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1. THE CONCEPT OF “I” IN KANT’S FIRST CRITIQUE

Adriano Bueno Kurle

Abstract

I seek to show in this paper how, in addressing the concept of “I” and the question of self-knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason, one encounters a paradox, which is essentially a consequence of the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I point to Kant’s concept of “I” and its three co-constitutive perspectives. The importance of the concept of subject and its intertwining with the concept of reason is pointed out, as also how these two concepts appear in the text of the Critique of Pure Reason as presuppositions. Subsequently, I deal with some basic questions of transcendental idealism. Finally, I briefly present the three perspectives of the “I”: as a phenomenon, as a transcendental structure, and as a noumenon. I conclude by bringing back what Kant himself conceives as a paradox, which is the subject’s self-affection, and the relation between the subject as noumenon and as inner sense.

Keywords: I; Consciousness; Psychology; Kant; Critique of Pure Reason.

Resumo

Busco mostrar neste trabalho como, ao abordar o conceito de “eu” e a questão do autoconhecimento na Crítica da Razão Pura, se encontra um paradoxo, que é essencialmente reflexo da doutrina do idealismo transcendental. Aponto para o conceito de “eu” em Kant e suas três perspectivas coconstitutivas. Aponta-se a importância da concepção de sujeito e seu entrelaçamento com o conceito de razão, e ainda como estes dois conceitos aparecem no texto da Crítica da Razão Pura como pressupostos. Posteriormente, trato sobre algumas questões básicas do idealismo transcendental. Por último, faço uma breve exposição das três perspectivas do “eu”: como fenômeno, como estrutura transcendental e como númeno. Concluo trazendo de volta o que Kant mesmo concebe como um paradoxo, que é a relação de autoafecção do sujeito, como uma relação entre sujeito como númeno e sentido interno.

Palavras chave: Eu; Consciência; Psicologia; Kant; Crítica Da Razão Pura.

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1 This is an English translation of an already published in Portuguese article: KURLE, A. B. O Conceito de eu na Crítica da Razão Pura. In: CARVALHO, Marcelo; FIGUEIREDO, Vinicius.. (Org.). XV Encontro da ANPOF: Filosofia alemã: de Kant a Hegel. São Paulo: ANPOF, 2013, p. 09-22. It is a summarization of the main topics of my Master’s Thesis, defended in 2013 at PUCRS. Unfortunately, I did not updated the bibliography. I added only some few footnotes for some critical observations I have now about the position I took in this article from 2013.

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Introduction

The treatment of the place of the subject in Kant's critical philosophy is fundamental to a good understanding of the breadth, depth, and articulation of the basic premises of this thought. It is through the position of the subject that the capacities and faculties that justify knowledge are found.

On the other hand, it cannot be said that the problem is to describe or discover the subject. Rather, Kant’s goal is to solve the fundamental problems of the philosophy of his time, which are connected to the justification of knowledge, the possibility of metaphysics, the relationship of philosophy to the modern sciences, human action, and the compatibility of morality and religion with the determinism of the physics of his time.

Kant's main task in answering these questions is to seek the limits and possibilities of knowledge in general in order, from these limits, to qualify the questions that can and cannot be answered — or, in another way, to separate empirical questions from purely conceptual questions and thus to reformulate metaphysical questions. Since, however, every task has a beginning, Kant’s beginning ultimately does not escape the philosophical paradigm of modernity, which treats the problem of knowledge fundamentally through the subject-object relationship centered on the epistemic capacities of the subject.

Kant's philosophy then starts from a certain conception and position of the epistemic subject to answer questions that are not fundamentally about her (i.e., what is at the focus of the question is not the subject). And this is where I believe it may become fruitful to address the question of the concept of "I" in Kant's theoretical-critical philosophy because it is in this concept that some ambiguities and problems of Kant’s philosophy are reflected. It is largely here where his main doctrine rests: that of transcendental idealism.

I seek to show in this paper how, in addressing the concept of “I” and the question of self-knowledge, one encounters a paradox, which is essentially a reflection of the doctrine of transcendental idealism, which in turn cannot be understood without the subject. The argumentative exposition here will be brief, as I seek in the short space only to point to the concept of “I” in Kant and its three co-
constitutive perspectives. Thus, my exposition begins by pointing out the importance of the concept of subject and its interconnection with the concept of reason, and also how these two concepts appear in the text of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as presuppositions, not being clearly defined. Subsequently, I deal with some basic questions of transcendental idealism, an essential doctrine to understand the tripartition of the concept of self. Finally, I briefly expose the three perspectives of the “I”: as a phenomenon, as a transcendental structure, and as a noumenon. I conclude by bringing back what Kant himself conceives as a paradox, which is the subject’s self-affection, as a relation between the subject as noumenon and as internal sense (empirical subject), concluding that the noumenal concept of “I” is integral to the theory as it addresses and includes the relation of self-affection.

1. Reason and subject as presuppositions

In order to find the fundamental problem, I believe it is important to show how, in what can be called a presupposition or starting point of the theory, there is an intimate relationship between reason and subjectivity and that although Kant does not spell out precise definitions for these concepts, the author works on them. Looking at the theory as a whole, it is hard to deny the essential role that these concepts occupy and that, to a large extent, this theory works with elements that are considered characteristics of reason as an operational capacity of a subject.

I attempt to argue for an interpretation that affirms the role of the psychological approach as an integral and essential element of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant does not distinguish between semantic and psychologistic elements but develops his argument through the conception of an intrinsic link between semantics and psychologism. Thus, I defend the idea that an interpretation that expurgates the psychologistic elements or that seeks to consider Kant’s approach as a purely logical-semantic approach (along the lines of some contemporary philosophies of language) without mischaracterizing what was written by Kant is not possible.\(^3\)

\(^3\) Scholars such as Strawson and Patricia Kitcher acknowledge the psychologistic elements of the Critique of Pure Reason. The former, however, seeks to reconstruct Kant’s theory by isolating the
The psychology present in Kant’s theory is not, however, an empirical psychology nor an anthropology, but it is rather an epistemology that presupposes an epistemic subject with certain operational capabilities (normative subject). The question is not guided by the description of the mind or human behavior but guided by a normative approach that asks for the necessary conditions for a certain cognitive product to be generated having its legitimacy as knowledge. In this way, one can characterize Kant’s approach as transcendental psychology to differentiate it from empirical psychology and rational psychology (this last one is metaphysical and transcendent).

Transcendental psychology should not be confused with pure logic. Kant’s intention is not to deal only with the sources of discursive and conceptual knowledge but with the conditions for forming knowledge of objects that involve the regulated association between nondiscursive and discursive elements. To make this difference clear, Kant distinguishes between general logic and transcendental logic4.

Kant starts from the conception that knowledge is the result of a relationship between heterogeneous faculties, namely, sensibility and understanding. The subject appears as a point of unity of these faculties, therefore even being beyond them, and as these are conditions for knowledge, the subject itself is beyond the possibilities of knowledge and appears in the theory as a limit. It is the unknown root that unites sensibility and understanding. Kant says the following, explaining the basic principles of his analysis and the role of a presupposed unity between the faculties of an epistemic subject:

All that seems necessary for an introduction or a preliminary is that there are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding, through the first of which objects are given to us, but through the second of which they are thought. Now if

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4 See KrV A 50-58/ B 74-83.
sensibility were to contain *a priori* representations, which constitute the conditions under which objects are given to us, it would belong to transcendental philosophy. The transcendental doctrine of the senses will have to belong to the first part of the science of elements, since the conditions under which alone the objects of human cognition are given precede those under which those objects are thought\(^5\).

This “common but to us unknown root” is subjective unity, which lies beyond the limits of knowledge, as we shall see later through the exposition of transcendental idealism and thus the delimitation of constitutive and legitimate knowledge from transcendent and illegitimate knowledge\(^6\).

2. Transcendental idealism

The concept of “I” is presented according to three perspectives: as a phenomenon, as an element of the transcendental structure, and as a noumenon. In order to understand the boundaries between each perspective, I must present the doctrine that allows this differentiation: transcendental idealism.

The main characteristics of transcendental idealism are the distinction between sensibility and understanding, space and time as subjective conditions of sensibility, and the delimitation of possible knowledge to possible objects of sensible intuition. Thus, the transcendental ideality of space and time plays a key role in distinguishing between the perspective of the phenomenon and the noumenon and in the part of the noumenon between the pure object of thought and a sensible object considered to be known as it is in itself. Since space and time cannot be deduced

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\(^6\) Considering Kant's rejection of ontology, one could understand that this root could be anything other than a subject, as well as it could also be a subjective unity - we simply cannot know. In any case, it must be a reason for the connection between these capacities in this empirical subject instead of elsewhere, as well as reason for this connection and this separation. This is a statement I have made in my Master's Thesis that I am nowadays open to review. Marshall says: "In a nutshell, the view is this: selves are individuated by experiences, so that whatever entities are jointly responsible for unifying sensations into a single experience thereby constitute a single self." (MARSHALL, Collin. Kant’s Metaphysics of the Self. *Philosophers Imprint*, v. 10, n. 8, pp. 01-21, August 2010, p. 01-02)
from experience but rather are fundamental elements for it to occur, Kant concludes that space and time are intrinsic elements of the subject's sensibility, thus being impossible to know objects as they are in themselves, but only the product of the appearance of objects is known through the formal capacities that the subject puts into it\(^7\).

The concept of a noumenon has a heuristic use in theory. It can be understood in the positive sense or in the negative sense. In the positive sense, the phenomenon is considered a known reality in the case of pure concepts as intellectual intuition. In the negative sense, it is thought of as having its reality only possible but not known to us. That is, in the positive sense, it is an illusion, but in the negative sense, it has the function of extending the possibilities of thought by taking into account the transcendental delimitation of knowledge. Analogous to this distinction, Kant deals with the constitutive and regulative use of transcendental ideas.

If, therefore, we wanted to apply the categories to objects that are not considered as appearances, then we would have to ground them on an intuition other than the sensible one, and then the object would have to ground them on an intuition other than the sensible one, and then the object would be a noumenon in a positive sense. Now since such an intuition, namely intellectual intuition, lies absolutely outside our faculty of cognition, the use of the categories can by no means reach beyond the boundaries of the objects of experience; and although beings of understanding certainly correspond to the beings of sense, and there may even be beings of understanding to which our sensible faculty of intuition has no relation at all, our concepts of understanding, as mere forms of thought for our sensible intuition, do not reach these in the least; thus that which we call noumenon must be understood to be such only in a negative sense\(^8\).

From transcendental idealism, we can think about the three perspectives of the concept of “I”.

\(^7\) See KANT, KrV, A27/ B 48; A 35-36/ B 52-53.
\(^8\) KANT, KrV: B 308-309.
3. The phenomenal “I”

The “I” as a phenomenon is the “I” considered as an empirical object. For Kant, the “I” as an empirical object can be given in temporal intuition by the internal sense in a relationship that involves the application of the concept of permanence and self-affection. The application of the concept of permanence requires a relation not only to time but also to space so that one can form, from the relation between succession and simultaneity, the consciousness of temporal states of before, now, and after, which are possible through the concept of permanence, which is represented spatially through a line, the timeline. One can apply the concept of permanence to the common internal sense state of the subject being permanently subject to different empirical representations in a certain temporal sequence.

In the relation of self-affection, there is the presupposition of the subject as a noumenon affecting itself and producing empirical representations in the internal sense, generating a paradox since this very activity cannot be affirmed without breaking the limits of knowledge imposed by transcendental idealism.\(^9\)

Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form. Everything that is represented through a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which is the object of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual. Any difficulty in this depends merely on the question how a subject can internally intuit itself; yet this difficulty is common to every theory. Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if all of the manifold in

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\(^9\) One could think that it is not necessary to consider the origin of the “affection” as an “I” or a self. But then it is not “self”-affection. This is an affirmation that I have made in my Master’s Thesis that, nowadays, I think should be more precisely explored.
the subject were given self-actively through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. In human beings this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject, and the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account of this difference. If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the latter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the representation of time; there it then intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is\(^\text{10}\).

Kant states that in self-affection there is no intuition of the soul as an object but only of phenomenal states of the subject, which in no way define what the subject is in itself. Since all intuition is sensible, and since there is no valid knowledge without the corresponding intuition, the knowledge of the "I" can only be given through an intuition without, however, this being known in its ontological constitution, but only in its temporal appearance given in the internal sense through the certain empirical representations that constitute its empirical history, while this “I” is the common link that remains before the distinct representations.

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object; yet it is still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us\(^\text{11}\).

\(^{10}\) Kant, KrV B67–69.
\(^{11}\) Kant, KrV A 22–23/B 37–38.
It is by the internal sense that things are represented for the subject according to the stream of consciousness, that is, time. However, it is not possible for the subject to know itself as an object except while it represents things in time to itself, and thinking of itself as an object could only do so according to the form of time, and thus according to sensible intuition, and thus the subject can only represent itself as an object as a phenomenon.

In the transcendental perspective, even if the representation of the object is taken as a phenomenon, the object is not denied as actually given. And the same goes for the soul: the self, while it is taken as an object, has its existence affirmed, but in the state of reflection (the mode by which it can take itself as an object), it is only (1) reflection on its mode of knowing or (2) phenomenon (empirical, as it gives itself in the internal sense). Since the phenomenon safeguards the existence of the object, while there is the phenomenon of the “I” it is not an illusion: it is really given. But while it is a phenomenon, it cannot be known in itself. So, the paradox: the “I” affects itself without knowing what it is in itself, but this manifestation of it in itself always occurs through its own (limited) way of knowing objects, so what makes it impossible for the “I” to know itself is its own cognitive constitution. One could think that the “spirit,” the “soul,” or any equivalent of the “I” is a presupposition in the Critique of Pure Reason, and only because it can be an object that participates as a limit (as well as the thing in itself, itself as a thing in itself) of the theory can its knowledge of what it is in itself be denied\(^\text{12}\).

However, this does not affirm any property of the object (in this case, the spirit, soul, or any equivalent), but only that this phenomenon has a real equivalent. This means that it is not known whether this real equivalent is simple or compound (for example, if this unity of the subject is not only the product of the regulated relation of several components that tend to unity, etc.), among any other properties, such as being indestructible, immortal, “of another nature,” among other things that one could think.

In order to be able to deal with phenomenal consciousness and keep out of the arbitrariness of the particular cases of empirical psychology, one must consider only 

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\(^{12}\) See KrV, B 69-70.
a few general conditions. It is from the transcendental elements that one can think
under what conditions an empirical consciousness is possible. According to the
transcendental conditions, space and time are conditions for any experience, thus
also fundamental conditions of empirical consciousness. Through the analysis of the
general conditions of the relationship between space and time, it is possible to think
about some essential aspects of a transcendental theory of the phenomenal self,
which is distinguished from an empirical theory by dealing precisely only with the
conditions of possibility of the self as a phenomenon.

4. The transcendental "I"

The transcendental concept of "I" must be sought in the analysis of the
position of the concept of transcendental apperception. To understand it properly, it
is necessary to pay attention to the conception of understanding as an epistemic
faculty, the distinction between general logic and transcendental logic, the
conception of synthesis and of concept as a function that regulates the activity of
synthesizing diverse representations under a unity. Only in this way can one enter
into the presentation of the concept of the original synthetic unity of apperception
and analytical identity of apperception, which we define in parallel as consciousness
and self-consciousness (or reflected consciousness).

It is important to understand the centrality of the concept of synthesis as a
capacity or activity of the understanding. It is not possible to understand what Kant
means by the relation between sensible and conceptual elements, by synthetic a
priori judgment, and by the original synthetic unity of apperception, without taking
into account the concept of synthesis as a subjective mental capacity, as a
transcendental condition for finite beings to form knowledge and for the product of
the relation between sensibility and understanding to be possible.

The concept of the original unity of apperception is the transcendental
synthetic unity, that is, the fundamental a priori unity of the syntheses, which
participates in the transcendental theory because it is considered necessary for
knowledge in general. It is the unity of consciousness and the condition for the unity
of various representations in a concept. The analytic unity of consciousness, which
presupposes the synthetic unity, is the transcendental necessity of the empirical possibility of recognizing the possession of representations as belonging to the subject that thinks them (or, the consciousness of operating relations through synthetic activity and recognizing itself as the subject of this operation).

Kant wants to show that, given one sensible representation 1, and another sensible representation 2, distinct from each other, if there is to be a relation between them, this must be operated by the understanding, never the distinct experiences given in the intuition being the source of this relation. Since mere empirical sensible experience does not contain in itself any connection, either given by intuition or by the objects themselves (since the relation between several dispersed experiences in an unity is a necessity if they are to be thought together and thus compose judgments and also the idea that they participate in one and the same experience), it is necessary that this connection be operated by the cognitive subject itself, through the spontaneity of the understanding.

This problem also invokes, along with the unity of experience through the unification of the different representations, the identity of a consciousness that recognizes them as its representations. And so, the operation of synthesis plays a fundamental role in relation to the unity of consciousness, and precisely because of this, Kant begins the transcendental deduction with the approach of synthesis as an operation of the understanding\textsuperscript{13}.

All knowledge must be connected to the understanding in order to become an element of a discursive judgment or an object identified according to concepts so that this activity of connection “is the representation of the synthetic unity of the manifold\textsuperscript{14}.” There is thus no unity prior to connection, and even the categories presuppose this connection. Kant thus deals with a unity that enables even discursive synthesis into concepts and judgments, and it is this higher unity that enables the unity of thoughts. This unity Kant calls the “original synthetic unity of apperception.”

The original synthetic unity is the unity of the syntheses of representations, only given \textit{a priori}, thus prior, therefore original, to any derived unity. This is the same as saying: there are transcendental conditions for the unity of empirical

\textsuperscript{13} See KrV, B 129-130.
\textsuperscript{14} KANT, KrV, B 130-131
representations. Since only through synthesis is the unity of the simplest empirical representations possible, and since this synthesis occurs according to functions, these functions themselves, as the “unity of activity” of synthesizing, must relate (the functions of these operations being varied) into a prior unity through which they operate together. This unity must be a priori, because it operates over a priori functions. As it operates unity over functions, it cannot be dependent on them to promote this unity, under penalty of bad circularity of the argument. Thus, this unity is qualitative and prior to the categories. The original synthetic unity is a condition for any empirical unity.

5. The noumenal “I”

Through the noumenal concept of “I,” one differentiates between its positive sense and its negative sense, according to the constitutive or regulative use of the transcendental idea of the soul.

This theme appears in the Kantian conception of reason, in the strict sense (as a faculty distinct from the understanding), where Kant deals with how ideas of totality emerge, through the natural dialectics of reason, according to each of the forms of judgment: categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. In this sense, the categorical judgment, in the search for the totality of the conditions of the subject (in the search for the unconditioned), generates the absolute idea of the subject. The totality of the conditions of the subject is the idea of the soul. This idea has its constitutive use, which generates illusions and bad metaphysics about the subject because it leads to statements that transgress the limits of knowledge - which has as a principle that every constitutive concept must have its counterpart in the unity of the object that must be able to be given in the sensible intuition.

However, this idea has its legitimate use as a regulative idea, which uses this concept heuristically, its function being to give unity to the various constitutive knowledge and normative concepts necessary for the unity of a theoretical system among the constitutive and normative elements.

To the fallacies generated by pure reasoning about the unity of the subject Kant calls “paralogisms of pure reason.” By showing the fallacious character of these
arguments (which consists in extrapolating the limits of knowledge by applying concepts to an object that cannot be given in intuition, taking as real something that is not known but is a pure idea of an object of reason), Kant wants to refute what he calls rational psychology. In this way, Kant refutes the possibility of metaphysical knowledge of the self or the soul\(^\text{15}\).

The application of the pure concepts to the “I” or soul as an object in general, according to the four kinds of categories, generates the following relations: (1) the soul is substance; (2) the soul is a simple substance (3) it is a unity in time (4) it is in relation to possible objects in space. The problem, according to Kant, is that one moves from simply asserting the transcendental necessity of a logical subject of representations and discourses to applying concepts of this “I” as an object. For Kant, “It is not the consciousness of the determining self, but only that of the determinable self, i.e., of my inner intuition (insofar as its manifold can be combined in accord with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thinking), that is the object\(^\text{16}\).” One must thus always distinguish the transcendental "I", which is always the subject, from the "I" as an object. The "I" as an object is always a phenomenal object, and so is either an empirical subject or the simple transcendental conditions for certain possible representations - the pure “I think” as temporal permanence before the possible representations and the recognition of its synthetic activity. That is, about the transcendental subject, nothing more can be predicated.

In short, paralogisms are summarized as the confusion of the “I” as the subject of thoughts with the “I” as the object of determined judgments, that is, as the object of knowledge. In this sense, Kant shows the difference between the subject in its reflexivity, showing that with this reflexive movement, a mediation is also placed, which puts the difference of the “I” to itself. The “I” is not completely transparent to itself as an object, that is to say, it does not have immediate access to its own ontological constitution.

The knowledge of the “I” as an object in general (of a universal determination, therefore, and not of a particular empirical subject) can only be known according to the predicates inherent in it. But the predication of objects depends on the categories

\(^{15}\) See KrV A 341–405 e B 397–432.

\(^{16}\) Kant, KrV B 407.
of the subject’s understanding, which have significance only if related to sensible intuitions. Since sensible intuition determines the phenomenality of knowledge, all knowledge of the self that goes beyond the determination of the subject as the logical subject of discourses is an empirical determination. Therefore, rational psychology has no validity.

Although it is not possible to know an object that corresponds to the idea of the absolute unity of the subject, it is still possible to think about it. In this sense, the idea of “I” as a pure object of reason has its regulative use. In this perspective, the idea is used as a guiding element in psychological research, ordering and regulating sensible events, empirical concepts, and reasoning into a larger systematic unity, which regulates the use of understanding around empirical research on a given subject, in this case, psychology\(^\text{17}\).

In its regulative use, this idea of the soul serves as a guiding principle for relating the various concepts, relations, and forces around the idea of a unified subject.

Conclusion

I conclude by bringing back what Kant himself conceives as a paradox, which is the subject’s relation of self-affection, as a relation between the subject as noumenon and internal sense (empirical subject), concluding that the noumenal concept of “I” is integral to the theory as it addresses and includes the relation of self-affection:

Here is now the place to make intelligible the paradox that must have struck everyone in the exposition of the form of inner sense (§ 6): namely how this presents even ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected, which seems to be contradictory, since we would have to relate to ourselves passively; for this reason it is customary in the systems of psychology to treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of apperception (which we carefully

\(^{17}\) See KrV, A 643/ B 671.
distinguish). That which determines the inner sense is the understanding and its original faculty of combining the manifold of intuition, i.e., of bringing it under an apperception (as that on which its very possibility rests). Now since in us humans the understanding is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and even if these were given in sensibility cannot take them up into itself, in order as it were to combine the manifold of its own intuition, thus its synthesis, considered in itself alone, is nothing other than the unity of the action of which it is conscious as such even without sensibility, but through which it is capable of itself determining sensibility internally with regard to the manifold that may be given to it in accordance with the form of its intuition. Under the designation of a transcendental synthesis of the imagination, it therefore exercises that action on the passive subject, whose faculty it is, about which we rightly say that the inner sense is thereby affected. Apperception and its synthetic unity is so far from being the same as the inner sense that the former, rather, as the source of all combination, applies to all sensible intuition of objects in general, to the manifold of intuitions in general, under the name of the categories; inner sense, on the contrary, contains the mere form of intuition, but without combination of the manifold in it, and thus it does not yet contain any determinate intuition at all, which is possible only through the consciousness of the determination of the manifold through the transcendental action of the imagination (synthetic influence of the understanding on the inner sense), which I have named the figurative synthesis.\(^{18}\)

Kant seems to resolve this paradox by internally splitting the subject: on the one hand, this spontaneous activity affects its other part, the internal sense, with the latter being a tabula rasa with the mere form of time. Now, to what extent is the consideration of one faculty actually affecting the other (Kant says, through the synthesis of the productive imagination) considered only formally? Does not the spontaneity of the understanding hold within itself a numerical trace? The very split between phenomenon and noumenon seems to be reproduced within the transcendental subject.

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\(^{18}\) KANT, KrV, B 152-154.
References


