Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine ed. by Dennis Schulting, Jacco Verburgt (review)

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that is positive and descriptive, empirically warranted and derived from impressions (6–7); and another that would allow Hume to "suppose in a general way, when doing philosophy, that the expression 'something-more-than-experience' can refer, and correspondingly, that something-more-than-experience *exists*" (7).

But even if real connections can by Hume's lights be possible objects of thought, that is far from thinking that Hume is committed to them or "takes [them] for granted," as Strawson insists (5, 9). A more natural option for the skeptic like Hume would be agnosticism not only about the nature of these connections, but about their existence as well.

Part 3 focuses on the Appendix worries. According to Strawson, Hume regards the psychological principles that explain our belief in personal identity as real, entering into causal relations. He speaks of Hume's commitment to the "real existence and operation" of principles that unite our perceptions in thought (105). But psychological principles so understood cannot be reconciled with the only empirically legitimate conception of the mind as a mere bundle of perceptions (120). The idea, fundamental to Hume's psychology, of the mind with faculties that exercise powers and enter into causal relations (56, 58, 102) falls away on the bundle view of the mind. This, Strawson alleges, is the worry of the Appendix.

There is something to be said for thinking of Hume's associative principles realistically at least insofar as it is natural so to understand passages concerning faculties and parts of the mind, in particular the Imagination. But this reading is, of course, far from the standard one, according to which the psychological principles are understood as regularities or generalizations and are not psychologically real entities. So Strawson's explanation of the Appendix worry will not convince those who reject his interpretation of the associative principles.

Strawson's account faces other challenges. The Appendix worries are restricted to the account of personal identity; but if the problem stems from a realism about psychological principles, Hume should be concerned about their invocation in many other parts of the *Treatise*. Moreover, Strawson's explanation of the Appendix worry is hard to square with how he urges us to read Hume. Skeptical realism holds, among other things, that there is more to the mind than a bundle of perceptions. Would not the realization that the bundle theory cannot explain our belief in personal identity therefore be embraced by Hume? As a skeptical realist, Hume should allow "that we can legitimately suppose that this something-more-than-experiences exists, and tak[e] it for granted that it does" (9); it is just the sort of thing that allows for the possibility of empirical psychology. If anything, skeptical realism suggests there should not be any Appendix worry (but see 135).

There is much in the book that I have not covered, such as Strawson's pointed criticism of rival interpretations, and the subtle phenomenology prompted by reflection on Hume's famous passage beginning with "When I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*" (*Treatise,* 1.4.6.3). This book will be of interest for the many who are concerned with Hume's discussion of personal identity, and particularly for those who want to explore whether the engaging yet controversial New Hume reading can be extended to address the interpretive puzzles of Hume's discussion of personal identity.

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Dennis Schulting and Jacco Verburgt, editors. *Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations of a Controversial Doctrine.* Dordrecht: Springer, 2011. Pp. xviii + 259. Cloth, $139.00.

The literature on transcendental idealism is vast and controversy-ridden. Some interpreters view this puzzling doctrine as detracting from Kant's real contribution—his theory of experience. Those who take the doctrine seriously debate whether or not appearances and

things-in-themselves constitute two ontologically discrete worlds. Currently, the discussion centers around whether the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction should be read epistemologically, as referring to two different aspects of the same object, or as a metaphysical distinction, since Kant thinks of appearances as non-ultimate reality.

The essays in this engaging volume fill a lacuna in the existing literature by addressing Kant's idealism from the perspective of Kant's views on logic and the discursivity of judgment. This interpretive strategy, as the editors rightly point out, marks a departure from the many studies that have focused primarily on Kant's statements on the ideality of space and time in order to understand his idealism.

In his argumentative introductory essay, Dennis Schulting provides a comprehensive survey of contemporary reflection on transcendental idealism. The remaining contributions are divided into three parts. Part I consists of general interpretations of transcendental idealism, opening with Karl Ameriks's moderate view. Ameriks takes the metaphysical approach to transcendental idealism, without positing a one-to-one correspondence between appearances and things-in-themselves. In his view, while appearances are subjectively constituted, they nevertheless also imply things-in-themselves. From this perspective, he criticizes Robert Hanna's interpretation of transcendental idealism for being too human-centric, and for failing to account for Kant's notion of noumenal freedom in a "positive spontaneous sense." Manfred Baum argues in his essay that Kant's first *Critique* does not present a system of transcendental idealism, but investigates the a priori cognition of objects. For Baum, transcendental idealism is the position that cognized objects cannot resemble things-in-themselves; it follows from Kant's thesis of the ideality of space and time, and cannot be further supported by examining Kant's logic. Finally, drawing on the third *Critique*, Ido Geiger argues that experience must be considered mind-dependent (or ideal), since experience requires the regulative idea of the supersensible ground of appearances—the presupposition that nature is aesthetically and logically purposive.

The second part deals with the relationship between Kant's transcendental logic and his idealism. Lucy Allais makes the case that one key argument of the transcendental deduction—that the conceptualization of objects requires necessary a priori rules that cannot be gained from experience—does not depend on transcendental idealism. Allais points out that this argument of the deduction need not be taken as metaphysically establishing the existence of objects. Rather, it could be understood as an epistemological point about how we should think about objects. Next, Gary Banham interprets transcendental idealism as the "idealism of apperception." He believes that the apperceptive unification of the spatiotemporal manifold via the transcendental imagination is prior to both the application of the categories and the appearance/thing-in-itself distinction. Steven Bayne's essay comes "very close to concluding" that the theory of concepts-as-rules is necessary for transcendental idealism.

In their contributions, Marcel Quarfood and Schulting both argue that transcendental idealism follows from Kant's characterization of discursive, or concept-using, understanding. Distinguishing discursive and non-discursive understanding, Quarfood argues that the thing-in-itself is not a thing, but a concept emerging from the analysis of the discursive understanding. Abstraction from spatiotemporality does not yield the thing-in-itself for Quarfood, because the representation of it must still be conditioned by discursive conceptuality. For Schulting, the thing-in-itself is the completely determined ground of all appearances, while appearances represent the less-than-complete determination by the categories, specifically the category of limitation. Hence, contra all two-aspects interpretations of transcendental idealism, phenomenal and noumenal objects cannot be numerically identical; and the latter must remain beyond discursive understanding.

The final part contains essays on the nature of the thing-in-itself. Dietmar Heidemann shows that the thing-in-itself does not commit Kant to skepticism. Since the transcendental idealist sees external reality as subject-constituted and not caused by the thing-in-itself, she has no reason, says Heidemann, to doubt this external reality, or to deny coherent truth claims regarding it. For Christian Onof, the thing-in-itself must be posited as the neces-

sary ground of appearance, since the subject can represent an object only if it encounters something outside itself. Directly addressing the aims of this part of the book, Onof characterizes the thing-in-itself as the surplus content lost in the act of conceptualization by the discursive intellect. Hence, he rejects the negative definition of the thing-in-itself as non-spatiotemporal, but accepts that both appearances and things-in-themselves refer to the same set of objects. In the last chapter, Jacco Verburgt remarks on the importance of taking reason's ultimate ideal of completeness into account in characterizing the thing-in-itself, and criticizes Béatrice Longuenesse's interpretation of this ideal as flawed.

Overall, the essays in this volume are to be commended for their creative and often insightful handling of the difficult doctrine of transcendental idealism. They are recommended for everyone interested in this topic.

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Gideon Freudenthal. *No Religion without Idolatry: Mendelssohn's Jewish Enlightenment.* Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012. Pp. xi + 332. Paper, $40.00.

In his learned and insightful reading of the eighteenth-century German–Jewish philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, Gideon Freudenthal clearly wants to rescue him from total irrelevance. For Freudenthal claims that "Mendelssohn's philosophy of Judaism—and of religion in general—can be defended and, in fact, still deserves contemporary interest" (12). But does Mendelssohn's philosophy deserve the interest of philosophers who are interested in what is still significant in the present first for themselves and then for everybody else; or perhaps it deserves the interest only of historians of ideas who are interested only in what was significant in the past for those who lived then? (Let it be assumed that a philosopher speaks in the first person in the present tense, that is, "This is what *I* think *is* true; and why.") So, does Freudenthal himself now agree with what Mendelsohn thought is *true*, or does he try to ascertain only what Mendelssohn truly *meant* back then?

Freudenthal does a fine job in refuting the putdown of Mendelssohn as a second-rate metaphysician made by his contemporary, the Lithuanian–Jewish philosopher Salomon Maimon, which was picked up by most later scholars of Jewish philosophy. He does this by showing that Mendelssohn did not really intend to be a metaphysician, but that he employed metaphysics (mostly that of Christian Wolff) only to bolster his semiotics. Mendelssohn conducted his semiotics in his treatment of language in general and of the Hebrew Bible in particular (something neglected by most scholars, even by those who can read the original Hebrew text of Mendelssohn's Bible commentary).

Since Mendelssohn saw the primary intent of the Bible to be practical, he interpreted the ceremonies it prescribes to be a "language of action" (18). These performative acts are tangible expressions, mandated by revelation, of the truths of "natural religion" (17). Metaphysics can help a philosopher explicate the meaning of these symbolic actions, but metaphysics should not be taken to be the ground from which natural religion (the religion of "common sense") is derived. For Freudenthal, Mendelssohn's primary task was to interpret the biblical text (and subsequent sacred texts), selectively employing ideas of speculative metaphysics so as to enable the Bible to gain philosophical respectability. That is why his methodology, if not his actual ideas, can be of interest to hermeneutical philosophy today.

Mendelssohn recognized that "permanent signs are conducive to idolatry" (9) (hence the title of Freudenthal's book). He saw the temptation of idolatry for any religion of revelation, yet he argued for the superiority of Judaism over Christianity nonetheless (ignoring Islam, though). For the Christian doctrine of transubstantiation (in Catholic and Lutheran theologies of the Eucharist) seems to mean the act of divinizing physical objects by the theurgic speech-acts that so elevate them. But that is not the case with Jewish speech-acts