

Avery Goldman. *Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea*. Bloomington-Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2012. Pp. xii + 249. Paper, \$27.95.

The general concern of Avery Goldman's thought-provoking study is to investigate whether Kant's epistemology rests on metaphysical claims regarding the subject and the object. More specifically, the question is: Kant presumes a "seemingly uncritical" (27) conception of experience in order to articulate the subjective conditions that make such a notion of experience possible; but does he ever justify his initial assumption? Contra Hamann and Hegel, who deny that Kant provides such a justification, Goldman claims to "unlock the presuppositions of [Kant's] celebrated analysis of the cognitive faculties" (3) by showing that such an analysis presupposes the metaphysical idea of the subject taken as a regulative principle.

In tandem with Kant interpretations that take the *Critique of Judgment* as completing the project of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Goldman argues that the boundary between the noumena and the phenomena, which limits finite cognition to the sensible and enables the critique of illusory metaphysics, is given not in an a priori necessary way by determinate judgment, but by "reflective judgment . . . directed by a regulative principle" (185). According to Goldman, Kant says in §76 of the third *Critique* that possibility differs from actuality only in finite cognition and "implies" (50) that our finite cognition may be dependent upon a regulative idea of reason. Pursuing this implication further, Goldman finds somewhat indirect evidence in the first *Critique* (A683/B711, A771-72/B799-800) to suggest that the psychological idea—the hypothetical but non-contradictory concept of the self as a "simple substance that can distinguish spatial appearances from the merely temporal activity of its thinking" (171)—serves as the regulative basis for the analysis of finite cognition. It performs this task by providing the act of transcendental reflection with the distinction between spatial objects and non-spatial thought, which then allows the speculative philosopher to explicate her faculties of cognition by "orienting" herself "in relation to her varied powers" (163-64).

Goldman views this regulatively employed psychological idea that emerges from the "speculative inquiry into the soul" (171) as a response to what, in his judgment, is a circular relationship between Kant's pursuit of metaphysics and his epistemology. The circularity lies in the fact that the psychological idea, or the unified subject as opposed to the object, forms the basis for the analysis of the faculties, even though this psychological idea itself arises out of a critique of metaphysics that follows from the analysis of the faculties (174). Goldman views this circularity as representing the "overarching methodology of Kant's transcendental inquiry" (20), and opines that Kant himself embraces rather than denies it (179). This leads Goldman to conclude that while Kant's theoretical system does not allow for an objective justification of its own starting point (180), it can nevertheless offer a "reflective systematization of the totality of our thought" including both empirical objects and metaphysical ideas that indeterminately guide the "unified account of the faculties of finite cognition" (184).

Although Goldman's argument is undoubtedly ingenious, his construal of circularity as the "key to understanding Kant's elusive transcendental method" (2) could be considered problematic. As Heidegger points out, Kant is certainly open to the charge of circularity—the category of possibility is supposed to demarcate the realm of experience even when it is experience that enables the derivation of this category. Goldman, however, focuses on the circular relationship between understanding and reason (121-23, 132), and makes this relationship the occasion for arguing that the hypothetical use of the psychological idea of reason "directs the analysis of the understanding" (168).

The problem with this argumentative trajectory is that no such circularity may exist between reason and understanding. One could argue that, in the first *Critique*, Kant starts by asking about the viability of metaphysics (Axii), and subsequently resolves this question through a critique of pure reason based on a new Copernican strategy in which we must "assume that the objects must conform to our cognition" (Bxvi). Construed this way, Kant

can be said to take as his point of departure a rational but merely hypothetical distinction between subject and object, and to assert the impossibility of objectively justifying this starting point.

In light of such an interpretation, it would be possible to challenge Goldman's contention that the psychological idea gained through metaphysical inquiry must necessarily direct the analysis of the understanding. Further, this interpretation would also raise the possibility that Goldman's own starting point—the question of whether Kant can objectively justify the initial presuppositions of his system—may have tacitly conditioned his conclusion that the psychological idea is the implicit starting point of Kant's transcendental method.

Notwithstanding such difficulties, Goldman deserves credit for providing a sustained and resourceful argument that shows the importance of the notion of the subject for comprehending Kant's transcendental method. For this reason, it should interest both Kant scholars and those interested in the German idealist tradition.

APAAR KUMAR

Patricia A. Blanchette. *Frege's Conception of Logic*. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xv + 190. Cloth, \$74.00.

As is well known, Frege does not have a model-theoretic conception of logic and language; sentences of his logical language *Begriffsschrift* are always already fully meaningful. Frege also famously rejects Hilbert's strategy for proving the independence and consistency of axioms. And he seems to have no particular interest in metatheory. Indeed, some have argued, Frege's conception of logic precludes even the possibility of any metatheory. Given how well entrenched model theory, Hilbert-style proofs of independence and consistency, and metatheory are in mainstream logic today, it is worth asking why Frege's conception of logic diverges, at least along these dimensions, so radically from our own. Blanchette's thoughtful and interesting book seeks to answer the question by reflecting on the logicism Frege's logic was to serve and in particular by close consideration of the nature and role of analysis in Frege's logicist program.

On Kant's account of it, the practice of mathematics has no need to analyze its concepts because, so he thought, they are always already clear. Developments in mathematical practice in the nineteenth century proved Kant wrong: the analysis of concepts is *central* to mathematics, at least as it was coming to be practiced. Instead of solving problems in the symbolic language of arithmetic and algebra using the sorts of constructive algebraic techniques that were first introduced by Descartes and then perfected over the course of the eighteenth century, this new form of mathematical practice was to proceed by deductive reasoning from concepts. And for this one needed to be much clearer than mathematicians had been hitherto about the contents of those concepts. Consider, for example, the notion of a rational number (which for the ancient Greeks is not even a number but instead a ratio of numbers). A rational number is understood in early modern mathematics to be a kind of expression (either a fraction or a repeating decimal). Such a conception is obviously of no use in inference and Frege understands the notion of a rational number very differently: to be a (positive non-zero) rational number is to be such that there is at least one (positive non-zero) whole number that is a multiple of that number. And similarly for other arithmetical concepts, all are to be stripped of irrelevant (sensory) content, and ultimately shown to be purely logical. And truths depending on them similarly are to be shown to be grounded in logic alone. But again, as Blanchette emphasizes, this form of analysis does not thereby strip away all content and meaning. Frege's logic is concerned with thoughts and their contentful concepts, not sentences syntactically characterized.

As the example of the concept of a rational number illustrates, analysis can seem quite radically to change our conception of that which is analyzed. A question naturally arises, then, regarding the relationship between *anabysanda* and *anabysantia*, in particular, whether