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Hegel y el proyecto de una Enciclopedia Filosófica

Comunicaciones del
II Congreso Germano-Latinoamericano
sobre la Filosofía de Hegel

Hegel e o projeto de uma Enciclopédia Filosófica

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Hardy Neumann
Óscar Cubo
Agemir Bavaresco
(Comps. / Orgs.)



El proyecto profundamente enraizado en el pensamiento de Hegel de desplegar la filosofía en la forma del saber enciclopédico se presentó por primera vez de forma claramente definida en la Enciclopedia de las Ciencias Filosóficas publicada en Heidelberg en 1817. Doscientos años tras la publicación de la Enciclopedia de Heidelberg este proyecto continúa siendo uno de los aspectos más incomprensidos de la filosofía hegeliana. En efecto, dicho proyecto parece ser hoy, si no algo completamente obsoleto, al menos sí una de las facetas menos inspiradoras de la herencia de Hegel, algo que parecería pertenecer más al Hegel “muerto” que al “vivo”. Por lo que respecta al presente e-book, el mismo contiene la mayor parte de las comunicaciones de los expositores latinoamericanos del II Congreso Germano Latinoamericano sobre la Filosofía de Hegel así como también las de aquellos expositores de otras regiones que enviaron una traducción de sus textos al español, portugués o inglés. Por su parte, las comunicaciones en idioma alemán de los expositores alemanes aparecerán publicadas próximamente. Agradecemos a todos los participantes del II Congreso Germano-Latinoamericano sobre la Filosofía de Hegel y, en especial, a aquéllos que con el envío de la versión definitiva de sus comunicaciones han contribuido a la realización de esta publicación.




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The intersubjective community of feelings: Hegel on music¹

*Adriano Bueno Kurle*²

1. Introduction

The purpose of this article is to examine the objective side of subjectivity formation through music. I attempt to show how music is a way to configure subjectivity in its interiority, but in a way that it can be shared between other individual subjectivities. Music has an objective structure, but this structure is the temporal and sonorous interiority of subjectivity. It has as its objective manifestation and consequence the feelings and emotions. These feelings are subjective, and in the level of *subjective Geist* they are related to intuition. Hegel believes that such intuition cannot be properly communicated, due to its exclusive access to the individual subject himself.

Despite that, music is an art, and it takes part in the level of *absolute Geist*³. That means that music is the connection between the objective and subjective sides of *Geist*, being a product of social relations, including the sharing, experience and recognition of subjective operations by the participants in society as something in common. Art is related to intuition but it is not intuition itself, nor it is reduced to the capacity of intuition. All

¹ I thank Christina Tencheva for the grammar review of this article.

² Adjunct Professor at Federal University of Mato Grosso; E-mail: adrianobk@gmail.com

³ For conceptual reasons I chose to use the original German word "*Geist*", instead of translating it.

three capacities of the *subjective Geist* in the theoretical *Geist* (namely intuition, representation and thinking)⁴ can be part of the relationship between art and the individual perspective. However, the link between art and intuition is an analogy between the *subjective Geist* and the *absolute Geist*, considering that art is a level of manifestation of social self-consciousness where the people and the social group have not yet become conscious of its content in its manifestation. The exposition of the ideal content of social relations is manifested through *absolute Geist*, beginning with its sensible manifestation. After this process, it is signified through a practice related to representation, and finally it is related to a conceptually and linguistically mediated practice, philosophy. These products cannot be a consequence of a mere subjective connections, but must be (as part of *absolute Geist*) a consequence of the objective relation between individuals in its subjective manifestations.

Furthermore, subjective capacities are a condition without which the development of the *absolute Geist* is not possible. At the same time, it is not possible that *subjective Geist's* capacities can be fully realized without social relations. Science is not a product of an individual-solipsistic relationship with the environment, but a product of a social relations, including language, shared experiences and shared *ways of comprehension*, such as the common way to feel and receive the environment in a subjective level discussed below.

I divide this exposition into three parts: (1) music and subjectivity, where I deal with the relation between body vibration, time, sound and the formal interiority of the listener/musical subject, analyzing the *form* of music in its subjective side (the relation to the listener); (2) music and content, where I examine the content generated by music as being the process of formation

⁴ See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, §§ 440 – 468.

itself (i.e. the process of given form to the interiority of subjectivity through sounds becomes its own content, namely, the feelings); and (3) music and words, where I scrutinize the relationship between music and words' capacities to make reference and to have content, considering the connection between pure music and lyrics, and between music and poetry as singular forms of art. I conclude with the idea that music has a specific role in Hegel's system, which is to bring to light and develop *absolute Geist's* (understood as the objectivation and formation of a social and cultural subjectivity) internal aesthetic form.

2. Music and subjectivity

Music has as at its core the following elements: sound, as determinate negation of materiality; time, as determinate negation of space; and interior subjectivity as determinate negation of the objective and the external. The musical content is not exclusive to the individual experience, but can be experienced, perceived and shared by other individual subjectivities. Thus, music is not a solipsistic subjective manifestation. Similarly, the negation of the materiality is a way to the elevation to the ideality, a capacity that only consciousness possesses (that is to say, *Geist* also has it, but only by means of the consciousness). Still, this ideality would remain only an abstraction unless it is individualized. According to the Hegelian logic, being individualized means having a material content. This also implies being connected to the singularity (or individuality, *Einzelheit*) of sensibility and intuition. Along these lines, the negation of materiality is not an exclusion of materiality, but instead its transformation through its relation to subjectivity.

The vibration reverberates in the material environment, and it is apprehended and shared through this material environment. But this vibration alone is not yet sound; it depends on its relation with audition and temporal intuition to become sound. Yet, it needs more to become music. It is temporality that

elevates vibration from the concrete to the ideal, it is the time that operates the negativity in relation to the materiality or, in other words, it is the result of this process of the negation of concrete spatial simultaneity. The sound cannot be dissociated to the temporal phenomenon and the capacity of audition, as there is no audition without time. Nevertheless, the subjectivity, as capacity to unite the multiplicity torn by time's negativity, is a necessary condition for sounding element to become meaningful.

Music has as its material the abstract form of subjectivity (the sounding temporality) and as its content, feelings. In the analysis of music, Hegel continues the approach to art as an expression of truth and as an element that expresses ideal content. Despite that, in music there is the meeting between subject and object, being the internal form of the subject the object of music itself. In this specific point, there are temporality and feelings, as well as the "movements of soul", the content of music. Thus, the subject (or at least some of its aspects) is the object of itself, and its form is also the content. Still, it is possible to deal with the content in a dual manner: on one hand there is the form itself and the internal subjectivity as content, or the feelings and emotions developed by music; on the other hand, music has limitations on expressing content because it has no concept, depends on capacity to refer to objects. Music makes no direct reference to objects or anything spatial (even if we consider that the mental spatialization of sounds might have a function in its process of rationalization). Music also does not use words – the text can be combined with music, but music itself is not textual.

There is, therefore, a limitation of music as a mean of expressing *Geist's* content in a proper manner. In such a way, music is a revealing element and *Geist's* truth producer, a necessary puzzle piece in the complexity of *Geist's* manifestation, self-production and self-knowledge. Music fulfills a specific function in the whole of individual arts, which in turn fulfills a function in the whole process of *absolute Geist's* development.

In music, the soul is free, and deals only with itself, being the musical relation a kind of self-relation, where the interiority of the subjectivity is free from the external conditioning, like weight and space. Music is an event that configures the internal structure of subjectivity and brings *temporal plasticity* to the soul (which is, at the beginning, an indeterminate and universal set of possibilities and a capacity to synthetically unify the fragmented elements). Thus, music configures the form of subjectivity through the fulfillment and the determination of time, and through sound movements that configure and express feelings. Here the word “feeling” should be understood as close as possible to its sensible meaning – related to that which touches the bodily sensibility – as well as the feeling in the sense of emotions that come to be “named” or to have conceptual meanings, like joyfulness, sadness, hope, and so on. When something like a musical event occurs, the soul’s or internal subjectivity’s shift from a universal to a particular configuration: the pure universal capacity of taking forms becomes determinate form through the musical event⁵.

In relation to sound and audition (and also listening), it is worth to note the following, clarifying in which sense the interiority related to music is already a characteristic of sound itself as suppression of space and as passage to time:

The suppression [*Aufhebung*] of the spatial therefore consists here only in the fact that a specific sensuous material sacrifices its peaceful separatedness [*Außereinander*], turns to movement, yet so vibrates in itself that every part of the cohering body not only changes its place but also struggles to replace itself in its former position. The result of this oscillating vibration is *sound or a note*, the material of music. Now, with sound, music relinquishes the element of an external form and a perceptible visibility and therefore needs for the treatment of its productions another subjective organ, namely *hearing* which, like sight, is one of the

⁵ See HEIMSOETH, Heinz. *Hegels Philosophie der Musik*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1964, pp. 172 – 174; NOWAK, Adolf. *Hegels Musikästhetik*. Regensburg: Bosse, 1971, pp. 41 – 102.

theoretical and not practical senses and it is still *more ideal than sight*. For the peaceful and undesiring contemplation of [spatial] works of art lets them remain in peace and independence as they are, and there is no wish to consume destroy them; yet what it apprehends is not something inherently posited ideally but on the contrary something persisting in its visible existence. The ear, on the contrary, without itself turning a practical relation to objects, listens to the result of the inner vibration of the body through which what comes before us is no longer the peaceful and material shape but *the first appear of ideal soulfulness*. Further, since the negativity into which the vibrating material enters here is on one side the suppression [*Aufheben*] of the spatial situation, that again becomes suppressed [*aufgehoben*] by the reaction of the body, therefore the externalization [*Äußerung*] of this double negation, i.e. sound, is an externality [*Äußerlichkeit*] which in its emergence through its being-there [*Dasein*] is annihilated again, and disappears in itself. Owing to this double negation of externality [*Äußerlichkeit*], implicit in the principle of sound, inner subjectivity corresponds to it because the resounding, which in and by itself is something more ideal than the for itself real subsistent corporeality [*für sich real bestehende Körperlichkeit*], gives up this more ideal existence also and therefore becomes a mode of externalization [*Äußerungsweise*] adequate to the internal [*Innerlichen*]⁶.

6 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp. 134 – 135, my italics. I used Knox's translation as reference in English, modifying the translation in some specific points for conceptual or interpretative reasons. See: HEGEL, G. W. F. *Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art*. Volumes I and II. Translated by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. In the original: „Die Aufhebung des Räumlichen besteht deshalb hier nur darin, daß ein bestimmtes sinnliches Material sein ruhiges Außereinander aufgibt, in Bewegung gerät, doch so in sich erzittert, daß jeder Teil des kohärierenden Körpers seinen Ort nicht nur verändert, sondern auch sich in den vorigen Zustand zurückzusetzen strebt. Das Resultat dieses schwingenden Zitterns ist der Ton, das Material der Musik. Mit dem Ton nun verläßt die Musik das Element der äußeren Gestalt und deren anschauliche Sichtbarkeit und bedarf deshalb zur Auffassung ihrer Produktionen auch eines anderen subjektiven Organs, des Gehörs, das wie das Gesicht nicht den praktischen, sondern den theoretischen Sinnen zugehört und selbst noch ideeller ist als das Gesicht. Denn die ruhige, begierdelose Beschauung von Kunstwerken läßt zwar die Gegenstände, ohne sie irgend vernichten zu wollen, für sich, wie sie da sind, ruhig bestehen, aber das, was sie auffaßt, ist nicht das in sich selbst Ideellgesetzte, sondern im Gegenteil das in seiner sinnlichen Existenz Erhaltene. Das Ohr dagegen vernimmt, ohne sich selber praktisch gegen die Objekte hinauszuwenden, das Resultat jenes inneren Erzitterns des Körpers, durch welches nicht mehr die ruhige materielle Gestalt, sondern die erste ideellere Seelenhaftigkeit zum Vorschein kommt. Da nun ferner die Negativität, in die das schwingende Material hier eingeht, einerseits ein Aufheben des räumlichen Zustandes ist, das selbst wieder durch die Reaktion des Körpers aufgehoben wird, so ist

Would Hegel be confusing a physical event with spatial events? The movement and transformation involved in a vibration would be the “suppression of the spatial”, which in turn is “suppressed by the reaction of the body”, thus the negation of the negation of space? What is the reason for that? Why would this movement of vibration pass through a negation that involves another negation, rather than only a change of state between a position of rest to another – or still a negation of this position of rest, but without necessarily implying a negation of space? Yet, in this case, what gives the negation of negation a different result than the initial state, prior to the first negation? Hegel considers that in this specific case this negation of negation is the sound⁷. Nonetheless, he also says that the sound is “the first appear of ideal soulfulness”. How could this affirmation be sensibly considered in relation to basic physics? Would Hegel confuse the physical event (the bodily vibration) with its psychophysiological effect (the sound)? How can the sound be at the same time treated as “externalization” and as ideality of the soul? How could sound, as externalization, “destroy itself” if the externalization to which sound refers is not the sound, but the bodily vibration?

Instead of merely confusing the physical and psychophysiological scopes, what Hegel does is to bring the phenomena to their unity – the vibration cannot be understood outside the sound phenomenon. It is not simply dealing with the vibration as a movement of places (which would be an aspect of the image, and thus the spatial exteriority), or of bodies in places, but something that becomes part of the phenomenon’s composition, which is the

die Äußerung dieser zwiefachen Negation, der Ton, eine Äußerlichkeit, welche sich in ihrem Entstehen durch ihr Dasein selbst wieder vernichtet und an sich selbst verschwindet. Durch diese gedoppelte Negation der Äußerlichkeit, welche im Prinzipie des Tons liegt, entspricht derselbe der inneren Subjektivität, indem das Klingen, das an und für sich schon etwas Ideelleres ist als die für sich real bestehende Körperlichkeit, auch diese ideellere Existenz aufgibt und dadurch eine dem Innerlichen gemäße Äußerungsweise wird.“

⁷ See also HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 9: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, §§ 254 – 261.

sound. This phenomenon, while treated artistically as being the sound the unfolding of the consciousness in itself, becomes a “mode of externalization adequate to the internal”, which is no more merely “something more ideal than the for itself real subsistent corporeality” but “gives up this more ideal existence.”, What that means is that it is not anymore about the sound or sonority as something separated of the conditions of its phenomenon. This element, as a condition of its phenomenon, is the interiority itself, which gives this movement its objective content, which is the pure form of the subjective interiority. By becoming objective to itself (even if staying in the interiority and for the interiority) the subjective interiority “gives up this more ideal existence”. What is expressed as content through sounds is the interiority without object, thus the pure sound (in the opposite to painting) can neither express nor make reference to objects.

The problem though is that the sound here is dealt as negation of space, while in fact the sound should be dealt as negation of the material solidity, bringing a sensible movement relation to the externality of the “being-outside-from-one-another” [*Äußereinander*] characteristic of space, to the internality of the abstract subjectivity. However, all of that shows that the sound and the movement of vibration cannot be understood only in spatiality, but also in temporality, the “one-after-another” [*Nacheinander*].

This characteristic of music and its relation to interiority can be compared with the characteristic of the self-consciousness in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*⁸. The interiority, or consciousness, has consciousness before itself. To say that the interiority has no object and at the same time to say that the interiority is the object itself would be a paradox. However, there is a duplication of the relationship, where what is positioned as an object is that which puts itself as an object. Still, to affirm that there is no object or that

8 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 3: Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, pp. 137 – 155.

the object itself is that which is empty would not be epistemologically legitimate. The musical phenomenon itself becomes the content, and the division between the subjectivity that observes and the subjectivity that is observed is only a linguistic resource to a phenomenon in itself inseparable. This separation is imposed by the logic of understanding, but must be understood as unified by the speculative reason⁹.

Hegel correctly understands that in music there is no distinction between the listener and the object. The intuition that takes part in music is one where the externalization “does not produce an object *persisting* in space but shows through its free unstable soaring that it is a communication which, instead of having stability on its own account, is carried by the inner subjectivity, and is to exist for and to it alone¹⁰.” This inner subjectivity comprises the formal side of music¹¹. It is to be dealt where it is possible to find music’s content and its determination. Still, if its determination is a content and, if there is a content, it is crucial to ask – what type of content is it and how would it be possible for music to *refer* to a content? It is in this paradox of having a content without having the capacity to make *reference* to anything, that music finds and realizes itself. Hence, and still paradoxically, music has a “formal content”, which is not exactly an externalizable object, outside of its own form of presentation. Yet, music realizes itself in this process of internalization, and comes to have as its content the event of the movement of soul, the becoming shape and internal figure to itself; that is to say, the feelings.

In the work of the musician:

9 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 8: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, §§ 79 – 82.

10 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 136.

11 See *Ibid.*, p. 136.

[...] the region of his compositions remains a rather formal interiority, the pure sound; and his immersion in the content becomes not the formation of something external but rather a retreat into the freedom of the inner itself, a dealing of him with himself, and, in some styles of music, even an assurance that as artist he is free from the content [*Inhalte*] altogether¹².

In this citation interiority as content for itself is clear. Similarly, this interiority cannot be reified or “become a thing” and it cannot be permanently determined. It is a characteristic of the immanent temporality that constitutes both the particular subjective interiority and music, which are two elements that co-constitute themselves. Thus, music cannot be a permanent content, being at the same time itself its own content as well as being “free from the content altogether”. Hence, music’s general content is the possibilities of determination of its content as sound flow, in mathematical, harmonic and rhythmic proportions. None of these contents are essential to this formal interiority. Only its capacity of actively determine (thus, its character as subject) sonorously this interiority through time and to then plasticize time in form of sound is what is its content. As it does not have any previous determinate content, it is possible to say that this subjectivity and this interiority are “free from the content”.

At the same time, however, this subjective interiority would still only be a non realized possibility, an abstract universal that has not determined itself in case it does not find its individualization and its particular realizations. For this reason, music (and the musical subjectivity) is “free” from content only while it is an abstract and subjective interiority, still having the

¹² Ibid., p. 141. Original text: „[...] die eigentliche Region seiner Kompositionen aber bleibt die formellere Innerlichkeit, das reine Tönen, und sein Vertiefen in den Inhalt wird statt eines Bildes nach außen vielmehr ein Zurücktreten in die eigene Freiheit des Innern, ein Ergehen seiner in ihm selbst und in manchen Gebieten der Musik sogar eine Vergewisserung, dass er als Künstler frei von dem Inhalte ist.“

possibility to realize this or that specific content (namely, it has in and for itself the negativity).

3. Music and content

Music has a formal character in a way that it can isolate itself from spatial representations, from the objective references and from the text. Despite that, it is possible for music to express content, either through its connection to the text or through the experimentation of these contents in “the notes and their harmonic relations and melodic animation¹³”. Through music, the content must be brought to the intimate subjectivity and to interiority, assuming the form of feelings. Through the “bringing to the I” (this abstract capacity of covering diverse possibilities, as well as the maintaining of the possibility of other coverings and negations), music brings a variety of particular feelings to intimacy. Here we are before “[...] a self-production and objectification of the soul as soul, an expression midway between the unconscious immersion and the return to itself, in inward specific thoughts, and an act of bringing to light, that is not practical but theoretical, just as the bird has in its song this delight and this production of itself¹⁴.”

As music has a direct relation only with time (being this last considered by Hegel as *Aufhebung* of the space), it has a higher level of ideality, as well as not differentiating between the internal content and the externality; the side-by-side [*Nebeneinander*] is a characteristic of space, while time has as its main characteristics the one-after-another [*Nacheinander*], succession, which implies

¹³ Ibid., p. 149.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 150. Original: „Es liegt eine Selbstproduktion und Objektivität der Seele als Seele darin, ein Ausdruck, der in der Mitte steht zwischen der bewußtlosen Versenkung und der Rückkehr in sich zu innerlichen bestimmten Gedanken, und ein Hervorbringen, das nicht praktisch, sondern theoretisch ist, wie auch der Vogel in seinem Gesang diesen Genuß und diese Produktion seiner selbst hat.“

an externality through the self-applied negativity of time. Moments of time are external one to another – that is to say, each moment and every “now” differentiates from each other, but they also maintain themselves together while they are part of the same *duration*¹⁵. As music has a direct relation only with time (being this last considered by Hegel as *Aufhebung* of the space), it has a higher level of ideality, as well as not differentiating between the internal content and the externality; the side-by-side [*Nebeneinander*] is a characteristic of space, while time has as its main characteristics the one-after-another [*Nacheinander*], succession, which implies an externality through the self-applied negativity of time. Moments of time are external one to another – that is to say, each moment and every “now” differentiates from each other, but they also maintain themselves together while they are part of the same *duration*¹⁴. In the case of music, this externality of moments is internal to the interiority of the subject itself, and, contrary to spatial events, it cannot happen in each moment as a separation between the subject of listening and the sound event. Only through the listening the sound realizes itself as sound, and only through the listening of a sound the listening becomes a listening. Also “[...] music however does not adopt movement as it occurs in space, and therefore there is left for its configuration *only* the time in which the vibration of the body occurs¹⁶.”

The same intuitive immediacy also happens with feelings, “which is principally the business of music to express¹⁷”. There is a point of identity between temporality and feeling, neither having a possible spatial reference (considering that time, here, is not a

15 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 3: Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989, pp. 82 – 92; HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 9: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, §§ 254 – 261.

16 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 163. Original: „[...] in betreff auf diese Räumlichkeit jedoch nimmt die Musik die Bewegung nicht auf, und ihr bleibt deshalb zur Gestaltung nur die Zeit übrig, in welche das Schwingen des Körpers fällt.“

17 Ibid., pp. 151 – 152.

content, but the medium through which both the musical events and the feelings are given or happen). Feelings relate to intuition, so it is possible to infer here the essential importance of music to *Geist's* formation and self-comprehension. The immediacy of the action of music upon the interiority and its identity with the feelings is expressed by Hegel in the following manner:

As in selfconscious thinking, so here too there already enters into our intuition and representations the necessary distinction between (a) the self that intuits, represents, and thinks, and (b) the object of intuition, representation, and thought. But, in feeling [*Empfindung*], this distinction is expunged, or rather is not yet explicit, since there the content [*Inhalt*] is interwoven with the internal [*mit dem Innern*] as such, without any separation between them¹⁸

From this it is possible to make some observations, starting with the differentiation between *conscious thinking* and the forms of intuition and representation. Therefore, it can be deduced that for Hegel there is a distinction between conscious and non-conscious thinking, being the intuition and the representation forms of thought, but not yet fully conscious – as well as the form of consciousness itself, presented in the *Encyclopedia* in the level of *Phenomenology*, is not yet thinking as conceptual consciousness. However, music involves an immediate form of expression of feelings, in which the expressed content and its form are not very different to each other. In this sense, it is possible to say that music is irresistible, because:

Expression in music has, as its content [*Gehalt*], the Inner itself, the inner sense of the thing and of feeling, which, being an art that do not proceed to spatial figures, has purely evanescent

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 152. Original: „In der Anschauung und Vorstellung nämlich tritt, wie beim selbstbewußten Denken, bereits die notwendige Unterscheidung des anschauenden, vorstellenden, denkenden Ich und des angeschauten, vorgestellten oder gedachten Gegenstandes ein; in der Empfindung aber ist dieser Unterschied ausgelöscht oder vielmehr noch gar nicht herausgestellt, sondern der Inhalt trennungslos mit dem Innern als solchem verwoben.“

notes as its element; the result is that music with its movements penetrates immediately, in the internal seat, all the movements of the soul. Therefore it captivates the consciousness which is no longer confronted by an object and which in the loss of this freedom is carried away itself by the ever-flowing stream of sounds¹⁹.

The feeling is, at the level of intuition, “the form of the particular and the subjective²⁰”, which finds itself at an essential, but still inferior level in *Geist's* process of self-constitution to the subjective level. It is the first moment of intuition, thus making it the less outspread and the most immediate. For Hegel, it is “the proper form of singularity of a Self, that the *Geist* has in the feeling, is the lowest and the worst²¹”. It is possible to imagine why Hegel affirm that if we imagine the human stuck or limited to intuition because then

If a man in any topic appeals not to the nature and notion of the thing, or at least to reasons – to the generalities of common sense – but to his feeling, the only thing to do is to let him alone, because by his behavior he refuses to have any lot or part in the community of rationality [*der Gemeinschaft der Vernünftigkeit*], und shuts himself up in his own isolated subjectivity – his private and particular self²².

19 Ibid., p.154. Original: „Indem nun der musikalische Ausdruck das Innere selbst, den inneren Sinn der Sache und Empfindung zu seinem Gehalt und den in der Kunst wenigstens nicht zu Raumfiguren fortschreitenden, in seinem sinnlichen Dasein schlechthin vergänglichen Ton hat, so dringt sie mit ihren Bewegungen unmittelbar in den inneren Sitz aller Bewegungen der Seele ein. Sie befängt daher das Bewusstsein, das keinem Objekt mehr gegenübersteht und im Verlust dieser Freiheit von dem fortflutenden Strom der Töne selber mit fortgerissen wird.“

20 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986, § 447. Translation used: HEGEL, G. W. F. *Hegel's Philosophy of Mind*. Translated From The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (rev. and Augmented) by William Wallace. New York: Oxford University Press, 1894.

21 Ibid., § 447.

22 Ibid., §447. Original: „Wenn ein Mensch sich über etwas nicht auf die Natur und den Begriff der Sache oder wenigstens auf Gründe, die Verstandesallgemeinheit, sondern auf sein *Gefühl beruft*, so ist nichts anderes zu tun, als ihn stehenzulassen, weil er sich dadurch der Gemeinschaft der Vernünftigkeit verweigert, sich in seine isolierte Subjektivität, die *Partikularität*, einschließt.“ Italics by the author.

This gives food for thought, especially when treated in relation to music. The citation above refers to intuition and feeling as the first mode of intuition, in the level of *subjective Geist*. But music finds itself in the level of the *absolute Geist*, in a level of mediation between subjective and objective *Geist*, as well as through rational mediation – it already has the presupposition of a *community of rationality* (this last being understood in the wider and Hegelian sense). The fact that music is an art and that it only exist as something shared testifies this affirmation. Therefore, music cannot suffer from this kind of solipsism that Hegel accuses the pure feeling in the level of subjective *Geist*. Music, on the contrary, *is the way out of this solipsism of feeling through a form of communication that is proper to this interiority and the feelings*. In music, we find a way to communicate feelings, thus making feelings a way for the intuitively shareable. Music finds itself in an extreme intimate core, at the same time working at a subcutaneous (properly intuitive) level of subjectivity though “music cannot propose to give an external illustration to ideas and thoughts as these are consciously apprehended by us²³”.

This point makes it possible for music to be, at the same time, an element of community unification of feelings and something that fails in relation to conceptual and objective communication at the level of the *community of rationality*. Despite that, this community of rationality only becomes concretely a self-recognized community when it recognizes itself through the empathy produced by music – something that cannot, however, be recognized through pure music.

That is why music is *necessary* at the same time that, to fulfill its function before *Geist's* aim, it needs complementarity (of the other forms of art, of the word and concept, or of the other

23 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p.154.

forms of expression of the *absolute Geist*, like religion and philosophy):

Music takes as aim to bring the inner self to the content [*Inhalt*], not as external figure [*Gestalt*] and stable objective work, but to bring its appearance as subjective interiority [*Innerlichkeit*]. Then, must the exteriorization give itself also immediately as the communication of a living subject, in which is put its whole interiority [*Innerlichkeit*]²⁴.

Music has, then, a proper and unique function in the community of rationality.

4. Music and words (and content, again)

Music has feelings as contents as well as music (being a form of art) is an event that occurs as form of intuition in the level of the *absolute Geist* (i.e. already in the level of mediation between objective and subjective sides of *Geist*, or, in the same sense, as sociocultural subjectivity). Therefore to music “having as content”, while it has the form of intuition, means that its content cannot be divided between an objective reference and a subject that intends to refer to the object. In intuition (following Hegel lines²⁵) there is no conscious separation or difference between the content and the subject, there is no difference between sense and reference (to use a Fregean terminology). That is the reason why Hegel affirms that the feelings (*Empfindungen*, closer to a corporeal and sensuous feeling than to emotions) are the content of music and that, at the same time, they are the “envelopment” of its content²⁶. This ambiguity in the use of the term “content” in relation to music

24 Ibid., pp. 158 – 159.

25 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §§446 – 450.

26 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp.195 – 213.

exemplifies a peculiar characteristic of music that no other art has, which is connected to the fact that it is purely interior and temporal. This is something that neither the visual arts which always involve space, nor poetry (because in some sense the word always has the possibility of referring to something external, which is not the word itself) can be. The musical sound differentiates itself from the sound of word because while the word makes possible to enter the more objective level of representation where there is a sign or a word pointing to an object, a reference, a signified, etc., music express immediately that what it signifies. Therefore, the content of music cannot be transposed in something other than itself. Even if it is possible to name the content and emotions that some specific music brings, what is said is something other than the music itself, which is what it is without possible translation. There is the peculiarity of music – interior intuition.

On the other hand, if music was indeed stuck in individual subjective interiorities, it would be dependent on pure arbitrariness. Saying that music has an immediate content means to say that music alone is not able to refer to something external to the sensible and emotional effects that it brings to light. For example, a piece of music, despite being able to be inspired by, cannot refer (without the help from words) to the French Revolution, to Napoleon, to the green of Amazon's trees, or to anything external. The possibility of music referring to something (i.e. not only intuit) is up to the arbitrary relations of the phantasy (a form of representation²⁷), which are subjective and cannot be an objective part of the content of music, or to music's relation to words. In the latter case it is not properly the music that refers to something, but the words, being music the "envelopment" of humor or the feelings related to the references and situations, in

²⁷ See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 10: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*, §§451 – 464.

which it is intended to put music. In this sense Hegel deals with music as “accompaniment”, namely the music sang with words, in which music

can only have the task, so far as music can execute it, of making the musical expression adequate to this content [*Inhalt*] which, by being contained in words, is brought to representation [*Vorstellung*] in its dearer determination [*Bestimmtheit*] and no longer remains a property of indeterminate feeling [*unbestimmteren Empfindung*]²⁸.

Despite the fact that Hegel does not deal with the issue with these words, in this case there are two contents: that which is expressed by the word (as able to make what music cannot do, namely, refer to something) and that which is expressed by music. Both music and text find themselves in a context where the feelings and sensations are essential constituents: the intention is to make it clear that this “envelopment” of the lyrics (namely, music) brings the essential element to the comprehension of communication. The words can only take a more complete meaning through the comprehension of its context not only described by words and references, but by the situation that involves the subject’s feeling and by bringing the public to a determinate position of “being the subject that feels this specific feeling” as the intention, as in the case of using music to dramatize passages and texts that could be, if read as “pure text”, felt and interpreted in diverse ways.

Hegel considers that in a musical context it is not the music that is submitted to the lyrics, as accompaniment, but the opposite: words and lyrics complement the determination and the meaning that music cannot give and, more specifically, bring the

28 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 191. Original: „[...] nur die Aufgabe haben kann, den musikalischen Ausdruck diesem Inhalt – der als *Inhalt* seiner näheren Bestimmtheit nach vor die Vorstellung gebracht ist und nicht mehr der unbestimmteren Empfindung angehörig bleibt –, soweit die Musik es vermag, gemäß zu machen.“

possibility of making reference. The words, in the accompaniment to music, give the context in which music, as an immediate processing of sensations and feelings, tries to express. That is why a specific piece of music can seem meaningful in specific non-musical contexts: it is possible to associate a determinate song or certain musical configurations to places like the forest, the city, a party, a war, and so on, not because music make reference to places, situations or events, but because these places and events also are able to create feelings, climates and sensations, which can be related to the feelings, climates or sensations that some specific songs or pieces of music express. Thus, this relation is indirect, and the words and lyrics collaborate to make these associations. Hence, it is possible to say that a song can be in accordance or not to the references made by the words and the text.

Music is the proof that those interior individual feelings can be shared, and that the situations expressed by words can cause similar feelings in different people, and even if that does not occur, the person who has different feelings in different situations would be able to understand the association between the feeling (directly expressed and configured by music) and the situation, even if this relation happens in a different manner to her. Music, therefore, being an immediate effect

masters the self in its simple self-concentration, it can for that self set limits to the roving freedom of thinking, ideas, and contemplation and to a passage beyond the specific topic [*Gehalt*] at issue because it keeps the heart firmly to one particular content [*Inhalt*], engages it in that topic, and, within this sphere, moves and occupies the feelings²⁹.

29 Ibid., p. 193. Original: „In beiden Fällen erklingt also der Inhalt für das innere Selbst, welchem die Musik, eben weil sie sich des Subjekts seiner einfachen Konzentration nach bemächtigt, nun ebenso auch die umherschweifende Freiheit des Denkens, Vorstellens, Anschauens und das Hinaussein über einen bestimmten Gehalt zu begrenzen weiß, indem sie das Gemüt in einem besonderen Inhalte festhält, es in demselben beschäftigt und in diesem Kreise die Empfindung bewegt und ausfüllt.“

Here it is possible to perceive the lack of limitation of meaning in music, its unique characteristic to produce feelings and sensations – *Empfindungen* – through sympathetic resonance with the soul and its limitation in relation to the possibility of reference³⁰. Because of this delimitation, music can be considered an incomplete singular form of art in comparison to poetry, which is able, through the use of words, to synthesize the capacities of making reference and to deal with both with the exterior and the interior from and through the interiority. Music can be considered

30 About this issue what Daniel Feige says is worth of consideration: “But means that which the artistic music realizes? Hegel’s proposal lies in the register of a sketched alternative introduced in the following manner: with the formalism (a) Hegel agrees that the understanding and the appreciation of music can only be thought starting from a reconstitution of the musical forms and in a determinate perspective where nothing remains beyond this reconstitution. Because each different or further determination would be an external determination of music. Also Hegel agrees with the theoretical substantial fraction [*gehaltstheoretischen Fraktion*] (b) that music can express something that goes beyond the musical form as he has conceived it. How can these two theses go together? They can stay together because Hegel has developed a non-formalist concept of musical form. [...] Music has then something analogous to a content [*Inhalt*], once this content cannot be conceptualized neither in the linguistic expression of the subject-matter [*Gehalt*] model nor in the qualities of presentation of figures/images [*Bildern*] model. Because also when it is not denied that music, in particular contexts and uses, is able to express contents (in the narrow sense), then it is correct to admit that it only happen in very specific cases.” (FEIGE, Daniel Martin. *Die Zeitlichkeit der Musik als Form der Zeitlichkeit des Subjekts: Hegel über Musik und Geschichte*. XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft der Philosophie 2014 Münster. *Geschichte – Gesellschaft – Geltung* 2014. In:

https://www.academia.edu/8585003/Die_Zeitlichkeit_der_Musik_als_Form_der_Zeitlichkeit_des_Subjekts_Hegel_%C3%BCber_Musik_und_Geschichte_The_Temporality_of_Music_as_the_Form_of_the_Temporality_of_the_Subject._Hegel_on_Music_and_History_.pp.04-05.

The original text: „Was aber heißt es, dass künstlerische Musik gelingt? Hegels Vorschlag lässt sich im Register der einleitend skizzierten Alternative folgendermaßen verorten: Mit dem Formalismus (a) stimmt Hegel darin überein, dass das Verstehen und die Wertschätzung von Musik nur ausgehend von einem Nachvollzug musikalischer Formen gedacht werden kann und in bestimmter Hinsicht auch in gar nichts anderem als diesem Nachvollzug besteht. Denn jede andere und weitere Bestimmung wäre eine *externe* Bestimmung der Musik. Gleichwohl stimmt er mit der gehaltstheoretischen Fraktion (b) darin überein, dass Musik etwas ausdrücken kann, was über musikalische Formen in der Weise, wie sie der Formalismus konzipiert, hinausgeht. Wie gehen beide Thesen zusammen? Sie gehen derart zusammen, dass Hegel einen *nicht-formalistischen Begriff der musikalischen Form* entwickelt. [...] Die Musik hat also durchaus etwas Analoges zu einem Inhalt, wenn auch dieser Inhalt weder nach dem Vorbild des sprachlichen Ausdrückens von Gehalten, noch nach dem Vorbild der Darstellungsqualitäten von Bildern zu begreifen ist. Denn auch dann, wenn man nicht bestreiten muss, dass Musik in besonderen Kontexten und Verwendung durchaus Gehalte im engeren Sinne ausdrücken kann, so ist es sicher so, dass das sicher nur in sehr speziellen Fällen geschieht.“

an earlier stage from the logical-phenomenological point of view because the sense of poetry only realizes itself when both the visual arts and music are comprehended³¹. In regards to the place of music in Hegel's system of singular arts, singular arts are singular and sensible modes of expression of the idea of art. It worth considering that the whole of singular arts forms a coherent totality³², which must be considered when attempting to comprehend what art is in its philosophical treatment [*wissenschaftliche Betrachtung*]³³. Despite that, each one of the singular forms of art fulfills a role in the historical and phenomenological development both of art and *Geist*. That is why the meaning of poetry presupposes an understanding of those elements exposed by the other singular arts. However, from this does not follow that there exists a chronology of the singular forms of art. This phenomenological presupposition involves a relation with the *Geist's* self-consciousness development, thus dealing with the role of each singular form of art in accordance to its place in this process of *Geist's* revealing and self-reflexion.

5. Conclusion

Music has its specific role, which cannot be substituted by any other singular form of art. Despite that, poetry is considered a “superior”, as well as a “posterior” form of art. However, this does leads to neither aesthetic superiority, nor chronological posteriority, of poetry. Despite music having a specific role in the system of arts, naturally it cannot satisfy all of *Geits's* necessities. Music finds its limits, and beyond them is the function of

31 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 224.

32 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 14: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik II*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp. 245 – 265.

33 See HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 13: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik I*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, pp. 13 – 40.

conducting *Geist's* way as another form of art, or yet religion, or philosophy. Still, the suppression of music does not mean its substitution. It follows only that what music expresses must be already understood in order to poetry to realize itself, bringing something new. This passage, as many others in Hegel's philosophy, does not involve an absolute negation of that which comes "before", but only the categorization of a "set", where some elements are presupposed to others to be possible, as well as the necessity of derivation of other new elements or new "ways of doing" the completion of the process. This is valid to both the relationship between the singular arts and the *absolute Geist's* forms of expression, namely art, religion and philosophy.

While aesthetics are also connected to the mode of apprehension and affection, and music is this formation of the soul itself in its interiority, would music not be a closer and more intimate expression of *Geist's* aesthetic formation due to its lack of any "objective content", i.e. reference to contents external to the *aisthesis*? Would that not present a limit of the concept, a limit to philosophy?

It possible to think about that argument in the following manner: if *Geist's* aesthetic mode transforms itself and if that which changes in *Geist* is always essential (assuming that *Geist's* configuration is the most effective truth, and that everything that it expresses and apprehends is in itself and for itself and, thus, not only the mere subjectivity, but also something posited in an objective manner and effective through its recognition as well) and if this form of expression and self-apprehension changes (in the sense that music itself changes in history – both the composition and the modes of apprehension, or the listening, change) and then also if music does not complete itself only with the composition of the work, but as Hegel "it is carried only by the interior [*Inneren*] and the subjective and is to exist only to the subjective interior

[*das subjektive Innere*]³⁴, then it must be concluded that it is not possible that art can be overcome in its capacity of capturing and producing truths. If the *absolute Geist* is the objective creation and manifestation of a social group subjectivity, then music is the self-intuition of societal interiority.

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34 HEGEL, G. W. F. *Werke 15: Vorlesung über die Ästhetik III*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990, p. 136.

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