarily transcending my ability to wholly perceive it. I experience others as harboring an interiority that forever eludes my perceptual grasp.⁴

The phenomenological approach to empathy therefore preserves what we might term the “transcendence intuition”: the idea that others are
concrete loci of mental phenomena that manifest with a first-person perspective unique to them, an inner vantage point that necessarily transcends my ability to perceptually reach it. Nevertheless, this approach simultaneously does justice to a competing intuition. Call this the “immanence intuition”: the idea that, despite the transcendence of another's first-person perspective, we nevertheless seem to directly see features of their mentality immanent in their expressive behavior. We thus see other minds as simultaneously hidden and revealed—as both inaccessible and accessible. As Husserl observes, “[t]he character of the existent ‘other’ has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible” (Cartesian Meditations 114). Other minds are given to us, experientially, with a particular complexity that warrants assigning them a unique mode of empathic perceptual intentionality.

In sum, phenomenology insists that we see features of another’s mental life embodied within his or her expressive actions. Perception puts us in direct contact with other minds. As we will now see, this idea has found new purchase in recent debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.5

SOCIAL COGNITION, THEORY OF MIND, AND DP

Mind the Gap

On one hand, it seems intuitive to posit an ontological and epistemic gap between minds. My mind certainly feels as though it’s ontologically distinct from yours (recall the earlier discussion of the “transcendence intuition”). I have a first-person perspective on the world that is unique to me; likewise, you. Moreover, my mind is at any moment populated with various contents that you know nothing about; likewise, you. These facts seem to follow from a further fact: we cannot see other minds. They are hidden behind layers of skin and skull.

Within the philosophical and empirical literature, this latter assumption has the status of an accepted truth requiring no independent argument. For example, Alan Leslie writes that “[o]ne of the most important powers of the human mind is to conceive of and think about itself and other minds. Because the mental states of others (and indeed ourselves) are completely hidden from the senses, they can only ever be inferred” (“Children’s Understanding” 164). In a recent handbook of social psychology, Nicholas Epley and Adam Waytz insist that “[p]eople do not have direct information about others’ mental states and must therefore base their inferences on whatever information about others’ mental states they do have access to. This requires a leap from observable behavior to unobservable mental states that is so common and routine that people often seem unaware that they are making a leap” (499).6
This pervasive acceptance of the unobservability of other minds within ToM approaches is reinforced by noting the explanatory character of both TT and ST. Both TT and ST claim to offer characterizations of the mechanisms enabling us to move from observable behavior to unobservable mental states. Since it is commonly assumed that perception is not up to the task, additional extraperceptual mechanisms are postulated. As we’ve already seen in the second section, however, phenomenologists insist that we directly observe aspects of another’s mind in his or her bodily presence. They further argue that because we can directly see aspects of another’s mental life, there is no need to posit a necessary, irreducible ontological and epistemic gap between my mind and that of another.

Is this an idea worth taking seriously? We’ve already noted the unintuitive character of the claim that we see other minds. But a closer look reveals this idea to be more plausible than it perhaps initially appears.

The Hybrid Mind in Context

Consider the idea that behavior (smiling, gesturing, jumping for joy, etc.) expresses mental phenomena. This is a crucial part of DP. Unfortunately, phenomenologists are not as clear on this point as one might like. There are a number of different ways that overt behavior might be said to express mental phenomena, not all of which are compatible with DP. Detailed discussion of this point lies beyond the scope of this essay. What I want to do instead is to suggest a rendering of “expression” that makes it clear how behavior can be said to make some mental phenomena available for direct perceptual contact by others. This rendering is consistent with phenomenologists’ defense of DP. It is also supported by different strands of empirical research.

DP claims that overt actions such as smiling, scowling, shaking one’s fists, gesturing while speaking, counting on one’s fingers, reaching for a beer, etc. give us direct perceptual access to other minds. Some mental features of others are embodied within the expressive behavior we see. Call this the “constitutive” sense of bodily expression: the idea that certain bodily actions are expressive of mind in that they actually constitute proper parts of some mental phenomena. To see these actions is thus to see part of another’s mind, not merely the subsequent causal effects of their his or her states. Put another way, mind is hybrid: it consists of both inner (neural, physiological, and phenomenological) and external (behavioral, environmental) processes. We thus might be said to have perceptual access to externally realized parts of another’s hybrid mind.

This is, I suggest, the sense of “expression” that DP proponents ought to adopt. Discussions of distributed cognition can help us get a firmer grip on this idea (Clark, Supersizing; Donald; Hutchins; Kirsh, “Distributed Cognition”; Menary, Extended Mind; Wilson and Clark). Consider first the case of memory. Our onboard biological capacity for memory is,
while impressive, nevertheless fairly limited. We are continually running up against its limits. So what do we do? Simply put, we recruit the world to help us remember. We exploit the environment as an external storage by offloading information onto it, which allows us to remember more things more efficiently. The process of remembering is thus partially distributed onto the environment.

For example, smartphones and portable calendars help us remember appointments and contact information; sticky notes fixed to computer monitors prompt recall of important to-do items; social and cultural practices and institutions, such as specific rituals or legal systems, encode historical narratives, memories, and shared procedures. These “exograms” or external representations complement the brain’s own internal memory traces or “engrams” (Donald 308–33). They don’t do the thinking for us, of course. Rather, they enhance the naked brain’s computational power by offering a representational format, storage capacity, and flexibility of access unavailable to the unaided brain. Our skillful relation to external representations thus bootstraps our native cognitive capacities. When we access these external representations, “the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right” (Clark and Chalmers 8).

In virtue of the distinctive and complementary causal role external entities play in helping us store, sort, and sift through information, the process of remembering is distributed across brain, body, and world. We don’t just use external representations to help us remember better. We also use them to reason, navigate, and plan more effectively. The humble pencil and paper allows us to solve mathematical problems that would otherwise elude us (McClelland and Rumelhart). Strategically organizing the spatial configuration of our workspace (e.g., lining up cooking ingredients in the order we need them) enhances workflow by reducing our computational burden, allowing us to focus more intently on other parts of the task at hand (Kirsh, “Intelligent”; see also Krueger, “Extended Cognition”; Scribner). Gesturing while solving mathematical problems can help us utilize more effective strategies (Goldin-Meadow). The navigation of large-scale objects like warships requires the coordination of multiple individuals and artifacts; representations (e.g., the ship’s bearing) propagate across a variety of distributed external media within the system, including both tools and other people (Hutchins). Dancers use gestures as external representations to materially encode a posture or sequence of steps, which affords the opportunity for others to scrutinize the shape, dynamics, emotion, and spatial elements of a phrase (Kirsh, “Thinking” 2864). This distributed process is a critical part of group coordination and planning.

There are many other examples one might cite. The salient point is that they all highlight how remembering, reasoning, navigating, and planning are examples of cognitive processes that span brain-body-world couplings. And to return to the earlier point: the centrality of coupling in distributing
various cognitive processes onto the world reinforces the hybrid nature of mind. Parts of these processes are, of course, intracranial. However, parts of the cognitive process are spatially located outside the head, available for public scrutiny.

Of course, we don’t just reason and remember. We feel things, too. There is evidence suggesting that some emotional and affective processes likewise have a hybrid structure. It is clear that emotions generate, or partially consist in, internal bodily states of arousal and our awareness of these states (Damasio; LeDoux; Prinz). It may also be the case that some emotions at least partially consist in our evaluative judgments or appraisals of the objects or events that trigger them (Nussbaum; Solomon). In this sense part of the emotion is internal to the subject. Nevertheless, many emotions have a bodily expression that others can see: facial expressions, gestures, and whole-body expressions. And this bodily expression—the emotion’s social profile—appears to be, at least in some cases, a constitutive part of the emotion itself.

Consider facial expressions. There is evidence that we practice facial expressions in the womb (Reissland, Francis, Mason, and Lincoln). However, we rarely smile on our own; smiles occur mainly in social contexts and thus have a social function (Kraut and Johnston; Jones, Collins, and Hong): they relay intentions to further ongoing interactions, elicit positive reciprocal responses, convey appraisals, and promote cooperation and social cohesion (VanSwearingen et al.). Our facial expressions play a crucial role in mediating these social processes. But they also appear to be part of the emotion itself.

Moebius Syndrome is a bilateral form of congenital facial paralysis (Briegel). People with Moebius cannot make any facial expression whatsoever. They often report that the phenomenal intensity of at least some of their emotions is diminished in light of their inability to facially express them (Cole; Cole and Spalding). Further support comes from individuals who’ve voluntarily undergone Botox injections, which inhibits facial expressions (i.e., a kind of voluntary Moebius Syndrome). These individuals report a decrease in the felt intensity of emotional experiences requiring the paralyzed muscles (Davis, Senghas, Brandt, and Ochsner), along with increased difficulty in processing emotional language referring to emotions requiring these muscles (Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, and Davidson). Many other studies suggest that manipulating facial expressions generates emotion-specific autonomic activity and produces a corresponding change in emotional phenomenology (Davis, Senghas, and Ochsner; Laird; Niedenthal). It appears, then, that the facial expression is part of the external scaffolding needed for the experiential realization of certain emotions.

The upshot of this discussion is that many of our cognitive and affective processes are distributed across the tangible, visible body—and perhaps even the world itself. Mind is hybrid, consisting of both inner and outer processes. The outer processes take the form of actions that manipulate the
informational structure of our environments, as well as various expressive actions. Like internal neural activity, these aspects are constitutive parts of some mental phenomena; when they are missing our cognitive and behavioral competence drops accordingly. And if minds are indeed hybrid, then, others have perceptual access to the external processes of our hybrid mind. They can see (bits of) our mind in our actions and expressive behavior.

In sum, this way of thinking about the mind, I suggest, helps us get a better grip on the phenomenological claim that, at least at times, we directly see aspects of another’s mentality. And so we don’t have to rely exclusively on extraperceptual mechanisms such as theories or simulations because parts of the minds we want to access are publically available, ripe for seeing.11

PROBLEMS FOR DP?

A problem with DP, the critic might suggest, is that it has a fairly limited explanatory scope.12 Clearly there are many instances when perception alone is unable to deliver sufficient social information. Perhaps I am interacting with someone in less than ideal conditions, such as looking at them from far away or in poor lighting. Or perhaps I am trying to sort out ambiguous behavior or complex mental states like ulterior motives, irony, jealousy, or the like—states that don’t necessarily have a concrete bodily-expressive signature. Such situations tend to be the focus of much imaginative literature. In these cases theorizing, simulating, or some combination of the two might therefore be needed for me to interpret and predict another’s behavior. Perception can reach only a small part of the complex topography of our social life.

It’s not clear that the DP defender needs to entirely disagree with the spirit of this objection. In the hands of even its most ardent current defenders, DP is not offered as a comprehensive theory of social cognition (see Gallagher 540; Zahavi, “Empathy” 551). So, DP need not necessarily be seen as offered in place of TT or ST. Rather, DP acknowledges that perception is only one tool in our social toolkit. It may be the central tool—but arguing for this point is not inconsistent with conceding that we sometimes draw upon other tools to navigate the complexities of our social life. But very often we don’t have to precisely because perception is so effective in giving us direct access to salient information. In stressing the necessity of extraperceptual mechanisms, however, the ToM paradigm has tended to underestimate the extent to which our basic social cognitive competence is carried by perceptual processes; the explanations generated have, accordingly, been too narrow in scope. They have also fundamentally misconstrued the character of how we engage with others in a very basic and immediate way (i.e., a way that doesn’t entail sophisticated cognitive prediction and/or explanation of mental states).13 In remaining open to the
plurality of ways we potentially engage with and understand others, DP encourages greater sensitivity to the complexities of our social life.

Nevertheless, the critic of DP might still suggest that DP targets a different *explanandum* than TT or ST—hence the different accounts. They might insist, in other words, that DP is concerned with social cognition at the experiential or personal level—not surprising given phenomenology’s abiding interest in consciousness. In contrast, TT and ST offer characterizations of the subpersonal mechanisms guiding social interaction, the cognitive or neural “machinery” that underwrites our personal-level experiences of others. But this machinery, like the physiological machinery enabling digestion or respiration, lies outside the scope of conscious awareness. So, DP’s criticisms are off the mark since it is working at a different level of description than either TT or ST. The critic might further argue that this personal-level/subpersonal-level distinction supports the primacy of ToM-style explanations, especially in considering literature’s exploration of the challenges and dangers that misunderstanding others poses. The former is derivative of the latter; experiences emerge from causally antecedent brain processes, and thus the latter ought to be given explanatory precedence.

The DP proponent can say several things in response. First, it is true that DP is not looking to offer characterizations of the subpersonal mechanisms of social cognition, insofar as that project involves speculating about neural activity or other forms of information processing beneath the threshold of conscious awareness. Shannon Spaulding, a helpful and thorough critic of DP, is therefore simply wrong when she suggests that DP defenders think the role of phenomenology “is to dictate the nature of operative sub-personal processes” (131).

It should be noted, however, that ToM proponents themselves have not always been faithful to this personal/subpersonal distinction. At times, their explanations are offered as applying to both levels. For example, Alvin Goldman’s version of high-level ST—what he used to call his “introspectionist” view—consists of the following features:

High-level mindreading is mindreading with one or more of the following features: (a) it targets mental states of a relatively complex nature, such as propositional attitudes; (b) some components of the mindreading process are subject to voluntary control; and (c) the process has some degree of accessibility to consciousness. (147)

As Goldman (and others—see Stich and Nichols; Jeannerod and Pacherie 128–29) makes clear, certain features of the mind reading process are realized at the personal level in that they are accessible to conscious awareness and voluntary control. If so, the claim that TT and ST are necessarily working at different descriptive levels than DP is off the mark.

Yet the DP defender can still grant the point that, generally speaking, TT and ST are in fact working at a different level of explanation while
still asserting DP’s relevance, for it seems odd to suggest that the phenomenology of certain cognitive processes has no relevance whatsoever when it comes to understanding the nature of those same processes (see Spaulding 131). Social cognition theorists should not accept this sort of unquestioned reductionism. And phenomenologists likewise ought not to accept the implication that theirs is a purely descriptive project of taxonomy and classification devoid of causal-explanatory potency.

Consider phenomenological psychopathology. Phenomenological methods allow us to get a clearer grip on the experiential dimension of the patient’s disorder—how schizophrenia, say, is lived through—as well as the structures or modes of consciousness that allow the disorder to manifest the way that it does. These descriptions allow researchers to better understand the character of a given disorder and make important diagnostic distinctions. But they can also contribute to causal explanations, too.

For example, charting symptom progression in schizophrenia is not simply a matter of isolating neurological abnormalities. This is because phenomenological features of the patient’s subjective life exacerbate the experiential fragmentation distinctive of the schizophrenic illness; they “provide both the motivation and the field of possibility for the progressive symptomatic developments” (Parnas and Sass 270). Certain causal explanations require both neurobiological and phenomenological elements (see also McClamrock). And even in cases where phenomenology need not be part of specific causal explanations, it can still provide helpful diagnostic clues about where to look for the relevant subpersonal mechanisms. Neuroscientific work on empathy and mirror neurons, for example, appeals centrally to individuals’ experience of others’ intentional actions. Both what they see and how they see it—their phenomenology—constrain the target explanandum at the subpersonal level (see Gallese).

Our concrete experience of others—the phenomenology of our personal-level awareness when we encounter them in their bodily presence—is unquestionably part of what needs to be accounted for. It may also play an important causal role in shaping the ontogenesis of various subpersonal mechanisms that are brought to bear upon this encounter, especially in early infancy (Hobson; Reddy).

NARRATIVE, LITERATURE, AND THE HYBRID MIND

I’ve indicated how phenomenological approaches to empathy and social cognition—the view I’ve labeled “DP”—can function as a useful supplement to ToM approaches. While it need not replace either TT or ST, I suggest, DP can nonetheless be of use in clarifying how perception puts us in direct contact with features of others’ mentality. This intimate perceptual relation must be in place before TT and ST accounts can get any explanatory traction.
Let me conclude by briefly considering the role of narrative and literature in this debate. Since DP does not purport to offer a comprehensive model of social cognition, this leaves open the possibility that we can—and indeed do—sometimes use other extraperceptual means to understand others. Literature not only reflects upon the use of such tools but also constitutes one. For a vivid example of how this is so, return to the case of Moebius Syndrome. People with Moebius Syndrome often report experiencing social difficulty. They tend to show more traits of inhibition, introversion, and feelings of social inadequacy and inferiority than a matched control group (Briegel). Part of this difficulty stems from the way that others treat them; many, it must be said, are simply ill-equipped to deal with facial difference. But since people with Moebius don’t display the expressive cues the rest of us do, even well-intentioned individuals may find interacting with them a challenge. This is because a crucial perceptual component is missing: the expressive cues provided by facial animation. As a consequence, others may be thrown off by this lack of facial expressivity and likewise fail to return their own facial cues: mirrored facial patterns that are normally a central and spontaneous part of our face-to-face interaction (Dimberg; Krueger and Michael). Deprived of this perceptual component, both parties struggle—and the interaction breaks down.

One of the strategies people with Moebius employ to overcome these difficulties is to explicitly study other people. They report explicitly adopting a kind of ToM stance—consciously scrutinizing other faces, gestures, actions, and interactive patterns, and intentionally incorporating what they see into their own social practices. Literature becomes an important tool here. Children with Moebius, for example, tend to be avid readers. They report learning about emotions and sociality from studying the narratives of characters in books (Cole and Spalding). These narratives fill in some of the details absent in their own social experience.

Of course, this strategy is not unusual, despite the unusual physical condition that in this instance motivates it. We are all surrounded by stories from the moment we’re born. And much of our social education comes from the myriad stories, fables, novels, plays, poems, songs, and myths that organize our sociocultural milieu. These narratives aren’t just entertainment; they have a social-cognitive heuristic value. They familiarize us with different character prototypes, social situations, and actions and intentions (Gallagher and Hutto)—psychological exemplars that often go well beyond those we perceptually encounter in our own lives.14

Narratives—particularly the kind we find in literature—thus codify social prototypes and normative templates in an enduring representational medium (see Hogan in this volume). And this externalization process—putting psychological exemplars into narrative form (e.g., by crafting complex characters like Jay Gatsby, Leopold Bloom, Clarissa Dalloway, or Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov)—results in determinate public objects that can be subjected to rational assessment and various kinds of metacognitive
scrutiny (e.g., thinking about other’s thinking, as well as thinking about our thinking about others’ thinking) (Clark “Magic Words”). Simply put, narratives and character prototypes are critical tools to help us understand others. Their enduring representational format can take us well beyond the social information we get by perceptually engaging with others. In this way do narratives open up new and expanded interpretive spaces in which we glean further insight into the complex motives, intentions, desires, and beliefs we find in others.15

Framed thusly, literary narratives might usefully be thought of as aspects of the socially extended (i.e., hybrid) mind—a strongly embodied conception of mind I’ve suggested ought to be a central aspect of DP, for narratives and literature are not only tools for transferring information. More radically, they are external environmental representations that (at least potentially) structure thought and action. The rich psychological information housed within literary narratives and the various characters that they are composed of invite careful scrutiny. But equally as important is the fact that the narratives and literary characters we study not only hone our metacognitive (i.e., ToM) abilities but also affect changes within our social environment. That is, they (potentially, at least) shape what we see in others and how we come to see it. Different narratives housing different psychological exemplars thus equip us with an adaptive flexibility that assists our practical navigation throughout the complexities of the social world. The thought and action-structuring information housed in narrative and literature can in this way complement and enrich the information accessible in direct social perception.16

NOTES

1. This is not to suggest that vision is the sole modality by which we develop awareness of others. Congenitally blind individuals lack visual access to others but are nevertheless full-fledged participants in the social world. Our auditory encounter with other voices, for example—as Husserl notes—can play a founding role in shaping the infant’s sensitivity to the social world (Husserl, Ideas 101, n.1). Additionally, very young infants spend more time touching and being touched than they do seeing; the tactile modality may in fact be our earliest port of entry into the social world. However, all of the major phenomenologists tend to focus on the role of visual perception in constituting our access to others. In this essay I will simply follow suit.

2. Alvin Goldman advocates a contemporary version of Lipps’s view, which he calls a “simulation-plus-projection” view of mind reading. See also Blake’s account of neural mirroring (this volume).

3. One might respond by pointing out that Scheler has overstated the differences between human and nonhuman expressions of emotions. There are surely some salient dynamic and morphological similarities between how humans and nonhuman animals bodily express happiness, say (buoyant gait; relaxed, loose-limbed posture; bright-eyed attentiveness), that could support...
the possibility of at least a coarse-grained form of imitation-plus-projection. Darwin (1872) makes a similar point.

4. Tables, trees, and sunsets, too, have properties (occluded backsides, micropysical structures, etc.) that elude my perceptual grasp—but they do not do so necessarily. In other words, by changing my perspective on them and revealing their previously occluded backside or enhancing my perceptual faculties (looking through a microscope), I can bring these hidden properties to perceptual presence. I cannot do the same thing with another's first-person perspective, however, since the difference between my perspective and his or hers is constitutional (i.e., necessary). But just because another's first-person perspective is necessarily hidden from me, it does not follow that every aspect of his or her mental life is likewise hidden. This latter claim is precisely what the phenomenological approach to empathy looks to challenge.

5. It is worth pausing to consider this question: how, if at all, does the subject's social-historical context shape his or her capacity for (direct) social perception? This question is all the more pressing given recent work in cross-cultural psychology and anthropology suggesting that human cognitive functions differ markedly across cultures (Ansari). Cultural changes even appear to affect low-level processes such as basic perceptual processing (Goh and Park; Nisbett and Miyamoto) and attentional control (Hedden, Ketay, Aron, Markus, and Gabrieli). For example, people from different cultural backgrounds are differentially sensitive to visual illusions such as the Müller-Lyer illusion (Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan; Segall, Campbell, and Herskovits); and they exhibit differences in saccadic eye movements when viewing pictures of natural scenes (Chua, Boland, and Nisbett). Phenomenologists who have paid particular attention to the cultural-historical dimension of social perception (e.g., Schutz) seem to assume that cultural factors can assist in disambiguating behavior but that our direct perceptual (i.e., empathic) access to others as minded is, nevertheless, a fundamental mode of encounter independent of cultural-historical particularities. It may be that direct social perception is, indeed, universal. Nevertheless, perhaps there is also a sense in which what we actually see in others, as minded, is determined in a fundamental way by cultural factors (see, for example, Chiao et al.). This is an important issue that warrants more attention than I can here give it. I am grateful to the editors for raising this point.

6. In his insightful essay, Howard Mancing (this volume) suggests that defenders of DP (e.g., Shaun Gallagher) misrepresent theory and simulation theorists as adopting a stance characterized by Cartesian mind-body dualism.” I don't think this is quite right. I do agree that there has been a tendency in the critical literature to reduce TT and ST to straw man caricatures and crude parodies (although I'm not sure that Gallagher is guilty of this sin). Nevertheless, no proponent of DP, as far as I know, would claim that TT and/or ST entail substance dualism; few philosophers of mind and even fewer cognitive scientists regard it as a serious option. Rather, to reiterate: what is at stake is the visibility of other minds. In other words, the question-able supposition (that is, from the perspective of DP) is a kind of internalism: the idea that mental phenomena are “unobservable, internal mental states” (Saxe, Carey, and Kanwisher 88) spatially confined to the biological borders of the subject. Their metaphysical nature is not important, if for no other reason than because materialism is widely presupposed. What is important, rather, is the fact that so many discussions of social cognition within the ToM literature explicitly frame their analysis as proceeding from this basic “unobservability supposition,” as the provided quotes indicate. From the perspective of DP, it is important to dwell on this point since this
founding supposition fundamentally shapes the kind of (extraperceptual) explanations ToM gives us.

7. See Krueger and Overgaard.

8. See Menary, Cognitive Integration, for an extended defense of the hybrid mind. See also Donald.

9. Controversial claims such as these have not gone unchallenged. See, for example, Adams and Aizawa, and Rupert.

10. See Krueger, “Emotions,” for further discussion of the distributed character of many emotions.

11. Nothing I've said thus far, however, suggests that DP, TT, and ST are necessarily incompatible. More on this ahead.

12. There are a number of other good objections one might make against DP. I simply don't have the space to consider them all here. For critical evaluations of DP, see, for example, Currie, De Jaegher, Herschbach, Jacob, and Spaulding. For responses to some of these objections, see, for example, Hutto (“Limits,” “Interacting?”), Krueger, “Seeing Mind,” Krueger and Overgaard, Zahavi, “Empathy,” and Zahavi and Gallagher.

13. A consequence of this misconstrual, the DP proponent would argue, has been a failure of ToM approaches to fully recognize that even newborns and very young infants have a fairly robust level of social sensitivity and interactive competence—what is often referred to as “primary intersubjectivity” (Trevarthen)—despite lacking the intellectual abilities needed for theorizing or high-level simulation (see Leudar and Costall; see also Reddy).

14. Gallagher and Hutto call this view the Narrative Practice Hypothesis (NPH). They argue that NPH supplants the need to posit the existence of theories and/or simulations (i.e., standard currency in the ToM economy). Rather, children's repeated encounters with sociocultural narratives is sufficient to give them an understanding of what makes others tick psychologically—as well as a sensitivity to the norms and reasons that inform the various social roles that pervade our day-to-day environments. This narrative competency, they further argue, builds upon a more primitive perceptual grasp of the meaning of others' expressions within face-to-face interaction (i.e., what I've been calling “DP”). I have some doubts about whether NPH truly supplants the need to posit any ToM-style mechanisms whatsoever. But that is a discussion for another time. What is interesting about NPH in this context is the fact that, even among those arguing that direct perception is our primary means of accessing others' mentality, literature and narrative are still afforded a prominent role in explaining how it is that we develop the more sophisticated interpretive capacities that characterize distinctly human social cognition. See Belmonte for a helpful discussion of ToM in the context of narrative theory and literary criticism.

15. For further discussions of how this is so, see, for example, see Bruhn, and Mancing (this volume).

16. For a defense of similar ideas, see Clark, “Magic Words,” and Gallagher and Crisafi.

REFERENCES


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[References]


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